DOCSLIB.ORG

Global Responses to Conflict and Crisis in Syria and Yemen

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Global Responses to Conflict and Crisis in Syria and Yemen BOOK REVIEWS is insufficient to deal with issues such as mi- Endnotes gration, technological development and co- 1. Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hob- lonialism, which are emphasized throughout son, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths that Your Teachers still the book. Tell You about 1648 and 1919,” Millennium, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2011), 2011, pp. 735–758. Despite its shortcomings, Buzan and Law- 2. Julian Borger, “Donald Trump Denounces ‘Globalism’ in Nationalist Address to UN,” The Guardian, (September 24, son’s The Global Transformation: History, Mo- 2019), retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us- dernity and the Making of International Rela- news/2019/sep/24/donald-trump-un-address-denounces- tions offers new discussions about the estab- globalism. lishment of the IR discipline and the modern 3. This is a Latin term that comes from Greek classical theatre international order. The book should be read and is generally used in cinema. It means “god from the ma- chine,” and refers to miraculously resolving a problem that by both academics and students, since it chal- would normally not be resolved. See Freddie Rokem, “Theatri- lenges a traditional, settled line of thought in cal Immanence: The Deus ex Machina after the Death of God,” the IR discipline. Performance Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2017), pp. 781-793. Global Responses to Conflict and Crisis in Syria and Yemen By Amanda Guidero and Maia Carter Hallward Cham: Palgrave Pivot, 2019, 118 pages, €46,00, ISBN: 9783030027889 Reviewed by Abdussamed Özbek, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University Global Responses to Conflict and ings known as the Arab Spring, Crisis in Syria and Yemen focuses which started in Tunisia in Decem- on the humanitarian crises and in- ber 2010. ternational intervention in the con- flicts in Syria and Yemen. This book The conflicts in Syria and Yemen also endeavors to explain why the have led to the killing of hundreds former has received more media at- of thousands of people and the dis- tention, given the fact that the crisis placement of millions. Both have in Yemen is equally severe and thus become highly internationalized deserves the attention of the international through the intervention of foreign actors. public. In order to do so, the book compares Despite these shared characteristics, the cri- the responses to each conflict through an ex- ses in Syria and Yemen have received differ- amination of the coverage each conflict has ent levels of global attention. A clear sign of received from the media, nongovernmental this imbalance is revealed through the dis- organizations (NGOs) and international or- crepancy in reporting on each conflict: “since ganizations (IOs) (p. 2). At the outset, the au- 2010, much higher numbers of articles have thors subtly account for the reasons why the been published about the conflict in Syria conflicts in Syria and Yemen differ both in from many more countries than articles deal- scale and scope from the rest of the tensions ing with the conflict in Yemen” (p. 3). Putting in the region triggered by the popular upris- aside the conventional wisdom and realist 280 Insight Turkey theories of IR, which might suggest that this erage of the two conflicts is not thoroughly discrepancy has to do with great power in- discussed. terests, the book seeks to find alternative ex- planations by taking into consideration such The third chapter presents an evaluation of the other factors as identity politics, economic different explanations given for the aforemen- issues and the relative power and location of tioned discrepancy, answering from different the Yemeni and Syrian diasporas. perspective of IR theory why both crises have not received the same global attention. Stem- The first chapter provides for the general ming from Realist theory, the first and most reader a brief overview of the countries and compelling explanation refers to the inter- their respective conflicts. The conflicts in Ye- ests of the great powers involved in the Syr- men and Syria have both inflicted huge and ian conflict as the source of the discrepancy. irrecoverable losses on each country and its Other IR-related explanations dwell on Syria’s people, resulting in a critical situation where central role and strategic position, both in the more than half of the population in Syria world order and in Arab politics, the threat (around 13 million people) are in dire need posed by Syrian refugees against EU countries of humanitarian assistance and 8 million and the military involvement of external and people in Yemen are at risk of famine. There- regional actors in the Syrian civil war. fore, the authors rightly argue that, despite the differences in death tolls and the varying The fourth chapter is an empirical effort to un- roles of external