Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

R. Kim Cragin

To cite this article: R. Kim Cragin (2015) Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:5, 311-327, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024

Published online: 25 Mar 2015.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uter20 Studies in Conﬂict & Terrorism, 38:311–327, 2015 Copyright Ó Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024

Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

R. KIM CRAGIN

RAND Corporation Arlington, VA, USA

On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda’s organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL’s behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

On 21 August 2013, a series of missiles containing the sarin nerve agent detonated in vil- lages outside of Damascus, Syria. Reports on the number of casualties varied widely. According to the Violations Documentation Centre, the attacks killed 588 civilians, including 135 women and 108 children, while the U.S. government estimated the number of fatalities to be as high as 1,429.1 Either way, this attack represented the most severe use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein killed thousands of Kurdish residents of Halabja in March 1988.2 The attack also magnified concerns in the international community about the possibility of non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda or Lebanese Hezbollah, obtaining chemical weapons from Syria’s arsenal. Likewise, by the time of this sarin attack, significant numbers of Al Qaeda foreign fighters, Hezbollah operatives, and Iraqi Shi’a militiamen had entered Syria. One report estimated that approximately 8,500 foreign fighters had joined Syria’s opposition forces between 2011 and 2013, of which 1,900 came from Western Europe.3 By January 2015, these numbers had increased to an astounding 19,000 foreign fighters from 90 countries.4 To counter these, Hezbollah initially sent 2,000 operatives to support Bashar al-Assad, along with approximately 5,000 Shi’a fighters from Iraq and 4,000 from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) between 2011 and 2013.5 And, like Al Qaeda’s

Received 17 February 2014; accepted 25 April 2014. Address correspondence to R. Kim Cragin, RAND Corporation, 1200 S. Hayes St., Arlington, VA 22202, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

311 312 R. K. Cragin foreign fighters, this Shi’a coalition also has more than doubled its support to Bashar al-Assad since 2013.6 Thus, beyond the threat of non-state actors obtaining chemical weapons, the conflict raised concerns of a spillover beyond Syria and Iraq to other countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and North America. These combined threats—the potential acquisition of chemical materials by non-state adversaries and an escalating competition between them regionally if not globally— necessitates a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. That is, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, IRGC, Iraqi militiamen, and Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war, is unlike any previous problem encountered both in its nature and scale, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi- proxy war has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, requiring the U.S. government to develop a new approach to mitigating the impact of these semi-proxy wars. Why a “semi-proxy” war? Generally speaking, the term “proxy war” refers to a conflict in which countries oppose each other indirectly, through the use of surrogates, typically in a third country. And, in fact, numerous experts and popular commentators have argued that the conflict in Syria goes beyond a civil war; it has become a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 7 Yet this description is somewhat deceiving. It presents the conflict in a traditional Cold War framework, with external state actors influencing the behavior of internal state or non-state actors. While this certainly exists in Syria, this more traditional understanding of a proxy war minimizes the role of external non-state actors.8 In Syria, external non-state actors—particularly Al Qaeda and Hezbollah—have changed the nature of the conflict.9 They also represent the primary threat to U.S. national security interests in the region and beyond. So this article utilizes the term, “semi-proxy war,” to underscore the importance of external non-state actors on this and other conflicts. Specifically, this article addresses the ongoing competition for influence between Al Qaeda, Lebanese Hezbollah, and its allies. By “its allies,” this article mostly refers to Iran, because it is difficult to examine Hezbollah’s external operations without discussing Iran. And, while this article focuses primarily on the conflict in Syria, similar patterns undeniably exist elsewhere. Moreover, while some might articulate that it is in the best interest of the United States for its adversaries to fight, this present article argues otherwise. The competition is at best destabilizing and, at worst, threatens U.S. national security. The U.S. government, therefore, cannot merely observe this escalating competition, but instead must find a way to mitigate its effects. This article is organized into three sections. The first section provides further discussion on the historical context of the competition between Al Qaeda’s network, Hezbollah, and its allies. Next, the article examines the ongoing conflict in Syria, including the nature of the competition between these actors, and its relevance to U.S. national security. The final section proposes a way forward for the U.S. national security community.

Historical Context Much has been written about the divide between Sunni and Shi’a communities in the Mus- lim World.10 This historical enmity has its origins in a struggle for succession to the Prophet Mohammad: a portion of his followers, now referred to as Shi’a, believed that the Prophet’s successor should come from his family, while others, referred to as Sunnis, wanted their leader to be selected by an inner circle of senior advisors. Religious zealots in both Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 313 communities believe the others to be apostates.11 These ideological tensions have erupted periodically in the political realm and upset regional stability, especially in the Arab world. Most recently, the “Arab Spring” re-exposed some of these underlying tensions. For example, in Bahrain, Shi’a citizens and residents marched against their Sunni-led monar- chy. In response to these protests, King Hamad al-Khalifa accused the Iranian government of fomenting unrest and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sent soldiers to his aid.12 Further, in November 2013, a bomb exploded outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut; the attack was claimed by Al Qaeda, causing concern among experts that the conflict in Syria would spark sectarian tensions in Lebanon.13 More recently, Huthi militias converged on the Presidential compound in Sanaa, Yemen, in January 2015.14 In most of these uprisings, Al Qaeda has represented a small and insignificant actor. But, increasingly, Al Qaeda fighters have found themselves in direct opposition to Leba- nese Hezbollah, Shi’a militias, and, equally important, Iranian interests. This opposition has not always been the case in past conflicts. During the 1980s, for example, Al Qaeda’s precursor, Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), maintained offices in Iran in support of the first Afghan war. The presence of these offices suggests that Iran’s regime at the very least believed that MAK activities did not undermine its interests. MAK’s publication, al- Jihad, subsequently reported in August 1985 that it was forced to close offices in twelve provinces because the Iranian government had become more “obstructionist.”15 This on-again-off-again relationship between Al Qaeda and Iran continued throughout the 1990s and extended past the September 2001 attacks in the United States. Iran reportedly provided training to Al Qaeda fighters in Lebanon in the mid-1990s.16 And, after U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Iran gave refuge to numerous fleeing Al Qaeda fighters. This refuge soon thereafter turned into a house arrest: Al Qaeda members could remain in Iran, away from family, or risk death by U.S. forces and allies if they left.17 Of course, over the years, Al Qaeda leaders also made choices that provoked Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah and other allies. The November 2013 attack against the Iranian embassy in Beirut was a blatant provocation. Similarly, in December 2013, another car bomb detonated in a Hezbollah stronghold of eastern Lebanon.18 But perhaps the most widely publicized was the decision by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to attack Shi’a political and religious leaders in Iraq.19 Simply put, the historical relationship between Al Qaeda’s network, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and other allies can be characterized as tumultuous at best. Part of this tumultuous relationship appears to be the result of the broader Shi’a– Sunni divide, discussed previously, especially for hard-liners. Beyond this ideological schism, however, Al Qaeda and Lebanese Hezbollah also have increasingly begun to compete for the role of revolutionary vanguard. This competition can best be seen on the issue of Palestine. In many ways, the Palestinian cause represents the litmus test for those who want to lead in the Muslim world—whether they are King Abdullah of Jordan, Prime Minister Najib Razak of Malaysia, or Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri. So leaders often take on the Palestinian cause to bolster their standing. But Al Qaeda has struggled in this regard. In January 2006, Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, referred to by its Arabic acronym “Hamas,” won an electoral majority in the Palestinian elections. Two months later, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the deputy leader of Al Qaeda and now Osama bin Laden’s successor, criticized Hamas for participating in the elections.20 It represented one of many rebukes that Al Qaeda leaders issued against Hamas in that time period.21 Al Qaeda leaders, in these statements against Hamas, likely intended to oppose more narrowly its stance on democracy. But the statements caused uproar among Muslim 314 R. K. Cragin supporters.22 In 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri responded to this backlash by issuing a statement that declared Al Qaeda’s support for the Palestinian cause and clarified his previous criticism of Hamas: “Palestine is our concern and the concern of every Muslim, and we won’t neglect it. Palestine was a land of Islam, and its recovery is the personal duty of every Muslim.”23 Despite Ayman al-Zawahiri’s efforts, evidence suggests that Al Qaeda was not able to quell criticism for its absence in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. By 2008, al-Zawahiri was forced to defend Al Qaeda’s support—or lack thereof—of the Palestinian cause in an online forum.24 In contrast, Lebanese Hezbollah, led by Hassan Nasrallah, historically has provided direct support to the Palestinian cause. Hezbollah has strong ties to Iran; Hezbollah was born out of Iran’s desire to export its revolution to other countries.25 Hezbollah also retains significant respect throughout the Muslim world for its perceived success in forcing Israeli forces to withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.26 Equally important, Hezbollah liter- ally joined the Palestinian fight against Israel, during more recent conflicts in 2006 and 2008. Hezbollah’s strategic victory allowed Nasrallah not only to improve Hezbollah’s standing internally in Lebanon, but also provided a mechanism for Hezbollah to claim victory on behalf of Palestinians. In September 2006, for example, after weeks of air raids from Israel, Hassan Nasrallah held a victory rally. During his speech, he reminded attend- ees of Hezbollah’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, and others’ failures.

