Studies in Conflict & Terrorism ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20 Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy R. Kim Cragin To cite this article: R. Kim Cragin (2015) Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:5, 311-327, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024 Published online: 25 Mar 2015. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1990 View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uter20 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:311–327, 2015 Copyright Ó Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024 Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy R. KIM CRAGIN RAND Corporation Arlington, VA, USA On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda’s organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL’s behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. On 21 August 2013, a series of missiles containing the sarin nerve agent detonated in vil- lages outside of Damascus, Syria. Reports on the number of casualties varied widely. According to the Violations Documentation Centre, the attacks killed 588 civilians, including 135 women and 108 children, while the U.S. government estimated the number of fatalities to be as high as 1,429.1 Either way, this attack represented the most severe use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein killed thousands of Kurdish residents of Halabja in March 1988.2 The attack also magnified concerns in the international community about the possibility of non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda or Lebanese Hezbollah, obtaining chemical weapons from Syria’s arsenal. Likewise, by the time of this sarin attack, significant numbers of Al Qaeda foreign fighters, Hezbollah operatives, and Iraqi Shi’a militiamen had entered Syria. One report estimated that approximately 8,500 foreign fighters had joined Syria’s opposition forces between 2011 and 2013, of which 1,900 came from Western Europe.3 By January 2015, these numbers had increased to an astounding 19,000 foreign fighters from 90 countries.4 To counter these, Hezbollah initially sent 2,000 operatives to support Bashar al-Assad, along with approximately 5,000 Shi’a fighters from Iraq and 4,000 from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) between 2011 and 2013.5 And, like Al Qaeda’s Received 17 February 2014; accepted 25 April 2014. Address correspondence to R. Kim Cragin, RAND Corporation, 1200 S. Hayes St., Arlington, VA 22202, USA. E-mail: [email protected] 311 312 R. K. Cragin foreign fighters, this Shi’a coalition also has more than doubled its support to Bashar al-Assad since 2013.6 Thus, beyond the threat of non-state actors obtaining chemical weapons, the conflict raised concerns of a spillover beyond Syria and Iraq to other coun- tries in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and North America. These combined threats—the potential acquisition of chemical materials by non-state adversaries and an escalating competition between them regionally if not globally— necessitates a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. That is, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, IRGC, Iraqi militiamen, and Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war, is unlike any previous problem encountered both in its nature and scale, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi- proxy war has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, requiring the U.S. government to develop a new approach to mitigating the impact of these semi-proxy wars. Why a “semi-proxy” war? Generally speaking, the term “proxy war” refers to a con- flict in which countries oppose each other indirectly, through the use of surrogates, typi- cally in a third country. And, in fact, numerous experts and popular commentators have argued that the conflict in Syria goes beyond a civil war; it has become a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 7 Yet this description is somewhat deceiving. It presents the conflict in a traditional Cold War framework, with external state actors influencing the behavior of internal state or non-state actors. While this certainly exists in Syria, this more traditional understanding of a proxy war minimizes the role of external non-state actors.8 In Syria, external non-state actors—particularly Al Qaeda and Hezbollah—have changed the nature of the conflict.9 They also represent the primary threat to U.S. national security interests in the region and beyond. So this article utilizes the term, “semi-proxy war,” to underscore the importance of external non-state actors on this and other conflicts. Specifically, this article addresses the ongoing competition for influence between Al Qaeda, Lebanese Hezbollah, and its allies. By “its allies,” this article mostly refers to Iran, because it is difficult to examine Hezbollah’s external operations without discussing Iran. And, while this article focuses primarily on the conflict in Syria, similar patterns undeniably exist elsewhere. Moreover, while some might articulate that it is in the best interest of the United States for its adversaries to fight, this present article argues other- wise. The competition is at best destabilizing and, at worst, threatens U.S. national secu- rity. The U.S. government, therefore, cannot merely observe this escalating competition, but instead must find a way to mitigate its effects. This article is organized into three sections. The first section provides further discus- sion on the historical context of the competition between Al Qaeda’s network, Hezbollah, and its allies. Next, the article examines the ongoing conflict in Syria, including the nature of the competition between these actors, and its relevance to U.S. national security. The final section proposes a way forward for the U.S. national security community. Historical Context Much has been written about the divide between Sunni and Shi’a communities in the Mus- lim World.10 This historical enmity has its origins in a struggle for succession to the Prophet Mohammad: a portion of his followers, now referred to as Shi’a, believed that the Prophet’s successor should come from his family, while others, referred to as Sunnis, wanted their leader to be selected by an inner circle of senior advisors. Religious zealots in both Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 313 communities believe the others to be apostates.11 These ideological tensions have erupted periodically in the political realm and upset regional stability, especially in the Arab world. Most recently, the “Arab Spring” re-exposed some of these underlying tensions. For example, in Bahrain, Shi’a citizens and residents marched against their Sunni-led monar- chy. In response to these protests, King Hamad al-Khalifa accused the Iranian govern- ment of fomenting unrest and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sent soldiers to his aid.12 Further, in November 2013, a bomb exploded outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut; the attack was claimed by Al Qaeda, causing concern among experts that the conflict in Syria would spark sectarian tensions in Lebanon.13 More recently, Huthi militias converged on the Presidential compound in Sanaa, Yemen, in January 2015.14 In most of these uprisings, Al Qaeda has represented a small and insignificant actor. But, increasingly, Al Qaeda fighters have found themselves in direct opposition to Leba- nese Hezbollah, Shi’a militias, and, equally important, Iranian interests. This opposition has not always been the case in past conflicts. During the 1980s, for example, Al Qaeda’s precursor, Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), maintained offices in Iran in support of the first Afghan war. The presence of these offices suggests that Iran’s regime at the very least believed that MAK activities did not undermine its interests. MAK’s publication, al- Jihad, subsequently reported in August 1985 that it was forced to close offices in twelve provinces because the Iranian government had become more “obstructionist.”15 This on-again-off-again relationship between Al Qaeda and Iran continued through- out the 1990s and extended past the September 2001 attacks in the United States. Iran reportedly provided training to Al Qaeda fighters in Lebanon in the mid-1990s.16 And, after U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Iran gave refuge to numerous fleeing Al Qaeda fighters. This refuge soon thereafter turned into a house arrest: Al Qaeda members could remain in Iran, away from family, or risk death by U.S.