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The Changing Pattern of the Foreign Policy of the New Russia Since 1991

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The Changing Pattern of the Foreign Policy of the New Russia Since 1991 Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 ISSN: 1696-2060 THE CHANGING PATTERN OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW RUSSIA SINCE 1991 Sunday Ariyo Aboyade* *Universidad de Lagos, Nigeria. E-mail: [email protected] Recibido: 11 noviembre 2016 /Revisado: 2 diciembre 2016 /Aceptado: 24 junio 2017 /Publicado: 15 febrero 2018 Resumen: Evaluar la pauta cambiante de la observable pattern in the foreign policy thrust política exterior de la Nueva Rusia surgida de of the New Russia, the paper identified liberal- las ruinas de la Unión Soviética en 1991 es un ism and nationalism as the dual underpinning complejo pero interesante estudio que destaca features of the foreign policy of the New Russia. cómo el Nuevo Estado ruso se ha comportado While at some point it was largely pro-West, at dentro del sistema internacional liderado por another it assumed an anti-West dimension Occidente, así como la dinámica de las relacio- and, yet at another level, it blended both pos- nes internacionales que han caracterizado el tures in its thrust to establishing the Russian nuevo orden mundial surgido tras la Guerra Federation as a major power centre in world Fría. Siguiendo la tendencia y el patrón obser- affairs. The paper concludes that the changing vable en la pujante política exterior de la Nueva pattern observable in the foreign policy of the Rusia, este artículo identifica el liberalismo y el New Russia was largely shaped by national in- nacionalismo como las principales característi- terest and the quest to establishing Russia as a cas de la política exterior del país. Mientras que world superpower. en algunos momentos se mostró claramente prooccidental, en otras asumió una dimensión Keywords: Russia; West; Foreign Policy; NATO; totalmente contraria e incluso llegó a mezclar Iron fist _______________________________________ ambas posturas en un intento de establecer a la Federación de Rusia como centro principal de INTRODUCTION poder en los asuntos exteriores. El documento concluye que este patrón visible en la política “I cannot forecast to you the action of Rus- exterior de la Nueva Rusia fue en gran medida sia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery in- moldeado por el interés nacional y la búsqueda side an enigma. But there may be a key, de establecer a Rusia como una superpotencia and that key is Russian national interest.” mundial. Winston Churchill. Palabras clave: Rusia; Occidente; Política exte- n examination of the changing pattern of rior; OTAN; Puño de hierro the foreign policy of the New Russia that _______________________________________ A emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union in December 1991 is a complex but in- Abstract: Assessing the changing pattern in the teresting study in contemporary international foreign policy of the New Russia that emerged relations. It highlights the dynamics of inter- from the ruins of the Soviet Union in 1991 is a state relations that subsequently characterise complex but interesting study which highlights the international order that emerged after the how the New Russian state has operated within Cold War and how the New Russia has operated the Western-led international system, as well as within the Western-led international system. In the dynamics of interstate relations that char- making this assessment, however, it is impera- acterised the international order that emerged tive to emphasise that the New Russia that after the Cold War era. Tracing the trend and © Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 73 Sunday Ariyo Aboyade The changing pattern of the foreign policy emerged in the post-Soviet era was not a totali- Fundamentally, while the foreign policy of the tarian state ruled by a Communist Party with a New Russia is largely guided by a blend of con- single, clearly defined foreign policy. That state fidence and insecurity, this blend has evolved, disappeared in 1991. In the words of Michael creating another gap between the West and McFaul, a Carnegie scholar, the New Russia is a Russia, especially since the turn of the millenni- democratising state, and her foreign policy um. While in the West, there is a broad prevail- thrust, in turn, is a product of domestic politics ing belief that Russia is in decline, emphasising in a pluralistic system.1 This new status shapes the insecurity in the mix: the behaviour of the New Russia in world affairs “unreformed economically and politically in the post-soviet era. stagnant, on the verge of major domestic Essentially, the foreign policy thrust of the New upheaval while dependent on high oil pric- Russia was largely guided by a blend of nation- es, Russia faces a range of challenges in a alism and pro-West policies in the immediate fast-moving and evolving international