Brothers and sisters: On this day, the day of divine victory, there are those who expect an internal talk about Lebanon, and I will certainly do that. But before I switch to internal talk, I would like, as on 12 July, emphasize two points: Our hearts, feelings, grief, and pain are today in Palestine. ...The Pal- estinian people are being killed every day and Palestinian houses are being destroyed every day while the whole world [besides Hezbollah] is silent; the Arab world before the world at large.27

The contrast between Hassan Nasrallah’s confidence in declaring his support for the Palestinian cause—as exemplified in this victory speech—and al-Zawahiri’s defensive- ness is noteworthy. It underscores how sympathizers might question Al Qaeda’s ability to act as revolutionary vanguard, especially in light of Hezbollah’s successes. Beginning in 2008, Ayman al-Zawahiri turned his criticism against Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah specifically in the hopes of diminishing its standing in the Muslim community. The nature of this criticism can best be seen in al-Zawahiri’s rhetoric on Syria. In September 2013, for example, he released a statement that included the following,

The jihadi uprising in Muslim Syria exposed the ugly face of the head of the Raﬁdah Safavid project in the Levant, Hassan Nasrallah, and dropped the masks that it always hid behind. It became clear to the Muslim Ummah that it is just a tool in the hands of this Raﬁdah Safavid project, which seeks to impose the rule of the vilayat-e-faqih, the one with contradictions, over the Ummah of Islam through slaughtering, repressing, torturing, violating sanc- tities, and supporting one of the most corrupt, despotic and criminal regimes.28

In this statement, Ayman al-Zawahiri attempted to accomplish two tasks; he referred to Iran in an insidious and pejorative manner. And, secondly, he tried to remind listeners Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 315 that Nasrallah only does Iran’s bidding. As such, it underscores the perceived competition for position as revolutionary vanguard between Al Qaeda and Lebanese Hezbollah. Finally, the competition for influence between Al Qaeda, Lebanese Hezbollah, and its allies also can be interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical struggled between Iran and its Sunni neighbors. In 2006 and 2007, as Iraq’s Shi’a majority began to solidify its control over that country, a number of authors observed that the ideological Sunni–Shi’a divide appeared to have deepened.29 Yet others argued it was too simplistic to view this schism through the lens of ideology, but rather it was part of a geopolitical struggle between Iran and its Sunni neighbors.30 Since that time, this geopolitical struggle has become increasingly evident, as exemplified in Syria.31 In summary, the ongoing competition for influence between Al Qaeda’s network and Lebanese Hezbollah and its allies in Syria should be understood in its wider historical context. This context incorporates a longstanding ideological divide between Sunni and Shi’a communities in the Muslim world. It also includes a desire on the part of both Hezbollah and Al Qaeda to be viewed as revolutionary vanguards. And, further, this competition has been exacerbated by geopolitical tensions between Iran on the one side and its Sunni neighbors on the other. The confluence of these factors over the past decade, and especially in the wake of the Arab uprisings, has helped to fuel instability in the Middle East. This instability has been magnified in Syria.

Syria’s Semi-Proxy War The outcome of the Syrian conflict holds a great deal of significance—arguably more than conflicts in either Afghanistan or Iraq—for Al Qaeda’s network, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Lebanese Hezbollah and its allies. Simply put, both Al Qaeda and ISIL would like to see the dissolution of the Assad regime and an Islamic Caliphate installed in its place. Hezbollah and Iran would like arguably their closest ally to survive the ongoing civil war. Of course, the myriad of interests in Syria paint a much more complex land- scape, especially after local interests, those of Syria’s others neighbors, and U.S. interests are taken into account. The presence of chemical weapons in Syria and their potential spread to non-state actors represents an added element of danger. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given this complexity, the international community has reacted and responded to the bur- geoning instability in Syria with various levels of inaction, action and panic. The following paragraphs focus primarily on Al Qaeda, ISIL, Lebanese Hezbollah, and IRGC, as illustrative of the expanding competition between these adversaries in a semi-proxy war. But, in doing so, these paragraphs also address these other interests to a lesser extent. Finally, this section also puts forth a rationale for U.S. intervention in this competition, especially as it becomes more global in nature.

