The Changing Pattern of the Foreign Policy of the New Russia Since 1991

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Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 ISSN: 1696-2060

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW RUSSIA SINCE 1991

Sunday Ariyo Aboyade*

*Universidad de Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: [email protected]

Recibido: 11 noviembre 2016 /Revisado: 2 diciembre 2016 /Aceptado: 24 junio 2017 /Publicado: 15 febrero 2018

Resumen: Evaluar la pauta cambiante de la observable pattern in the foreign policy thrust política exterior de la Nueva Rusia surgida de of the New Russia, the paper identified liberal- las ruinas de la Unión Soviética en 1991 es un ism and nationalism as the dual underpinning complejo pero interesante estudio que destaca features of the foreign policy of the New Russia. cómo el Nuevo Estado ruso se ha comportado While at some point it was largely pro-West, at dentro del sistema internacional liderado por another it assumed an anti-West dimension Occidente, así como la dinámica de las relacio- and, yet at another level, it blended both pos- nes internacionales que han caracterizado el tures in its thrust to establishing the Russian nuevo orden mundial surgido tras la Guerra Federation as a major power centre in world Fría. Siguiendo la tendencia y el patrón obser- affairs. The paper concludes that the changing vable en la pujante política exterior de la Nueva pattern observable in the foreign policy of the Rusia, este artículo identifica el liberalismo y el New Russia was largely shaped by national in- nacionalismo como las principales característi- terest and the quest to establishing Russia as a cas de la política exterior del país. Mientras que world superpower. en algunos momentos se mostró claramente prooccidental, en otras asumió una dimensión Keywords: Russia; West; Foreign Policy; NATO; totalmente contraria e incluso llegó a mezclar Iron fist ______ambas posturas en un intento de establecer a la Federación de Rusia como centro principal de INTRODUCTION poder en los asuntos exteriores. El documento concluye que este patrón visible en la política “I cannot forecast to you the action of Rus- exterior de la Nueva Rusia fue en gran medida sia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery in- moldeado por el interés nacional y la búsqueda side an enigma. But there may be a key, de establecer a Rusia como una superpotencia and that key is Russian national interest.” mundial. Winston Churchill.

Palabras clave: Rusia; Occidente; Política exte- n examination of the changing pattern of rior; OTAN; Puño de hierro the foreign policy of the New Russia that ______A emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union in December 1991 is a complex but in- Abstract: Assessing the changing pattern in the teresting study in contemporary international foreign policy of the New Russia that emerged relations. It highlights the dynamics of inter- from the ruins of the Soviet Union in 1991 is a state relations that subsequently characterise complex but interesting study which highlights the international order that emerged after the how the New Russian state has operated within Cold War and how the New Russia has operated the Western-led international system, as well as within the Western-led international system. In the dynamics of interstate relations that char- making this assessment, however, it is impera- acterised the international order that emerged tive to emphasise that the New Russia that after the Cold War era. Tracing the trend and

© Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 73 Sunday Ariyo Aboyade The changing pattern of the foreign policy emerged in the post-Soviet era was not a totali- Fundamentally, while the foreign policy of the tarian state ruled by a Communist Party with a New Russia is largely guided by a blend of con- single, clearly defined foreign policy. That state fidence and insecurity, this blend has evolved, disappeared in 1991. In the words of Michael creating another gap between the West and McFaul, a Carnegie scholar, the New Russia is a Russia, especially since the turn of the millenni- democratising state, and her foreign policy um. While in the West, there is a broad prevail- thrust, in turn, is a product of domestic politics ing belief that Russia is in decline, emphasising in a pluralistic system.1 This new status shapes the insecurity in the mix: the behaviour of the New Russia in world affairs “unreformed economically and politically in the post-soviet era. stagnant, on the verge of major domestic Essentially, the foreign policy thrust of the New upheaval while dependent on high oil pric- Russia was largely guided by a blend of nation- es, Russia faces a range of challenges in a alism and pro-West policies in the immediate fast-moving and evolving international en- post-Cold War era and a more inclusive, aggres- vironment,”3 sive and competitive anti-West posture much Russia’s view is different. Russia considers itself later before the turn of the millennium, which as a re-emerging power on the rise to claim its affirms its intention to be more active and as- sertive in international affairs, not as a mere proper status in world affairs. The New Russia’s participant but as a power centre in the “New foreign policy thrust, thus, aims at working to World Order” designed and shaped by Wash- anticipate and lead events in the international ington and its allies. Thus, since the emergence system, to be more prominent in international of the New Russia Federation, the state has affairs, advocating its interests, using both more pursued a complex foreign policy largely influ- traditional ‘hard power’ instruments as well as enced and driven by national interests that is developing its international presence and using more ‘soft strength’ to protect and assert its dominated by economic needs of the state. This interests.4 pattern though necessitated a pro-Western stance, it assumed an anti-Western dimension The paper is divided into themes for better frim about 1995, when practically the New Rus- understanding of the trend and pattern observ- sia pursued as part of its foreign policy thrust an able in the foreign policy pursuit of the New interest aimed at countering and revising West- Russia and the dynamics of her engagement ern expansion into former Soviet space and with the West in the post-Cold War era. The Western “arrogance” in the international sys- following themes are considered: the collapse tem with an “iron fist” as well as to increase of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian influence in world politics – a foreign New Russia, Foreign Policy of the New Russia: policy largely influenced and shaped by the Objectives and Perspectives, and Foreign Policy personality of the leader of the Russian Federa- of the New Russia: Observable Pattern and tion, political parties and interest groups to an Trend from 1991. uncommon degree.2 1. THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW RUSSIA 1 Michael McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy Objectives?” Testimonies before the House Commit- The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about tee on International Relations”, Carnegie Endow- a profound change in the global power balance. ment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1 May It marked the end of the rivalry that saw the 1999, struggle of “two systems” projected onto all http://carnegieendowment.org/1999/04/30/what- areas of international affairs and an era marked are-russian-foreign-policy-objectives-pub-424 (accessed 23 June 2016). 2 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet 2016). This view was equally shared by Sergey Kara- Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking. New York, ganov, a Russian political scientist, in his discussion Palgrave McMillan, 2002, 1. See also Fyodor Luky- in 2011 of Russia’s foreign policy in the 21st Century. anov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore 3 Andrew Monaghan, The New Russian Foreign Policy Russia’s Rightful Place,” Foreign Affairs, 95/3, 2016. Concept: Evolving Continuity. London, Chatham https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ House, 2013, 7 – 8. russia-fsu/2016-04-18/putins-for (accessed 23 June 4 Ibid., 8.

