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THE DYNAMICS OF SINO-RUSSIAN MILITARY COOPERATION, 1989-1994: MOTIVES, PROCESSES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Taeho Kim, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1995

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

James E. Harf

Allan R. Millett Adviser Kevin J. O'Brien Department of Political Science OMI Number: 9534007

Copyright 1995 by Kim, Taeho All rights reserved.

DMI Microform 9534007 Copyright 1995, by DMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Taeho Kim 1995 To My Mentors;

Parris H. Chang, Hoei-Hoan Cho, and A. Doak Barnett

11 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Tl is my honor and obligation to acknowledge intellectual indebtedness to those scholars who have helped me to complete this study. First of aU, I owe a personal and intellectual debt to thiee noted China scholars who have guided me into the study of

Chinese politics: Parris H. Chang (Pennsylvania State University), Hoei-Hoan Cho

(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), and A. Doak Barnett (Johns Hopkins/S ATS).

This study would not have been completed without the perennial admonition of my adviser, James E. Harf. I would tike to express my sincere appreciation to him and the other committee members, Allan R. Mtilett and Kevin J. O'Brien.

I am also very grateful to many scholars in the field who offered helpful comments on the manuscript at its various stages in 1992-1994: Tai Ming Cheung, R. Bates Gill,

Alexander Huang, Ellis Joffe, James R. Lilley, Michael Mazarr, and Xiaoxiong Yi. I am of course alone responsible for any remaining errors or faulty interpretations.

At a more personal level, I cannot thank enough my parents, Chun Hai Kim and

In Soon Song, for their unswerving support for my study. To my wife, Myunghee (Mimi)

Sung, and my son, Alexander Hongshik Kim, I am most grateful for their sharing of the travails of my long academic peregrination.

m VITA

September 15, 1960 ...... Bom - Seoul, The Republic of Korea

1983 ...... B.A., Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, The Republic of Korea

1985 ...... M.A., The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania

1989 ...... Senior China Analyst (since 1991), The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), Seoul

PUBLICATIONS

"Kim Jong-il: 's New Leader." Jane's Intelligence Review. Vol. 6, No. 9 (September 1994). pp. 421-24.

"China's Military Buildup in a Changing Security Climate in Northeast ." In Richard H. Yang, ed. China's Military: The PLA in 1992/93. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. pp. 121-36.

"Prospects for Political Change and Liberalization in North Korea (with Young Koo Cha)," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 155-69.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

Studies in: International Relations Comparative Politics Chinese Politics and Military

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT...... iii

VITA...... iv

LIST OF TABLES...... vü

LIST OF FIGURES...... viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... ix

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW...... 1

Salience and Complexity of the Issue...... 3 Research Tradition in the Study of Sino-Soviet Relations 8 Problems of Data and Current Interpretations...... 11 Outline of the Study ...... 17

n. THEORIES OF COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...... 26

The Realist and Institutionalist Debate ...... 27 Three Approaches to International Cooperation...... 36 Importance of Nonsystemic Factors...... 53

m. RESUMPTION OF SINO-RUSSIAN MILITARY TIES : A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS...... 63

The Motivational Systems ...... 65 Decision-Making Structures and Processes in China: The Case of the Su-27 Sale ...... 78 Need for an Integrated Framework ...... 92 rv. CHINA'S DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOVIET FACTOR IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE...... 101

The Sino-Soviet Honeymoon in the 1950s...... 102 The Soviet Legacy and the Decades of Technological Isolation ... 116 China's Changing Defense Requirements in the 1980s ...... 119 After the Sino-Soviet Normalization in 1989 ...... 124

V. SINO-RUSSIAN MILITARY TIES AND CHINA'S DEFENSE MODERNIZATION...... 149

China's New Military Strategy ...... 150 PLA Ground Force ...... 156 PLA Navy ...... 160 PLA Air Force...... 166 PLA Nuclear Force and Missile Systems ...... 171 Transfer of Technology and Scientific Personnel ...... 175

VI. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND REACTIONS...... 187

The China Factor in Post- East Asian Security ...... 188 ...... 193 Japan...... 199 The Korean Peninsula...... 203 ASEAN and the South China S ea ...... 208 The United States...... 216

Vn. CHINA'S DECISION-MAKING CALCULUS IN NORMALIZATION; A HISTORICAL COMPARISON 227

Sino-U.S. Normalization...... 228 Sino-South Korean Normalization...... 242 China’s Patterns of Engagement...... 252

vm . CONCLUSIONS...... 264 Theoretical Issues Revisited ...... 264 The Future of Sino-Russian Military Relations ...... 271 Implications for East Asian Stability ...... 276

LIST OF REFERENCES...... 285

VI LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

3.1 Changes in China's Motivational Systems, 1950-1989 ...... 68

3.2 Motivational Systems of China, the U.S., and the USSR at the Time of Tiananmen Incident in May/June 1989 ...... 74

4.1 Selected List of Mutual Visits by Chinese and Russian Leaders since 1989 ...... 135-36

5.1 's Actual and Potential Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons and Selected Military-Related Items to China, 1990-1994...... 176

vn LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

2.1 The Strategic Triangle among the United States, the , and China...... 40

3.1 Relationship between Motivational Intensity and the Level of External Opportunity...... 72

3.2 China's Military Command Structure since November 1989 .... 87

3.3 An Integrated Framework for Foreign Policy Decision-Making ...... 94

4.1 Official Chinese Defense Budget, 1986-1994 ...... 128

vm LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAM Air-to-air Missile ACDA U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency AIFV Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle APC Armored Personnel Carrier APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASM Air-to-surface Missile ASW Anti-submarine Warfare AIBM Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System CC Central Committee CCP CPE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CMC Central Military Commission COSTIND Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union DIA U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency DPP Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan) DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea ECM Electronic Countermeasures EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone FBIS-CHI Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-China FBIS-SOV Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-Central Eurasia PEER Far Eastern Economic Review GA Group Army GDP Gross Domestic Product GLD PLA General Logistics Department GPD PLA General Political Department GSD PLA General Staff Department

IX IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency nss International Institute for Strategic Studies IMB International Maritime Bureau IMF International Monetary Fund KMT Kuomintang (The Nationalist Party) MET Main Battle Tank MFN Most Favored Nation MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System MND Ministry of National Defense MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MR Military Region NIE Newly Industrializing Economy PKO Peace-keeping Operation PLA People's Army PLAAF People's Liberation Army ASr Force PLAN People's Liberation Army Navy PMC ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference PPP Purchasing Power Parity PRC People's Republic of China RMB Renminbi (Chinese Currency) ROC Republic of China ROK Republic of Korea RRU Rapid Reaction Unit SAM Surface-to-air Missile SDF Japanese Self-defense Forces SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLOC Sealanes of Communication TMD Theater Missile Defense TRA Taiwan Relations Act USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW

This study is about Sino-Soviet/Russian military relations and their various implications. The thirty-some-year-old Western literature on Sino-Soviet relations has been, in essence, the study of the Sino-Soviet conflict. As long as the two Communist giants were locked in mutual rivalry and hostility and the Sino-Soviet conflict was deemed a "permanent fixture" in world politics, it seemed only natural for scholars to focus on some major aspects of the Sino-Soviet conflict, such as its causes, endurance, and implications.

The fact is, however, that since Soviet President 's historic visit to in May 1989, China and the Soviet Union have remarkably improved their overall relations, including trade and economic relations, settlement of border disputes, high-level visits, regional cooperation, and military ties. In particular, military ties between Beijing and have not only expanded rapidly to include advanced Soviet warplane sales, but the pace, scope, and level of their military cooperation have increased faster than many scholars and officials would have thought possible. Even the August 1991 coup in Moscow and the subsequent disintegration of 2 the Soviet Union at the end of the year did not prevent bilateral relations from expanding further.

The puzzle, then, is: what was the underlying rationale for Chinese and

Soviet/Russian^ decisions to resume military ties with each other after more than three decades of hostility and confrontation?

This study makes a strong case that their normali 2^ation in general and their military interactions since 1989 in particular require a serious revision of the dominant theme of conflict in the research tradition of the study of Sino-Soviet relations. It further argues that the current state of international relations research offers little help in explaining, let alone predicting, dramatic foreign policy changes, such as the resumption of the Sino-Soviet/Russian military relations.

This study purports to enhance our understanding of new dynamics in Sino-

Soviet/Russian relations. It has the opportunity to offer an alternative view of the study of Sino-Russian relations by analyzing their military interactions and relating them to the broader body of literature in political science. Finally, this study defends its position and arguments with new evidence and an integrative approach, which systematically investigates not only China's domestic and international constraints but also its leadership's security perceptions. In particular, by examining the changing motivational systems of China since 1949, it helps illuminate how China’s relationships with the changed from one period to another. Salience and Complexity of the Issue

The resumption of Sino-Soviet military ties has been widely regarded as one of the most significant strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region in the early

1990s. Had it happened during the Cold War, the possible consequences of the world's most populous and largest nations colluding with each other would have been a specter powerful enough to send shivers throughout the globe. But the demise of the

Cold War has considerably reduced the security threat to China, and China has launched the "Four Modernizations" drive since 1978,^ which requires a peaceful external environment.

It is perhaps ironic to note that under such an unprecedented peaceful environment came a sharp and sustained increase in China's military spending and weapons acquisition from abroad, especially from the Russian Federation.^ While there are no simple answers to this seemingly contradictory trend, as this study seeks to emphasize, many of China's contemporary behavior is closely intertwined with its historical experience, which presents both opportunities for and limits on China's present and future options. Viewed from this perspective, China's decision to resume military ties with Russia is merely a repetition of old questions. In a litchi nutshell, the fundamental driving force behind China's strategic behavior since the mid-19th century has been the continuing gap between China's perceived security needs and its inability to produce a desired force structure by itself. Since the founding of the

People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, for example, this security gap has forced 4 the PRC to ally itself with the Soviet Union in the 1950s and, later, to align itself with the United States in the 1970s.

What is new, however, is the domestic and international environments in which China seeks to solve the old question. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s

China had more reasons to be confident about its national security and economic development than ever before. On its domestic front, China registered the world's second highest economic growth rate (i.e. 9.4 percent) throughout the 1980s and the highest in 1992-1994 (i.e. 12.8 percent in 1992, 13.2 percent in 1993, and 11.8 percent in 1994).'* In 1993 the and the International Monetary Fund re- estimated China's GNP on the basis of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), rather than the conventional dollar conversion, and put the Chinese economy the world's third largest, only after those of the U.S. and Japan.^ At the regional and international level, a virtual dissipation of the Soviet threat, the reduced U.S. military presence in

Asia, and China's growing diplomatic influence in the region have all contributed to the re-emergence of China from the shadow of its history and to the realization of its growing national interest.

In a similar vein, China's persistent quest for advanced foreign weapons and technologies is inextricably related to its modem history, strategic culture, and the national objective of making China strong and independent. The acquisition of advanced weaponry and related technology is central to China's current defense modernization drive and to the consummation of its growing regional and global 5 ambitions. In other words, China now holds a better position to resolve the old questions to its favor, and, looking further ahead, to reclaim its historical position in

Asia. It is this effort on the part of the Chinese—to close the security gap and to reassert its traditional influence and status in Asia—that motivates its military modernization and selective acquisition of advanced weapons and military technologies from abroad.®

Moreover, China’s quest for advanced weapons and weapons technology is also likely to have far-reaching implications on the regional balance of power. China's traditional cultural dominance, coupled with its newly-acquired economic and diplomatic influence, will continuously cast a long shadow over the future of East

Asia. China's growing power projection capability, if strengthened by Russia’s advanced weapons and technology, is also likely to increase the possibility that China would translate its growing military muscle into concrete political gains when opportunities present themselves.

At the global level, China's foreign arms and technology acquisition will have a long-term effect on weapons proliferation. During the 1980s China emerged as a significant arms supplier and provided weapons, military technology, and assistance to a host of Asian and Middle East countries. Despite its repeated public denials to the contrary, China also contributed to the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies to a variety of Third World countries.^ Moreover, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China could delay, hamper or block the 6 international efforts to curb proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies and to promote worldwide arms-control regimes. This will obviously have a lasting impact on the emerging international order.

On the other hand, military collaboration with Russia in general and the purchase of modem Russian weapon systems in particular pose difficult questions for the Chinese leadership. The acquisition decision could lead to a possible military dependency on Russia in the future and, given the faltering state of the Russian defense economy, even the availability of spare parts and logistic support could not be guzu"anteed. The bitter memory of summer I960, when Soviet advisors left China almost overnight and left China's burgeoning industry high and dry, is still vivid to

Chinese top leaders. A more fundamental question for the Chinese was: would the

Russians ever provide China with advanced defense technologies or would they be interested in off-the-shelf sales and/or older technologies? The had their concerns as well: wouldn't the weapons and technologies transferred today to China be used against Russia tomorrow if the relations deteriorate again? These are some of the real concerns both sides had to answer before resuming military cooperation.

For both theoretical and practical reasons, Sino-Russian military cooperation constitutes an important case study. First, it sheds light on the nature of Chinese and

Russian policy deliberation processes leading to their respective foreign policy behavior at the time of domestic and international turbulence. It can also have heuristic and comparative value when more information becomes available on China's 7 recent decisions to normalize or restore diplomatic relations with Indonesia (August

1990), Singapore (October 1990), Israel (Januar}' 1992), and South Korea (August

1992). At a more practical level, the study of Sino-Russian military relations enhances our understanding of the changing dynamics of relations in the Asia-Pacific and of their policy implications.

Despite the far-reaching implications of their military ties for major agendas in the prosperous Asia-Pacific, including China's defense modernization, regional stability, and U.S. strategic interest in the region, surprisingly little scholarly effort has been made to explain the motives and processes of their close military cooperation. In addition, the existing sparse body of literature insufficiently compares the resumption of relations with China's earlier efforts to obtain advanced weaponry and technology from the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1950s and 1970s, respectively.* In short, the existing literature hardly puts China's arms importation in a proper historical perspective.

To assess the role of Sino-Russian military ties in China's defense modernization, it is necessary to recognize at th*" outset that there is a panoply of intersecting dimensions embedded in the research topic, including: 1) linkage among

China's threat assessment, defense strategy, and force structure; 2) the defense industrial capability for indigenous production and the assimilation of foreign technology; 3) the economic infrastructure in support of scientific and technological innovation; and 4) the foreign policy decision-making process, including bureaucratic 8 and leadership politics. It is the interplay of the above factors that would make or break China's quest for defense modernization. This study seeks to incorporate these contemporary factors into its analysis, while not overlooking the continuing influence of China's historical experience.

Research Tradition in the Study of Sino-Soviet Relations

This study builds on the voluminous literature on Sino-Soviet relations. The body of the Sino-Soviet literature has been accumulated over the thirty years so that there are many works with scintillating insights and penetrating views. The Sino-

Soviet literature, however, still remains the study of conflict between the two communist giants.

While not all writers of Sino-Soviet relations were concerned with theorizing or methodological rigor, there have been at least two major research traditions or problématiques in the study of the Sino-Soviet conflict: the origins of the conflict from the late 1950s to the border conflict in 1969 and the dynamics of the conflict since the early 1970s.^ The first research tradition has generated many pioneering works on the causes of the conflict. Early writers were well aware, however, that there was no single dominant cause, but a combination of factors underlying the multifaceted Sino-Soviet conflict. They were equally aware of the escalatory nature of the conflict, from ideological differences, to divergent national and personal interests, to armed border clashes. With these caveats in mind, the causes of the Sino-Soviet 9 conflict, as identified by earlier writers, can be grouped into three independent variables; ideological dispute, divergent security and national interest, and domestic political imperatives.

The ideological aspect of the Sino-Soviet conflict is rather well-known. Mao's desire to become the leader of the international communist movement after Stalin’s death was unacceptable to Moscow; Khrushchev's thesis of "peaceful coexistence" with the U.S. was in Beijing's view a breach of faith in -Leninism. Donald

Zagoria, among others, has masterfully shown the various functions of ideology in the

Sino-Soviet conflict. While ideology provided both China and the Soviet Union with

"rational limits to the conflict," their "common commitment to communism" was a major factor both facilitating and sustaining the conflict.The "in-house enemy" was more dangerous than outside enemy for not only did it undercut the unity within the international communist movement, but it also offered alternative roads to communism based on the same corpus of Marxism-Leninism.

On the other hand, not all scholars assign the same value to the role of ideology in the conflict. Several scholars, such as G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal,

Roderick MacFarquhar, and William Griffith, treat ideology as a dependent variable, which is often derivative from more important security and national interests.

Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, for instance, have opined that the "ideological difference constitutes a kind of permanent potential for rivalry between the two

Communist Great Powers. Yet it does not by itself explain the timing and content of 10 any particular dispute between them."" Rather, as Griffith has convincingly argued,

"[c]ommunist ideology intensifies the clash of Sino-Soviet national interest," and "the interest of any strong Chinese state and any strong Russian state must and do conflict.'"^ Later scholars, probably with the hindsight of the armed clashes in 1969, often devaluate the ideological dimension of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

In retrospect, the 1969 border clashes were a watershed in the history of Sino-

Soviet relations. Not only did the events seem to have finally confirmed the earlier speculations on the divergence of national interests between China and the Soviet

Union over the issues of "inevitability of war," Soviet assistance in China’s nuclear development, and the 1958 Taiv/an crisis, but they have also sustained the conflict for two more decades.

Finally, the Sino-Soviet conflict seemed to closely overlap with each country's domestic developments, including policy and power struggle. In the late 1950s China and the Soviet Union adopted different paths of socialist development, with the attendant efforts to export their respective "models" to the Third World. At the personal power level, Mao's position became increasingly vulnerable after the dismal

failure of the (1958-60), while Khrushchev's power fluctuated

more widely than Mao's between the 1956 Hungarian intervention and the 1962

Cuban Missile Crisis. In this turbulent domestic politics, Sino-Soviet relations turned

from bad to worse. 11 In contrast to the first problématique which focused on the origins of the conflict, the main agenda of the second tradition in the Sino-Soviet study had been the triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The so- called "strategic triangle" line of thought became paramount in the academic and policy circles in the 1970s. Several scholars such as Lowell Dittmer and James

Hsiung have argued that bilateral interactions among the three countries were conducted with an eye on the third party.Since the emergence of China's

"independent foreign policy" in the early 1980s, however, the validity of the strategic triangular thinking and of the "China card" became increasingly in doubt. Moreover, due to the inapplicability and abstract logic of the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese strategic relationship, other scholars such as Steven Levine and Jonathan Pollack have long advocated for the abandonment of the strategic triangular assumptions.

Problems of Data and Current Interpretations

Due to the nature of the research topic, a few caveats must be in order. The first and foremost challenge for the researcher would be the closed and sensitive nature of the topic. Military cooperation and arms acquisitions are issues which directly affect military security of the states involved and closely intertwined with their national interests. China is not different from any other countries which seek to maintain some secrecy over such policy decisions and processes. China is, however, considerably different from other countries when it comes to the degree and extent of 12 secrecy over such matters. Since China's "opening" to the outside in the late 1970s, the Chinese government has churned out an enormous amount of socio-economic data on a fairly regular basis, to such an extent that the earlier generation of Western

China scholars could have only dreamed of. Moreover, field study in China has now provided new valuable sources of information on virtually every aspect of Chinese society. In the outside researcher's view, however, many of its vitally important mechanisms, including the process of selecting its top leaders and most security issues, remain closely guarded and are still shrouded in super-secrecy.

The data problem is often compounded by China's culture and bureaucratic politics as well. In closed and hierarchial societies such as China's, information is a precious currency for one's needs and is often transmitted only through the complex web of personal connections called gm nxi}^ On the other hand, China's bureaucratic structure, organized along the vertical command system (xitong) with minimum horizontal coordination, also inhibits the proliferation of information beyond a small coterie of top leaders and bureaucrats. The combined effect of such cultural and bureaucratic aspect is that even Chinese analysts and bureaucrats themselves often lack a comprehensive picture of their military programs.

Worse still, even when the Chinese government is relatively open in its defense data, many of their official records are suspicious of biases or distortions. In the case China is the exporter or importer of arms, it is not uncommon that while its counterparts acknowledge the arms deal, China maintains "no-comments" policy.'^ It 13 is in this context that and Sheryl WuDunn, seasoned China , came to the conclusion that "with time it became clear to us that the

[Chinese] authorities do not just manipulate the truth. They lie. They invent. So you don't just get a distorted view of reality. You get absolute falsehood."**

As a result, the China security analyst has to put extra effort in garnering and verifying the information than his or her colleagues would normally do. Fortunately, however, contrary to the popular myth that information on such sensitive issues as

Sino-Russian military relations are largely unavailable to outside analysts, most information can be gleaned in the open Chinese and the Russian press. Moreover, reflecting the increasing openness of the Russian society, the Russians have not only insisted on the "transparency" of their military deals with the Chinese, but they have often published the details of their military deals.

Perhaps understandably, to grasp such complex phenomenon as Sino-Russian military cooperation, it is necessary to consider several independent sources to verify the accuracy of the data and the validity of the analyst's hypotheses. For the present study a review of primary data bases such as Foreign Broadcast Information Service

(FBIS), Jane's Defence Weekly (JDW), and Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) proves to be extremely useful. Annual compilation of world-wide defense data and information made available by such renowned organizations as the International

Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 14 (SIPRI), and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) also offer an additional check for the accuracy of the primary sources.

In addition, in order to obtain accurate regional and U.S. perspectives, a number of discussions with and published works of the leading members of key "think tanks" in the regional capitals and Washington have been incorporated in the study.

They include: the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) in Seoul, the Chinese

Institute for International and Strategic Studies (CUSS) in Beijing, the National

Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS) in , and the Chinese Council of Advanced

Policy Studies (CAPS) in .

While the present study is informed by probably one of the most extensive data sources which have been available on the subject, it should be acknowledged that in the study of Sino-Russian military relations complete information is rare and "hard evidence" is rarer still. Thus it is vitally important to note that the analyst is solely responsible for pointing out the gaps in data and making an objective and good-faith assessment of the available information. To enhance the reliability of information, this study has consciously employed the widely-accessible sources available in most major

American libraries and has cited multiple sources for particular information, whenever possible.

With regard to the existing literature on China's foreign military relations, there have been surprisingly few comprehensive efforts to document and analyze the

motives, processes, and implications of Chinese military interactions with foreign 15 countries. The Western study of the Chinese military and its interactions with foreign countries can be divided into three periods: first of all, a sparse body of literature on

Sino-Soviet military relations began to appear in the 1960s. Perhaps sharing the media sensationalism, scholarly and policy works mushroomed at the time of the Sino-Soviet conflict. But there was virtually no major effort to systematically investigate the Sino-

Soviet honeymoon and their military interactions in the 1950s.Data availability was probably one towering barrier for the outside researcher, and the anti-communist social milieu in America was probably another. But this does not justify the intellectual bias preferring conflict to cooperation.

Much of the work which specifically addressed China's defense modernization effort, including the acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, tended to focus on the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when China seemed to broadly share the West's strategic objectives. It was this second wave of literature that shed light on most major aspects of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its modernization efforts, including the PLA's organization, strategy, training, education, defense industry, internal role, and arms proliferation and acquisition.^' The present work has undoubtedly benefitted from the hard work and insights of Western China security scholars who addressed such a wide range of topics for the last 15 years.

The third wave arrived only in the early 1990s. Compared with the second wave's focus—that is, China's defense reform and its Western connection, the recent studies tend to focus on the PLA's economic activities, internal role, regional 16 strategies, and arms acquisition from Russia/" In particular, the burgeoning body of literature on Sino-Russian military relations tends to play up most contemporary developments and short-term policy implications without sufficient comparison to

China's earlier attempts to forge military relations with other leading nations. Nor do they seem to pay sufficient attention to China's motivational and perceptual systems that undergird its policy changes toward Russia and the United States since 1989.

This work looks beyond the current prevailing tendency among analysts of

Sino-Russian ties and seeks a deeper understanding of foreign policy dynamics. For instance, by pointing to the Soviet Union's financial crisis in the late 1980s as the single variable that motivates the Soviet/Russian sale of advanced weapons to China, analysts may forgo deeper and more nuanced explanations. Similarly, a closer understanding of the dynamics of Sino-Russian military relations can bring some balance to the extreme views held by several scholars. For example, while a Chinese foreign policy scholar ruled out in 1991 the possibility of Sino-Soviet/Russian military cooperation because "neither country's internal problems and crises can be solved by major foreign policy actions,"^ many other scholars and Journalists have expressed shock by advancing variants of the so-called "China threat thesis," such as China as provocateur,^'* China's desire to project powerbeyond Asia,^^ and China's aspiration for a status.

Probably the most serious problem the existing literature shares is that it has, to varying degrees, assumed or singled out Russia's financial need as virtually the sole 17 motivation for Russia's sale of advanced weapons and technologies to China, without answering the underlying reasons for such a dramatic policy change. The question is then: isn't Russia jeopardizing its long-term security by selling advanced weapons to a country which it regarded as a major security threat or as a hostile neighbor for the last three decades?

This study challenges such simplistic mono-variable explanations because nations hardly, if ever, change military relations with each other for economic reasons only; nations act to enhance their long-term national interests, including the economic ones. This is known in comparative politics as the "observer problem. Therefore, this study seeks a deeper understanding of the dynamics of Sino-Russian military cooperation by employing an integrative perspective: it looks beyond the immediate causes, such as Russia's financial need or the post-Tiananmen Western economic and military embargoes against China, and examines the motivations of the Chinese leadership as well as the internal and external factors.

Outline of the Study

The remainder of the study is divided into seven chapters. The first two chapters are theoretical in nature and seek to provide a theoretical underpinning of the study. Chapter 2 will review theories of cooperation in international relations. First, the debate between realists and liberals on the question of cooperation among nations is introduced. The second section will review the three major theoretical clusters of 18 international cooperation—i.e., game-theoretic, quantitative-statistical, and psychological approaches. The third principal section of the chapter will highlight the significance of nonsystemic—domestic and individual—factors in understanding the dynamics of Sino-Russian military cooperation.

By taking advantage of the perceptual framework in foreign policy analysis,

Chapter 3 explicates the motivational and perceptual systems of the Soviet Union,

China, and the United States in 1989, when all three countries veered toward a major change in their three-way relations. It also shows how several useful hypotheses can be generated by studying the relationship between the motivational system and the level of external opportunity. The rest of the chapter is devoted to illustrate how decision structures shape decision processes and why an integrated perspective is needed in explaining foreign policy changes. Taken together, this chapter provides a structured framework for analyzing the underlying rationales behind the resumption of

Sino-Russian military ties.

Chapter 4 puts the current Sino-Russian military cooperation in a broader historical context; not only does it offer the history of China's military relations with the Soviet Union and the U.S. since 1949, but it also conducts an in-depth analysis on the nature and extent of Sino-Soviet military relations in the 1950s. This is a fresh cut on the subject, albeit 30-some years later. This chapter emphasizes China's persistent quest for defense modernization which runs through its modem history. 19 Chapters 5 and 6 take up contemporary developments since 1989 and into the mid-1990s. A substantial body of empirical data will be presented in Chapter 5. The chapter will assess the impact of the Sino-Russian military ties on China's ongoing military modernization in terms of the latter's military strategy, three armed services, nuclear force, and military technology. An accurate and balanced assessment on the extent of Sino-Russian military cooperation will provide a yardstick with which the nature of their current military relations and their future projectory can be gauged.

Chapter 6 addresses the implications of Sino-Russian military cooperation for regional security in the years ahead. Although not a principal focus of the study, the issue has now attracted more attention from both academia and policy community than ever before, due largely to China's growing economic and diplomatic clout at the regional and global level. It also details China's perception of its security as well as the reactions of regional actors, including Taiwan, ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea.

The penultimate chapter seeks a historical comparison of China's decisions to normalize diplomatic relations with foreign countries. Notwithstanding their temporal and spatial differences, Sino-U.S. and Sino-South Korean normalization are interesting cases which could highlight the parameters of Chinese foreign policy, and will be compared with the resumption of Sino-Soviet ties. The preliminary findings support the view that Chinese leaders are basically "hypothesis testers,who are sensitive to outside information and who take several preliminary cautious steps before making a major foreign policy change. 20 In the closing pages, several conclusions will be presented which can be briefly sketched here. First, any serious effort to fully understand Sino-Russian military relations or China's future for that matter cannot ignore the weight of China's past which provides both incentives for and limits on its projectory. China's policy shift in 1989 should also be seen in the context of its historical past. This understanding precipitates the second conclusion: at least in the case of Sino-Russian military relations since 1989, the theme of cooperation proves to be an equally important structural condition as that of conflict had been for three decades since the late 1950s. Finally, this study concludes that Sino-Russian military cooperation is real and based upon the firmer ground of mutual security and economic interests than their ideologically-based honeymoon days in the 1950s and that overall improvements in

Sino-Russian relations are likely to have a lasting impact on the regional and international order well beyond the year 2000. 21 NOTES

1. Since this study covers the period before and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the terms "Soviet Union" and "Russia" are used interchangeably.

2. "Four Modernizations" are the modernization of agriculture, industry, science/technology, and defense. It was first promulgated in 1975 and implemented after the historic Third Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in December 1978.

3. China's official defense budget has increased by an average of over 15 percent between 1990 and 1994. See Far Eastern Economic Review, April 5, 1990, August 8, 1991, April 2, 1992, May 26, 1993;South China Morning Post(International Weekly Edition), March 19-20, 1994.

4. China's annual GDP growth in 1980-91 was 9.4 per cent, second only to South Korea's 9.6 percent. See Asia 1994 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, Ltd., 1994), p. 14; World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1993), p. 59. China's official announcement on its 1993 GDP growth was 13.4 percent. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report—China (hereafter FBIS-CHf), March 11, 1994, p. 22; Patrick E. Tyler, "Chinese Leader Says 'Mistakes' by Government Fueled Inflation," New York Times, March 6, 1995, pp. A l, A4.

5. Steven Greenhouse, "New Tally of World's Economies Catapult China into Third Place," New York Times, May 20, 1993, pp. A l, A8. For PPP-based assessment of the Chinese economy, see Asia-Pacific Economic Update (Honolulu: U.S. Pacific Command, Spring 1994), p. 91.

6. For a comprehensive analysis on China's import of foreign arms and technology since 1950, see R. Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, Superb and Secret Weapons: China's Weapons and Weapons Technology Jrom Abroad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

7. Richard F. Grimmett, CRS Report to Congress: Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1985-1992, Congressional Research Service, No. 93-656 F, July 19, 1993; Richard A. Bitzinger, "Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 84-111; Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales: Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, pp. 559-63. 22

8. Prasun Sengupta, "China Expands Air Forces," Military Technology, August 1992, pp. 49-50; Edmond Dantes, "The PLA Air Force Build-Up: An Appraisal,"Asian Defence Journal, November 1992, pp. 42-48; Malcolm Davis, "Russia's Big Arms Sales Drive," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, August-September 1994, pp. 11-12.

9. For a summary of the analytical tradition in the study of Sino-Soviet studies, see Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945- 1990 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992). pp. 5-13. Taking a "prismatic approach," Dittmer's work recasts Sino-Soviet relations in terms of convergence theory, China's search for national identity, and the "strategic triangle." It is, however, heavily based upon the triangular assumptions and ends at a time when their relations were about to unfold.

10. Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton: Press, 1962), pp. 22-23.

11. G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds.. The Sino- Soviet Dispute (London: The China Quarterly, 1961), p. 10.

12. William Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), p. 28.

13. See, for instance, Thomas G. Hart, Sino-Soviet Relations: Re-examining the Prospects for Normalization (Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1987).

14. For studies based upon strategic triangular and game-theoretic models, see Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945-1990; James C. Hsiung, ed.. Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy: Challenges for the U.S. and Its Asian Allies (New York: Praeger, 1985); Peter Kien-hong Yu and Phillip M. Chen, eds.. Models and Case Studies on Washington-Moscow-Peking: Faces and Phases o f Triadic/Triangular Relationships, Asia and World Monograph Series, No. 41 (Taipei, Taiwan: Asia and World Institute, 1987).

15. Steven I. Levine, "Chinese Foreign Policy in the Strategic Triangle," in June Teufel Dreyer, ed., Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 63-86; Jonathan Pollack, "China and the Global Strategic Balance," in Harry Harding, ed., China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven: Press, 1984), pp. 146-76; Chi Su, "The Strategic Triangle and China's Soviet Policy," in Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 39-61. 23 16. The best analysis of guanxi and its importance in Chinese politics is still Lucian W. Pye, The Dynamics o f Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), pp. 138-42.

17. The discrepancy partly stems from the Chinese Foreign Ministry's genuine ignorance of arms sales, which remains the prerogative of the Chinese military. See John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 87-109. Shaun Breslin notes that when China wanted to sell more missiles overseas in late 1988, the announcement was made not by the government, but by the PLA conglomerate, the China Precision Machinery Import and Export. See Shaun Breslin, "The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy," in Gerald Segal, ed., Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990), pp. 115-34.

18. Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, China Wakes: The Struggle fo r the Soul of a Rising Power (New York: Times Books, 1994), p. 168.

