ISSN 1829 - 4286
Armenian Journal of Political Science
1 201 7
Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences
Center of Pe r spective Researches and Initiatives ARJPS published in the framework of Project “Center of Perspective Researches and Initiatives ” of the Scientific State Committee (Ministry of Education and Science, RA)
E DITORIAL B OARD Tigran Toro syan (Editor) Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences , Armenia Sergiu Chelak Romanian Institute of International Studies, Romania Yuri Gasparyan Armenian State Pedagogical University Jerzy Jaskiernia Jan Kochanowski University, Kiel ce, Poland Malkhaz Matsaberidze Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University , Georgia Andrey Medushevsky National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Russia Sergey Minasyan Caucasus Institute , Armenia Karlen Mirumyan Brusov State Universi ty of Languages and Social Sciences , Armenia Anna Ohanyan Stonehill College, USA Rainer Schulze University of Essex, United Kingdom Irina Semenenko Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the RAS, Russia Levon Shirinyan Armenian Sta te Pedagogical University Victor Soghomonyan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences , Armenia Albert Stepanyan Yerevan State University , Armenia Petra Stykow Ludwig - Maximilians Universit ät M ü n c h en , Germany Talin Ter Minasian INALCO , France Levon Ze k i y an Venetian Institute of Oriental Studies, Italy
ISSN 1829 - 4286 © Center of Pe r spective Researches and Initiatives , 201 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TO THE AUTHORS OF ARJPS 4
NEW WORLD ORDER: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS Tigran Torosyan, Grigor Arshakyan Geopolitical Aspect of Russian - Turkish Relations: Rivalry or 5 Cooperation? Malkhaz Matsaberidze Peculiarities of F oreign Policy Orientation of Georgia’s Ethnic 29 Minorities
POST - SOVIET TRANSFORMATIO N Anna Khvorostiankina ‘Constitutional Identity’ in the Context of Post - Soviet Transformation, Europeanization and Regional Integration Processes. t he case of 45 A rmenia Andrey Medushevsky Constitutional Transformations in Post - Soviet Region: Results of 81 Previous Studies
CONFLICT RESOLUTION Aram Terzyan From Natural Allies to Belligerent Neig h bours: The Evolution of Foes’ 113 Conceptions in Armenia’s Foreign Policy Discourse Rajkumar Singh Fault Lines of Pakistan’s Baluchistan Policy 1 31
TO THE AUTHORS OF ARJPS
The Armenian Journal of Political Science (ARJPS) strives to publish scholarly research of exceptional merit, focusing on important issues (in particular, Post - Soviet Transformation, State - Building, Democratisation and Human Rights, Conflict Reso lution , Recon - ciliation Processes, National Identity and International Integration, New World Order, South Caucasus in the Geopolitical Struggle etc.) and demonstrating the highest standards of excellence in conceptuali s ation, exposition and methodology. A uthors must demonstrate how their analysis illuminates a significant research problem, or answer an important research question, of general interest on political science. Authors must strive for a presentation that will be understandable to as many scholar s as possible, consistent with the nature of their material. The ARJPS publishes original works. Therefore, authors sh o uld not submit articles containing tables, figures, or substantial amounts of text that have already been published o r are forthcoming in other places, or that have been included in other manuscripts su b mitted for review to book publishers or periodical (including on - line journals). All submitted articles are subject to a rigorous peer review process, based on initial editor screening and double - blind refereeing by a minimum of two referees.
Address : Yerevan, Toumanyan 42, YSULS , Room 202 Tel: 010 530272 - 208 , 091402731 E - mail: [email protected] www.arjps.org
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 5
NEW W ORLD ORDER: REGI O NAL DEVELOPMENTS DOI : 10.19266/1829 - 4286 - 201 7 - 0 1 - 05 - 28 Geopolitical Aspect of Russian - Turkish Relations: Rivalry or Cooperation?
TIGRAN TOROSYAN Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences , Armenia
GRIGOR ARSHAKYAN Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences , Armenia
The article discusses the features of the Russian - Turkish relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the context of geopolitical riv alry in the South Caucasus. It particularly focuses on the processes taking place after the Five - Day War between Russia and Georgia. The clashes of interests of both parties are most clearly manifested in the two most troubled regions of the Eurasian Heart land – the South Caucasus and the Middle East. The Russian - Turkish relations are distinguished by the unusual combinations and alternation of rivalry and cooperation. In a new era it is best illustrated with regard to the flows and routes of energy resourc es towards Europe. Over the last decade, both countries face difficulties in international relations and, as a hundred years ago, they try to overcome them cooperating/competing in the framework of the projects of mutual interests.
Keywords Turkey, Russi a, Middle East, South Caucasus, Caspian basin, energy resources, rivalry, cooperation
Introduction
The Russian - Turkish relations stand out in international bilateral relations for their sharp fluctuations, the most unusual combinations and alternation of cooperation and rivalry. This is due to a highly specific foreign policy run by both states and the clash of their interests in the two 6 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan most active regions of the Eurasian Heartland 1 – the South Caucasus and the Middle East. The peculiarities of this relat ionship, characterized by a three - hundred - year history, have the most striking manifestations during the geopolitical realignments, the latter of which started after the collapse of the USSR. At the beginning of the 90s, when Russia was facing numerous cha llenges conditioned by the post - Soviet transformation, Ankara considered that a favorable situation was created in the South Caucasus and Central Asia to fill the vacuum of foreign influence caused by the collapse of the USSR and to make these regions the zones of its influence 2 . However, very soon Turkey realized that the accomplishment of this goal was unrealistic due to several reasons, and it sought to ensure a new role in the region in another way. The beginning of the 90s marked a great interest of th e West towards the energy resources of Azerbaijan and, in general, the Caspian basin. Ankara managed to block the transportation of these resources through the territory of Russia, setting new requirements for the energy supply through its straits. Meanwhi le, the United States and the European countries obviously opted for the route bypassing Russia. The result was that in a given situation the only potential route to transfer the energy resources of that region was through the territories of Azerbaijan, Ge orgia and Turkey. In 2005 Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and in 2006 Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline were implemented based on the agreements signed in the mid 90s. It seemed that there were real opportunities for the accomplishment of the goals set out in 1998 Declaration on the transfer of the Caspian basin and the Central Asian oil resources to the international markets through the Baku - Ceyhan pipeline, signed by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Ankara hoped that th e unequivocal support of the United States and the EU countries to the project will not only guarantee its success, but will turn to a decisive factor for the qualitative increase of Turkey’s role in the Eurasian Heartland. To this end Turkey tried to use both the fact of being the only transit country for
1 Mackinder H., The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal, 1904, 23; Mackinder H., Democratic Ideals and Reality , London: Constable and Company, 1919. 2 Torosy an T., The Return of Turkey , Russia in Global Affairs, 2009, 3, July - September, 120 - 129.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 7 transferring the energy resources to Europe in near future, and its significant impact on Azerbaijan – one of the donor countries of that project. However, things developed in a different direction. Since the early 2000s, due to several factors the tensions have been steadily growing in two parts of the Eurasian Heartland – the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Russia managed to cope with the internal political tensions, to consolidate its power, and it started to openly manifest its aspirations of acquiring a growing role in international relations. While the United States did not give up its goal of establishing a unipolar world order, the EU tried to find opportunities for the increase of the energy im port volumes and diversification of transport routes and energy sources. As a result, on the one hand the transportation of the Caspian basin and the Central Asian energy resources becomes a tool of geopolitical rivalry, and the hostage of the clash of geo political interests on the other. The Russian - Turkish relations bear a clear impact of these tensions and the exotic combinations of the rivalry - cooperation elements typical to them most clearly manifest the process developments. The situation has been fur ther complicated due to a new hotspot in the Middle East, which sidelined the other regional issues with its scope, variety of foreign actors (including the US, Russia and Turkey) and the potential unforeseen consequences. In terms of the subject matter of the article, it is necessary to examine not only the region in its wider scope, issues of energy resources transportation to Europe, the engagement of powerful actors in the processes and the serious clashes of their interests, but also the features of th e policy they pursue.
Prerequisites for the formation of new geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus
Due to the lack of the agreement among the littoral states on the use of the Caspian Sea, as well as the preventive measures arising from the geopo litical aspirations of Russia since the early 2000s, the project of the transportation of the Caspian energy resources started with BTC and BTE has not been further processed as a result of entirely new regional developments. Following the NATO and EU enla rgements, the Black Sea became the Eastern frontier of Europe and its significance for NATO 8 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan highly increased. Despite strong Russian objections, both Ukraine and Georgia have clearly expressed their willingness to become the future EU and NATO members. On the one hand, Russia was trying to firm up its grip over the Black Sea region, on the other the United States and NATO sought to increase their influence in this turbulent, yet highly strategic region 3 . The elimination of dividing buffer zones made the cla shes inevitable. Moscow’s position was precisely formulated in Putin’s speech at 2007 Munich Conference on security policy 4 . He announced that Moscow will not accept any attempt of unipolar world order formation, particularly those of the US aimed at acqui ring a new role in international relations. The speech had a symbolic meaning in terms of a new stage of the Russian - American rivalry within the new world order formation, which later led to harsh confrontations, sanctions and indirect clashes 5 . This had a serious impact both on the bilateral relations of the countries seeking dominance in the South Caucasus and the Middle East, and on further developments in these regions. The impact is particularly noticeable with regard to the Russian - Turkish relations. On the one hand Ankara uses the decades - long partnership with the United States to achieve its goals, on the other – the possibilities of cooperation with Russia. Turkey’s president R. T. Erdogan formulated Ankara’s ambition in the following way “America is our ally and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We are obtaining two - thirds of our energy from Russia. We act in accordance to our national interests. We cannot ignore Russia” 6 . Of course, in the pas t Russia also had occasions to make sure that Turkey opts for tactical measures with the intention of getting maximum benefit from given situations. Moscow probably considers it as a possibility of combining interests with Ankara yielding a large part of i ts tactical interests with the
3 Öniş Z., Yılmaz Ş., Turkey and Russia in a shifting global order: cooperation, conflict and asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region, Third World Quarterly , 201 5 , 37 , 1, p. 13. 4 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the 43 rd Munich Conference on Security Policy”, 10 February 2007, http:globalsecurity.org/…/2007/putin - munich_070210.htm . 5 Torosyan T., Vardanyan A., The South Caucasus Conflicts in the Context of Struggle for the Eurasian Heartland, Geopolitics , 2015, 20 , 3, 559 - 582. 6 Aras B., Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, 2009, 11 , 3, p. 137.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 9 expectation of having strategic outcomes. Moreover, due to the sanctions of the West following the crisis in Ukraine, Moscow does not have much option in the field of international cooperation. Turkey has an important place w ithin a limited scope of Russia’s partner countries. It is clear that in the last stage of new world order formation both Russia and Turkey are not only doomed to delicate maneuvering between cooperation and harsh rivalry but sometimes have to use drastic measures.
New Geopolitical Situation in the South Caucasus
Immediately after the Five - Day War between Russia and Georgia, Turkey blocked the access of US warships to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits 7 . The official explanation was strongly diplo matic. The US is trying to revise the provisions of the Montreux Convention which is unacceptable for Turkey. However, the problem was not Turkey’s “full commitment” to the Convention, but its opposing to its chief ally in favor of its chief rival. While s ome Turkish experts were trying to represent this as an escape from dangerous confrontation with Russia 8 , in fact it was obviously a favorable step towards Russia 9 . It is no coincidence that the West sharply criticized this act accusing Turkey of betraying NATO and backing Russia 10 . However, a few days later Turkey made the second similar step. On August 12, 2008 Turkey’s Prime - Minister Erdogan visited Moscow and suggested the creation of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform with the inclusion of three recognized states of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) as well as Russia and Turkey 11 . Obviously such an initiative
7 Aras B., Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional Partnership, SETA Policy Bri ef, 2009, 35, p. 8; Morrison D., Turkey restricts US access to the Black Sea, 18.10.2008, www.david - morrison.co.uk . 8 Özel S., Şuhnaz Y., Turkish – American Relations for a New Era: A Turkish Perspective, TÜSİAD Report , İstanbul, April 2009, p. 73. 9 Öniş Z. , Yılmaz Ş., Op. cit. 10 Baran Z. , Will Turkey Abandon NATO?, The Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121997087258381935.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. 11 Devrim D., Schulz E., The Caucasus: Which Role for Turkey in the European Neighborhood?, Insight Turkey , 2009, 11 , 3, 177 - 193; Çelikpala M., Türkiye ve 10 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan would not have been possible for the near future in particular given the Russian - Georgian and the Armenian - Azerbaijani bilateral relations. It is hard to believe that this has not been realized in Ankara. The sense of this initiative, failed shortly after it was introduced, was completely different. Erdogan has not only openly announced about this initiative without discus sing it in advance with the US, but it has not even considered the participation of Washington in suggested platform. Even given the lack of the prospects for the Platform implementation, Turkey’s step was a significant support to Russia. It became the sub ject of harsh criticism of the West due to geopolitical ambitions and the Five Day War between Russia and Georgia. This gave rise to a dramatic improvement of the Russian - Turkish relations manifested not only by a significant increase in the frequency of h igh - level state visits 12 , signing of more than forty agreements on trade and economic relations 13 and the perspective of increasing the trade turnover between two countries to $ 100 billion in 2020 14 , but also by a new level of cooperation in the field of ene rgy. It was marked both by multi - billion finance programs, and by its strategic importance. Of particular importance are the agreements on the joint implementation of the projects regarding the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Turkey, Samsu n - Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Stream gas pipeline 15 . Still, the Russian - Turkish relations are not regarded as “strategic partnership”, though it is considered that they are
Kafkasya: Reaksiyoner Dış Politikadan Proaktif Ritmik Diplomasiye Geçiş, Uluslararası İlişkiler , 7 , 25, 93 - 126. 12 Özbay F., The Relations between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 2011, 16 , 3, p. 77, Kolobov O., A. Kornilov, Middle East Policy of Russia Under President Medvedev: Strategies, Institutes, Faces, Bilge Strateji, 2011, 2 , 4, p. 30 ; Weitz R., Russia - Turkey Energy Ties: Coo peration with Conflict, DIPLOMAATIA , September 2012, No. 109, http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/russia - turkey - energy - ties - cooperation - with - conflict/ . 13 Ibid. 14 Turetskiy premyer: tovarooborot s Rossiei vyrastet do 100mlrd dollarov k koncu desyatiletiy a 22.11.2013, http://fedpress.ru/news/polit_vlast/news_polit/1385117429 - turetskii - premer - tovarooborot - s - rossiei - vyrastet - do - 100 - mlrd - dollarov - k - kontsu - desyatilet . 15 Raufoglu A., Turkey, Russia at Odds over Middle East, Caucasus, Foreign Policy, 03.06. 201 2, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/06/03/turkey - russia - at - odds - over - middle - east - caucasus/ .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 11 in a “strategic dimension” in the field of energy 16 . Meanwhile, the latter does not imply the absence of problems in that sphere especially given the mismatch of the objectives of the two countries. Russia is aimed to increase Turkey's dependence on the Russian gas thereby preventing the construction of pipelines passing from the Cen tral Asia and the Caspian basin that are not under Moscow’s control. In its turn, Ankara is seeking to diversify its sources of energy supplies and to become the largest transit corridor from these regions to Europe. To this end, Turkey is trying to best u se the rivalry between Russia and the EU. The latter has actively supported the idea of the pipeline construction projects (first of all, the “Nabucco” gas pipeline) regarding the transfer of energy resources from the South Caucasus and Central Asia to Eur ope bypassing Russia 17 . Turkey similarly wanted to play a significant role in this project. It is no coincidence that the intergovernmental agreement on the construction of the pipeline was signed in Ankara on July 13, 2009, when the discussions started ove r Turkey’s participation in the Russian “South Stream” project – an alternative to “Nabucco”. Although Russia reacted harshly to the signing of the Agreement, Russian Energy Minister S. Shmatko cautioned against planning for an energy future without Russia recalling one the most famous Russian expressions “Don’t sell the skin of a bear before you kill it” 18 . However, it affected the Russian - Turkish relations in no way. The situation in the Eurasian Heartland gained new quality and the prospects for the fut ure developments significantly changed due to an unprecedented and irrevocable strengthening of the US presence in the region (in Georgia), EU’s active regional involvement, the Russian - Turkish rapprochement and the exacerbation of the Syrian conflict. To get the maximum benefit from these multi - vector processes, Turkey had
16 Özbay F., Türkiye - Rusya İlişkileri: Stratejik Ortaklık Mı?, Hasret Çomak (ed.), 21. Yüzyılda Çağdaş Türk Dış Politikası ve Diplomasisi, Kocaeli, Umuttepe Yayınları, 2011, pp. 301 - 312. 17 Roberts J. M., The Black Sea and European energy security, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2006, 6 , 2, 207 - 223; Kardas S., Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6, 134, 14.07.2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35262&no_cache=1 #.V1FFtjV97cs ) ; Freifeld D., T he great pipeline opera , Foreign Policy, 22. 08.2009, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/08/22/the - great - pipeline - opera/ . 18 Freifeld D., Op. cit. 12 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan to maneuver carefully with balanced rapprochements and not irreversible disruption of relations keeping the necessary distance from all (the US, the EU, Russia). In this regard, one coul d have been expected that Turkey will show Russia and the others that any new situation requires new bargaining in one of the most critical situations for the West. It happened in the UN Security Council during the voting on a draft resolution to impose sa nctions on Syria, when Turkey joined the West and the League of Arab States entering into a confrontation with Russia 19 . However, according to Ayyub, this does not mean that Turkey will return to its traditional strategic dependence from the US and its alli es – the approach defining Turkey’s foreign policy during the Cold War and the first decade of the Post - Soviet era. He considers that under the Justice and Development Party Turkey was striving for a strategic autonomy of the country as well as for greater engagement in the Middle East. Meanwhile, it realizes that such a policy should not undermine its relations with NATO and the US 20 .
The impact of energy supply routes on the formation of new geopolitical situation
Although the trade and economic relation s between Russian and Turkey were developing in almost every direction, including construction (the total cost of the projects carried out by the Turkish construction companies between 1989 and 2014 amounted to more than 61.7 billion dollars 21 ), banking (in September 2012, Russian Sberbank acquired 99.85% of Denizbank for 3.5 billion dollars 22 ), tourism (about 4.5 million Russian tourists visited Turkey in 2014 23 due to which Turkey's revenues
19 Arbatova N., Moskva i Ankara v mnogopolyarnom mire, voenno - promyshlenniy kurier , № 26 (443), 04.07.2012, http://vpk - news.ru/articles/9018 . 20 Ibid. 21 Torgovo - ekonomicheskie otnosheniya Turcii i Rossii, 16.03.2016, http://moscow.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=220069 . 22 Bozbay B., Topanoğlu E., Turkey: Commercial Relations betwee n Turkey and the Russian Federation, 20 June 2014, http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/321956/international+trade+investment/Commerc ial+Relations+Between+Turkey+And+The+Russian+Federation . 23 Öniş Z., Yılmaz Ş., Op. Cit.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 13 amounted to about 7 billion dollars 24 ) etc. The energy field is of p articular importance for both countries. Energy export volumes and costs are crucial in the formation of the Federal budget of Russia. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), to ensure the growth rates of the socio - economic development of recen t years it will be necessary to provide oil reserves exceeding 237 million tons in 2030 25 . It may seem that the interests of both countries coincide in that field, particularly given the fact that Russia ensures 29% of Turkey’s oil resources and Turkey rece ives 63% of its natural gas via the Russian “Blue Stream” pipeline. The foreign political component of this sector is no less important than its internal economic importance. Moreover, it is the foreign political component that conditions the clash of inte rests between Russia and Turkey in this particular field. Energy export is one of the key tools of foreign and security policy 26 . Moscow is trying to regain its status of superpower using energy diplomacy, as was the case with the Soviet Union 27 . But today i t is a more difficult task. As compare to the USSR, today’s Russia does not incorporate two hydrocarbon - rich regions – the Caspian basin and the Central Asia. To ensure its geopolitical influence, Russia needs to control the oil and gas export routes from these regions to international markets. To this end, Moscow should address two problems – the establishment of the appropriate relations with the countries having these reserves and the neutralization of the EU aspirations to meet the energy demands and to diversify the energy supply sources and routes emerged as a result of the formation of independent states in these regions. To address this problem, the EU has two more options – energy imports from the Arab states or Iran. However, the increase of tensio ns in the Middle East, the Syrian crisis, as well as the ambiguous prospects for the full normalization of
24 V Turcii ocenili vozmojnye ubytki ot ro ssiiskikh sankciy v 20 milliardov dollarov, 30.11.2015, https://lenta.ru/news/2015/11/30/turk/. 25 Shangaraev R. N., Vzaimodeystvie Rossii i Turcii v sfere energetiki, Turciya: novye realii vo vnutrenney politike i uchastie v regionalnikh geopoliticheskikh processakh, MGIMO Universitet, 2014, p. 243. 26 Blank S., Russian energy and Russian security, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations , 2011, 12 , 1, 173 - 188. 27 Ozkan G., Post - Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy in the Caspian Region within the Context of Pipeline Geopolitics and Geoeconomics, International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, 2015, 5 , 7, p. 635. 14 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan relations with Iran almost excludes the use of these options in the near future. However, Russia faced another serious problem after the collapse of the USSR. Belarus and, in particular, Ukraine, which the pipelines to Europe are stretched through, are trying to get benefits from the Russia - EU rivalry/“cooperation” in the field of energy. Although the construction of the “North Stream” pipeline provide d some alternative, to fully address the problem it was necessary to build a new pipeline in the southern direction for the transfer of the Russian gas. On the one hand, it would meet a growing demand of the European states, on the other hand it would stro ngly weaken the political significance of the pipelines passing through Ukraine and Belarus. To this end, it is planned to build the “South Stream” pipeline which is to unite the coast of Russia to that of Bulgaria under the Black Sea, from where the Russi an gas is to be transferred to the European states 28 . Meanwhile, Russia regarded this pipeline as an alternative to the pipelines (“Nabucco”, “Trans - Adriatic”(TAP), “Trans - Anatolian” (TANAP), “Turkey - Greece - Italy) proposed within the “Southern Gas Corridor” 29 and, in particular, the largest one of them – “Nabucco” 30 . Russia believed that the “Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan” oil pipeline undermined its influence on the settlement of the issues related to the Caspian oil resources. The implementation of “Nabucco” may have the same impact in the field of the natural gas. This is the reason why Moscow tried not only to build an alternative gas pipeline but also to activate talks on the transfer of the Azerbaijani gas, thereby seeking to deprive “Nabucco” from its only real so urce in the near future 31 . The normalization of relations with Turkey created new opportunities for Russia to pass the “South Stream” through the Black Sea coastal areas of this country. In December 2011, the Turkish
28 Watkins E., Russia to build South Stream natural gas pipeline via Turkey, Oil & Gas Journal, 01.09.2012, http://www.ogj.com/a rticles/print/vol - 110/issue - 1a/general - interest/russia - to - build - south.html . 29 Sartori N., The European Commission’s Policy Towards the Southern Gas Corridor: Between National Interests and Economic Fundamentals, Istituto Affari Internazionali , IAI Working Papers 1201, 2012, pp. 6 - 7. 30 Roberts J. M., Op. cit. 31 Cohen A., Azerbaijan and U.S. Interests in the South Caucasus: Twenty Years after Independence, The Geopolitical Scene of the Caucasus: A Decade of Perspectives: Edited by Diba Nigâr Göksel & Zaur Sh iriyev , İstanbul, 2013, p. 61.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 15
Government allowed the Russian company “Gazprom” to start the construction of the pipeline 32 . İt was due to Moscow’s expected support from Turkey to realize the “Samsun - Ceyhan” oil pipeline project and the falling of the Russian gas prices 33 . Later on, it acquired an exceptional importance in transporting the Russian gas to the Southern Europe. R ussia - US geopolitical rivalry reached its peak when following the overthrow of Yanukovych, the President of Ukraine, the new government clearly formulated its strong pro - Western stance, and Russia initiated drastic measures among the Russian - speaking and p ro - Russian population of the Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine promoting secessionist aspirations to escape further irrevocable developments. When the latter led to armed clashes, the United States and later the EU imposed harsh sanctions on Russia. Russia’s annexation of Crimea strengthens its positions in the Black Sea region which is also considered to be the zone of Turkey’s interests where it plays an important role. Still, though Turkey announced that it supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, it did not express strong criticism towards Russia. According to Demirtas, “Turkey will not risk its relations with Russia for the Crimea” 34 . Moreover, Ankara has not joined the US and the EU sanctions against Russia due to the crisis in Ukraine. Turkey’s Fore ign Minister M. Cavusoglu noted that Turkey did not want to join the EU sanctions against Russia highlighting that Moscow is Turkey’s important trade partner. He also urged the other EU states to be “realistic” and try to understand what they can do withou t the Russian gas, noting that “each state should consider its own interests” 35 . Zeybekci, Turkey’s Minister of
32 Watkins E., Op. cit.; Okumuş O., Russia Winner in Energy Transit Deal With Turkey, 10.07.2013, http://www.al - monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2013/07/russia - turkey - energy - cooperation - south - stream.html . 33 Raufoglu A., Op. cit. 34 Demirtas S., Turkiye, Kirim’da Rusya ile iliskilerini riske atmayacak, BBC Turkce , 15.03.2014, www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2014/03/140315_kirim_turkiye.shtml . 35 Turkey Refuses to Join Anti - Russia EU Sanctions for Economic Reasons, 11.02.2015, http://spu tniknews.com/politics/20150211/1018132862.html. 16 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan
Finance gave more accurate assessment stating that the current crisis between Moscow, the US and the EU is a real opportunity for Ankara 36 . It may seem that the use of sanctions against Russia and, in particular, the joining of the EU to this was rather favorable for “Nabucco” in terms of the competition with the “South Stream”. Due to this, Brussels asked its member states not to participate in the construction of the “South Stream” project. Bulgaria announced that it was withdrawing from the project (the European section of the pipeline should have run through Bulgaria), and it seemed that Moscow appeared in a hopeless situation. It would have both economic (several years and significant financial resources have been spent for project preparation), and political losses (Russia would lose an important lever to influence the Ukrainian issue). Nevertheless, during his visit to Ankara at the end of 2014 , President Putin introduced the only realistic solution to that complex problem. He announced that Russia would abandon the "South Stream" project and instead initiate a new “Turkish Stream” project 37 . Certainly, it is not an entirely new project, since it proposes to transport all the gas intended for the “South Stream” project (63 billion cubic meters) via the starting point of the same route, i.e. through the gas pipeline under the Black Sea; and to sell it to Turkey. Europe will have to buy that gas fro m Ankara, since Russia has nothing to offer to the European countries purchasing significant portion of their gas reserves from Moscow. Meanwhile, there will be no serious ground behind purchasing gas from Turkey. In April 2015, the foreign ministers of Tu rkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary discussed in Budapest their countries participation in the “Turkish Stream” project; and all five approved it. However it was soon followed by strong pressures. Hahn, the European Commissioner for European Neighb orhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, announced that Turkey’s attacks on the European countries regarding the issue of the Armenian Genocide are
36 Michalopoulos S., Greece accuses Turkey of exploiting Russian EU Food Ban, 11.08.2014, http://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture - food/news/greece - accuses - turkey - of - exploiting - russian - eu - food - ban . 37 Bierma n S., Arkhipov I. , Mazneva E., Putin Scraps South Stream Gas Pipeline after EU Pressure, Bloomberg , 02.12.2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014 - 12 - 01/putin - halts - south - stream - gas - pipeline - after - pressure - from - eu. html.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 17 only complicating Turkey’s accession to the EU 38 . The resolution adopted by the European Parliament on the anniversary of the Armenian Genocide also comes to prove the EU’s hardening attitude towards Ankara 39 . According to Hochstein, the US State Department’s special envoy, during the talks with Lafazanis, the Minister of Productive Reconstruction, Environment and Energy of Greece, the latter announced that the “Turkish Stream” is undesirab le for the US. He advised Greece to abandon that project and to focus on TAP 40 . Greece may also be offered to participate in the construction of TANAP based on the agreement signed by the presidents of Turkey and Azerbaijan on June 26, 2012. According to th e project, 16 billion cubic meters of gas will be transferred via this pipeline from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz - 2 gas field to Turkey, of which 6 billion to be expired in Turkey and the rest – exported to Europe. This pipeline can not obviously meet the deman ds of Europe, and it is only aimed to save the reputation of Europe in the context of presenting the “Southern Gas Corridor” as an important component of the EU energy security. Later on, Yildiz, the Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, reiter ated once again Turkey’s commitment to the “Trans - Anatolian” and “Trans - Adriatic” projects (the basic elements of the “Southern Gas Corridor”), as well as to the Turkish - Russian energy cooperation 41 . TANAP did not face Russia’s confrontation as was the case with Nabucco due to its limited capacity. The government of Greece considers the “Turkish Stream” to be beneficial for the country, and it will make efforts for its
38 EU Commissioner . Turkey’s Reac tion over Armenian Genocide may Complicate EU Ambitions, available at https://news.am/eng/news/264682.html , 30.04.2015 39 Armenian genocide centenary: MEPs urge Turkey and Armenia to normalize relations, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news - room/cont ent/20150413IPR41671/html/Armenian - genocide - centenary - MEPs - urge - Turkey - and - Armenia - to - normalize - relations , (15.04.2015). 40 US urges Athens to focus on TAP, not Turkish Stream, http://www.infobalkans.com/2015/05/08/us - urges - athens - focus - tap - not - turkish - str eam , (14.05.2015). 41 Peker E., Russia, Turkey Complete Initial Turk Stream Gas Pipeline Talks, The Wall Street Journal , 11.12.2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia - turkey - complete - initial - turk - stream - gas - pipeline - talks - 1418288422. 18 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan implementation 42 . Considering the financial and economic complex situation in Greece, it c an be assumed that this country will be more determined than Bulgaria which easily abandoned the “South Stream”. However, the failure of “Nabucco” was also due to the inaccurate assessments of its starting point 43 . The project developers did not take into a ccount three major factors regarding the transportation of energy resources: the coordination possibilities of the actual amount of resources of donor countries, geographical and political realities. Otherwise, they will clear out that Azerbaijan have smal l reserves to meet the EU needs in near future. According to forecasts, between 2006 and 2030 the import volumes of natural gas will be increased by 87% 44 . The possibilities of transporting the Central Asia’s rich gas resources to Europe through the territo ry of Azerbaijan are rather hypothetic given the ambiguity of the Caspian Sea status. Moreover, there are no restrictions related to the volumes or routes for transferring these reserves to the East. The transportation possibilities of Iran’s rich resourc es are too vague in near future due to ambiguous relations with the West, Azerbaijan and Turkey. In addition, Turkey pursues strongly pragmatic foreign policy with regard to a particular problem and a particular situation. The current situation seems to be very promising for official Ankara in terms of becoming a major corridor for the transportation of energy resources. Moscow could obviously play a key role here as a guarantor of gas transportation via the “Turkish Stream” to the European border. This e xplains a series of pro - Russian steps made by Ankara in a new geopolitical situation since 2008, in particular, the refusal to join the anti - Russian sanctions imposed by the West as well as the creation of a unique opportunity for Russia regarding the cons truction of the “Turkish Stream”.
42 Amerika pryamo zaya vilo chto ne khochet uchastiya Grecii v “Tureckom potoke”, www.regnum.ru/news/1923051.html . 43 Torosyan T., Arshakyan G., Turkey’s Modern Foreign Policy: New Challenges and New Opportunities, Armenian Journal of Political Science, 2015, 2, 73 - 90. 44 Söderbe rgh B., Jakobsson K., Aleklett K., European energy security: An analysis of future Russian natural gas production and exports, Energy Policy , 2010, 38 , 12, 7827 - 7843.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 19
The impact of geopolitical factor on the transportation possibilities of energy resources
R. Erdogan, the President of Turkey, inspired by the perspectives of the “Turkish Stream” proposed the creation of Russia - Turkey - I ran alliance thereby drastically changing the geopolitical situation in the Middle East given the new developments related to the gas fields in this region. Together with Qatar Iran initiated the producing of gas from the “North Pars”, the world’s largest gas field 45 . The prospects become more complete while regarding the significant gas reserves found in the offshore areas of Cyprus, Lebanon and particularly, Israel. These countries are seeking to export gas to Europe in near future, which can be accomplish ed in two ways. The first possible route is through the Turkish territory, reaching under the Mediterranean Sea to Cyprus, then to Greece, finally by land to Europe. Ankara has several arguments in favor of running these streams through its territory, i.e. the unresolved conflict of Cyprus, the financial and economic complex situation in Greece, etc. Still, there are serious challenges on the Turkish path as well. The regulation of huge flows of energy supplies requires adequate financial and political res ources. In terms of the first, the above - mentioned trilateral alliance, suggested by Erdogan, is rather promising. However, the relevant “price” should be paid for its realization. Russia will never agree to the transit of the Iranian gas through TANAP whi ch will create an alternative to the Russian gas for Europe. Therefore, Ankara should solve the problem of interest clashes with Azerbaijan since the importance of the latter for Europe may grow in case of transporting the Iranian gas through TANAP. The tr ansit of Israeli gas is possible through the restoration of cooperation with that country removing from the special relationship with the Muslim world. Turkey has not only future but also present challenges. Although the Syrian crisis has no direct connec tion with the issues related to the transfer of the energy resources, it may be a powerful geopolitical factor undermining the cooperation.