74 © Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 The changing pattern of the foreign policy Sunday Ariyo Aboyade by the threat of global war with little or no pos- “we want termination and not continua- sibility for constructive international cooperation of the arms race and, therefore, offer tion.5 Historically, the collapse of the Union of a freeze of nuclear arsenals, an end to fur- Soviet Socialist Republics is usually traced to ther deployment of missiles. We want a Mikhail Gorbachev and the policies he pursued real and major reduction of the arms to reorder the Cold War relations with the West stockpiles, and not the development of ev- as well as his domestic policies to reform the er-new weapons systems, be it in space or ailing Soviet economy and agitated society. on Earth.”8 Gorbachev’s policies of “glasnost” and “pere- To achieve this, Gorbachev entered into deals stroika,” set in motion the chain of events that eventually led to the collapse of the Union. with the West, mainly the United States of America, on the termination of the arms race, When Gorbachev took office in 1985 as leader the reunification of Germany and the adoption of the Soviet Union, he chose a new Soviet path of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe aimed distinct from his predecessor’s. He sought an to reduce confrontation and forge a partnership end to the Cold War with the West as a step between the rival blocs in the East and the towards resuscitating the ailing Soviet econo- West. While these concessions eased the ten- my. Gorbachev had ambitious plans to create a sion in East-West relations, relaxed internation- profoundly different relationship with the West al tension and assured a hopeful end to the and the rest of the world. This agenda, which Cold War, the continued deterioration of the the Kremlin described as “new political think- soviet economy and the increasing agitation ing,” was initially quite popular domestically within the Union, especially of constituent and was well received abroad as well. However, states and influential movements, moved the as Gorbachev struggled and ultimately failed to Eastern superpower closer to disintegration. restart the Soviet economy, “new political The continued deterioration of the soviet econ- thinking” came to be seen as an effort to com- omy during the late 1980s and early ‘90s, and pensate for, or distract attention from, rapid Gorbachev’s resented romance with the West socio-economic decline by concentrating on foreign policy.6 culminated in some intriguing political manoeu- vring and attempts at forceful hijacking power However, throughout the late 1980s, the re- by coup d’état from the Communist Party. form-minded Gorbachev and his allies in gov- These events defined by the loss of confidence ernment believed that the best way out of the in the leadership of Gorbachev and the Com- Cold War would be to agree on new rules for munist Party set the stage for the eventual dis- global governance.7 In his acceptance speech as integration of the Soviet Union. By December the new soviet leader, he outlined as part of his 1991, the Soviet Union had virtually ceased to foreign policy pursuit and asserted the Soviet exist, and the future of its territories and peo- leadership valued the successes of the relaxa- ples uncertain. First, three republics of Estonia, tion of international tensions achieved in the Latvia, and Lithuania seceded from the Union, 1970s and were ready to take part in carrying while the other twelve republics continued to on with the process of establishing peaceful, strive for independence. Although attempts mutually beneficial cooperation with the West. were made by Gorbachev to establish a new He emphasised, “Union of Sovereign States” with some degree of integration in foreign policy, defence and economic affairs, agreement among the re- maining twelve republics was not achieved. In 5 Melville, Andrei; Shakleina, Tatiana (eds.), Russian fact, the union republics had begun to act as Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities. Budapest, Central European University Press, 2005, though they were sovereign states and were 28. negotiating with each other, bypassing the cen- 6 Klee, Mary Beth; Cribb, John; Holdren, John (eds.), tral government. This process culminated on The Human Odyssey: From Modern Times to Our Contemporary Era, 3, USA, K12 Inc., 2010, 309 – 312; see also Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest 8 See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 12, 1985 availa- to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place,”. ble on Microsoft Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, 7 Ibid. WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008).

