Some Thoughts on Cross-Strait Relations

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SomAmericae Thoughtn ForeignsPolicon Cross-Straighy Interests, 24: 243t Relation–254, 2002s 243 Copyright © 2002 NCAFP 1080-3920/02 $12.00 + .08 DOI:10.1080/1080290032434 Some Thoughts on Cross-Strait Relations

Alan D. Romberg

Introduction wan, the Penghus, and the offshore islands, and it has no formal links to the PRC. There are differences among Taiwan’s political leaders about bjectively speaking, Cross-Strait relations how to describe this—for example, whether to Oare far less tense in the spring of 2002 than endorse “one China/respective interpretations” they were two years ago, when Chen Shui-bian as an enduring position arising from the 1992 was elected by Taiwan’s voters as president of SEF–ARATS negotiations. For now anyway, the Republic of China. They are less tense than Beijing has rejected the second half of that for- they were during most of the five-year period mulation (that is, “respective interpretations”), before that, when Chen’s predecessor, Lee and the debate in Taiwan has largely centered Teng-hui, sought to “push the envelope” on on other questions. Taiwan’s “sovereign, independent” status. De- Both sides of the Strait are focusing on creat- spite occasional lapses, both Beijing and Taipei ing stronger economic relations—Taiwan out of have clearly decided to cool the rhetoric even economic necessity as well as a desire to defuse as they maintain “principle” and harbor con- the issue domestically; Beijing both to reap the cerns about the other side’s intentions. It is ap- economic rewards of greater Cross-Strait trade parent that Chen’s May 2000 inaugural pledge and investment and to create a more favorable not to pursue independence or other steps so climate for political negotiations later on. None- greatly feared by the PRC leadership during the theless, the ways in which both sides address eco- election campaign played an important role. So, nomic issues are conditioned by the current po- too, have decisions made in Beijing about the litical stalemate. We can expect further tugging importance of constructive relations with the and hauling over the ground rules for future deal- United States. That said, many on the mainland ings, including political “conditions” that one side perceive a disturbing pattern of “incremental” or the other may seek to impose, as well as po- steps toward separate status—or even indepen- tential qualitative and quantitative limits. dence—and continue to warn of the dangers of taking this too far. For its part, the Taipei leadership argues that The View of Chen Shui-bian its policies fit within the parameters of what Beijing labels as acceptable “localism” and should from Beijing not be viewed as “creeping independence” or a direct challenge to the PRC over the question of The atmosphere prevailing in Beijing on the “one China.” Still, Chen Shui-bian and virtually eve of the March 18, 2000, Taiwan presidential all other major political leaders in Taiwan take election was highly charged. Specific warnings the position that the Republic of China is a sov- were issued about the consequences of a victory ereign, independent country and that, although by Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the tradi- it constitutionally encompasses all of the main- tionally pro-independence Democratic Progres- land, its operational jurisdiction is limited to Tai- sive party (DPP). Nonetheless, the PRC took

American Foreign Policy Interests 244 Alan D. Romberg

Chen’s inaugural commitment to the “five no’s”1 sales package approved in April 2001; President as an indication that its worst fears would not be Bush’s statement shortly thereafter about doing realized, at least in the near term. Still, the PRC “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself; suspected Chen’s ultimate intentions and, al- more liberal ground rules adopted for Chen when though stress eased as Beijing came to see him as transiting the United States in May; and, most a pragmatist rather than an ideologue, fear re- recently, the president’s twice-repeated public mained that the new Taiwan leader might take reaffirmation when he was in Beijing in Febru- the island in unhelpful directions if it seemed to ary 2002 of fidelity to the Taiwan Relations Act be in his political interests to do so. Mainland (TRA), while he directly vowed allegiance to the observers became increasingly discontented over three U.S.–PRC joint communiqués only in pri- time as Chen appeared to them to be more con- vate. Most recently, Beijing was upset by the is- cerned with catering to U.S. insistence that there suance of a visa to Taiwan’s defense minister to be no big destabilizing steps rather than actually pay a “private” visit to a conference in February moving toward some sort of mutually acceptable in Florida, where he met on the margins with Cross-Strait political framework. This was rein- two senior U.S. national security officials. All of forced in their minds by Chen’s reserved posi- this led to a notably sharp protest from Vice Min- tion on heading the National Unification Coun- ister Li Zhaoxing to Ambassador Clark Randt on cil (or even giving it a serious role), his refusal to March 16, 2002, and the cancellation of an April state that he was “Chinese,” his tentative en- 2002, U.S. Navy port call in Hong Kong, as well dorsement of one China/respective interpreta- as anticipated PLA Navy calls at U.S. ports later tions and then his pullback from that position, in the year.4,5 There is no sign that this will have and various steps now labeled “de-Sinicization” any immediate impact on efforts to broaden such as the changing of the logo for the Govern- day-to-day Cross-Strait relations, as discussed in ment Information Office (GIO) in order to remove the following sections. the map of China and advocacy of a new romanization system. Concern also was underscored by what has Shifting PRC Tactics been characterized as a “rectification of names” campaign. It refers to Taipei’s decision to put “is- Recognizing that it had to cope with an ad- sued in Taiwan” on ROC passports, proposals to ministration in Taipei that had a history and ap- change the title of its overseas offices to “Taiwan proach to relations with the mainland that were Representative Office” from “Taipei Economic sharply different from those of its KMT prede- and Cultural Representative Office,” and the cessors, Beijing began in the immediate aftermath GIO’s recent revelation that it is following the of Chen’s election to search for ways to generate practice of the Presidential Office and is using greater support in Taiwan for the one-China prin- “Taiwan” rather than the “Republic of China” ciple. One of the first efforts, in the late summer as much as possible “to describe the country’s of 2000, involved Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s is- name” in order to show that the island “is stand- suance of what came to be called the three new ing up for itself.”2 The success of current efforts sentences. The key feature was to change Beijing’s to lay a legal foundation for a future referendum standard statement that “Taiwan is part of on Taiwan’s name and status also would cause China” into “Taiwan and the mainland are both strong reverberations in Beijing, even though no parts of China.” This change paralleled a formu- referendum is currently anticipated.3 lation in Taiwan’s own National Unification Moreover, Beijing’s concern has been height- Guidelines. ened by what it perceives as U.S. “complicity” in Some opposition (KMT and PFP) politicians all of this. It sees this reflected in a major arms suggested that Taipei pursue the new formula to