45 Stanislav Tarasov, Stanet li Putin Leninom, a Erdogan - Ataturkom, www.regnum.ru/news/1 872663.html . 20 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan
The Syrian crisis is important for Turkey in two dimensions. First, to solve its own problems, on the one hand Turke y is looking for the opportunities to strengthen its positions as a Middle Eastern regional “superpower”, on the other hand, it tends to suppress any manifestation of the Kurdish self - determination 46 . Meanwhile, considering the tough geopolitical clashes of interests between Russian and the US in Syria, Turkey needs to demonstrate more flexibility in order to avoid complaints from both parties. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Turkey runs an explicit anti - Assad policy strongly supporting the anti - Assad forces, including the “Islamic State” terrorist group, as well as conducting propaganda and diplomatic struggle against official Damascus 47 . The Western officials often blame Ankara that it acknowledges, allows and even with the help of the Turkish sp ecial agencies supports the penetration of armed terrorists and the weapons sent to them through Turkey to Syria 48 . Russia's interest in Syria also has several dimensions. After the collapse of the USSR, it is the first time that Russia plays an important role in the processes taking place far from its borders and bearing exceptional importance using its military forces. Therefore, the success is particularly important for Moscow in terms of its self - affirmation and its ambitions to become one of the major players in international arena. According to the official position, Russia perceives the strengthening of the radical groups and the perspective of statehood fall in Syria as a real threat to Russia and the post - Soviet neighbor states. Russia considers Ass ad's government to be legitimate and tries to accomplish its goals backing the government of Syria. Turkey and Russia obviously have conflicting ambitions in the Middle East. However, at the initial phase of the Syrian crisis, the Turkish - Russian high - leve l bilateral relations
46 Markedonov S., Rossiysko - tureckie otnosheniya i problemy bezopasnosti Kavkazskogo regiona, 30.05.2016, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/valday/Rossiisko - turetckie - otnosheniya - i - problemy - bezopasnosti - Kavkazskogo - regiona - 18188 . 47 Brooker P. S., Rus sia vs. Turkey: Competition For Influence, 12.12.2015, http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/12/russia - vs - turkey - competition - for - influence/ . 48 Hubbard B., Yeginsu C., After Opening Way to Rebels, Turkey Is Paying Heavy Price, The New York Times, 24.06.2014, http: //www.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/world/europe/after - opening - way - to - rebels - turkey - is - paying - heavy - price.html .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 21 allowed both parties to balance the economic challenges and geopolitical rivalry minimizing the impact of disagreements on multilateral cooperation over political issues 49 . To support the Iraqi land forces, in September 2014, the US - l ed coalition comprised of 60 states conducted airstrikes on the positions and infrastructure of the “Islamic State” 50 . However, one of the major goals of the US was Assad’s removal from power supporting the Syrian anti - government groups. As a result, the st ruggle against the “Islamic State” was not highly effective. On September 30, 2015 the Federal Council of the Russian Federation, on the basis of the official request of Syria’s President, gave its consent to the use of the Russian Air Forces in Syria, if necessary, with the aim of providing air support to the land forces of this country 51 . The involvement of the Russian Air Forces in the conflict, with the aim of the massive bombing of the positions of the “Islamic State” and the Syrian opposition, raised the discontent of the West and Turkey 52 . The rising tension in the Russian - Turkish relations turned into crisis in November 24, 2015, when in the Syrian - Turkish border the Turkish warplanes shot down the Russian Su - 24 attack aircraft 53 . Russia’s response wa s rather harsh, and a month later President Putin signed a
49 Öniş Z., Yılmaz Ş., Op. cit. 50 U.S. Department of State, “Joint statement issued by partners at the Counter - ISIL Coalition Meeting”, December 3, 201 4, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234627.htm l. 51 Sovet federacii razreshil ispolzovanie rocciiskikh voisk v Sirii, 30.09.2015, https://lenta.ru/news/2015/09/30/za/ . 52 Khoury G., Putin’s Road to Disappointment in Syria, 01.10.2015, https://mediu m.com/the - eastern - project/putin - s - road - to - disappointment - in - syria - 2f53ba484e1f#.hvp0853bg ; Stewart W., Tomlinson S., Putin signs decree drafting 150,000 conscripts into the Russian military... as Iran and Hezbollah prepare major ground offensive in Syria w ith air support from Moscow's bombers, 02.10.2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article - 3255876/Russia - pouring - gasoline - fire - Syria - s - civil - war - says - America - Putin - defies - West - drops - bombs - non - ISIS - forces - fighting - Assad.html . 53 Skorobogatiy P., V Sirii sb it rossijskij bombardirovshcik, 24.11.2015, http://expert.ru/2015/11/24/turetskie - pvo - sbili - voennyij - samolet/ ; Shaheen K., Walker S., Putin condemns Turkey after Russian warplane downed near Syria border, The Guardian , 24.11.2015, https://www.theguardian.c om/world/2015/nov/24/turkey - shoots - down - jet - near - border - with - syria . 22 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan decree imposing economic sanctions on Turkey 54 . Ankara, in its turn, restricted the access of the Russian warships to the Bosphorus 55 . A sharp decline in trade between the two countries shows serious effects of the Russian sanctions. It amounted to almost 30 billion dollars in 2014, 23 billion dollars in 2015 and 4.8 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2016 56 . In December 2015, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Simsek announced that the economic sancti ons imposed by Russia could cost Turkey’s economy approximately 9 billion dollars 57 . The future of the “Turkish Stream” was also highly endangered. The problems of Turkey were not only limited to the Russian sanctions. According to Aydintasbas, Erdogan has become isolated diplomatically. For the past few years Turkey had been going through a deep sense of isolation having switched from its “zero problems with neighbors” policy to a place where they had no neighbors without problems 58 . Having been engaged in numerous and complex multi - vector processes, Turkey has significantly increased the risk of its failure. According to Phillips: “When facing a difficult task, Ankara rarely demonstrates an ability and foresight of a well - coordinated strategy. The Turks are good administrators when it comes to daily matters, however
54 Vladimir Putin podpisal ukaz o vvedenii sankcii protiv Turcii, 28.12.2015, http://izvestia.ru/news/597508 ; Putin podpisal noviy ukaz o sankciyakh protiv Turcii, 12.2015, https://lenta. ru/news/2015/12/28/measures/ . 55 S pervogo iyunya Turciya vvela vizy dlya dalnoboyshchikov, 02.06.2016, http://informing.ru/2016/06/02/s - 1 - iyunya - turciya - vvela - vizy - dlya - dalnoboyschikov - iz - rossii.html . 56 Tovarooborot Rossii s Turciey v 2015 godu sokratils ya pochti na chetvert, 09.02.2016, http://www.interfax.ru/business/493872 ; Milyukova, P. Khimshiashvili, A. Levnskaya, Sem mesyacov v ssore. Skolko Rossiya i Turciya poteryali na konflikte, 27.06.2016, http://www.rbc.ru/economics/28/06/2016/577157b89a79472 39346aba3 . 57 Turkish economy risks losing $9 billion over Russia crisis: Deputy PM, 07.12.2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish - economy - risks - losing - 9 - billion - over - russia - crisis - deputy - pm.aspx?pageID=238&nID=92187&NewsCatID=344 . 58 Tavernise S., Seeking to Improve Ties With Russia, Turkey Apologizes for Downing Warplane, The New York Times , 27.06.2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/world/europe/russia - turkey - erdogan - putin.html?_r=0 .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 23
they have less potential in developing delicate policy requiring vision and flexibility” 59 . The complex political and economic situation, the deterioration of relations with the US and the EU due to the ambitious projects with Russia regarding the energy field and the refugee issues, forced reconciliation with Israel after six years of diplomatic competition, the failure of the “neo - Ottomanism” policy 60 , as well as the failure of creating an alterna tive to Russia in the Black Sea via Ukraine made the situation extremely dangerous. Given the probable effects of the challenges facing Turkey, in June 27, 2016 President Erdogan apologized in a letter to President Putin over the downing of a Russian milit ary jet 61 , According to Wood, this decision marks a total capitulation of Turkey and it strengthened Putin’s image as the strongman of Europe showing once again that in a waiting policy the Russians will always win, and the only way to change Moscow’s behav ior is with the threat of using force 62 , The process of normalization of relations began after 7 months of crisis in the Russian - Turkish relations under highly complex geopolitical and economic situation. Although the tensions eased in the Russian direction , they still continue to grow in both internal and the Western directions. On the night of July 15, 2016 the failed coup attempt perpetrated in Turkey attracted considerable attention not only internally but also internationally. President Erdogan’s harsh reaction to these developments – 6000 arrested, persecution of dissident politicians and journalists, and even a threat to the restoration of the death penalty – led to a growing negative attitude of the West 63 .
59 Philips D. L., Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy a nd Turkish - Armenian Reconciliation, Oxford, Berghahn Books. 2005. 60 Torosyan T., Arshakyan G. , Op. cit. 61 Kravchenko S., Kremlin Says Erdogan Apologized for Turkey Shooting Down Jet, 27.06.2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016 - 06 - 27/kremlin - s ays - erdogan - apologized - for - turkey - shooting - down - bomber. 62 Wood T., Putin ascendant over NATO as Turkey turns tail, The Washington Times, 30.06.2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/30/vladimir - putin - uses - nato - weakness - for - russia - domin/ . 63 Bod kin H., Millward D., Ensor J., Rothwell J., Turkey coup attempt: World leaders warn President Erdogan not to use uprising as excuse for crackdown as more than 6,000 arrested, The Telegraph , 18.07.2016, 24 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan
The problematic relations with the EU have n o perspective of improvement in near future. In August, Putin and Erdogan expressed their willingness to reestablish cooperation and search for compromise over the question of Syria. This provoked the anxiety of the West as after the attempt of the militar y coup the President of Turkey was negotiating not with the NATO allies, but with the President of Russia 64 . It is important to find out whether it is Ankara’s another attempt of using the “Russian card” against the US and NATO or a real turning point in Tu rkey’s foreign policy. According to Kruk, if Turkey really wants to turn towards Russia, then this will surely have great strategic importance. It will mean the disappearance of the last real point of support for the US hegemony in the Middle East as well as the rupture of the NATO ring around Russia 65 . Of course, the West will not allow this to happen. If the first attempts of Ankara's pro - Russian stance, given their small and temporary effects, might have escaped from the harsh reaction on the part of the West, the new wave of the Russian - Turkish rapprochement may lead to other developments. On the whole, the response of the EU member states regarding Turkey’s aggressive actions has been significantly changed. If previously the elites of these countries wa ited for the redemption of the Turkish aggression, sometimes even attempting to encourage it, now it is usually followed by harsh responses. In particular, Germany and the Netherlands barred Turkish Prime Ministers from entering the country to campaign for constitutional amendments among the Turkish
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/17/turkey - coup - plot - president - erdogan - rounds - up - thousands - of - soldie/ . 64 MacFarquhar N., Russia and Turkey Vow to Repair Ties as West Watches Nervously, The New York Times, 09.08.2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/world/europe/putin - erdogan - russia - turkey.html . 65 Kr uk A., Erdogan mezhdu Rossiei i SSh. Chto budet s ideei neoosmanizma, 11.08.2016, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global - processes/Erdogan - mezhdu - Rossiei - i - SShA - Chto - budet - s - ideei - neoosmanizma - 18309.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 25 community 66 . Moreover, the harsh response of the official Ankara was followed by very hard criticism addressed to the Turkish authorities. During the March 27 Conference “Quo vadis. Germany - Turkey”, the President of Bundestag Norbert Lammert announced: “What happens today in Turkey is not the normal course of events, but a pre - calculated plan. In a country which is a NATO member and seeks to become an EU member there are violations of civil rights and the arrest of deputies elected by the people. We can speak of two coups in Turkey since summer. The first was a coup d’état that failed, and the second was organized by Erdogan against his own country's constitution. And this one seems to be successful. Erdogan actua lly dissolves the parliament arresting deputies. He does so through a referendum disarming the parliament elected by the people…President Erdogan and AKP envisage to transform the unstable but democratic order to totalitarian system based on a long - prepare d scenario” 67 . The developments demonstrate that the Turkish - European problems are not reduced, but are even institutionalized moving from bilateral cooperation to the European institutions. In April 2007, the Council of Europe resumed the monitoring of T urkey suspended in 2004, in response to the constitutional
66 Sparks between Turkey and Holland as Erdogan calls the Dut ch 'Nazi remnants' http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/11/erdogan - calls - dutch - fascists - row - turkey - netherlands - escalates/ ; Polizisten eskortieren türkische Ministerin zur deutschen Grenze http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/niederlande - vs - tuerkei - fatm a - betuel - sayan - kaya - nach - deutschland - geschickt - a - 1138374.html ; Niederlande verweigern türkischem Außenminister Landeerlaubnis http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/streit - mit - tuerkei - niederlande - verweigern - mevluet - cavusoglu - landeerlaubnis - a - 1138332.html ; AKP sagt alle Ministerauftritte in Deutschland ab http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/tuerkei - regierungspartei - akp - sagt - alle - ministerauftritte - in - deutschland - ab - a - 1139758.html . 67 Bundestagspräsident Norbert Lammert: „Zweiter Putschversuch droht er folgreich zu sein“, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_bSXpY7Ueo ; Scharfe Worte gegen Erdoğan, http://www.taz.de/!5396880/ . 26 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan amendments 68 . Following this event, Erdogan even threatened to restore the death penalty in Turkey 69 . This is a completely new quality of the relationship between Turkey and the European institution s as for decades the reasons of tensions, if any, were explained by the activation of the extremist forces. Official Ankara promised to solve the problems receiving from Europe statements of support and a series of concessions. This new situation probably shows that, like a century ago, Russia and Turkey continue to consider bilateral relations to be the main direction of their foreign policy for the near future.
Conclusion
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the developments in the two most active re gions of the Eurasian Heartland – the South Caucasus and the Middle East – have been affected by the uncompromising struggle for new world order formation and the reconsideration of transportation routes and flows of energy resources. It has a strong impac t on the Russian - Turkish relations traditionally characterized by the unusual combination and alternation of rivalry and cooperation. The Russian - Turkish relations may be divided into four phases in considered period. During the first phase, started after the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued till 2007, Ankara sought to become the most powerful foreign actor in the South Caucasus and the Central Asia. However, it failed, because having overcome its internal political challenges Russia was gradually restoring its influence. The beginning of the second phase was registered by the Five - Day War between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the events related to which revealed the pro - Russian stances of Ankara. During this phase, lasted till 2015, the Russian - Turk ish relations undergo rapid developments due to serious problems both countries faced in international relations and the tempting prospects.
68 The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey , Resolution 2156 (2017) , http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref - XML2HTML - en.asp?fileid=23665&lang=en . 69 Turkey Put on Council of Europe Watchlist Over Rights Record , https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017 - 04 - 25/turkey - put - on - council - of - europe - watchlist - over - rights - record .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 5 - 28 27
In 2015, the downing of a Russian military aircraft near the Syria - Turkey border to neutralize the effects of the pressures from the US and the EU and the undesired operations for Ankara conducted by the Russian Air Forces marked the end of this phase and the beginning of the crisis in the Russian - Turkish relations. Though the crisis lasted only 7 months, due to its s ignificance it can be considered the third phase of the Russian - Turkish relations. The overcoming of 2016 crisis and the restoration of cooperation primarily due to serious difficulties Russia and Turkey faced in international relations, already demonstr ating significant signs of isolation, put the beginning of the fourth phase. Russia’s relations with the West are not getting better. These are even worse with the US despite the predictions that Trump’s presidency would lead to a reduction of tensions. To have a place in new world order, Moscow has yet to prove that it can overcome the challenges of different regions – the Eastern Ukrainian and the Crimean conflicts in the Black Sea region, the Syria crisis in the Middle East, the renewal of Nagorno - Karaba kh war in the South Caucasus. The power of Turkey does not seem to withstand the multi - vector (in some cases, conflicting with each other) relations established during 2000s due the Ankara’s foreign policy. The situation is particularly complex due to a s eries of domestic political difficulties, in particular the coup attempt, a great wave of violence that followed, and the anti - democratic constitutional amendments. There seems to be the repetition of what happened a century ago when in the process of shap ing the new world order Russia and Turkey, rejected by all, were able to get out of a complex situation relying on each other. Of course, these situations vary in some aspects. Although Europe has difficult problems to solve, namely a huge flow of refugees and terrorism, challenges caused by the EU’s dramatic enlargement and Brexit, the sidelining of its own interests in some instances as an expression of solidarity with the US, etc, it is not fully crushed (as after the First World War) and it can influenc e the further developments. The situation is not that bad in the Middle East and the South Caucasus as compared to the past century when the Russian - Turkish “bargaining” had unlimited possibilities. However, the solution of the complex problems in the two most troubled regions of the Eurasian 28 Tigran Torosya n, Grigor Arshakyan
Heartland will be undoubtedly conditioned by the formation of a new world orde r and a geopolitical stability.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 29 - 44 29
DOI: 10.19266/1829 - 4286 - 2017 - 01 - 29 - 44 Peculiarities of Foreign Policy Orientation of Georgia’s Ethnic Minor ities
MALKHAZ MATSABERIDZE Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University , Georgia
Ethnic minorities residing on the territory of Georgia are not fully integrated into the Georgian society. This factor has its implications on their various viewpoints on th e foreign policy course of Georgia. A significant portion of the two most numerous ethnic minorities of Georgia – Azerbaijanis and Armenians – are more pro - Russian oriented segment of the population as compared to their Georgian counterparts. Therefore, th ey demonstrate less support towards foreign policy course aimed at the Euro - Atlantic integration. This tendency is highlighted by the public opinion polls conducted in Georgia during the last several years. Public opinion polls of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) of the US are particularly interesting in this respect 1 .
Key words Etnic Minorities, Armenians , Azerbaijanis , Georgia, public opinion polls
Azerbaijanis and Armenians – the Two Most Numerous Ethnic Minorities in Georgia
According to the population census of 2014, the population of Georgia (excluding inhabitants of the occupied territories – Abkhazia and South Ossetia) comprised 3.713.8 persons, among them Georgians were 3.224.6 (86.8 percent). Ethnic minorities, making 13.2 percent of the entire population, are dominated by Azerbaijanis (233.0 – 6.3 percent) and Armenians (168.1 – 4.5 percent). Other ethnic minorities are significantly legging behind in numerical terms. For example, next to Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the Russian ethnic mi nority count 26.5
1 The NDI has been conducting public opinion polls in Georgia systematically. From 2016 “Minority Settlements” w ere separately included in its surveys. These segments include ethnic Azerbaijani and Armenian settlements in 2016 survey conducted three times (March, June and November). This enables to follow the dynamics of public opinion among ethnic minorities. 30 Ma lkhaz Matsaberidze persons, which comprises 0.7 percent of country’s population 2 . A great majority of Azerbaijanis (177.032) are compactly settled in the Khvemo Khartli region, whereas great majority of ethnic Armenians (81.089) resides in Javakheti 3 . The l ack of Georgian language skills among the ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis is the main factor hindering their effective integration into the mainstream Georgian society. According to the public opinion polls of 2014, 231.456 persons indicated the Azerbaij ani language as their mother language, whereas 43.579 persons declared that they master the Georgian language skills . In the region of Khvemo Khartli, 176.417 persons named the Azerbaijani language as their mother language, whereas only 18.983 persons amon g them master the Georgian language skills. According to the public opinion polls conducted in 2014, 144.812 persons declared that their mother language was Armenian; among them 57.316 persons stated that they know the Georgian language fluently. Situation is more complicated in the Samtskhe - Javakheti region: 79.878 persons stated that the Armenian language was their mother language, whereas 5.573 persons confirmed that they know the Georgian language fluently 4 . Due to the lack of knowledge of the Georgian language, a great portion of ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani citizens of Georgia do not get news from the Georgian sources. Correspondingly, they either have a lack of information or have tendentious information on the ongoing processes. Although the Publi c Broadcaster of Georgia is obliged to transmit news on minority languages, minorities are not systematically
2 Mai n results of the population census of 2014. General Information. http://census.ge/files/results/Census%20Release_GEO.pdf . 3 Main results of the population census of 2014. Distribution of population according to regions and nationalities. http://census.ge /ge/results/census . 4 Main results of the population census of 2014. Distribution of population according to regions, mother language and knowledge of the Georgian language, http://census.ge/ge/results/census .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 29 - 44 31 provided with up - to - date information. This has a negative influence on their political and civic inclusion 5 . Ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis are getting information mainly from the countries of their ethnic origins, in their mother language, or in Russian, through the TV stations of the Russian Federation. This fact further alienates them from the Georgian society 6 . Information sources of Azerbaij an and Russia have either negative or neutral attitudes towards the Euro - Atlantic aspirations of Georgia. Public opinion polls conducted in Georgia during the last several years demonstrated that ethnic minorities were the least informed segment of the Ge orgian population. Compared to the Georgian population, they do not equate themselves with Europeans and consider Russia to be their preferred trade ally 7 .
The West and Russia through the Eyes of Ethnic Minorities
This part of the paper will analyze the peculiarities of viewpoints held by ethnic minorities on country’s foreign policy course and will compare it to the outcomes of the public opinion polls on this issue. The public opinion polls conducted in 2016 on the issue of Georgia’s membership in the E U and NATO structures demonstrated the following dynamics of public attitudes in the areas populated by ethnic minorities and on the nation - wide level 8 :
5 State of Being of Minorities in Georgia, Th e Georgian National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2013, p. 8 , Policy Paper_WG1_Umciresobebi_1.pdf . 6 Mekhuzla S., Roshe E. , Education Reform and National Minorities in Georgia, ECMI Working Paper, 2009 , September, 46, p. 8 , http ://www.ecmicaucasus.org/upload/publications/working_paper_46_en.pdf . 7 Assessment of Attitudes and Knowledge towards the EU in Georgia. Changes and Tendencies in 2009 - 2013. Research Outcomes , p. 5, eu_survey_report_2013_final_geo.pdf. 8 Public Opinion S urvey in Georgia: Results of March, 2016, conducted by the CRRC under the order of the NDI - Georgia - March - 2016 - PoliticalRatings - geo.pdf; Public Opinion in Georgia: Results of the Survey Conducted in June, 2016, conducted by the CRRC under the order of the N DI. NDI - poll - June - 2016 - geo.pdf. 32 Ma lkhaz Matsaberidze
Table 1. Answers to the question: “Do you approve the statement of the government of Georgia regarding country’s prospective membership in the EU?”
Nation - Wide Results Results in the Areas Populated by Ethnic Minorities 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016
III VI XI III VI XI
Approve 77 72 72 55 50 47
Disapprove 14 16 18 27 24 29
Do not Know 9 1 2 10 18 26 24
Source: NDI Polls Conducted in 2016
Table 2 . Answer to the question: “Do you approve the statement of the government of Georgia regarding country’s prospective membership to NATO?”
Nation - Wide Results Results in the Areas Populated by E thnic Minorities 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016
III VI XI III VI XI
Approve 68 64 61 44 47 39
Dissaprove 19 22 25 31 25 32
Do not Know 12 14 14 24 27 28
Source: NDI Polls Conducted in 2016
Public Opinion in Georgia: Results of the Survey Conducted in November, 2016, conducted by the CRRC under the order of the NDI. NDI_November 2016 poll_Issues_GEO.pdf .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 29 - 44 33
These results demonstrate that support towards the pro - Western orientation of Georgia is low among ethnic minorities as compared to the nation - wide results. In March 2016, support towards Georgia’s prospective membership in the EU and NATO was 22 percent and 24 percent lower compared to the nation - wid e indicators. Considering changes in the society on this issue in 2016, it is apparent that support towards Georgia’s Euro - Atlantic integration dropped from 77 percent to 72 percent on the nation - wide level, whereas among ethnic minorities it dropped from 55 percent to 47 percent. As for the support towards the membership in the NATO, this figure is 10 percent lower than support towards the EU memebership both, on the nation - wide level, and among ethnic minorities. In terms of dynamics of public opinion in 2016, support towards membership in the NATO decreased by 7 percent (from 68 percent to 61 percent) on the nation - wide level, whereas it dropped by 5 percent among ethnic minorities (from 44 percent to 39 percent). Comparison of the NDI polls of 2016 to t hose conducted in previous years attest the rise of support towards membership in the EU among ethnic minorities of Georgia. Public opinion polls demonstrate that 52 percent of ethnic minorities supported Georgia’s memberhsip in the EU or were not determin ed in his/her position if the issue would be put on referendum. Only 1/3 of ethnic minorities hold positive image of the EU and another 1/3 were neutral on this issue; 23 percent was not yet clear on his/her attitudes towards the EU 9 . Public opinion polls conducted among ethnic minorities demonstrate that orientation towards Russia is higher among ethnic minorities. According to the public opinion polls conducted in March 2016, 47 percent considered Russia as the main threat to Georgia on the nation - wide le vel, whereas among ethnic minorities this figure was 19 percent 10 .
9 Assessment of Attitudes…, Op. cit. p. 7. 10 Public Opi nion in Georgia: Results of the Survey Conducted in March, 2016, conducted by the CRRC under the order of the NDI. NDI - Poll - Georgia - March - 2016 - geo.pdf . 34 Ma lkhaz Matsaberidze
Table 3. Answer to the question: Which country or organization presents the biggest threat for Georgia?
Nation - Wide Ethnic Minority Settlements Russia 47 19
ISIS 8 11
US 7 7
Turkey 5 8
NATO 2 4
Source: NDI Polls Conducted in 2016
Public opinion polls conducted in 2013 attested positive attitudes towards Russia among ethnic minorities. 57 percent of ethnic minorities considered Russia to be the country which supported Georgia the most ( this figure was 17 percent among ethnic Georgian population). Meantime, for ethnic Georgian population, the EU supported Georgia better than other states/entites. According to the public opinion polls of 2013, this figure was 38 percent for ethnic Georgian population and 14 percent for ethnic minorities 11 . Orientation of ethnic minorities towards Russia becomes apparent through exploring the issue of choice of a foreign language. According to the public opinion poll conducted in 2013, which posed the questi on “ Which foreign language should be a mandatory one in secondary schools as a choice of a second language? ” , 53 percent of ethnic minorities preferred the Russian language, whereas this figure was only 25 percent among ethnic Georgians. 62 percent of ethn ic Georgians argued for the necessity of introducing the English language as a second language in Georgian secondary schools. Prioritization of the English language from the side of ethnic Georgians is the testimony to their pro - Western orientation. Meanti me, prioritization of the Russian language from the side of ethnic minorities does not necessarily mean that they
11 Assessment of Attitudes…, Op. cit., p. 11.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 29 - 44 35 know the Russian language better than their ethnic Georgian counterparts. 29 percent of ethnic Georgians declared that they master the Russian language, whereas this figure was only 20 percent among ethnic minorities. The 17 percent of minorities and 10 percent of ethnic Georgians did not have basic competences of the Russian language 12 .
The Viewpoints of Ethnic Minorities on the Foreign Policy C ourse of Georgia
Differences in foreign policy course of Georgia are determined by divergent opinions on the West and Russia held among society. Support towards the pro - Western course is considerably lower among national minorities compared to the nation - wide results. According to the survey conducted by the NDI in March, 2016, 20 percent of surveyed minorities argued for the necessity of launching the pro - Russian course of Georgia, whereas this figure was only 5 percent in nation - wide results; 25 percent of minorities argued that Georgia had to launch the pro - Russian foreign policy, balanced by good relations with the NATO and EU structures (support to this line was 16 percent in the nation - wide results). 27 percent of minorities was in support of the pro - Western course through maintenance of good relations with Russia (52 percent in the nation - wide results), whereas support towards the pro - Western course was 12 percent (14 percent in the nation - wide results) 13 . It should be mentioned that support towards t he pro - Western course lowered both among national minorities, and on the nation - wide level in 2016 (see table 4).
12 Assessment of Attitudes…, Op. cit., p. 1 2 . 13 Public Opin ion in Georgia… Op. cit. 36 Ma lkhaz Matsaberidze
Table 4. Answer to the question: “According to you, the foreign policy of Georgia should be ... ”
Nation - Wide National Minority Indicator Settlements
2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016
III VI XI III VI XI
Pro - Western 14 13 12 12 5 7
Pro - Western, although good relations with Russia 52 48 54 27 28 25 should be maintained
Pro - Russian, although good relations with EU and 1 6 20 18 25 28 24 NATO should be maintained
Pro - Russian 5 6 9 20 23 30
Do not know 11 11 13 15 13 13
Source: NDI Polls Conducted in 2016
Ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani citizens of Georgia have rather different foreign policy priorities, compa red to their ethnic Georgian counterparts. This is tesified by the following indicators: among the countries, which could provide security of Georgia in their best, 11 percent of national minorities give priority to Azerbaijan, whereas this figure is only 1 percent in nation - wide results. Evidently, Azerbaijan as the main security guarantor of Georgia was named by ethnic Azerbaijani citizens of Georgia. 8 percent of national minorities consider Turkey as the main threat to Georgia, whereas this figure is 5 percent in nation - wide results. Evidently, Turkey as the number one threat is considered by
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 29 - 44 37 ethnic Armenian population of Georgia. 29 percent of national minorities consider Russia as a country which could provide security to Georgia in its best, whereas t his figure is only 13 percent in the nation - wide results 14 .
Table 5. Answer to the question: Which country or organization could provide security to Georgia in its best?
Nation - Wide Census Settlements of National Minorities
NATO 23 15
EU 13 16
Russia 13 29
US 10 3
Azerbaijan 1 11
Source: NDI Polls Conducted in March, 2016
14 Public Opinion in Georgia… , Op. cit. 38 Ma lkhaz Matsaberidze
Table 6. Answer to the question: Which country or organization presents the main threat for Georgia?
Nation - Wide Census Settlements of National Minorities
Russia 47 19
IS IS 8 11
USA 7 7
Turkey 5 8
NATO 2 4
Source: NDI Polls Conducted in March, 2016
What factors determine the pro - Russian stance of ethnic minorities? As the results of the NDI survey demonstrate, foreign language TV stations and news sources play a key ro le in formation of this reality. If a portion of an electorate receives information from foreign news sources, the probability of their pro - Russian incline becomes higher. This holds true for non - ethnic minority population as well 15 . NDI survey of the June, 2016 demonstrated that 23 percent of population of Georgia receive every - day information from the non - Georgian TV stations 16 . Although this figure is 52 percent among national minorities 17 .
15 Public Opinion in Georgia: Results of the Survey Conducted in June, 2016, conducted by the CRRC under the order of the NDI. NDI - poll - June - 2016 - geo.pdf , p .68 . 16 The survey outcomes revealed that the middle - age population comprises the main audience of the non - Georgian TV channels. 17 Public Opinion in Georgia: Results of the Survey Conducted in June, 2016… , p .77 .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 29 - 44 39
Table 7. Answer to the question: Do you receive information on po litics and ongoing developments from non - Georgian TV stations?
Nation - wide indicators National Minority Settlements
Yes 23 52
No 77 45
Source: NDI Polls Conducted in June, 2016
Foreign broadcasting companies, which are transmitted in Georgia, are mainl y the Russian ones. According to the survey, conducted in June, 2016, the most popular foreign TV channels watched in Georgia are the Russian ones: Channel One Russia – 35 percent, RTR – 26 percent, Rossiya 1 – 18 percent, Rossiya 24 – 12 percent, followed by Euronews – 10 percent, the Russian Ren - TV – 7 percent, TV - Tsentr – 4 percent, RTVI – 2 percent, “Russia Today” – 1 percent. 26 percent of the surveyed population named other channels, among them Armenian, Azerbaijani, Turkish and some other Russian in formation sources .
Provision of information on politics and on some other urgent issues from the Russian media outlets has a direct impact on foreign policy choice of the audience. Considering the impact of foreign information sources on the foreign policy choice of the population in Georgia, the following picture is provided by the survey of the NDI conducted in June, 2016 (see table 8) .
40 Ma lkhaz Matsaberidze
Table 8
Follows to the non - Does not Georgian information Follow to the sources (TV channels) non - Georgian information sources (TV channels) Pro - Western 11 14
Pro - Western, wi th a desire 43 50 to maintain good relations with Russia
Pro - Russian, although with a 29 18 desire to maintain good relations with the EU and NATO
Pro - Russian 9 5
Do not Know 6 13
Source: Survey conducted in June, 2016 by the NDI
The same tendency is r evealed through the survey conducted on feasibility of a particular foreign policy choice for Georgia (see Table 9) 18 .