actors in each country’s con- derstand why Syria receives more attention than flict, the humanitarian crisis in each country Yemen in the media. The authors using data is equally grim and deserves the same global from Google’s Global Database of Events, attention. Language, and Tone (GDELT) project for quantitative analysis, to no one’s surprise, The second chapter investigates how inter- find that sources and articles reporting on national humanitarian law (IHL) and its as- Syria far outweigh those reporting on Ye- sociated frameworks are referred to by states men (p. 70). A significant finding, however, to justify their involvement in domestic con- is that a greater number of articles report on flicts and humanitarian crises. Highlight- the use of force by states in Syria and Yemen ing three different explanations for differing than on humanitarian issues (p. 70). As the state actions in the two countries, the au- authors themselves acknowledge, a mere sta- thors deduce that international legal frame- tistical abundance does not mean in itself that works for humanitarian intervention are not one conflict is viewed as more significant than frequently invoked in either conflict and that the other. Therefore, in the following chap- there are limitations in the international le- ter (5), the authors embark on analyzing the gal framework that prevent IOs from acting framing of specific events within the crises in duly in humanitarian crises. Although the Yemen and Syria. The framing analysis, later authors reveal which explanations the exter- named correctly as a content analysis by the nal actors resort to for their interventions in authors, covers the reporting of nine interna- the conflicts in Syria and Yemen, which are tionally known news sources on the conflicts mainly intervention by invitation and estab- and the press releases and news stories of IOs. lishing peace and security, the implications The findings of the qualitative analysis in this of this pattern for the discrepancy in cov- chapter indicate that coverage of the two coun- 2020 Summer 281 BOOK REVIEWS tries is relatively similar, with articles on both regarding the use of state and non-state force Syria and Yemen giving limited attention to and the violation of law thereof. international law and IHL (p. 96), which does not answer the main question of the book. Overall, despite its methodological shortcom- ings, Global Responses to Conflict and Crisis in The concluding chapter tries to relate the re- Syria and Yemen is a timely effort to explain sults of the data analysis to the explanations a limited aspect of the crises in Yemen and offered by international law and international Syria. The book will benefit general readers relations for the central riddle of the book. Re- as well as those who want to get a brief over- iterating the results of the previous chapters, view of the nature of the conflicts in Yemen the final chapter points to the most significant and Syria. It will help citizens better address finding of the analyses, which indicates that the many humanitarian crises that may occur even in coverage of the humanitarian aspects around the world. The book can also be use- of the crises in Syria and Yemen and the po- ful for students of Media Studies and Interna- tential breaches of international humanitarian tional Relations, as it features a section in the law, news reporting by the main international final chapter providing recommendations for sources and IOS tend to evade any discussion further research in the relevant fields. The Politics of Healthcare Reform in Turkey By Volkan Yılmaz London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 267 pages, €99.99, ISBN: 9783319536668 Reviewed by İlknur Şimşek, Yalova University Healthcare reform has been a sig- in social politics. Volkan Yılmaz nificant issue across the world for the author takes on the challenge of some time. In my humble opin- providing a comprehensive analy- ion, diffirent countries have a lot sis of the political dynamics of the to learn from each other in terms HTP. Methodologically, the book of healhcare, especially developed is a case study based on a single countries from developing ones. country. It examines the political Healthcare reform in Turkey has dynamics of Turkish HTP between become a platform for critics, poli- 2003 and 2013. Empirically over- tics, academics and policy makers, as the po- lays the change in healthcare financing with litical system in Turkey was undergoing a sig- interpretations of politics. Whilst describing nificant transformation at the time the Health the new configuration of power, it also draws Transformation Programme (HTP) in Turkey on different approaches to healthcare sys- was being implemented in 2003. tems. The main focus is the transformation in healthcare system since 2003. The book under review is written by Volkan Yılmaz, who is an academician specializing Yılmaz a detailed overview of the historical 282 Insight Turkey.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • GCC Policies Toward the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen: Ally-Adversary Dilemmas by Fred H