December 1991 in the establishment of the end of the Cold War, Russian officials, however, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by have not made so clear a statement about what three Slav republics of Russia, Ukraine and Bela- exactly happened from their point of view. Ac- rus. From this point forward, it became clear cording to Fyodor Lukyanov, Their assessments even to the leaders of the Union that “the have ranged from “we won” affirming the Rus- U.S.S.R. has ceased to exist as a geopolitical sian people overcame a repressive communist reality.”9 system to “we lost” indicating that the Russians allowed a great country to collapse.12 Neverthe- This level of deterioration was not envisaged by less, leaders of the New Russia have all agreed Gorbachev. Thus, this unanticipated internal on one thing: the “New World Order” that dislocation weakened the Soviet’s position in emerged after 1991 was nothing like the one the ongoing process to end the Cold War with envisioned by Mikhail Gorbachev and other the West. The dissolution of the union meant reform-minded Soviet leaders as a way to pre- the exit of a superpower from the international vent the worst possible outcomes of the Cold arena, leaving the United States as the only War. The disintegration of the Soviet Union surviving superpower to dictate the course of rendered Gorbachev’s paradigm obsolete. A event henceforward. Gorbachev resigned as “New World Order” no longer meant an ar- Soviet president on 25 December 1991, and all rangement between equals; it meant the tri- Soviet institutions ceased to function at the end 13 umph of Western principles and influence. of 1991. The main benefactor was Russia, lead- The US-led 1990 – 1991 Gulf War introduced a ing state among the soviet republics. It assumed new dynamic: without the constraints of super- the U.S.S.R.'s seat on the United Nations Securi- power rivalry, the Western powers seemed to ty Council, and all Soviet embassies became feel emboldened to use direct military interven- Russian embassies. Thus, the New Russia tion to put pressure on states that resisted the emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union as new order, such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. the Russian Federation. The emergence, how- Thus, the New Russia entered into the new ever, was nothing comparable to the political world order prepared to battle for relevance influence wielded by the U.S.S.R. in world af- and assume eventually the exited status of the fairs as a superpower. The New Russia inherited defunct USSR as a superpower in world affairs. all that was left of the Soviet Union but not its superpower status, and thus came to be sub- 2. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW RUSSIA: jected to the “New World Order” charted by OBJECTIVES AND PERSPECTIVES the ‘fortunate’ West.10 The foreign policy of the New Russia at incep- In January 1992, a month after the official dis- tion was influenced by some long-term inter- solution of the Soviet Union, US President, ests, such as the desire to establish Russia as a George H. W. Bush, announced in his State of democratic, free state in the post-totalitarian the Union Address: “By the grace of God, Amer- era, provide favourable conditions for the for- ica won the Cold War.” Bush asserted, “The mation of a modern efficient economy, ensure Cold War didn’t ‘end’ – it was won.”11 On the the state’s financial and economic independence and achieve the equal and natural incor- 9 Martin McCauley, "The Gorbachev Era." Ency- clopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite, Chica- 1992, go: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014. http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/sp 10 See Dewdney, John C.; Pipes, Richard E.; Conquest, eech-5531 (accessed 20 June 2016). Robert; McCauley, Martin, "Union of Soviet Socialist 12 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Republics." Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Ref- Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place,” Foreign erence Suite. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Affairs, 95/3, 2016, 2014. See also Nogee, Joseph L.; Donaldson, Robert https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia- H. Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II. New fsu/2016-04-18/putins-for... (accessed 23 June York, Pergamon Press, 1992; Engelmann, Kurt E.; 2016). Lincoln, W. Bruce; Parrott, Bruce; Lieven, Dominic, 13 See Thorun, Christian, Explaining Change in Rus- "Russia." Microsoft Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, sian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008). Russia’s Conduct towards the West. Great Britain, 11 George H. W. Bush, President of United States of Palgrave McMillan, 2009, 9: McFaul, “What are Rus- America, State of the Union Address, 28 January sian Foreign Policy Objectives?”