American Foreign Policy Interests Some Thoughts on Cross-Straight Relations 245 determine whether it contained something mean- come to the mainland—in an “appropriate capac- ingful. But because Qian’s version contained pro- ity” (that is, not in a party role)—as long as they visions that there is only one China and that the were not independence advocates.8 Beijing even territory and sovereignty of that China are “in- went so far as to opine that the vast majority of divisible,” and especially given the disparity be- DPP members were not independence advocates; tween the PRC’s “internal” and “external” for- that only a small handful of such diehard ele- mulations (ney way yeou bye),6 Chen declined. ments existed. The DPP, however, was still con- Moreover, to the criticism of his opponents, Chen sidered unacceptable because it had not formally increasingly came to identify the PRC’s one- repealed an independence provision of the party China principle with Beijing’s position on “one charter, even though the party had adopted later country/two systems,” and he argued that accept- resolutions that it insists have superseded and ing one China would thus be tantamount to sur- nullified that provision. These various moves, rendering ROC sovereignty. although positive, should not be overread.9 They Not to be discouraged, however, the PRC gov- did not alter Beijing’s fundamental requirement ernment work report approved by the National that Taipei accept the one-China principle before People’s Congress in mid-March 2002 included dialogue can be resumed or the PRC’s adherence the three new sentences. According to the For- to one country/two systems as the “best”—some- eign Ministry, this language demonstrated the times called the only—formulation for unifica- mainland’s “kindness, sincerity, and tolerance tion. toward solving the Taiwan question and realiz- ing the reunification of the motherland as early as possible.”7 Promoting Economic Ties Beginning in the late summer of 2001, having (unsurprisingly) failed to obtain Chen Over the past several years, even before the Shui-bian’s agreement to the one-China principle, most recent shift of emphasis, Cross-Strait eco- the PRC decided to pursue the potentially more nomic relations have bourgeoned as authorities fruitful opportunities presented by the recom- on both sides have eased the way through a re- mendations of Taiwan’s Economic Development laxation of restrictions. As suggested above, this and Advisory Council (EDAC) for liberalizing trend has been strengthened in the last few rules governing Cross-Strait trade and invest- months as the PRC has emphasized that ment. This did not mean that PRC insistence on “Cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges the one-China principle as the basis for political should not be disturbed by political differences”10 discussion had been abandoned. It meant that it at the same time that Chen Shui-bian has been would be “deemphasized” for now in favor of an advocating “more economics, less politics.”11 area that held out greater promise. Moreover, it According to Taiwan’s Board of Foreign fit with Beijing’s view that it could generate pres- Trade, two-way trade amounted to almost 30 bil- sure on Chen from the Taiwan business commu- lion dollars in 2001, accounting for 13 percent of nity to drop his insistence that the “three links” Taiwan’s total foreign trade, up almost 2 percent (discussed below) had to be established only from the previous year. Exports from Taiwan also through official channels. rose 2 percentage points, to almost 20 percent of The PRC made another show of tactical flex- the island’s total outward shipments, and imports ibility when the DPP made major gains—and the from the mainland climbed more than 1 point to KMT faltered—in the December 2001 Legislative 5.5 percent of Taiwan’s global total.12 Yuan elections. Beijing openly adopted as a for- It also is noteworthy that this substantial in- mal policy what had been its informal approach terdependence is very much a two-way street. for years: to allow individual DPP members to More than 11 percent of the mainland’s imported