    II. Analysis Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi, and King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Saudi Arabia, preside over the ‘Sheikh Zayed Heritage Festival 2016’ in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on 4 December 2016. GCC Policies Toward the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen: Ally-Adversary Dilemmas by Fred H. Lawson tudies of the foreign policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries usually ignore import- S ant initiatives that have been undertaken with regard to the Bab al-Mandab region, an area encom- passing the southern end of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have become actively involved in this pivotal geopolitical space over the past decade, and their relations with one another exhibit a marked shift from mutual complementarity to recip- rocal friction. Escalating rivalry and mistrust among these three governments can usefully be explained by what Glenn Snyder calls “the alliance security dilemma.”1 Shift to sustained intervention Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have been drawn into Bab al-Mandab by three overlapping develop- ments. First, the rise in world food prices that began in the 2000s incentivized GCC states to ramp up investment in agricultural land—Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi all turned to Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda as prospective breadbaskets.2 Doha pushed matters furthest by proposing to construct a massive canal in central Sudan that would have siphoned off more than one percent of the Nile River’s total annual downstream flow to create additional farmland.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Developing Countries
    Overseas Development lostitute Briefing Paper March 1991 THE IMPACT OF THE GULF CRISIS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES The economic repercussions of the Gulf crisis have been widespread. Apart from the impact on the Gulf states Box 1: Impact of Gulf Crisis themselves, the resulting economic disruptions over the past (where impact > 1% of GNP) seven months have affected many countries. In response to requests for a consistent set of estimates of the impact on less Impact of the Gulf crisis developed countries, ODI undertook a study both to assess the Oil CostI Non-oil effects and to consider the response by the international Country (B eneftt) Cost Total Cost community. US$7n US$m. US$m %GNP This Briefing Paper, finalised on the day the war ended, Low income draws on the findings of this study. Two conclusions stand Middle p:ast out. First, the large number and wide range of developing Yemen (570) 1400 830 10.4% countries that have been severely affected by the crisis-. Second, South Asia while there has been a considerable response to the crisis, the Bangladesh 130 115 245 1.4% distribution of assistance has been highly selective. Some Pakistan coimtries have been almost over-compensated while others 560 295 855 2.4% have received little help. Sri Lanka 140 125 265 4.0% Sub-Saharan Africa Effect on developing countries Beiiin 40 40 2.2% The Gulf crisis has had both global and specific effects on Chad 25 25 2.5%. developing countries. The crisis, in particular the period of Ethiopia 115 115 2.0% higher oil prices, has adversely affected world growth and Ghana 50 50 1,0% hence growth in developing countries.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background the Yemen Civil War Is
    CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background The Yemen civil war is currently in its fifth year, but tensions within the country have existed for many years. The conflict in Yemen has been labelled as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world by the United Nations (UN) and is categorized as a man-made phenomenon. According to the UN, 80% of the population of Yemen need humanitarian assistance, with 2/3 of its population considered to be food insecure while 1/3 of its population is suffering from extreme levels of hunger and most districts in Yemen at risk of famine. As the conditions in Yemen continue to deteriorate, the world’s largest cholera outbreak occurred in Yemen in 2017 with a reported one million infected.1 Prior to the conflict itself, Yemen has been among the poorest countries in the Arab Peninsula. However, that is contradictory considering the natural resources that Yemen possess, such as minerals and oil, and its strategical location of being adjacent to the Red Sea.2 Yemen has a large natural reserve of natural gasses and minerals, with over 490 billion cubic meters as of 2010. These minerals include the likes of silver, gold, zinc, cobalt and nickel. The conflict in Yemen is a result of a civil war between the Houthi, with the help of Former President Saleh, and the Yemen government that is represented by 1 UNOCHA. “Yemen.” Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Yemen_HNO_FINAL.pdf. 2 Sophy Owuor, “What Are The Major Natural Resources Of Yemen?” WorldAtlas, February 19, 2019.