76 © Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 The changing pattern of the foreign policy Sunday Ariyo Aboyade poration of the Russian Federation into the the pattern and character of the foreign policy world community as a great power that boasts of the state.15 a centuries-long history, unique geopolitical situation, considerable military might, and sig- In the same vein, there is a unanimous position nificant technological, intellectual and ethical on the fact that Russia must pursue economic capacities.14 These long-term interests formed political and military cooperation within the the basis for the foreign policy objectives sub- Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia’s sequently pursued by the New Russia from foreign policy elites remain resolute on establishing a Russian sphere of influence within the 1991 and shaped the pattern of her engage- region. To achieve this, Russia must pursue as a ment in the international system up to present day. foreign policy goal the promotion of greater cooperation within the Commonwealth that In the last two and half decades of the engage- comprises eleven of the former fifteen soviet ment of post-soviet Russia in international rela- republics. This position and the first policy on tions, a pattern observable in her foreign policy the economy and territorial integrity of the thrust and behaviour in the international sys- federation are the major domestic determinant tem indicate a complexity. At one point, her of the Russian foreign policy.16 In addition to foreign policy thrust has been largely pro- the pursuit of Russia’s economic revival and Western, and at another, it assumes an anti- avoiding further disintegration of the federa- Western posture, although not to the extreme tion, and the need to carve out a sphere of in- as to engender the fear of a global war. In fact, fluence for the New Russia, leaders of the state the foreign policy pursuits of the New Russian also agree that the maintenance of Russia’s from 1993 espoused both characteristics, a nuclear superpower status is key to retaining syncretic foreign policy posture that blended global relevance and retaking Russia’s rightful pro-Western interests with an anti-Western place in international affairs. According to stance to reflect the influences of the various McFaul, “Russia’s nuclear weapons stockpile is schools of thought and interest groups that had the one power attribute that still accords Russia continued to influence and shape Russia’s be- special status in the international system.”17 haviour in world affairs. This set of objectives shape Russian foreign Although it was well recognised at the inception policy behaviour and influences Russian foreign of the state that it was vital the New Russia’s policy response to other international issues in foreign policy be guided not by ideological general and predictable manner. Russia’s tacit stances or parties’ needs, but by fundamental support for the control of international oil at national interests, her foreign policy from 1991 the turn of the millennium, which resulted in has been a product of ideologies and group the raising of oil prices, increased hard currency interests that are superimposed as national revenues for Russian oil companies and the interests. However, all the leaders of the New Russian government, was largely influence by Russia since 1991, from Boris N. Yeltsin to Vla- her internal economic problem. It was also be- dimir Putin, share in supporting a few common, cause of Russia’s desire to maintain the Com- general foreign policy objectives, and disagree monwealth of Independence States as its on many other. In general, there is a consensus sphere of influence that Russia does not sup- that Russia’s first foreign policy objective must port the deployment of American troops in be to reverse her internal decline and estab- Azerbaijan and fears further NATO expansion lished a firm control of its borders, as it is im- towards its borders. Generally, on issues like possible for the New Russia to be a major inter- this, Russia’s foreign policy thrust has followed national actor with a shrinking economy. This well-known fact underlies the foreign policy of the New Russia, but how the achievement of this goal was being pursued is what influences 15 See McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy Objectives?”” 16 Thorun, Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy, 28 – 46: McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign 14 Melville; Shakleina (eds.), Russian Foreign Policy in Policy Objectives?”” Transition, 27. 17 Ibid.

© Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 77 Sunday Ariyo Aboyade The changing pattern of the foreign policy a discernible pattern – Russia’s national inter- democratic forces in the Baltic, Caucuses and ests.18 Ukraine, which resulted eventually in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The pro-Western A major influence on the changing pattern of Idealists as a group only have a normative the foreign policy of the New Russia has been commitment to Western values and Western the influence of the different school of thought integration; they were not being driven merely in Russia’s external relations, which determines by self-interest.21 Although the advocates of the behaviour of the Russia in the international this liberal approach are in the minority, it system at any given time. Essentially, the school formed the major influence on Russia foreign of thought to which a leader belongs usually policy in the early part of the Yeltsin leadership. dominates how Russia would pursue her inter- Andrei Kozyrev, the first Russian foreign minis- ests in the international system as well as re- ter directed the affairs of Russia’s external rela- spond to international issues within the system. tions along this line until his dismissal in 1996. Majorly, scholars have identified the various perspectives represented by these schools of By the end of the first year of independence, thought. According to McFaul, there are four the impetus for a pro-Western foreign policy schools of thought in Russian foreign policy, had started to fade off, as Russian’s expecta- namely the Pro-Western Idealists, the Pro- tions concerning Western assistance were not Western Pragmatists, the Anti-Western Prag- met. The euphoria for democracy and the matists and the Anti-Western Ideologues.19 Western ways gradually became unpopular, and government foreign policy appeared to be Russia’s foreign policy in the early years of the drifting back to more anti-Western patterns of post-Soviet era was largely influenced by the the soviet era. The pro-Western pragmatists pro-Western Idealists. The Pro-Western Ideal- drove the movement that reinvigorated the ists support ideas about democracy, the mar- support for maintaining a pro-Western orienta- ket, self-determination and integration with the tion in foreign po-licy pursuit of the Russian Western capitalist system. This is clearly oppos- state. ing and adversative to the ideas pursued by the soviet ancien regime. A key figure in the emer- These movements include groups with tangible gence of the New Russia in 1991 was the Rus- economic interests in cooperative relations sian leader Boris Yeltsin, who subsequently was with Western countries, such as Gazprom, oil elected president of the federation. Boris Yelt- companies, mi-neral exporters, technology sin and his government were guided by this set companies and the bankers, some Russian gov- of liberal ideas that included in foreign policy ernors of Russian provinces, especially Titov of matters a distinctly pro-Western and peaceful Samara and Prusak of Novgorod in northwest- foreign policy. After independence in 1991, ern Russia as well as Shaimiev in Tatarstan Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and President along with hundreds of non-governmental Boris Yeltsin, at first, maintained a strongly pro- organisations supported a cooperative relation- American foreign policy. Yeltsin and Kozyrev ship with the West because of their stake, and a initially had a relaxed attitude toward the east- majority of public opinion.22 Thus, the pro- ward expansion of NATO, which had been the Western orientation of the Russian foreign poli- main military alliance of Western nations during cy was retained as these various movement the Cold War.20 gradually replaced groups with political ideas as the main societal forces influencing foreign Boris Yeltsin’s pro-Western stance was not unexpected giving his struggles against soviet communism and the support he received from 21 McFaul, Michael, “What are Russian Foreign Policy Objectives?”; See also the analysis of Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-Soviet era in Mankoff, 18 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Jeffrey, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Era, 38 – 40. Power Politics, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Pub- 19 McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy Objec- lishers, Inc., 2009, 53 – 54; Fawn, Rick (ed.), Rea- tives?” lignments in Russian Foreign Policy, London, Frank 20 Lieven, Dominic, "Government of Russia." Micro- Cass Publishers, 2003, 10 – 14. soft Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, WA: Microsoft 22 McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy Objec- Corporation, 2008). tives?”