American Foreign Policy Interests 246 Alan D. Romberg goods and services in 2001 came from Taiwan, high-tech sector. The solution that emerged was second only to Japan’s 17+ percent share of the to allow three 8-inch plants to be established on PRC market.13 the mainland before 2005, all to fall under rules In addition, according to data from Taiwan’s set up under the rubric of the government’s “ac- Ministry of Economic Affairs, the PRC remains tive opening, effective management” approach to Taiwan’s favorite investment destination by a economic relations with the mainland. This will wide margin.14 Almost three-quarters of Taiwan allow control of the value and sophistication of firms investing abroad in 2001 had operations on the technology transfers across the Strait and will the mainland (versus 16.5 percent invested in the limit operations to firms that have made “con- second-place United States). Moreover, of those siderable investment” in 12-inch fabs on Taiwan, companies planning to invest outside Taiwan in and then only after the latter have been fully 2002, more than 77 percent planned to do so on operational for six months.18 the mainland.15 Regulations on a wide variety of less contro- Driving many firms to move in that direction versial product lines were progressively eased in are surging Taiwan labor costs, the rising value anticipation of opportunities created by parallel of the New Taiwan dollar, relatively strict envi- accession to the WTO by Taiwan and the PRC. It ronmental regulations in Taiwan, and scarce land was announced in mid-February 2002, for ex- on the island. Other attractions are the huge, ample, that Taiwan trading companies would untapped market on the mainland and presumed henceforth be able to deal directly with their opportunities that will arise out of the PRC’s ac- mainland counterparts, import bans were lifted cession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). on approximately 2,000 PRC farm and industrial But there are some signs that, when viewed products, and Taiwan and PRC banks could now from an overall perspective, the rush to invest engage in direct remittances (although not in ei- abroad, including specifically on the mainland, ther NT dollars or RMB).19 Steps were set in may be abating. A Taipei Computer Association motion on both sides to allow branches of the and Digital Weekly magazine survey, for example, other side’s banks to open. In late March, showed that those businesses planning to invest Taiwan’s cabinet decided to loosen constraints on in the mainland in the coming year dropped from inbound investment from the mainland.20 about 85 percent of all those surveyed at the end Beijing, supported by many Taiwan busi- of 2000 to slightly more than two-thirds of firms nesses, has argued that until the three links are surveyed in late 2001/early 2002.16 According to established, the cost of doing business with the the latter poll, reasons for less emphasis on main- mainland will remain unnecessarily high. The land investment included a greater sense of po- three links, which were initially proposed more litical and economic stabilization on the island, than 20 years ago21 and later incorporated by PRC including less concern about the Taipei President Jiang Zemin into his 1995 “eight-point government’s performance.17 proposal,”22 include provisions for direct mail ser- High-tech investment on the mainland re- vices, transportation, and trade. mains controversial in Taiwan. In the spring of Although at one point there was an impres- 2002, there was a heated debate on the island sion that Beijing required Taipei’s formal accep- over the question of allowing at least some 8-inch tance of one China as a precondition for estab- computer chip wafer fabrication facilities (fabs) lishing those links, it was made clear some time to move to the mainland. Manufacturers argued ago that because the links would not be “politi- vigorously that factors of competitiveness re- cal” connections, they must merely be carried out quired such a move. Others, however, expressed as “domestic” relations23 “under” (read, “in a concern about both the political/security impli- manner consistent with”) the one-China prin- cations and the economic impact on Taiwan’s ciple. Although all of the practical implications