    [Show full text]
  • Institutional Change and the Egyptian Presence in Yemen 1962-19671
    1 Importing the Revolution: Institutional change and the Egyptian presence in Yemen 1962-19671 Joshua Rogers Accepted version. Published 2018 in Marc Owen Jones, Ross Porter and Marc Valeri (eds.): Gulfization of the Arab World. Berlin, London: Gerlach, pp. 113-133. Abstract Between 1962 and 1967, Egypt launched a large-scale military intervention to support the government of the newly formed Yemen Arab Republic. Some 70,000 Egyptian military personnel and hundreds of civilian advisors were deployed with the stated aim to ‘modernize Yemeni institutions’ and ‘bring Yemen out of the Middle Ages.’ This article tells the story of this significant top-down and externally-driven transformation, focusing on changes in the military and formal government administration in the Yemen Arab Republic and drawing on hitherto unavailable Egyptian archival material. Highlighting both the significant ambiguity in the Egyptian state-building project itself, as well as the unintended consequences that ensued as Egyptian plans collided with existing power structures; it traces the impact of Egyptian intervention on new state institutions, their modes of functioning, and the articulation of these ‘modern’ institutions, particularly the military and new central ministries, with established tribal and village-based power structures. 1. Introduction On the night of 26 September 1962, a column of T-34 tanks trundled through the streets of Sana‗a and surrounded the palace of the new Imam of Yemen, Mu ammad al-Badr,2 who had succeeded his father Imam ‘ mad (r.1948-62) only one week earlier. Opening fire shortly before midnight, the Yemeni Free Officers announced the ‗26 September Revolution‘ on Radio Sana‗a and declared the formation of a new state: the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).
    [Show full text]
  • YEMEN Unrelenting Conflict and Risk of Famine
    IRC WATCHLIST 2021 14 IRC WATCHLIST 2021 15 1. YEMEN Unrelenting conflict and risk of famine KEY FACTS PROBABILITY IMPACT CONSTRAINTS ON HUMAN THREAT Population: 29.8 million 10 8 COUNTRY RESPONSE EXISTING PRESSURES NATURAL THREAT 24.3 million people in need of humanitarian aid 5 8 ON POPULATION (80% of population) 16.1 million people facing crisis or worse levels of Yemen tops the IRC’s annual Emergency Watchlist for the food insecurity (IPC 3+) in 2021 (54% of population) third year in a row: a consequence of over five years of major armed conflict and severe underfunding that has pushed the 53.2% child stunting due to malnutrition (second world’s largest humanitarian crisis to new lows in 2020 and highest in world) left the humanitarian response on the brink of collapse. 20.5 million people lack access to clean water and The conflict remains intense even after five years since the escalation sanitation of the war in 2015 following the Saudi and Emirati-led Coalition’s intervention to support the Internationally Recognized Government 3.6 million people internally displaced (IRG) against the Ansar Allah movement. Conflict between forces loyal to the IRG and Ansar Allah escalated in Jawf and Marib governorates 50% of health facilities are not fully functional throughout 2020. There is no sign of a political resolution to the crisis despite localized agreements over the past two years. Meanwhile, the 190th (of 195 countries) for capability to prevent and COVID-19 pandemic and a steep drop in humanitarian funding puts the mitigate epidemics country at risk of massive further deterioration.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Programme Gulf States the Yemen
    Regional Programme Gulf States Policy Report – October 2019 The Yemen War Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations Introduction Fabian Blumberg Recently, there have been important developments in the war in Yemen; a war which has, according to the UN reports, created the worst humanitarian disaster of the 21st century. On the one hand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew significant part of its military forces from Yemen declaring the time has arrived for a peace settlement to the conflict. On the other hand, militants of the South took control over Aden from the internationally-backed government amid a fierce armed confrontation between the forces of the two sides leading to a crack in the Arab Coalition that is fighting the Houthis since March 2015. News also has erupted as the Houthis claimed that they managed to attack Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facilities at the 19th of September. Back in March 2019, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) had organized a workshop in Cadenabbia, Italy, to discuss the prospects of peace in Yemen after the Stockholm agreement between the international recognised government and the Houthis. Entitled “Yemen’s War: Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations”, the workshop was attended by experts on Yemen from Europe, Germany, US, and Yemen who provided informed opinions about the conflict in Yemen and on the best way to advance peace among the warring parties. Building on that, KAS has asked experts to write down their analyses on the situation and their recommendations on how to bring about peace in Yemen. They also provide ideas for the contribution German foreign policy could provide.