18 Public Opinion in Georgia: Results of the Survey Conducted in June, 2016, …, p . 68 .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 29 - 44 41
Table 9
Follows to Does not the non - Follow to Georgian the non - information Georgian sources information (TV sources (TV channels) channels) Georgia will benefit more through its 47 55 European and Euro - Atlantic integration
Georgia will benefit more if it abandons 39 27 its Euro - Atlantic integration course for the improvement of its relations with Russia
Do not agree with none of them 8 7
Do not know 5 11
Ethnic Minorities and t he Factor of Russia
The significant pro - Russian predisposition of ethnic minorities could be used by Russia and pro - Russian forces of Georgia. In 2010, Vladimer Sokor, commenting the statement of the foreign minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov , made on July 8, 2010, argued that “apart from Abkhazians and South Ossetians, the Russian government has never tried to provoke some other ethnic groups of Georgia” 19 . In his statement, Lavrov suggested to the government of Georgia to restore normal relat ions with “Armenians, Azerbaijanis and some other ethnic groups residing in Georgia”. This was a warning signal from the side of Russia that Moscow could provoke ethnic tensions in Georgia in case of defeat of the pro - Russian forces acting in the country; if this becomes
19 Sokor V., Lavrov’s allusion on inter - ethnic conflicts in Georgia, Jamestown Foundation , July 12, 2010 , http://foreignpress.ge/analitika/2503 - lavrovi - saqarthveloshi - ethnikuri - konfliqtis - tsaqezebaze - mianishnebs.html?lang=ka - GE . 42 Ma lkhaz Matsaberidze reality, the Kremlin will seek for various instruments to destabilize the Georgian provinces populated by ethnic minorities 20 . The pro - Russian tendencies of numerous ethnic minorities of Georgia should not lead to the creation of stereotypes among the Georgian society. Analyzing current situation in the Samtskhe - Javakheti region, experts mention: it is unacceptable to make statements like “Armenians – the fifth column of Russia in Georgia”; “ethnic Armenians of Georgia are against the Euro - At lantic integration of the country” – which are demonstrated not as an individual choice, but as a treason of the “great Georgia idea” 21 . What are the tools to maintain the pro - Russian tendencies among ethnic minorities? Followed to the presentation of the r esults of public opinion polls of the NDI, conducted in March, 2016, experts argued the necessity of “transformation of the national project in a way to make it inclusive and satisfy the needs of ethnic minorities” 22 . Popularization and demonstration of the benefits of the pro - Western course and Euro - Atlantic integration of Georgia among ethnic minorities will decrease the pro - Russian stance among them. Attitudes of ethnic minorities towards the visa liberalization are the testimony to this claim. On Decembe r 15, 2015, the EU Commission published its positive report regarding the fulfillment of requirements of the action plan for visa liberalization of Georgia. Although ethnic minority settlements were poorly informed regarding visa - liberalization process (58 percent, compared to the nation - wide figure, which stood as 86 percent), supporters of visa liberalization process stood as 69 percent. Answering the question “Do you agree or not to the statement that visa liberalization will bring benefits to the people , like you?” positive answer among ethnic minorities is higher than on the nation - wide level (74 percent compared to 72 percent).
20 Ibid. 21 Molodini G. , T he Russia Factor in Javakheti, December, 2010 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216263291 _ rusuli _ paktori_javakhetshi. 22 Tskhadaia G., A Few Notes on the Results of NDI Polls. 13.04.2016 , http://www.tavisupleba.mobi/a/blog - giorgi - tskhadaia/27672369. html .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 29 - 44 43
Results of the Public Opinion Poll on the Topic of Visa Liberalization 23 (Table 10) :
Table 10 Nation - wide In Ethnic Minority Settlements
Where you informed regarding visa liberalization? 86 58 Yes 11 35 No 4 7 Do not Know
Do you support this decision?
Support 84 69
Do not Support 8 14
Do not Know 7 14
Do you agree or not to the statement 2016 2016 2016 2016 that people like you could benefit from the visa free regime? III VI III VI
Support 72 64 74 58
Do not Support 18 26 17 21
Do not Know 10 10 9 20
Prolongation of the vi sa liberalization process decreased optimism among population; although visa liberalization became a reality from the Spring of 2017, improvement of living conditions and
23 Public Opinion in Georgia: Results of the Survey Conducted in March, 2016, … 44 Ma lkhaz Matsaberidze perspective of employment are the main topics of concern for Georgian and ethnic mino rity population of the country. If politicians, government and civil society want to increase support towards the EU in Georgia, population should be informed on the benefits of the European integration of Georgia 24 . Notwithstanding the pro - Russian stance o f ethnic minorities, the governmental party, either the United National Movement or the Georgian Dream, promoting policy of the Euro - Atlantic integration, was getting popular support during elections in the regions populated by ethnic Armenian and Azerbaij ani minorities.
Conclusion
The most significant ethnic minorities of Georgia – Azerbaijanis and Armenians – have different foreign policy priorities compared to their ethnic Georgian counterpart. Public opinion polls of 2016 demonstrate that these minori ties are more pro - Russian oriented and demonstrate less support towards the Euro - Atlantic integration of Georgia. Dynamics of public opinion among ethnic minorities is the same as in ethnic Georgian population – there is a rise and decline towards particul ar foreign policy course among ethnic minorities like on the nation - wide level. Different foreign policy priorities of ethnic minorities could be explained by the weak knowledge of the Georgian language and overt reliance on the Russian information source s. Continuation of civic integration process and rising benefits from the politics of rapprochement to the EU will have its impact on the foreign policy priorities of ethnic minorities.
24 Assessment of Attitudes…, Op. cit., p. 9 .
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 45
POST - SOVIET TRANSFORMATION DOI: 10.19266/1829 - 4286 - 201 7 - 0 1 - 45 - 80 ‘Constitutional Identity’ in the Context of Post - Soviet Transformation, Europeanization and Regional Integration Processes : the case of Armenia *
ANNA KHVOROSTIANKINA National University of “Kyiv - Mohyla Academy”, Ukra ine Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences, Armenia
The purpose of this paper is to explore the existing scholarly approaches to the notion of constitutional identity and examine the potential applicability of this concept for the analys is of the processes of post - Soviet transformation, Europeanization and regional integration. Drawing upon the multiple definitions proposed in international academic literature, the author views ‘constitutional identity’ as a combination of four interrelat ed meanings: (1) as identity of a constitution; (2) as identity of the people, or imagined political community; (3) as constitutional identity of a society, or an actual political community and (4) as identity of a national constitutional order in its inte rrelations with other legal orders. It is argued that the concept of ‘constitutional identity’ taken in these four dimensions can serve as an effective analytical tool to characterize the transformation processes in the countries in transition – both those that run internally (e.g. transformation of constitutional culture) and those that have external relevance (e.g. regional integration). The paper reflects the initial stage of the research project; thus, the author does not have an ambition to cover the i ssue comprehensively, but introduces theoretical framework and poses the questions for further investigation.
Keywords Constitutional identity, constitutional culture, post - Soviet transformation, constitutional values, constitutional reforms, regional in tegration, Europeanization
______* This is the revised and expanded text of a paper given at the international conference, entitled “25 Years of Post - Soviet Transformation: Result and Prospects” (28 - 29 October 2016, Yerevan , Armenia). It is based on the research project in progress, preliminary findings of which were presented within the course “Constitutional Cultures in Transition: Constitutional Identities and Values in the Post - Soviet Space” (March - June 2017, Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, Stanford University, USA). 46 Anna Khvorostiankina
Introduction
This paper reflects the initial stage of the research project aiming at discovering and explaining the particularities of post - Soviet transformation, ‘Europeanization’ a nd regional integration in Armenia through the prism of the processes of evolution of Armenian ‘constitutional identity’. Although the concept of ‘constitutional identity’ is frequently applied in the contemporary legal (first of all, judicial 1 ) and polit ical discourse, in the international scholarship, there is no uniform understanding of ‘constitutional identity’ and its meaning still remains unclear 2 . Moreover, some authors doubt this concept “ is indeed a distinctive phenomenon worthy of its own concept ual class ” underlining that it “ remains underspecified and difficult to distinguish from related phenomena” 3 .
1 Anna Śledzińska - Simon i dentifies three main areas of application of ‘constitutional identity’ concept in judicial argumentation: “ (i) in decisions concerning the legitimacy of constitutional amendments; (ii) in decisions concerning the legitimacy of constitutio nal migration and engaging in a dialogue between various courts; and (iii) in decisions concerning integration within a supranational organization” ( Śledzińska - Simon A., Constitutional identity in 3D: A model of individual, relational, and collective self and its application in Poland, International Journal of Constitutional Law , 2015, 13 , 1, 124 – 155). 2 Michel Rosenfeld opens his chapter ‘Constitutional Identity’ in Oxford Handbook on Comparative Constitutional Law with the statement that “‘Constitutional identity’ is an essentially contested concept as there is no agreement over what it means or refers to” (Rosenfeld M., Constitutional Identity, Oxford Handbook on Comparative Constitutional Law (eds.), OUP, 2012, p. 756; Saiz Arnaiz A., Alcoberro Llivina C., Why Constitutional Identity Suddenly Matters: A Tale of Brave States, a Mighty Union and Decline of Sovereignty, Saiz Arnaiz A., Alcoberro Llivina C. (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Intersentia, 2013, pp. 1 - 3; Marti J . L., Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v. Identity of the People, Saiz Arnaiz A., Alcoberro Llivina C. (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Intersentia, 2013, p. 18; Sledzinska - Simon A., Constitutional identity in 3D: A model of individual, relational, and collective self and its application in Poland, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2015, 13, 1, 124 – 155, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mov007 (01.08. 2016). 3 Pavone T . , C onstitutional Identity: An Overview and Some Conceptual Concerns (4/23/2014), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/tpavone/files/jacobsohn - _constitutional_identity_critical_review.pdf (30 .06. 2017).
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 47
In the context of relations between the European Union (EU) and its Members, national constitutional identity of the Member States is often viewe d as a limit of possible ‘Europeanization’ 4 (or the limit of EU’s, or European, constitutional identity) 5 . In my research I pose the question whether the concept of ‘constitutional identity’ can help to explain the dynamics of ‘Europeanization’ and integra tion processes beyond the borders of the EU in the post - Soviet space. The study focuses on the case of Armenia. Regardless its ‘U - turn’ 6 towards the membership in the Russia - led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Armenia, as one of the participants of the Eas tern Partnership (EaP) initiative, still aims to preserve the active dialog with the EU, in particular by concluding the new EU - Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 7 . Being urged to make difficult geopolitical choices, this post - Soviet country can serve as a unique laboratory to observe and study the intertwined processes of post - Soviet transformation, internationalization, Europeanization and regional integration of different levels and vectors 8 . The proposed study investigates t he interrelated processes of post - Soviet transformation and Europeanization in Armenia through the prism of evolution of national constitutional identity. For the purposes of comparative analysis, the parallels are drawn between Armenia, other
4 For the purposes of this research, I define ‘Europeanization’ as a domestic response to the transformative power of the EU which results in the transposition of the European norms, values and practices into domestic legal order. 5 In this meaning, the term “national constitutional identity” is appl ied, in particular, by German, French, Polish and Lithuanian bodies of constitutional justice. 6 EU Officials Warn Yerevan over ‘U - Turn’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (4 September, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/a/armenia - eu - customs - union/25095145.html (3 0.11.2016). 7 Joint Press Release by the European Union and Republic of Armenia on the Initialling of the EU - Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (Yerevan, 21 March 2017), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters - homepage/23120/ joint - press - release - european - union - and - republic - armenia - initialling - eu - armenia - comprehensive_en (30 .06. 2017). 8 At the same time, as Delcour and Wolczuk observe, “[i]n the rich literature on the EU’s influence in its eastern neighbourhood, Armenia is one of the least studied countries” ( Delcour L., Wolczuk K. , The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation, Journal of European Integration , 2015 , 37, 4, 491 - 507). 48 Anna Khvorostiankina post - Soviet countries (in particular, Moldova and Ukraine 9 ), and the post - socialist countries – EU Member States. Armenia, as well as other post - Soviet countries under the scrutiny, declares adherence to the so called common European values 10 (that are today considered as being of global, or universal, importance). In fact, such values as the Rule of Law, Human Rights and democracy are fully recognized and reflected in the texts of many post - Soviet constitutions. However, the understanding, perception and mechanisms and practice of implementation of these values differ – sometimes significantly – from what is declared. In other words, assuming that the effectiveness of Europeanization can be evaluated on the levels of norm selection, norm adoption and norm implementation 11 , it is the last level which is the most problematic in case of the European values implementation in post - Soviet countries. The main question is why it is so. Can it be that there are specific characteristics of Armenian constitutional identity, - presum ably rooted in Armenians’ political and legal mentality, Armenia’s Soviet and pre - Soviet past, - that can facilitate or hinder the effective transposition of European norms and values and/or their proper implementation into Armenian legal system? Do the sp ecific features of the national constitutional identity influence the orientation towards this or another integration project (EU or EAEU)? In what way does constitutional identity determine the level of adaptability of the country to the standards and req uirements of such integration projects? These are the questions to be answered in the research project.
9 All three countries are the participants of the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative. Within the EaP, each of them, however, represents a unique case of ‘Europeanization’ and a unique case of relations with the EU. Moldova’s way to the association relations with the EU was relatively smooth. Ukraine, al though being among the ‘best performers’ in the process of implementation of political, legal and economic reforms, at the end came to the conclusion of the Association Agreement through revolutionary process. Armenia, having made a ‘U - turn’, chose the ori entation towards the Russia - led Eurasian Economic Union but aims to preserve the relations with the EU, in particular, in the field of political dialog. 10 Art. 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution of RA. 11 Lavenex S., Schimmelfenning F ., EU Rules beyond EU borde rs: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy , 2009, 16, 6, 791 - 812.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 49
The purpose of the present paper is rather modest. It aims to introduce the complex construct of ‘constitutional identity’ as a theoretical framework fo r further analysis of the post - Soviet transformation and Europeanization processes in the country under the scrutiny. This approach is built upon the so called ‘analytical eclecticism’ 12 which allows studying multiple interconnected social relations, mechan isms and phenomena of different nature “maintaining a rigorous approach in deploying distinct theoretical traditions in order to capture the complex reality of the real world” 13 . Integrating the definitions proposed in the international academic literature, I view the constitutional identity as a complex phenomenon 14 – a combination of four interrelated meanings:
12 Sil R., Katzenstein P . , Analytical Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditi ons, Perspectives on Politics , 2010, 8 , 2, 411 - 431. 13 Bache I., Bulmer S. and Gunay D ., Metatheory and Europeanization research: let’s get critical!, p . 13, https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/8473aa39 - 998d - 4d04 - a792 - 033c237f69c7.pdf (20 .01. 2017). 14 V iewing ‘constitutional identity’ as a complex, multi - layered phenomenon is not a new approach. In her study on the particularities of constitutional identity of Poland, A. Śledzińska - Simon proposes a three - dimensional (3D) model of the identity of constitu tional subject (which, in authors view, equals to a nation - state) ( Śledzińska - Simon A., Op. cit., p. 138). The model is built upon the adaptation of the concept of ‘tripartite self’ of an individual which “ presupposes that persons aim to achieve self - defin ition and self - interpretation (i) in terms of their uniqueness (intrapersonal, individual level), (ii) in terms of their relationships with others (interpersonal, relational level), and (iii) in terms of group membership (group, collective level)” ( Ibid ., p. 137). Correspondently, she identifies individual, relational and collective dimensions of identity. Understanding the co nstitutional identity as ‘a particular regime of rights’, Śledzińska - Simon differentiates between (i) individual identity (particularistic self - understanding of a constitutional self which may overlap with national identity; in author’s opinion, only this dimension “reflects a traditional culture - and nation - based type of identity” ); (ii) the relative dimension of constitutional identity which “ describes the relations between the constitutional self and other external selves, such as other nation - states and intergovernmental organizations”; and (iii) collective dimension that explains “the relation between member states, on the one hand, and the European Union as a separate constitutional entity” ( Ibid ., p. 138 - 139). The four - dimensional analytical model of constitutional identity proposed in this paper differs from this approach in an assumption that ‘constitutional identity’ existing in a particular state (or other entity, e.g EU) is composed with the interrelated identities of at least four different beare rs (constitution, constitutional subject – the people (or imagined political community), 50 Anna Khvorostiankina
(1) identity of a constitution , i.e. the fundamental principles and values enshrined in the constitution that define its specific nature and constitute its core, as well as its specific features; (2) the dialogically and consciously constructed identity of the people (or imagined political community); (3) constitutional identity of an actual political community , which is characterized by the harmony/dish armony between what is written in the constitutional text, identity of the people and the societal constitutional practice. It shows whether society is a political community identifying itself with the declared constitutional foundations or exists separate ly in the “parallel” world of its own values and practices. (4) identity of a constitutional order that determines its [order’s] relations with other orders (international, supranational, subnational) and its openness towards external influences (e.g. the openness to the processes of legislative harmonization, openness to the influences of the normative power of global actors, interest in legal transplants, following the ‘best practices’ etc.). The ‘constitutional identity’ is clearly an interdisciplinary concept; it covers the legislative settings and the real - life constitutional practice, as well as the extra - legal factors that influence constitutional reality in a given community. Having characterized the phenomenon of ‘constitutional identity’, I then integrate this theoretical construct with the analytical model of ‘Europeanization’ elaborated by Lavenex, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier. This model is based on the combination of three main mechanisms of transfer of the European norms into the legal syst em of a third country: external incentives, social learning and lessons drawing 15 . By such combination, I show which elements (dimensions) of national actual political community, and constitutional order), which are constructed by different actors. 15 Lavenex S., Schimmelfenning F ., EU Rules Beyond EU borders: Theoriz ing External Governance in European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy , 2009, 16, 6, 791 - 812; Schimmelfenning F., Sedelmeier U., Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of Eu ropean Public Policy , 2004, 11 , 4, 661 - 679; Schimmelfenning F., Sedelmeier U., Candidate Countries and Conditionality, Graziano P., Vink M.P. (eds), Europeanization. New Research Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 88 - 101.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 51 constitutional identity can potentially be facilitating and hindering factors influencing the effectivenes s of Europeanization. I make the preliminary conclusion that there are certain characteristics of national constitutional identity that determine or potentially can influence the effectiveness of Europeanization (sharing the European values; influence of the Soviet legacies on legal mentality and constitutional culture; openness towards the external influences, international standards and best practices; and the tendency to ‘instrumentalize’ the Europeanization processes). Importantly, these characteristic s are, at first sight, mutually contradicting. The contradictions can be explained with the belonging of the identified characteristics to different dimensions of ‘constitutional identity’ and different dynamics of transitional change within each of these dimensions.
The concept of ‘constitutional identity’: constitutional identity as the identity of a constitution
As it was stated above, there is no uniform understanding of what ‘constitutional identity’ is. Analysing the multiplicity of scholarly defi nitions, J.L. Marti proposes differentiating between two possible meanings of ‘constitutional identity’: (1) “the identity of the constitution” and the (2) “the identity of the people or political community ruled by such constitution” 16 . In the first meani ng, “constitutional identity is what makes of that constitution that constitution”; in other words, it is “constitutive, or essential, or definitional core” of the constitution 17 . This core, in its turn, is not limited to the constitutional text, but compri ses the fundamental “values, principles and rules” which may be identified through constitutional interpretation based not only on legal, but also on political and moral arguments. Textually, the “core” may be reflected in the unamendable provisions of the constitution or provisions which are more difficult to amend in comparison with other provisions (although
16 Marti J. L. , Two Different Ide as of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v. Identity of the People , Saiz Arnaiz A., Alcoberro Llivin a C (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration , Intersentia, 2013, p. 19. 17 Marti J. L ., Op. cit., p. 22. 52 Anna Khvorostiankina quite often this is not the decisive argument 18 ). Substantially, if such norms are changed, the changes are much more significant than ‘regular’ cons titutional amendments – they reflect the shifts of revolutionary importance 19 . This approach is not absolutely new: the ‘constitutional identity’ as an essence of a constitution reflected in its unamendable core is discussed, in particular, in Carl Schmitt ’s Constitutional Theory (1928). Analysing the boundaries of ‘authority to amend the constitution’, he states that constitutional provisions may be changed only “under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the constitution as an entirety i s preserved. This means the authority for constitutional amendments contains only the grant of authority to undertake such changes […] in constitutional provisions that preserve the constitution itself ” 20 (italics added – A.Kh .). Discussing ‘constitutional identity’ as an ‘identity of the constitution’ reflected in the core values, principles and rules, J.L. Marti reaches the “puzzling” – in his own words – conclusion: since the ‘core’ in many [European] constitutions is often more or less the same, the con stitutional identities of these countries should also be the same 21 . On the one hand, this statement seems to be true – the European countries share the same ‘core’ constitutional values and principles which, in fact, create the so called “common constituti onal traditions” of the EU Member States as one of the sources of the EU law. On the other hand,
18 Illu strative in this regard in the case of Latvia, where the text of the Constitution ( Satversme ) formally allows amending the provisions enshrining the fundamentals of the constitutional order; however, as the Constitutional Law Commission of the President of the State has concluded, “an unwritten core of the Satversme exists, which defines the constitutional identity of the State of Latvia, i.e., the identity of the state in state law and the identity of the state order. Essentially the core of the Satversme is inviolable, i.e., the constitutional legislator has the right to amend the Satversme in accordance with the [established] procedure only in a way that does not make the amendments incompatible with the core of the Satversme”. On the basis of its finding s, the Commission proposed to introduce the ‘eternity clause’ to the constitutional text ( R odiņa A., Pleps J . , Constitutionalism in Latvia: Reality and Developments , New Millennium Constitutionalism: Paradigms of Reality and Challenges , Yerevan, Njhar, 201 3 , p. 443). 19 Marti J. L ., Op. cit., p. 24. 20 Schmitt C . , Constitutional Theory, Duke University Press, 2008, p. 150. 21 Marti, J. L ., Op. cit., p. 30.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 53 this may mean that ‘constitutional identity’ is not limited to these basic values and principles. P. Faraguna goes further by making the distinction between “c onstitutional identity as a reference to those characters that are not subject to modification, either by constitutional amendments or by interpretative transformations, and therefore “eternally” characterize a given constitution (“constitutional identity despite difference”)” i.e. ‘constitutional identity’ close to Marti’s definition and “those characters that make one constitution different from another constitution (“constitutional identity as difference”)” 22 . Applying this approach to the case of Const itution of the Republic of Armenia (RA), one may conclude that “constitutional identity despite difference” is embodied in the unamendable provisions of Articles 1 23 , 2 24 and 3 25 (and the provisions related to them, in particular, those establishing the speci fic features of the human rights regime and the openness towards the international human rights standards); while “constitutional identity as difference” may be found, for example, in Preamble 26 , Articles 18 27 and 19 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of
22 Faraguna P . , Constitutional Identity — A Shield or a Sword? The Dilemma of Constitutional Identities in the EU (June 30, 2017) , https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995416 (15.02.2017). 23 Article 1. The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign, democratic, social state governed by the rule of law. 24 Article 2. In the Republic of Armenia, the power belongs to the people. The people shall exercise their power through free elections, referenda, as well as through state and local self - government bodies and officials provided for by the Constitution. Usurpation of power by any organisation or individual shall be a crime. 25 Ar ticle 3. The Human Being, His or Her Dignity, Basic Rights and Freedoms. 1. The human being shall be the highest value in the Republic of Armenia. The inalienable dignity of the human being shall constitute the integral basis of his or her rights and freed oms. 2. The respect for and protection of the basic rights and freedoms of the human being and the citizen shall be the duty of the public power. 3. The public power shall be restricted by the basic rights and freedoms of the human being and the citizen as a directly applicable law. 26 The Armenian People, recognizing as a basis the fundamental principles of the Armenian statehood and national aspirations engraved in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia, having fulfilled the sacred message of its free dom loving ancestors for the restoration of the sovereign state, committed to the strengthening and prosperity of the fatherland, to ensure the freedom, general well - being and civic 54 Anna Khvorostiankina
A rmenia 29 . Notably, the unamendable core of the Armenian Constitution enshrines the system of values (such as the rule of law, democracy, respect to human dignity and fundamental rights) which the Republic of Armenia ‘shares’ with the European Union 30 . The r esults of the research show that, in contrast with the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of other post - Soviet and post - socialist countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Czech Republic), the Constitutional Court of RA does not employ the notion o f ‘constitutional identity’ in its decisions. At the same time, the Court refers to the very close concepts of the ‘spirit’ of Constitution 31 (which, from my point of
harmony of future generations, declaring their faithfulness to universal v alues, hereby adopts the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia. 27 Article 18. The Armenian Apostolic Holy Church 1.The Republic of Armenia shall recognise the exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church, as a national church, in the spiritual life of the Armenian people, in the development of their national culture and preservation of their national identity. 2. The relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church may be regulated by law. 28 Article 19 . Ties with the Armenian Diaspora 1. The Republic of Armenia shall, together with the Armenian Diaspora, implement a policy targeted at the development of comprehensive ties and preservation of the Armenian identity, promote repatriation. 2. The Republic of Armenia s hall, based on international law, contribute to the preservation of the Armenian language, Armenian historical and cultural values and to the development of Armenian educational and cultural life in other states. 29 The Constitution of the Republic of Armen ia of 5 July 1995, with the amendments of 2005 and 2015, http://www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=5805&lang=eng (30.06.2017). 30 Preamble of the draft Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement Between the European Union and European Atomi c Energy Community and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the Other Part (hereinafter – CEPA), Annex to the Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Comprehensive an d Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, JOIN (2017) 37 final of 25.09.2017. According to Art. 2 of Draft C EPA, the respect to these values belongs to the general principles of the Agreement and constitute the ‘essential element’ of it. 31 Decision of the Constitutional Court of RA DCC - 350 of 22 February 2002 on the case of conformity of obligations stated in t he Convention for the Protection of
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 55 view, correlates with the ‘identity of the constitution’ as ‘whole’ and ‘part’ respectivel y) and ‘axiology of the Constitution’ 32 covering the values and fundamental principles of the constitutional order which do not necessarily have the literal textual expression in the constitutional text. The latter can be considered as an equivalent of the notion of ‘identity of the constitution’.
Constitutional identity of the people (or imagined political community)
The second understanding of the ‘constitutional identity’ in Marti’s classification is ‘the constitutional identity of the people’ (or ‘poli tical community’). He proposes identifying at least three possible approaches to this version of ‘constitutional identity’: (1) national identity reflected in the constitution, (2) identity of the people constituted by the constitution (constitutional subj ect) and (3) the identity of the people as both the author (constitutive authority) and the subject of a constitution 33 . Despite the different accents of meaning, all three approaches, in my view, indicate that two understandings – identity of the constit ution and identity of the political community – are not only closely intertwined, but are different dimensions of the same complex phenomenon of ‘constitutional identity’, which is not a static object or a state of affairs, but a dynamic system of social r elations. Rosenfeld and Jacobsohn agree that “ constitutional identity furnishes essential links between the constitution, its environment, and those who launched it as well as those for whom it was intended.” 34 As Peter Häberle observes “[a] constitution
human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms […] with the Constitution of RA, http://concourt.am/english/decisions/common/doc/sdv - 350e.htm . 32 Decision DCC - 1175 of 14 November 2014 in Case on Conformity of the Obligations Stipul ated in the “Treaty on the Accession to the Treaty of 29 May, 2014 On The Eurasian Economic Union Signed by the Republic of Armenia” Signed on 10 October, 2014 in Minsk with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, http://concourt.am/english/decisions/ common/pdf/1175.pdf (15 .10. 2017). 33 Marti J. L ., Op. cit., p p . 32 - 33. 34 Rosenfeld M. , Constitutional Identity , Rosenfeld M, András Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law , OUP, 2012, p p . 760 - 761 . 56 Anna Khvorostiankina is not merely a juridical text or a normative set of rules, but also […] a mirror of cultural heritage and the foundation of its expectations” 35 . In his fundamental study, Jacobsohn stresses that “ a constitution acquires an identity through experience, that its identity neither exists as a discrete object of invention nor as a heavily encrusted essence embedded in a society’s culture, requiring only to be discovered”. 36 He then continues stating that: Identity emerges dialogically and represents a mix of poli tical aspirations and commitments that is expressive of a nation’s past, as well as the determination of those within the society who seek, in some ways, to transcend that past. It is changeable but resistant to its own destruction, and it may manifest its elf differently in different settings . 37 It should be noted that ‘the people’ in this understanding of constitutional identity is not an actual community consisting of real individuals and social groups. In Rosenfeld’s words, it is an ‘imagined’ community which is an evolving one and “does not correspond to any set of persons crisply delimited in time and space” 38 , although “ it must channel its manifestations and iterations through persons assembled in plausible even if not actual configurations” 39 . As Rosen feld underlines, “C onstitutional identity originates as a lack that must be filled in an ongoing dynamic process of imagination through recombination and reconstruction of certain available relevant materials. Moreover, how the lack of constitutional iden tity is sought to be filled not only changes over time, but it also generates disputes and rifts within the relevant polity at every moment within its trajectory” 40 .
35 Häberle P. , The Constitutional S tate and Its Reform Requirements, Ratio Juris, 2000 , 13 , 1 , pp. 77 - 79, cited in : Roznai Y. , Towards a Theory of Constitutional Unamendability, Jus Politicum 18, Juillet 2017, Cours constitutionnelles et révisions de la Constitution, http://juspoliticum.com /uploads/jp18 - t01_roznai.pdf ( 01.11.2017 ). 36 Jacobsohn G. J., Constitutional Identity, The Review of Politics , 2006, 68, 361 – 397. 37 Jacobsohn G. J., Op. cit., p. 361. 38 Rosenfeld M . , The Constitutional Subject, Its Other, and the Perplexing Quest for an Id entity of Its Own: A Reply to My Critics (March 13, 2012), Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper , 358, p. 13, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021356 (15 .09. 2016). 39 Rosenfeld M ., Op. cit., p. 9. 40 Ibid.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 57
It can be argued that in the realities of post - Soviet transition, one of the most active ‘c onstructors’ of national constitutional identity are the constitutional courts. As David Robertson shows, in contemporary realities “constitutional judges often come near to being applied political theorists, carrying out a quite new type of political fun ction” of “transforming societies” through “spreading the values set out in the constitution throughout their state and society” 41 . Even more, they not only “spread”, but also define or shape the meaning of the constitutional values. As a result, the so - cal led acquis constitutionelle (by analogy with acquis communaitare of the EU) – “the continuity of jurisprudential lines [of constitutional courts] and accumulation of constitutional experience 42 become an integral part of what can be named the constitutional identity of the people. This, in its turn, may have an impact on the constitutional identity of the actual (not imagined) society or political community. To provide an example, one could refer to the case of Poland, where, according to Sledzinska - Simon, t he activism of Constitutional Tribunal in the transition period contributed to “juristocracy rather than to democratization through civic society and citizens’ impact on policy - and law - making” 43 . Being actively and consciously constructed, the constitutio nal identity of the ‘imagined’ community can include (or even be built upon) historical legacies. For example, in case of Armenia, these may be “ the democratic traditions of the independent Republic of Armenia established on May 28, 1918” 44 or earlier const itutional traditions which resonate
41 Robertson D. , The Judge as Political Theorist: Contempora ry Constitutional Review, Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 1. 42 Safjan M . , Political and Constitutional Courts. A Judge’s Personal perspective, EUI Working Paper Law , 2008 , 10, http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/8101 (30 .10. 2017). According to M. Safjan , the notion ‘ acquis constitutionelle’ was applied for the first time by the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland in its Decision of 20 November 2002, case No K 41/02 concerning the tax abolition and the patrimonial declarations ( Safjan M ., Op. cit., p. 20). 43 Sledzinska - Simon A. , Constitutional identity in 3D: A model of individual, relational, and collective self and its application in Poland, I nternational Journal of Constitutional Law , 2015, 13, 1, 124 – 15 5. 44 Preamble of the Declaration of Independence of RA of 23 August 1990. 58 Anna Khvorostiankina with the contemporary understanding of constitutional values 45 . At the same time, the ‘imagined community’ may negate and ‘seek to transcend’ the Soviet legacy, for example, by revision of the nature of relations between the state and an individual and rethinking the approaches to the nature of law (departing from purely positivistic theory, adopting new approaches of interpretation of constitutional provisions and increasing the openness towards the international law and international legal standards). However, when it comes to the implementation of these new approaches in everyday practice, the problems arise: the Soviet legacy, which can easily be negated consciously, is still affecting the legal mentality and constituti onal culture of the actual (real) society and thus causes the discrepancies between the constitutional identity of ‘the people’ and that of the actual political community.