American Foreign Policy Interests Some Thoughts on Cross-Straight Relations 247 have not been made clear, one example has been tinues to insist that there can be no return to cited: As with Taiwan–Hong Kong ocean links, dialogue until Taipei accepts the one-China prin- ships coming into harbor would not fly “national” ciple. This was recently reiterated both by Pre- flags. Moreover, Beijing says that because offi- mier Zhu Rongji in his Work Report to the Fifth cially sponsored “dialogue” cannot resume until Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress27 Taipei accepts the one-China principle, arrange- and by President Jiang Zemin in his meeting with ments for the three links would have to be worked “native Taiwanese deputies” to the Congress.28 out through private firms or industry associa- Although not reported on those occasions, such tions, not through SEF and ARATS,24 much less PRC calls usually include a requirement that governmental agencies. Taipei endorse the “1992 consensus.”29 In his January 24, 2002, speech welcoming Taipei, for its part, continues to insist that it DPP members to visit China, Qian Qichen also will accept no preconditions for returning to dia- proposed holding discussions on establishing logue but that at the table it would be willing to mechanisms designed to promote economic co- talk about both one China and the 1992 consen- operation. It is not clear, however, how that would sus. In addressing this subject recently, Taiwan work if official or quasi-official talks were pre- Premier Yu Shyi-kun did not rule out agreement cluded. In this regard, although some believe com- on the one-China principle, but he said that any mon WTO membership could facilitate such assessment of it depends on how “one China” is discussions, this outcome is problematic from defined.30 the PRC perspective.25 PRC observers claim to be encouraged by Despite business community pressure in Tai- public opinion polls in Taiwan that show support wan to go along with the PRC approach to “pri- for one country/two systems rising to as high as vate” negotiations on the three links, there has 30 percent or more. But not only do other polls been resistance in Taipei. In part, this has been show such support hovering at much lower lev- directed at the content (especially air links, which els,31 there is no likelihood that respondents an- have been seen as having national security im- swering positively on such polls would support a plications). But it also has been related to the system that places them under the sovereign con- PRC-proposed unofficial mechanism for setting trol of the PRC or of any central government that them up. Taipei insists that many of the changes resides in Beijing. It is possible that some have in regulations and procedures cannot avoid gov- in mind “divided” or “shared” sovereignty.32 More ernment scrutiny or even direct negotiation. likely, however, few have given any serious Nonetheless, since the EDAC recommendations thought to such nuanced approaches to sover- were issued (and Chen Shui-bian called for their eignty but are merely expressing a willingness to prompt implementation) and since both Taipei contemplate some one-China umbrella arrange- and Beijing have joined the WTO, a certain level ment in which Taiwan and the mainland coexist of flexibility has been introduced into Taipei’s harmoniously side by side, neither subordinate thinking. It is not clear how this will ultimately to the other, domestically or internationally. play out, but the interests of both sides would Contributing to this conclusion are not only seem to be leading toward some sort of accom- the widely varying poll results on this subject but modation.26 the fact that, after many years of cultural and social assimilation, there has been a recent re- surgence of ethnic divides within Taiwan Wrestling with “One China” (waishengren versus benshengren ). Some observers attribute this development to the reemergence Although it stresses its commitment to of a “Taiwanese” sense of grievance over politi- “peaceful reunification,” Beijing, as noted, con- cal inequality as compared with the status of

American Foreign Policy Interests 248 Alan D. Romberg mainlanders. Whether or not this troubling trend, (including the 2004 presidential elections) would stirred up in the hothouse of Taiwan politics, have to take cognizance of the potential risks of abates over time, it shows that feelings about careless handling. Nonetheless, if some reliable “ethnicity” are still sensitive and that they will assurances were given that neither side would probably have a real and perhaps increasing im- adopt steps that provoked a crisis, the predict- pact on Cross-Strait relations for some time to ability that resulted would be welcomed. come.33 But there cannot be any such assurance un- Other developments continue to feed the der current circumstances. Not only are further, PRC’s concern about continuing incremental provocative steps by one side or the other not movement toward Taiwan independence. Empha- precluded, but tensions also can be generated sis on Taiwan’s local language, history, and cul- through unanticipated events such as the EP-3 ture, even the recent move to treat the Republic incident of April 2001. An incident growing out of Mongolia (as, it should be noted, the PRC does) of an exchange of “demonstration” military as a foreign country34 have been interpreted as moves by the two sides of the Strait, for example, part of a large and growing body of evidence of could escalate very quickly, notwithstanding the creeping de-Sinicization. fervent hope of all to avoid conflict. Some Taiwanese, including Vice President Maybe muddling through is the best one can Annette Lu, now openly advocate that the United hope for. But we need to face the fact that the States abandon the Shanghai Communiqué and current “listen-and-watch” approach of Beijing the other two joint communiqués with the PRC and the apparently self-satisfied approach of and base American policy on the TRA.35 Beijing Taipei are inadequate to the real stakes. Far more has expressed concern, but as a practical matter, flexible thinking is called for. PRC colleagues say this extremist position will not prosper. that there is no flexibility on the issue of sover- There are two principles at work here. The eignty. They rule out, for example, any consider- first is Beijing’s one-China principle, including ation of confederation or commonwealth, as that the assertion that one China exists today, that it would involve recognizing that Taiwan has inde- encompasses Taiwan as well as the mainland, and pendent sovereignty, in violation of Qian Qichen’s that territory and sovereignty are indivisible. The dictum that sovereignty is indivisible.37 Although other is Taipei’s insistence that the Republic of understandable from the current PRC perspec- China is a sovereign, independent state today and tive, this thinking will not lead to a mutually ac- that it will accept no arrangement that puts Tai- ceptable solution. Even if a KMT or PFP candi- wan under mainland sovereignty now or that date were to win in 2004—Beijing’s fervent wish, mandates that Taiwan (however autonomous it notwithstanding its denials—no such person may be) will necessarily come under Beijing’s would retreat beyond one China/respective inter- sovereign rule in the future. As they stand, those pretations, and the content of any Taiwan am- positions are irreconcilable. Thus both sides are plification of “respective interpretations” could wise to focus for now on economic relations while well be even more problematic for Beijing in two they work to reduce tensions.36 years than it would be today. If one could be assured that there was no pos- Moreover, placing high odds on Chen’s defeat sibility of a crisis, living contentedly for the in- is premature at best. His positive rating in pub- definite future with the status quo would not be lic opinion polls has now moved above 60 per- a bad outcome for everyone. No one would be cent, from under 40 percent a year ago.38 In part, completely happy, and there would still be some this reflects his more deft handling of economic jockeying and even tension from time to time. and political affairs. But in part it reflects the Movement connected with the leadership transi- increasingly outspoken sense of Taiwanese iden- tion in the PRC and in the Taiwan political world tity mentioned earlier, which does not necessar-