78 © Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 The changing pattern of the foreign policy Sunday Ariyo Aboyade policy outcomes in Russia. For instance, the However, soon domestic pressure prompted a Russian business lobby, although has a rather foreign policy shift. The Soviet Union was a limited scope of foreign policy interests, seek to superpower and possessed a very different maintain access to Western investment capital social and economic system from that in the and markets. Thus, when security issues, such West. This appealed to the pride of many Rus- as opposition to NATO expansion threaten sians and helped erase a traditional sense of these access interests, the coalition of liberals inferiority to the West. In 1991, quite suddenly within the Russian within the Russian govern- and unexpectedly for most Russians, the USSR ment and their allies in Russia’s economic socie- ceased to exist and Russia lost much of its in- ty cooperated to sustain engagement.23 ternational power and status. In the 1990s, Russia was forced to ask the West for economic The anti-Western pragmatists and ideologues assistance and investment. The pro-American are the other forces that influence foreign poli- foreign policy of President Yeltsin and his for- cy debates in Russia. While the pragmatists eign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, quickly found attempt to define Russian foreign policy objec- considerable opposition. The opposition in- tives in terms of interests rather than ideas, creased when Russia did not receive the mas- norms or mission, the ideologues are passion- sive Western financial assistance that many ately anti-Western and sees international rela- Russians had naively expected.26 tions as primarily a balance of power battle between Russia and the West. Both do not In particular, strong support for the ultrana- think that Russia stands to gain from a pro- tionalist candidate, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, in the Western foreign policy or Western integration December 1993 parliamentary elections con- more generally. Rather than see a Russian rela- vinced the government that the public de- tions with the West as a “win-win,” they per- manded a more nationalistic, less pro-Western ceive it as a “zero-sum game.” Prime Minister approach to foreign policy. As a result, Russia Yevgeny Primakov, Moscow Mayor Yurii Lu- resumed sales of arms and civil nuclear tech- zhkov, General Aleksandr Lebed and Vladimir nology to developing countries, including Iran, Zhirinovsky are some notable proponent of which elicited disapproval from the United anti-Western foreign policy orientation and States. More importantly, Russia began ex- influenced the course of Russian foreign policy pressing loud support for Russians in the “near significantly till present day.24 abroad” (as Russians refer to the outlying areas of the former USSR) and strong opposition to 3. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW RUSSIA: NATO expansion, and was at odds with NATO OBSERVABLE PATTERN AND TREND FROM countries over how to resolve the ethnic tur- 1991 moil in the former Yugoslavia. NATO’s support A key figure in the emergence of the New Rus- for Muslims and Croats drew disapproval from sia was the Russian leader Boris Yeltsin, who Russia, which had historical ties to the compet- 27 subsequently was elected president of the fed- ing ethnic Serbs. eration in 1991. After independence in 1991, Much of this shift in policy was more a question the Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Presi- of rhetoric than one of practice, however. By dent Boris Yeltsin at first maintained a strongly 1997, Russia’s support for Russian-speaking pro-American foreign policy. Yeltsin and secessionists in the Trans-Dniester region of Kozyrev initially had a relaxed attitude toward Moldova had become more moderate. The the eastward expansion of NATO, which had Russian government never encouraged Russian been the main military alliance of Western na- 25 secessionists in Crimea; their strength in 1993 tions during the Cold War. and 1994 threatened both political stability in Ukraine and Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In

23 Ibid. and Mass Perspective, 1993 – 2000. New Jersey: 24 Ibid. Princeton University Press, 2002, 88 – 89. 25 Lieven, Dominic "Government of Russia." Mi- 26 See Lieven, Dominic, "History of Russia." Microsoft crosoft Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, WA: Mi- Encarta 2009 [DVD] (Redmond, WA: Microsoft Cor- crosoft Corporation, 2008); Zimmerman, William, poration, 2008). The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite 27 Lieven, "Government of Russia.”

