Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2018/03 The 1957 Defence White Paper The Cancelled Projects Tony Buttler SUMMARY This paper, which is based on a presentation to a seminar on the 1957 Defence White Paper, describes the aircraft and engine projects that were cancelled as a direct result of the policies announced in the White Paper. It also describes a number of aircraft projects that were cancelled or on which development ceased in the mid-1950s. These are often identified as casualties of the White Paper, although that was not the case. One consequence of the 1957 White Paper was the decision by Hawkers to develop the P.1127 after it became clear that there would not be a British market for the P.1121 supersonic air superiority strike fighter. The Harrier was developed from the P.1127, which changed the face of high performance combat aircraft operations and is one of the most important of all developments in UK aviation history. 1. INTRODUCTION This paper is based on a presentation to a seminar on the 1957 Defence White Paper (1) (DWP) on 24 October 2017 by the Historical Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society. It considers the airframe and engine projects which were terminated by the White Paper, but first I would like to mention three projects which were NOT cancelled by this document, but which many publications say were, often I think to try to make out that the DWP had even more of an effect on UK military projects than it perhaps did. When assessing these programmes, it should be borne in mind that Harold McMillan became Prime Minister in January 1957 and he then made Duncan Sandys his Minister of Defence – so all three projects had already gone by the time Sandys began work on this document. 2. PROJECTS NOT CANCELLED BY THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2.1 Hawker P.1083 The first design to consider is a gorgeous- looking project from Hawker Aircraft, the P.1083. This was intended purely to be a supersonic development of the standard Hawker Hunter, fitted with a new 50° swept wing and armed just with guns. A full go-ahead for the P.1083 was given by the Ministry on 12th December 1951 (Figure 1). Then in April 1953, well into manufacture, the Air Staff requested that Figure 1 Original manufacturers model of the Hawker P.1083. 86 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2018/03 the P.1083 (and the Supermarine 545 which comes next) should be rearmed with the de Havilland Blue Jay (later Firestreak) air-to-air missile as its primary weapon. This created problems in both types due to a lack of space for radars, fuel and other equipment. The problems were never solved and in June 1953 the P.1083 was officially cancelled. The prototype airframe, due to fly later that year, was subsequently modified as the prototype Hunter F.Mk.6 with the Figure 2 P.1083 and Hunter Hawker models show Rolls-Royce Avon 200-series engine their different wings. (Figure 2). 2.2 Supermarine Type 545 The Type 545 was originally proposed as another 50° sweep wing development of an existing type, this time the Supermarine Swift, but as built it featured a crescent wing and was known as the Crescent Wing Swift (Figure 3). Go-ahead for this transonic project was given in 1952, but by 1954 the need for the aircraft was being questioned. Initially the programme was cut back to just the part-complete first prototype, and then the Type 545 was finally terminated in December 1955. This decision was made largely to conserve funds for other projects since the research Figure 3 Original manufacturer’s model information the first aircraft would provide was now of the Supermarine Type 545 considered be of too little value and too late. At this point the prototype was not too far away from completion (Figure 4). 2.3 Gloster Thin Wing Javelin The first Gloster Thin Wing Javelin project was drawn in July 1953. When Specification F.153 was written around the aircraft the main structural difference between the standard Javelin and the new thin wing variant lay in the wing itself. Subsequently, larger engines were fitted, the strength factors were raised and the equipment requirements were altered so much that this project was no Figure 4 Supermarine 545 at Cranfield 1960 longer a Javelin with a new wing, but rather a Wikipedia commons 87 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2018/03 new aircraft having the same general appearance. It was almost a full redesign and as such was expected to be just supersonic in level flight at altitude (Figure 5). Then during a visit to Washington in December 1955 the UK Minister of Supply Reginald Maudling saw secret papers relating to the Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow interceptor fighter then under evaluation by the US Air Force. As a consequence a UK evaluation team was sent to Canada in the New Year to assess the Arrow for its potential use by the RAF. Both Arrow and Figure 5 Model of the Gloster Thin Wing Javelin Javelin were produced by firms within the Hawker Siddeley Group, but the Arrow clearly had a far superior performance and capability. The Thin Wing Javelin was out of date and as a result was cancelled in May 1956. Further and much more advanced versions of the Thin Wing Javelin were produced by Gloster and published works which refer to these designs indicate that the Thin Wing Javelin would have been capable of around Mach 1.8. But they were all produced after the real Thin Wing Javelin project had been cancelled. 3. AIRCRAFT PROJECTS CANCELLED BY THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER Five aircraft projects were destroyed by the 1957 DWP, while the development programme for another (the English Electric Lightning) was badly affected. And it was not just fighter types that were lost – there were bombers as well and two jet engine programmes will also be discussed. Without wishing to criticise any decisions taken long ago in a different situation, in this paper I would like to make some observations as to what I think might have happened had each of these projects not been cancelled – what stage might they have reached? These are purely my own thoughts and are presented to encourage discussion, and to perhaps suggest that in some cases their demise might not have been such a loss as we might imagine. 3.1 Avro 730 The Avro 730 project started with the issue in 1955 of Specification R.156T and Operational Requirement OR.330 for a supersonic high- altitude reconnaissance aircraft capable of Mach 2.5. Designs were submitted by Avro, English Electric, Handley Page, Short Brothers and Figure 6 The Avro 730 as proposed 88 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2018/03 Vickers. The Avro 730 was declared the winner and was ordered in prototype form in late 1955. In its earliest form the 730 still fell short of the requirements but it was considered to be the best choice (Figure 6). In particular it was to have an airframe made throughout in high tensile steel because, thanks to the problems of kinetic heat, this was the only way of securing the specified Mach 2.5 speed. In due course a nuclear weapon/bomb-carrying capability was added under OR.336 and the design was revised quite extensively (Figure 7). In February 1957 service entry for Avro 730 was scheduled to be 1965 and the manufacture of the first test fuselage was well under way at Avro. But in March the Air Staff completed an examination of the contribution which manned fighter aircraft could make to the defence of the United Kingdom, which of course formed the Figure 7 The Avro 730 as built basis of the famous April 1957 Defence White Paper. At the same time the Air Staff examined the problem of maintaining the deterrent and, in view of the increasing capacity of the Soviet defensive system (which included surface-to- air guided weapons), it was now considered most unlikely that the Avro 730 could survive during the period it would be operational. OR.336 was, therefore, cancelled in April 1957 along with the Avro 730. The 730 was to have been powered by the Armstrong Siddeley P.176 engine and extra prototypes of the Bristol 188 research aircraft were to have been built as P.176 test beds. The 188 was another steel aircraft and its first flight did not take place until 1962 – nearly a decade after it was first proposed – primarily because of the time required to develop new fabrication techniques for its steel structure (several changes of engine also contributed to the delays). Figure 8 Bristol 188 research aircraft The Avro 730 was full of advanced systems and equipment and there was plenty of scope for problems. There were also concerns about how well the aircraft could fly if it was damaged (would it be able to return to base?) and whether there would be sufficient stiffness in such a long slim fuselage. Finally, as noted the all-steel Bristol 188 proved very difficult to build, and so would manufacturing the larger 730’s structure have been an even more difficult and longer task? 89 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2018/03 It is also worth bearing in mind that for the proposed SST (which became the Concorde), the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC) rejected steel in 1959 as too difficult and too expensive. In America the North American XB-70 Valkyrie bomber was built in steel and that too failed (few people realise that this was the heaviest aircraft it the world when it first flew at Mach 3).