Constitutional identity of an actual society (actual political community)
Remark ably, one of the central concepts in Jacobsohn ’s theory of constitutional identity is the concept of ‘ disharmony ’ – a discrepancy between the ideas embodied in the constitution and the social reality. This phenomenon becomes especially relevant in cases of societies in transition, as those of the post - Soviet space. In Jacobsohn’s words, “[c]onstitutional disharmony creates a need for adaptation and coping with conflict and dissonance, and constitutional identity must be shaped dialogically with a view to ov ercoming the causes of such disharmony” 46 . On the basis of comparative analysis of several constitutional documents, Jacobsohn differentiates between “militant constitutions” and “acquiescent constitutions”. These two polar ideal models characterize two dif ferent types of interrelation between a constitution and a social reality it operates in 47 . While “militant constitutions” create a ground for transformation of social reality, the “acquiescent constitutions” tend to
45 For in - depth historical account of Armenian constitutional culture see: Harutyunyan G ., Constitutional Culture: The Lessons of History and the Challenges of Time, Revised English Edition, Yerevan, “Njar”, 2017. 46 Rosenfeld M . , Con stitutional Identity ..., p. 761. 47 Jacobsohn G. J ., Constitutional Identity, Harvard University Press, 2010, p. 213.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 59 preserve the existing social values 48 . Th us, the level of disharmony between the constitutional ideas and the social reality is higher in the first case and lower in the second. Which model is used, or the proportion in which the characteristics of both models are combined, depends on the social context in time the constitution is elaborated and adopted. It can be assumed that in societies in transition (such as post - Soviet societies) constitutional identities are still in the process of development. For such “evolving constitutional identities ” typical is “the disharmonic tension between preservation and transformation” 49 . Classifying the situations which result in the adoption of new constitutions, Rosenfeld identifies six types of social contexts of constitution - making 50 . Adoption of constitut ions in post - communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), according to Rosenfeld, can be explained with the “pacted transition model” 51 . The distinguishing features of this model 52 are: (1) pacted negotiations between the weakened old regime and the oppositio n, which lead to the establishment of the new constitutional order; (2) no interruption of legality; and (3) significant influence of internal and external factors 53 . With some reservations 54 , this model may be applied to some of the post - Soviet countries as well. In addition to these characteristics, however, one should mention one more particularity of the post - Soviet constitution - making context - the necessity to create an independent state. In contrast with the CEE, the transition in post - Soviet space cov ered not only the
48 Jocobsohn G. J. , Op. cit., p. 214; Rosenfeld M . , Constitutional Identity ..., p. 761 ; Klug H ., Constitutional Identity and Change, Tulsa Law Review , 2013, 47 , 41 - 49 . 49 Jacobsohn G. J. , Op. cit., p. 214. 50 These are “(1) the revolution - based model; (2) the invisible British model; (3) the war - based model; (4) the pacted transition model; (5) the transnational model; and (6) the international ly grounded model” ( Rosenfeld M. , Constitutional Identity ..., p. 766). 51 Rosenfeld M. , The Identity of Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture and Community, Routledge, 2009, p p . 197 - 198. 52 Rosenfeld exemplifies this model with the case of constitution - making processes in Spain in 1978 and applies it to the cases of constitution - making in post - communist Poland and Hungary and South Africa in 90s. 53 Rosenfeld M . , The Identity of Constututional Subject..., p p . 198 - 200. 54 On the particularities of ‘pacted transition’ in the post - Soviet countries see: McFaul M. , The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, World Politics , 2002 , 54 , 212 – 244 . 60 Anna Khvorostiankina regime change, but also the processes of state - building. It can be concluded that this type of social context is a favorable environment for conflicting relations of preservation and transformation and stimulates disharmony between the so cial reality, a new constitutional text and the constitutional identity of ‘the people’. Understanding constitutional identity as a dynamic interrelation between a constitution and an actual political community is a fruitful interdisciplinary (socio - legal ) approach that allows evaluating to what extent the values embodied in the text of a constitution are supported and shared by the society. In the context of post - Soviet transformation, it helps to reveal to what extent transition to democratic values that occurs in formal - legal dimension (i.e. in constitutional text and legislation), often under the influence of various external factors/actors, is harmonized with the transition to the same values in social reality. It is obvious that, in order to strengthe n the rule of law, democracy and respect to human rights, it is not enough to declare these values as fundamental in the text of a constitution. Proper implementation in practice is what matters, since it is the only way to give them life 55 . Interestingly, as Ginsburg and Versteeg show comparing more than hundred constitutions, the countries that explicitly protect such values as the rule of law in their constitutions tend to have lower level of respect to the rule of law in practice than those that do not i nclude the rule of law guaranties in the constitutional texts 56 . Proper implementation of the constitutional values that a particular political community aspires to achieve, is possible only when these values are internalized by the society 57 and not perce ived as
55 See, for example, the analysis of constitutional reforms in the light of the rule of law principle in Ukraine: Khvorostiankina A. , Constitutional Reforms and Post - Soviet Transformation in Ukraine : Challenges on the Way to the Rule of Law, Armenian Journal of Political Science , 2015, 1, 101 - 116. 56 Ginsbu rg T., Versteeg M. , Constitutional Correlates and the Rule of Law. Adams M. , Meuwese A. and Hirsch Ballin E. (eds.), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 507, 517. 57 According to Vorländ er, “Constitutions can only do justice to their central tasks of legitimising and integrating political communities and their institutions if their normative rules and offered meanings are accepted and practiced in the social reality, if communication abou t fundamental values and patterns of behaviour takes
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 61 something imposed from outside. This means that the phenomenon of constitutional identity of an actual political community is closely intertwined with the phenomena of constitutional culture 58 (or – broader – political or legal culture 59 ) and the two interrelate as part (constitutional identity) and whole (constitutional culture). As Siegel observes, “’Constitutional culture’ is the black box through which the Constitution’s words are transformed into concrete consequences. It is an interlocking syste m of practices, institutional arrangements, norms, and habits of thought that determine what questions we ask, what arguments we credit, how we process disputes, and how we resolve those disputes”. 60
place between the rulers and the ruled” ( Vorländer H. , “Gründung und Geltung: Die Konstitution der Ordnung und die Legitimität der Konstitution,” Melville G., Vorländer H. (eds.), Geltungsgeschichten: Üb er die Stabilisierung und Legitimierung institutioneller Ordnungen, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna: Böhlau, 2002, p. 256 as cited in: Hensel S. , Bock U. , Dircksen K., and Thamer H. (eds.), Constitutional Cultures: On the Concept and Representation of Constitutions in the Atlantic World , Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012, p. 5). 58 As J. Mazzone defines, “[c]onstitutional culture […] can be said to include such things as the disposition of regular citizens to recognize and accept that they are governed by a written document, one that creates institutions of government and sets limits on what the government may do; the accepted belief that the governing charter is created by the citizenry; the knowledge that the charter is not timeless, but rather that the citizens ma y change it or revoke it under certain circumstances; and the understanding that until the charter is changed we are bound by it and required to go along with its ultimate results even though we are free to disagree with them. Constitutional culture also i ncludes the understanding that a constitution unifies a population beyond those in one's immediate sphere of acquaintance such that other people in other places are likewise governed by this written document and that, whatever our other differences, this i s something we have in common ” ( italics added ) ( Mazzone J. , The Creation of a Constitutional Culture, Tulsa Law Review , 2004, 40, 4, Art. 7, p. 672). The last element in conjunction with the internalization of constitutional values, in my view, compose the constitutional identity of an actual political community. 59 In his ‘Law and Society: An Introduction’, L.M. Friedman states that legal culture “determines when, why, and where people use law, legal institutions, or legal process; and when they use other institutions or do nothing”; it “sets everything in motion” and “is an essential variable in explaining the working of law” ( Cotterrell R . , Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory, Ashgate, 2006, p. 86). 60 Siegel A. M . , Consti tutional Theory, Constitutional Culture, Journal of Constitutional Law , 2016, 18 , 4, p . 1107 . 62 Anna Khvorostiankina
Regardless the certain developments over the last decade s, in Armenia the disharmony between the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, their practical implementation and perception by the Armenian society is still significant. According to S. Payaslian, Armenian political culture is deeply influe nced by authoritarian Soviet experiences and its fundamental transformation and cultivation of democratically oriented norms in foreseeable future is unlikely, in particular, due to the lack of socioeconomic development 61 . He notes: People living in underd eveloped, substandard socioeconomic conditions […] cannot emphasize objectives at variance with the imperatives of daily livelihood. Human rights values under such conditions become closely associated with pressing economic considerations rather than matte rs pertaining to civil and political liberties 62 . Taking into account the social realities, the processes of democratic transformation in Armenia entail the “dissolving of the oligarchic economic and political structures” and “reconfiguration of relations” between the state, individuals and civil society 63 . Payaslian expresses the hope in transgenerational change – the development of political culture brought by the post - Soviet generations. The preliminary findings of the present research project show that th is hope is not groundless: today, the young Armenian people more and more often define the constitutional core values as a part of Armenian constitutional culture and declare the sharing of these values (although skeptical attitudes are also significantly strong) 64 .
Constitutional Identity as the Identity of a Constitutional Order
The notion of ‘constitutional identity’ can be also viewed through the prism of the fourth possible meaning – as an identity of a national
61 Payaslian S. , The Political Economy of Human Rights in Armenia : Authoritarianism and Democracy in a Former Soviet Republic, I.B. Tauris, 2011, pp. 290 - 293. 62 P ayaslian S ., Op. cit., p. 291. 63 Ibid. 64 Based on the results of the focus groups discussions with the students of Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences in the period from 2013 to 2017.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 63 constitutional order in its interrelat ions with other legal orders. In today’s reality, national constitutional orders cannot exist in isolation; they are in dialogs with international, supranational, subnational, and foreign legal orders 65 . These dialogs result in mutual [although usually asym metric] transformative influence. The concept of constitutional identity in this case helps to characterize the limits of these possible influences. It indicates the degree of openness of a constitutional order towards other legal orders and its adaptabili ty to the external standards and requirements 66 . This understanding of the constitutional identity was specifically elaborated and actively employed in the case - law of the European constitutional courts in cases addressing the interrelations between the do mestic and EU legal orders. In the context of EU, the national constitutional identity is viewed as a limit of possible ‘Europeanization’ of the legal systems of the EU Member States (or a limit of European constitutional identity, i.e. the constitutional identity of the EU) and is linked to the concept of state sovereignty 67 . In the academic literature, the two basic approaches to the application of ‘constitutional identity’ argument by the European constitutional courts are metaphorically defined as ‘a shi eld’ and ‘a sword’ 68 : in first instance, the ‘constitutional
65 Speaking about the contemporary notion of legal pluralism and interaction of legal orders, Armin von Bogdandy notes: “any given constitution does not set up a normative universum anymore but is, rather, an element in a normative pluriversum ” ( Von Bogdandy A . , Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relationship between international and domestic constitutional law, International Journal of Constitutional Law (I*CON), 2008, 6, 3 - 4, 397 – 413). 66 It may be assumed – in a form of working hypothesis, at this stage, - that the less consolidated and ‘mature’ the constitutional identity is, the less resistant constitutional order is to external influences. 67 In this meaning, the term “national constitutional identity” is applied, in particular, by European bodies of constitutional justice (the re cent examples from Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic, Denmark are analyzed, in particular, in Faraguna P. , Constitutional Identity — A Shield or a Sword? The Dilemma of Constitutional Identities in the EU (June 30, 2017) , https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995416 ) . See also the case studies in : , Saiz Arnaiz A., Alcoberro Llivina C. (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Intersentia, 2013. 68 Faraguna P., Op. cit.; Konstadinides Th., Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order within the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement (December 1, 2011) , Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , 2010 - 2011, 13 . 64 Anna Khvorostiankina identity’ (reflected in the constitutional text) is used to protect national legal systems from “further and future integration”; in the second, - as an “operative clause” to resolve a conflict be tween the national constitutional law and EU law 69 . Having analyzed the case - law of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Sledzinska - Simon and Ziółkowski show that this court understands constitutional identity of Poland “as the axiological equivalence or convergence with the EU legal order, or conversely, as divergence from common constitutional standards ” 70 . In the EU law, the legal grounds for the judicial argumentation based on the ‘national constitutional identity’ argument are derived from the Treaty on the European Union. Art. 4(2) TEU states that: The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treatie s as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self - government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security ( Italics added – A. Kh .). The argumentative approaches of the European constitutional courts in the cases addressing the problem of national constitutional identities in the context of European integration are quite controversial and complex and deserves more detailed examination than can be afforded within this paper. In addition, it is linked to the very specific context – the context of membership in the EU and the ‘shared’, ‘tran sferred’ or ‘limited’ sovereignty. My understanding of ‘constitutional identity’ as the ‘identity of a national constitutional order’ is much broader and covers various types of external influences. These influences may be of different nature (formal or i nformal) and may be realized through different ‘channels’ – through the formal legal tools provided by national legislation 71 and/or indirectly
69 Faraguna P., Op. cit., p. 1. 70 Sledzinska - Simon A., Ziółkowski M ., Constitutional Identity of Poland: Is the Emperor Putting on the Old Clothes of Sovereignty? (July 5, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997407 (15.09.2017). 71 To provide some examples, one can refer to Art. 5(3) of Constitution of RA set ting out the hierarchy of legal norms and providing that “In case of conflict between the norms of international treaties ratified by the Republic of Armenia and those of laws, the norms of international treaties shall apply”; Art. 81 of Constitution
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 65 through socialization of domestic actors involved in law - making and law - applying (specifically, judicial) activiti es. In the same manner, the obstacles for the effective interplay of the national constitutional order with other legal orders may be created either directly by a constitution or legislation or indirectly by domestic actors, in particular, due to the stil l significant impact of Soviet legacies on their legal mentality 72 .
of RA stating that “ The practice of bodies operating on the basis of international treaties on human rights, ratified by the Republic of Armenia, shall be taken into account when interpreting the provisions concerning basic rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Restrictions on basic rights and freedoms may not exceed the restrictions prescribed by international treaties of the Republic of Armenia”; Art. 15 of the Judicial Code of RA of 2007 recognizing the case - law of the ECtHR as an official sourc e of law in Armenia. Art. 43 of the Constitution in its version of 1995 stated that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution are not exhaustive and a person can have other rights, in particular those guaranteed by the international treaties. The Constitutional Court used this constitutional provision as a ground for its arguments confirming the compliance of the obligations deriving from the ECHR with Armenian Constitution thus confirming the openness of Armenian constitutional order towards t he international human rights standards (see para. 13 of Decision DCC - 350 of 22 February 2002). Another ‘channel’ of external influence on Armenian legal system is the process of legislative approximation based on the [already outdated] EU - Armenia Partners hip and Cooperation Agreements, legal - political EU - Armenia Action Plan and relevant domestic legislative framework (for the information on the state of approximation processes as of 2014 see: Ghazaryan N., Hakobyan A ., Legislative Approximation and Applica tion of EU Law in Armenia, Van Elsuwege P., Petrov R. (eds.), Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union Routledge, 2014, pp. 191 - 214). The new developments in this field are expected with coming into force of the new EU - Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Cooperation Agreement (the draft CEPA contains much more precise and elaborated approximation clauses in comparison with general and legally non - binding formulation of approximation clause in Art. 43 of PCA). 72 Let us consider the practice of application of the case - law of the ECtHR by domestic courts. Although, as shown supra in note 72, the ECtHR case - law is recognized as an official source of domestic law, the judges still face methodological p roblems while applying it due to the long - lasting domination of legal positivism during the Soviet era ( Ghazaryan, N., Hakobyan , Op. cit., p. 205) . These problems are not unique, however: to a certain degree they are typical for the post - communist countrie s ( Kühn Z . , The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) Predictions, German Law Journal , 2005 , 6 , 3 , 563 - 582 ; Meleshevych A. , Khvorostyankina A . , ‘Ukraine’, L. Hammer and F. Emmert (eds), The European Convention on Human Righ ts and fundamental freedoms in 66 Anna Khvorostiankina
Discussing the external influences on the practice of the constitutional courts in Eastern Europe, Robertson observes that “one of the most marked aspects of their jurisprudence is the wid espread use of arguments and decisions from other constitutional courts”. 73 Referring to the foreign legal sources and case - law is also a tendency in the development of the practice of Armenian Constitutional Court 74 . The process of constitutional adjudicati on in the majority of cases includes the stage of studying of the international and foreign legal materials which influence the formation of the legal positions of the Court, although sometimes the arguments based on foreign legal materials and comparative legal analysis do not appear in the final text of the decisions and the Court just briefly states that the relevant practices has been examined 75 . The openness of a constitutional order towards the external influences (specifically, through participation i n the international integration projects) is linked to the understanding of the concept of sovereignty in this constitutional order. The issue of sovereignty in the context of integration processes was highlighted by the Constitutional Court of RA in sever al cases. In its Decision DCC - 350 of 22 February 2002 on the case of conformity of obligations stated in the Convention for the Protection of human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms […] with the Constitution of RA 76 . Deciding on the issue of the jurisdiction of the
Central and Eastern Europe , The Hague , Eleven International Publishing, 2012, pp. 557 - 596). 73 Robertson D . , Op. cit., p. 96. 74 As one of the most recent examples, one can mention the Decision DCC - 1384 of 10 November 2017 on the Case of conformity of Parts 3 and 4 of Article 64, Part 1 of Article 69 of the Law on Local Self - Government of the Republic of Armenia with the decisions N2 - n, 7 - n, 8 - n, 9 - n of Vanadzor community council dated 31 march, 2017 with the Constitution of t he Republic of Armenia on the basis of the application of the deputies of the National Assembly, where the Court refers to the relevant legislative practice of several European countries (the text in Armenian is available at: http://concourt.am/armenian/de cisions/common/2017/pdf/sdv - 1384.pdf ( 14 .11. 2017). 75 Based on the expert interview with Dr. S. Arakelyan, Head of the Legal - Advisory Service of the Constitutional Court of RA. 76 Decision of the Constitutional Court of RA DCC - 350 of 22 February 2002 on the case of conformity of obligations stated in the Convention for the Protection of human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms […] with the Constitution of RA, English
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 67
ECtHR and the binding force of its judgements for the Republic of Armenia, the Court stated that, although the Constitution does not directly provide the right to apply to the international courts to protect one’s rights, “ taking as a ground the au thorizing nature of Article 43 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia and the sovereign right of the Republic of Armenia voluntary and on the base of mutual concordance to accept such an obligation in the name of the effectiveness of the internatio nal co - operation , it can be noted that the obligations set forth by Articles 36 and 43 of the issued Convention do not contradict the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia” (para. 14 of the Decision) ( italics added – A. Kh .). In its Decisi on DCC - 1175 of 14 November 2014 in Case on Conformity of the Obligations Stipulated in the “Treaty on the Accession to the Treaty of 29 May, 2014 On The Eurasian Economic Union Signed by the Republic of Armenia” Signed on 10 October, 2014 in Minsk with th e Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, 77 the Constitutional Court assessed, among other issues, “the concordance of the axiological approaches of the obligations undertaken […] under the Treaty” with the fundamental principles forming the foundations of the constitutional order of RA according to the Constitution and “concordance of the forms and mechanisms of international cooperation with the principles of sovereignty, equality and mutually beneficial cooperation of member states” 78 . Having defined the nature of the Eurasian Economic Union as, in fact, supranational, the Court employed the argument of “voluntary character of participation” in the supranational organization, underlined that such participation is based on an international treaty which is to be duly ratified by the Parliament, referred to the link of the “will of national participation” with the “mandate [to participate] deriving from national interests”, thus following the ‘trend’ of contemporary understanding of
version available at: http://concourt.am/english/decisions/common/doc/sdv - 350e.htm . 77 Decision DCC - 1175 of 14 November 2014 in Case on Conformity of the Obligations Stipulated in the “Treaty on the Accession to the Treaty of 29 May, 2014 On The Eurasian Economic Union Signed by the Republic of Armenia” Signed on 10 October, 2014 in Minsk with the C onstitution of the Republic of Armenia, http://concourt.am/english/decisions/common/pdf/1175.pdf (15 .10. 2017). 78 P ara. 4 (a) and (b) of the Decision. 68 Anna Khvorostiankina sovereignty as not unlimit ed phenomenon and recognizing the recent regional and international integration processes as, in principle, compatible with the this constitutional principle 79 . The Courts stressed that the Constitution of RA does not stipulate any restriction in the issues of international or regional cooperation; at the same time, it pointed out to the existence of specific constitutional requirements in Armenian legal order. In addition to the principles of sovereignty, legal equality and mutual expediency of internationa l cooperation, the Court (1) highlighted that the restrictions on human rights [possibly resulting from participation in a supranational organization] should be in accordance with the norms and principles of international law and (2) recognized that operat ion of the decisions of supranational bodies in Armenia is possible only within the scope of accordance with the Constitution of RA. 80 The Court formulated the legal position of general applicability holding that “any decision adopted by any supranational b ody with the participation of the Republic of Armenia which is not in conformity with these requirements in not applicable in the Republic of Armenia. In the case of following these requirements, cooperation of RA with any international or regional organiz ation will not raise the issue of constitutionality” 81 . In the recent Decision DCC - 1381 of 10 October 2017 on the conformity of the obligations stipulated by the Agreement on the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union signed on April 11, 2017, with the Constitution of RA 82 , the Constitutional Court differentiated between the legal acts of international and supranational nature. While the acts of the first category, in the Court’s view, regulate ‘horizontal’ relations between the subjects of international legal relations, the acts of the second category regulate vertical relations between the state and the subjects within the state, thus directly affecting the individuals. As a consequence, the supranational acts in the process of their implementation can potentially violate the constitutional rights; however, the possibility of such potential violations cannot be assessed in
79 T he argumentation in para.7 of the Decision. 80 Para. 7 of the Decision. 81 Ibid. 82 http://concourt.am/ armenian/decisions/common/2017/pdf/sdv - 1381.pdf (13.11.2017).
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 69 frames of preventive and abstract constitutional control. Such evaluation is possible only when there is a practice of application of a supranational act 83 . This, in turn, means that even if the Constitutional Court within preventive constitutional control finds a specific supranational act generally in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of these can be challenged a posteri ori when the practice of their application is available. It can be preliminary concluded that the constitutional order of Armenia is open to the external influences through both formal and informal ‘channels’ under the condition of securing the supremacy o f national Constitution and complying with its ‘axiology’, or value core, or – in other words – its identity. Since Armenian constitutional identity is in the process of development and transcending the Soviet past, the openness of the constitutional order has some specific ‘transitional’ characteristics. On one hand, there is a tendency to orient towards international legal standards, follow the foreign ‘best practices’ and ‘borrow’ the external experience. On the other hand, these processes are not free f rom the methodological problems caused by the particularities of legal mentality affected by Soviet positivistic tradition.
The role of constitutional identity in the processes of regional integration in the post - Soviet space
Does the constitutional ide ntity determine the orientation towards specific integration project? On the one hand, it is obvious that the choice of a particular integration project can be influenced by variety of factors – geopolitical, political, economic. On the other hand, however , in some cases the geopolitical orientation may become an element of the constitutional identity enshrined by the constitution or the documents of constituting character (such as the declarations of independence) and having the status of a constitutional value. Here one can speak about the interplay of the second and first dimensions of ‘constitutional identity’: the people (due to historical or cultural particularities) view a specific
83 A rgumentation in para. 5 of the Decision. 70 Anna Khvorostiankina geopolitical orientation as preferable (or the only possible); and the constitutional text reflects and protects this (particularistic) value. To give an example, one can refer to the case of the Republic of Moldova. In its Judgement of 9 October 2014 in case regarding the constitutionality of the EU - Moldova Association Agr eement, the Constitutional Court of Moldova found that “within the meaning of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova and of Article 1 of the Constitution, orientation towards the European area of democratic values is an element of const itutional identity of the Republic of Moldova” ( italics added – A. Kh .) 84 . Furthermore, this element is a “defining” one; “thus, the process of European integration […] not only complies with the constitutional identity of the country, any other adverse o rientation is unconstitutional a priori ” 85 . Another example is the case of Lithuania, where the Constitutional Act of 8 June 1992 “On the Non - Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania with Post - Soviet Eastern Alliances” constitutes the integral part of the Co nstitution 86 prohibiting “to join in any form any new political, military, economic or other unions or commonwealths of states formed on the basis of the former USSR” 87 . As President of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania Žalimas observed, this principle o f geopolitical orientation, “based on historical experience”, is a specific feature of the Lithuanian constitutional identity 88 .
84 Judgment on the constitutionality of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova, on the one hand, and the European Union and the Eu ropean Atomic Energy Community and its Member States, on the other hand, and of the Law No. 112 of 2 July 2014 on its ratification , http://www.constcourt.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=7&id=583&t=/Overview/Press - Service/News/The - Association - Agreement - between - the - Republic - of - Moldova - and - the - European - Union - constitutional ( 0 1 .11. 2017). 85 Ibid. 86 Art. 150 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuani a, https://e - seimas.lrs.lt/rs/legalact/TAD/TAIS.206072/ (30 .06. 2017). 87 Para. 1 of the Constitutional Act of 8 June 1992 “On the Non - Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania with Post - Soviet Eastern Alliances”, https://e - seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.21154?jfwid=1clcwot6i3 . 88 Žalimas D. , Eternity Clauses: a Safeguard of Democratic Order and Constitutional I dentity , Speech of the President of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania, p. 2, http://www.gjk -
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 71
Other post - Soviet constitutions, while not indicating directly the specific integration orientations, enshrine the core values t hat, in their turn, - if shared by the actual political community - can potentially influence such orientation. As the Constitutional Court of RA indicated in the EAEU Treaty case cited above, the Constitution of Armenia does not stipule any restriction on the issues of international or regional cooperation 89 ; it neither indicates the specific integration priorities or preferences. The analysis of the circumstances of Armenia’s accession to the EAEU allows stating that this orientation is based rather on pra gmatic economic interests and security considerations than value - oriented ‘civilizational choice’ 90 . Although the Constitutional Court of Armenia, having applied the ‘axiology’ test, did not find the discrepancies between the core values of Armenian constit utional order and EAEU Treaty, participation in the EAEU will hardly contribute to the strengthening of these values 91 . The EU - Armenia draft CEPA, to the contrary, views the strengthening and proper implementation of the ‘common’ values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as an essential element of
ks.org/repository/docs/Speech_of_the_President_of_the_Constitutional_Court_of_L ithuania_Prof.Dr._Dainius_alimas.pdf ( 0 1 .11. 2017) . 89 It should be noted, however , that, according to the amendments to the Constitution introduced in 2015 (not yet in force), “t he issues related to the accession to supranational international organisations shall be resolved through referenda” (Art. 205 of the Constitution). 90 Bendavi d N., Laurence N ., EU Stunned by Armenia U - Turn , The Wall Street Journal , 4 September 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/09/04/eu - stunned - by - armenia - u - turn/ (30.10.2016). 91 Being the organization of economic cooperation, the EAEU does not aim at prom oting such values as the rule of law, democracy and respect to human rights; instead, among the principles of its functioning, the EAEU Treaty lists the respect to the universally recognized principles of international law including the principle of sovere ign equality of the member states and ‘respect to particularities of political order of the member states’ (Art. 3 of the EAEU Treaty). Formally, the EAEU Member States recognize the ‘European’ (or universal) values in their constitutions ( see Art. 1 and A rt. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus; Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Art. 1 of the Constitution of Kyrgyz Republic; Art. 1 and Art. 2 of the Constitution of Russian Federation). The implementation of these values, however, is extremely problematic issue: all of the listed stated are either consolidated authoritarian or semi - authoritarian regimes, not free or partly free (based on the data of Freedom House 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom - world/freedom - world - 2016 , (30.10.2017)). 72 Anna Khvorostiankina the Agreement 92 . Thus, while cooperation within EAEU may be considered as pragmatically motivated, orientation towards enhanced cooperation with EU is definitely in compliance with the identity of Armeni an Constitution. Furthermore, in long perspective, it will be beneficial for further dialogical development of constitutional identity of the Armenian people and evolution of the constitutional identity of actual political community. If the orientation to wards specific integration project may, in some cases, be encompassed by the identity of a constitution and that of the political community, the adaptability of the national constitutional order to the requirements of an integration project, in my view, de pends on all four dimensions of constitutional identity: while identity of the constitution, constitutional identity of the people and the actual political community influence the ‘substance’ of adaptation processes, the identity of the constitutional orde r and its openness towards the external influences determine the mechanisms and tools of the adaptation.
Constitutional identity and the Europeanization processes
The concept of ‘Europeanization’ covers a set of complex processes and is not limited to the transposition of the rules of EU into the domestic legal system. These processes of change under the influence of the EU (or European structures generally, according to some of the approaches) transform not only the legislation system of a country, but also influence political culture, legal mentality and judicial reasoning, empower civil society and transform the relations between a state and an individual. According to the definition given by C. Radaelli, Europeanization comprises [the] processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions
92 Art. 2 of draft CEPA.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 73 and t hen incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political and public policies 93 . Originally, the definition was elaborated in the context of the internal relations within the EU (i.e. between EU and the Member States); however, it remains true if applied to describe the influences of the EU beyond its borders. Europeanization as a ‘complex adaptation patterns and interaction logic’ 94 can become one of the possible ways of post - communist transformation; for some of the countries that underwen t the processes of transition (CEEC including post - Soviet Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), it was the principal way of transformation. Vink and Graziano define Europeanization as “the domestic adaptation to European regional integration”, where ‘regional i ntegration’ means “the formation of closer economic and/or political linkages among countries that are geographically near each other” 95 . This definition thus covers various formats of European integration projects (cooperation within Council of Europe, OS CE, the advanced forms of relations with the EU – association relations or other cases of ‘integration without membership’). In this paper, I focus mainly on the transformative influence of the EU. Although the role of CoE in promoting the democratic value s in post - Soviet space is significant (first of all, due to the availability of binding instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the judgments of the ECtHR), today one can speak about the joint actions of the EU and CoE in strengthen ing the rule of law, democracy and good governance, as well as respect to human rights. Furthermore, the values and standards of the CoE, being a part of the common constitutional traditions of the EU Member States, are the integral part of the European co nstitutional order. The focus on the EU’s influence is also determined by the research question concerning the role of the constitutional identity in the integration processes in Armenia,
93 Radaelli C ., Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change , European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 2000, 4, p. 3. 94 Radaelli C ., Europeanisation: Solution or Problem? European I ntegration online Papers (EIoP), 2004, 8 , 16, p. 4, http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004 - 016.pdf (15.10.2016). 95 Vink M. P., Graziano P., Challenges of a New Research Agenda, Graziano P., Vink M. P. (eds), Europeanization: New Research Agendas? Basingstoke , Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 3 – 20, pp. 7 - 8. 74 Anna Khvorostiankina taking into consideration the specific geopolitical situation of thi s country and its attempts to balance between EU and EAEU. According to one of the possible explanations of the mechanisms of Europeanization beyond the EU borders offered by Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier and Lavenex, EU transfers its norms and rules to the t hird countries’ legal orders using three modes of external governance: hierarchical governance, network governance and market governance. Each of the modes employs specific tools (external incentives, social - learning and lessons drawing, respectively). The effectiveness of application of these tools depends on the so called ‘mediating factors’. The table below summarizes the proposed theoretical framework.
Table 1. Forms and mechanisms of the EU norms transfer, proposed by Lavenex, Schimmelfennig and Sede lmeier 96
Mode of Tools Conditions and governance mediating factors
Hierarchical Some elements of “[A] state governance (it is reflected this mode are used in the adopts EU rules if the in traditional ‘Community conditionality benefits of EU rewards method’ and is not present mechanism (external exceed the domestic as such in external incentive model) including adoption costs.” The relations (where only market - based and value - cost – benefit balance ‘quasi - hierarchy’ may be based conditionality. The depends on: (i) the found in a limited number “dominant logic is a determinacy of of cases)) bargaining strategy of conditions, reinforcement by (ii) the size and reward” 97 speed of rewards, (iii) the credibility of threats and
96 Schimmelfenning F., Sedelmeier U . , Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public Policy , 2004, 11 , 4, 661 - 679; Lavenex S ., Schimmelfenning F., EU Rules Beyond EU borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics. Journal of European Public Policy , 2009, 16 , 6, 791 - 812; Lavenex S., A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood policy: integration beyond c onditionality? Journal of European Public Policy , 2008, 15 , 6, 938 - 955. 97 Schimmelfenning F, Sedelmeier U ., Op. cit., p. 662.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 75
promises, and (iv) the size of adopt ion costs” 98
Network Socialization, “[T]he actors governance ( it is social - learning and involved are motivated characterized by formal communication by internalized equality of the involved identities, values, and actors and is based on norms ”. consent regarding the Mediating application of specific factors: measures). i) legitimacy (“the likelihood of rule adoption, increase if rules are formal, member states are subject to them as well, the process of rule transfer fulfils basic standards of deliberatio n, and EU rules are shared by other international organizations”) ii) identity (“the likelihood of rule adoption is expected to increase with the identification of the target state and society with the EU community”) tiii) resonance (“rule adoption will be facilitated if conflicting domestic rules are absent or delegitimated and if EU rules tie in with existing or traditional domestic rules”) 99
98 Schimmelfenning F, Sedelmeier U., Op. cit., pp. 664 - 667. 99 Schimmelfenning F, Sedelmeier U ., Op. cit., pp. 667 - 668. 76 Anna Khvorostiankina
Market Lessons drawing “A state has to: governance ( " the EU as ( “a state adopts EU rules, (i) start such as well as its if it expects these rules to searc hing for rules processes and policies solve domestic policy abroad; may also provide a model problems effectively” 100 ) (ii) direct its for other regio ns, states, search at the political and societal actors who system of the EU; may come to see them as (iii) evaluate EU appropriate solutions to rules as suitable for their own problems.) domestic circumstances. These conditions depend on four sets of factors: policy dissatisfaction; EU - centered epistemic communities ; r ule transferability ; and veto players” 101
The analysis of this three - modes model of the EU norms transfer allows making an assumption regarding the role of ‘constitutional identity’ (in all four understandings discussed in this paper) in the Europeanizatio n processes. As it is shown in the table, in case of applying the conditionality mechanism, the effectiveness of norms transfer depends on the cost - benefit balance: the reward the EU promises for the introduction of specific reforms should be more signifi cant than the adaptation costs. In case of the value - based conditionality (which has been widely criticized in the academic literature), the application of this mode of governance is especially problematic. It is obvious that it is not enough to formally r ecognize the values promoted by the EU (furthermore, in case of Armenia these values have already been formally recognized on the constitutional level and declared as ‘shared’ or ‘common’ in the EU - Armenia legal and political documents). What is required i s the effective
100 Schimmelf enning F, Sedelmeier U ., Op. cit., p. 669. 101 Ibid.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 77 implementation of such norms which, in turn, depends on their internalization by the domestic actors 102 . At the same time, when there is a significant disharmony between the core values enshrined by the national constitution and the constitu tional identity of the society, it may be possible that the target government would be more interested in preserving this state of disharmony rather than in getting the reword for the effective reform implementation. According to Schimmelfenning and Sedelm eier, in case of value transfer to the authoritarian states, “the domestic political costs of complying with EU conditionality proved prohibitively high. Democratic rules would have required these governments to give up the very instruments on which their political power rested” 103 . In addition, it is also likely that, without proper internalization of the promoted values, the Europeanization reforms will be instrumentalized by domestic actors and empower the authoritarian incumbent governments against their political opponents, thus resulting in the so called ‘Europeanization pathology’ 104 . The internalization of the norms by the domestic actors may be reached, in particular, through socialization, social - learning and communication within the network governan ce. In the area of values promotion, this seems to be the most appropriate mode of governance, since it targets the mentality stimulating the change in legal and political culture. Two of the mediating factors listed in the table are specifically relevant to the issue of constitutional identity. According to the authors, “the likelihood of rule adoption is expected to increase with the
102 Gstöl S., The Contestation of Values in the European Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges of Capacity, Consistency and Competition, Poli S. (eds), The European Neighbourhood Policy – Values and Principles, R outledge, 2016. Importantly, the necessity to properly implement (not only declare and recognize) these values is underlined in the new EU - Armenia CEPA. 103 Schimmelfenning F., Sedelmeier U ., Op. cit., p. 670. 104 Börzel T., Pamuk Y., Pathologies of Europeani zation: Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus, West European Politics , 2011, 35 , 1, pp. 79 - 97; Börzel, T., Pamuk, Y. Europeanization Subverted? The European Union’s Promotion of Good Governance and the Fight Against Corruption in the South Caucasus, KFG Working Paper No 26, April 2011, http://userpage.fu - berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_26.pdf (30.08.2017). 78 Anna Khvorostiankina identification of the target state and society with the EU community ” 105 ( italics added – A.Kh. ). In other words, in case of such identification the society perceives the core European values as its own (and not forcefully imposed from the outside), even if they are not fully implemented in practice. The ‘resonance’ with the domestic rules can facilitate the processes of norm tr ansfer: the European norms will more likely be adopted if they are in harmony with the domestic norms, in particular, with the provisions of Constitution embodying its identity. In case of market mode of governance, the EU serves just as one of the possib le examples to follow. The effectiveness of ‘lessons drawing’ as a tool in this case will depend on the potential openness of a domestic constitutional order towards external influences and the readiness to absorb the new norms.