19. China was one of the few arms importing developing nations who submitted a report for the UN Register of Conventional Arms in 1992. But it also volunteered no additional background information. The fact remains, however, that China's reporting of its arms import is incomplete and that most of its arms imports from Russia transpired after the Chinese reporting. See E. J. Laurance, S. T. Wezeman, and H. Wulf, Arms Watch: SIPRI Report on the First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 2, 22. For a discussion of China's attitude toward arms control and international security cooperation, see Roxane D. V. Sismanidis, China and the Post-Soviet Security Structure," Asian Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 39-58.

20. Exceptions are Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Praeger, 1966); Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962).

21. China's efforts in the 1980s to reorganize the defense industries and acquire advanced foreign arms and technology are detailed elsewhere, and many of them are worth re-reading. They include: Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection," China Quarterly, June 1982, pp. 254-70; David L. Shambaugh, "China's Defense Industries: Indigenous and Foreign Procurement," in Paul H. B. Godwin, ed.. The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the (Boulder:1980s Westview Press, 1983), pp. 43-86; Sydney Jammes, "Military Industry," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, eds., Chinese Defense Policy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 117-32; John Frankenstein, "People's Republic of China: Defense Industry, Diplomacy, and Trade," in James Everett Katz, ed.. Arms Production in Developing 24 Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making (Lexington, MA: D C. Heath and Company, 1984), pp. 89-102; Wendy Frieman, "Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernization," in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr. and Bruce W. Watson, eds., China's Military Reforms: International and Domestic Im.plications (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 51-68. The "People's Liberation Army (PLA)" is the collective term for all armed forces of China. It consists of ground force, navy, air force, and the second artillery (nuclear force). It also commands since June 1993 the People's Armed Police (PAP), whose main function is internal security.

22. For the study of Sino-Soviet/Russian relations, see Tai Ming Cheung, "Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Military Relations in the 1990s," in Richard H. Yang, ed., China's Military: The PLA in 1992/1993 (Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, Taipei, ROC), Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 61-77; Bin Yu, "Sino- Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security," Asian Survey, March 1993, pp. 302-316; Dennis Van Vranken Hickey and Christopher Craig Harmel, "United States and China's Military Ties with the Russian Republics," Asian Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 241-54.

23. Guocang Huan, "The Dynamics of Sino-Soviet Relations," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1991, pp. 143-61. The quotation is from page 160.

24. See, for example, Zhao Xiaowei, "The Threat of a New Arms Race Dominates Asian Geopolitics," Global Affairs, Fall 1992, pp. 29-40.

25. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November-December 1993), pp. 59-74. For a well-balanced analysis of China's regional interests in Asia, see Steven I. Levine, "China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power," in Harding, ed., China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s, pp. 107- 45.

26. It should be acknowledged, however, that "China's desire to be a superpower" is a widely-shared sentiment in and outside China. For further discussion on this possibility with an emphasis on military capability, see Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China"; Jim Mann and David Holley, "China Seeking To Be a Superpower," Pacific Stars and Stripes, September 16, 1992; Yossef Bodansky, "The People's Republic of China Once Again Seeks Global Military Options," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, April 1992, pp. 8-10.

27. The term is coined by George Tsebelis for his discussion of the "nested games" framework. Viewed from the perspective of nested games, the Chinese leadership's decision to forge military relations that may appear to be a suboptimal choice to the outside observer could be perfectly optimal in light of the fact that China is involved in a series of games. China's apparent suboptimal choice of concluding military 25 cooperation with Russia is largely a result of the observer's incomplete information. Contrasting China's option in the military arena with other options in a series of other arenas may show that China's military ties with Russia was the de facto optimal choice in the context of nested games, which subsequently increased the range of options in other arenas and eventually China's overall national interests. For a further discussion, see George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), especially Chapter 1.

28. In contrast to "cognitive misers" who are character- or principle-driven, "hypothesis testers" are leaders who are situation-driven and sensitive to the context. Different types of leaders often lead to different decision outcomes. For a further discussion, see Margaret G. Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision- making," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds.. Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 77-94; John Orbell and Robyn M. Dawes, "A 'Cognitive Miser' Theory of Cooperators' Advantage," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 515-28. CHAPTER H

THEORIES OF COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

While the problem of cooperation* among nations has long been central to international relations theory, its importance has taken on a new relevance in light of the recent growth of international institutions and the demise of the Cold War.

Conversely, since World War II the dominance of the realist "paradigm" in the study of international relations has tended to focus the scholarly attention more on the conditions of conflict than on those of cooperation. With this state of the discipline in mind, the first section of the chapter takes stock of the recent turns and contours of the scholarly debate on the conditions of international cooperation. The current debate between "neorealism" and "neoliberal institutionalism"^ at the systemic level subsequently informs the three major theoretical clusters on international cooperation

(i.e. game-theoretic, quantitative-statistical, and psychological approaches), which are the focus of the second section. The third and last section explicates why the existing approaches are inadequate in coping with changes in interstate relations and highlights the importance of nonsystemic factors in striking a balance between academic understanding and the changing realities in the world.

26 27 The Realist and Institutionalist Debate

The most fundamental characteristic of international relations is its anarchic nature. International anarchy, which can be defined as lack of overarching authority above states, tends to foster competition and conflict among nations with self-driven interest and thus impedes cooperation among themselves. More often than not, both realists and institutionalists concur on the term's denotative meaning. Even the two well-known institutionalists Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, for example, have observed that in world politics "there is no common government to enforce rules, and by the standards of domestic society, international institutions are weak."^

On the other hand, they differ sharply from one another on the nature and theoretical consequences of anarchy. In particular, the key term informs the debate to revolve around two central questions regarding international cooperation: the problem of cheating and the relative gains hypothesis. Regarding the cheating problem, realists argue that the problem is adequately reflected upon the realist theory's core assumptions. While there have long been many strands of realism, most of its chief proponents would accept the following assumptions: 1) the state is the primary actor in international politics—the state-centric assumption; 2) world politics can be analyzed as if the states were unitary-rational actors, carefully calculating costs and benefits of alternative courses of action—the rationality assumption; 3) states seek power (in the case of Hans Morgenthau) and security (in the case of Kenneth Waltz)— the power assumption; 4) military power is theultima ratio of international politics. 2 8 the final arbiter of interstate disputes; 5) state behavior is dictated more by international environment (Waltz's "Third Image") than by domestic factors (his

"Second Image"); and 6) the anarchic world offers little role to play for morality

(Morgenthau) or for international institutions (Joseph Grieco)/

From the above assumptions, it logically follows that cheating is one of the greatest barriers to international cooperation and casts a long dark shadow over the

willingness among nations to cooperate and over the prospects of international

institutions for any success. Cheating also exacerbates the fear of war among nations,

since each state judges "its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its

own reason or desire. In his study of security dilemma in anarchy, for example,

Robert Jervis opines that "the central question is not, 'Why do wars occur?' but 'Why

do wars not occur more often?

Institutionalists, on the other hand, challenge the realist argument by pointing

at the anomalies between the realist understanding and the changing patterns of

interstate behavior. First, even if all of the above realist assumptions were accepted at

face value, the institutionalists argue, one must also explain other realities of world

politics as well; why do states in perpetual anarchy often strike mutually beneficial

arrangements among themselves in both economic and security affairs? How can the

realist account for the growth of international regimes in Europe since the 1970s,

unlike the failure of their predecessors in the 1930s? In short, what makes possible

"cooperation under anarchy"?^ 29 Second, institutionalists argue that realists frequently understate and largely ignore the important role international institutions or regimes play in the anarchic world. One major function of international regimes, institutionalists argue, is precisely to reduce the uncertainty over the cheating problem in interstate interactions.

In addition, regimes are designed to increase the transparency in state behavior, reduce the cost of interstate transactions, and bring stability and cooperation to international environment. By so doing, regimes can reduce the likelihood of cheating and increase the possibility of cooperation among nations. A leading proponent of international regime theory has observed that:

International institutions exist largely because they facilitate self-interested cooperation by reducing uncertainty, thus stabilizing expectations. It follows that the expectations of states will depend in part on the nature and strength of international institutions. Hence, a valid analysis of rational state policy...must take international institutions into account.^

Third, institutionalists also charge that realists, by making the cheating problem a constant, have reified the issue in international relations research. Rather, the cheating problem, which is derived from the nature of international anarchy, must be treated as a variable.^ In the real world, the institutionalist argument is supported, at least partially, by the different outcomes of interstate interactions over time and issues. Theoretically, the argument stresses the need to spell out the scope conditions of theoretical statements in international relations research. 30 On the other hand, international anarchy also raises the question of absolute or relative gains, which has a direct bearing on the feasibility of international cooperation. The essence of the relative versus absolute gains problem is whether nations are concerned with absolute or relative gains in their interactions with others.

While this hypothesis has informed the most recent academic debate between realists and institutioneilists, it should be acknowledged that due mostly to the unspecified and shifting assumption bases among leading proponents of both realism and institutionalism, it is very difficult to pinpoint their respective positions on this vitally important issue.The following discussion is therefore based upon the assumption that realists tend to emphasize relative over absolute gains, while institutionalists are more concerned with absolute than relative gains. The early context of the debate is provided by Kenneth Waltz in his Theory o f International Politics:

When faced with the possibility of cooperation for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities."

Waltz's conception of the problem also gives rise to the realist insight that nations are not only concerned with the problem of cheating, but they must seriously consider the question of relative gains, which directly affects their security and 31 physical survival in the world. As a rational actor in a self-help, anarchic world,

realists argue, a state cannot help but measure its relative capabilities against that of

others. Similarly, in his study of hegemonic war and international change Robert

Gilpin has pointed out: "the oligopolistic condition of international relations

stimulates, and may compel, a state to increase its power; at the least, it necessitates

that the prudent state prevent relative increases in the powers of competitor states.

Perhaps one of the most ardent defenders of the realist conception is Joseph

Grieco. His recent theoretical engagement with institutionalists has accentuated the profundity of the relative gains problem. In fact, according to Grieco, the relative gains problem is the litmus test for the validity of competing claims between realism and institutionalism. He charges that institutionalism has failed "to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy," and that this failure has allowed institutionalism "to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. In his view, this amounts to a failure of institutionalism to identify a major source of impediments to international cooperation. Thus, Grieco concludes that "the fundamental goal o f states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities (emphases in original)."*'*

Grieco's argument has not only sharpened the realist position on the relative gains problem, but he, in fact, parts with those of earlier realists. Unlike classical realists and some recent institutionalists who envision that nations seek to maximize their interests in the form of power, Grieco advances the view that nations are what 32 he calls "defensive positionalists"; nations are "defensive" because they are concerned more with being exploited by than exploiting others; and nations are "positionalists" because they are not atomistic actors scrambling for power at all times, but are

"interested in achieving and maintaining relative capabilities sufficient to remain

secure and independent in the self-help context of international anarchy."*^ It then is hardly surprising to find that the relative gains problem impedes the prospect for cooperation among nations.

Grieco's sophisticated argument seems to have overcome the shortcomings of

the utility-maximizing assumption of nations held by earlier realists. In addition, his

main argument on the defensive state positionality has generated a strong hypothesis

which can be summed up as follows: if any cooperative arrangements allow other

states to obtain greater gains, a state will decline to join, or limit its commitments to,

the arrangements even if the arrangements will provide it with large absolute gains.

This hypothesis, however, derived from Grieco's discussion of the defensive

positionality and the relative gains question, seems to be a powerful but problematic

one. For one thing, while the hypothesis directly points to the fact that cooperation is

indeed difficult to achieve in the real world politics, the switch of terms from "power

and utility maximizer" to "defensive positionalist" is a terminological sleight of hand:

they do not provide any clue on what the balanced share of gains—i.e., the apparent

solution for international cooperation in Grieco's argument—might look like, but

instead serve as what Imre Lakatos calls "protective belt" for his theoretical 33 engagement with institutionalists.^® Simply put, they deprive states of their offensive- oriented denotation.

Not surprisingly, institutionalists' counterclaims are focused on the structural conditionality of international cooperation. In particular, they have emphasized that the realist hypothesis, without its scope and domain, is a sterile statement which inadequately accounts for the multitude of cooperative cases in the post-World War II era, especially in international political economy. The structural conditions that institutionalists have identified are three-fold: mutuality of interests, the shadow of future, and the number of actors.

Institutioncdists' study on mutuality of interest is largely concerned with how to reduce the conflictual preferences among the egoistic states, while promoting mutual interests among them. Their main analytical tool is game theories replete with narrative historical cases. In various types of games such as Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag

Hunt, and Deadlock,*® their payoff structure affects a player's decision to defect or cooperate. In a single-play Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) for two players, for example, both players have an incentive to defect regardless of the other player's decision to cooperate (C) or defect (D). Thus the preference ordering for such game would be: successful defection/cheating (DC), mutual cooperation (CC), mutual defection (DD), and unrequited cooperation (CD). The dilemma for both players in a single-play PD is that if they all defected (DD), the payoff would be worse than in the case of mutual cooperation (CC). 34 Then the problem of cooperation boils down to how to make mutual

cooperation the most preferred strategy for both players: CC > DC > DD > CD,

which is often called Stag Hunt. As Jervis has shown,such condition for mutual

cooperation existed, albeit briefly, after wars against a hegemon. After costly wars,

the incentives among the former allies for mutual cooperation are high, which

transforms "a balance of power to a concert. " Under the concert, a potential payoff

for defection is not greater than the one for mutual cooperation. Continued

communication and stable expectations among them would also prolong the period of

mutual cooperation.

The second structural condition is what Axelrod and Keohane call the "shadow of the future." It posits that if future payoffs are greatly valued, there would be less incentives for nations to defect today. In game theories, this requirement is met by the reiteration of games. The shadow of the future also reinforces the differences between the economic and military domains: in international political economy there is a much greater chance for retaliating against others' defection than in the military-security domain in which the incentives for defection would not only be high, but the defection is aimed at destroying others' retaliatory capabilities.

The shadow of the future captures the essence of the neoliberalist argument that even the egoist states have incentives for cooperation under certain circumstances,

such as long-term benefits over short-term gains. In particular, as Axelrod and

Keohane have pointed out, when there are long time horizon and regularity of stakes 35 in interstate relations, the future payoffs are more valued than current payoffs and there are less incentive to defect today.One's perception of the other's future behavior also plays a significant role in the logic behind the shadow of the future.

Similarly, Robert Powell has shown how equilibria outcomes can be found in a formal repeated PD game to the effect that the future cost of uncooperative behavior outweighs the immediate gain.^' In short, cooperation is indeed possible among egoistic states in anarchy.

International cooperation is affected not only by the mutuality of interest and the shadow of the future but also by the third condition, the number of actors. Simply put, it is crystal clear, in a two-actor game, whether or not one actor's action is reciprocated by the other; it becomes much less clear when the number of actors increases. In an N-person game, for instance, it is often difficult to identify who the defectors are and harder still to punish them.

As Charles Lipson and others have argued, the "sanctioning problem" is more acute in military than economic affairs, due to the greater risks involved and the more severe demand for monitoring compliance in military affairs.It would be misleading to suggest, however, that multiple self-interested states would be interested only in short-term payoffs in military affairs. As postwar history is replete with numerous cases of multilateral agreements on nuclear and conventional forces, international cooperation is indeed possible in an N-person game in military affairs, even if the level of complexity may multiply as the number of actors increases. 36 Three Approaches to International Cooperation

The realist and institutionalist debate has informed the more concrete approaches of international cooperation in several ways: first of all, the debate has highlighted the question of the scope and domain of the theoretical construct; the subsequent theories are less encompassing. Second, it has alerted theorists of the importance of nonsystemic levels—that is, domestic and individual factors. While not all theories of cooperation take into account the interactive process among three levels of analysis, its consideration becomes an imperative in establishing causal relationship. Third, the debate has accentuated the need to pay more attention to the specific context of interaction among states. Thus the subsequent approaches have not only employed a wide array of historical cases to bolster their arguments, but they have emphasized the importance of strategies and perceptions in achieving cooperation among nations.

In the study of international cooperation, there have been at least three major theoretical clusters: game-theoretic, quantitative-statistical, and psychological approaches.^ As a logical extension of the debate between realism and institutionalism, all three approaches are the elaborate sets of assumptions designed to explain cooperation in the real-world setting. Despite their differing methodologies, all three seek to find out behavioral propensities of certain countries against others over time in an effort to enheince their empirical footings. In particular, all three 37 conceive, to a varying extent, that "a strategy of cooperative initiatives coupled with reciprocal responses" would be the best strategy to induce cooperation.^'*

The game-theoretic approach is a variant of the broader rational choice research program and looks into the cooperation problem as different types of

"games" among self-interested players. Different games offer different payoffs, and rules of a particular game become the strategies of each player. It is a deductively- based modeling of a set of possible equilibria in which no player chooses other alternatives other than mutual cooperation.^ Unlike a simple PD or Stage Hunt mentioned above, however, recent game theories deal with three or more number of players in multi-level settings.