1997, the New Russia signed a friendship treaty and international trade. These things could only with Ukraine, settling the long-standing dispute be achieved on the West’s terms. 30 over the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and confirming its recognition of Ukraine’s post-independence In 1999, the New Russia’s relations with West- borders. 28 ern nations suddenly worsened as NATO admit- ted the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, There were multiple reasons for Russia’s re- thus expanding into Central and Eastern Eu- straint. The country was conscious of its eco- rope, and also attacked Yugoslavia to compel nomic and military weakness, and it was also the Yugoslav government to halt military opera- aware of the potential for conflict within the tions against Albanian separatists in the Kosovo former USSR if national borders were chal- province. This NATO eastward expansion, main- lenged or ethnic conflicts encouraged. Fur- ly by absorbing countries that had previously thermore, Yeltsin recognized that Russia need- formed a buffer zone around Russia elicited ed to integrate itself into the world economy reaction from Kremlin. For centuries, Russian and Western-dominated institutions, such as security strategy has been built on defence: the World Trade Organization (WTO), if it was expanding the space around the core to avoid to regain economic prosperity and effective being caught off-guard. As a country of plains, global influence. Russia’s long-running dispute Russia has experienced devastating invasions with Japan over the Kuril Islands also reduced more than once; the New Russia, thus, has long the country’s room to manoeuvre in interna- seen reinforcing “strategic depth” as the only tional affairs.29 way to guarantee its survival.31 Consequently, Russia denounced NATO as aggressive and ex- However, American determination to incorpo- pansionist and drew closer to China. However, rate many former Soviet satellite states into the Russian policymakers understood their own North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) an- country’s weakness and its need to attract gered the Russian political elite. Because Western investment. The government’s rheto- NATO’s essential purpose had been to serve as ric at times reflected the increasingly nationalist an anti-Soviet alliance, the political elite felt it mood in Russian society, but its foreign policy was insulting when the former satellites were remained cautious.32 invited to join. They also resented being ex- cluded from the dominant military and political The resumed antagonism against Western ac- bloc in Europe, which seemed intent on extend- tions by the New Russia in international affairs ing its membership right up to Russia’s borders. became more noticeable towards the close of Under Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, Rus- the century and was borne out of the need to sia became more critical of United States poli- check Western arrogance and its expansion into cies and began to rebuild political ties to China former soviet space. Despite being cautious of and some of its old allies in the Middle East. its foreign policy action, the New Russia Even as Russia fostered these ties, the Russian demonstrated its resentment of the actions of government recognized its own weakness and the West in international affairs, especially the its need for positive relations with the West. aggression of the United States, NATO and the This knowledge prevented Russia from going European Union. To the Russian, the West mis- too far for fear of isolating itself from Western interpreted Russia’s inaction. As Ivan Krastev nations. In the Soviet era international isolation and Mark Leonard observed in their 2014 publi- and the attempt to develop a powerful self- cation, “The New European Disorder,” Western sufficient economy had failed disastrously. Yelt- powers “mistook Moscow’s failure to block the sin’s regime understood this and was commit- ted to full participation in the world economy

28 Ibid. 30 Lieven, "History of Russia." 29 Oliker, Olga; Crane, Keith; Schwartz, Lowell H.; 31 Lukyanov, Fyodor, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Yusupov, Catherine, Russian Foreign Policy Sources Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place,” Foreign and Implications. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, Affairs, 95/3, 2016, 2009, 93 – 95; see also Lieven, Dominic, "Govern- https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia- ment of Russia." Microsoft Encarta 2009 [DVD] fsu/2016-04-18/putins-for (accessed 23 June 2016). (Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008). 32 Lieven, "Government of Russia."

