SomAmericae Thoughtn ForeignsPolicon Cross-Straighy Interests, 24: 243t Relation–254, 2002s 243 Copyright © 2002 NCAFP 1080-3920/02 $12.00 + .08 DOI:10.1080/1080290032434 Some Thoughts on Cross-Strait Relations Alan D. Romberg Introduction wan, the Penghus, and the offshore islands, and it has no formal links to the PRC. There are dif- ferences among Taiwan’s political leaders about bjectively speaking, Cross-Strait relations how to describe this—for example, whether to Oare far less tense in the spring of 2002 than endorse “one China/respective interpretations” they were two years ago, when Chen Shui-bian as an enduring position arising from the 1992 was elected by Taiwan’s voters as president of SEF–ARATS negotiations. For now anyway, the Republic of China. They are less tense than Beijing has rejected the second half of that for- they were during most of the five-year period mulation (that is, “respective interpretations”), before that, when Chen’s predecessor, Lee and the debate in Taiwan has largely centered Teng-hui, sought to “push the envelope” on on other questions. Taiwan’s “sovereign, independent” status. De- Both sides of the Strait are focusing on creat- spite occasional lapses, both Beijing and Taipei ing stronger economic relations—Taiwan out of have clearly decided to cool the rhetoric even economic necessity as well as a desire to defuse as they maintain “principle” and harbor con- the issue domestically; Beijing both to reap the cerns about the other side’s intentions. It is ap- economic rewards of greater Cross-Strait trade parent that Chen’s May 2000 inaugural pledge and investment and to create a more favorable not to pursue independence or other steps so climate for political negotiations later on. None- greatly feared by the PRC leadership during the theless, the ways in which both sides address eco- election campaign played an important role. So, nomic issues are conditioned by the current po- too, have decisions made in Beijing about the litical stalemate. We can expect further tugging importance of constructive relations with the and hauling over the ground rules for future deal- United States. That said, many on the mainland ings, including political “conditions” that one side perceive a disturbing pattern of “incremental” or the other may seek to impose, as well as po- steps toward separate status—or even indepen- tential qualitative and quantitative limits. dence—and continue to warn of the dangers of taking this too far. For its part, the Taipei leadership argues that The View of Chen Shui-bian its policies fit within the parameters of what Beijing labels as acceptable “localism” and should from Beijing not be viewed as “creeping independence” or a direct challenge to the PRC over the question of The atmosphere prevailing in Beijing on the “one China.” Still, Chen Shui-bian and virtually eve of the March 18, 2000, Taiwan presidential all other major political leaders in Taiwan take election was highly charged. Specific warnings the position that the Republic of China is a sov- were issued about the consequences of a victory ereign, independent country and that, although by Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the tradi- it constitutionally encompasses all of the main- tionally pro-independence Democratic Progres- land, its operational jurisdiction is limited to Tai- sive party (DPP). Nonetheless, the PRC took American Foreign Policy Interests 244 Alan D. Romberg Chen’s inaugural commitment to the “five no’s”1 sales package approved in April 2001; President as an indication that its worst fears would not be Bush’s statement shortly thereafter about doing realized, at least in the near term. Still, the PRC “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself; suspected Chen’s ultimate intentions and, al- more liberal ground rules adopted for Chen when though stress eased as Beijing came to see him as transiting the United States in May; and, most a pragmatist rather than an ideologue, fear re- recently, the president’s twice-repeated public mained that the new Taiwan leader might take reaffirmation when he was in Beijing in Febru- the island in unhelpful directions if it seemed to ary 2002 of fidelity to the Taiwan Relations Act be in his political interests to do so. Mainland (TRA), while he directly vowed allegiance to the observers became increasingly discontented over three U.S.