en- post-Cold War era and a more inclusive, aggres- vironment,”3 sive and competitive anti-West posture much Russia’s view is different. Russia considers itself later before the turn of the millennium, which as a re-emerging power on the rise to claim its affirms its intention to be more active and as- sertive in international affairs, not as a mere proper status in world affairs. The New Russia’s participant but as a power centre in the “New foreign policy thrust, thus, aims at working to World Order” designed and shaped by Wash- anticipate and lead events in the international ington and its allies. Thus, since the emergence system, to be more prominent in international of the New Russia Federation, the state has affairs, advocating its interests, using both more pursued a complex foreign policy largely influ- traditional ‘hard power’ instruments as well as enced and driven by national interests that is developing its international presence and using more ‘soft strength’ to protect and assert its dominated by economic needs of the state. This interests.4 pattern though necessitated a pro-Western stance, it assumed an anti-Western dimension The paper is divided into themes for better frim about 1995, when practically the New Rus- understanding of the trend and pattern observ- sia pursued as part of its foreign policy thrust an able in the foreign policy pursuit of the New interest aimed at countering and revising West- Russia and the dynamics of her engagement ern expansion into former Soviet space and with the West in the post-Cold War era. The Western “arrogance” in the international sys- following themes are considered: the collapse tem with an “iron fist” as well as to increase of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian influence in world politics – a foreign New Russia, Foreign Policy of the New Russia: policy largely influenced and shaped by the Objectives and Perspectives, and Foreign Policy personality of the leader of the Russian Federa- of the New Russia: Observable Pattern and tion, political parties and interest groups to an Trend from 1991. uncommon degree.2 1. THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW RUSSIA 1 Michael McFaul, “What are Russian Foreign Policy Objectives?” Testimonies before the House Commit- The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about tee on International Relations”, Carnegie Endow- a profound change in the global power balance. ment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1 May It marked the end of the rivalry that saw the 1999, struggle of “two systems” projected onto all http://carnegieendowment.org/1999/04/30/what- areas of international affairs and an era marked are-russian-foreign-policy-objectives-pub-424 (ac- cessed 23 June 2016). 2 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet 2016). This view was equally shared by Sergey Kara- Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking. New York, ganov, a Russian political scientist, in his discussion Palgrave McMillan, 2002, 1. See also Fyodor Luky- in 2011 of Russia’s foreign policy in the 21st Century. anov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore 3 Andrew Monaghan, The New Russian Foreign Policy Russia’s Rightful Place,” Foreign Affairs, 95/3, 2016. Concept: Evolving Continuity. London, Chatham https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ House, 2013, 7 – 8. russia-fsu/2016-04-18/putins-for (accessed 23 June 4 Ibid., 8. 74 © Historia Actual Online, 45 (1), 2018: 73-83 The changing pattern of the foreign policy Sunday Ariyo Aboyade by the threat of global war with little or no pos- “we want termination and not continua- sibility for constructive international coopera- tion of the arms race and, therefore, offer tion.5 Historically, the collapse of the Union of a freeze of nuclear arsenals, an end to fur- Soviet Socialist Republics is usually traced to ther deployment of missiles. We want a Mikhail Gorbachev and the policies he pursued real and major reduction of the arms to reorder the Cold War relations with the West stockpiles, and not the development of ev- as well as his domestic policies to reform the er-new weapons systems, be it in space or ailing Soviet economy and agitated society. on Earth.”8 Gorbachev’s policies of “glasnost” and “pere- To achieve this, Gorbachev entered into deals stroika,” set in motion the chain of events that eventually led to the collapse of the Union. with the West, mainly the United States of America, on the termination of the arms race, When Gorbachev took office in 1985 as leader the reunification of Germany and the adoption of the Soviet Union, he chose a new Soviet path of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe aimed distinct from his predecessor’s. He sought an to reduce confrontation and forge a partnership end to the Cold War with the West as a step between the rival blocs in the East and the towards resuscitating the ailing Soviet econo- West. While these concessions eased the ten- my.
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