Significance for Al Qaeda Central, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIL For Al Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan, aka “Al Qaeda Central,” Syria represents the best opportunity to reclaim credibility in the Muslim world after a difficult Arab Spring. The unarmed uprisings that took place during the initial phases of the Arab Spring demonstrated to Muslim publics that it was possible to overthrow perceived despots without resorting to violence. This logic undermined Al Qaeda’s entire purpose and argument since the creation of MAK in the 1980s.32 The response of Al Qaeda Central to this challenge was twofold. First, prior to his death, Osama bin Laden gave permission to Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan and 316 R. K. Cragin

Pakistan to return to their homelands to participate in the Arab Uprisings.33 This decision appeased internal rumblings within the movement. Second, Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly ridiculed those who yielded to the belief that unarmed revolutions would prevail.34 Nei- ther response demonstrably strengthened Al Qaeda Central’s credibility via-a-vis pro- democratic uprisings, until the Syrian conflict. This conflict provided Al Qaeda Central with the opportunity to reinforce its rhetoric through action. If the conflict in Syria has existential overtones for Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, Jab- hat al-Nusra fighters have articulated more concrete objectives. According to the Quilliam Foundation, based in the United Kingdom, Jabhat al-Nusra has approximately 5,000 fighters.35 Some of these fighters are referred to as “foreign fighters,” or those who have traveled to Syria from other parts of the Muslim world to participate in the fight.36 These foreign fighters reportedly have arrived from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, France, and England.37 But other fighters originated in Syria and, as of summer 2013, Syrians for the most part oversaw the command structure within al- Nusra.38 In interviews with journalists, these commanders articulated their priorities as first, overthrowing the Assad government, and then establishing a Syrian government based on Islamic law, expanding that base into an Islamic Caliphate throughout the Mus- lim world, and, finally, enmity with America and the West.39 Al-Nusra’s leader, known as Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani, is thought to be a Syrian jihadist who joined Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, now known as ISIL) and then returned to Syria to fight against the regime.40 He brought many of AQI’s tactics back to Syria with him. The first al-Nusra attack – or the first one that they claimed – took place on 6 January 2013. It was a suicide attack against buses in central Damascus. Al-Nusra also introduced remote-detonated car bombs, political assassinations, and has executed prisoners and perceived traitors.41 All of these tactics echo back to AQI and its extreme violence against Coalition Forces and Shi’a populations in Iraq. But al-Nusra also has attempted to improve on the AQI methods, especially in its public relations campaign. In one interview with journalists, an al-Nusra commander was quick to observe that he governed the territory under his control effectively; residents had sufficient food, fuel, and traveled safely from village to village.42 Similarly, in April 2013, as al-Jawlani announced his allegiance to Al Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan, he also was careful to add that “We reassure our brothers in Syria that al-Nusra Front’s behavior will remain faithful to the image you have come to know, and that our allegiance (to Al Qaeda) will not affect our politics in any way.”43 These statements were followed by videos, released by al-Nusra’s Himam News, of al-Nusra fighters distributing food and other aid to local community members.44 Importantly, al-Nusrah has not been the only Al Qaeda affiliate fighting in Syria. In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda’s Iraq branch, announced that AQI and al-Nusra would be merging into one organization, called the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” or ISIL. Key paragraphs from this announcement have been included below.

It’s now time to declare in front of the people of the Levant and world that the al-Nusra Front is but an extension of the Islamic State of Iraq and part of it. We are determined after asking Allah and consulting those whose religion and wisdom we trust, that we must go forward with the journey of going higher with the group, bypassing all that will be said, for the hand of Allah is above all, no matter what strikes us because of this. Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 317

So we declare while relying on Allah: The cancellation of the name “Islamic State of Iraq,” and the cancellation of the name “al-Nusra Front”, and gather- ing them under one name, the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” [ISIL] and also unifying the banner, the banner of the Islamic State, the banner of the Caliphate, Allah permitting.45

Al-Baghdadi apparently made this announcement—the merging of two Al Qaeda affiliates—without the approval of either Al Qaeda Central or al-Jawlani in Syria. It is possible that this announcement would have gone somewhat unremarked, but the next day, al-Jawlani refuted the merger in his own public statement, revealing a significant fracture within the global Al Qaeda network. 46 This caused a dilemma for Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan: did they side with al-Baghdadi or al-Jawlani? And, what would happen to their own credibility if they chose the wrong representative for Syria? In the end, a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to jihadists in Syria, leaked to Al-Jazeera news, suggested that al-Zawahiri was more sympathetic to al-Jawlani. Although Ayman al-Zawahiri rebuked both al-Baghdadi and al-Jawlani, he also officially “cancelled” ISIL, as indicated below.

Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was in error in his announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham without seeking our order, consulting us or even informing us. Sheikh Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani was in error of his announcement of the rejection of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham and made clear his rela- tion with al-Qa’ida without seeking our order, consulting us, or even informing us. The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham is cancelled...47

But Ayman al-Zawahiri may have chosen poorly. Al-Baghdadi and his supporters refused to dissolve ISIL upon al-Zawahiri’s request. This refusal emphasized al- Zawahiri’s relative position of weakness, not strength, within the global Al Qaeda network: no negative repercussions seemed to occur. Furthermore, foreign fighters continued to travel to Syria to join ISIL, despite its disregard of al-Zawahiri. According to an intelligence report prepared by the Free Syrian Army and cited by David Ignatius of the Wash- ington Post, ISIL had 5,500 foreign fighters and 17,000 local fighters as of November 2013.48 These numbers far exceeded those estimated for al-Nusra. While it would be easy to interpret the ISIL-al-Nusra clash as an internal power struggle between two strong personalities, it also revealed divergences in priorities between these two Al Qaeda affiliates. Al-Nusra commanders have tended to emphasize overthrowing the Assad regime. ISIL commanders have articulated other objectives. Spe- cifically, in interviews with journalists, ISIL leaders have stressed the importance of establishing control over territory, perhaps even in lieu of defeating Assad’s forces entirely.49 Logically, this divergence could be due simply to differences in command structure; foreign fighters reportedly have retained most command positions in ISIL, in contrast with al-Nusra. The results, however, make the Sunni side of the semi-proxy war in Syria incredibly complex and unpredictable. ISIL and al-Nusra fighters have collaborated. Al-Nusra and Free Syrian Army fighters also have cooperated in attacks. 50 But, at the same time, ISIL has attacked both al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army.51 Further, while most of the fighting has remained inside Syria, some evidence indicates a possible 318 R. K. Cragin spillover into Lebanon, and ISIL has threatened to send suicide bombers to Istanbul and Ankara inside Turkey.52 In summary, the conflict in Syria clearly is significant for Al Qaeda and ISIL. But the nature of this significance varies. For Al Qaeda Central, it is an existential conflict. That is, it represents the best hope for Al Qaeda Central to retain its credibility in the jihadi movement. The conflict has both nationalistic and religious overtones for al-Nusra. While for ISIL fighters, Syria represents a potential base of operations for their campaign to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the region. Lebanese Hezbollah has reacted to all three, but appears to be concerned primarily about the latter.