    [Show full text]
  • From Yemen War to Joint Army? WP Egyptian-Saudi Differences Over Arab Military Cooperation
    Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments From Yemen War to Joint Army? WP Egyptian-Saudi Differences over Arab Military Cooperation Jessica Noll and Stephan Roll S On 25 March 2015 a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states launched air strikes on Yemen to halt the advance of the Houthi movement. A few days later the summit of the Arab League decided to set up a joint Arab army. Nevertheless, the two most important Arab countries support opposing concepts for military cooperation: Egypt proposes institu- tionalised long-term military cooperation to increase its political weight in the region, while Saudi Arabia prefers ad hoc coalitions precisely in order to avoid long-term dependency on other countries, not least Egypt. However, the two events suggest that states in the region are stepping up military cooperation. Germany and the European Union should treat this development with scepticism. Experience shows that such col- laborations tend to exacerbate rather than resolve regional conflicts. At their summit meeting at the Egyptian of the Saudi military operation against the resort of Sharm al-Sheikh on 28 and 29 Houthi movement in Yemen, there is no March 2015, the members of the Arab direct connection between the two events. League agreed to set up joint armed forces. Consequently the Arab League resolution According to the final declaration of the makes no mention of the Yemen conflict. summit, the force should be capable of In fact, the joint army project is an Egyptian rapid intervention to guarantee the national initiative that President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi sovereignty of member states and protect first floated in February 2015 in connection them against territorial threats.
    [Show full text]
  • ASSESSING the IMPACT of WAR on Development in Yemen
    ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF WAR on Development in Yemen Jonathan D. Moyer | David Bohl | Taylor Hanna | Brendan R. Mapes | Mickey Rafa DISCLAIMER This report presents the findings of a commissioned study on the impact of war on development in Yemen, through scenarios using the Sustainable Development Goals lens. The views expressed in this study are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, including UNDP, or the Member States of the United Nations. Furthermore, the designations employed herein, their completeness and presentation of information are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the United Nations Development Programme. Copyright 2019 By United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 60th Meter Road P.O. Box: 551 Sana’a, Republic of Yemen Website: http://ye.undp.org All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronical, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of UNDP ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The core team for this report comprised Dr. Jonathan D. Moyer, Assistant Professor and Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; Mr. David Bohl, Senior Research Associate; Ms. Taylor Hanna, Research Fellow; Mr. Brendan Mapes, Research Fellow; and Mr. Mickey Rafa, Assistant Director of Research Operations. From UNDP Yemen Country Office, all discussions were led by Mr. Auke Lootsma, Resident Representative; Ms. Asmaa Shalabi, Strategic Advisor; MS. Leanne Rios, Communication and Advocacy Team Leader; and Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • A Binational Approach to the Palestine Conflict Don Peretz*
    A BINATIONAL APPROACH TO THE PALESTINE CONFLICT DON PERETZ* I BINATIONALISM VERSUS EXCLUSIVITY Binationalism as a possible solution to the bitter conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalisms in Palestine is not a novel conception. Thirty and even forty years ago there were Zionists such as Dr. Judah Magnes' and leaders of the Ha-Shoraerha-Zair movement who conceived of binationalism as a middle way toward resolution of the conflict. However, neither Palestine Arab nationalists nor most Zionist leaders found such proposals meritorious. By the end of World War II when the Biltmore program 3 calling for a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine had become accepted Zionist policy, and establishment of the country as an independent Arab state was the generally proclaimed goal of Palestine's Arab leaders,4 a binationalist compromise seemed even more remote. Extermination of ninety per cent of Europe's Jews, and intensification of Arab nationalism deepened the rift between the two groups of peoples. Zionists, with the support of most organized world Jewry, by and large declared willingness to accept less than all of Palestine rather than surrender to a shared sovereignty. They preferred a smaller but exclusive Jewish state in part of the disputed area to a diluted control within a larger region. Without complete sovereignty, they believed, it would be impossible to achieve their total national 0 B.A. 1945, University of Minnesota; M.A. 1952, Ph.D. x955, Columbia University. Professor of Political Science and Director of the Southwest Asia North Africa Program, State University of New York at Binghamton, N.Y. Author, IsRtA.L AND Ta PALEsrIE ARlABs (i955); TH MIDDLE EAST TODAY (1963); THE MIDDLE EAST: SELECTED READINGS (1968).