Conclusion
Summarizing t he approaches discussed in this paper, the complex phenomenon of ‘constitutional identity’ can be represented as a combination of several interrelated meanings: (1) identity of a constitution, i.e. the fundamental principles and values enshrined in the co nstitution that define its specific nature; (2) constitutional identity of the people (or imagined political community) which, according to Jacobsohn, develops dialogically and represents “a mix of political aspirations and commitments that is expressive o f a nation’s past, as well as the determination of those within the society who seek, in some ways, to transcend that past”; it is actively and consciously constructed (in particular, by the judges of constitutional courts); (3) constitutional identity of an actual political community, or society, which is a part of this society’s constitutional culture and shows whether it identifies itself with the constitutional foundations or exists separately in the “parallel world” of its own values and practices. In other words, the constitutional identity of the actual political community determines the harmony/disharmony between what is written in the
105 Schimmelfenning F., Sedelmeier U ., Op. cit., pp. 667 - 668.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 45 - 80 79 constitutional text and reflected in the constitutional identity of the people and the actual societal constitutiona l practice; (4) identity of a constitutional order that determines its relations with other orders (international, supranational) and its openness towards various external influences. As it was demonstrated in the paper, in case of post - socialist states, the concept of ‘constitutional identity’ can serve as a useful tool not only to characterize the particularities of the transformation processes in these countries (the evolution of constitutional identities in all four understandings of this concept), but also to explain the dynamics of the regional integration processes. The orientation towards specific integration project may, in some cases, be an integral part of the identity of a constitution and that of the political community; the adaptability of the national constitutional order to the requirements of an integration project, in its turn, depends on all four dimensions of constitutional identity. While identity of the constitution, constitutional identity of the people and the actual political communi ty influence the ‘substance’ of adaptation processes, the identity of the constitutional order and its openness towards the external influences determine the mechanisms and tools of the adaptation. The integration of these four - dimensional understanding of constitutional identity with one of the possible models explaining the processes of Europeanization beyond the EU borders allows making preliminary conclusions that in Armenia, where the national constitutional identity is in the process of transitional development, the effectiveness of Europeanization depends on several [sometimes, mutually contradicting] factors. The contradictions among these factors can be explained with their relevance to different dimensions of ‘constitutional identity’ and differe nt dynamics of transitional change within each of these dimensions. Thus, on the one hand, Armenia declares its belonging to the European family and sharing the European values (which are reflected in the constitutional text and constitute the core of ide ntity of Armenian Constitution), but, on the other hand, the constitutional identity of the actual political community, its legal mentality and constitutional culture are still significantly affected with the Soviet legacies. The openness of 80 Anna Khvorostiankina
Armenian const itutional order towards external influences contributes to further development of the constitutional identity of the ‘imagined’ political community though recognition of international standards and absorbing of Western best practices. However, this not alw ays translates into the constitutional practices of the actual political community; moreover, this openness may even lead to ‘pathologies’ of Europeanization when it appears to be instrumentalized by the ruling elites to promote their own interests.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 81
DOI: 10.19266/1829 - 4286 - 201 7 - 0 1 - 81 - 112 Constitutional Transformations in Post - Soviet Region: Results of Previous Studies
ANDREY MEDUSHEVSKY National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia
The article examines political effe ct of constitutional changes in post - Soviet states during the last 25 years. All constitutional amendments adopted in post - Soviet states are analyzed and systematized to ensure the balance of constitutional powers under changing social conditions. The arti cle introduces the classification of all amendments on the basis of formal juridical criteria and on the set of criteria proposed by political scientists. It reveals the real and potential conflicts between branches of power which could be provoked by the applied forms and methods of constitutional revision. The article makes a detailed analysis of institutes involved in the process of discussion and adoption of amendments as well as formal and informal procedures of the amendment process. To this end the a uthor uses the methods of comparative - legal studies and cognitive constitutionalism. The revelation of real motives of constitutional revision, legal and political forms and technologies provides the possibility of reliable explanation of ambiguous constit utional reform trends, achievements, failures and pitfalls of political transformation. It opens the way for the full - fledged constitutional engineering, independent constitutional monitoring and provides the possibility to forecast the prospective politic al trends of ''new democracies'' in post - Soviet space.
Keywords Constitutional amendments, post - Soviet states, cognitive constitutionalism.
The contribution of literature to the formulation of the problems of post - Soviet constitutional reforms can be re duced to seven main conclusions. The first methodological conclusion modern science is guided by in studying constitutional amendments is the “uprising against legal
The article was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2017 - 2018 (grant № 17 - 01 - 0048 ) and by the Russian Academic Excellence Project "5 - 100". 82 Andrey Medushevsky formalism”, i.e. overcoming a purely normative approach to their interpretation and recogn izing the importance of political analysis in understanding the logic of constitutional amendments. This approach, outlined in the works on the theory of constitutional amendments, has now become the subject of legal sociology 1 . In modern Russian literatur e, it is represented both by lawyers and political scientists 2 . The second conclusion is the statement on the relationship between constitutional amendments and the economic and political processes 3 . Under the theory of democratic transition, the represent atives of this trend studied the process of democratic consolidation, focusing on the adoption of democratic constitutions, the choice of the form of government, the functioning of the electoral system and the evolution of regime characteristics. Political literature traditionally focuses on the definition of real institutions and actors of the political process, seeking to understand the role of political parties, social movements, elite groups in power and the functioning of political regimes. However, th e contribution of this line of research was limited to the lack of special attention to the role of constitutional reforms in general and amendments - in particular. The latters were usually viewed as a relatively minor adjustment of established models con stituting a subject area of traditional lawyers. It is only now that the problem is addressed by researchers 4 . This, in our opinion, largely explains the limited possibilities of the theory of democratic transition, which proved incapable of convincingly explaining the transformation of new democratic regimes towards the authoritarianism without the formal abolition of democratic constitutions,
1 Sartori G., Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquire into Structures, Incen tives and Outcomes, 2 nd ed, London, Palgrave, 2002. 2 Konstitutsionnoe razvitie Rossii: zadachi institutsional'nogo proektirovaniya, M., 2007; Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo i pravovoe gosudarstvo kak faktory modernizatsii rossiskoy pravovoy sistemy, Asterion, 2 009, 1 - 2; Osnovy konstitutsonnogo stroya Rossii: dvadtsat' let razvitiya, M., Institute of law and Public Policy, 2013 (in Russian). 3 Verkhovenstvo prava kak factor ekonomiki, M., Liberal'naya missiya, 2013 (in Russian). 4 Torosyan T., The Role of Consti tutional Process in Transformation of Post - communist States, Armenian Journal of Political Science , 2015, 1, 5 - 18.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 83 as well as the emergence of original hybrid regimes of “alleged constitutionalism” or “deformed democracy” 5 . Th e third conclusion is the statement of the relationship between the legal form (or “constitutional design”) and the nature of political regime. The case was to find out the advantages of some forms of government over the others. This determined the researc hers' primary attention to “institutional design” 6 . However, a heated debate on this issue did not lead to a definite conclusion: a strict association of parliamentary form of government with democratic regimes, and the presidential one with authoritarian regimes is recognized as too schematic. The critics of this thesis repeatedly pointed to the difficulty of implementing the Westminster model of parliamentarism in multipartite (multinational) societies, underlining the positive sides of presidential (or m ixed) systems for societies in transition. In post - Soviet space, this problem should be formulated with regard to transitional forms that are far from classical models. On the whole, the specific character of post - Soviet constitutional systems, sometimes d efined by the concept of “deferred constitutionalism”, opens up opportunities for elites to manipulate legal norms and their radical transformation through amendments or various extralegal (and anti - legal) methods. Thus, we talk about “hybrid regimes”, “gu ided”, “deformed democracy”, “paraconstitutionalism”, “surrogate parliamentarism”, etc. 7 . The decision by the elite to introduce an amendment in favor of one or another form of government does not necessarily indicate a strategic choice towards democratiza tion or authoritarianism.
5 Yasin E. G., Prizhivyotsya li demokratiya v Rossii?, M., NLO, 2013 (in Russian). 6 Linz J., Stepan A. , Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South Africa, and Post - Communist Europe, Ba ltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Elster J., Offe C., Preuss U. , Institutional Design in Post - communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge, Univer sity Press, 1998; Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001. 7 Sakva R., Sravnitel'ny analiz izmenenii politicheskikh rezhimov stran postsovetskoy Evrazii, Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2006, 4 , 57, 117 - 127; Shu lman E., Surogaty parlamentarizma, Pro et Contra , 2014, 62 , 1 - 2, 124 - 132 ; Shablinskiy I. G., Evloyutsiya politicheskogo rezhima v Ro ssii. Konstitutsionnye osnovy i neformal’nye praktiki, M., TEIS, 2014 (in Russian). 84 Andrey Medushevsky
The forth conclusion refers to the specifics of the political and legal regimes in post - Soviet space in terms of the following parameters: first , the incompleteness of constitutional transformations, which most researchers associa te with the non - completed democratic consolidation of the post - Soviet states or even a complete breakdown of democratic transition; second , the catch - up nature of modern post - Soviet constitutionalism, allowing to use the notion of “catch - up constitutional modernization”, the manifestations of which are constitutional amendments that formally reflect the borrowing of norms and institutions from more consolidated democracies. From this perspective, we can infer the role of borrowings in the literature on the post - Soviet constitutions, and in general the directions of these borrowings in the adoption and amendment of the constitutions of Russia and other countries of the region 8 ; third , recognition of the ineffectiveness of implementing the most important const itutional principles. These principles are fixed constitutionally and undergo significant transformations at the level of legislative, judicial and administrative practices, not to mention informal ones 9 . The fifth conclusion: all researchers recognize the instability of the constitutional achievements of the 1990s, the contradictory nature of the transformations, when subsequent amendments cancel or devalue the results of the previous ones. The crisis of the paradigm of ''democratic transition" made the re searchers address the question of various strategies of the transition period (revolutionary, reformation and conservative), the reasons for choosing one of them, as well as the failures and "traps" of the transition process, including contradictions in co nstitutional regulation. However, the explanation of the failures of legal modernization does not seem to be unambiguous. Some researchers believe that they are due to historical reasons - the traditions of nominal Soviet constitutionalism. Some link this phenomenon to the inadequacy of
8 Nakashidze M., The Role of Constituti onal Borrowing for the Constitutiona l Drafting in Post - Soviet Space, World Congress of the International As sociation of Constitutional Law, Oslo, 2014. 9 Problemy realizatsii Konstitutsii. Mezhdunarodnoe issledovanie, M., 2008; Konstitutsionnye p rintsipy i puti ikh realizatsii, Analiticheskii doklad, M., IPPP, 2014 (in Russian).
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 85 democratic institutions in the social setting of transitional societies, while the others - to malfunctions, related to the structure of political regimes or to external factors. Part of this discussion is the debate about the geographic scope of the region (Central, Eastern Europe or Eurasia); continuity of the concept of the transition period (whether it is over or not); the content of the concept of "post - Soviet constitutionalism" (whether it expresses a particular model or generalizes the features of the transition to constitutional democracy). In general, the discussion continues on the question of whether post - Soviet constitutionalism should be recognized as a special model or simply a deformed version of classical cons titutional models, which analysis of the prospects for its development depends on 10 . The sixth conclusion is the recognition of the significance of the "constitutional policy" of post - Soviet regimes as an independent factor of their transformation. The mode rn literature presents systematic review of the constitutional policy of the post - Soviet states, raises the question of the place of constitutional amendments in this policy (even addresses the "policy of constitutional amendments" 11 ), shows the influence o f constitutional models of separation of powers (parliamentary and mixed) on the configuration of the elites of post - Soviet states 12 . The study highlights the importance of comparing various drafts of constitutional reforms, including the reconstruction of the "erroneous ways" of constitutional design (observations about the ambivalent role of constitutional amendments and the methods for their adoption). However, this study is in its infancy and has not yielded definite results to date. The seventh conclusi on is that there is general agreement on the need for a comparative study of the constitutional practice of post - Soviet states through the immanent logic of constitutional changes. This conclusion is substantiated in the reports of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. The Commission sees one of its tasks in monitoring the constitutional state in the post - Soviet space and
10 Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Eu rope, Fruhstorfer A., Hein M. (eds.), Springer, 2016. 11 Roberts A., The Politics of Constitutional Amendment in Eastern Europe, C onstitutional Political Economy , 2009, 20 , 99 - 117. 12 Semenova E., Edinger M., Best H. , Parliamentary Elites in Central and Eastern Europe: Recruitment and Representation, L ., N - Y ., Routledge , 2013. 86 Andrey Medushevsky summarizing the recommendations to national governments in the form of expert reports. The most important of these for the purp oses of this study is the compilation report of the Venice Commission on Constitutional Amendments in the Post - Soviet States of 2010 (CDL - AD (2010) and a series of reports on individual states (Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Armenia). The means for obtainin g relevant materials is the organization of independent constitutional monitoring and, in particular, a detailed analysis of constitutional amendments of various states as a tool for adjusting the constitutional and political systems 13 . In general, the mode rn literature, with its considerable number of works, is far from a systematic scientific analysis on the post - Soviet amendments. Outside of legal approaches, there is no clear concept and criteria for the comparability of amendments. Prevailing are the wo rks on individual states or amendments, often having emotional and political coloring. Conclusions are mainly reduced to policy recommendations, but not evidence.
Constitutional design and political regime: the role of amendments in their interaction
The a ttempt to bring together the legal (normative) and political approaches has found its expression in the use of the methods of neo - institutionalism. This approach allowed to formulate "comparative constitutional engineering" (the term used by J. Sartori), t o contrast "viable constitutionalism" with unviable one, bearing in mind the possibility of selection of constitutional norms and institutional design 14 . From this perspective, it is important to identify the relationship between constitutional and institut ional design, as well as to outline the ways of systematizing constitutional changes on legal and political parameters. The contribution of constitutional changes to the development of post - Soviet political regimes is regarded in diametrically opposite way s. Some researchers agree on a certain influence of constitutional design on the structure of political regime and in particular – on the configuration
13 Konstitutsionnye printsipy…, Op. cit. 14 Designs for Demo cratic Stability. Studies in Viable Constitutionalism. New York, Sharpe, 1997.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 87 of the separation of powers 15 . Others, on the contrary, believe that the amendments in the post - Soviet re gion are entirely determined by the political regime and its elite for the sake of its reproduction in power. In other words, the political regime is the basis of constitutional changes, and the amendments are only a "dependent variable" 16 . A schematic gene ral conclusion has been drawn which, in our opinion, needs to be adjusted or at least confirmed: for the implementation of constitutional reforms in Eastern European states, the formal parameters of the constitutional reform are of key importance, while fo r the countries of the post - Soviet region - the political parameters and interests of power groups. The issues on initiating and promoting constitutional amendments, the reasons for their adoption or rejection in the constitutional process, and in general the mechanisms for making decisions on the reform of constitutions by ruling elites and leaders, are addressed in different ways 17 . There is no single answer to the question of the role of the constitutional amendments in the institutional design of the pos t - Soviet regimes. Contrary to the prevailing view that constitutional amendments have a subordinate and even technical role in comparison with the fundamental provisions of the current constitutions, the practice of modern political regimes shows that this is far from reality. In the history of world constitutionalism, we can trace situations when amendments radically change the content of current constitution (eg, the XIV th Amendment to the US Constitution), introduce a new interpretation of its norms (the 2008 amendments to the French Constitution of 1958), or contradict them (the concept of "unconstitutional constitutional amendment" in the jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany), and sometimes serve as an instrument for the introduction of a ne w
15 Krasnov M. , Postsovetskie gosudarstva: yest’ li zavisimost’ politicheskogo rezhima ot konstitutsionnogo dizayna? Sravnitel’noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2014, 2 , 99, 29 - 45 ( in Russian). 16 Giniyatov F. M., Konstitutsionnye izmeneniya v gosudarstva kh postsovetskogo prostranstva i Vostochnoy Ev ropy, Vestnik ekonomiki, prava i sotsiologii, 2011, 3, 112 - 116 (in Russian); Sidorov V. V. , Constitutional Changes in Post - Soviet States and Eastern Europe, The Social Sciences , 2015, 10 , 2 , 67 - 70. 17 Tuori K., Constitutional Design and the Choice of the Political Regime, Armenian Journal of Political Science, 2015, 2, 5 - 14, Roberts A., Op. cit. 88 Andrey Medushevsky constitution (Japan's current constitution is introduced as an amendment to the old Meiji constitution). Such amendments, leading to a radical constitutional revision, can significantly change the interpretation of human rights, political system, system of separation of powers, and create a legal basis for fundamental changes in the existing regime or its key institutions. Hence, we get diametrically opposed judgments on the need of constitutional fixation of the prerogatives of the constituent power, as well as on the extremely cautious attitude towards empowering parliaments with constituent functions and the role of constitutional referendums in adopting amendments 18 . This observation is particularly true for the so - called "new democracies" that have eme rged from totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, gained national sovereignty, adopted democratic constitutions, but so far failed to complete the construction of fully functioning democratic systems and are at a crossroads regarding the vector of future po litical development. This is true for the post - Soviet states over the past 25 years. They are united, firstly, by the initial state of the beginning of transformation (the general Soviet legacy of nominal constitutionalism); secondly, the revolutionary (fu ndamentally non - legal) adoption of democratic constitutions and institutions of constitutional justice based on the adoption of various Western models of separation of powers (usually a dualistic or mixed presidential - parliamentary form of the French model of government, maintaining a stable authoritarian trend); thirdly, the changing strategy of constitutional development, related to the peculiarities of political regimes and the logic of their constitutional transformation, the vector of which may produce the opposite effect (from democracy to the restoration of authoritarianism) 19 . Constitutional design is essential in determining the vector of political and legal development. However, the influence of this factor is
18 Responding to Imperfection. The Theory an d Practic e of Constitutional Amendment, Stanford Levinson (e d. ) Princeton University Press, 1995; Roznai Y., Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. A Study of the Nature and Limits of Constitutional Amendment Powe rs, London, HSE, 2014; Encyclopedia o f Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789 - 2015. John R.Vile (ed.). 4 - th e d. Santa Barbara, ABC - Clio, LLC, 2015. Vol. 1 - 2. 19 Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Fruhst orfer A., Hein M. (e ds.). Springer , 2 016.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 89 indirect, as it is realized at the inte rsection of developers' ideas about the past (the attempt to avoid previous mistakes) and the future (vision of an ideal model). Like any purposeful adjustment, the constitutional amendment, by the very fact of its appearance testifies to the imperfection of the existing system. It is important to determine what this dysfunction is, what are the alternative ways of eliminating it (whether there is necessity to intervene in the text of the basic law), and most importantly - who, how and why insists on this d ecision. The study of the developers’ motivation when deciding on the appropriateness of reviewing the "constitutional design" is presented in a limited way. The discussion on the causes of constitutional dysfunctions did not lead to an unambiguous answer to the question regarding the extent to which they are determined by the political culture of the society, and to which - by contradictions of the constitutional regulation or mistakes of law enforcement practice. The reasons for determining relevant situa tions as "contradictions" or "lacunae" in the constitution do not become the subject of a special analysis. In a number of countries, observations on the significance of individual constitutional innovations for changes in national political regimes are pr imarily express - analysis of changes 20 . Meanwhile, the value of experiments on the transformation of the constitutional system in some countries (for example, in Ukraine) is recognized as controversial for the other countries of the region 21 . Equally importan t are the selected procedures for adopting amendments, which, if nullified by the constitutional courts, return the situation back to the beginning of the entire cycle of constitutional changes. The author's study of the constitutional amendments in the st ates of Eastern Europe and the CIS states in the last decade, which he conducted as an expert of the Institute of Law and Public Policy during his visits to the relevant countries of the region, made him believe that the interaction of constitutional desig n and political regime is most clearly revealed in the debates about constitutional amendments. This
20 Borisov N ., Konstitutsionnye al ’ ternativy Ukrainy : nazad v budushchee ?, Vlast ’, 2011, 2, 64 - 69 ; Khaitov M ., Konstitutsionnye reformy v Turkmenistane , Gosudarstvo i pravo , 2011, 1, 88 - 93; Torosyan T., Perspektivy i vyzovy perekhoda Armenii k sisteme parlamentskogo pravlen iya , Sravnitel ’ noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2016, 4 , 113, 29 - 40 ( in Russian ). 21 Klyamkin I., 2014: god Ukrainy, M., Liberal’naya missiya, 2015, 159 - 160. 90 Andrey Medushevsky enables to disclose the cognitive motivation of developers and the political tendencies of the regimes 22 . In situations of unstable equilibrium, the constit utional amendment can be no less significant than the constitution itself, since it determines the functioning and interpretation (up to revision) of its norms for a long period. From the standpoint of this approach, the appeal to the problems of constitut ional changes, the special study of significant constitutional amendments and, especially, the procedures for their adoption, is quite relevant. These procedures, according to the Secretary of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe T. Markert, are now throwing "a challenge to new democracies" 23 . The constitutional amendment, therefore, is an instrument for "fine - tuning" of the entire balance of power and determination of the vector of the political system.
Method of cognitive jurisprudence in the st udy of constitutional amendments
The research is based on the method of cognitive jurisprudence developed by the author. Its novelty in comparison to traditional legal and political approaches is the systematic reconstruction of the meaning of constitutio nal principles and the transformation of this meaning in the course of the changing correlation of three parameters - values, norms and jurisprudence. This method allows to overcome the contradictions of the three main traditional approaches in the theory of law (jusnaturalism, positivism and realism), which reduce the essence of rights exclusively to ethical standards, the current legal norm or the historically formed tradition of judicial practice. As to meta - legal understanding of law, all three aspects are interrelated in the legal construction of the meaning of the basic constitutional principles, the corresponding institutions and practices. The essence of the cognitive approach is to elucidate the motivation of constitutional decisions: what are their ideological
22 Medushevsky A. N., Ot revolyutsii k Restavratsii: oligarkhicheskie tendent sii postsovetskikh politicheskikh rezhimov, Sravnitel’noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2010, 4, 155 - 178. 23 Markert T., Constitutional Amendment Procedures as a Challenge to New Democracies. The Impact of Constitutional Processes o n Post - Communist Transform ation, 2014.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 91
(informational) determinants; what models became the subject of developers; what was accepted and rejected; which model of the legal institution was adopted and why; how the relevant constitutional principles were transformed under the influen ce of implementation practice 24 . Representatives of neo - institutionalism repeatedly noted the importance of cognitive approach, meanwhile stating that it was not developed in the field of institutional analysis. One of our tasks is to specify the methodolog y of such research for the purposes of legal design. In the center of attention are: the correlation of the informative picture of the world; legal norms, administrative institutions, communications (information exchange) and forms of social mobilization w ithin the framework of the system of constitutionalism. The cognitive method allows to generalize such parameters of the legal construction of reality as the psychological attitudes of developers, the normative constructions they use and their projection i n institutions and social practices 25 . The constitutional amendment acts as a special case of such a design, a realized choice of the vector of political and legal development. The method of cognitive jurisprudence has already been applied by the author in the course of a comparative analysis of legal, administrative and judicial reforms, in the reconstruction of the Soviet model of nominal constitutionalism, as well as in studying the transformation of modern Russian constitutionalism 26 . It enabled to obtain significant scientific results and served as the basis for the collective project of constitutional monitoring carried out by the Institute of Law and Public Policy in recent years 27 . Obtaining evidentiary results
24 Medushevsky A. N., Po liticheskie sochineniya: pravo i vlast’ v usloviyakh sotsial’nikh transform acii, M., Tsentr Gumanitarnykh I nitsiativ, 2015 (in Russian). 25 Medushevsky A . N ., Kognitivno - informatsionnaya teoriya kak novaya paradigm a gum anitarnogo poznaniya , Voprosy filosofii , 2009, 10; Medushevsky A . N ., Kognitivnaya teoriya prava i yuridicheskoe konstruirovanie real ’ nosti , Sravnitel ’ noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2011, 84 , 5, 30 - 42. 26 Medushevsky A . N ., Rosiiskie reformy s pozitsii teo rii kognitivnoy istorii , Voprosy ekonomiki , 2016, 3, 131 - 160; Medushevsky A . N ., Konstitutsionnye komissii v SSSR : struktura , sostav , mekhanizmy deyatel ’ nosti , Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo v Rossii i za rubezhom , 2016, 1 - 2 ( in Russian ). 27 Konstitutsionnyi mo ni toring: kontseptsiya, metodika i itogi ekspertn ogo oprosa, M., Institut prava i publichnoy politiki, 2014 (in Russian). 92 Andrey Medushevsky is regarded in the disclosure of the mecha nisms for constructing/reconstructing the relevant principles, norms and institutions under the influence of both legal and socio - psychological factors. These are reflected in alternative drafts of the revision of the Basic Law and are fixed by the corresp onding constitutional amendments. Thus, we put forward the following definition of constitutional amendment: a change in constitutional norms, which is the result of purposeful cognitive activity of developers and is fixed in the text of the Basic Law. The constitutional amendment is, therefore, a fixed informative product of purposeful activity in the construction of legal reality - a unit of constitutional and legal regulation and at the same time an indicator of its development. This definition has sever al advantages over previous legal or sociological definitions of the amendment. It takes into account the cognitive side of the decision on revision of the constitution, reveals the decision - making process (selection of alternative proposals for amendments ), reflects the interaction of formal and informal procedures for the transformation of the constitution, and implies their legal fixation (ie, mandatory legal fixation of new "rules of the game" in the constitution and/or the constitutional law). Thus, al l social and political changes are eliminated from the sphere of analysis if they do not lead to the fixation of new norms in the basic law and at the same time include all political initiatives, since they result in a fixed modification of the text of the constitution, constitutional laws or judicial decisions. The technique of the analysis is constitutional monitoring of amendments in all states of the post - Soviet region for the past 25 years, and a qualitative generalization of its results based on key p arameters of the study. The study of theoretical and completely pragmatic problems of the constitutional transformation of post - Soviet states goes hand in hand. The need to adjust the constitutions of the post - Soviet regimes to internationally recognized s tandards of democracy requires attention to the results of reforms and procedures of constitutional review, as well as the organization of independent monitoring of their implementation. The analysis of all the tools of post - Soviet constitutional amendment s is
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 93 undoubtedly important for determining the prospects for Russian constitutionalism and the possibilities for its improvement 28 .
Subject of the study: amendment as an instrument for the legal construction of political reality
The thesis of the independe nt contribution of constitutional amendments as an instrument for the transformation of political regimes requires further clarification. The author proceeds from the neo - institutionalist view holding that institutions are rules of the game, forms of inter action, social conventions, defined both by formal (legally fixed) rules and informal norms of behavior. Institutions include "the means by which rules and norms receive their practical implementation" 29 . Thus, the adoption of a constitutional amendment tha t changes the constitutionally established "rules of the game" is a definite cognitive, sometimes fateful, choice of the developers. It determines the functioning of a set of norms, institutions and practices of their application in the context of certain social orders, the duration of their existence, as well as a set of rules established by the elites to achieve certain goals of social development. If this hypothesis is correct, then it is necessary to find out which factors the decision on the constituti onal amendment depends on - the information environment, the rigidity of the constitution, the social environment, cultural stereotypes, the solution of the problem of preserving power and its legitimacy, practical management issues, etc. Unlike the previo us literature on the issue , the author sees the task in reconstructing the process of the appearance of the amendment - from the emergence of the idea of its development to its adoption as an acting constitutional norm.