American Foreign Policy Interests Some Thoughts on Cross-Straight Relations 249 ily preclude a one-China approach but will not tary dimension of the Cross-Strait face-off con- sit still for the subordination of Taiwan to the tinues to grow. The U.S. national intelligence of- mainland. Although the overall electoral “bal- ficer for strategic and nuclear programs, Robert ance” between so-called Pan-Blue and Pan-Green Walpole, recently testified at a Senate hearing factions has not changed greatly, tendencies can- that the number of PRC short-range ballistic not be ignored. missiles deployed opposite Taiwan is expected to Thus, unless PRC thinking about the defini- grow to “several hundred” by 2005. He judged tion of one China is expanded, its approach to that the growing arsenal of such missiles provides dialogue is broadened, and its consideration of the mainland with a “survivable and effective” Taiwan’s “international space” and security re- conventional strike force with expanded cover- quirements are more responsive, the prospect is age.40 Moreover, Beijing is actively pursuing the for continuing political deadlock. From Taiwan’s acquisition of advanced airplanes, ships, missiles, side as well, more creative and flexible thinking and other weapons systems obviously designed is needed if there is to be progress. Chen to counter presumed American involvement in a Shui-bian’s insistence that the one-China prin- Taiwan contingency. ciple is equivalent to one country/two systems is On the other side of the Strait, Taiwan con- unjustified and unhelpful. So, too, is the tinues to strengthen its defensive forces in order government’s rigid position that only formal, to counter growing PRC strength. Moreover, government-to-government negotiations can be there is active discussion among some strategic used to arrange the three links. Instead of focus- thinkers in Taiwan about the need to develop of- ing its energies on replacing “Republic of China” fensive strike capabilities as part of a credible with “Taiwan” in every possible way, even where deterrent, rather than simply preparing to de- it has no practical utility, Taipei would do well to feat attacking missiles and invasion forces. If it think hard about whether there is a concept of were to become doctrine that the best defense is one China—however different it may be from the a good offense, that would have important impli- PRC’s current concept, especially regarding one cations for the Cross-Strait military dynamic as country/two systems—that the people of Taiwan well as for U.S. arms sales and other military re- can live with. As candidate George W. Bush said: lated decisions. Before Lee Teng-hui’s trip to Cornell in June I would hope Taiwan would also hear 1995, there were signs that the PRC could ac- the call that a one-China policy is im- commodate a larger Taiwan international role as portant for the peaceful resolution of long as it did not challenge Beijing on the ques- the dispute between China and Taiwan tion of sovereignty. That tolerance was subse- . . . [and] has allowed . . . Taiwan to de- quently put in cold storage and has remained velop into a market-oriented economy there ever since. Beijing had no choice about and flourishing democracy.39 Taiwan’s joining WTO, although it continues to try to rewrite history by identifying Taiwan’s status as “a separate customs territory of China.” (This irksome habit does nothing but annoy Playing Well Together people in Taiwan; it certainly does not encour- age Taipei to think about cooperative ap- In the meantime, both sides need to adopt proaches.) positions that reinforce stability rather than The PRC continues to block Taiwan’s partici- merely score points off their counterparts across pation in every conceivable international organi- the Strait. Despite current efforts on both sides zation, irrespective of whether it is made up of to avoid confrontation, the fact is that the mili- sovereign states or is official. A reported recent

American Foreign Policy Interests 250 Alan D. Romberg example involved a proposed trip to Lesotho by a national interest in maintaining peace and sta- privately organized—and properly documented— bility in East Asia.42 group of Taiwan doctors, dentists, pharmacists, The policy problem for Washington is to medical technicians, nurses, and medical students square that strategic national interest with an- to provide free medical services. The medical other: to maintain strong, positive, and produc- group was denied entry at the insistence of the tive relations with the People’s Republic of China. PRC.41 Meeting the challenge of balancing those two PRC colleagues broadly hint that if Taipei ac- critical considerations has not always been easy cepted the one-China principle, they would in the three decades since the Nixon/Kissinger present an extensive list of proposals that would opening to China, and the effort to do so has not provide Taiwan with entree to a wide range of always been managed well. But it is no less a re- international activities. One has to assume that quirement today than it ever was. this message has been conveyed to Chen’s gov- The advent of the Bush administration has ernment, at least indirectly. But unless Beijing raised particular questions in PRC minds about gives Taipei the political space to deal on the ba- the steadfastness of this approach. Many believe sis laid out earlier—that is, without requiring the that there has occurred an American tilt in the acceptance of the sovereign authority of a cen- direction of not only ensuring Taiwan’s security tral government in Beijing—it will not be enough but of giving it a degree of “dignity” in political to break the impasse. relations that both transcends anything seen Some authorities and experts on the main- since normalization in 1979 and verges on active land think that allowing people in Taiwan to be support for a separate status. “masters of their own house” on a day-to-day There is no question that this administration, basis should be good enough to attract them to a either on its own initiative or in acquiescing to one-China deal that meets Beijing’s current defi- Taipei’s importuning, has added frills to the po- nition. It would not. litical side of the equation. To this point anyway, the premises of the one-China policy remain in- tact, as President Bush reaffirmed in Beijing in The American Connection February.