Axelrod, for instance, introduced a strategy of cooperation based on reciprocity (TIT for TAT), which would encourage stable cooperation among egoistic states.It is assumed that by taking a cooperative initiative at an early stage of engagement with other states a state can promote reciprocal cooperation. If the initial cooperation is not reciprocated by others, the individual actor would follow tougher actions. In particular, if the time horizon is long enough, the strategy of reciprocity could become a strategic rationality.

Notwithstanding its simple and clear logic, the TIT-for-TAT is in actuality an enormously complex strategy consisting of unequivocal commitments, hard bargaining, issue linkages, and elaborate sanctions. The strategy can also logically lead to conflict as well. As Axelrod admits, "if the other player defects once, TIT for 38 TAT will respond with a defection, and then if the other does the same in response, the result would be an unending echo of alternating defections. The nature of the overall strategic atmospherics can significantly influence the results of TIT for TAT.

During the postwar era the varying perceptions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union with each other also led TIT-for-TAT to detente or to armed rivalry.

Another game-theoretic account with enhanced explanatory power is George

Tsebelis' "nested games. As a study of rationality, the nested-games perspective asks why apparently suboptimal choices are made by humans, groups, and nations.

When such suboptimal choices are made by an actor, it is often because of the lack of the observer’s information. On other occasions, it is the function of the observer's lack of perspective; the observer is focusing on one game, but the actor, in reality, is involved in a whole network of games—which Tsebelis calls "nested games."

There are two types of nested games, which constitute the core of his argument. One is the situation in which the payoffs of one arena vzuy with those of other arena. While the observer focuses on one arena, the actor, who is involved in several arenas, takes into account all variable payoffs arising from these arenas. The choice may look suboptimal to the observer is the optimalizing one to the actor when all variable payoffs are considered. This is "games in multiple arenas. The other type is "institutional design," which refers to a political initiative concerning the rules of the game. Since various games have different sets of rules, the choosing of the 39 game by the actor means that the actor by itself chooses the rules of the game. In this way, the actor can enlarge its "strategy space.

While Tsebelis' work is a study of rational choice applied in British, Swedish, and French electoral politics, it has far-reaching theoretical implications for the present discussion of international cooperation. Can nations, for example, forgo the relative gains temptations today in the expectation of future absolute gains? Can a nation's apparent suboptimal choice in the security arena become the de facto optimal choice when the payoffs in the economic arena considered—a la Japan-U.S. relations in which the former's security dependence on the latter was indeed the best option to ensure both its economic success and cooperative relations with the United States?

On the other hand, there have been a series of attempts to apply the game- theoretic model to various realities in world politics. One such an attempt relevant to this study was the so-called "strategic triangle" among the United States, the Soviet

Union, and China. Since not only did the concept attract the attention of many scholars and statesmen in the 1970s and 1980s, but it deals with the question of strategic relations among arguably the three most powerful nations in the world, it requires a closer examination.

An early theoretical exploration was made by Lowell Dittmer in his 1981 article "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis."^' At the outset, Dittmer sets out his purpose: "to explore its inner logic and dynamic propensities" and to examine whether the game model "can help illuminate past 40 developments and make future prospects somewhat more comprehensible. Dittmer

adds that there are two objective conditions for the three-way strategic game to work:

1) all three players recognize the strategic salience of the triangular relationships; and

2) the relationship between any two players will be influenced by each player's relationship to the third,W ith the two conditions in mind, Dittmer divides the triangular relations in 1949-1978 into three periods (See Figure 2.1): "Stable

Marriage" in 1949-1960 when China and the USSR held stable, positive relations with each other, and each player had enmity toward the third player (U.S.); "Soviet-

American Detente" in 1960-1969 when the USSR and the U.S. held positive relations, and each had negative relations toward China; and "Romantic Triangle" in

1970-1978 when the U.S. maintained positive relations with the other two players

("suitors"), but the latter held negative relations with each other, thus enabling the

U.S. to stand at the pivot in the strategic triangle.

Stable Marriage Soviet-American Detente Romantic Triangle (1949-1960) (1960-1969) (1970-78) USSR USSR USSR H I

PRC USA PRC USA PRC USA

Figure 2.1 The Strategic Triangle among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China

Symbols: positive negative direction of asymmetry Source: Lowell Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle; An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July 1981), pp. 491, 493, 499. 41 That China was an important factor which exacerbated or ameliorated the defense burden on either side of the U.S.-Soviet strategic equation is an undisputed

fact. It is also true that bilateral interactions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union

were often made with their triangular implications in mind. Dittmer's conception of

triangularity, however, has failed to explain the dynamics of the relations: first, if there is only one positive relations (Sino-Soviet) and two negative relations (Sino-

U.S. and U.S.-Soviet) in 1949-1960, does the overall relationships among the three

nations constitute a strategic triangle?; secondly, in terms of the three-player game's inner logic there is no difference between the first and second periods—that is, there are only one positive bilateral relations and two negative bilateral relations in both periods; thirdly, concerning the two objective conditions for strategic triangle, it is not entirely clear whether all three players shared similar views on the importance of

the tripolarity or whether China—a major but not a superpower—could have ever had influence as strong as the other two players-the superpowers; and fourth and finally, it seems that as an analytical tool the strategic triangular concept gropes for the wide

forest of the three-way relations, but leaves out too many important trees of history,

ideologies, and domestic politics of each nation, which might hold the key to

understanding the causes and patterns of change in their respective relations with one

another.^'* Not surprisingly, these critiques on strategic tripolarity are cumulatively

reflected upon its mother research program of game models. 42 To sum up, despite their powerful deductive logic and simplicity, all abstract game models have application problems in the real world of politics, in which contextual and historical factors often assume overriding importance. Another major criticism of the game model is its rationality assumption of decision-makers. The important question of motives is missing in this model, which also ignores the

"persistent images of one's opponents, double standards, and competition for relative gain."^^ Despite the importance of the parsimony requirement for theoretical construct, it is questionable whether or not game models do capture the essence of international relations; it oversimplifies the realities; it focuses exclusively on the interstate, systemic level; and it fails to deal with the complex motivational and perceptual elements in interactions among nations. Taken together, the above shortcomings necessitate a highly circumscribed use of the game-theoretic model in real-world settings.

The second major theoretical cluster in the study of international cooperation has been what is collectively called the quantitative-statistical approach. It seeks to find the patterns or regularities of state behavior in terms of quantifiable evidence across large numbers of cases. Unlike the deductive game theory, the quantitative- statistical approach relies on the inductive research method. It thus attempts to explain international cooperation, the dependent variable, with the quantifiable description of a state's past behavior. 43 Setting aside the question of its verisimilitude, postwar behavioralism, as a challenge to the traditional research tradition and method in political science, has generated a whole body of quantitative literature across the discipline/^ Concerning the study of international cooperation, the approach also joins the central debate in international relations scholarship: whether states behaviors reflect reciprocity (i.e. interstate) or domestic bureaucratic routine.

Beginning with Lewis Richardson's model on two-country arms race dynamics, a host of other scholars have tried to identify the absence or presence of reciprocity in the context of U.S.-Soviet arms buildup. Arms spending studies which had been conducted up to the early 1980s, for example, almost unanimously concluded that the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not respond to the other's increase in arms spending.Rather, the superpower arms spending was found to be primarily driven by bureaucratic factors. More recent studies on arms spending, conducted mostly in the late 1980s, did find differing levels of reciprocity in superpower arms spending: several scholars argue that arms spending is a function of some expected level of spending by the other and bureaucratic inertia, while others contend that U.S. responded to the Soviet increase in defense spending, but not vice versa.The overall research findings were at best inconsistent and at worst spurious and contradictory.

A major discordant voice was struck by Joshua Goldstein and John Freeman in their several studies of cooperative reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations."*^

Theirs is a serious attempt to correct the notorious shortcomings of quantitative- 44 statistical approach in terms of measurement and data base. First of all, to rectify the measurement error they have dealt with the problem of overaggregated data at the outset. Since temporally aggregated data tend to "mask causal relationships,"'’* they, unlike earlier researchers, have abstained themselves from using arms spending data, which are normally available only on an annual basis. Instead, Goldstein and Freeman employed the events data, which can be disaggregated to monthly bases.

Secondly, to enhance data reliability, Goldstein and Freeman employed three independent events data sets—COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank), WEIS

(World Events Interaction Survey), and ASHLEY (i.e. Richard Ashley).'’^ Each data set was created independent of the others by different researchers. They are, however, huge data sets with each set having an average of over 10,000 events spanning two to three decades.

The hypotheses (i.e. reciprocity or routine) were then tested by the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach,'’^ in a multiequation where the past behavior of each of the three countries is included. Since there are only six possible bilateral interactions among the three countries, there are six equations—one for each country's behavior toward one of the other two. Each equation, in turn, contains the same six interactions (i.e. variables) on its right-hand side with coefficient of each variable and error terms included.

With the multiequation in hand, they have identified three "break points" which have the highest levels of hostility among the three countries during the Cold 45 War era: the early 1950s, the late 1960s, and the early 1980s. The three periods roughly correspond to the outbreak of the wars in Korea, , and Afghanistan.

The periodization, Goldstein and Freeman continue, also corresponds to the Soviet leadership transitions (the death of Stalin in 1953, the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, and the death of Brezhnev in 1982) and the Republican control of the White House in the U.S. (in 1953, 1969, and 1981).^^

Their research findings have significant theoretical and policy-relevant implications. In Goldstein's study on the superpower reciprocity, for instance, he finds that the U.S.-Soviet relations for the last forty years have undergone several changes, but "have gradually evolved toward greater cooperation," and superpower cooperation "blossomed in recent years. He further argues that the "absence of inverse response by either country [superpower] underlines the fallacy of hard-line approaches: neither country [superpower] is generally inclined to cooperate by the other's hostility."'*® In a separate study coauthored by Goldstein and Freeman on

U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations, they continue the upbeat mood: "Improvements in

Sino-Soviet relations are easier to discern. There is considerable evidence of Chinese reciprocity of Soviet action.... But thanks in part to Soviet initiatives and Chinese reciprocity, relations have become fully 'normal'..."'*^ On another page, they envision that "Now, at the outset of an apparent new phase of world politics, it is possible to strive consciously for cooperation on all three sides of the triangle at once...."'**

Building on the base already established by the "limited reciprocity regime" and by 46 the "apparent evolution of great power relations to the brink of lasting three-way cooperation," they finally conclude that "leaders in the three countries may be able to create a new expectation of nonhostility among the great powers.""*^

In terms of theorizing about international cooperation, they have also sent heartening and saddening news to different colleagues in international relations, depending upon where the latter stand. For one thing, Goldstein and Freeman have found bipolar reciprocity and asymmetrical triangularity, which contradict the analysis of Dittmer who maintains the assumption of symmetrical tripolarity. For another, their finding that there had been "pervasive reciprocity" among the U.S., the Soviet

Union, and China for the last four decades undermines the logic and rule of the game theories' payoff structures and devastates the underlying rationale of the scholars and statesmen who have long advocated for TIT for TAT to the Soviet behavior during the

Cold War.^°

To be fair with Goldstein and Freeman, their works are an important theoretical contribution to the study of international cooperation. Their works have rectified some serious shortfalls of empirical study, namely measurement errors and data problems. By applying the quantitative-statistical approach to the strategic triangular relationship among the three great powers, they have posed new challenges to the central propositions held by both academic and policy communities. The burden of counterclaims to their research designs and findings is also overwhelming: to go over the three monthly-data sets with the total of 30,000 events—some overlapping—in 47 the relations among the three powers for the last four decades! Such gargantuan effort is neither feasible nor necessary; suffice it to mention here briefly some lessons relevant to the theoretical discussion of international cooperation.

First and foremost, their empirical analysis is about the general behavioral propensities of the three countries over the past four decades. In their own admission, it measures only "the average response of the three countries to the others' policies over many time periods and over many issues (emphasis in original).This simplifying tendency of statistical analysis may gloss over deeper and more nuanced reasons for policy initiatives and responses. As a consequence, this shortcoming seems to have required them to add six particular historical cases to supplement their macro statistical findings.

As a statistical study of the strategic triangle, second, their work tends to overemphasize the strategic triangular assumptions discussed earlier in connection with Dittmer's game-theoretic account. In particular, while both authors occasionally point at domestic policy inertia and leadership changes, their analytic focus has remained exclusively on the systemic level. Theirs is a study of the patterns of cooperative reciprocity among the three countries, and the possibility of domestic and individual factors being explanatory variables has never been explored.

The third critique is that even if all of their studies cited here were completed after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and the collapse of the strategic triangle, they still pinned down their hope on "lasting three-way cooperation." The six-year-long 48 frosty relations between the U.S. and China since Tiananmen may indeed be a short time-span, given that their research findings are based upon the four-decade period.

But, if their longer-term study finds such "pervasive reciprocity" among the three countries, they must also be able to explain why such deep-seated reciprocal propensities change from one period to another. In the last pages of their book,

Goldstein and Freemen finally admit that "we know little about how and when the deeper propensities change. We also do not understand why countries decide to behave atypically.

Finally, they anticipate future study on these topics in connection with

"historical case studies of the structural transition...[in] the strategic triangle"—the three break points in the early 1950s, the late 1960s, and the early 1980s.^‘* Their admission is tantamount to saying that notwithstanding the methodological soundness and analytical rigor, their quantitative-statistical approach has been insensitive to causality, arguably the most critical of all questions in social sciences.

The third and last theoretical cluster in the study of international cooperation has been the psychological approach. Like the quantitative-statistical approach, the psychological approach is also inductively based. It, however, focuses on the subsystem level and runs against the rationality assumption of the game-theoretic approach. Under this loose theoretical grouping lie a variety of perspectives such as motivations, cognitive processes, and bureaucratic politics. In short, the psychological approach focuses on major dimensions of foreign policy decision making. 49 The origin of the psychological approach in international relations is related to the rationality assumption of the postwar realism. In the immediate postwar years, it was assumed that in order to find out a state's likely behavior in the international system, it was often sufficient to look into such objective factors of a state as its geography, history, and alliance relations. The decision-making perspective directly challenged such assumptions. According to Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton

Sapin, the reification of the state no longer became a given. They made crystal clear what should be the focus of analysis: "It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision-makers—those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name o f the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers (emphases in original).

Snyder and his associates's re-interpretation of foreign policy was no less than revolutionary; their primary analytical objective was the "re-creation of the 'world' of decision-makers as they view it. While they admitted that the new way of studying foreign policy was subjective in nature, their work has produced a generation of scholars who have delved into the study of key decision-makers' psychological aspects such as perceptions, attitudes and behaviors as well as decision-making process under different settings.

On the question of cooperative reciprocity, on the other hand, Charles Osgood has made an early attempt to apply the psychological approach. Arms race is a 50 "graduated and reciprocated, unilaterally initiated" interaction, according to Osgood,

whose solution requires the reversing the process by replacing unilateral escalation

with unilateral de-escalation, while maintaining the reciprocity in response to the

other's actions/^ This strategy of cooperative initiatives coupled with reciprocal

responses is what he calls GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation In Tension-reduction).

Even if the reciprocation from the other side is not immediately forthcoming,

however, it is important that GRIT strategy should continue over time to be

successful. Osgood's psychological conception of GRIT strategy parallels to a PD game with variable payoffs.

In the vortex of the Cold War, however, GRIT strategy was overshadowed by deterrent strategy. In comparison with the GRIT strategy, deterrence strategy is essentially a hostile initiative coupled with the determination to respond to the other's actions reciprocally. Jervis offers distinction between a "deterrence model" and a

"spiral model"; the deterrence model posits that "the only way to contain aggression and cope with hostility is to build up and intelligently manipulate sanction, threats, and force"; the spiral model holds that "threats and negative sanctions...are often self- defeating," while "properly executed concessions lead the other side to reciprocate rather than, as in the deterrence model, leading it to expect further retreats from the first state.

On the other hand, the success of the spiral model and GRIT strategy, which are designed to promote cooperative initiates and reciprocity, are dependent upon the 51 nature of the underlying images and expectations a state's holds of the other. In other words, the- spiral model and GRIT strategy are based upon the untested assumption that one side's good intentions will be reciprocated by the other's good intentions in the long run. This problematic proposition obviously lacks empirical evidence at the current state of international relations research.