28 Medushevskiy A. N., Law and Justice in Post - Soviet Region: Strategies of Constitutional Modernization, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2012, 3; Medushevskiy A. N., Konstitutsionnye printsipy 1993 goda: formirovanie, itogi I perspektivy realizatsii, Sravnitel’noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2013, 92, 1 , 30 - 34; Medushevskiy A. N., Problems of Modernizing the Constitutional Order: Is it Nec essary to Revise Russia’s Basic Law, Russian Politics and Law, 2014, 52, 2, March - April, 44 - 59. 29 North D., Wollis J., Weingast B., Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, M., 2011, p . 429. 94 Andrey Medushevsky
The study is focused on the whole set of constitutional amen dments affecting the form of government, the balance of separation of powers and the interpretation of their functioning in the states of the post - Soviet region in the past 25 years. All the states of the region were covered by a process defined as a "cons titutional fever", the expression of which was the amendment of constitutions and constitutional law in the field of separation of powers, the number of which exceeded 50. The most important of them are the amendments that determined the institutional conf iguration and vector of the relevant regimes. This approach determines the subject of analysis (a block of constitutional amendments affecting the adjustment of the form of government); regional framework (12 states of the post - Soviet region, including Rus sia), a chronological framework (25 years since the collapse of the USSR and the formation of independent states - a sufficient period for summing up the preliminary comparative results of constitutional modernization). The systematization , cataloging and mapping of the amendments create a compact and solid empirical basis for their classification and proof - reading from the standpoint of comparative law, cognitive jurisprudence and political science. Meanwhile, it opens the door for typologizing, classifyi ng and contributing to the functioning of post - Soviet political regimes. The heuristic significance of the study is determined by the absence of fundamental works on post - Soviet amendments. There are considerable works on the empirical analysis of constitu tional amendments in classical and newly - developing democracies. However, this literature includes a number of important limitations. Firstly, it is generally limited to a purely normative analysis of the adopted amendments that turned to the norm of the c onstitution, and practically does not pay attention to rejected amendments that are not less informative for the purposes of this study. The very fact of their existence is implicitly reflected in the adopted amendment, and in the future may lead to its re placement by counter - amendment. Secondly, it does not pay special attention to cognitive aspects of initiation and promotion of amendments, including non - constitutional institutions, and ignores the informal parameters of their discussion outside the const itutional institutions. Thirdly, it very rarely singles out amendments as an
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 95 independent subject of research, preferring to talk about "constitutional design" (a concept meaning the peculiarities of the form of government in its institutional expression); "constitutional process" (as a change in the stages of constitutional and legal regulation), or about the "constitutional policy" of the ruling regimes - the political goals pursued in making amendments (this removes the issue of the independent meaning of amendments, subordinating them to the tactical goals of the elites). Fourthly, it contains very little empirical research and observations on the effect of constitutional amendments on the transformation of political regimes in post - Soviet states. This is due in part to low evaluation of their legal significance, and in part to a lack of awareness of Western lawyers about the situation in the region). In general, the problem remains to which extent the theory of amendments and the questions formulated in i t (applied to classical constitutional democracies) are valid with respect to post - Soviet political regimes, especially to those characterized by guided democracy and nominal constitutionalism 30 . In this context, the author investigates the trends of politi cal regimes in Central Asia 31 . The practical and consultative significance of the issue became clear to the author due to "integrative observation". He was an OSCE expert during the constitutional crises in Kyrgyzstan and prepared a number of recommendation s that were positively evaluated by the international expert community and a number of statesmen of the country. The work was continued with regard to the constitutional reforms of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, where there was a dialogue with leading politicians and judges on the issues of transitional legislation 32 . These
30 Lael K. Weis ., Constitutional Amendment Rules and Interpretative Fidelity to Democracy, Melbourne University Law Review , 38, 241 - 280; Roberts A. , The Politics of Constitutional Amendment in Eastern Europe , Constitutional Political Economy , 2009, 20, 99 - 117. 31 Medushe vsky A. N., Politicheskie rezhimy Srednei Azii: konstitutsionnye reform y v ramkakh avtoritarnoy modernizatsii, Sravnitel’noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2012, 89, 4, 45 - 60; Medushevsky A. N., Political Regimes of Central Asia: Constitutional Reforms in a F ramework of Authoritarian Modernization, The Soviet Legacy and Nation - Building in Central Asia. APRC Proceedings Series , Seoul , 2011, 4, 5 - 28. 32 Medushevsky A . N ., Revolyutsiya v Kirgizii : itogi i perspektivy konstitutsionnykh preobrazovanii , Sravnitel’noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2011, 96 Andrey Medushevsky questions were in the center of the author's attention while studying the problems of Russian constitutionalism. The sources of this study are 1) constitutions and laws on amendments; official and unofficial comments to them; 2) materials of editorial commissions and official reports on their activities; 3) materials for discussing amendments in the media and the Internet; the available literature of the question; 4) data from opinion polls showing the extent to which the amendments are supported in case of their public discussion or approval in an advisory or final referendum; 5) conclusions of constitutional courts in cases when they have been involved in assessing the constitutionali ty of the respective draft bills on amendments; 6) expert assessments of national and international independent institutions, primarily the analytical documents of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, and, in particular, reports on individual co nstitutional amendments in the regional countries); 7) personal interviews of the author with participants involved in the development of constitutional amendments or those involved in the process of their discussion and promotion - lawyers, judges, expert s, politicians, journalists 33 . Since the major problem is to identify the role of constitutional amendments in determining the institutional structure and the vector of development of political regimes in post - Soviet states, it becomes necessary to verify t he following assumptions :
1. the possibilities, boundaries and parameters of the autonomous (independent) contribution of constitutional amendments to the definition of political regime configuration in post - Soviet states; 2. identification of sustainable and re petitive development mechanisms and technologies of adopting amendments that are
80, 1 , 13 - 32; Medushevsky A . N ., Konstitutsionnaya reforma v Turkmenistane: perekhod k demokratii ili modernizatsiya avtroitarizma, Sravnitel ’ noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie , 2008, 67 , 6, 5 - 16; Medushevsky A . N ., Konstitutsionny kontrol ’ i politicheskii vybor v obshchestvakh perekhodnogo tipa : k probleme le gitimnosti sudebnykh reshenii na postsovetskom prostranstve , Vestnik k onstitutsionnogo soveta respubliki Kazakhstan , Astana , 2011, 18, 49 - 64; Medushevsky A. N., The Russian Constitution of 1993: What it Means Today? Armenian Journal of Political Science , 2015, 1, 2, 49 - 76. 33 Osnovy konstitutsionnogo stroya Rossii: dvadtsat’ let razvitiya, M., Institut prava i publichnoy politiki, 2013.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 97
formed at the intersection of basic constitutional norms, institutional solutions and sustainable formal and informal practices of interpretation; 3. the establishment of cogniti ve variables determining the motivation of developers, the similarities and differences in the results of the constitutional audit for the countries of the region - their relative success, failure or reproduction of political and legal instability; 4. determi nation of the role of constitutional review initiatives for the consolidation and reconfiguration of party political forces, elite groups and their new identity in the sphere of public policy; 5. the possibilities and limits of forecasting the results of the adoption of amendments and their impact on changing political practices.
In general, it is necessary to clarify the significance of this tool for explaining the final outcome of regime transformation - the consolidation of democracy, the restoration of aut horitarianism or the reproduction of instability in the form of a cyclic change of some forms of government by the others.
Constitutional amendments as a realized choice of the elites in post - Soviet states
The scope of the study is determined by its purpo se, i.e. the disclosure of the role of constitutional amendments in the revision of the established constitutional "rules of the game" and the determination of the ''independent'' value of this instrument in the transformation of the form of government and political regimes of post - Soviet states. This explains the imposed restrictions. Firstly, we are not talking about the analysis of regimes as such. Their development is influenced by many factors - from the political culture of society to specific tasks b eing solved by the leadership of different states. Secondly, not all constitutional amendments, including those affecting fundamental human rights, are the subject of the study, but only those that directly affect the form of government or the functioning of the most important power institutions of the states concerned. Thirdly, the priority is given to the 98 Andrey Medushevsky mechanism for initiating, promoting and accepting amendments, i.e. the process of making political decisions on constitutional issues. Fourthly, special attention is paid to technology and the "tactics" for carrying out amendments in the political process. The transformation of constitutional principles and institutions is not necessarily carried out by one amendment - it can be a series of relatively min or changes of individual constitutional norms that in combination produce the desired effect, or the decision of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the relevant draft laws or approval procedures). Fifth, in contrast to traditional legal s tudies dealing only with the adopted amendments (the norms of the basic law), this study is primarily focused on the interaction of adopted and rejected amendments, i.e. cognitive mechanism of selection of alternative constitutional norms reflecting the po litical choice of the elite of a given country.
Substantial research parameters
1) identification, description and systematization of the adopted constitutional amendments in the countries of the region for the last 25 years. We are talking about the amen dments to the constitutions and constitutional laws adopted on the results of the revolutions and reforms of modern times in 12 post - Soviet states. Of this total number, at the center of the study are the amendments marking a radical or substantial change in the form of government and political regime. These have been accompanied by a high level of political conflict in Armenia (2005, 2016), Azerbaijan (2002, 2009, 2016), Belarus (1996, 2004), Georgia (2004, 2010, 2013), Kazakhstan (1996, 2007, 2009, 2010), Kyrgyzstan (1994 - 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2016), Moldova (2000, 2010, 2016), Tajikistan (1996, 1999, 2016), Turkmenistan (1995 - 2005, 2008, 2014), Uzbekistan (1995, 2002, 2014), Ukraine (2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2014, 2015). In this comparative context par ticular attention is given to the amendments of the Russian Constitution (2008, 2014). Like a cardiogram, these corrections fix changes in the form of government, in a number of cases (as in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova) representing a consistent cyclic al reproduction of similar models of political system.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 99
2) conduction of their classification according to formal criteria - the rubric (to which sections of the Basic Law they relate); the scope of the review (which values, principles and norms of the cons titution are affected by the changes); the method of revision (the ratio of constituent and constituted power, the role of key institutions involved in the development and adoption of amendments); the nature of proposed changes (territorial structure, form of government, bicameralism, the system of separation of powers, the procedure for the formation and prerogatives of individual branches of power and the most important institutions); form (one amendment or group of amendments pursuing a single goal), tim e of the conduction (one - off change or extended in time); preparation procedures (which institution acts as their formal or informal initiator, the developer and the driving force behind their conduction - parliament, government, president). 3) the disclos ure of the procedures for the adoption of amendments with clarification of their specificity by countries, determined by the difference in constitutional norms, legislation, and procedural factors in the countries of the region (flexibility of constitution s, the existence of unchanged constitutional norms, unicameral or bicameral structure of parliament, adopted by the current parliament, include convocation of new parliament, or suggest subsequent approval by referendum, allow participation of the Constitu tional Court in their discussion). 4) comparative analysis of political crises in the regional countries related to the split in relation to the goals and objectives of the constitutional audit: clarifying the expectations of the society and political part ies regarding constitutional amendments; a comparison of the projects of the ruling parties and the opposition; solution of the problem of qualified majority in the parliament, necessary for the promotion of amendments, preparation and conduct of constitut ional referendum and wording of the issues brought to them; position of the Constitutional Courts; constitutional and non - constitutional factors of influence on decision - making, their consequences for overcoming the political (constitutional) crisis and pr oviding conditions for sustainable development; the nature of this exit (through a contract or break of legal continuity). 100 Andrey Medushevsky
5) reconstruction of the political mechanism of constitutional review: determining the correlation between formal and informal goals of reforms, technologies for developing and promoting amendments: which actor is their true initiator; what is the composition of the commission for their development (do they include representatives of the opposition); is it open or closed discussion; whi ch institutions carry out the analysis of the project before it is submitted for discussion; how the procedural framework has changed during the discussion; whether there were attempts to informally influence developers from other institutions or political actors; how did the discussion and adoption of amendments take place. The independent part of the research is the identification and comparative analysis of political (including fully Machiavellian) technologies used by various political regimes for makin g amendments (similarities and differences, foreign borrowings, political control, use of the experience of other countries in the region). It is necessary to clarify whether there was a split in the ruling elite regarding the aims and objectives of the re forms; whether it found expression in the alternative drafts of constitutional revision and by what methods it was overcome. 6) the contribution of amendments to the stabilization of the constitutional (political) system: the answer to the question of why some amendments are adopted and others are not, or adopted in some countries but rejected in others; what foreign samples are used by developers and why; how the process of reforming the constitution looks in time; what political interests are represented in this process; how PR - support of promotion of amendments is organized, the reaction of society to them; whether it is possible to ensure the legitimacy of constitutional amendments. In general, this approach allows to reconstruct alternative strategies f or constitutional modernization, model its dynamics, and compare the phases of constitutional reforms across countries. 7) obtaining evidentiary conclusions about the contribution of the relevant amendments for ensuring democratic consolidation, both prima ry and secondary - democratization of the political system, or, on the contrary, strengthening the authoritarian vector, or creating conditions for the reproduction of constitutional instability (pendulum fluctuations in constitutional models, when subsequ ent constitutional amendments simply reject the previous ones). It is important to test the hypothesis
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 101 about the role of constitutional revision in the consolidation and reconfiguration of party political forces, their identification in the public sphere.
Preliminary conclusions submitted for discussion
The cognitive method is the basis for understanding legal and institutional design in the form of constitutional amendments. The methodology of cognitive constitutionalism seems promising in studying such a form of institutional design as constitutional amendment. The latter is the result of the purposeful cognitive activity of the developers in changing the existing "rules of the game" (values, principles, norms, institutions, procedures for their activities ), which was formalized as a constitutional norm. This concept is, firstly, value - impartial covering both constitutional reforms and counter - reforms. Secondly, it reveals the cognitive framework of the relevant changes including the alternative projects a nd ways to achieve them. Thirdly, it limits the problem area of research to accepted and fixed amendments, positivized in the current law. The presented definition of the constitutional amendment allows to combine cognitive, legal and political parameters of the analysis. Its application contributes to the accumulation and explanation of the original experience of the post - Soviet states in this field (questions of the correlation of ideology and law, constituent and constituted power, the boundaries of the revision of the basic law, the initiators of constitutional audit, the flexibility of interpreting the meaning of norms and their language, the impact of borrowings and the role of informal factors of decision - making). The impact of constitutional design on the transformation of political regimes is indirect and is realized in case of adoption of constitutional amendments. The theory of democratic transition does not explain the contradictory experiments of constitutional reforms in the post - Soviet region - the breakdowns of constitutionalism, the cyclical nature of the reproduction of similar forms, and the multi - vector orientation of political regimes. 102 Andrey Medushevsky
The impact of constitutional design and regime characteristics on the choice of the vector of political development is not mutually exclusive. The thesis of the influence of the form of government on the structure of the regime, just like the opposite thesis about the complete predominance of institutional and political interests over formal and legal ones, should be rejected as too a priori . Constitutional design expresses the cognitive attitudes of the initiators of transformations in accordance with the world mainstream, as well as the goals of the changes (borrowings). The real mechanism of power almost u niversally tends to stability under different forms of government, determining the structure of political regime, the dominance of elite groups, the method of decision - making. The balance of the correlation of constitutional design and regime characteristi cs is determined by the practical implementation of constitutional engineering. This is a "bifurcation point" when legal forms receive political guarantees of implementation, and the latter finds acceptable expression in legal and institutional design. The interaction of constitutional and regime characteristics is most clearly expressed during changes - the development and adoption of constitutional provisions expressed in amendments that modify the form of government and the model of separation of powers. The systematization of conflicts, associated with the adoption of amendments, allows to build a typology of regimes in terms of the degree of constitutional stability and the strategies of constitutional changes. The systematization of problematic situati ons, arising under the conditions of the development, promotion and adoption of constitutional changes, reveals three main strategies in the post - Soviet region: - revolutionary - during the "color revolutions" (complete replacement of the text of the const itution with a new one, using anti - legal or questionable methods from the legal point of view); - reformational - in the modes of authoritarian modernization (changes in constitutions by introducing a series of radical amendments); - conservative - in trad itionalist authoritarian regimes (minor changes in the constitution by partial adjustment of certain norms aimed at legitimizing or replicating the current government or individual leaders).
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 103
Classification of post - Soviet constitutional systems by the crite rion of the change strategies used allows to state the following: ineffectiveness of the amendments in the first case due to the irresistible split of government and opposition and the lack of consolidation of the elite; their strong effectiveness in the s econd case (an imposed compromise, i.e. the fate of the amendments is entirely in the hands of the dominant party with a certain engagement of the opposition) and their instrumental (imitative) character in the third case (for example, in de facto regimes with hereditary power succession). The typology of political regimes in accordance with their use of constitutional amendments allows to classify them into the following types: constitutionally unstable (high dynamics of constitutional changes tend to be c yclical when the subsequent amendment rejects the meaning of the previous one and returns the situation back to the beginning of the transformation); developing (a stable linear dynamics of amendments directed to one goal) and stagnant (the amendments expr ess tactical modifications of the authoritarian regime without qualitative advancement). This enables to build a gradation of transitional political systems from almost constitutional to paraconstitutional and right up to regimes of nominal constitutionali sm. In fact, this classification should be even more fractional, taking into account both institutional and functional - procedural features). The success of a meaningful constitutional audit depends on a combination of cognitive, constitutional and politica l factors. T hey determine the path from the formation of the idea of the amendment and the associated institutional expectations to its formal adoption. This allows to reveal the dysfunctions of post - Soviet regimes. The factors which the success or failure of consti tutional amendments depends on is schematically divided into cognitive, constitutional and institutional - political type. The analysis of the first reveals the motivation for the decision on constitutional amendments, their progress and the methods of adopt ion. There is the possibility of reconstructing the idea of constitutional transformation - from the initial draft of the reform, through its legal formulation (taking into account the overcoming of institutional obstacles and alternative projects) to th e adoption of the amendment (positivization 104 Andrey Medushevsky of new principles, norms and institutions in the current constitutional law). Orientation of developers to parliamentary, mixed or presidential forms is the most visible external expression of these preferences. The institutional limits of the adoption of amendments are determined by the expectations of the developers - the idea of the potential for forming a qualified majority in the parliament, forecasting the support of the initiative by other institutions (t he upper house, the constitutional court or the president), the expectations from the adoption of the referendum approval procedure. In dependent modes, the support of corrections by external players has priority. In the event that the amendments do not ha ve the institutional prerequisites for adoption, we deal with such "amendments" that are more a form of political PR and mobilization of extra - parliamentary supporters of their initiative. The choice of institutional instruments is determined by the follo wing political reasons: the consensus achieved by the elite with regard to the aims of the amendments (the contract within the framework of the theory of "rational choice"), the homogeneity (split) of the elite - the desire for a treaty or the desire of on e part of it to impose its will on others (constitutional amendment as a way of establishing political domination) or the desire of the ruling group to prolong the situation of uncertainty over time (a situation when one political goal is achieved by vario us constitutional amendments, when the amendment was withdrawn by the other one or devalued by legislative, administrative or judicial interpretation of the norms). The formal similarity of the contents of the amendments and the procedures for their adopti on, demanded by developers in different countries, does not necessarily indicate a similarity of regimes and the logic of their functioning. Analysis of institutional factors, that determine the direction of constitutional review, allows to identify the fu nctioning features of formal institutions and procedures. The choice of similar formal procedures for constitutional changes in the post - Soviet region does not necessarily indicate a similarity of the tasks to be solved. They may be similar, different or o pposite. Thus, the task of establishing constitutional stability can be resolved by amendments expanding the prerogatives of the parliament and, on the contrary, limiting them in favor of the executive. It is possible to change this choice in connection wi th
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 105 the loss of the dominant position in the parliament by the ruling party - the transition from the parliamentary system to the mixed one and vice versa. In a comparative context, this calls into question the thesis of the direct connection between "const itutional design" and the parameters of regime, but it makes one resort to building a typology of the mechanisms of their correlation - situations when the form of government really determines its content, does not correspond to it (the imitational type of legitimization), or corresponds to it only partly, inferring the adoption of political decisions from the sphere of constitutional control (various modifications of nominalconstitutionalism). Outwardly very democratic amendment (eg, the transition from th e presidential system to the parliamentary one) or the appeal to the sovereign - people in the form of a referendum may (and often does) serve as an instrument for prolonging elites in power (for example, the practice of referendums in post - Soviet region, pr olonging the stay of the current leader in power or turning the president into a prime minister while retaining the power functions of the former leader and his party). The cognitive dissonance of post - Soviet elites determines the conflict of the constitut ional modernization and the instability of its results. Instability of post - Soviet constitutionalism is expressed in the stability of the contribution of amendments and the degree of predictability of their influence on the transformation of political regi me. The mechanism for adopting amendments reveals the cognitive attitudes of the elite, the correlation of formal legal, procedural and technological preferences. However, it is cognitive and not legal guidelines that determine the goal - setting - the mecha nisms and technologies used, including the vector of constitutional policy and the borrowing strategy. The dynamics of constitutional reforms, the transformation of constitutional legislation and judicial interpretation remains unstable and resembles a neu rotic cycle expressing the change of various psychological conditions - the transition from apathy (the desire to change nothing in the established rules of the game) to a sharp rejection of them (the desire to drop all the figures from the chessboard and start the party with a "clean slate"), disappointment (from the lack of rapid changes for the better) and autism (attempts to give out desirable for 106 Andrey Medushevsky valid). A concentrated expression of these impulses is constitutional amendment as a compromise, fixed in t he constitutional law, between public expectations and a politically conditioned form of their satisfaction. Their real functioning characterizes the reductionism of settings: the transition from the proclamation of "radical" reforms to a restrictive inter pretation of the meaning of innovations, followed by a return to the usual management patterns. The stability of the contribution of the amendments is higher in case the level of political consolidation is higher, while the number of concurrent alternative projects is lower. The development takes place in the mode of political consensus no matter whether real or artificially secured; compliance with formal procedures is not questioned in society; the adopted amendments represent the linear development of pr evious changes rather than the rejection of them; finally, it receives a consistent legitimization in the course of subsequent political development. Until recently, these criteria are more in line with the amendments in authoritarian regimes characterized by a higher level of constitutional stability. The dynamics of post - Soviet constitutional changes do not confirm the hypotheses formulated on Western principles, testifying to the limited legitimacy of constitutional institutions. The analysis of the dyna mics of post - Soviet constitutional changes does not support a number of general hypotheses formulated on the basis of the Western constitutions: - First, the durability of post - Soviet constitutions and the volume of assigned prerogatives of the executive a re not directly correlated with the level of frequency of amendments; - Second, the high level of frequency of amendments does not indicate the durability of constitutions, and, conversely, the low level of frequency of amendments does not point to the shor t life of constitutions. All post - Soviet constitutions are subject to criticism and adjustment almost from the moment of their adoption. Their fate is not directly related to the amendments introduced or the absence of such amendments. In any case, there i s no consistent correlation of these parameters.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 107
- Third, the rigidity of constitutions is not an insurmountable obstacle to their revision. Greater flexibility does not guarantee an automatic increase in the number of amendments; - Fourth, the low frequency of amendments does not necessarily indicate an increase in the significance of judicial interpretation as a way of constitutional revision. - Fifth, the choice of alternative strategies and instruments for revision (constitutional, quasi - constitutional, an d unconstitutional) is determined not so much by the rigidity of the constitution as by the degree of stability of the political regime and the ruling elite as well as by the expectations of the success of the action in the short or medium term rather than long - term perspective. In general, these features testify to the incompleteness of the formation of the constitutional systems of post - Soviet states and the limited scope of the legitimacy of constitutional institutions. Classification of amendments by fo rmal legal and political criteria enables to reveal their contribution to the choice of the regime transformation vector and predictable political effect . The definition of the role of constitutional amendments in the revision of the "rules of the game" wi thin political regimes allows to classify amendments according to 1) the degree of formal conformity of the constitution (ie, the rules on the adoption of amendments and legislative review procedures); 2) the degree of influence on the constitutional inter pretation of the principle of separation of powers - its radical revision (the introduction of a new form of government), the adjustment of the existing model (in favor of one of the branches of power), less significant changes; 3) the extent of the impact on the political system (changing the structure, the order of formation or functioning of institutions of power); 4) the degree of influence on the future trends of the political regime (towards democratization, authoritarianism or the emergence of new hy brid forms). The revision of constitutional norms without formal adoption of amendments (in the narrow legal sense of the term) is carried out in three ways - modifications of legislation both constitutional and customary, 108 Andrey Medushevsky judicial interpretation and chang ing priorities of administrative regulation. The radicalism of the amendments determines their strong impact on the adjustment of the political system in the short term, but it is less significant in the long term, as its effect is reduced by subsequent co unter - amendments, legislative changes or the use of informal methods of audit. The negative trends in the use of these alternative instruments of constitutional revision are obvious: the legislation of the post - Soviet countries under the pretext of "clarif ying" constitutional norms and bringing them closer to "life," capable to significantly limit the scope of their application; the decisions of constitutional courts are contradictory up to the adoption of mutually exclusive decisions on similar issues in d ifferent countries or at different stages of the constitutional crisis in one country; the legitimacy is limited. The contribution of informal political practices is rather significant. Their combined impact is not inferior to formal practices, and in some cases determines their selective application . Informal political practices related to the procedures of constitutional review can be divided into constitutional, extra - constitutional and anti - constitutional types, differing in the degree of destructive im pact on the legal system. They cover all relevant procedures for the promotion of amendments in the political process and can be grouped as special technologies reproduced in countries of the region. These include: - the use of constitutional ambiguity (gap s and contradictions in the basic law) for the purposes of the current elite which is facilitated by a contradictory decision on who is the guarantor of the constitution - the parliament, the constitutional court, the president or the "people"; - restricti on of public information or direct disinformation of the public about the purposes of the planned constitutional amendments, the use of euphemisms or concepts that distort the essence of the amendment, including unilateral formation of the political agenda ; - use of the institutions of direct democracy (referendums) as opposed to the constitutional institutions of representative democracy;
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 109
- tendentious (politicized) interpretation of norms by the institutions of constitutional justice, which take the side o f one of the branches of power; - involvement of quasi - constitutional institutions ("public" organizations) for the introduction and development of amendments (especially if the procedure for the formation and operation of quasi - public organizations is not clearly fixed in legislation); - isolation of the opposition within the framework of the legislative institutes; - behind - the - scenes conspiracy (decision on the amendment in a closed, intra - elite regime - behind not only formal institutions, but also of i ts own political parties); - coerced promotion of amendments using various means to influence lawmakers - corruption, manipulation and threats. The structure of informal practices reflects the changing nature of unconstitutional practices in adopting amendm ents. The use of informal practices is presented in all spheres, levels and periods of constitutional regulation. It covers the spheres of legislative, judicial and administrative practices, constitutional and customary legislation, and it is highly import ant in situations of political instability. While some of the informal practices do not conflict with the constitution (expressing the general features of any transitional political process and the difficulties of inter - party dialogue) or they are on the v erge of constitutionality (exploiting the low political culture of society and the weakness of constitutional justice), others are openly unconstitutional, undermining the legitimacy of the relevant amendments. Examples are "unscrupulous" agreements of pol itical parties (or their parliamentary factions and leadership); the imposed coordination of the actions of the ruling party and the opposition under the auspices of an outwardly "impartial" arbitrator; changes of procedures for discussion and adoption of amendments in course of their conduction; direct or indirect pressure of the authorities on the opposition or the courts; falsification of electoral process, information manipulation. The volume of unconstitutional practices is less pronounced at the level of legislative regulation. Meanwhile, it increases at the level of 110 Andrey Medushevsky regulation of parliamentary procedures (changing the rules for their implementation), administrative powers and the adoption of judicial decisions on constitutional issues. The cataloging of the application of informal technologies for the promotion of amendments across countries allows to identify the difficult - to - recognize alignment of power within the ruling regimes with respect to the vector of constitutional changes - from the supporte rs of "legalism" to the adherents of political expediency. A formal constitutional amendment may result from these gradual and inconspicuous constitutional changes, precede them, or articulate their cumulative impact on the transformation of the political regime. Recognition of amendments or procedures for their adoption as unconstitutional does not mean their automatic legal abolition. However, it leads to a political conflict: in the event of a split in the elite, it becomes the basis for calls for action s of civil disobedience, and sometimes leads to the overthrow of relevant regimes. The legalization of politics and the politicization of law in the adoption of amendments are the two sides of the instability of the constitutional policy typical to post - So viet regimes. Legalization of politics is a general trend of regimes that have adopted constitutionalism as the legitimating basis of their existence. However, the attempt for strict formalization of procedures makes the relevant norms (usually borrowed fr om more advanced foreign models) incompetent. This, in its turn, motivates the struggle for their abolition. The politicization of amendments - the way they are actualized in the political struggle - is determined by the following reasons: they do not stem from a single legitimizing doctrine; the interpretation of the amendments is not neutral; administrative practices in the application of norms (especially taking into account the previous two components) tend to adopt a doctrine of discretion that involve s a broad interpretation of the delegated powers of the executive especially in matters of security and struggle against separatism and terrorism). The peculiarity of post - Soviet states is that these methods of constitutional review (more precisely, change s in the meaning of fundamental constitutional principles and norms) are poorly understood by society and legislators, but are in high demand by the current political
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 81 - 112 111 regimes. The political effect of constitutional amendments is different in the context of general trends of the policy of law (or the so - called "constitutional policy") of the post - Soviet regimes. Some amendments actually mean a veiled coup d'état carried out with the continuation of the formal constitutional succession of the government when it actually changes (eg, amendments fixing a lifetime presidency or introducing an indefinite procedure for the re - election of one leader for the presidency). "Childhood diseases" of post - Soviet constitutionalism is an expression of the conflict of goals a nd means of transformation. Rational choice in constitutional design is confronted with the lack of a full - fledged doctrine of constitutional modernization, bringing legal solutions to the victim of political expediency. The dysfunction is expressed in the following ways: - conflict of overstated expectations of society from constitutional reform and the desire of elites to maintain political stability; - contradiction in the priorities of constitutional regulation - gaining national sovereignty, building a l egal state (formal equality of individuals) and protecting the rights of minorities (the first priority often contradicts the second one, both contradict the third one); - non - compliance of goals and means of legal regulation (conflict of democracy and mai ntenance of stability in transitional societies); - impulsive nature of conduction - a limited period of time for transformations related to the logic of geopolitical changes (orientation to external actors), the duration of the electoral cycle, and the de sire of elites (national and ethnic clans) to maintain their own dominance. The permanent "constitutional fever" is expressed in the ephemeral nature of constitutional changes, the comparative ease of which is combined with a multi - vector orientation, recu rrent movements and the instability of realization. This phenomenon reflects the childhood diseases of post - Soviet regimes: a limited amount of their democratic legitimacy, a general distrust of law as a form of social regulation, cognitive dissonance with regard to the priorities of constitutional policy. 112 Andrey Medushevsky
Rethinking the doctrine of amendments and eliminating dysfunctions in their adoption is the way to sustainable political and legal development in the region. Sustainable constitutional development presupp oses overcoming the contradictions of constitutional regulation: - the doctrinal rethinking of the priorities of the constitutional policy ("policy of amendments") by the ruling class of the countries of the region; - the agreement between the main actors of the political process on long - term goals of constitutional modernization, with the possibility of legal fixation of the priorities of its strategy, goals and promotion tools; - professionalism and continuity of the elite, capable of carrying out these go als in the long term under the conditions of democratic political competition, i.e. despite the change in the configuration of political forces in the parliament (the importance of public and legal ethics and the ent renchment of its values in the public consciousness and the practice of elites); - independence of constitutional justice and development of a stable doctrine of political legitimization of judicial decisions in society (including anti - majority decisions , which are in conflict with the mood of society and elites); - comparative study and generalization of the experience of constitutional amendments of the post - Soviet states to identify the causes of dysfunctions in their conduct (an official comment on thi s); - description and fixation of informal practices for the promotion of amendments with the aim of elucidating their unconstitutional substratum and the possibilities for its elimination through directed legislative regulation (generalization of practices and the "roadmap" of their binding revision); - independent monitoring of constitutional amendments as an important tool for adjusting political and legal regimes in post - Soviet states.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 113
CONFLICT RESOLUTION DOI: 10.19 266 /1829 - 4286 - 201 7 - 0 1 - 113 - 130 From Natural Allies to Belligerent Neig h bours: The Evolution of Foes’ Conceptions in Armenia’s Foreign Policy Discourse *
ARAM TERZYAN Malmö University, Sweden
Conventional wisdom presumes that the portrayal of the foe in a state’s foreign policy discourse is quite indicative of the core characteristics of its foreign policy identity. Relying on discourse analysis of Armenian Presidents’ speeches, this study explores the evolution of foe’s conc eption in Armenia’s foreign policy discourse from 1991 to 2016. More specifically, it scrutinizes major ups and downs of Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s conceptions, examining their identity - related and situational determinants and constraints. It markedly depa rts from political and economic explanations of Armenia’s troubled relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, focusing chiefly on Armenian Presidents’ beliefs about country’s staunch foes. Remarkably, foes’ conceptions have experienced puzzling fluctuations in Presidents’ discourse from 1991 - 2016. The characteristics of Azerbaijan and Turkey have shifted from the notions ‘natural allies’ and ‘indispensable neighbours’ to ‘belligerent’, ‘bellicose’, ‘destructive, ‘Armeneophobic’, ‘Ottoman’ and ‘unreliable’ actors . Along with situational constraints, the principal causes of the shift lie in different belief systems of Armenian Presidents, and most, importantly, Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s mounting animosity towards Armenia.
Keywords Azerbaijan, Turkey, foe, Armenop hobia , belligerence
Introduction
The long - standing logjam over Armenia’s troubled relations with ______* This publication is part of my postdoctoral research at the department of Global Political Studies o f Malmö University, thanks to a Swedish Institute scholarship.
114 Aram Terzyan
Azerbaijan and Turkey has prompted a focus on a wide array of regional - level (geo) political and (geo) economic constraints. Remarkably, a bunch of studies adopt geopolitical notions to accou nt for the anatomy of belligerence and ensuing bitter divisions among Armenia and its neighbours. In essence, there is a tendency for the emphasis to be placed on regional - level geopolitical and geoeconomic constraints determined by major regional powers, such as Iran, Turkey, Russia and the US 1 . Additionally, some studies focus on the conceptual framework of Turkey’s modern foreign policy, scrutinizing the implications of "Neo - Ottomanism" ideology and "Strategic Depth" doctrine for its relations with frien ds and foes 2 . Alternatively, some authors devote significant attention to the core constraints, stemming from Armenia’s smallness 3 - incapability of redefining its relations with neighbors. It is generally assumed that alongside other political and econo mic constraints, historical controversies with Turkey 4 , as well as historical development of the Armenian and Azerbaijani national identities and the overlapping claims to the territory of Nagorno - Karabakh 5 militate against achieving a breakthrough. Where as little to no attention has been devoted to social constructivist perspective of key policy - makers’ core beliefs and their role in policy making. Departing from mainstream explanations of troubled relations, this study focuses particularly on Armenia’s P residents’ beliefs about Azerbaijan and Turkey in the operational code approach. The concept of operational code refers to the set of axioms, postulates, and premises that
1 Jafalian A. ed., Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus : Regional Conflicts and Transformation, Ashgate Publishing, 2011; De Waal T., The Caucasus: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2010. 2 Torosyan T., Arshakyan G., Turkey’s Modern Foreign Policy: New Challenges and New Opportunities, Armenian Journal of Poltical Science , 2015 , 2 , 3 , 73 - 90. 3 Kotchikian A., The Dialectics of Smallness: State - Making in the South Caucasus, AIPRG Working Paper No. 06/13 , pp. 1 - 21. 4 Mirzoyan A., Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the West: Between History and Geopolitics , Palgrave Macmilan, 2010, pp. 55 - 106. 5 Geukjian O., Ethni city, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno - Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy, Routledge, 2012.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 115 appear to constitute the foundation of more specific beliefs and practices. Accordi ng to a widely adopted definition “the individual’s belief set represents all the hypotheses and theories that he is convin ced are valid at a given moment ” 6 . The beliefs have been classified into two broad categories: those concerned with the leader's phi losophical beliefs about the nature of the political universe and those concerned with the leader's choices and instrumental tactics 7 . These beliefs focus on overall perception of the reality (philosophical beliefs) as well as the conception of the method s and instruments to attain policy goals within the constraints of the perceived reality (instrumental beliefs) 8 . Additionally, a belief system entails normative beliefs (beliefs about what ought to be) and positive beliefs (beliefs about what is), centra l and peripheral beliefs (beliefs which are unshakeable and beliefs which are less central), and open and closed belief systems (belief systems which are or are not open to change in general) 9 . Given the challenges and constraints of tracing complex system s of beliefs, feelings, and motivations in the brain of an individual, there is a propensity in studies to explore the contents and relationships of a belief system through its effects as manifested in the language of human subjects. It is generally assume d that w ords represent the exercise of power in the form of making threats and promises or in the form of invoking authority to support or oppose actions between states or other agents in world politics 10 . Overall, the study relies on discourse and content analysis of Armenian Presidents’ speeches to elucidate their principal beliefs about the nature and core characteristics of Armenia’s foes, say, the evolution of Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s conceptions in their political thinking.