This is not an article about American policy. But it is appropriate to note that Americans un- Conclusion derstand they have a role to play here and to say a word or two about how they view that role. The fact that both sides of the Strait are now Although some Americans doubtless are con- competing to demonstrate their good intentions cerned about the growing dependence of Taiwan and reasonableness rather than their “tough- on the Cross-Strait economic relationship and ness” is a positive development. If they are to would be opposed to any move toward reunifica- reach a state of stability, they need to take this a tion, it has not been American policy for more significant step further and find ways to demili- than 30 years to try to determine the substance tarize the Cross-Strait issue. But this will not of relations between Taiwan and the mainland. happen until they find a mutually acceptable po- Instead, the U.S. focus has been on the need to litical framework not to “resolve” the issue but reiterate that any resolution of questions between at least to “bound” it. Until that happens there them must be peaceful. This position is not com- is a real, even if small, danger of a tragic war. fortable for Beijing, which views the Taiwan ques- Under current circumstances, the two sides tion strictly as an “internal” affair. But it reflects are talking past each other: Beijing insists on the the reality that the United States has a strategic acceptance of one China before resuming dia-

American Foreign Policy Interests Some Thoughts on Cross-Straight Relations 251 logue; Taipei insists on resuming dialogue before tral element of 1992 will have been taken care of. discussing one China. There is no intersection None of this will happen, however, without talk- between those two approaches. ing about it, regardless of who is in charge in Beijing bridled at the “personal view” ex- Taiwan. pressed by AIT Chairman Richard Bush when he One of my Taiwan-specialist PRC interlocu- was in Taiwan in early 2002. He criticized the tors asked me the following question: If two fami- PRC requirement that Taipei accept one China lies live next door to each other, and the child of before dialogue could resume. It is doubtful that one family is acting badly and the neighbor en- he was acting under instructions or that his state- courages that bad behavior, what is one to think ment reflected a considered U.S. policy decision of the motives of that neighbor? My response was to start taking positions on the substance of that it is unhelpful to think of the PRC as a par- Cross-Strait dialogue. But Dr. Bush was voicing ent and Taiwan as its child. And the PRC needs what most Americans feel: that it is unreason- to stop demanding, like a parent, that Taiwan able to ask either side to make fundamental con- accept its terms “because I said so.”43 cessions before sitting down at the table. As a As to the “neighbor”—the United States—it practical matter, I do not expect Beijing to back seems that there need not—and should not—be off its insistence that Taipei accept one China interference in an amicable process to resolve before the Wang-Koo dialogue can resume. Nor differences between the two parties next door. But do I expect that Taiwan will back off its refusal if there is danger of chaos and mayhem in the to do that. In this situation, both sides need to neighborhood, that neighbor may well feel com- find a way to bypass this roadblock and conduct pelled to step in to avert an emergency caused an authoritative but low-key conversation in either by violent behavior, on one side, or by which they can explore the entire range of key moves to burn the house down, on the other. issues in order to lay a predictable and mutually To stick with my colleague’s metaphor, what acceptable foundation for moving forward. is really needed is a recognition that all members As noted earlier, PRC colleagues say they have of the first family are adults and that what is re- many ideas that Taiwan will find pleasing once quired is adult family dialogue in which problems they return to the table under the one-China prin- can be identified and talked through and solu- ciple. One presumes that such ideas address not tions worked out while showing respect for all only Taiwan’s international space but also its parties’ dignity and interests. That is not impos- security. Taiwan colleagues say that there are sible in this situation; it is just very difficult. prospects for accepting the one-China principle (albeit in some variant of one China/respective About the Author interpretations). They can proceed, however, if they have some confidence in the implications of Alan D. Romberg, a member of the NCAFP’s doing so. Roundtable on U.S.–China Policy and Cross-Strait Both will have to live with the inherent con- Relations, is senior associate and director of the tradictions between the PRC assertion that China Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center. Beijing represents Taiwan in the international community and Taipei’s refusal to accept that assertion. With goodwill and imagination, how- Notes ever, this would be manageable. Whether Taipei could also directly endorse the so-called 1992 con- 1. In his inaugural address on May 20, 2000, sensus is another difficult question, but perhaps Chen included the following pledge: it is not impossible to work out. If the two sides [As] long as the CCP [Chinese Communist can agree on a formula about one China, the cen- party] regime has no intention to use military

