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Mexico's Security and Anti-Crime Strategy

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Mexico's Security and Anti-Crime Strategy Latin America Initiative Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS CHANGING THE GAME OR DROPPING THE BALL? Mexico’s Security and Anti-Crime Strategy under President Enrique Peña Nieto Vanda Felbab-Brown NOVEMBER 2014 NOVEMBER 2014 AUTHOR Vanda Felbab-Brown is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and author of As- piration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2013) and Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2010), as well as numerous articles. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank Harold Trinkunas and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments on the paper. Bradley Porter and Adam Siegel provided first-rate and indispensable research assistance. My deep thanks also go to the many people I interviewed during the fieldwork in Mexico or consulted with be- forehand and afterward. They all provided unique and important perspectives and insights. These include officials of the U.S. and Mexican governments, members of the Mexican military and police forces, U.S. and Mexican academics, policy experts, and NGO representatives, members of the U.S.-Mexico business community, Mexican journalists, and foreign correspondents in Mexico. And I am also deeply grateful to the many other Mexican citizens who, despite security risks to themselves and their families, were willing to speak with me. For security reasons, many of my interlocutors must remain anonymous. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its abso- lute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommenda- tions of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation. CHANGING THE GAME OR DROPPING THE BALL? MEXICO’S SECURITY AND ANTI-CRIME STRATEGY UNDER PRESIDENT ENRIQUE PEÑA NIETO LATIN AMERICA INITIATIVE, FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANALYSIS October 2014. As with many institutional reforms in Mexico, there is large regional • Even as the administration of Mexico’s Pres- variation in the quality and even design of ident Enrique Peña Nieto has scored im- the reforms being implemented. At least, portant reform successes in the economic however, the Mexican Congress, overall a sphere, its security and law enforcement weak player in setting and overseeing an- policy toward organized crime remains in- ti-crime policy in Mexico, approved a new complete and ill-defined. Preoccupied with criminal code in the spring of 2014. The the fighting among vicious drug trafficking so-called National Code of Penal Procedure groups and the rise of anti-crime vigilan- (Código Nacional de Procedimientos Penales) te militias in the center of Mexico, the ad- will be critical in establishing uniform appli- ministration has for the most part averted cation of criminal law across Mexico’s thir- its eyes from the previously highly-violent ty-one states and the Federal District, and criminal hotspots in the north where major standardizing procedures regarding investi- law enforcement challenges remain. gations, trials, and punishment. • The Peña Nieto administration thus most- • Instead of pushing ahead with institution- ly continues to put out immediate security al reforms, the Peña Nieto administration fires—such as in Michoacán and Tamau- has highlighted poor coordination among lipas—but the overall deterrence capacity national security agencies and local and na- of Mexico’s military and law enforcement tional government units as a crucial cause forces and justice sector continue to be very of the rise of violent crime in Mexico. It has limited and largely unable to deter violence thus defined improving coordination as a escalation and reescalation. key aspect of its anti-crime approach. • Identifying the need to reduce violence in • Despite its rhetoric and early ambitions, the Mexico as the most important priority for Peña Nieto administration fell straight back its security policy was the right decision of not only into relying on the Mexican mili- the Peña Nieto administration. But despite tary in combination with the Federal Police the capture of Mexico’s most notorious drug to cope with criminal violence, but also do- trafficker, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, ing so belatedly and with an essentially anal- much of the security policy reform momen- ogous lack of planning and prepositioning, tum that surrounded the Peña Nieto admin- and with essentially the same operational istration at the outset of its six-year term has design as the previous Felipe Calderón ad- prematurely dissipated. Key pillars of the ministration. policy are plodding along meekly, including the national gendarmerie, the new intelli- • Although homicides, including those per- gence supercenter, and the mando único. The petrated by drug trafficking organizations October 2013 deadline to vet all police units (DTOs), have decreased in Mexico, the drop for corruption and links to organized crime did not reach the 50% reduction in the first was missed once again and extended until six months in office that the Peña Nieto ad- ministration had promised. Moreover, in CHANGING THE GAME OR DROPPING THE BALL? MEXICO’S SECURITY AND ANTI-CRIME STRATEGY UNDER PRESIDENT ENRIQUE PEÑA NIETO LATIN AMERICA INITIATIVE, FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS III various parts of Mexico, the violence reduc- in progress, with the government’s resolve, tion cannot be necessarily attributed to gov- policies, and outcomes varying widely ernment policies, but rather is the outcome among Mexico’s states. of new balances of power being established among criminal groups in previously highly • The Peña Nieto administration’s focus on contested hotspots. Many of these balances socio-economic anti-crime policies and of power among the DTOs had emerged al- other crime prevention measures is high- ready in the last years of the Felipe Calderón ly laudable. But its signature anti-crime administration. In these areas of newly estab- socio-economic approach—the so-called lished criminal control and deterrence, even polígonos program—has not been well-op- kidnapping and extortion might be leveling erationalized and is not integrated with law off and becoming more predictable, even as enforcement efforts. The discreet efforts re- they are overall on the rise in Mexico. main scattered. The theory, implementation, and monitoring parameters of the national • In its security and law enforcement efforts, crime prevention strategy are not yet ade- the Peña Nieto administration has largely quately worked out. These deficiencies un- slipped into many of the same policies of dermine the program’s effectiveness and risk President Felipe Calderón. In particular, the dissipating the dedicated yet relatively small current administration has adopted the same resources allocated to the effort as well as the non-strategic high-value targeting that de- effort’s energy. Monitoring and evaluation fined the previous administration. Perhaps of the effectiveness of socio-economic an- with the exception of targeting the Zetas and ti-crime efforts, including the polígonos ap- Los Caballeros Templarios, this interdiction proach, is particularly weak and nebulous. posture mostly continues to be undertaken on a non-strategic basis as opportunistic RECOMMENDATIONS intelligence becomes available and without forethought, planning, and prepositioning to avoid new dangerous cycles of violence Overall, the Mexican government must develop a and renewed contestation among local drug comprehensive law enforcement strategy beyond trafficking groups. This development is -par high-value targeting, sharpen its anti-crime so- tially the outcome of institutional inertia in cio-economic policies, and better integrate them the absence of an alternative strategy, and with policing. This involves: of operational simplicity, compared to, for example, a more effective but also more de- • Making Interdiction More Strategic manding policy of middle-level targeting. Interdiction must move beyond the current nonstrategic, non-prioritized, opportunis- • Importantly, the Peña Nieto administration tic targeting posture. The most dangerous has sought to pay greater attention to and groups should be targeted first, with an eye respect for human rights issues, such as by toward local stability. Targeting plans should allowing civilian claims of human rights vio- be based on robust assessments of the vio- lations by Mexico’s military forces to be tried lence hits might trigger and with strategies in civilian courts and establishing a victims’ to mitigate and prevent such outcomes (such compensation fund. But the efforts to in- as through force prepositioning). crease rule of law, justice, and the protection of human rights and to reduce impunity and corruption remain very much a work CHANGING THE GAME OR DROPPING THE BALL? MEXICO’S SECURITY AND ANTI-CRIME STRATEGY UNDER PRESIDENT ENRIQUE PEÑA NIETO LATIN AMERICA INITIATIVE, FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS IV • Switching from High-Value Targeting to corruption, adopting proactive and knowl- Middle-Layer Targeting edge-based policing methods, achieving a Interdiction should shift away from predom- sufficient density of permanent-beat deploy- inantly high-value targeting to middle-layer ments, and developing local knowledge. targeting. This may seem a marginal techni- cal change; in fact, it has profound positive • Doubling Up on Justice and Human Rights implications regarding
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