Significance for Hezbollah and its Allies Like Al Qaeda, the outcome of the conflict in Syria holds a great deal of significance for Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran. According Saudi officials, cited by The Guardian, Saudi Arabia and its allies believe that nothing will weaken Iran more than the loss of Syria.53 Former Iranian officials have made similar claims.54 In February 2012, for example, an Iranian cleric reportedly stated, “if we lose Syria, we will not be able to keep Tehran. But, if we lose Ahvaz, Khuzestan, we will get it back as long as we have Syria.”55 For the Iranian regime, the longstanding ties with Syria date back to its 1979 revolution. This relationship has solidified over the years through mutual interests on and cooperation in Lebanon and an opposition to Saddam Hussein. So it is easy to see how Iran would have a strategic interest in helping the Assad regime survive an ongoing civil war. As a result, Iran has devoted substantial resources to help bolster the Assad regime over the past several years. These resources have included approximately $4.6 billion in financial aid and credit, as of July 2013.56 Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps– Qods Force (IRGC–QF) also has facilitated the transfer of weapons, provided thousands of fighters, and sent senior advisors into Syria to help coordinate Assad’s campaign.57 According to a story in The New Yorker, Iranian advisors have coordinated attacks, established systems to monitor opposition forces’ communications, and forced Assad’s security services to cooperate more fully than they have in the past.58 The total extent of this support (e.g., volume of weapons, number of fighters) is unclear, but experts generally agree that the nature and amount of the aid provided to Syria exceeds aid supplied to Shi’a forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2008.59 Most of Iran’s support for the Assad Regime has been overseen by the Islamic Revo- lutionary Guards Corps, according to former and current U.S. government officials.60 More specifically, the Syria portfolio was given directly to Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC–QF.61 Often described as a combination of the U.S. government’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces, the IRGC–QF has been responsible for expanding Iran’s influence throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia through more covert means. This has yielded support—through advice, training or other forms of assistance—for Iran’s non-state allies. But IRGC–QF operatives also have been indicted by Argentina’s courts for orchestrating the 1994 attack by Hezbollah against a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.62 And, more recently, in October 2011, the U.S. government charged an IRGC–QF operative, Gholam Shakuri, for participating in a plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.63 IRGC–QF, therefore, provides both indirect support and takes direct action in support of Iran’s interests. For Syria, these interests mean bolstering the Assad Regime. Beyond IRGC–QF, fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah also have been involved in efforts to support Bashar al-Assad.64 For example, in April 2013, Hassan Nasrallah, the Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 319 leader of Lebanese Hezbollah, reportedly sent approximately 2,000 fighters to Syria. The purpose was to help Soleimani retake the town of Qusayr from opposition fighters.65 In fact, according to some reports, Soleimani at this point commanded approximately 70,000 Syrian fighters, 2,000 more from Hezbollah and 800 from Iraq’s Shi’ite militias.66 Two months later, Syrian IRGC–QF and Hezbollah forces were successful in this campaign. For Soleimani, this victory represented a turning point in the efforts to strengthen Assad vis-a-vis the opposition forces.67 But, equally important, Hezbollah was not merely being generous in its support to IRGC–QF and its efforts in Syria. Qusayr represented a key location for Hezbollah as well, because it was a gateway to the Bekka Valley in Lebanon. Indeed, independent of IRGC–QF and Iran’s broader interests, the outcome of the conflict in Syria also holds significance for Hezbollah. Over the years, Syria has coordinated with Iran in its backing for Hezbollah and in its opposition to Israel, particularly Israeli presence in southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights. This coordination—between Iran and Syria—emerged out of the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s and 1990s. It is well known that Hezbollah came into being in the midst of the Lebanese civil war. Simply put, in the early 1980s, Palestinian guerrilla fighters established headquarters in Lebanon to fight against Israel. They also trained and equipped local Lebanese militias (primarily Shi’a residents) to fight along with them. Israel responded to this threat by invading southern Lebanon in 1982. The Lebanese militias fought back with aid from Iran and Syria and, eventually, in the midst of this struggle, Hezbollah was formed.68 That said, Hezbollah and Syria have not always had an easy relationship. In the mid- 1980s, the Shi’ite militias in Lebanon were organized under an umbrella group named “Amal.” But Amal eventually split and infighting occurred between factions. At that time, Syria reportedly supported the original Amal, while Iran backed one of the factions that would become Hezbollah. Moreover, this fighting continued even as other factions fought against Shi’ite militias for control over Lebanon. This civil war lasted until the September 1989 Ta’if Agreement, which arranged a power-sharing government in Leba- non, and was brokered by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As part of this agreement, Lebanese Hezbollah was allowed to keep its weapons, provided that they were used to fight against Israeli forces.69 Since that time, Hezbollah has worked to present itself as a local political party with a militant wing that is only interested in defending Lebanon.70 When the fighting started in Syria, Hezbollah leaders publicly maintained this position, despite covertly sending personnel to support Soleimani and Assad. In May 2013, however, Hassan Nasrallah altered course and announced Hezbollah’s active support for the Assad Regime. Several excerpts from this announcement have been included below.

We have entered a completely new phase. What is happening in Syria is very important and fateful, for Lebanon’s present and future. Let us not bury our heads in the sand and act like we live in Djibouti, we are here on the border [with Syria]. We have the courage to talk and the courage to act and we will therefore speak honestly as such a historic and sensitive moment requires us to. ...We regard the control these groups [takfiris] have over Syria, and specifically over parts of Syria bordering Lebanon, as a grave danger to Lebanon and a grave danger to all Lebanese. It is not only a danger to Hezbollah, or to the Shia of Lebanon, it is a danger to Lebanon and the Lebanese and the Resistance and communal coexistence in Lebanon. If these groups [takfiris] control areas bordering Lebanon they pose a threat to Lebanese Christians 320 R. K. Cragin

and Muslims, and when I say “Muslims” I means Sunnis, Druze, Shia and Alawites. I don’t just mean Shia, it is the Sunnis who are first and foremost in danger. The proof of this is Iraq. The same groups fighting in Syria today are an extension of a group there called “the Islamic state of Iraq”. Just ask Iraqi Sunnis how many of their Sunni clerics and Islamic party leaders this group killed; leaders who didn’t follow it. ...And we have been promised here in Lebanon that this [takfiri] scourge is coming our way. This is the danger. This mind does not accept dialogue ...it has no priorities or common denominators. All it does is declare others apostates for the most trivial reasons, and it sanctions their killing. What future can there be for Syria amidst these groups and this mind? What future for Lebanon? What future for Palestine? What future for the people of this region?71

This statement is significant. In it, Nasrallah carefully explained why his organization had decided to join the fight in Syria. Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah’s purpose was to counter “takfiris’” expansion into Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. If a Muslim is declared takfir by religious authorities, he has been identified as an apostate. But outside strict religious authority, some extremists—more recently ideologies associated with Al Qaeda— have opted to denounce opponents in the Muslim world as apostates. This denunciation provides a justification for Al Qaeda to attack other Muslims. Al Qaeda ideologues, therefore, have been referred to as “takfiris” or those who declare other Muslims as apostates.72 Essentially, in this statement, Nasrallah claimed that his fight was against those takfiris who were attempting to expand their influence in the Levant. He declared war on Al Qaeda.73 Since that time, websites associated with Hezbollah and Al Qaeda have exploded with vehement arguments over Syria, as well as the involvement of Iran and Sunni governments.74 This rhetoric has been paralleled with a series of attacks inside Lebanon against Iranian and Hezbollah targets.75 And, given the existing turmoil in Bah- rain, Yemen, Iraq, and other countries with significant Sunni and Shi’a populations, a dec- laration of war by Hezbollah on Al Qaeda presents the possibility of escalation even outside the Levant.