Some psychological notions such as expectations and perceptions are doubtless central in the study of cooperation under anarchy. In particular, they form the basis for the formation of international regimes. Since international regime tackles the problem of international cooperation with the reciprocity of norms, expectations, and rules among nations, the pervasiveness of reciprocity has a direct beaiing on the success or failure of an international regime on the whole. However, "international regimes," according to Axelrod and Keohane, "do not substitute for reciprocity; rather, they reinforce and institutionalize it." In addition, regimes incorporating "the norms of reciprocity delegitimize defection and thereby make it more costly. A set of logical questions then would be: under what conditions nations reciprocate others' cooperative or hostile policies? Given the enduring nature of underlying images and expectations one state holds of the other, does the former still reciprocate the way as the latter expected?; and when do the pervasive images and perceptions change?

To answer these questions, most psychological studies have employed case studies with varying degrees of success. Despite its rich description of the real world events, the psychological approach has yet to overcome the problems of context- 52 specificity, lack of theoretical rigor, and subjective interpretation.®^ While focused,

structured comparative case studies would be a significant theoretical improvement,®^

the psychological studies have yet to answer satisfactorily why the long-held behavioral propensities, based upon the underlying images and perceptions, do change to make or break international cooperation. In a study of reciprocity among the

United States, the Soviet Union, and China, Goldstein and Freeman again pose the challenging questions. They wonder:

when and why such [triangular] behavior occurs, or what impact it has on the effectiveness of cooperative strategies....Put another way, we would like to know more about the conditions under which human subjects might decide to take into account, in formulating a strategy toward one opponent, the opponent's relations with a third individual. To our knowledge, these kinds of experiments have not been adequately incorporated in the studies of international cooperation.®^

It is worth recalling that their quantitative-statistical study of the three-way cooperation has measured the general behavioral propensities among the three countries, but failed to deal with particular changes in the three countries' behavioral patterns. Both authors do acknowledge the importance of the human factor, but their methodological choice has precluded the exploration of this possibility. Neither do they pay sufficient attention to the domestic source of international behavior. A far more challenging questions are: why such long-held patterns of behavioral propensities do change, often dramatically? Should each approach individually is inadequate in addressing the question of conditionality in international cooperation, is 53 it possible to systematically integrate the insights of each approach? Finally and most important of all, what are the interactive effects of systemic and nonsystemic factors in facilitating or hindering international cooperation?

Importance of Nonsystemic Factors

The neglect of domestic politics in the study of international cooperation has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. There are at least three main reasons for its long neglect: first of all, the dominance of the realist paradigm and in particular structural realism has slighted the importance of domestic factors in understanding international cooperation. For one. Waltz, the chief proponent of structural realism, defines states as "units" and treats them as more or less unitary actors. His major concern remains systemic-level analysis and ordering principles, i.e. the distribution of capability in the international system. To Waltz, it is not the choice or strategy of a state, but the structure of the international system that determines state behavior. Joseph Nye has echoed this problem of structural realism when he says that

"by assigning everything except the distribution of capabilities to the unit level, that category becomes a dumping ground hindering theory building at anything but the structural level."®'* Thus, structural realism's theoretical parsimony is achieved at the expense of the rich and fertile sources of state behavior at the domestic level.

The second reason for the neglect of nonsystemic factors is also closely related to the first. As Helen Milner has convincingly argued, the realist credo that 54 international anarchy is the condition for differentiating between domestic and international politics fostered the neglect of the former/^ As noted earlier, the nature of anarchy has created the cheating and relative-gains problems in achieving international cooperation. But from the perspective of domestic politics, however, states' concern with others' cheating and relative gains stems not only from the anarchic nature of international politics but also by a multitude of other factors, such as states' internal character, national interest, and strategies. In addition, their perceptions, bureaucratic inertia, and political arrangements can present differing courses of state behavior. Milner calls for a more attention on these factors for the benefit of international relations research:

[A]narchy does not determine whether relative or absolute gains dominate the motivations of states. Rather, that depends on the domestic character of states and other features of the issue-areas... .Thus, for all that systemic theory has been touted for its supposed epistemological priority or inherent parsimony, the biggest gains in understanding international cooperation in the future are likely to come from domestic-level theories.®®

The third barrier inhibiting the exploration of the domestic sources of state behavior has been the choice of methodologies in international relations research.

With the notable exception of the psychological approach whose analytical focus essentially remains at the subsystemic level, the game-theoretic models and the quantitative-statistical approach assume the rational and unitary nature of actors to reduce theoretical complexities arising from actor variations. This is tantamount to treating domestic factors as a constant at all times; but the fact is that domestic factors 55 are an important variable and do influence state behavior in the international realm in most times. It is not surprising then to find that by neglecting the domestic factors, the game-theoretic and quantitative-statistical approaches in toto have failed to explain the causes for change in state behavior or behavioral propensities, which in part lie at the domestic level. The prospects for international cooperation are also affected by the interplay of domestic factors, such as perceptions of decision makers, political coalition, and bureaucratic politics.

Exploring the domestic factors would prove to be a commendable scholarly venture at the current state of international relations research in that it would not only provide more clues for conditionality of international cooperation but it would also clarify the nexus between domestic and international politics, notwithstanding the traditional distinction between the two. In a recent study Robert Putnam shares the same view, but in the context of theory construction: "domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangles.

Similarly, Michael Mastanduno, David Lake, and G. John Ikenberry call for placing the state action at the center of the current international relations research to delve into the question of interaction between domestic and international politics. The authors find it ironic that the "Realist tradition places the state at the center of its analysis but fails to develop a comprehensive theoretical appreciation of its nature or

logic."®* The end result of the irony has been the neglect of domestic factors in the 56 study of international cooperation and the continuing intellectual demarcation between comparative politics and international relations. To understand the importance of examining both domestic and systemic factors, one need only recall the last sentence of Waltz's Man, the State, and War: "The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.

To sum up, the realist and institutionalist debate over international cooperation has sharpened the need to investigate the structural conditions of cooperation. In addition, it highlights the importance of scope and domain of the theoretical constructs such as the game-theoretic, the quantitative-statistical, and the psychological approaches. While the three approaches have enriched international relations research, their methodological choice has largely prevented them from exploring the domestic sources of interstate behavior. It is in this context that the recent scholarship has called for more attention on the interaction between domestic and external/systemic factors^° for a better understanding of international cooperation.

The same integrative perspective seems essential in explaining the dramatic changes in a state's foreign policy behavior, as will be seen in the next chapter. 57 NOTES

1. "Cooperation" is an elusive concept, lacking any scientific rigor. It is important to note that the concept is more than a coincidence of common interests, but less than harmony which denotes an automatic confluence of interests among nations without any conscious efforts on either side to make adjustments. According to Robert Keohane, ''intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination (emphases in original)." See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 51-52.

2. On several major questions such as the nature of the anarchy and problems of international cooperation, classical realists and neorealists are in agreement. For variants of realism and liberalism, see Joseph S. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics, January 1988, pp. 235-51.

3. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), p. 226.

4. This list of the realist elements is a compilation of the assumptions shared by leading proponents of realism. For other lists, see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, August 1988, pp. 485-507; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 23-24.

5. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Press, 1959), p. 159.

6. Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), p. 58.

7. "Cooperation under Anarchy" was the title to which the whole October 1985 issue of World Politics was devoted. See also Kenneth A. Oye, ed.. Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

8. Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in David Baldwin, ed.. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 288. Baldwin's edited volume is largely a reprint of previously published materials in major international 58 relations journals and also intends to be a sequel to Robert Keohane's edited volume in 1986, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

9. This position has been most persuasively advanced by Helen Milner, See Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics, April 1992, pp. 466-96, especially pp. 485-86. See also Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," in Baldwin, ed., ibid., pp. 162-67.

10. For a discussion of the problem, see Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, September 1991, pp. 701-26.

11. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theories o f International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley, 1979), p. 105.

12. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 87-88. In the same volume Gilpin notes that "a group or a state will attempt to change the political system in response to developments that increase its relative power or decrease the cost of modifying political arrangements and will continue its efforts until an equilibrium is reached between the costs and benefits of further change, " pp. xi-xii.

13. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, August 1988, pp. 485-507; reprinted in Baldwin, ed.. Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 116-40. The quotation is from p. 118.

14. Ibid., p. 127.

15. Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Baldwin, ed.. Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 303.

16. Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds.. Criticism and the Growth o f Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196.

17. Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," pp. 228-38.

18. These types of games are copiously explained elsewhere. See, for example, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, January 59 1978, pp. 167-214; George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Press, 1990).

19. Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," especially pp. 78-79.

20. Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," pp. 232-34.

21. Robert Powell, "The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, December 1991, pp. 1303-20.

22. Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics, October 1984, pp. 1-23.

23. Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 6-35.

24. Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 87; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). See also the discussion of the reciprocity strategy in the review of Axelrod's book by Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations, " International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 167-86.

25. This is a typical game model in which there are only two choices, cooperate or defect. Many classical game models, including Axelrod's {ibid.) employ such dichotomy, but there are of course many more choices in the real-world setting.

26. Axelrod, The Evolution o f Cooperation.

27. Ibid., p. 176.

28. George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

29. Ibid., pp. 10, 57-58.

30. Ibid., pp. 8-10.

31. Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis," World Politics, July 1981, pp. 485-515.

32. Ibid., p. 485. 60 33. Ibid., pp. 490-91.

34. For a well-balanced assessment on the role of strategic triangle in China's policy toward the Soviet Union since the early 1970s, see Chi Su, "The Strategic Triangle and China's Soviet Policy," in Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War(Armonk, NY; M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 39-61.

35. Deborah Welch Larson, "The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations," Negotiation Journal, Vol. 4 (1988), pp. 281-301, especially pp. 289-92. For a critique of the game-theoretic approach, see Goldstein and Freeman, Three-Way Street, pp. 12-14.

36. Bernard Susser, "From Burgess to Behavioralism and Beyond," in Bernard Susser, ed.. Approaches to the Study of Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 3-15.

37. Joshua Goldstein and John Freeman, "U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine, Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 17-35.

38. Stephen J. Majeski and David Jones, "Arms Race Modeling: Causality Analysis and Model Specification," Journal o f Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25 (1981), pp. 259- 88.

39. John T. Williams and Michael D. McGinnis, "Sophisticated Reaction in the U.S.- Soviet Arms Race: Evidence of Rational Expectations," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32 (1988), pp. 968-95; William Dixon, "Reciprocity in the United States-Soviet Relations: Multiple Symmetry or Issue Linkage," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30 (1986), pp. 421-45.

40. Over the years Joshua Goldstein and John Freeman have produced several studies on the reciprocity both individually and collectively. See Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street', Joshua Goldstein and John Freeman, "U.S.- Soviet-Chinese Relations"; Joshua Goldstein, "Reciprocity in Superpower Relations: An Empirical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1991), pp. 195-209. They are, however, all aimed at studying the issue of reciprocity with the same data sets.

41. For a discussion of the measurement error arising from using highly aggregated data set, see Goldstein and Freeman, "U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations," pp. 21-22. 61 42. A fuller account of their data sets can be found in Goldstein and Freeman, Three- Way Street, pp. 36-41.

43. For a summary of the re s^ c h design and equations, see Goldstein and Freeman, "U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations," pp. 22-23.

44. Ibid. , especially p. 30.

45. Goldstein, "Reciprocity in Superpower Relations, " p. 207.

46. Ibid., p. 207.

47. Goldstein and Freeman, Three-Way Street, p. 155.

48. Ibid., p. 156.

49. Ibid., p. 157.

50. The quotation is from Goldstein and Freeman, "U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations," p. 30. The same conclusion, however, runs through all of their works cited above.

51. Goldstein and Freeman, Three-Way Street, p. 84.

52. Six historical cases are in chapter 4, ibid.

53. Ibid., p. 143.

54. Goldstein and Freeman, "U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations," p. 30.

55. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, "The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 202.

56. Ibid. p. 202.

57. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender.

58. Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 78-82.

59. Jervis also calls for more empirical test for this debatable assumption. See ibid., p. 84. 62

60. Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," p. 250.

61. See, for example, Fred I. Greenstein, "Can Personality and Politics be Studied Systematically," in Susser, ed. Approaches to the Study o f Politics, pp. 363-89.

62. Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul G. Lauren, ed.. Diplomacy: New Approaches to History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.

63. Goldstein and Freeman, Three-Way Street, p. 143.

64. Joseph S. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," p. 243.

65. Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations," p. 489.

66. Ibid., p. 496.

67. Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), p. 427.

68. Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1989), p. p. 471.

69. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 238.

70. For a useful distinction between external and systemic factors, see James E. Harf, David G. Hoovler, and Thomas E. James, Jr., "Systemic and External Attributes in Foreign Policy Analysis, in James N. Rosenau, ed.. Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), pp. 235- 49. CHAPTER in

RESUMPTION OF SINO-RUSSIAN MILITARY TIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The above theoretical discussion has presented the main lines and contours of arguments on international cooperation. While the debate between realists and institutionalists about the nature and effect of international anarchy on the prospects for cooperation is by no means conclusive, it has subsequently alerted international relations scholars of the importance of the scope and domain in theoretical development. In particular, the inadequacy of the systemic-level analysis has led the analyst to investigate not only nonsystemic factors but also the interaction between the systemic and nonsystemic factors in explaining cooperation among nations.

This chapter goes further than the above efforts by arguing that a better international relations theory must explain how fundamental changes in long-held patterns of foreign policy behavior do come about, often dramatically. The specification of the conditions under which international cooperation might occur— which attracted the attention of recent international relations scholarship—is not enough; no matter how laudable the attempt is, the conditionality is only a necessary but static consideration. In other words, recent scholarship on the conditionality of

63 64 international cooperation put little effort on the dynamics that create a potential for changes in foreign policy directions/

For the present task of explaining the resumption of Sino-Russian military relations and their rapid expansion, it is necessary to look into not only the domestic and international contexts which condition such policy reorientation, but also the perceptions, motivations, and images of the Chinese leadership in their overall assessment of threats to and opportunities for China. This kind of research requires the analyst to investigate at least the following three areas: 1) an objective specification of China's domestic and external conditions for a possible foreign policy change over time; 2) the Chinese leadership's mental representation of the world as they see if, and 3) the sequencing and the possible interactive process among the major variables.

This multi-variable approach which can be termed as an "integrative perspective" is not only congruent with Charles Hermann's call for a "perspective that views major [foreign policy] change not as a deterministic response to large forces operative in the international system, but rather as a decision process,"^ but it also is an essential task for probing into the possible interactive effects of major variables.

The chapter's first section introduces the perceptual analysis and its related concepts. It then shows how the interplay of two major factors, the motivational intensity and the existence of external threat or opportunity, could generate four hypotheses concerning foreign policy changes. It also illustrates why different 65 motivational systems lead different foreign policy directions by comparing the motivational systems of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Section two delves into the nature of China's policy-making structures and processes by emphasizing individual leaders' role and organizational processes in China's policy­ making. Taking as an example the Soviet sale of the advanced warplanes to China, it not only assesses the rationale behind the Chinese decision to resume military ties with the Soviet Union, but it also specifies how the range of foreign policy options can be narrowed. Finally, the third section wraps up theoretical discussions undergirding the present study. It argues for an integrated framework which investigates the dynamic interaction among the motivational system, structures, and processes that produces particular foreign policy outcomes.

The Motivational Systems

In attempting to understand the resumption of Sino-Russian military cooperation, it is worth recalling that three major variables of the Sino-Soviet

conflict—i.e., ideological dispute, divergent national interest, and domestic political

imperatives—are inadequate in explaining the recent resumption of their military ties.

In other words, the same variables, that have supposedly sustained the conflict for the

last three decades, cannot explain both conflictual and cooperative behavior at the

same time. A typical explication of the shift in Sino-Soviet relations is this: "The

defence culture notion of peace through strength was therefore both a cause of [Sino- 66

Soviet] conflict in the 1960-70s, and a cause of detente (or at least stability) by the early 1980s.

The quotation is an informed reading of China's modem history which led to

China's propensity to resist the humiliating experiences in the hands of more powerful nations. It, however, largely ignores important domestic and international changes

China had undergone between the 1960s and the 1980s. For example, ideological dispute was dramatically toned down after 's death in 1976 and became a non-issue by the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit. National interests of both countries had also undergone several changes and could not be precisely defined a priori before

Sino-Soviet military ties resumed. Finally, domestic imperatives in both China and the Soviet Union per se did not and do not necessarily lead to their close military ties.

In order to look beyond cursory explanations and to search for deeper causes for change in Sino-Russian relations, it is necessary to ascertain the Chinese leadership's actual policy preferences and how they have changed over time. The theoretical discussions underlying this chapter is based on the perceptual analysis in foreign policy decision-making."^ In the tradition of perceptual analysis two concepts, motivation and perception, figure prominently. Motivation is an analytical concept which can be defined as the "compound of factors predisposing a country to move in a certain direction in foreign policy. Perception is a "construction of reality regarding the behavior of another nation or nations in which foreign policy decisions are made. 67

Both motivation and perception are, however, analytical concepts which cannot be directly observed in the real world. It thus must be inferred from two sources: verbal statements of leaders and foreign policy actions of the states involved.