6 Houghton D. P., Political Psychology: Situations, Individuals, and Cases, Routledge 2009, p. 106. 7 Jerold M ed., The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton , The University of Michigan Press, 2003 , pp. 35 - 42. 8 Houghton …Op. cit., pp. 106 - 107. 9 Ibid. 10 Schafer M. and Walker G. S. ed., Beliefs and Leadership in Wo rld Politics, Palgrave Macmilan, 2006, p. 31. 116 Aram Terzyan
While process tracing shed s light on major situational constraints that, alongside Presidents’ beliefs, have determined their perceptions of foe.
The portrayal of Turkey and Azerbaijan in Levon Ter - Petrosyan’s discourse (1991 - 1998)
The conception of Turkey has experienced dramati c ups and downs in Armenian foreign policy discourse since the restoration of Armenia’s independence in 1991. The newly formed political elite, known as the Pan - Armenian National Movement (PANM), embarked on ambitious objective of redefining Armenia’s tr aditional friends and foes in Armenian political thinking. More precisely, it started to shape a new neutral and civic identity that was believed to be conducive to the challenges threatening the country. At the core of this policy was the transformation of the Armenian - Turkish relations. Given the Ottoman past and, in particular, the strong mark that the Genocide has left on Armenian collective memory and identity, "Turkey" appeared to represent everything that opposed the essence of "Armenia. "Turkey’s p erception as a historical foe in Armenian collective memory was reinforced following the Turkish blockade of the country, a gesture of solidarity with Azerbaijan. Armenia’s political elite, however, viewed anti - Turkish sentiments as a threat to Armenian - Tu rkish rapprochement, which was viewed as indispensable for Armenia’s steady development and regional stability. The political elite worked hard to overcome Armenian society's deep - seated anger toward Turkey. "We always remember historical conflicts but, gu ided by our country’s realistic interests, we must overcome our pain and establish normal interstate relations… The psychological barriers appear to be overcome, which is the greatest achievement of our movement" 11 . In an attempt to alleviate the severe suf fering caused by the economic blockade and transition, the ruling elite was consistently striving to prepare ground for the Armenian - Turkish rapprochement. The discourse analysis of Armenia’s foreign policy from
11 Ter - Petrosyan L., Yntrani: Eluytner, Hodvacner, Harcazruycner {Selected Speeches, Articles, Interviews, Archives of the First President of the Republic of Armenia}, Erevan, 2006, p. 300.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 117
1991 - 1998 indicates that despite the challen ges facing Armenia due to the blockade by Turkey, there was no outright anti - Turkish rhetoric. To this end, it attempted to transform Turkey from a historical foe to an indispensable neighbor. Furthermore, Turkey's core characteristics in Ter - Petrosyan’s d iscourse are intimately linked to the notion of "friend" rather than that of "foe." Ter - Petrosyan’s administration did not put the issue of the Genocide recognition on the foreign policy agenda, viewing it as prejudicial to the Armenian - Turkish relations. "Armenia regards the events that occurred in 1915 as a genocide against the Armenian people. Nevertheless, Armenia does not view that issue as a prerequisite for normalizing Armenian - Turkish relations... Mutual understanding between two societies is contin gent upon rapid settlement of bilateral relations" 12 . In Ter - Petrosyan’s view, Turkey’s historical depiction as a hostile enemy in Armenian collective memory had to be overcome in order to prepare society for dialogue and mutual understanding. He declared: "As neighboring states, Armenia and Turkey have to forge mutually beneficial economic ties and gradually overcome historical conflicts, rebuild confidence between Armenian and Turkish societies via the establishment of friendly relations… this obliges eac h party to display political will and moral attitude" 13 . The president of Armenia tended to attribute the lack of progress in Armenian - Turkish relations to Azerbaijan’s aggressive stance against any sort of normalization: "We stand ready to establish relati ons without any preconditions right away… Turkey does not reportedly oppose this but seems to have been fallen into a trap which it set by linking the improvement of its relations with Armenia to the Armenian - Azerbaijani relations and in particular to the resolution of the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict" 14 . Ter - Petrosyan avoided taking a harsh position towards Azerbaijan since he believed that the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict was essential for Armenia’s national interests and regional coop eration. Ter - Petrosyan tended to interpret the conflict as a Kremlin - led conspiracy against two nations, rather than a manifestation of ethno - political antagonism
12 Ter - Petrosyan L ., Op. cit., p. 480. 13 Ter - Petrosyan L., Op. cit., p. 48. 14 Ter - Petrosyan L., Op. cit., p. 595. 118 Aram Terzyan stemming from racial, cultural and religious divisions: "There is no ethnic, racial, national or religious factor behind the conflict…the conflict itself has been artificially incited and retained by colonial nation [Russia]. Without the Kremlin’s interference, Armenia and Azerbaijan would find a common language… If there was a democratic governme nt in Azerbaijan that was open to dialogue, any sort of mediation would be rendered obsolete" 15 . President Ter - Petrosyan was adhering to the "democratic peace" theory, which believes democracy promotion is essential to breaking the impasse in the "frozen" c onflict. "I am confident that,once we have a fair settlement for the Karabakh conflict, our societies will quickly rediscover the devices necessary to retain the traditions of peaceful co - existence" 16 . Notwithstanding the Armenian - Azerbaijani conflict, Arme nia’s foreign policy discourse was free of rhetoric that propagated contempt against Azerbaijan. Ter - Petrosyan made a clear distinction between the Azerbaijani state and society, contending that the core hindrance to Armenian - Azerbaijani dispute resolution was the deficit of democracy in Azerbaijan and its unwillingness to remain committed to a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, Ter - Petrosyan’s discourse tended to be more negative than positive about Azerbaijan; there was a blurred line between the notio ns of "friend" and "foe." Ter - Petrosyan criticized Baku’s policy, which in his view, used the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict to deflect attention from domestic economic, political and social shortcomings 17 . The core conceptions of Azerbaijan in Armenia’s foreign policy discourse under Ter - Petrosyan’s presidency were reflected in the following terms: "destructive", "belligerent", "nondemocratic", "natural ally", "neighboring partner", etc. The Nagorno - Karabakh conflict was seen as the major obstacle to the rapproc hement with "natural allies", Azerbaijan and Turkey. The ruling elite stressed the potential economic significance of the Armenian - Turkish and tha Armenian - Azerbaijani relations, claiming that historical conflict and identity - related constraints
15 Ter - Petrosyan L., Op. cit., p. 197. 16 Ter - Petrosyan L., Op. cit., p. 196. 17 Ter - Petrosyan L., Op. cit., p. 194.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 119 must come second to economic interests. In Ter - Petrosyan’s view "Karabakh’s foe is the international community rather than Azerbaijan" 18 . Nevertheless, his efforts at redefining Azerbaijan and Turkey in Armenian strategic thinking beyond the notion of "the other" and reconciling collective memory with economic considerations proved futile. His "pro - Turkish" and "pro - Azerbaijani" views, especially the emphasis on concessions in the NKR conflict resolution in exchange for lifting the blockade, were at odds with widely h eld views among the public. This ultimately resulted in his resignation in 1998.
The conception of foes in Robert Kocharyan’s discourse (1998 - 2008)
The Armenian government's positions toward Azerbaijan and Turkey in foreign policy discourse hardened mark edly throughout Robert Kocharyan’s presidency. He firmly asserted: "After 10 years of a re - evaluation of our approach, now I think that it was politically wrong [to make concessions]. It gave no results. And what happened in 1998 - 2000 regarding the toughen ing of the position towards Turkey was logical as we got nothing from our concessions..." 19 In Kocharyan’s speeches, Turkey is fiercely condemned for subjecting Armenia to an unlawful blockade, which hindered Armenia’s advancement toward European integratio n and steady development. Yet, despite the historical conflict and the Turkish blockade, there was a tendency to regard Turkey as an important neighbor that could play a crucial role in regional stability if it reversed its policy toward Armenia. "History and geography have thrown us together, we are neighbors… some distance between our two countries might have allowed us to put distance between our past and our future. But we have no such luxury. There is no space, no cushion, between us" 20 . The National Se curity Strategy states: "The absence of normalized
18 Ter - Petrosyan L., Op. cit., p . 630. 19 Armenian leader tells Turkey not to meddle in Karabakh , January 2003, http://reliefweb.int/report/armenia/armenian - leader - tellsturkey - not - meddle - karabak (11.09.2016). 20 Speech by Vartan Oskanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Republic of Armenia, June 26, 2002, http://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/item/2002/06/26/turk/ (09.03.2017). 120 Aram Terzyan relations adversely affects the stability of the region… The normalization of Armenian Turkish relations would lower the possibility of new dividing lines emerging in the region and would help to create a more conducive environment for the final settlement of the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict" 21 . Throughout Kocharyan’s presidency, Yerevan repeatedly expressed its readiness to bypass the issue of Genocide recognition in order to break the impasse in the Armenian - Turkish relationship. The National Security Strategy of Armenia states: "Armenia has long advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations without any precondition and will continue its efforts to surmount the obstacles and improve the bilateral relatio ns between Armenia and Turkey" 22 . The lack of any tangible progress in normalization was attributed to Ankara’s aggressive policy. When asked about the main obstacles to the normalization of bilateral relations, Foreign Minister Oskanian was quick to cite T urkey’s stance on the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict: "The establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey or the complete re - opening of the border before the conflict's final settlement is not probable… the Karabakh issue has become a precondi tion for normalizing relations 23 . The core characteristics of Turkey in foreign policy discourse under Kocharyan are linked to contrary notions of "important neighbor" and "historical foe", characterized by "non - European policy" and "belligerent rhetoric". Regarding Azerbaijan, Armenia’s foreign policy makers started out on a positive note, placing strong faith in peaceful negotiations. Initially, Kocharyan abstained from adopting a harsh position toward Azerbaijan, calling on the latter to tone down its amb itions and resume negotiations over a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict without preconditions 24 . In the president’s view, a breakthrough in the conflict settlement could be
21 Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy , http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf (07.08.2015). 22 Ibid. 23 An Exclusive Interview by Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian to the Mediamax Agency , October 18, 2002, http://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/item/2002/10/18/mediamax (26.02.2016). 24 Kocharyan R., Eluytner ev harcazruycner {Speeches and Statements} ,Yerevan, 2011, p. 19.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 121 achieved only via intensified and persistent efforts at movi ng beyond the deep - rooted hostilities. Like his predecessor, Kocharyan invariably stressed that, despite Azerbaijan’s efforts at presenting the conflict in religious and cultural realm in order to win the Muslim world’s support, there is no religious or cu ltural reason behind the conflict 25 . Nevertheless, over time he started to respond to Azerbaijan’s propaganda and threats to resume war against Armenia. A new line in Yerevan’s foreign policy discourse regarded Azerbaijan as an "aggressor". "The war of 1992 - 1994 was precipitated by the aggression unleashed by Azerbaijani authorities seeking to conquer the territory of Nagorno - Karabakh through ethnic cleansing…the conflict settlement should build upon its essence rather than Azerbaijan’s build - up stemming fro m oil dollars. That is a recipe for confrontation rather than compromise" 26 . Guided by European patterns of conflict settlement, Armenian foreign policy makers believed intensified interaction between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be instrumental in breaking the impasse: "The history of the EU formation indicates the advantages of regional cooperation as a path to prosperity and stability…Lack of regional cooperation is one of the core impediments to the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict settlement. Armenia believes in the possibility of conflict settlement through regional cooperation, whereas Azerbaijan rules out the possibility of cooperation unless the conflict is settled" 27 . Kocharyan began to question the ethnic compatibility of Armenians and Azerbaijanis: "The a nti - Armenian pogroms (in 1988 in Sumgait and in 1990 in Baku) have shown that Armenians and Azerbaijanis are ethnically incompatible. People who have lived through a genocide cannot allow it to repeat itself" 28 . The parties have drifted further apart during President Aliyev’s presidency. The nadir came when Azerbaijani Army lieutenant , Ramil Safarov, killed 26 - year - old Armenian officer, Lieutenant Gurgen Margaryan in his sleep, during a special NATO - backed course in Budapest on February 19, 2004. Safarov was subsequently hailed as a
25 Kocharyan R., Op. cit., p. 141. 26 Kocharya n R., Op. cit., p. 247. 27 Kocharyan R., Op. cit., p. 255. 28 Ar menian leader… 122 Aram Terzyan hero in Azerbaijan, gaining Aliyev’s explicit support 29 . In statements following the incident, Kocharyan emphasized that Azerbaijan’s hostility left little room for optimism in regards to peaceful conflict resolution. The murder wi dened the conflict, and consolidated anti - Azerbaijani sentiments across Armenian society. The portrayal of "the other" became increasingly savage. President Kocharyan said, "Armenian society would never glorify an axe - murderer decapitating a human being wh o is asleep. I am confident that in such a psychological condition a society cannot succeed..." 30 The National Security Strategy of Armenia stresses the need for conflict transformation, referring to Azerbaijan’s policy as detrimental to conflict settlement and regional cooperation: "Azerbaijan has adopted a policy aimed at the exclusion of Armenia from all projects of regional cooperation. Azerbaijan continuously refuses to open its communication routes with Armenia and denies all Armenian and international initiatives to engage in bilateral cooperation in an attempt to exert pressure on Armenia regarding the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict. Armenia believes that bilateral and regional cooperation could build confidence and have a serious positive impact on the ov erall situation. Armenia will continue its confidence building efforts and to this end will encourage cooperation, contacts and visits on every level" 31 . To sum up, unlike his predecessor, Kocharyan adopted a harsher position vis - à - vis Turkey invariably str essing that Armenia was not going to ignore the history. Yet Kocharyan abstained from putting preconditions on the establishment of bilateral relations, which he believed were essential for Armenia’s eventual European integration. The core characteristics of Azerbaijan and Turkey in Armenia’s foreign policy under Kocharyan’s presidency revolved around the notions "belligerent", "bellicose", "destructive", "ethnically incompatible", and "aggressive” 32 .
29 Azerbajani Kills Armenian at Peace Program , February 19.2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ articles/A54979 - 2004Feb19.html (22.09.2016). 30 Kocharyan R., Op. cit., p. 2 97. 31 Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy… 32 Terzyan A., Galstyan N., The Portrayal of “The Other” in Foreign Policy Discourse and Public Consciousness in Armenia (2008 – present)’, Caucasus Analytical Digest , Centre for Security Studies (CSS), Sep tember 2015, 77 , pp. 2 - 6.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 12 3
The conception of Turkey in Serzh Sargsyan’s discourse ( 2008 - 2016)
The outset of Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency coincided with large - scale geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus, including the Five Day War fought between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The unfreezing of "frozen" conflicts sent ripples of apprehension through Armenia at the possibility of a "spill - over" of instability into the country. To mitigate possible risks, Sargsyan expressed the political will to move beyond deep - rooted hostilities and identify the means for peaceful co - existence with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Sargsyan placed special emphasis on redefining Armenia’s general and foreign policy identities, a process seen as essential to achieving a breakthrough in regional cooperation: "We should formulate and define a new Armenian ide ntity, an identity that should become our beacon in the new century” 33 . The call implicitly stressed the necessity to resolve the Armenian - Turkish conflict and turn the page on the long - stalled relations between the two countries. The Turkish notions of "ze ro - problems with neighbors" and "rhythmic diplomacy" seemed to reflect Ankara’s new position, particularly concerning the normalization of Armenian - Turkish relations, which were previously perceived as a "red line" issue. This warming received a further im petus from Ankara’s 2008 proposal to establish the "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform". The new developments were expressed in Sargsyan’s foreign policy discourse, characterized by a strong emphasis on the notions of a united Caucasus and Armenia n - Turkish rapprochement. Sargsyan declared: “I believe that the August (2008) events have made it clear for everyone how tense the situation in the Caucasus actually is, and how serious the challenges and threats are 34 . He attached critical importance to re gional cooperation as a recipe for addressing these new challenges. Armenian - Turkish rapprochement was
33 Speech delivered by President Serzh Sargsyan in the United States at the official reception hosted by the Embassy of Armenia to the US, Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations and leading Armenian - American Organizat ions , September 24, 2008, http://www.president.am/en/statements - and - messages/item/2008/09/24/news - 18/ (04.02.2016). 34 Speech by President of the Republic of Armenia H.E. Mr. Serzh Sargsyan at the 45th Munich Security Conference , February 7, 2009, http://www.president.am/en/press - release/item/2009/02/07/news - 395/ (17.04.2016). 124 Aram Terzyan placed at the heart of the renewed regional policy: "I truly believe that the time has come to solve problems in Armenian - Turkish relations" 35 . To bring t hese visions to fruition, Sargsyan invited the Turkish president to visit Armenia on September 6, 2008 to watch the World Cup qualifying match between Armenia and Turkey. Abdullah Gül’s historical visit to Yerevan, coupled with Sargsyan’s commitment to est ablish diplomatic relations with Turkey without setting pre - conditions, profoundly challenged the status - quo. All subsequent developments and statements appeared to support the establishment of diplomatic relations within a very short time. The "roadmap" f or normalizing relations was finalized in April 2009 and on October 10, the two countries' foreign ministers signed the "Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey" and a "Protocol on th e development of relations between of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey". The ratification of the protocols seemed to be just a matter of time, given the parties strong rhetoric supporting the end to the deadlock. Regrettably, the reality shaped up differently and, shortly after signing them, Turkey backtracked on its commitment to establishing relations with Armenia without setting preconditions 36 . The conciliatory policy spotlighted many identity - related obstacles to the establishment of bilateral relations. From the outset, Armenian - Turkish rapprochement sparked political and public debates in Armenia. The nationalist party Dashnaktsutyun pulled out of the ruling coalition in protest over the talks. The party harshly criticized Sargsyan’s conciliatory policy towards Turkey, in particular, the normalization "roadmap", which it believed did not reciprocate Armenia’s concessions. Dashnaktsutyun expressed deep concerns over the possible preconditions imposed on Armenia by Ankara, referring to the fact that Turkey had not lifted the economic blockade 37 . Armenians in Diaspora – the descendants of Armenian Genocide survivors – viewed Sargsyan’s conciliatory policy
35 Speech delivered by President Serzh Sargsyan in the United States… 36 Terzyan A., The Evolution of Armenia’s Foreign Policy Identity: The Conception of Identity Driven Paths. Friends and Foes in Armenian Foreign Policy Discourse , Values and Identity As Sources of Foreign Policy in Armenia and Georgia , ed. Kornely Kakachia and Alexander Markarov, ‘UNIVERSAL’, pp. 170 - 171. 37 Dashnaks Quit Armenia’s Ruling Coalition , April 27, 2009, http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/1616799.html (14.03.2016).
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 125 towards Turkey as a "betrayal". To reduce widespread anxieties and clarify the proces s, the president went on a pan - Armenian tour to major Armenian communities. He repeatedly emphasized that the process would not jeopardize the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and was not dependent upon the settlement of the Nagorno - Karab akh conflict through unacceptable concessions 38 . Notwithstanding this intensified effort to break the deadlock, over time other obstacles came to the light. Specifically, Turkey proved incapable of resisting Azerbaijan’s staunch opposition to Armenian - Turki sh conciliation. Sargsyan suspended the procedure of ratifying the Protocols 39 . Following the failed process, Sargsyan toughened his position towards Turkey: "The policy of "zero problems" with neighbors yielded zero results. That occurred because Turkey i s trying to solve all problems with neighbors at the expense of those very neighbors" 40 . The failed outreach had deep repercussions with Armenian society, reinforcing fears that Turkey’s imperial nature was unchanged. Sargsyan’s discourse expressed this ide a clearly, when he branded Turkey’s regional policy as a vivid manifestation of a "New Ottomanism": "What did the Ottoman Empire bring to the peoples under its yoke other than massacres, oppression, and tyranny? Does anyone miss Ottomanism, or support a re ason to deliver a "New Ottomanism"? 41 Foreign Minister Nalbandian questioned Turkey’s adherence to "zero problem with neighbors", stressing the disconnect between its rhetoric and policy: "Turkey pretends that all problems in the region must have a "compreh ensive solution" once and for all. This is a beautiful phrase, but how realistic is it? It is mere rhetoric, all words and
38 Address by President Serzh Sargsyan during the meeting with the Armenian - Iranian community - Statements and messages of the President of RA - Updates - The President of the Republic of Armenia [the official site] , April 14, 2009, http://www.president.am/en/statements - andmessages/item/2009/04/14/news - 34/ (21.03.2016). 39 Terzyan A …, Op. cit., p. 172. 40 Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the Extended Meeting Held at the RA Ministr y of Defense , January 15, 2013, http://www.president.am/en/statements - andmessages/item/2013/01/15/President - Serzh - Sargsyan - speech - session - Ministryof - Defense/ (18.06.2017). 41 Speech of S. Sargsyan in the House of Representatives of Cyprus, January 17, 2011, http://www.aysor.am/en/news/2011/01/17/serzh - sargsyan - cyprus - address/237747 / (20.06.2017). 126 Aram Terzyan no performance… It seems we speak in different languages. On the one hand, the Turkish leaders pretend that they always respect the p rinciple of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), but on the other hand, they refrain from ratifying and implementing the agreements signed by themselves in Zurich" 42 . Turkey’s withdrawal from the protocols eroded Armenian confidence in Turkey and further hardened the view of Turkey as an unreliable and unpredictable neighbor which pursued anti - Armenian policies. “To hell with you, ratification" 43 . This crude phrase, which Sargsyan delivered to Ankara at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly on September 24, 2014, is indicative of the difficulties that his position towards Turkey has undergone throughout his tenure. On February 16, 2015 the president sent an official letter to the Chairman of the National Assembly Galust Sahakyan to recall the A rmenian - Turkey protocols from parliament 44 . In essence, Sargsyan’s initial attempts at redefining Armenia’s foreign policy identity to bring it in line with Armenian - Turkish rapprochement proved futile. Subsequently, the terms "Ottoman", "destructive", "bel ligerent" and "unreliable" became the core characteristics of Turkey in Armenia’s foreign policy discourse.
From sheer optimism to infinite disillusionment: the evolution of Azerbaijan’s conceptionin Serzh Sargsyan’s dscourse
From the very outset of his presidency, Sargsyan stressed the necessity of political will in achieving a breakthrough in Armenian - Azerbaijani relations. Armenian foreign policy makers have consistently stressed that Azerbaijan’s anti - Armenian propaganda, coupled with the full - blown arms race between the two countries, doomed initiatives for
42 Edward Nalbandian, Turkey Has Gone Back on its Word: Armenia's foreign minister says Ankara needs to prove its good intentions , http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100 01424052748703794104575545663167622050 (14.04.2017). 43 Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the 69 th Session of the UN General Assembly, September 24, 2014 , http://www.president.am/en/statements - andmessages/item/2014/09/24/President - Serzh - Sargsyan - UN - N ew - York - speech/ (12.02.2016). 44 Serzh Sargsyan Recalls Armenia - Turkey Protocols, 2015 , http://civilnet.am/2015/02/16/serzh - sargsyan - recallsarmenia - turkey - protocols/#.VOhbh_msWSo (08.07.2016).
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 127 regional cooperation and conflict settlement to failure. This disappointment particularly applies to the EU’s peace - oriented Eastern Partnership. Sargsyan questioned the viability of its regional cooperation component, noting that Azerbaijan’s resolve to extort unilateral concessions from Armenia render it meaningless. In his view, there is no common ground between Armenia and Azerbaijan due to Baku's aggressive and uncompromising policy. "The East ern Partnership had some problems in its formation period yet... I still do not understand the criterion of grouping Armenia and Azerbaijan into one partnership – different opportunities, different approaches, different goals – and this is the reason that this component did not work" 45 . Nevertheless, unlike his predecessor, Sargsyan has utterly rejected the identity - based notions of ethnic incompatibility between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. He has made a clear distinction between Azerbaijani state and societ y, expressing a hope that the people of Azerbaijan or a significant percentage of them do not endorse state - run Armenia - phobic propaganda: "I am confident that our peoples will have a better future than the one contemplated by some leaders who preach hatre d and war… I do not consider the people of Azerbaijan to be the enemy of the Armenian people. We are capable of respectfully resolving our disagreements and peacefully co - existing as neighbors" 46 . Armenian foreign policy makers - President Sargsyan and Fore ign Minister Edward Nalbandian - have fiercely criticized speculations about the religious nature of the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict, asserting that any attempt to package the dispute in a religious context is not constructive. Nalbandian has repeatedly cond emned Baku for propagating ethnic contempt against Armenians. In Armenia’s foreign policy discourse, Azerbaijan is largely characterized
45 Statement by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh S argsyan at the High - Level Meeting on the 5th Anniversary of the Eastern Partnership , April 24, 2014, http://www.president.am/en/statements - andmessages/ item/2014/04/25/ President - Serzh - Sargsyan - speech - Eastern - Partnership - Prague/ (28.11.2016). 46 Statement o f Serzh Sargsyan the President of the Republic of Armenia in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe , October 2, 2013, http://www.president.am/en/statements - andmessages/ item/2013/10/02/President - Serzh - Sargsyan - participated - at - thesession - of - the - PACE - speech/ (17.10.2016). 128 Aram Terzyan as Armenophobic and uncompromising 47 . Despite the commitment by both Armenia and Azerbaijan to find a compromise settlem ent for the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict, ample evidence indicates there are misconceptions about the very term of "compromise". President Sargsyan’s statement at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 29, 2015, in addition to his address at the 31st Ministerial Conference of the Francophonie on October 10, 2015, is indicative. "I shall note that aggressive policy pursued by Azerbaijan resulted in the absence of any meaningful progress of negotiations for the conflict settlement, and the situ ation drifts toward increasing tensions. The dictatorial regime of the country made disgraceful repression an instrument to strangle the people’s anger … It is obvious to us that the Azerbaijani leadership has irreversibly lost both the sense of reality an d all norms of human conduct 48 . The President expressed his frustration: "Unfortunately, there is currently a huge gap between the perceptions of the Azerbaijani authorities and the norms accepted by the civilized world. While the civilized world is creatin g the necessary conditions for a people’s exercise of their right to self - determination, Azerbaijan, blinded by its oil revenues, is trying in all possible ways to impose its views on not only Nagorno - Karabakh and Armenia, but also on the mediator countrie s…" 49 In Armenia’s foreign policy discourse, Azerbaijan is largely associated with the terms "non democratic", "uncompromising", "belligerent", "bellicose", "destructive", and "Armenophobic": "Coercion, violence, terror, war; these are our opponent’s notion s of reality. They are trying to impose upon us the same notions they force on their own people. We have rejected these terms, and will never accept them. We are creating a different reality: economic growth, the rule of law, strengthening of democracy. Th e word "Armenia" must first of all entail
47 Terzyan A., The Role of Beliefs in Armenia - Azerbaijan Confrontation: A Glance Into Presidents’ Discourse’, Armenian Journal of Political Science, 2016, 1, 76 - 79. 48 President Makes Address at Session of UN General Assembly , http://www.president.am/en/pressrelease/item/2015/09/29/ President - Serzh - Sargsyan - speech - UN - General - Assembly/ (12.10.2016). 49 Address by President Serzh Sargsyan to the Representatives of the U.S. Expert Community at the Carnegie Endowment , October 1, 201 5, http://www.president.am/en/statements - andmessages/item/2015/10/01/President - Serzh - Sargsyan - speech - at - Carnegie/ (28.03.2017).
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 113 - 130 129 these notions" 50 . Armenia’s foreign policy discourse vis - à - vis "the other" has undergone considerable changes throughout Sargsyan’s presidency. Unrealized expectations for reconciliation with Turkey led Yerevan to t oughen its positions, which shifted from optimistic to critical. The latter was precipitated by Azerbaijan’s rhetoric and aggressive policy towards Armenia, as well as the failure to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey without setting preconditions.
Conclusion
The conceptions of Azerbaijan and Turkey in Armenia’s foreign policy discourse have undergone considerable changes from 1991 to 2016. Armenian Presidents’ beliefs, along with situational constraints have led to distinct perceptions of foe. M ore specifically, first President Levon Ter - Petrosyan tended to conceive of Azerbaijan and Turkey as Armenia’s natural allies, stressing the necessity of addressing all the obstacles standing in the way of strategic alliance. His discourse analysis promp ts to posit that the issue of Genocide recognition and complete self - determination of Nagrono - Karabakh took a back seat to immediate establishment and further development of comprehensive partnership with Azerbaijan and Turkey. It follows that identity - rel ated beliefs, particularly towards Armenia’s staunch foes were peripheral to his central beliefs about immense economic benefits stemming from rapid settlement of disputes with neighboring countries. Remarkably, the terms ‘natural allies’ and ‘inidspensabl e economic partners’ were frequently used in Ter - Petrosyan’s discourse to characterize Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s importance to Armenia. Whereas, second President Robert Kocharyan overturned Armenia’s foreign policy discourse about Azerbaijan in Turkey. In his view, the troubled relations owed to devastatingly belligerent and bellicose policies adopted by Azerbaijan and Turkey towards Armenia.
50 Statement by the President of The Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan at the Ceremony of Inauguration , April 9, 2013, http://ww w.president.am/en/statements - and - messages/item/2013/04/09/Statement - by - Serzh - Sargsyan - at - the - Ceremony - of - Inauguration/ (20.03.2017).
130 Aram Terzyan
Thus, the recipe for tackling disputes had to do with dropping Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s anti - Armenian pursuits, ra ther than unilateral concessions on Armenia’s part for the sake of promising economic benefits. One could argue, that unlike his predecessor, identity - related beliefs were not outweighed by instrumental beliefs about economic benefits of establishing part nership with neighbours, even at the cost of unilateral concessions. He tended to conceive of Turkey as destructive and aggressive actor, which strives to strangle Armenia through blockade. As for Azerbaijan, Kocharyan went so far as to question the ethnic compatability of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Thus, Kocharyan’s beleifs towards Azerbaijan and Turkey were quite closed, given that he deemed them (particularly Azerbaijan) hostile, belligerent and even incompatible with Armenia. Regarding third Presiden t Serzh Sargsyan’s conceptions of Armenia’s foes, it is noteworthy that he started off with an upbeat note, striving for a breackhrough on the logjam over troubled relations with neighboring countries. Nevertheless, situational constraints and particularly foes’ mounting belligerence towards Armenia translated his initial optimism into profound disillusionment. Turkey’s abrupt withdrawal from disclosing the border with Armenia, as well as Azerbiajan’s mounting resentment towards Armenia, vividly manifested in full - blown arms race, prompted a rethink of his related beliefs. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijan was largely associated with the terms "non democratic", "uncompromising", "belligerent", "bellicose", "destructive", and "Armeneophobic" in his discourse. In a similar fashion, he frequently used the terms "Ottoman", "destructive", "belligerent" and "unreliable" to characterize Turkey and Turkish policy particularly towards Armenia.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 131
DOI: 10.19266/1829 - 4286 - 201 7 - 0 1 - 131 - 149 Fault Lines of Pakistan’s Baluchistan Policy
RAJKUMAR SINGH B.N.Mandal University, India
Increasingly, Baluchistan is coming under international focus and its tense relationship with the government of Pakistan. In fact, the nationalist forces of Baluchistan never accepted its integration in 1947 - 1948 with brute force and since then the Baloch people call their land an occupied area, leading to various insurgencies against Pakistan in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The current phase of insurgency in the form of more vigorous movement for indepen dence began in 2004, growing gradually and still continuing. In addition, Pakistan’s Baluchistan is a poor land with rich natural resources such as gas, coal and other minerals with other important economic sectors which include fisheries, mining manufactu ring industries, trade and other services. In contrast, Baluchistan has been called a “neglected province where a majority of people lacks amenities 1 . It has always been the poorest and least developed of all of Pakistan’s provinces. The paper aims to high light this contradictory position of Baluchistan which, to a large extent, has fuelled the overall dissatisfaction/alienation of the Baloch people from the parent country, Pakistan. There are several provinces, like Baluchistan, that gave a potential contr ibution to country’s development but get a little in return. By examining the entire elements inside Baluchistan, it will be placed in a larger regional and global context. The case of Baluchistan contains far - reaching implications for the world but, in pa rticular for the country and region.
Keywords Baloch people, society, economic exploitation, political alienation, coercion.