Significance for the United States While it would be easy to advocate that the U.S. government “sit back and watch” the escalating animosity between Hezbollah, ISIL, and Al Qaeda Central, this approach poses several important risks. First, this semi-proxy war has the potential to spread to beyond Syria and Iraq to other important U.S. allies in the Middle East, North Africa, or even elsewhere.76 This possibility has been discussed widely and, according to most, the immediate vulnerabilities appear to be Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, given their proxim- ity to the conflict in Syria. Clearly, the fighting in Syria has affected sectarian tensions in Lebanon. Jordan has yet to experience this same level of violence, but, like Lebanon, it has absorbed a significant number of refugees, estimated at over 500,000.77 And, finally, as mentioned previously, Turkey has been threatened directly by Bashar al-Assad for supporting opposition forces and, somewhat ironically, Al Qaeda for its lack of support.78 Although discussed somewhat less in the expert community, very similar dynamics recently have emerged in Yemen, with Iran allegedly providing support to the Huthi rebels and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) struggling to push back against Huthi control over large swaths of territory.79 It also would be easy to imagine that this Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 321 competition could manifest itself in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where sectarian tensions already exist, as well as even the unrest in Egypt, Libya, or Tunisia. Although less proba- ble, this competition could also emerge in Central, South, or Southeast Asia. In January 2013, for example, authorities in Thailand arrested a man suspected to be associated with Lebanese Hezbollah. He was linked to a terrorist plot in Bangkok.80 While these attacks were not directed at Al Qaeda affiliates, they demonstrate an ability by Lebanese Hezbal- lah to expand their declared war against Al Qaeda globally to targets beyond Syria’s immediate neighbors. Finally, the United States, Canada, Australia, and countries in Western Europe have reason to be concerned about the possibility of Al Qaeda foreign fighters returning from Syria, Iraq, or even Yemen to the West to conduct attacks. In January 2015, for example, authorities in Belgium discovered and disrupted plots against targets in Brussels and Ant- werp. Authorities linked these plots to ISIL.81 ISIL also was linked to a plot to kidnap and behead individuals in Australia in September 2014.82 And some authorities have noted ties between the attack against the satirical newspaper, Charlie Hebdo, and AQAP leaders in Yemen.83 In summary, the conflict in Syria has morphed into a semi-proxy war that threatens U.S. national security interests. This semi-proxy war includes external non-state actors who are competing against each other for success in Syria and preeminence in the region. These non-state actors have demonstrated an ability to conduct attacks outside of the Mid- dle East and North Africa. And, they have reach into the United States, Australia, Canada, and Western Europe. Finally, the potential exists for these adversaries to obtain access to chemical weapons, magnifying the threat beyond conventional terrorism. These circum- stances underscore the need for U.S. involvement. The question remains, however, what can the United States do that will not exacerbate the problem?

A Way Forward The policy challenges presented by Syria specifically, and other semi-proxy wars more generally, are not insignificant. The U.S. government has demonstrated a strong reluctance to intervene with security forces, even after al-Assad crossed a declared “red line” in a chemical attack. Part of this reluctance derives from a certain war fatigue after Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. government also has expressed some concern that weapons provided to opposition forces might benefit al-Nusra or ISIL. Equally important, any U.S. intervention in Syria directly could complicate ongoing diplomatic efforts with Iran on its nuclear program. Simply put, the U.S. government must design a strategy to mitigate the threats posed by the outflow of foreign fighters to Western Europe, Australia, or North America, and heightened sectarian violence in the region, all without undermining its ongoing diplomatic engagements. This strategy also cannot require a substantial commitment of U.S. military forces. So it must rely primarily on U.S. law enforcement, intelligence and other diplomatic resources, as well as the resources of Interpol and partner nations in the region and elsewhere. One possible alternative strategy is to focus on disrupting travel to and between these conflicts. That is, the U.S. government could focus resources on reducing external non- state actors’ ability to move people, money and materials into and out of select semi-proxy wars. The best way to do this, however, is not to focus on the conflict zones themselves, but rather, transit countries. Admittedly, this approach is somewhat narrowly focused; it would not “solve” broader political and humanitarian crises in conflict such as Syria. The benefit of such an approach, however, is that it does not rely on a substantial 322 R. K. Cragin commitment of U.S. forces. It also does not directly intervene in the conflicts, but rather makes it more difficult for local conflicts to threaten regional stability or morph into global threats. It also builds on some existing, albeit nascent, efforts by partner nations to minimize the spillover effects of the conflict in Syria. For example, in February 2014, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia declared that citizens who fight abroad should expect prison sentences of three to 20 years.84 France, similarly, reinstituted “special permission” requirements in April 2014 for youths and minors traveling abroad in an effort to minimize the number of its citizens traveling to fight in Syria. Simply based on this article alone, the priority semi-proxy wars would be Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. But it is easy to imagine other potential semi-proxy wars for the U.S. government in the future. The initial step for any strategy against the transit of fighters, weapons, or money into and out of conflict zones would be to determine how non-state actors’—in this instance Al Qaeda, ISIL, and Lebanese Hezbollah—logistical networks function. Do they primarily utilize air, sea, or ground transportation methods? What countries tend to function as hubs within these networks? Who are the personalities involved? Do patterns of transit into a conflict match those out of a conflict? How do patterns of transit for people, money and weapons differ? How do these non-state actors transport their most valuable items? What vulnerabilities exist? Answering these questions will require the integration of intelligence, law enforcement and other forms of information. It may also require a shift in collection priorities for the United States and its partners. More importantly, the outcome of this analysis should yield a different set of policy interventions than typically considered in the counterterrorism community. For example, it is easy to imagine that one of the outcomes would be an effort to indict certain counter- feit rings that might otherwise not draw attention from international law enforcement agencies. Or perhaps programs to purchase weapons from black markets that might once have been deemed unthreatening. Diplomatic priorities might change in some countries. Intelligence cooperation might deepen with others. The underlying objective of all of these efforts would be to minimize the escalating competition between non-state adversaries as they engage in semi-proxy wars. This “transit networks” approach, at first glance, might appear to be overly compli- cated. Nonetheless, it addresses all of the concerns articulated by U.S. policymakers about the risks of intervening in Syria. This approach also presents a way forward for U.S. counterterrorism strategy in conflicts outside of Syria, such as Iraq, Yemen, and even Mali, with their own set of complex problems that make intervention by substantial U.S. forces unlikely. In each of these countries, the Al Qaeda threat cannot be ignored. A strategy aimed at eliminating transit hubs presents an opportunity for the U.S. government to iso- late these conflicts and minimize any spillover threats.