80 © Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 The changing pattern of the foreign policy Sunday Ariyo Aboyade post-Cold War order as support for it.”33 Begin- came a key ally in the US-led war on terrorism. ning in 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin In May 2002, the New Russia and the United repeatedly expressed deep dissatisfaction with States reached their first arms-reduction treaty what he and many Russians saw as Western in more than a decade. In addition, that month, arrogance. However, according to Fyodor Luky- the New Russia became a limited partner in anov, “Washington viewed such criticism from NATO. In November 2002, Russia did not object Russia as little more than a reflexive expression when NATO announced a further expansion to of an outmoded imperial mentality, mostly include several more nations in Eastern Europe, intended for domestic consumption.”34 among them the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.36 However, Russia From the Russian point of view, a critical turn- was critical of the United States over its inva- ing point in Russian relations with the West at sion of Iraq in 2003. Russia joined with Germa- the close of the century came when NATO in- ny and France in the United Nations (UN) Secu- tervened in the Kosovo war in 1999. Many Rus- rity Council in proposing that UN weapons in- sians including strong advocates of liberal re- spectors were given more time to search for the form were appalled by NATO’s bombing raids alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. against Serbia, a European country with close And giving the strategic relationship of the New ties to Moscow, which were intended to force Russia with countries of the Middle East, it the Serbs to capitulate in their fight against simply refused to join the invasion force that Kosovar separatists. The success of that effort, 37 the United States and Britain assembled. which also led directly to the downfall of the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic the following As the United States flexed its muscles and year seemed to set a new precedent and pro- NATO became a more formidable organization, vide a new template for Russo-Western rela- Russia found itself in a strange position. Russia tions in world affairs. Since 2001, NATO or its was offered a limited niche inside Europe’s leading member states have initiated military expanding architecture. Western leaders as- operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. All sumed that Russia would respond to its eco- three campaigns led to various forms of regime nomic predicament by becoming part of what change and, in the case of Iraq and Libya, the can be referred to as “wider Europe”: a theoret- deterioration of the state. In this sense, it is not ical space that featured the EU and NATO at its only NATO’s expansion that has alarmed Russia core but that also incorporated countries that but also NATO’s transformation, a purely de- were not members of those organisations by fensive alliance now a fighting group, which it encouraging them to adopt voluntarily the was not during the Cold War.35 norms and regulations associated with membership. This was unlike Gorbachev’s concept of At the turn of the century, however, Russia’s a common European home where the Soviet leaders continued cautious foreign policy rela- Union would be a co-designer of a new world tions with the West; relatively cooperative and order, Moscow instead had to give up its global unpretentious in opposing Western oversteps. aspirations and agree to obey rules it had Kremlin criticised, opposed Western actions played no part in devising.38 President of the when it threatens Russia’s interest and cooper- European Commission, Romano Prodi, in 2002 ated with the West on issues of common inter- made it clear to Kremlin that Russia would ests. Essentially, however, Kremlin was anxious share with the EU “everything but institu- to maintain good relations with the Western tions.”39 In plain terms, this meant that Russia powers. President Vladimir Putin pursued a foreign policy of closer cooperation with the 36 Lieven, "Government of Russia." West. Following terrorist attacks in the United 37 Ibid. States in September 2001, the New Russia be- 38 Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place.” 33 Krastev, Ivan; Leonard, Mark, “The New European 39 Romano Prodi, President of the European Com- Disorder,” European Council on Foreign Relations mission, Speech/02/619, “A Wider Europe: A Prox- (ECFR), 117, November 2014, 7. imity Policy as the Key to Stability, Peace, Security 34 Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of Restore Russia’s Rightful Place.” the EU, 6th ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet 35 Ibid. Project, Brussel, 5 – 6 December 2002.

© Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 81 Sunday Ariyo Aboyade The changing pattern of the foreign policy would adopt EU rules and regulations but was aimed not only at strengthening Assad’s would not be able to influence their develop- position but also at forcing the United States to ment. This was suffocating for Russia, who must deal with Moscow on a more equal footing. The respond to this disregard. cease-fire eventually arrived at in 2013 although represents an unexpected cooperation For quite a while, Moscow essentially accepted on the Syrian crisis, where the civil war has pit- this proposition, making only minimal efforts to ted Moscow, which acts as the primary protec- expand its global role. However, neither Russian tor and patron of Syrian President Bashar al- elites nor ordinary Russians ever accepted the Assad, against Washington, which has called for image of their country as a mere regional pow- 42 an end to Assad’s rule. er. The early years of the Vladimir Putin era saw the recovery of the Russian economy with a If anything at all, what the unexpected coopera- consequent increase in Russia’s international tion between the Russia and the US highlight is influence. Suddenly, Russia was no longer a the fact that, although the world order has supplicant; it was a critical emerging market changed beyond recognition during the past and an engine of global growth.40 What is more, two and a half decades and is no longer defined although the West was experiencing growing by a rivalry between two competing superpow- difficulties steering its own course economically ers, it remains the case that when an acute in the first decade of the millenium, it never lost international crisis breaks out, Russia and the its desire to expand, pressuring Ukraine, for United States are often the only actors able to example, to align itself more closely with the resolve it.43 Rising powers, international institu- EU. At this point, the Russian foreign policy to tions, and regional organizations frequently keep the West at arm’s length became more cannot do anything, or do not want to. What is pronounce. The New Russia, thus, came to the more, despite Moscow’s and Washington’s conclusion, as the Russian political scientist, expressions of hostility and contempt for each Sergei Karaganov, put it in 2011 “that Western other, when it comes to shared interests and expansionism could be reversed only with an common threats, the two powers are still able “iron fist.”41 to work reasonably well together. This trend is very visible in the Putin Russia’s foreign policy. The “iron fist” was evident in Russia’s response However, it is important to note that these to Western incursion into its sphere of influ- types of constructive interactions on discrete ence during the 2014 Crimean Crisis. The Feb- issues have not changed the overall relation- ruary 2014 ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor ship, which remains troubled.44 Even as it Yanukovych by pro-Western forces was, in a worked with Russia on the truce, the United sense, the final straw for Russia. Moscow’s op- States continued to enforce the sanctions it had eration in Crimea was a response to the EU’s placed on Russia in response to the 2014 an- and NATO’s persistent eastward expansion nexation of Crimea. during the post–Cold War period. Moscow re- jected the further extension of Western influ- With the ascendance of Russian foreign policy ence into the former Soviet space in the most and its ability to project the interests of Russia decisive way possible with the use of military globally as global power, it marks the attain- force. The Kremlin is now, more than before, ment of the long-sought status of the New Rus- resolute in order to defend its interests close to sian Federation. As Fyodor Lukyanov observed, Russia’s borders, it must play globally. “the era of bipolar confrontation ended a Therefore, having drawn a line in Ukraine, Rus- long time ago. Nevertheless, the unipolar sia decided that the next place to put down the moment of US dominance that began in iron fist would be Syria. The Syrian intervention 1991 is gone, too. A new, multipolar world has brought more uncertainty into interna-