Introduction The province Baluchistan has been marginalized throughout history. It goes back to the independence of Pakistan i n 1947. The conflict in Baluchistan is an ongoing conflict between the inhabitants of the Baluchistan province and the government of Pakistan. It is born from
1 Kupecz M., Pakistan’s Baloch insurgency: history, conflict drivers, and regional implications, International Affairs Re view , 2012, 20 , 3, 96 - 97. 132 Rajkumar Singh a combination of social, economic, political, and cultural factors and is characterized by a high level of insecurity and continuing violence/organized violence, weak institutions; and poor governance or the lack of equitable delivery and distribution of public goods and services. Currently Baluchistan is an unending tale of socio - economic and politic al lapses. Despite its abundance in the wealth of natural resources, it remains the most backward province of the country. A deep - rooted sense of deprivation and frustration has made its people highly suspicious of the policy - makers in Islamabad, raising s erious questions about the state of federation in Pakistan. Since independence, in general, the people of Pakistan in all provinces have had no role in determining the course of their history or the direction of their country’s policies. They have been exp loited in the name of ideology and external threats while the real domestic challenges facing the country have remained unaddressed. The governments have been presiding without taking the people in confidence or accepting the responsibility of their action or policies.
Objectives of the Study
The research is about the several aspects of Baluchistan, now a province of Pakistani state. In reference to this, right from the days of its accession to Pakistan in March 1948, Baluchistan continues to be a trouble - torn province despite its richness in natural resources and minerals. Even today, it is considered as the most neglected and underdeveloped province of the country. After 23 years of its accession, in 1970, it gained the provincial status under Pakistani federation, but it made no difference for Baluchistan. A section of the people, from the beginning was against its accession to Pakistan and favoring independence they waged a guerilla war against the central government. The current situation in Baluchista n not only challenges the federalism of Pakistan, but poses a potential threat to its unity and integrity as well. In this respect, the study will
discuss the situation in which the Baluchistan Province was formed;
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 133
analyze the social composition of the pr ovince with its various aspects; evaluate the excesses/exploitation of province’s natural resources; analyze the overall situation including phases of violence in Baluchistan; analyze and suggest the needs - based measures failing which will upset the regio nal balance and peace in Pakistan.
Methodology
The research methodology in the paper is to explain the entire context of Baluchistan in reference to Pakistani state. The existing material on various aspects of Baluchistan is mostly descriptive and theor etically ambiguous. Therefore, the study used secondary sources such as books, journals, and newspapers, at times quantitatively to explain and analyze today’s alarming stage in Pakistani’s federal structure. In addition, primary sources such as different reports, published from time to time have been used for quantitative analysis. The study relied mainly on data/materials collected because it would help to test the hypothesis. The objectives/questionnaires built for this purpose shall analyze the problem with the help of theoretical frameworks on different aspects. Finally, in course of the study the main focus remained on different aspects of Baluchistan under Pakistani federal structure and therefore, the work has excluded otherwise very useful narrati ons of other contexts to concentrate solely on study themes. The paper through study is intended to explain the problem that has not been dealt with the way the present study does.
Review of Literature
The history of the people of Baluchistan province includes colonial subjugation, forcible annexation, the refusal of sub - state ethnic claims, interference in local affairs, and the inability of Islamabad to 134 Rajkumar Singh deliver genuine development. On the other, tribalism and factional conflict have kept the Baloch fr om advocating a coherent set of demands. In the context, there are two most intriguing scholars of the Baloch political history and nationalism. Inayatullah Baloch and Selig S. Harrison, through their painstaking studies and credible scholarship maintained the nationalist methodology - Baloch in nationalist history and Harrison in modern Baloch nationalism. Baloch in his book, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan 2 , introduced the Western methodology and models to approach the Baloch history and historiography. His contribution to the consolidation of nationalist beliefs in Baluchistan was central to his work. Another person of prominence on the topic is Selig S. Harrison, who remained in close contact with the Baloch national movement leaders in 1970s and had a n access to rare and invaluable documents, relating to history and politics. In his famous work, In Afghanistan’s Shadow 3 , he analyses the Baloch nationalistic movement of the 1970s, which led to armed conflict during 1973 - 77. There are several other wri ters who have given their important contribution to Baloch culture, language, society, and economic condition. In the context there are no separate matters of Pakistani Baloch and hence their culture, along with other things, closely related to the general Baloch. In the entire Baloch history and culture, national sentiment remained continuously a prime factor. The Baloch possesses a rich body of folklore, in the form of Balochi proverbs, common sayings, puzzles, songs and stories. The Balochi literature co nstitutes an important source of inspiration for nationalist feelings and emotions. Sabir Badalkhan, through his scholarly article in an edited book, The Studies of the Ethno - Religious Images in Jhalawan and Las Bela Provinces in Balochistan 4 , maintained t hat the Baloch tribes through a numerous legends, proverbs, poems and songs, all oral form of literature, have developed more sophisticated cultural heritage. Songs, in particular, have been a cultural link and a means of expression of the Baloch. Worlds
2 Baloch I., The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1987, p. 75. 3 Harrison S., In Afghanistan’s Shadow:Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation, New York and Washin gton, Carnegie Endowment, 1981 4 Maeda K., The Studies of the Ethno - Religious Images in Jhalawan and Las Bela Provinces in Baluchistan, University of Wako, 1999, pp. 83 - 85.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 135
M usic Vol. 5 (2000) 5 , Dictionary of Oriental Literatures Vol. 2 (1974) 6 , the first monthly periodical in Balochi, Ouman (1951), all certify the above facts that Baloch epic songs transmit the Balochi history, talk about Baloch customs and traditions, and re mind us values. Since 1948, as Balochistan became a part of Pakistan, a more favorable environment led to the growth of such cultural institutions as the Balochi Literary - Society and the Balochi Language Association which have functioned ever since. Among scholars, there are two opinions on Baloch society and social organization. One group accepts the fact that the politics of development and modernization are profoundly influenced by the patterns and process that mark groups and class relationships 7 , while others including Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner view that despite modernization and urbanization the importance of tribes and tribal organizations have not destroyed 8 . But over the course of time, the Baloch society and organization as well have cha nged to a great extent and now there is a widespread Baloch national consciousness that cuts across tribal divisions 9 . According to Mahmud S. Ali’s book, The Fearful State: Power, People and the Internal War in South Asia 10 , “in the absence of traditional l eaders the dynamic of socio - economic change has precipitated a new kind of leader - younger men of ‘common’, non - sardari, descent”. In short, although the Baloch has devised a nationalist ideology, yet tribal support remains a crucial ingredient to any pote ntial success in Baluchistan. Earlier during colonial era, the British despite neglect, brought about some changes in Balochistan, and encouraged commerce, trade, administration and created an abundance of new professions. With the annexation (1948), Balo chistan remained on the whole extremely
5 Worlds Music . South Asia: The Indian Subcontinent, New York and London, 2000, vol . 5, p. 773. 6 Dictionary of Oriental Literature, London, 1974. vol. 2, pp. 56 - 58. 7 Bill J., Springborg R., Politics in the Middle East. (3 rd edition). Glenview, Little Brown and Company, 1990, p. 86. 8 Khoury Ph., Kostiner J. Tribes and State in the Midd le East. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990, p. 136. 9 Harrison S., Op. cit. 10 Mahmud A. , The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia, London, 1993, p. 153. 136 Rajkumar Singh deprived. Since the early 1950s, the Pashtuns took control of most of the commercial life previously controlled by Sindhis. Politically as well, this province of Pakistan continued to be unrepresented/underrepresente d for a long time. As indicated in documents of Balochistan government, the wide disparities between urban and rural Baloch caused a major concern 11 . Apart from rich minerals and natural resources, the province saves a large number of foreign exchange 12 . The New York Times 13 and Dawn 14 have also maintained that among other grievances, the Baloch contended that they had not been benefited from the mineral resources of their homeland. Economic grievances of Balochistan were also supported and certified by Mir Khu da Bakhsh Marri Balochi’s, A Judge May Speak 15 , Janmahmad’s Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan 16 and Mozaffar Shaheen’s book, The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan:A Study of Recruitment of the Central Cabinet 17 . The continued negligence o f the province Balochistan in all walks of life has deepened the sense of deprivation against Islamabad. In order to review the literature, the study has relied mainly upon secondary sources which helped a lot in terms of explaining different aspects suc h as society, culture, language, economy, politics, etc. of the Pakistani province, Baluchistan. These endeavors helped me to get some concrete information and insight relating to the problems of Baluchistan, and explain problem.
Elements of Baluchi stan
Formation of the Province . Baluchistan, the province of today’s Pakistan, originally comprises of three areas: One, the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Balochistan directly ruled by the British
11 Government of Baluchistan, Development Statistics of Baluchistan , 1981, vol. 1, no. 10, Quetta. 12 Brailvi M., Baluchistan - What is the Issue?, Quetta, 1984. 13 The New York Times , New York, February 15, 1980. 14 Dawn , February 1, 1946, p. 4. 15 Bakhsh Marri Kh ., A Judge May Speak. Lahore, Ferozsons, 1990, p. 166. 16 Janmahm ad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan. Emergence, Dimonsion, Repercurssions. Quetta, Gosha - e - Adab, 1989, p. 273. 17 Mozaffar Sh. , The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment to Central Cabinets, Ohio, Miami University, 1980, p. 180.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 137
India, which in August 1947, immediately became part of Pakistan, two, the four princely states of feudalistic nature, namely Makran, Kharan, Las Bela, and the Khanate of Kalat, which decided to accede to Pakistan in March 1948. The Khan of Kalat agreed to join Pakistan under the condition that only defense, c urrency, foreign relations and finance would be controlled by the federal government. The third part was the enclave of Gwader, purchased from the Sultanate of Oman in 1958. In line, the four princely states together formed the Balochistan States Union in October 1952. Three years later in October 1955 “One Unit” system was introduced which resulted in the merger of Balochistan States Union and the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Balochistan. The enclave of Gwader, which was still part of the Sultanate of Oman, was purchased in October 1958 and all together formed the then province of West Pakistan. Again the province was officially dissolved in 1970 and the former Balochistan States Union and the former Chief Commissioner’s province of Balochistan were com bined to form the new province of Balochistan. In 1977, the then Balochistan province was expanded and Gwader was incorporated. Thus now, in its present form, it includes the three - the Chief Commissioner’s province, the Balochistan States Union and the enc lave of Gwader. In total the country Pakistan is comprised of four provinces - Baluchistan, Gilgit Baltistan, Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh two centrally administered areas, a territory and a capital territory. The province Baluchistan is one of th e four provinces of Pakistan located in the southwestern region of the country. Its provincial capital and largest city is Quetta. It shares border with Punjab and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to the northeast, Sindh to the southeast, the Arabian Sea to the south, Iran to the west and Afghan to the north. Most of the province’s inhabitants are Baloch people, Pashtuns and Brahuis, although there are small communities of Hazaras, Sindhis, Punjabis, and other settlers such as the Uzbeks, and Turkmens. It covers an area of 347,190 square kilometres, and is the largest province by area, constituting 44% of Pakistan’s total landmass. In addition, it also borders the geopolitical regions of the Middle East and Southwest Asia, Central Asia and Sout h Asia. The climate of the upper highlands is characterized by very cold winters and hot summers. In the lower highlands, winters 138 Rajkumar Singh vary from extremely cold in northern districts to milder conditions closer to the Makran coast. Winters are mild on the plains , with temperature never falling below freezing point. Summers are hot and dry, especially in the arid zones of Chagai and Kharan districts. The desert climate is characterized by hot and very arid conditions.
Social Composition . Gradually but very slow ly the social composition of Pakistan’s province Baluchistan is changing and getting a focus world - wide. Originally it is constituted from a number of kindred groups. It has many subdivisions or clans who claim to have blood relations with one another thro ugh common ancestors. Kinship, which has its characteristic form in clan and family structure, provides the basic ordering mechanism for society. Even in the 19 th century as modernization and urbanization reduced the importance of tribes and tribal organiz ations, the influence of tribal pattern is not destroyed 18 . The tribal patterns are existent and paternalistic methods of control through family networks continue to have relevance. Another expert on international economic development Dr. Nek Buzdar, also c onfirms that the Baloch society, by and large, adheres to traditional ways of life. He believes that despite the emergence of political parties in Balochistan, tribal organization and political leadership still play a dominant role in local and provincial administration 19 . Tribes in Balochistan are divided into Shahri (Sedentary) and nomadic units. The Shahris were the backbone of the feudal order, which was predominant in central and southern Balochistan (Makkoran), while the nomads were the cornerstones of the tribal order prevailing mainly in the northern tribal areas. Both groups, however, were bound together by a set of historically evolved relationships based on economic, social, political, military, and lingual interactions 20 . Of the both, the Baloch tr ibal system is segmentary which means that it is a set of equal lineages allied relatively and contingently for political action, decisions being made by assemblies and councils, with no offices and
18 Khoury Ph., Kostiner J. , Op. cit. 19 Buzdar N., Social organization, resource use, and economic development in Baluchistan, Balochi Labzank, Baluchistan (monthly), 2000, March - April, p. 82. 20 Swidler N., Brahui Political Organization and the National State, in Ainslie Embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, Durham, Carolina Academic Press , 1977.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 139 hierarchy of authority, and thus no top 21 . Therefore, cent ralized authority is absent in such a system. Keeping the fact in view, the colonial government exercised control over the Baloch tribes, the British themselves were light on the ground, and in return for the chieftains, loyalty, gave them a free hand to k eep the tribal way of life largely unchanged.
Baloch Social Organizations. In traditional Baloch society the most widely known institutions are the Sardari and Jirga . Under these systems, every tribe had its separate Jirga (council of elders) which acted as a court of law 22 . Jirga at the tribe’s level operated under the leadership of Sardar and dealt with important matters concerning the tribes and disputes arising among them, the election of a new Khan or the eventual external threats. Providing the Baloc h society a historical, social and political structure, the Jirga remained intact for a long time and helped the Baloch deal with the situation of anarchy, chaos and emergency. In line, the constitution and powers of traditional Jirga was changed under the British rule in 19 th century when Sir Robert Sandeman introduced a new kind of Jirga, called “Shahi Jirga” where only Sardars and aristocrats could sit. The meeting of Shahi Jirga was usually held once or twice in a year. Its powers were expanded in compa rison to earlier and now it could impose taxes in property and labour and only the Political Agent could review the decision 23 . The new system was considered as a shrewd mechanism of indirect rule with powers vested in a few carefully selected tribal elders loyal to the British and ready to act against their own people. Another traditional Baloch social system, “Sardari” appears to have had its origin in the Mughal period of Indian history. In contrast to the system of Jirga, Sardari system is highly centr alized and
21 Salzman Ph., Why tribes have chiefs:A case from Baluchistan, in Richard Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran, and Afghanistan, London, 1983, p. 267. 22 Mohammad Usman H. , Baluchistan: Mazi, Hal aur Mustaqbel, Karachi Indus Publications, 1976, pp. 174 - 175. 23 Dehwar M.M.S., Contemporary History of Baluchistan. Quetta, Third World Publication, 1994, p. 260. 140 Rajkumar Singh hierarchical 24 . Under it, at the apex of the system is the sardar, the hereditary central chief from whom power flows downward to waderas, the section chiefs, and beyond them to the subordinate clan and sub - clan leaders of the lesser tribal units . The sardar’s extraordinary authority within this structure probably stems from the essentially military character of early Baloch tribal society. However, modernization has changed much of the tribal system. It was first challenged by the setting of inte rnational boundaries which partitioned into three states, dividing some of the large tribes between countries and prohibiting the traditional summer and winter migrations of nomads and semi - nomads. The second challenge occurred between the world wars, whe n the British and Persians largely pacified Balochistan. The termination of the traditional nomadic economic system devastated the tribes and as a result they move into cities and towns. This increased chieftains’ distance from the tribe. Over the course of time, the traditional social organization of the Baloch to a great extent has changed and now there is a widespread Baloch national consciousness that cuts across tribal divisions 25 . In a tribal society, a political ideology such as Baloch nationalism wo uld hardly gain support, because loyalties of tribal members do not extend to entities rather than individual tribes. Within the tribes, an individual’s identity is based on his belonging to a larger group. This larger group is not the nation but the tribe .
Pakistani Baloch. In the post - colonial period when Balochistan made an integral part of newly - formed state Pakistan, it also became the land where 70% of the total Baloch people began to live. Historically, Balochistan with its tribal and semi - tribal s ocial structure has had a strong politico - economic strange hold by a chieftains and tribal Sardars. Typical domination of the tribal lords on the politics of the province marred the overall development and evolution of the political process that could pave the way for the greater political participation. On the other, from the very beginning, Pakistan has not been a smooth democracy and thus, the electoral politics has failed to prevail the political economy of
24 Barth F., Pathan identit y and its maintenance”, in Fredrik Barth (ed.), Ethnic Group and Boundaries . Boston, 1969, pp. 117 - 134. 25 Harrison S., Op. cit.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 141 the country. In the phase of controlled democr acy that intermitted the direct military rule or dictatorial regime the nature and style of the governance remained unaccommodating. The actual political and economic powers always cling on to the centrist forces and never devolved to the regional or p rovincial representatives. This led to the dysfunctional political process especially at provincial level that further consolidated the already stronghold of local elites. Unlike other provinces of Pakistan where a teeming middle class has been emerging wi th assertive political and economic ambitions, the social structure in Balochistan is sharply divided between a tiny but extremely powerful class of tribal chieftains and legal business tycoons and remaining lower class and a small group of public sector e mployees. Consequently a vibrant middle class is missing in Baloch society. The majority of Baloch are Hanafi Sunnis, but there is a community of an estimated 500,000 to 700, 000 Zikri Baloch, who live in the coastal Makran area and in Karachi. The Zikri s believe in the Messiah Nur Pak, whose teaching supersedes those of the Prophet Mahammad. Baloch society is stratified and has been characterized as “feudal militarism”. The significant social tie is that between a leader, the Hakim, and his retinue, cons isting of pastoralists, agriculturalists, lower - level leaders, and lower level tenant farmers and descendants of former slaves. Baloch has long been accustomed to indirect rule, a policy that leaves local elite with a substantial measure of autonomy. The u psurge of 1970s saw precipitous deterioration in relations between Balochistan and the central government. The conflict touched the lives of most Baloch and, for the first time, politicized those long accustomed to accepting the status quo. Original demand s for greater regional autonomy escalated into a full - scale movement aimed at restructuring the government along the federal lines. In coming decades/years the traditional cleavages among hakim, minor leaders, and hizmatkar had declined in importance as th e Baloch increasingly thought of themselves as a unified group in opposition to Pakistan, or Punjabi, hegemony.
Economy. Closely connected to social set up is its economy. The economy of Balochistan is largely based upon the production of natural gas, co al and minerals. Agriculture and livestock also dominate the 142 Rajkumar Singh
Baloch economy. Horticultural development is a fairly recent, yet growing phenomenon. Other important economic sectors include fisheries, mining, manufacturing industries, trade and other service s being rendered by public and private sector organizations in the province. Tourism remains limited but has increased due to the exotic appeal of the province. Limited farming in the east and fishing along the Arabian Sea coastline provide income and sust enance for the local population Due to the tribal lifestyle of many Baloch and Brahui people, animal husbandry and trading bazaars throughout the province are important. People choose to live in regions that have water, roads, hospitals, electricity, and a congenial climate. Therefore, the population is concentrated around the highlands of Quetta and Kalat and in the districts bordering the plains of Punjab and upper Sindh. The other well - populated districts are along the Makran coast and in the Kirthar hil l ranges along the western border of Sindh. Lack of adequate rainfall throughout the province and availability of water only in certain belts of land decides the occupation of the people. Today, the Baloch, despite occupying a vast and resourceful territ ory has failed to keep the pace of socio - economic development and modernity with other fellow nations in the region. The economic grievances of the Baloch dates back to the British era. As the British developed industries and agriculture in Sindh, Punjab, and NWFP, they ignored Balochistan. There is a widely held view that the British rulers neglected the economic development of Balochistan 26 . A section of them also view that it was not merely a case of neglect, but what might be called purposeful sidetracki ng, even suppression. Of course the British had their own imperial interest to protect. Aijaz Ahmad, a Pakistani Marxist, wrote, “The British imperialist interest in Balochistan was not primarily economic; rather it was of a military and geostrategic natur e” 27 . Military experts also expressed the same view and maintained that Balochistan was the chessboard on which the Great Game was played 28 .
26 Dawn, February 1, 1946. 27 Ahmad A., The National Question in Baluchistan, Pakistan Forum, 3, 8 - 9, 1973, 4 - 18. 28 Ahmad S. I., Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1992, pp. 70 - 85.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 143
The British rulers probably thought that an economically and politically enervated Balochistan would lend itself to b e used more easily. On the other hand, a prosperous and united Balochistan could become recalcitrant and forge relations with undependable principalities in the neighborhood 29 . However, despite this neglect, in the course of time, the British rule encourage d commerce and trade and the administration had created an abundance of new professions. All these developments led finally to the rise of Baloch national consciousness and nationalism in eastern Balochistan in the 1920s. As earlier, with annexation in 19 48, Balochistan remained on the whole extremely deprived. Since the early 1950s, the Pashtuns took control of most of the commercial life previously controlled by Sindhi Hindus. Provincial administration was predominantly Punjabi and few of the higher civi l servants were Baloch. According to preliminary surveys, underground water as well as mineral resources were available in large quantities in Baluchistan. But the underdeveloped infrastructure of the province made them difficult to exploit. As a result in the 1970s, compared to the other three provinces Punjab, Sindh and NWFP, Balochistan was the most neglected and impoverished province in Pakistan. In 1976, the annual per capita income was 54 dollars as compared with the 80 dollars for Punjab, 78 dollars for Sindh, and 60 dollars for NWFP 30 . In 1977 the life expectancy in rural Balochistan was 42 years as compared with the national average of 60 years. Similarly, the national literacy average was 16 percent, while that of Balochistan was 6 to 9 percent 31 (Ha rrison, 1981). To the Baloch such an economic gap can hardly be justified in the light of Balochistan’s rich maritime resources along the several hundred miles of coast as well as its land - based mineral resources. According to Baloch nationalists, the peop le of Baluchistan were not the beneficiaries of the huge resources and income the province provided to the Federal exchequer. The continued negligence has deepened the sense of deprivation and feeling of hatred against
29 Mansergh N., The Transfer of Power 1942 - 47, vol. 12, London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, August 2, 1982, p. 480. 30 Burki Sh., Pakistan Under Bhutto, London, Macmill an Press, 1980, p. 94. 31 Harrison S., Op. cit. 144 Rajkumar Singh
Islamabad. A section of the Baloch na tionalists believe that the centralist nature of Pakistani federation is such that small nationalities like the Baloch would find it hard to accommodate within the federation. Thus, the basic issue related to the economic claims of the Baloch is the righ t distribution of natural resources between the centre and the province. Balochistan is the richest unit in the federation of Pakistan as far as the natural resources like various types of minerals, particularly natural gas, copper, marble and gold. At the same time it has a very significant geographical and coastal position 32 . Now the problem is that Ports and Shipping are not only a federal subject but they are totally operated from Islamabad. The local population has always been complaining against their deprivation of the royalties concerning natural resources and their lack of participation in the development.
Baloch Religion and Culture. The state religion in Pakistan is Islam, which is practiced by about 95 - 98% of the people of the nation 33 . The remain ing 2.5% practice Christianity, Hinduism and other religions. Muslims are divided into different sects: the majority of them practice Sunni Islam, while 5.20% are Shias and 2.2% are Ahmadi Muslims. At large, Baloch differ from their neighbors not only in t heir language, literature, religion, and feelings, but also in their traditions and habits. For example, Arab Islam failed to assimilate the Persians into Arab traditions. Iranians fought and resisted Arab domination and though they converted to Islam, the y formed a new sect (Shia) in Islam. They maintained their separate language, literature and traditions. Turks and Afghans also refused the domination and influence of Iranian Islam. The same is true of the Baloch, who maintained their own traditions and c ustoms, which are different from Punjabi, Sindhi, Iranian and Afghan Muslims. Likewise, in sphere of religion the Baloch people have a different perception than other nations in Middle East. They are not fundamentalist
32 Imran M., Akram - ul - Haq M., Pakistan federation and Baloch nationalism: A prospect for economic development and political challenges, Canadian Social Science , 2016, 12, 3, 56 - 61, http://www.cscanada.net/inde x.php/css/article/view/8252 33 Country Profile: Pakistan, Library of Congress Country Studies on Pakistan, February, 2005.
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 145 and do not believe in mixing religion with politics 34 . The overwhelming majority of the Baloch adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam of the Hanafite rite. It is important to note that before succumbing to Islam the Baloch were mostly Zoroastrians. The remnants of some Zoroastrian tradition are s till evident among some Baloch tribes 35 . The conversion of the Baloch to Islam had a sterilizing effect on their sense of nationhood. Especially since the Nasir Khan’s era, the term “Balochistan” has meant more than just geography. It also refers to Baloch culture and is therefore social and political concept as well. Language, culture, and perception are intimately intertwined and hence language has been a key element contributing to a sense of national identity as one scholar puts it, “Baloch identity i n Baluchistan has been closely tied to the use of the Balochi language in inter - tribal relations”. In spite of almost half a century of brutal assimilation policy, both in Iran and Afghanistan, the Baloch people have managed to retain their culture and the ir oral tradition of story telling. The harsh oppression of the governments has strengthened the Baloch’s will to pass on their heritage to coming generations. The Baloch language is both proof and symbol of the separate identity of the Baloch, and impress ive efforts are made to preserve and develop it. In Pakistan the Balochi is generally classified as Eastern Balochi and Western Balochi. Eastern Balochi is spoken mainly in the north eastern area of the province of Balochistan in Pakistan and in neighborin g areas of the province of Punjab and Sindh. Western Balochi is spoken in the Western and southern areas of the Pakistani province of Balochistan as well as in Karachi and other parts of Sindh and other parts of the region. Balochistan, despite its scarc e population, has an uncommon racial and tribal diversity. Most of the people in the cities and towns understand and speak more than two languages. In addition to Balochi, Pashtoo and Brahvi, the majority of the population understand and speak Urdu, the na tional language. In Kachhi and Sibi districts, people speak Seraiki and Sindhi. Quetta city, the confluence point of all linguistic
34 Baloch I., Op. cit. 35 Qaisarani Sh., Baluchistan Iarikh Wa Mazhab, Quetta, Edarch Tadris, 1994, p. 259. 146 Rajkumar Singh groups accommodates not only Urdu, Balochi, Pashtoo, Brahvi and Sindhi speaking people but Darri and Persian speaking ones a s well. In fact, Baloch culture is opposite to the general perception about it. Though Balochistan is an area of barren lands, deserts and mountains, the Baloch culture is full of traditions, arts and crafts. Balochistan is also known for its tribes and festivals. Another distinct feature of Baloch culture is the storytelling tradition. Poats and storytellers are highly respected in Baloch culture. In Baloch culture marriages are different and unique than in the other provinces of the country. The marriag es are according to the Islamic principles in presence of a Maullana along with the presence of witnesses. Usually the marriages are done in young ages but are arranged in early childhood or at birth. There is a very low or negligible ratio of love marriag es as this is not appreciated across the culture in all tribes. Likewise, divorcé rate is very low in Balochistan as compared to the other provinces of Pakistan. However, dress, festival, music, food, and sports are almost the same as of other provinces of the country.
Government and Politics. Balochistan is one of the four provinces of Pakistan, located in the southwestern part of the country. Its provincial capital and largest city is Quetta. In common with the other provinces of Pakistan, Balochistan has a parliamentary form of government. The ceremonial head of the province is the Governor who is appointed by the President of Pakistan on the advice of the provincial Chief Minister. The Chief Minister, the province’s chief executive, is normally the le ader of the largest political party or alliance of parties in the provincial assembly. The unicameral Provincial Assembly of Balochistan comprises 65 seats of which 11 are reserved for women and 3 reserved for non - Muslims. The judicial branch of government is carried out by Balochistan High Court which is based in Quetta and headed by a Chief Justice. For administrative purpose, the province is divided into six divisions. The six divisions are further subdivided in 32 districts. The government of Pakistan has been dealing with animosity among the tribes of Balochistan since the time the country came into existence in 1947. The causes of the conflict with Balochistan include a ripe ethnic nationalism along with feelings of economic and political
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 147 exclusion 36 . Demographically though it constitutes a mere 3.6 percent of the total population of Pakistan, it is strategically extremely important to the country because of the high concentration of natural resources including gas, oil, copper and gold. However, despi te the richness in natural resources, Balochistan continues to remain the poorest province of Pakistan. In addition, following the capture of Kalat on April 1, 1948, cases of military atrocities have been a recurrent occurrence in the province. Acts of ill treatment by officials in the region included torture, arbitrary, arrests executions and acts of indiscriminate violence. As a result, the people of Balochistan fell a sense of separate identity on account of a shared history, language, and other cultural aspects. This shared culture among the Balochs led to the ripening of a strong sense of nationalism that propounded for a larger political autonomy and a separate state for Balochistan. In Pakistan’s Balochistan province, insurgencies by Baloch national ists have been fought in 1948, 1958 - 1959, 1962 - 1963, 1973 - 1977 with an ongoing and reportedly stronger, broader insurgency beginning in 2003. Baloch separatists allege that the central government of Pakistan is systematically suppressing development in Bal ochistan to keep the Balochs weak, while their opponents argue that international business interests have been unwilling to invest in the region due to continuing unrest 37 . Of the five Pakistan faced the first insurgency in 1948 when on April 1, the militar y invaded Kalat and Yar Khan, the then ruler of Kalat, signed a treaty of accession, submitting the federal government. At the time Yar Khan’s younger brothers, Princes Agha Abdul Karim Baloch and Muhammad Rahim, refused to lay down arms and in coming year s continued unconventional attacks on the army until 1950. Second conflict took place from 1958 to 1959 against the “One Unit” policy of the government which decreased their representation in government. This guerilla war was fought by Nawab Nauroz Khan an d his followers and they were arrested, charged with treason and subsequently hanged on the charges. It followed the tension continued to grow amid consistent
36 The Indian Express, Augus t 18, 2016. 37 Kemp G., The East Moves West: India, China and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 116. 148 Rajkumar Singh political disorder and instability at the federal level. Further, Sher Muhammad Bijrani Marri led like - minded militants into guerilla warfare from 1963 to 1969 by creating their own insurgent base. This insurgency ended in 1969, with the Baloch separatists agreeing to a ceasefire. In 1970 Pakistani President Yahya Khan abolished the “One Unit” policy, which led to the recognition of Balochistan as the fourth province of West Pakistan. In the fourth conflict (1973) which led to armed insurgency Pakistani military lost 300 to 400 hundred soldiers while a large number of Baloch militants and civilians wer e killed. The current conflict started in 2004 with an insurgent attack on Gwadar port and their stated demands include greater control of the province’s resources and a moratorium on the construction of military bases in the area. In the context Pakistan accused India, and occasionally the US of supporting Baloch rebels.
Conclusion and Pathways
Basically, the root causes of the conflict are both historical and political. Besides the historical and political reasons, the social factors such as ethnicit y and religion have also played a vital role in the continuance of the conflict. Examination of the nature and causes of conflict in Balochistan reveals a great deal of similarity with other conflicts taking place around the world. These causes are inequal ity, discrimination, resentment, the perception of inequality, socio - economic factors, marginalization, and the lack of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Baloch grievances started within the federation when the federal government concentrated all pow er, including political and socio - economic power in its hand. This milieu compelled the Baloch people feel that the federal government’s behavior towards them is totally exploitative. In Pakistan’s case it is crucial to mention that, without the accountabi lity that comes through sustained mass political participation, the State will fail to provide solutions to basic grievances such as provincial autonomy, control over natural resources, educational access and basic needs of the province. In a nutshell, the se economic, socio - political and cultural grievances among most deprived groups of the Baloch have provoked conflict over the last six decades. Today the
Armenian Journal o f Political Science 1(6) 2017, 131 - 149 149
Baloch grievances are causing them to reassert their ethno – nationalist identity, thereby posing a ch allenge to the concept of Pakistani nationalism. Conflict resolution in any region of the world requires taking into account the sources of conflict for addressing root causes which may lead to prevent violence. They emerge mostly from the unfulfilled demands of the people living in the conflict area and these demands are usually related to their religious, ethnic, linguistic or political identities. The conflict in Baluchistan is also an expression of such divergence about various activities in the sys tem including differences about allocation of resources, centralization of power, and undemocratic political structure. In the context, it is imperative that the needs of Balochs must be heard, understood and fulfilled. In this regard, the following recomm endations can be useful in reaching out a conflict resolution. The federal government should ensure the implementation of NFC Awards, the Aghaz - e - Huqooq - e - Baluchistan package, and the 18 th Constitutional Amendment in letter and spirit. The government must improve security situation of the province. All accused persons, detained or missing, should either be released or produced before the court on account of Habeas corpus principle. Rule of law should be adhered, illegal detentions should be discouraged. The fundamental need of economic opportunities must be met. Pak - China Economic Corridor and Gwadar should engage the natives in these projects. Thus, even today, a needs - based solution is within reach. Connecting with their needs, rather than using enem y images and labeling, may prove successful in Baluchistan. 150