Notes 1. “Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know,” BBC News, 24 September 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399 (accessed 28 October 2013). 2. John Simpson, “Halabja Chemical Weapons: A Chance to Find the Men Who Armed Sad- dam Hussein,” 2 December 2012. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20553826 (accessed 28 October 2013). 3. Alex Spillius, “Number of Foreign Fighters in Syria Nearly Doubles,” The Telegraph,20 December 2013. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/ 10523203/Number-of-foreign-ﬁghters-in-Syria-nearly-doubles.html (accessed 28 October 2013). 4. Jim Garamone, “Special Ops Commander Discusses Challenges, Priorities,” DoD News,27 January 2015. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128047 (accessed 29 January 2015). Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 323

5. Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” The New Yorker, 30 September 2013. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins (accessed 12 December 2013); and Jamie Dettmer, “Number of Shia Fighters in Syria Could Rise Following Fatwa,” Voice of America News, 16 December 2013. Available at http://www.voanews.com/content/number-of- shia-fighters-in-syria-could-rise-following-fatwa/1811638.html (accessed 20 December 2013). Addi- tionally, in June 2013, journalist Robert Fisk reported that Iran planned to send approximately 4,000 IRGC soldiers to Syria to support the regime. The Iranian government, however, has stipulated that these soldiers are merely advisors. Robert Fisk, “Iran to Send 4000 Troops to Aid President Assad’s Forces in Syria,” The Independent, 16 June 2013. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/middle-east/iran-to-send-4000-troops-to-aid-president-assad-forces-in-syria-8660358.html (accessed 28 October 2013). 6. Hugh Naylor, “Lebanon’s Once-Mighty Hezbollah is Facing Attacks in Syria—and at Home,” Washington Post, 28 October 2014; David Axe, “Iran transformed Syria’s Army into a Militia That Will Help Assad Survive Another Year,” Reuters, 17 December 2014. Available at http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/16/iran-transformed-syrias-army-into-a-militia-that- will-help-assad-survive-another-year/ 7. In his editorial, David Brooks summarized this proxy war as “The Saudi and Iranian powers hover in the background, fueling each side.” David Brooks, “One Great Big War,” New York Times, 29 August 2013. 8. Others have made similar arguments, more broadly, on the more traditional view of warfare. See, for example, Joseph Nye, “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010; and for a parallel argument on proxy wars, see Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict,” The RUSI Journal 158(2) (28 April 2013). 9. In his April 2013 article entitled, “Proxy War and the Future of Conflict,” Andrew Mumford argued that it is possible for non-state actors to be not only the beneficiary of support in a proxy war, but also a benefactor. 10. See, for example, Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future (New York: W.W Norton & Company, 2006). 11. Geneive Abdo, “The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprising and the Rebirth of the Shi’a- Sunni Divide,” Analysis Paper, Brookings Institution, Number 29, April 2013; Martin Walker, “The Revenge of the Shia,” Wilson Quarterly 30(4) (Autumn 2006): pp. 16–20; and Morten Valb- jorn and Andre Bank, “Signs of a New Arab Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Sunni-Shi’a Divide,” Middle East Report, No. 242 (Spring 2007), pp. 6–11. 12. Martin Chulov, “Saudi Arabian Troops Enter Bahrain as Regime Asks for Help to Quell Uprising,” The Guardian, 14 March 2011. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/ mar/14/saudi-arabian-troops-enter-bahrain?INTCMP=SRCH&guni=Article:in%20body%20link (accessed 29 October 2013). 13. Hwaida Saad, Anne Barnard, and Alan Cowell, “Blasts at Iranian Embassy in Beirut Kill at Least 23,” New York Times, 19 November 2013; Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, “The Syrian Spillover: Is Anyone Prepared for the Unintended Consequences of the War in Syria?” For- eign Policy, 10 August 2013. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/10/the_ syrian_spillover#sthash.F5cHOZ7E.dpbs (accessed 19 December 2013); Nicholas Blanford, “In Lebanon a Worrying Sectarian Spillover from Syria,” The Christian Science Monitor, 3 June 2012. Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0603/In-Lebanon-a-worrying-sec tarian-spillover-from-Syria (accessed 30 October 2013); and “Spillover: Syria and Lebanon,” The Economist Online, 20 August 2012. Available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2012/ 08/syria-and-lebanon (accessed 30 October 2013). 14. Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Clashes Hit Yemen Capital again as Houthis Pursue Political Gains,” Reuters, 20 January 2015. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2015/01/20/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0KT1JK20150120 15. Al-Jihad Magazine, Nadia Oweidat (trans.), Issue 11, 31 August 1985. 16. Michael Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al-Qa’ida: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 117(2) (Summer 2002), p. 178. 17. In October 2013, Abu Anas al-Libi, was captured by US forces in Libya for his role in Al Qaeda’s attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He reportedly left Iran for Libya after the start of the Arab Spring and Moammar Gadahfi’s death. Jim Michaels, “Al-Libi May Yield al-Qaeda Insights,” USA Today, 8 October 2013, p. 5A. 324 R. K. Cragin

