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The ANSO Report (1-15 March 2012)

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The ANSO Report (1-15 March 2012) CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2012 Issue 93 REPORT 1‐15 March 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-4 The shooting of civilians in Panjwayi by a Whilst country-wide AOG attack rates 5-8 Northern Region rogue IMF solider in Kandahar proved a continue to exhibit a downward trend Western Region 9-10 defining event this cycle, with the affair when compared to the last two years, this feeding into the perceived IMF-GOA trust year’s long winter season and the vigour of Eastern Region 11-14 deficit and general anti-IMF sentiment the AOG campaign noted last year caution coming just after the incineration affair in against a hasty interpretation of present Southern Region 15-18 Bagram. Contrarily to the previous IMF conditions. For example, AOG volumes in 19 ANSO Info Page mishap, the killing did not translate into the Southern Region this period recorded a country-wide demonstrations. This was steep growth line, marking twice as many due to a combination of factors, including attacks as the opposition networks in the HIGHLIGHTS the public view of the shooting as a war East; until now the main contributor to related crime rather than a transgression AOG volumes this year (for the break- Killing of civilians by against national or cultural values. down and comparisons, consult the graphs rogue IMF soldier in ‘Demonstration fatigue’ and a vocal GOA below). Kandahar stance in its immediate aftermath also The NGO community, however, faced an served to shape public reaction. The inci- NGO clinics impacted array of criminal events. National staff dent marked another tactical public rela- by IED & IDF in Khost members fell prey to ‘drive by’ thefts in tions loss for IMF in the South and played and Nangarhar Jalalabad whilst another robbery affected directly into the strategic objectives of the two NGO staff travelling late at night from Criminal robberies of opposition. A series of attacks followed, Baghlan towards Samangan. Of a more NGO staff in including one against a VIP delegation at- serious nature were the incidents involving Nangarhar and tending the funeral ceremony in Panjwayi, NGO health facilities in the East. In Baghlan as well as a bizarre attempt to drive into a Nangarhar, a clinic was impacted by IDF group of IMF soldiers at the main base in during an assault on a DAC while an IED ANSO is supported by Helmand. However, the explicit involve- detonated in front of a clinic in Khost City, ment of AOG in both attacks remains in in what appears as an intimidation attempt question. As to the possible long-term im- by local ‘medical mafia’. Also in Khost, an plications, the delicate issue of sovereignty explosion caused damage to another clinic and the legal status of IMF has been raised shortly after the premise was searched by as the Wolesi Jirga called for the IMF per- IMF, though exact cause and author of this petrator to be tried in an Afghan court, an event remain unclear at this time. issue promptly rejected by the US. AOG attack rate Jan-Feb-Mar comparison AOG incident distribution in 2012 January February March January February March 300 1200 250 1000 200 800 150 600 100 400 50 200 0 0 CENTRAL EAST NORTH NORTH SOUTH WEST 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 EAST ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL K ABUL Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 Kabul Province returned to the 40 quiet experienced prior to the in- and primary motivations of the 30 cineration affair. Whilst the attack. In the past, IEDs affixed 20 NGO community reflected on the to vehicles included both political 10 and criminal attacks, although the Panjwayi incident as having a po- 0 tential to trigger another row of activity remained marginal. A anti-IMF protests, the situation temporary spike was marked last did not translate into any major year along the ring road north of activity as of the end of the cycle. Kabul, where sticky bombs target- KABUL AOG KABUL Crime Overall, ANSF dominated the ed IMF-contracted fuel tankers en route to Bagram. In counter- local community reiterated that the fighters landscape and authored over two were not members of any active AOG. For thirds of the incidents. Conflict- point, the capital city witnessed just four cases since 2006 of the overall trends, the volumes recorded in related arrests remained limited to Surobi this year stand against the trending for three operations in the capital which only two were attributed to AOG. The latest incident remains 2010 and 2011 when AOG stayed more active (District 1, 5 and 7) and a more during the first quarter. It remains too early to