American Foreign Policy Interests 252 Alan D. Romberg force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my other long-standing position—its role as the “sole term in office, I will not declare independence, I legal representative of all the Chinese people, will not change the national title, I will not push including in Taiwan”—and it has fought hard to for the inclusion of the so-called state-to-state deny Taiwan any international standing or par- description in the Constitution, and I will not ticipation, even when statehood is not an issue. promote a referendum to change the status quo 7. “Phrases on One-China Principle in Gov- in regard to the question of independence or uni- ernment Report Significant: Spokesman,” fication. Furthermore, there is no question of People’s Daily (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ abolishing the Guidelines for National Unifica- 200203/28/print20020328_92977.html). tion and the National Unification Council. (http:/ 8. This was first made public in Vice Premier /www.president.gov.tw/2_special/index_e.html) Qian Qichen’s January 24, 2002, speech com- 2. Maubo Chang, “GIO Promoting Use of ‘Tai- memorating Jiang Zemin’s January 30, 1995, wan’: Official,” CNA, March 18, 2002. There is a “Eight-Point Proposal.” Because of some confu- certain irony here inasmuch as Taipei has re- sion regarding what stance DPP members were sorted to various stratagems in order to be able supposed to take on one China in order to be to refer to itself as the Republic of China abroad, welcomed, Beijing clarified that it was not de- an identification no longer allowed by countries manding that such DPP visitors take an oath that “derecognized” it and normalized relations endorsing the one-China principle (see “Wang with Beijing. Zaixi Reiterates Motherland’s Welcome for DPP 3. State Council, Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Members at Large to Visit Mainland,” Beijing Director Wang Zaixi addressed this issue in late Zhongguo Xinwen She, March 8, 2002). March in an interview with a Taiwan newspa- 9. It is interesting that some in China felt it per: “If the Taiwan authorities act willfully on necessary to underscore this point. See Xin Yue, this [the Referendum Act], it will certainly pro- “Taiwan Authorities Should No Longer Be ‘Con- duce serious consequences and cause tension in fused,’” Beijing Renmin Ribao (Overseas Edi- Cross-Strait relations” (Wang Ming-yi, “Wang tion), February 19, 2002. Zaixi, Deputy Director of State Council’s Taiwan 10. Huang Shaohua, “China Is Marching To- Affairs Office: Democratic Progressive Party Is ward Reunification with Firm and Confident Not a Monolithic Bloc,” Taipei Chung Kuo Shih Pace,” Beijing Zhongguo Xin Wen She, March 14, Pao, March 29, 2002). Thus far, however, the DPP 2002. and the Taipei Cabinet have been quite reserved 11. Sofia Wu, “President Calls for Normal- about acting on that proposal (see Stephanie Low, ization of Cross-Strait Ties,” CNA, February 26, “DPP Cautious on Referendum Law,” Taipei 2002. Times, March 1, 2002). 12. Those relative percentages hide, however, 4. See “China Summons U.S. Ambassador to an absolute drop in the value of trade by 7.4 per- Make Representations,” People’s Daily Online cent (David Hsu, “Taiwan’s Trade with Mainland (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200203/17/ China in 2001 Down,” CNA, February 28, 2002). eng20020317_92254.shtml). 13. “Taiwan Exports to China Up, Investment 5. “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Answers Down,” Asia Pulse/CNA, in AsiaTimes online, Journalists’ Questions at News Conference on 21 March 6, 2002; and Xinhua News Agency Report March 2002,” Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 29, 2002. (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn). 14. Total PRC-approved Taiwan investment 6. Qian’s formulation suggested “internal” since the late 1980s is now estimated in the range Cross-Strait dealings would be on an “equal ba- of $60 billion (Benjamin Kang Lim, “Taiwan and sis,” a long-standing PRC position. But to the China Launch Flurry of Contacts,” Reuters, “external” world, the PRC firmly insists on an- March 3, 2002). About half of this amount has