18. “Suicide Blast Hits Hezbollah Area in Lebanon,” al-Jazeera News, 17 December 2013. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/suicide-blast-hits-hezbollah-area- lebanon-201312176519884722.html (accessed 20 December 2013). 19. “al-Zarqawi Declares War on Iraqi Shia,” al-Jazeera News, 14 September 2005. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/09/200849143727698709.html (accessed 22 September 2013). 20. Stephen Ulph, “Al-Zawahiri Takes Hamas to Task,” Terrorism Focus 3(9) (7 March 2006), p. 1. 21. Notably, Hamas also rebuked Al Qaeda in this very public argument. See Kim Cragin, “al- Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its Implications for U.S. Policy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32(2009): pp. 576–590 for a discussion of this dynamic. See also Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Palestine is Our Concern, the Concern of Every Muslim,” trans. SITE Institute, As-Sahab Media, 11 March 2007, transcript available at http://sitemultimedia.org/ video/SITE_Zawahiri_Palestine_Concern_31107.wmv 22. Jared Brachman, Brian Fishman, and Joseph Felter, Power of Truth: Questions for Ayman al-Zawahiri, West Point CounterTerrorism Center, April 2008; and Kim Cragin, “al-Qaeda Con- fronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its Implications for U.S. Policy,” Stud- ies in Conflict and Terrorism 32 (2009), pp. 576–590. 23. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Palestine is Our Concern, the Concern of Every Muslim,” trans. SITE Institute, As-Sahab Media, 11 March 2007, transcript available at http://sitemultimedia.org/ video/SITE_Zawahiri_Palestine_Concern_31107.wmv (accessed 2 March 2015). 24. Ibid., see also “Key Points and Pressing Issues in Initial Sampling of Questions Submitted to by Jihadist Forum Members of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,” SITE Intelligence Group, 23 January 2008, document number 2008012302. 25. Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Naim Qassam, Hizballah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi Books, 2005); Augustus Richard Norton, Hizballah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 26. Augustus Richard Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Leb- anon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30(1) (Autumn 2000), pp. 22–35. 27. Hassan Nasrallah, “Victory Rally,” televised by al-Manar Television, 22 September 2006. Available at http://www.montrealmuslimnews.net/nasrallahspeech.htm (accessed 20 December 2013). 28. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “46 Years after the Year of the Naksa,” trans. Site Intelligence Group, 18 September 2013. 29. Martin Walker, “Revenge of the Shia,” Wilson Quarterly 30(4) (Autumn 2006), pp. 16–20 and Toby Jones, “Saudi Arabia’s Not So New Anti-Shi’ism,” The Middle East Report, No. 242 (Spring 2007), pp. 29–32. 30. Morten Valbjorn and Andre Bank, “Signs of a New Arab Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Sunni-Shi’a Divide,” Middle East Report no. 242 (Spring 2007), pp. 6–11. 31. Ramin Mostaghim and Patrick J. McDonnell, “Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander Reported Killed in Syria,” LA Times, 4 November 2013. Available at http://www.latimes.com/ world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-iran-revolutionary-guard-commander-syria-20131104,0,4843613.story# axzz2lDCEbB1T (accessed 5 November 2013) and Ian Black, “Saudi Arabia to Spend Millions to Train New Rebel Force,” The Guardian, 7 November 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian. com/world/2013/nov/07/syria-crISIL-saudi-arabia-spend-millions-new-rebel-force (accessed 19 November 2013). 32. Daniel Byman, “Terrorism after the Revolutions: How Secular Uprisings Could Help (or Hurt) Jihadists,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2011) and Daniel Byman “al-Qaeda’s Terrible Spring: Why the Organization Might Not Survive,” Foreign Affairs, Postscript, 24 May 2011. Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67864/daniel-byman/al-qaedas-terrible-spring (accessed 2 March 2015). 33. Letter from Abu ‘Abdallah (Usama bin Laden) to Shaykh Mahmud (‘Atiyya), 26 April 2011, released by West Point CTC, 1 May 2012, document number SOCOM-2012-0000010. 34. Ayman al-Zawahiri, cited in Bill Roggio, “Zawahiri Rebukes Muslim Brotherhood for Trusting Democracy,” Threat Matrix: A Blog of the Long War Journal, 3 August 2013. 35. Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat al Nusra: A Strategic Briefing,” Quilliam Foundation, no date provided. Available at http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/ uploads/publications/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf (accessed 13 November 2013). The numbers of fighters for different opposition groups vary widely. Another report estimated that Al Qaeda fighters from al-Nusrah and the Islamic State of Iraq combined totaled almost 10,000. Ben Farmer and Ruth Sherlock, “Syria: Nearly Half Rebel Fighters are Jihadists or Hardline Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 325

Islamists, Says IHS’ Jane’s Report,” The Telegraph, 15 September 2013. Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10311007/Syria-nearly-half-rebel-fighters-are- jihadists-or-hardline-Islamists-says-IHS-Janes-report.html (accessed 9 December 2013). 36. Seth G. Jones, “Syria’s Growing Jihad,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55(4) (August–September 2013), pp. 53–72. 37. Ruth Sherlock, “Inside Jabhat al-Nusra: The Most Extreme Wing of Syria’s Struggle,” The Telegraph, 2 December 2012. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/mid dleeast/syria/9716545/Inside-Jabhat-al-Nusra-the-most-extreme-wing-of-Syrias-struggle.html (accessed 20 November 2012); Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Syria’s al-Nusra Front—Ruthless, Orga- nized and Taking Control,” The Guardian, 11 July 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian. com/world/2013/jul/10/syria-al-nusra-front-jihadi (accessed 20 November 2013); Benotman and Blake, “Jabhat al Nusra: A Strategic Briefing.” 38. Ruth Sherlock, “ Inside Jabhat al-Nusra,” 2 December 2012 and Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Syria’s al-Nusra Front,” 11 July 2013. 39. Ibid. 40. Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat al Nusra: A Strategic Briefing.” 41. Ruth Sherlock, “Inside Jabhat al-Nusra,” 2 December 2012 and Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Syria’s al-Nusra Front,” 11 July 2013. 42. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Syria’s al-Nusra Front,” 11 July 2013. 43. Jim Muir, “al-Nusra Pledges Allegiance to al-Qa’ida,” 2013, and Stephanie d’Arc Taylor, “Jabhat al- Nusra’s Rising Stock in Syria,” al-Jazeera News, 19 May 2013. Available at http:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/20135161073885661.html (accessed 2 October 2013). 44. “Himam News Video Shows al-Nusra Fighters Distributing Food in Homs,” posted and translated by SITE Intelligence Group, 16 August 2013. 45. “ISI Leader Rebrands ISI and al-Nusrah Front as ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,’” posted 8 April 2013, translated and released by SITE Intelligence Group, 16 April 2013, document number unavailable. 46. Jim Muir, “al-Nusra Pledges Allegiance to al-Qa’ida,” 2013 and Stephanie d’Arc Taylor, “Jabhat al- Nusra’s Rising Stock in Syria,” al-Jazeera News, 19 May 2013. Available at http:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/20135161073885661.html (accessed 2 October 2013). 47. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini and Abu Mohammed al- Jawlani,” 23 May 2013, trans. Aymenn Jawwad al-Tamimi, 9 June 2013. Available at www.aymennjawwad.org (accessed 10 September 2013). 48. David Ignatius, “Ousting Assad May Be Only the Beginning,” Washington Post, 2 Decem- ber 2013. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-in-syria-ousting- assad-may-be-only-the-beginning/2013/12/02/24013450-5b9d-11e3-a49b-90a0e156254b_story. html (accessed 9 December 2013). 49. Khaled Yacob Oweis, “Beheadings and Spies Help al-Qa’ida Gain Ground in Syria,” Reu- ters, 5 December 2013. Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/uk-syria-crISIL- qaeda-insight-idUKBRE9B40NC20131205 (accessed 9 December 2013). 50. “FSA Brigade Joins al-Qaeda Group in Syria,” al-Jazeera News, 21 September 2013. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/09/2013920164342453621.html (accessed 9 December 2013). 51. Ibid. See also “‘al-Nusra’ threatens ISIL, Raqqa is Our Emirate,” Arabi News, 22 October 2013. Available at http://breakingnews.sy/en/article/27512.html(accessed 9 December 2013). 52. Nick Tattersall, “al-Qaeda’s Rise in Northern Syria leaves Turkey in a Dilemma,” Reuters, 17 October 2013. Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/uk-syria-crISIL-turkey- qaeda-idUKBRE99G06T20131017 (accessed 10 December 2013). 53. Alastair Crooke, “Syria and Iran: The Great Game,” The Guardian, 4 November 2011. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/04/syria-iran-great-game (accessed 10 December 2011). 54. Karin Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6(8) (August 2013). 55. Mushreq Abbas, “Iran’s Man in Iran and Syria,” Iraq Pulse of al-Monitor, March 2013. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/contents/articles/opinion/2013/03/soleimani-iraq- syria-difference.html (accessed 19 December 2013). 326 R. K. Cragin