–PRC joint communiqués only in pri- time as Chen appeared to them to be more con- vate. Most recently, Beijing was upset by the is- cerned with catering to U.S. insistence that there suance of a visa to Taiwan’s defense minister to be no big destabilizing steps rather than actually pay a “private” visit to a conference in February moving toward some sort of mutually acceptable in Florida, where he met on the margins with Cross-Strait political framework. This was rein- two senior U.S. national security officials. All of forced in their minds by Chen’s reserved posi- this led to a notably sharp protest from Vice Min- tion on heading the National Unification Coun- ister Li Zhaoxing to Ambassador Clark Randt on cil (or even giving it a serious role), his refusal to March 16, 2002, and the cancellation of an April state that he was “Chinese,” his tentative en- 2002, U.S. Navy port call in Hong Kong, as well dorsement of one China/respective interpreta- as anticipated PLA Navy calls at U.S. ports later tions and then his pullback from that position, in the year.4,5 There is no sign that this will have and various steps now labeled “de-Sinicization” any immediate impact on efforts to broaden such as the changing of the logo for the Govern- day-to-day Cross-Strait relations, as discussed in ment Information Office (GIO) in order to remove the following sections. the map of China and advocacy of a new romanization system. Concern also was underscored by what has Shifting PRC Tactics been characterized as a “rectification of names” campaign. It refers to Taipei’s decision to put “is- Recognizing that it had to cope with an ad- sued in Taiwan” on ROC passports, proposals to ministration in Taipei that had a history and ap- change the title of its overseas offices to “Taiwan proach to relations with the mainland that were Representative Office” from “Taipei Economic sharply different from those of its KMT prede- and Cultural Representative Office,” and the cessors, Beijing began in the immediate aftermath GIO’s recent revelation that it is following the of Chen’s election to search for ways to generate practice of the Presidential Office and is using greater support in Taiwan for the one-China prin- “Taiwan” rather than the “Republic of China” ciple. One of the first efforts, in the late summer as much as possible “to describe the country’s of 2000, involved Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s is- name” in order to show that the island “is stand- suance of what came to be called the three new ing up for itself.”2 The success of current efforts sentences. The key feature was to change Beijing’s to lay a legal foundation for a future referendum standard statement that “Taiwan is part of on Taiwan’s name and status also would cause China” into “Taiwan and the mainland are both strong reverberations in Beijing, even though no parts of China.” This change paralleled a formu- referendum is currently anticipated.3 lation in Taiwan’s own National Unification Moreover, Beijing’s concern has been height- Guidelines. ened by what it perceives as U.S. “complicity” in Some opposition (KMT and PFP) politicians all of this. It sees this reflected in a major arms suggested that Taipei pursue the new formula to American Foreign Policy Interests Some Thoughts on Cross-Straight Relations 245 determine whether it contained something mean- come to the mainland—in an “appropriate capac- ingful. But because Qian’s version contained pro- ity” (that is, not in a party role)—as long as they visions that there is only one China and that the were not independence advocates.8 Beijing even territory and sovereignty of that China are “in- went so far as to opine that the vast majority of divisible,” and especially given the disparity be- DPP members were not independence advocates; tween the PRC’s “internal” and “external” for- that only a small handful of such diehard ele- mulations (ney way yeou bye),6 Chen declined. ments existed. The DPP, however, was still con- Moreover, to the criticism of his opponents, Chen sidered unacceptable because it had not formally increasingly came to identify the PRC’s one- repealed an independence provision of the party China principle with Beijing’s position on “one charter, even though the party had adopted later country/two systems,” and he argued that accept- resolutions that it insists have superseded and ing one China would thus be tantamount to sur- nullified that provision. These various moves, rendering ROC sovereignty. although positive, should not be overread.9 They Not to be discouraged, however, the PRC gov- did not alter Beijing’s fundamental requirement ernment work report approved by the National that Taipei accept the one-China principle before People’s Congress in mid-March 2002 included dialogue can be resumed or the PRC’s adherence the three new sentences. According to the For- to one country/two systems as the “best”—some- eign Ministry, this language demonstrated the times called the only—formulation for unifica- mainland’s “kindness, sincerity, and tolerance tion. toward solving the Taiwan question and realiz- ing the reunification of the motherland as early as possible.”7 Promoting Economic Ties Beginning in the late summer of 2001, hav- ing (unsurprisingly) failed to obtain Chen Over the past several years, even before the Shui-bian’s agreement to the one-China principle, most recent shift of emphasis, Cross-Strait eco- the PRC decided to pursue the potentially more nomic relations have bourgeoned as authorities fruitful opportunities presented by the recom- on both sides have eased the way through a re- mendations of Taiwan’s Economic Development laxation of restrictions.