American Foreign Policy Interests Some Thoughts on Cross-Straight Relations 253 already been expended (Xinhua Report, March Shyi-kun vowed to set up the three links as soon 29, 2002). as possible “as long as national security and eco- 15. “Mainland Most Popular for Taiwan’s nomic development can be ensured” (Flor Wang, Overseas Investment,” Asia Pulse/CNA, in “‘Three Links’ The Sooner the Better: Premier,” AsiaTimes online March 13, 2002. CNA, March 19, 2002). 16. “Mainland Investment Fever Dwindling: 27. Reported by Xinhua, March 5, 2002. Poll,” CNA, March 4, 2002. 28. Reported by Xinhua, March 8, 2002. 17. Ibid. 29. This refers to an arrangement reached be- 18. Victor Lai, “Taiwan Allows Conditional tween Taiwan and the mainland in late 1992 in Transfer of 8-Inch Wafer Fabs: Premier,” CNA, which each endorsed a version of one China as a March 29, 2002. basis for dialogue in the spring 1993 between SEF 19. “Taiwan Relaxes Ban on Direct Trading Chairman Koo Chen-fu and ARATS Chairman with China,” Associated Press, in South China Wang Daohan. Since then, however, a disagree- Morning Post (SCMP.com) on February 16, 2002. ment has arisen over the nature of the consen- 20. “Taiwan’s Cabinet Decides to Ease sus, whether it is still valid, and even over Half-Century Ban on Chinese Investments,” whether there ever was a “consensus.” Chen Hong Kong AFP, March 27, 2002. Shui-bian has refused to endorse it up to now. 21. In the January 1, 1979, National People’s 30. “Assessment of ‘One China’ Depends on Congress Standing Committee “Message to Com- Definition: Premier,” from Taipei Times, March patriots in Taiwan,” reported by Xinhua on De- 6, 2002, as carried by Taiwan Headlines, March cember 31, 1978. 6, 2002 (http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/). 22. Jiang’s speech “Continue to Promote the 31. For example, a recent Mainland Affairs Reunification of the Motherland” was delivered Council survey showed only 9.2 percent support, on January 30, 1995, and reported that day by 69.2 percent opposition, and the remainder in- Xinhua. different (Fang Wen-hung, “9.2 Percent of Tai- 23. According to the Taiwan Affairs Office’s wanese Support ‘One Country/Two Systems’: Wang Zaixi, the PRC wants the routes labeled as Poll,” CNA, at Taiwan Headlines online, Febru- special domestic routes, but Taiwan insists they ary 22, 2002). be called special international routes. Said Wang: 32. As noted, the “three new sentences” would “This would be difficult to achieve. Problems can rule out “divided sovereignty.” But at various be overcome only if we make the definition fuzzy” times in the past, officials and other important (Wang Ming-yi, “Wang Zaixi . . . Is Not a Mono- personages on both sides have raised the concept lithic Bloc,” op. cit.). of “shared sovereignty.” See Ralph N. Clough, 24. Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations (Lanham: Roman and Littlefield, 1998), 98. Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) were estab- 33. There are numerous articles on the ques- lished in late 1991 and early 1992 as quasi-official tion of ethnic divisions. One of the more acces- bodies to handle Cross-Strait ties in current cir- sible discussions appeared in the Singapore cumstances. Straits Times on February 17, 2002: Goh Sui Noi, 25. Whereas Taipei would like to use WTO “Taiwan’s Great Divide,” available at http:// channels, Beijing says it is inappropriate not only taiwansecurity.org/News/2002/ST-021702.htm. because they would be “official” but also because 34. But not changing the constitution, which their dealings are “domestic” and should be nominally includes Mongolia within the Repub- worked out directly between them, not under the lic of China. umbrella of an international trade organization. 35. “Taiwan’s Lu Urges U.S. to Dump 3 U.S.– 26. On March 19, 2002, Taiwan Premier Yu China Communiques,” Kyodo, March 29, 2002.

American Foreign Policy Interests 254 Alan D. Romberg

See also Flor Wang, “Think Tank Asks Bush to Researcher of China International Affairs Insti- Abandon Shanghai Communique,” CNA, Febru- tute,” Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service, March ary 27, 2002. 27, 2002. 36. Moreover, even if they agreed on some 38. “Approval Rating for Taiwan’s President broad political principles today, it is generally ac- Hits an 18-Month High After Cabinet Reshuffle,” knowledged that there is no realistic prospect of Associated Press, reported in The China Post, (re)unification for decades to come. In the PRC, Internet edition, March 1, 2002. the standard practice is to refer to “reunification,” 39. GOP Debate in Los Angeles, March 2, highlighting Beijing’s position that Taiwan has 2000, at http://issues2000.org/Celeb/George_ historically been part of China and is not unified W_Bush_China.htm. with the motherland today only because of his- 40. James Kuo and Fang Wen-hung, “Main- torical circumstances. In Taiwan there is a grow- land China to Continue to Deploy Missiles Oppo- ing tendency to highlight not only that Taiwan site Taiwan: CIA,” CNA, March 11, 2002. has never been part of the PRC but that in many 41. Sofia Wu, “Beijing Blocks Entry of Tai- people’s minds its status as part of China is ques- wan Medical Volunteers to Lesotho,” CNA, March tionable. In this view, any future link-up would 4, 2002. simply be “unification.” This usage was even com- 42. This position, initially adopted when Tai- mon under the KMT (for example, the National wan was still under a strict authoritarian regime, Unification Council). has been strongly reinforced with the emergence 37. See the argument, for example, in Liao of full-blown democracy on the island. Yi, “Instituting ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Is 43. Which translates in realpolitik terms as Most Beneficial—Interviewing Guo Zhenyuan, “because I have the PLA to back me up.”

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