56. Ibid. 57. Michael R. Gordon, “Iran’s Support Emboldens Assad, Envoy Says,” New York Times,20 March 2013. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/middleeast/irans-support- emboldens-assad-us-envoy-says.html?_r=0 (accessed 9 December 2013); and Con Coughlin, “Iran Sends Elite Troops to Aid Bashar al-Assad Regime in Syria,” The Telegraph, 6 September 2012. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9526858/Iran-sends- elite-troops-to-aid-Bashar-al-Assad-regime-in-Syria.html (accessed 10 December 2013). 58. Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander.” 59. Karin Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria”; Mushreq Abbas, “Iran’s Man in Iran and Syria”; Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander.” 60. Ambassador R. James Woolsey, “Breaking the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus,” testimony provided at a joint hearing before House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittees on Mid- dle East and North Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Terrorism, NonProliferation and Trade, 11 April 2013. Available at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/stuff/uploads/documents/UPDATED_Woo sley_Testimony_April_11_2013.pdf(accessed 10 December 2013); and, “Treasury Targets Hizbal- lah for Supporting the Assad Regime,” US Department of Treasury Press Release, 10 August 2012. Available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1676.aspx (accessed 10 December 2013). 61. Ibid. See also, Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander” and Mushreq Abbas, “Iran Looks to Iraq for Syria Support,” trans. Joelle el-Khoury, al-Monitor, 13 September 2013. Available at http://www. al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/iran-looks-for-support-from-iraq.html (accessed 2 March 2015). 62. David Barnett, “Argentine Prosecutor accuses Iran of Establishing Terror Network in Latin America,” The Long War Journal, 30 May 2013. Available at http://www.longwarjournal. org/archives/2013/05/argentine_prosecutor.php (accessed 10 December 2013). 63. “Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” Press Release, Department of Justice, 11 October 2011. Available at http://www.jus tice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-ag-1339.html (accessed 11 December 2013). 64. “Treasury Targets Hizballah for Supporting the Assad Regime,” 10 August 2012. 65. Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander.” 66. Ibid, see also Mushreq Abbas, “Iran’s Man in Iran and Syria.” 67. Ibid. 68. Kim Cragin, “Hizballah, Party of God,” in Brian Jackson et al., eds., Aptitude for Destruc- tion, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005); Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance; Qas- sam, Hizballah: The Story from Within; Norton, Hizballah: A Short History. 69. Ibid. See also, Hassan Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement,” Digi- tal Documentation Center, American University of Beirut, no date provided. Available at http:// ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html (accessed 18 December 2013). 70. Kim Cragin, “Hizballah, Party of God” and Zayn Knaub, “Why is Hezbollah in Syria?” Small Wars Journal, 19 November 2013. Available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-is- hezbollah-in-syria (accessed 9 December 2013). 71. Hassan Nasrallah, “Speech Delivered on 25 May 2013,” Amal Saad-Ghorayeb (trans.). Available at http://syria360.wordpress.com/2013/05/28/nasrallahs-may-25th-speech/ (accessed 23 December 2013). 72. Kim Cragin, “Early History of al-Qa’ida,” The Historical Journal 51(4) (2008), pp. 1047–1067. 73. Others have made similar observations. See, for example, Ali Hashem, “Nasrallah on Syria: This Battle is Ours,” Iran Pulse of al-Monitor, 26 May 2013. Available at http://www.al-mon itor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/nasrallah-hezbollah-syria-speech-rockets.html (accessed 23 December 2013). 74. See, for example, “Hizballah Forum Members Argue that Gulf States are Apostates,” SITE Intel Group, 14 October 2013. 75. “Deadly Clashes Erupt in Eastern Lebanon,” al-Jazeera News, 28 September 2013. Avail- able at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/09/armed-men-open-fire-at-hezbollah- checkpoint-2013928125822292532.html (accessed 23 December 2013). 76. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, “The Syrian Spillover.” 77. United Nations Human Rights Commission, 13 May 2013. Available at http://data.unhcr. org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (accessed 23 December 2013). 78. “Assad: Turkey Will Pay for Backing Rebels,” al-Jazeera News, 4 October 2013. Avail- able at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/10/assad-turkey-will-pay-for-backing-reb Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 327 els-2013104201945799943.html (accessed 23 December 2013); and Tattersall, “al-Qaeda’s Rise in Northern Syria Leaves Turkey in a Dilemma.” 79. Eric Schmidt and Robert Worth, “With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mid- east Role,” The New York Times, 15 March 2012; Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Iranian Support Seen Crucial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Reuters, 15 December 2014. Available at http:// www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215 (accessed 29 January 2015). 80. Haroon Siddique, “Thailand Arrests Hezbollah Suspect after Terror Tipoff,” The Guard- ian, 13 January 2012. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/13/thailand-arrests- hezbollah-suspect-terror-tipoff (accessed 23 December 2013). 81. James Kanter and Andrew Higgins, “Belgium Offers Partial IDs of 2 Killed in Police Raid,” The New York Times, 21 January 2015. 82. “Australia Disrupts Beheading Plot in Support of ISIS,” NBC News, 18 September 2014. Available at http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/australia-raids-foil-alleged-beheading- plot-support-isis-n205986 (accessed 29 January 2015). 83. Andrew Higgins and Dan Bilefsky, “French Police Storm Hostage Sites, Killing Gunmen,” The New York Times, 9 January 2015. 84. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Obama Seeks to Calm Saudis and Paths Split,” New York Times,27 March 2014. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/world/middleeast/obama-courts-a- crucial-ally-as-paths-split.html?_r=0 (accessed 24 April 2014); “From Riyadh to Beirut, Fear of Syria Blowback,” Associated Press, 1 March 2014. Available at http://www.timesfreepress.com/ news/2014/mar/01/riyadh-beirut-fear-syria-blowback/ (accessed 24 April 2014).