40 Lo, Bobo (ed.), Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy. London, The Royal Institute 42 Krastev and Leonard, “The New European Disor- of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2003, 53 – der,” 7. 55, 69 – 72. 43 Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to 41 Karaganov, Sergei, “An Iron Fist to Keep NATO Restore Russia’s Rightful Place.” Expansion at Bay,” Russia in Global Affairs, 4, 2011. 44 Ibid.

tional affairs. Both Russia and the United monwealth of Independence States as the States are struggling to define their proper sphere of influence of the Russian Federation roles in the world”.45 has necessitated the anti-Western thrust of the foreign policy at some point, especially from This assertion affirms the global relevance of 1993 when NATO began to expand its influence the New Russia in the strategic calculation of into former soviet space, a development con- the West. No longer can the West solely super- sidered as security threat to Russia and her intend issues in the international system un- interest within the region. Similar behaviour has checked. Whereas the condition of relations has characterise the New Russia’s response to the not returned the world to a bipolar system of continued expansion of the European Union the soviet era, it has established the New Russia into former Soviet republics since the turn of as a global power in the current multipolar sys- the century. tem. The desire of the Russians to be accorded due CONCLUSION respect in the western-led international order The changing pattern of the foreign policy of also encouraged passionate Russian nationals the New Russia that emerged from the ruin of to favour an anti-Western foreign policy against the Soviet Union and the nature of its relations what the Russian’s called “Western arrogance.” with Africa since 1991 has been considered in The stockpile of nuclear weaponry at the dis- the foregoing. A noticeable trend in the foreign posal of the Federation particularly conferred a policy of the New Russia from the emergence of special status on Russia, at least the West the state in 1991 is that its conception and im- would necessarily reckon with Russia in inten- plementation is greatly influenced by national tional political matters. This soviet inheritance interests as well as the interests of different has made Russia confident enough in the inter- stakeholders in the nation’s external relations. national system to challenge the superpower It is these interests and the varied ways in status of the United States of America in major which different schools of thoughts believe the international relations matters. Russia had con- foreign policy goals of the state could be tinued to be a check on the powers of the Unit- achieved that has influenced the changing pat- ed States in world politics. Russia’s role during tern of the New Russia from inception to date. the Iranian nuclear saga significantly influenced A historical examination of the behaviour of the the outcome of the deal eventually arrived at. New Russia in international affairs showed that Russia’s influence is equally significant in any Russia’s foreign policy hovered between pro- possible resolution of the Syrian crises that had Western orientations to anti-Western stance. crippled the state since the Arab spring. Nevertheless, the domestic determinants of the Russia’s resolute stance on the recent Crimean foreign policy of the New Russia and the Rus- crisis with Ukraine as well as its defiance to sian people’s belief in the superpower status of international sentiments for Ukraine also un- their state as a successor to the defunct Soviet derline that although the New Russia may not Union necessitated the blend of both pro- be an economic power like the United States or Western and anti-Western orientation of Rus- China, its rival in the East Asian space, its formi- sia’s foreign policy behaviour and response in dable military strength and the sophistication of world politics. For instance, the need to mod- its military technology has made her a rival to ernise and strengthen the inefficient economy the global power and a power centre in world of the Russian state necessitated a pro-Western politics. This understanding of its strength and posture in her relations within the western-led weaknesses in relations to other powers in the international economic order. A cooperative international system has therefore necessitated relationship with the West was necessary at some compromise in form of partnership with inception and even at present to strengthen the Western countries on many strategic issues in weak economy of Russia. world affairs. In fact, the continued partnership with NATO and the United States is a case in On the other hand, the need to keep the Com- point.

45 Ibid.

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