robust operation in Dashti Saqawa an outlier regardless its primary motives. fully assess the underlying causes of the slow (Chahar Asyab). operational tempo this year, though the harsh th In the evening on the 6th of On the 14 , AOG ambushed an winter can hardly be denied as a prominent March, an explosive device, likely ANA-IMF convoy in the Uzbin feature. However, it is also an established fact a ‘sticky’ IED, detonated on an Valley of Surobi. The attack did that domestic networks are often active in the ANA vehicle shortly after the not have much impact besides neighbouring areas in Tagab, Laghman and driver parked inside the com- being the first manifestation of even Nangarhar, whilst they tend to keep their pound of the Ministry of Defence local AOG presence this year. It home turf calm. In particular, the recent AOG in District 2. The blast injured also came amidst local efforts at surge in Tagab & Alasay could have absorbed two ANA staff, including the reintegrating former IEA affili- significant local resources. The current level of driver, and damaged three vehi- ates. A group of Pashai fighters AOG activity in Surobi does not represent any cles. The circumstances remain from the Upper Uzbin Valley major concern to the safety of day-time NGO unclear as does the authorship joined the APRP recently, though travels along the highway. NGO Incidents P ANJSHIR Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 This cycle, several avalanches causing structural damage were The NGO community noticed the An interest of local politicians to bring the Af- reported from the borderland be- usual amount of political maneu- ghan Local Police program into the province tween Dara and Paryan, and most vering among different local pow- was also notated, yet the actual chances of this of local roads there remained er groups, yet the general agendas happening are quite low. This may change at a blocked by snow. remain aligned with the strong later stage this year with the envisaged road Panjshiri lobby in the central gov- construction project between Panjshir and Nu- Besides a handful of demonstra- ernment and do not threaten to ristan via Dara. The road construction could tions during the previous cycle, impact NGOs in their daily pro- encompass a local equivalent of ‘critical infra- Panjshir has not experienced gramming. structure protection’ forces. much insecurity so far this year. NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 14th of March 2012. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 After the significant upscale of 30 AOG activity in January and Feb- Derakht, Joybar). Yet, the cycle ruary, AOG activity levels opened with a bold SAF attack on 20 dropped this cycle marking only a passing ANA convoy in the dis- 10 three attacks for the first weeks of trict center of Alasay in the mid- 0 March. Nonetheless, the series of morning on the 1st. Each side 33 attacks generated by the oppo- sustained four casualties and the sition so far this year outnumbers AOG record included one killed. the sum of all AOG incidents KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime In the evening hours on the 9th, staged so far in the rest of Central. IMF air support mistook civilian adult perished in another mis-targeted IMF air Moreover, the low attack rates did dwellings in Ibrahim Khel for strike in Geyawe Payeen (Nijrab). Of note not quite translate into improve- AOG positions and fired heavy though, the latest protest remained focused on ments in the security conditions weapons against the assumed tar- this particular incident and did not connect for the civilians. As the combat get. The strike killed three and with the external events such as the Bagram operations continued to converge injured a further two civilians. incineration affair or, at a later stage this cycle, on main access roads and in the The community staged an angry the rogue IMF shooting of civilians in Panjwa- population centers, civilian casu- but peaceful protest the next day yi, Kandahar. alties continued to rise. From an in the district center during which NGO perspective, Kapisa cur- Conflicts over natural resources, agricultural the bodies of the victims were rently maintains the highest NGO land and water & irrigation infrastructure, are displayed in public. Needless to threat profile in Central. somewhat common for the spring season as say, anti-IMF sentiment stayed seen on the 8th when two families clashed over AOG activity remained restricted high throughout the cycle. The land in Adina Khel, Alasay. The situation de- to SAF and SAF/RPG attacks on air-strike came less than a month generated into a fight which left two partici- ANP infrastructure in Tagab (Seh ago after 7 children and a young pants killed.
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