The importance of understanding a state's motivations lies in the fact that they constitute the assumptional bases of its foreign policy choices. As Richard Cottam has reminded us, a particular government's motivations are central to its "world view" in which "an individual perceives and chooses among policy alternatives.

In this kind of perceptual inferencing, however, scholars have noted several conceptual difficulties: if perception is a mental picture on which actions are based, perception and verbal statement are not necessarily the same thing, and "an individual will articulate even to himself only a small portion of the mental picture on which he bases his actions...."* Another complexity is that the same action can be generated by different motives, while a single motive can cause different actions. Still another, verbal statements of a leader and the policy actions of a state are two different levels; to assume that one level is equal to the other is committing an anthropomorphic fallacy. To avoid the problem of two different and "incommensurate levels," the following analytical scheme is focused on state actions rather than an individual leader's verbal statements.^

The perceptual analysis allows the analyst to delve into multiple but specific motivational types such as economic interests, messianic ideology, and security. A motivational system is a hierarchy of motivational types ordered according to the their 68 priorities in foreign policy. The different ordering of priorities generates a variety of

Weberian ideal-typical image types. In the case of Cottam's perceptual analysis of

19th-century British views of Egypt, for example, he has identified five image types:

"enemy," "complex," "allied," "imperial," and "colonial" images.There can, of course, be many other image types held by a state toward other states.

As an illustration of the perceptual analysis. Table 3.1 shows China's overall motivational systems since 1950s. It is an ordinal-level, not an interval-level, presentation of China's priorities in its domestic and foreign policy. It indicates, among others, the dramatic shifts, as seen in its changing priorities, in both China's domestic and foreign policy during four decades of its existence.

Table 3.1 Changes in China's Motivational Systems, 1950-1989

Priority 1950s/60s 1970s 1980s 1989 A Ideology Security Economy Stability B Secu'liy Ideology Security Economy C Economy Economy Stability Security

Note: The term "security" indicates the defense of a nation against external military threats, while "stability" denotes domestic stability or the continuation of communist or democratic rule.

While any of the above motivational systems is likely to predispose China's foreign policy in a certain discernible direction, it is important to note that some motivations are externally driven, and others internally driven. For example, security concerns in most part stem from external environment over which China has little 69 control. Its foreign policy behavior, especially in the 1970s, tended to follow the patterns prescribed by realists or strategic triangular scholars. China had maintained such strategic behavior throughout the 1970s, despite the continuing domestic disputes over ideological and economic issues.

In contrast, economic concerns in the 1980s are derived from several internal sources—in particular, from China's economic backwardness stemming from decades of ideological struggle and policy disasters. Again predictably, China's priority on economic modernization led its foreign policy to steer toward the creation of a peaceful external environment conducive to economic development at home. Such internally-driven foreign policy was upheld throughout the 1980s, notwithstanding the existence of significant external disturbances such as the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet empire, respectively, at the top and the bottom of the decade.

The point is that irrespective of whether or not a state's foreign policy is driven by external or internal factors, the specification of a motivational system would indicate vectors that have a directional movement. More often than not, international

relations theorists and area specialists note that domestic and external factors are

reinforcing with each other and that its combined effect would somehow produce a particular type of foreign policy. Yet both scholars have little to say about the

directions of foreign policy. The study of the motivational system is thus an important

first step in understanding the dynamics of foreign policy change. 70

Motivations, while one of most important factors in determining the directional change of foreign policy course, have varying degrees of intensity across issues and time. The intensity of motivations may vary, for example, over economic or security concerns; the latter requires a higher level of a government's extraction capability over its resources at a shorter time than the former. On the other hand, a state's motivational systems evolve over time, resulting in different levels of intensity, and its motivational intensity could significantly increase during a time of crisis, which involves surprise, little time, and military threat.

The intensity of motivations seems to have at least two potential effects on foreign policy change. One potential effect is related to the distance between priorities. The priority distance in the 1950s and 1960s was narrower than the one in the 1970s. It seems that the narrower the distance between the priorities is, the less contradictory the overall motivational system will be at a given moment. The other effect is that it influences the pace of change in overall foreign policy directions.

Since 1949, China's dramatic changes in its foreign policy course have mostly been followed by the resolution of a prolonged leadership struggle over personal power and policy lines—e.g., the death of Lin Biao in 1971 before Sino-U.S. rapprochement and

Deng Xiaoping's rise to power in 1978 before Sino-U.S. normalization.

In developing an analytical framework to explain foreign policy change,

motivations thus stand as the crucial factor to be investigated. Another factor of less

importance is the existence of external threat to or opportunity for China. It is 71 imperative to emphasize, however, that the external threat or opportunity is largely independent of China's motivational system. External threats or opportunities are created in the international context over which a state has little control. It is, however, the existence of external threat or opportunity which, when combined with the motivational intensity of a state, makes possible changes in foreign policy, often in a particular direction.

In sum, two factors must be principally considered in studying foreign policy change: the level of a state's motivational intensity and the existence of external threats to or opportunities for that state. From these two factors we can generate useful hypotheses concerning the possibility of foreign policy change. The terms

"threats" and "opportunities" are, however, neither clear-cut nor mutually exclusive.

In the real world, for instance, an external event could often present both threats to and opportunities for a particular state. For the present purpose of understanding international cooperation and for an analytical simplicity, the following discussion focuses more on external opportunities than on external threats. Four hypotheses can be drawn from the relationships between a state's motivational intensity and the existence of external opportunities:

Hypothesis 1: If the level of a state's motivational intensity is low and the level of external opportunity is low, then there would be "NO CHANGE" in foreign policy.

Hypothesis 2: If the level of a state's motivational intensity is low but the level of external opportunity is high, then there would be "EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE" in foreign policy. 72

Hypothesis 3: If the level of a state's motivational intensity is high but the level of external opportunity is low, then there would be "DIPLOMATIC PROBING," but no major change, in foreign policy.

Hypothesis 4: If the level of a state's motivational intensity is high and the level of external opportunity is high, then there would be "DRAMATIC CHANGE" in foreign policy.

V MOTIVATIONAL \ INTENSITY FOR CHANGE LOW HIGH LEVEL OF EXTERNAL \ OPPORTUNITY \ NO CHANGE ( I ) DIPLOMATIC PROBING (III)

Sino-U.S. Relations LOW in the I950s/60s Sino-U.S. Relations after Tiananmen in 1989 Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1960s/70s

EVOLUTIONARY ( II ) DRAMATIC CHANGE ( IV ) CHANGE Sino-Soviet Relations Sino-U.S. Relations in the 1950s HIGH in the 1980s Sino-U.S. Relations in the 1970s Sino-Soviet Relations Sino-Russian Relations in the 1980s after 1989

Figure 3.1 Relationship between Motivational Intensity and the Level of External Opportunity

Note: The term "change" denotes a significant departure from any two countries' past patterns of bilateral relations, while "opportunity" is defined as the possibility of cooperative reciprocity in bilateral relations—that is, a situational variable.

All four hypotheses are depicted in Figure 3.1. For all levels of foreign policy change—from a specific policy change to a general orientational change, one of these 73 outcomes could occur. Moreover, since any state needs to cope with a great number of issues at a given time, all four outcomes could be simultaneously operative.

As an illustration. Figure 3.1 also includes China's foreign relations since the

1950s with the United States and the Soviet Union. Hypothesis 1 or Cell I in the figure indicates a situation in which, due mostly to ideological and security reasons,

China's motivational intensity for change is low and the level of external opportunity is low. Both cases result in no change in foreign policy course as long as such conditions exist. Hypothesis 2 or Cell II includes two cases with two opposite vectors: one conflictual (Sino-U.S. relations) and the other cooperative (Sino-Soviet relations).

Both cases highlight the existence of high-level opportunity in the external environment, but due to China's propensity to distance itself from getting close to either superpower, only evolutionary change is possible. After Tiananmen, as

Hypothesis 3 or Cell III illustrates, China has maintained a strong intensity to improve bilateral relations with the United States, arising from its stake in economic modernization. However, because of the demise of the Cold War and the existence of a host of outstanding bilateral issues in Sino-U.S. relations, either side's concerns are not addressed by the other. This is a classic example of two countries talking past each other. While there is only one historical case which is more conflictual than cooperative, the opposite direction (i.e. more cooperative) is also possible in other cases in this category. Finally, three cases in Cell IV, or Hypothesis 4, show the confluence of China's motivational intensity for change and the external opportunity. 74

All three cases have not only led a significant departure from their past patterns of

relations, but they have all moved to a more cooperative direction than before. This is

no coincidence, for one of the two principal variables is external opportunity; if it is

replaced with external threat, the same cell would indicate a more conflictual

relationship.*^

The overall foreign policy directions, indicated by a state’s motivational

system, thus can lead to major changes, depending upon the availability of external

threat or opportunity. Directional changes in foreign policy often take a sharper turn

during a crisis. China's legitimacy crisis during Tiananmen in June 1989 is a shining

case in this regard and has been a watershed demarcating a volte-face in its relations

with both the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Table 3.2 delineates the

motivational systems of three countries during Tiananmen in 1989.

Table 3.2 Motivational Systems of China, the U.S., and the USSR at the Time of Tiananmen Incident in May/June 1989

Priority China U.S. USSR A Stability Democratic values Economy B Economy Economy Stability C Security Security Security

Note: The term "security" indicates the defense of a nation against external military threats, while "stability" denotes domestic stability or the continuation of communist or democratic rule. 75

During the four decades of its governance, the Chinese leadership had never experienced such direct and intense challenge to its authority to rule as the one during

Tiananmen. Party and government structures were, to be sure, ruined at the height of the , but Mao Zedong's authority—the embodiment of the Chinese

Communist Party's (CCP) authority—was by no means in jeopardy. Even if China's opening to the West since 1978 ushered in the so-called "unhealthy tendencies" from the West such as "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois liberalization," those sporadic and short-lived outpourings of Western cultural infiltrations were kept to a tolerable limit throughout the 1980s.

From the Chinese leadership's perspective, Tiananmen was a culmination of the potential dangers of China's open-door policy to the West. Likewise, the Chinese leadership was sharply divided over the possible responses to Tiananmen demonstrations, resulting in the ouster of General Secretary —the highest ranking leader in the CCP—and other reform-minded leaders. At stake was no less than the very survival of communist rule in China. As such, Tiananmen precipitated the radical reordering of China's motivations: domestic stability thus became the primary motivational base for China's domestic and foreign policy. In addition, because of the high motivational intensity, the priority distance in 1989 became wider than the one in the 1980s.

The United States' official responses during Tiananmen, including the imposition of economic and military sanctions against China, collided with China's 76 new motivational systems. Worse still, the passing of the Cold War structure had, in the American view, marginalized the strategic importance of China, which would otherwise have had a soothing effect on their bilateral differences. By mid-1989, when the "rollback" of the Soviet empire in East Europe had yet to occur in the coming months, the geostrategic rationale that had guided Sino-U.S relations since the early 1970s evaporated all but in name. Thus, the compatibility of domestic political and social values and economic benefits held the center stage of their bilateral relations, only to see to a direct clash thereafter. The first major signal that the

Chinese leadership decided to downgrade Sino-U.S. security ties came in April 1990 when it canceled the so-called "Peace Pearl" program, the largest joint defense deal between China and the U.S. to upgrade the Chinese F-8 II (J-8 II) fighter aircraft.'^

On the other hand, the Soviet motivational system was more compatible, if not identical, to China's than that of the United States. First of all, Soviet foreign policy since Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 and its China policy in particular can be summed up as a series of consistent efforts to enhance Soviet security with a fewer resources.*'* During the latter half of the 1980s the Soviet Union took a host of measures toward China that were conducive to confidence-building, including a near resolution of the "Three Obstacles," a significant reduction of security threat, and progress in border talks.The Soviets' consistent efforts to normalize relations with

China were culminated in Gorbachev's visit to China amid Tiananmen demonstrations. And Gorbachev abstained himself from offering any comments. 77 during and after the visit, which might be construed as condemning China's violent suppression of student demonstrations.

Probably there were two other factors in the minds of Chinese leaders which favor the notching up of its relations with the Soviet Union. One factor was that

Soviet priority on security was deeply intertwined with its own concern with internal stability, while the U.S. priority on democratic values were not linked with its immediate security concerns. It points, among others, to the fact that the Soviet Union would be less threatening to the security and stability of China for the years to come.

The other was that the Chinese leadership's emphasis on economic modernization, as mentioned above, necessitated the reduction of defense outlays and the improvement of relations with neighboring countries. Thus, Sino-Soviet normalization in May 1989 should be seen in view of the compatibility of their motivational systems which were then transformed and their mutual need for a continued reform and internal stability.

It is the interplay of China's changing economic and strategic factors that has eventually led Chinese leaders to make conscious and fundamental choices of forging military relations with the Soviet Union and later Russia.

In summary, China's motivational system underwent a rapid transformation during Tiananmen, with a particular directional momentum in its relations with the

United States and the Soviet Union. As is the case with any interstate relations, however, there was nothing inevitable about China's foreign policy outcomes. The parameters of China's evolving relations with the Soviet Union were to take a more 78 concrete form by the choices and decisions of Chinese leaders made in their own policy-making context.

Decision-Making Structures and Processes in China: The Case of the Su-27 Sale

To understand the overall predisposition of China's foreign policy and its orientation, the analyst must principally investigate the motivational system and external factors. The specific foreign policy outcomes are, however, often the function of the interplay of several internal aspects of policy-making in China such as the nature of Chinese politics, the leadership's role, and policy-making structures and processes. As those individual and institutional factors involved in policy deliberations tend to vary across issues and time, this study takes up China's acquisition of the

Soviet Su-27 fighter aircraft as an illustrative case for understanding China's decision calculus to resume military ties with the Soviet Union.

There are several reasons for the selection of the case: as Tai Ming Cheung has noted in his pathbreaking case study on the sale of the -27s to China,'® the

Su-27 deal illustrates the difficulties inherent in restoring military ties after decades of hostilities. In addition, the sale represents a milestone in the development of Sino-

Soviet military ties in that the Su-27 FLANKER is not only one of the most advanced fighter aircraft currently deployed by the Russian Air Force—never sold to overseas except to China by December 1994, but it shows the dramatic change in the Soviet threat perception of China, given the sale’s possible military implications. 79

The Sino-Soviet negotiations on the warplane began in June 1990 and were concluded in May 1991; at the outset the Chinese side negotiated for 24 Su-27s but ordered two additional aircraft at the end of 1992, bringing the total to 26. All 26

were delivered to China by early 1993. The total cost, including the aircraft,

armament, spare engines, and training support, has been estimated at U.S.$1.3-1.5 billion—the largest weapons deal China has ever concluded with any foreign country.

By the end of 1993, China ordered the second batch of additional 26 Su-27s.’^

From the security viewpoint, Russian leaders must have thought twice about

the possibility that the advanced warplanes sold to China today could be used against

Russia in the future, should their bilateral relations deteriorate again. At the same

time, military collaboration with Russia and, in particular, the purchase of the modem

Russian warplanes also posed difficult questions to the Chinese leadership as well.

The acquisition decision could lead to a possible military dependency on Russia in the

future and, given the faltering state of the Russian defense industry, even the

availability of spare parts and logistic support cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, the

Chinese leadership remembered well the nightmare of Summer 1960—when the Soviet

advisors and technicians left China almost overnight, which placed the burgeoning

Chinese industry in limbo for many years. A more fundamental question, however,

was: would the Russians ever sell such highly advanced warplanes to China?

The Su-27 case highlights two dilemmas that the Chinese leadership faced in

the early 1990s; the PLA's defense requirements and a balance between economic and 80 defense modernization. Caught between the Scylla and the Charybdis, the Chinese defense industry's snail-paced progress in providing requisite warplanes for the

PLÂAF and the U.S.-led post-Tiananmen economic and military embargoes, the

Chinese leadership was faced with an occasion to make a high-stakes decision.

First, the PLA's strategic shift since the 1985 CMC meeting envisions

“limited local wars” (yowcian jubu zhanzheng) on border areas as the most likely type of warfare which requires rapid mobility and fire power. The PLAAF, however, has been ill-equipped to meet the new challenges. It is the gap between the doctrinal requirements and the existing aircraft inventory that has sharpened the sense of urgency among the Chinese top brass.

Second, the modernization of its air force could not be delayed until the U.S. lifted its military sanctions, which included the suspension of the "Peace Pearl" program. Nor could the Chinese government afford to scuttle its relations with the

United States, which would jeopardize the much-needed American capital and technology for its Four Modernizations. In making such a fundamental decision as the switching of defense supplier, played a decisive role and China's institutional factors performed only a supportive function. This hypothesis is supported by the following discussion of Deng Xiaoping's role in and his orientation to Chinese politics.