    [Show full text]
  • ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt Or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment
    JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment by NORMAN CIGAR Abstract: The emergence of ISIS has represented a significant security risk to U.S. interests and to regional states. In Yemen, the ISIS threat has evolved within Occasional Paper #1 the country’s devastating civil war and, while its lethality has declined, this study Villanova University suggests it remains a factor of concern, Villanova, PA and assesses the challenges and options available for the US and for the November 2020 international community for dealing with this threat. ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment by Norman Cigar “The fight against terrorism is far from over” Leon E. Panetta, Former Director CIA, 25 August 20191 Introduction and Terms of Reference Even in its short history, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has posed a significant security challenge both to U.S. interests and to regional states. As the ISIS Caliphate disintegrated recently in its heartland of Iraq and Syria under a succession of blows by its international and local adversaries, the focus of the international community often shifted to ISIS’s outlying branches. However, contrary to early optimism, ISIS has proved a stubborn survivor even in its Iraq-Syria core, while its presence in branches or affiliates in areas such as the Sinai, the Sahara, West Africa, Mozambique, Yemen, and Khurasan (Afghanistan/Pakistan) also continues to be a significant security threat to local and international interests.2 Moreover, each theater of operations presents a unique set of characteristics, complicating the fight against such local ISIS branches.
    [Show full text]
  • Mission Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen
    SWP Research Paper Muriel Asseburg, Wolfram Lacher and Mareike Transfeld Mission Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs SWP Research Paper 8 October 2018 Abstract The upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have led to civil wars in three countries: Libya, Syria and Yemen. In all three cases, the United Nations have tried to mediate agreements between the conflicting parties to bring about peace through power-sharing. In this endeavour, the UN can lean on its broad experience in mediation efforts to end civil wars. In the three conflicts examined here, however, the UN’s attempts at reso- lution through power-sharing have failed. In Yemen and Libya, power-shar- ing agreements have not prevented conflicts from lingering on or violence from breaking out again. In Syria, the UN has not even managed to bring together the Syrian parties in the civil war for direct talks. The altered mili- tary balance of power has rendered the initial goal of a political transition unrealistic. This study answers the following questions: Why are these three conflicts so resistant to resolution efforts? What are the specific aspects of the conflict configurations that impede UN efforts? What factors in the UN approach are obstacles to a successful conclusion? What lessons can be learned for future mediation efforts? And how can Europe contribute to progress in this area? SWP Research Paper Muriel Asseburg, Wolfram Lacher and Mareike Transfeld Mission Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs SWP Research Paper 8 October 2018 All rights reserved.
    [Show full text]
  • A/HRC/45/CRP.7 29 September 2020
    1 0 A/HRC/45/CRP.7 29 September 2020 English Arabic and English only Human Rights Council Forty-fifth session 14 September–2 October 2020 Agenda item 2 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014 Detailed findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen* Summary Submitted as a supplement to A/HRC/45/6, this paper sets out the detailed findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen mandated to investigate violations by parties to the conflict since September 2014. During this year, the Group of Eminent Experts prioritised for investigation violations occurring since mid-2019, while taking a longer temporal scope for some categories of violations not fully addressed during our previous reports. The Group of Eminent Experts found reasonable grounds to believe that the parties to the conflict in Yemen are responsible for pervasive and incessant international human rights law and international humanitarian law violations, many of which may amount to war crimes. The summary of these findings is included in A/HRC/45/6. In addition to highlighting the parties to the conflict responsible for violations, the Group of Eminent Experts identified, where possible, potential perpetrators of crimes that may have been committed. A list of names of such individuals has been submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on a strictly confidential basis to assist with future accountability efforts.
    [Show full text]