The post-1978 efforts to institutionalize policy-making process in China notwithstanding, Deng Xiaoping remains the ultimate source of authority for making 81 decisions for all important domestic and foreign policy. It should be acknowledged that Deng has never enjoyed the same personal authority and political power that Mao did and that Deng has been only primus inter pares. In fact, post-Mao China has largely been governed by the first-generation revolutionary leaders, the so-called "Old

Guard" or the "Eight Elders."*^ No other elders, however, had experience as broad as

Deng's in across the party, government, and the military. In addition, other Chinese leaders often acknowledged Deng's paramount role in policy-making. General

Secretary Zhao Ziyang, for example, told the following to the visiting Gorbachev in

May 1989:

Although Mr Deng quit the party Central Committee and the Standing Committee of its Politburo at his own request at the 13th National Party Congress in 1987, all the party knows we cannot leave him or his wisdom and experience....On important matters, Mr Deng Xiaoping still steers the way.... [W]e have always made reports to and asked for opinions from comrade Deng Xiaoping while dealing with most important issues.^”

For reasons of his personality, age, and political purposes (e.g., making rooms for his proteges to maneuver), Deng has largely shunned from media exposure or public appearance since the mid-1980s. Deng's leadership style has largely been much like that of a puppeteer, a manipulator of events from behind the scenes. As Lucian

Pye has insightfully noted, Deng's leadership style befits that of a traditional Chinese ruler whose "omnipotence lies in the mystery which invisibility evokes. 82

The fan et origo of Deng's authority is not his official positions, but his seniority based upon his personal history, leadership skill, and guanxi (personal connections) across the party, government, and the military. In addition to his extensive military career in the pre-1949 period, Deng was the party's mouthpiece in the Sino-Soviet dispute, implemented the herculean task of moving defense industries into interior provinces in the 1960s, and served as PLA Chief of Staff in the mid-

1970s. He also served as a member of the CMC in 1954-1989, and in the post-Mao

Chinese politics Deng has been China’s preeminent leader and the chief architect of the Four Modernizations. His broad experience in foreign and military affairs is unmatched by that of the other "old guards of the Chinese revolution."

Deng himself tried in the 1980s to delegate some of his decision authority to his subordinates to enhance their positions, separate the party from the government, and to ensure an orderly succession process after he passes from the scene.This could not be done, however, due to the nature of power and authority in China. For one thing, Deng's seniority—the ultimate source of his authority in Chinese political culture—cannot be passed down to his proteges. For another, over the years Deng has left a large trail on what issues are important to him. Those include Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations in 1979, China's unification formula "one country, two systems," and the Sino-Soviet normalization in 1989. Most recently, Deng himself unintentionally revealed his policy-making role in the newly-published Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping: "Fortunately, I [Deng] was still there to deal with it [Tiananmen] 83 and it was not difficult. The Su-27 deal is a national security decision and thus is an issue of highest importance. Deng is not known to have delegated the decision authority on such issues to other leaders.

According to a noted China scholar, A. Doak Barnett, foreign policy-making

deliberations became more regularized and institutionalized in post-Mao China and by

the mid-1980s, the CCP Secretariat and the "inner cabinet" were key offices for

foreign policy-making in China. On major domestic and foreign policy issues,

however, there is no evidence that those two offices have been empowered to make

authoritative decisions. Instead, Barnett opines that Deng remains the "ultimate source

of authority for making decisions in China" and that most major domestic and foreign

policy decisions "are made by him, and all [major decisions] must be acceptable to

him."^‘* In a 1984 interview with Barnett, then Premier Zhao Ziyang was quoted as

having said, "As all people know...major issues are determined with the participation

of Comrade Deng Xiaoping...not because of his position...[but because of] his rich

political experience, wisdom, and prestige.

Furthermore, the following three information accumulated in the 1980s

strongly indicate that Deng has been the ultimate decision-maker in China's major

national security issues: first, Deng has been operating his own secretariat consisting

of personal aides and his family members. Military affairs are handled by Li Jiejun

and foreign affairs by Wang Ruilin.^® His personal secretariat had provided him with

an independent source of information and a yardstick against which various policy 84 options of the party and governmental organizations were evaluated. Second, since the source of authority in China rests upon his seniority, a general secretary or a premier, who is theoretically empowered to make authoritative decisions, still has to take orders from Deng. Third, the acquisition of Soviet warplanes is an issue of strategic, military, and economic importance. Its first batch of 26 would cost $1.3-1.5 billion— thus requiring the commitment of significant government resources—and, once acquired, it would force China to rely upon Russia in terms of spare parts, pilot training, and logistics. All of this evidence strongly indicates the Su-27 decision has to be made by none other than Deng Xiaoping himself.

The above observation is also partially supported by empirical evidence forwarded by several China scholars. One of the most prominent models in post-Mao

China's decision-making has been what Kenneth Lieberthal, , and

David Lampton called the "fragmented authoritarianism" or "bargaining" model.

The model holds that "authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed."^* The fragmentation is structurally based and has been deepened by the reform process in the 1980s. As a result, bargaining and competition over limited resources characterize the system. In an attempt to apply the model to various policy clusters in China, however, the authors have found that the degrees of fragmentation vary widely across issue-domains. They acknowledge that "there appears to be far less evidence of bargaining relationships than has generally been found in...economic cluster.Carol Hamrin (on party's leadership system). 85

Jonathan Pollack (the military), Melanie Manion (cadre policy), and other contributors to the volume could not find enough evidence to support the thesis that the decision-making in China is fragmented.

Aside from Deng Xiaoping, the military institutions also played a part in clinching the deal. As becoming a popular approach since Graham Allison and

Morton Halperin, the bureaucratic model hypothesizes that a nation's foreign policy actions and decisions are the result of the competition and the bargaining processes among various bureaucracies vying for the limited governmental resources and commitment.^® It further assumes that a government foreign policy action is not the rational choice adopted after a careful weighing of all available options. Nor does it reflect a nation's long-term national interests. More often than not, it is the result of the bureaucratic process of "pulling and hauling" and nothing but expedient compromises made by governmental organizations to avoid foreign policy paralysis.

The bureaucratic model, in short, clearly locates the primary sources of foreign policy-making within the government and sensitizes the analyst the importance of bureaucratic expertise and role in formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

In Russia, the Su-27 supplier, there were four major bureaucratic players: the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOPA), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES), and the defense industry (DI). The distinct missions and goals of each of the three Russian ministries and the DI would render the Su-27s deal particularly susceptible to bureaucratic explanations. Moreover, the 86 lack of the leadership control over the arms exports and the absence of consensus on the content of national interests during the disintegrating period of the Soviet Union provides for an ideal ground for bureaucratic "pulling and hauling," resulting in the sale of advanced warplanes to China amid political uncertainties.

Despite the vagaries of the Russian politics in the early 1990s, the four bureaucratic players have held remarkably consistent views and positions on arms transfer.^* The MOFA, sensitive to diplomatic repercussions of the sale, has opposed the sale of advanced weapons which might disrupt the precarious military balance in the Asia-Pacific. At the opposite end, the defense industrialists are desperate to sell virtually any conventional weapons to help boost the sagging Russian defense industry. The MOD and the MVES stand in between the two extreme positions, and have both proponents and opponents of advanced weapons sales to China. The fragile balance among the four bureaucratic players, however, was broken in 1990-91. For one thing, the military involvement in the August 1991 coup, including Defense

Minister Yazov, resulted in the removal of anti-China, conservative military personnel from power. Moreover, the ever-deepening economic crisis has shored up the position of those in the MOD and the MVES favoring further arms sales. 87

The Old Guard Deng Xiaoping ^ ^

Party Government

Politburo Standing Central Military State Council Committee Commission'* (Premier: ) (General Secretary: (Chairman; ) Jiang Zemin)

Ministry of Ministry of Foreign AGFairs National Defense

General Staff General Political General Logistics Department Department Department

NavyAir Force Second Academy Comm, for Science, Artillery of Military Technology and Industry Force Science for National Defense

Seven MRs (Chengdu, , , Jinan, Lanzhou, Shenyang, and Beijing)

Figure 3.2 China’s Military Command Structure since November 1989

Symbols: Command Coordination Notes: I. The “Old Guard” is not a formal organization, but an informal group consisting of old revolutionary cadres. 2. Deceased in 1992 3. Deceased in 1993 4. After November 1989 88

Arms acquisition process in China, however, is tightiy controlled by the party's Central Military Commission, the highest military decision-making body in

China, in consultation with the Politburo and the military's three general departments.

(See Figure 3.2.) The Ministry of Defense is largely an administrative body with no real power. Due to the high level of party control of the military and the government,

China may not be as susceptible as Russia to bureaucratic analysis, especially in military and security issues. China's post-1979 reform and the opening to the outside, however, have helped the researcher to gamer fragmentary evidence and discern looming patterns on this esoteric issue.

Available information on the Chinese bureaucracy indicates a broad cleavage between economic and foreign ministries (EFM) and the military (PLA) over the allocation of limited governmental resources.Since China launched Four

Modernizations in 1979, the PLA has accepted the supremacy of national economic development over other priorities, including military modernization.^^ After

Tiananmen, however, the PLA has visibly enhanced its influence and role in China.

Not only did the PLA become heavily involved in Chinese politics but it has received a continuous defense budget increase partly as a "political reward" for its role at

Tiananmen. In particular, since the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, the rise of professional officers to the positions of responsibility became more frequent, and they

seem to manage and control most of China's military affairs today.In summary, 89 post-Tiananmen Chinese politics have strengthened the relative position of the PLA vis-a-vis that of EFM.

Another indication of bureaucratic cleavages between the PLA and the EFM might be seen through the issue of the South China Sea. In July 1992, Indonesia hosted the third conference for the resolution of territorial disputes in the South China

Sea. During the last day of the conference, Chinese foreign ministry officials initiated to "co-develop the [South China] Sea and resolve any disputes peacefully," which was adopted by other conference participants.^^ Within the next two days, the PLA occupied another islet in the disputed South China Sea, indicating that the PLA and the MOFA might have been working on different foreign policy positions and plans.

Still another factor that has bolstered the PLA position in the early 1990s was the rise of Admiral Liu Huaqing to the Politburo Standing Committee. Admiral Liu, a major architect of Chinese military modernization, is a graduate of the Voroshilov

Naval Academy in Leningrad and has been very active in developing Sino-

Soviet/Russian military ties. Without a stellar figure whose standing is comparable to that of Admiral Liu, the EFM might have well lost the bureaucratic infighting for the allocation of government resources.

In short, the bureaucratic politics perspective has provided the researcher a useful tool in explaining and even predicting Russian foreign policy behavior, especially when the leadership crisis led to a bureaucratic tug-of-war among various ministries. The relative shift in the balance of power among the four bureaucratic 90 players helped led to the transfer of the Su-27s to China. In China, on the other hand, arms acquisition process in particular and national security issues in general are tightly controlled by a few top leaders. Even if the PLA's institutional interests prevailed over those of EFM in the early 1990s, the available information still suggests that the

Su-27 decision is the result of top leaders' decision rather than the compromise between the government bureaucracies.

On the other hand, the Su-27 deal in particular and the Sino-Russian arms transactions in general have grown from somewhat different motives on each side.

The primary motivation for Russia has been financial consideration. Arms sales generate hard currency for the cash-strapped government coffer and help alleviate economic hardship. They also help protect Russia's defense personnel, industry, and technological edge from the devastation wrought by domestic economic and political jolts. In addition, the Soviet Union was obliged to the Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe (CFE) Treaty in November 1990 and now Russia has either to move the surplus of treaty-limited weapons east of the Urals, scrap them altogether, or sell them to foreign countries.Russia's secondary consideration has been the forging of political relations with the customer states and regions.

The Chinese held more variegated motivations than the Russians, and their motivations in the resumptions of military ties have grown over the years to include the following.^® First, China's purchase of the Russian weapons and technology is a logical way of correcting present deficiencies of the PLA's huge, but largely outdated 91 weapons inventory. This is particularly so given the fact that the majority of the

PLA's weapons inventory is based upon the old Soviet technology. The second reason is that China, like many other countries, is unabashedly taking advantage of the

"buyer's market" created by the exigencies of the Cold War's collapse. After all,

China's new military ties with Russia present an unprecedented opportunity for its leaders to modernize the PLA by acquiring requisite weapons, equipment, and technologies. Third, the Chinese acquisition is directed to bolster its military position in Asia, commensurate with its growing economic and diplomatic status. Parallel to this motivation is the awareness that China need to emerge from its past humiliating experiences with a stronger military force. The fourth and final consideration might be that China is likely to re-export the acquired Russian technologies to other countries in a variety of forms. It is a way to arrest the rapid decline in China's arms export orders in the early 1990s.^^

Amid post-Tiananmen Western sanctions against China, the Soviet Union emerged as an alternative source for China's defense modernization, which is central to safeguard its growing national interest. The Su-27 case illustrates, however, the

Chinese leadership's concern over the dependence of foreign weapons and technology and over the continuing importance of its economic link with the West. China's decision to acquire the Russian weaponry and technology not only indicates a fundamental reassessment of its threat perceptions, as reflected in the new motivational system, but the range of options was considerably narrowed by the 92 nature of decision-making in China, in particular the paramountcy of Deng Xiaoping.

Finally, the Su-27 decision illuminates the continuing relevance of three levels of analysis in international relations research.

Need for an Integrated Framework

Both realists and institutionalists claim to have provided students in international relations with an adequate understanding on the problems of international cooperation. The realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states seemed to have captured the conflictual aspects of bipolar rivalry in the Cold War. Pointing at the growth of international regimes and the incidence of cooperative interstate behavior, on the other hand, institutionalists called for a more scholarly attention on the conditions of cooperation. The subsequent three approaches on international cooperation, however, remain in essence systemic-level analysis and have made little attempt to investigate the domestic sources of state behavior.

The perceptual analysis puts the state at the center of its analysis. By examining a particular state's motivational system across issues and time, the researcher can discern the overall predisposition of its foreign policy course. When combined with external opportunities, moreover, the analysis of the motivational system sheds light on the dynamics of international cooperation and change. The above analysis of China's motivational systems has shown how dramatic changes in its foreign policy behavior could come about and why China's relations with the 93

United States and the Soviet Union/Russia are likely to take either a cooperative or a conflictual form. In short, the perception analysis incorporates both international and domestic factors and its possible interaction.

It is equally evident that the final foreign policy outcome is the decision made by government authorities with choices and constraints operating at both domestic and international level. The Su-27 case has shown how a set of domestic variables, including the nature of power and authority in China and its preeminent leader Deng

Xiaoping's role, has significantly influenced the policy-making processes in China.

Moreover, that decisional processes vary according to the different types of decisional structure is now well established in the discipline.'*'^

In this sense, the perceptual analysis can be fruitfully combined with what

Margaret and Charles Hermann call the "decision units approach."'** The latter's main premise is that different types of "ultimate decision units"—i.e., predominant leaders, single groups, and autonomous actors—will substantially shape a government's foreign policy outcome. The examination of Deng Xiaoping's role in the decision-making is entirely in line with Hermann and Hermann's "single predominant leader" as the ultimate decision unit.

From the practical point of view, the decision unit approach provides a distinct advantage over other models since what the policy community needs to know is knowledge about particular foreign policy outcomes and organizational processes of other governments rather than the global causes of war or national attributes of other 94 governments. In the theoretical viewpoint, the decision units approach elucidates how different decision structures engender different types of decision processes for a given issue-domain, such as economic and defense issues. Foreign policy behavior, the final outcome of the decision process, can thus be conceived as having been strongly influenced by a nation's decision structure. An integrated framework, which combines the perceptual analysis with the decision units approach, can be schematically presented in Figure 3.3.

External Motivational Decision Decision Decision Environment System Structure Process Outcome

Threat Types Individuals Formulation Foreign or —^ and —> and -» and Policy Opportunity Intensity Organizations Implementation Behavior

Figure 3.3 An Integrated Framework for Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Source: Adapted from Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (January 1981), p. 252.

To summarize, recognizing the primary significance of the decision-making units in providing the structure and process and of the key control variables, which would subsequently narrow down foreign policy options, is the same consideration of the present study that calls for an integrated framework in foreign policy decision- 95 making. The integration of the perceptual analysis and the decision units approach would provide students in international relations with a theoretical insight on the origins of foreign policy behavior and its changes as well as a practical guideline for contingencies unaccounted for by systemic-level analysis. 96 NOTES

1. For a discussion of change in cognitive representation, see Richard Herrmann, "The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy of Drawing Inferences about Perceptions," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32 (1988), pp. 180-87; R. B. Zajonc, "Discussion of Abelson's Talk on Cartwright Founders' Day," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 9 (1983), p. 56.

2. Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34 (1990), p. 20.

3. Gerald Segal, "Defence Culture and Sino-Soviet Relations," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 1985), p. 182.

4. It largely focuses on subsystemic factors, including bureaucratic politics, small group dynamics, and individual psychology. See Graham Allison, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory o f Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Irving Janis, Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980).

5. Richard K. Herrmann, Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), p. 7. Richard W. Cottam has defined motivation as a "compound of factors that predispose a government and people to move in a decisional direction in foreign affairs. " See his Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 31.

6. Richard K. Herrmann, Perceptions and Behavior, p. 8.

7. Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, p. 10.

8. Ibid., p. 44.

9. Scholars engaged in the perceptual analysis are well aware of the levels of analysis problem. To infer perceptions of a government on which its policy actions are based, some scholars have introduced terms such as "modal view," "prevailing world view" and "prevailing view" to note that there are many differing perceptions and images within any single government and to infer the dominant view in that government on which policy alternatives are based. 97

10. Richard W, Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, pp. 62-92.

11. For an analysis of the impact of a crisis on decision-making context, see Charles F. Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable," in James N. Rosenau, ed.. International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York; Free Press, 1969).

12. If China's motivational intensity for change is left intact in the matrix and if the "external opportunity" is replaced with "external threat," Cell IV would contain only two cases: Sino-U.S. relations in the 1950s/60s and Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s/70s. While the change of a variable would necessitate the change of titles of each cell, it is interesting to note that the substitution of external threat for opportunity indicates that China's relations with both superpowers between 1950s and 1970s were based upon security threats from either superpower or both, while its relations with both superpowers since 1980s have been less influenced by security threats.

13. The $550 million deal was signed in 1986 to upgrade 50 Chinese F-8 fighters. Soaring development costs added an extra 30 to 40 percent to the original estimate. The cancellation of the deal in April 1990 has been widely regarded as a political message to the U.S. that the latter's assistance in China's defense modernization is no longer important. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Comrade in Arms," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 19, 1990, p. 30.

14. See Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rappallo," Asian Survey, March 1993, pp. 285-301. Hung P. Nguyen has persuasively argued that Soviet military policy toward China is primarily based upon the Soviet need to ally itself with another continental power in the East, as it did with in the 1920s to offset its weakening geopolitical position vis-a-vis the West.

15. For an excellent analysis on major developments in Sino-Soviet relations leading to the May 1989 summit, see Steven Goldstein, "Diplomacy amid Protest: The Sino- Soviet Summit', Problems o f Communism, September-October 1989, pp. 49-71.

16. Tai Ming Cheung, "Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Military Relations in the 1990s," in Richard H. Yang, ed., China's Military: The PLA in 1992/1993 (Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, Taipei, ROC), Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 64-66.

17. All information regarding the Su-27 deal can be obtained from the following sources: Tai Ming Cheung, ibid.; Jane's Defence Weekly, January 22, 1994, p. 3; Julia A. Ackerman and Michael Collins Dunn, "Chinese Airpower Revs Up," Air 98

Force Magazine, July 1993, pp. 56-59; Ng Ka Po, "A Review of China's Military Modernisation since 1987," China News Analysis (Hong Kong), No. 1511 (June 1, 1994), pp. 1-9; Arthur Ding, "The PLA in 1993: Its Modernization and Political Succession," Zhonggong Dalu Yanjiu ( Studies, Taiwan), Vol. 37, No. 2 (February 1994), pp. 37-45; Pinkov (Ping Ke-fu), "The Analysis of Current Status of Talks on Arms Reduction in the Border Area and Arms Trade between Russia and China" (Toronto, : Kanwa Translation Information Centre Canada, August 1994), pp. 1-7.

18. See Paul H. B. Godwin, "Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local and Limited War," The Annals oftheAAPSS, January 1992, pp. 191-201.

19. The eight elders are Deng Xiaoping (90), Chen Yun (89), Li Xiannian (deceased in 1992), Peng Zhen (92), Yang Shangkun (88), Wang Zhen (deceased in 1993), Bo Yibo (88), and Song Renqiong (86). As of December 1994 there are only six elders, and only Deng has the extensive experience across the institutional lines. For an analysis on the relationship between Deng and other "Old Guard," see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China," South China Morning Post, June 24, 1992, p. 21; FBIS-CHI, October 12, 1994, pp. 15-17; Nan Shih-yin, "Predictions on Post-Deng Period Appear One After Another; Top Levels Avoid Controversies," Kuang Chiao Ching (Hong Kong), No. 264, September 16, 1994, pp. 6-9, inFBIS-CHI, October 14, 1994, pp. 24-27.

20. The Xinhua (New China) News Agency's text as cited in South China Morning Post, May 17, 1989, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, May 17, p. 15.

21. Lucian Pye, "An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China's Political Culture," China Quarterly, September 1993, pp. 412-443, 415. The entire September 1993 issue of China Quarterly was devoted to the assessment of Deng Xiaoping's professional persona: politician (David Shambaugh), economist (Barry Naughton), social reformer (Martin King Whyte), soldier (June Dreyer), and statesman (Michael Yahuda). It is interesting to note that an assessment of Deng Xiaoping as a foreign policy-maker was notable for its absence, notwithstanding its significance. This is probably due to the secretive nature of foreign policy-making in China.

22. Deng's reform efforts in the early 1980s are analyzed in Parris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," Problems o f Communism, January- February 1981, pp. 1-21; Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats," Asian Survey, June 1983, pp. 673-91.

23. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993). See also New York Times, November 4, 1993. 99

24. A. Doak Bamett, The Making o f Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 12.

25. Ibid., 11.

26. Li Jiejun is now Vice President of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) and Wang Ruilin is Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department. For further analysis, Xinhua, June 8, 1994, in FBIS-CHI, June 9, 1994, pp. 31-32;Zhongshi Zhoukan (China Times Business Weekly), No. 155, December 18-24, 1994, pp. 6-10.

27. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). The quotations are from the latter book. See also David M. Lampton, "Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill," Issues and Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (March 1987), pp. 11-39.

28. Lieberthal and Lampton, eds.. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, p. 8.

29. Ibid., p. 17.

30. Allison, Essence o f Decision', Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974).

31. Stephen J. Blank, Challenging the New World Order: The Arms Transfer Policies of the Russian Republic (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993); Charles C. Petersen, "Moscow's New Arms Bazaar," Orbis, Spring 1994, pp. 277-92.

32. See, for example, "CPC Military Attacks Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), No. 201, July 1, 1994, pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI, July 26, 1994, pp. 33-36.

33. For the text of Deng Xiaoping's speech at the enlarged meeting of the CMC, see Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, October 1993), pp. 126-29. China's current security strategy has been based upon the decisions made in this landmark meeting, which included the reassessment of international situation, the continuation of troop reductions, and the reorganization of MRs. The meeting also reaffirmed that national economic development held a priority over defense modernization. While Deng Xiaoping 100 acknowledged the necessity of military equipment modernization, he cautioned that "We need to be patient for [the next] few years," p. 128.

34. Zhongshi zhoukan (China Times Business Weekly), No. 155, December 18-24, 1994, pp. 6-10.

35. FBIS-CHI, July 9, 1992, p. 1.

36. This view is well advanced by John W. Carver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 1992), pp. 999-1028.

37. An excellent analysis on the implications of Soviet aircraft sales to China is available. See Harlan W. Jencks, Some Political and Military Implications of Soviet Warplanes Sales to China, SCPS Papers No. 6 (Kaohsiung, ROC: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, April 1991).

38. For a summary of China's variegated motivations, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey and Christopher Craig Harmel, "United States and China's Military Ties with the Russian Republics," Asian Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 243-47.

39. According to R. Bates Gill, the total value of China's arms sales over the period 1986 to 1990 (i.e., U.S.$7.569 billion) was more than the total for the preceding 14 years' worth of Chinese arms transfer combined (1972 to 1985: U.S.$7,381 billion). See his Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 38. China’s overseas weapons sales, however, plummeted in the early 1990s. For example, China's weapons sales in 1991 and 1992 were mere $400 million and $100 million, respectively. See Nayan Chanda, "Drifting Apart," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 26, 1993, pp. 10-11.

40. Jerel A. Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (January 1981), pp. 234-52.

41. Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33 (1989), pp. 361-87; Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermann, and Joe D. Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior," in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds.. New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987). CHAPTER rV

CHINA'S DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOVIET FACTOR IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter has the opportunity to take stock of China's defense development since 1949, with an emphasis on its military with the Soviet Union. The first section delves into the nature and extent of Sino-Soviet military relations in the 1950s and, by employing newly available sources, details the nature of Soviet military assistance program to China. This is virtually a first cut on the subject, which is essential for understanding the limitations and potentials of the Russian military cooperation with

China in the early 1990s. Section two briefly discusses the legacy of the Soviet factor on the subsequent courses of China's weapons and military developments. The remaining two sections are concerned with more contemporary developments in the

1980s and up to 1994. Section three reviews China’s efforts to acquire Western arms and technology in the 1980s and explicates its failure. Finally, section four offers a detailed analysis on the nature and evolution of Sino-Soviet/Russian military relations in the early 1990s. Taken together, sections three and four look into China's changing perceptions of its security requirements and China's military interactions with the

West and the Soviet Union.

101 102 The Sino-Soviet Honeymoon in the 1950s

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that China’s present weapons inventory is the v/orld's largest open-air museum of old weaponry and equipment. It is equally true, however, that China has amply demonstrated its modem technological prowess in several weapon systems such as ballistic missile, nuclear submarine, and satellite programs. This seeming unevenness in weapons-system development stems in part from the international and domestic turbulence the Chinese communists have faced since they came to power in 1949, and the long civil wars that had preceded it. It is thus of critical importance to understand the formative years of Chinese defense industry, particularly the nature and the extent of the Soviet transfer of arms and arms technology in the 1950s.

Ravaged by 100 years of foreign intervention and civil wars, the communist

China's state machinery and economic infrastmcture needed an overhauling with vast capital investment and foreign assistance. Primarily because of the growing bipolarization of world politics, China had no option but to turn to the Soviet Union, the most developed socialist state and patron of the communist bloc.^ Thus China patterned itself along the Soviet model of socialist development in restructuring the state, society and the military.

The daunting task of building socialism in China began immediately after the official proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. After an unusually long two-month stay in Moscow, Mao Zedong was able to secure economic 103 and political support from Stalin, as stipulated in the thirty-year Sino-Soviet Treaty of

Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950. While four other agreements between China and the Soviet Union codified the future trade relations and resulted in the return to China of the Chinese Eastern (Manchurian) Railway, the treaty provided China, in essence, with a five-year loan of U.S.$300 million at one- percent interest and the construction of 50 key projects, mostly in the form of Sino-

Soviet joint ventures, over the next nine years.^

In light of China's vast need for economic and technological infusion, however, the amount of Soviet aid was only a drop in the ocean. For one thing, the

Polish were granted a higher level of aid—i.e., $450 million at no interest—than the

Chinese. For another, Stalin was "clearly in no hurry to provide it [military aid] to the Chinese in substantial quantities until compelled to do so by circumstances. The circumstances turned out to be the Chinese intervention in the in 1950.

The Chinese armed forces, under the guise of the "Chinese People's

Volunteers (CPV)," entered the Korean War, in late October 1950. The information on the extent of Soviet military aid to China during the Korean War remains fragmentary, sketchy, and contradictory and needs to be further corroborated with the war archives which began to open to the public recently.'* Available sources unmistakably indicate, however, that the exigencies of war compelled the Soviet

Union to supply a substantial number of heavy equipment, mostly in artillery and tanks, and aircraft to North Korea and China. Due to the PLA's old, but huge 104 inventory of light arms and artillery, the CPV entered the war in October 1950

without Soviet military assistance. The initial casualties at the end of 1950 and, in

particular, after the heavy battle losses in early 1951, prompted PLA Chief of Staff

Xu Xiangqian's visit to Moscow in May 1951 and eventually led the Soviet Union to

send enough arms to equip 64 infantry divisions and 22 air divisions.^ The total air

strength of the PLAAF was more than tripled in size during the year 1951, from 500

in 1950 to 1,500-2,450, including about 700 MiG-15 fighter jets and 200 Tu-2 piston

light bombers.® During the Korean War, the Soviet Union supplied China with the

estimated military aid of U.S.$1.5-2 billion, including over 1,000 MiG-15s and aid to

war industries in Manchuria.’ As a result of the Chinese involvement in the war,

China became more dependent on the Soviet Union financially and diplomatically, but

Chinese leaders sought to follow the Soviet lines of socialist development more

closely than before.

The death of Stalin on March 5, 1953 and the end of the Korean War on July

27 of the same year proved to be a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. The year

1953 was also the beginning of China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). A more

generous Soviet aid to build additional 91 projects in China came in the weeks

following the death of Stalin.^ During the high-level visit to Beijing in October 1954,

Klirushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan further expanded the scope of the Soviet aid program to China, including the signing of the scientific-technical agreements and the construction of 15 new industrial projects. Mikoyan's April 1956 visit to China 105 resulted in Soviet commitment to additional 55 projects. An agreement signed in

August 1958 allowed the construction or expansion of additional 47 metallurgical, chemical, and machine-building industries—bringing the total number of Soviet projects in China to 258 by 1958.® Finally, the February 1959 agreement envisaged the construction of 78 projects, 31 more than those in the previous agreement for the period of 1959-67, but apparently none of the 31 new projects was completed when the Soviet technicians withdrew from China in August 1960. The military proportion of the Soviet aid program, estimated to be quarter to over half the total aid, was part of this larger Soviet assistance program to China.

A notable increase in the level and extent of the Soviet aid to China after the death of Stalin strongly indicates that Stalin's successors were far more intended to supply China with better weapons and technological know-how than Stalin, who had kept China militarily and financially dependent on the Soviet Union by providing finished products and spare parts only. Beginning in 1953 till 1956, when Khrushchev made the de-Stalinization speech, the Soviet aid program included the wholesale transfer of blueprints, prototypes, know-how, and personnel for China's burgeoning defense industries.

Soviet assistance in China's weapons-producing capability has often been referred to by Western analysts as "the largest technology transfer experiment in history, or "they [the Russians] gave their Chinese allies the best they had available."** While the Chinese and the Soviets offered different accounts in the 106 context of the later Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet aid program to China in the 1950s undoubtedly included a massive transfer of blueprints, equipment, technological know-how, and personnel.

According to the Soviet accounts, the Soviets helped the Chinese to build more than 250 key industrial projects: between 1954 and 1963 the Soviet Union provided

China with over 24,000 sets of scientific and technological documents, including

1,400 projects of large industrial enterprises, and more than 10,000 Soviet specialists in various scientific fields visited China between 1950 and 1960.^^ The same source claimed that between 1951 and 1962 some 10,000 Chinese engineers, technicians and skilled workers, including 1,000 researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, as well as over 11,000 students and postgraduate students were educated and trained in various Soviet institutions of higher learning, research centers, and industrial enterprises. Including an additional 8,173 Chinese for short-term training, other sources estimate, the total number of Chinese students and trainees stayed in the

Soviet Union in the 1950s could be as high as 38,000.*^

In tandem with the influx of Soviet industrial aid, China began to marshal its own resources to build an indigenous weapons-production capability in the early

1950s. While China followed the classic development path of weapons production— from simply assembly, to spare-parts production, to co-production under license, and eventually to the production of complete weapon systems, the growth of China's defense industry shows some distinct features in terms of organizational divisions. 107 leadership control, and resource allocation/'* In 1951 the Military Industry

Commission under was set up, and the following year the Second

Machine Building Industry (MBI) was created with specific responsibility of weapons production/^ From the outset, Chinese defense industry closely followed the Soviet

lines of production. Geographically, the majority of defense plants were located in

China's interior areas (the so-called Third Line) to protect them from the possible

U.S. attack and to promote bzdanced development among different regions.

The rapid expansion of defense production and organizations by the mid-1950s gave rise to problems of leadership control over and policy coordination in defense industry. The leadership's response to these problems has been a series of organizational changes in China's defense industry. In October 1958, the National

Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) was created with Nie

Rongzhen as its chairman. The NDSTC had mainly focused on research and

development of new and advanced weapons, especially nuclear weapons. Sometime in

1960, another national body was established to coordinate the production of conventional weapons at various defense factories under six MBIs. As Benjamin

Ostrov's recent study of the NDSTC has shown, the organizational separation between R&D and weapons production was one thing, but the reality was quite

another.*® Not only did the holistic and continuous nature of weapons production

make the organizational division of labor untenable, but the NDSTC and the NDIO

had an overlapping and competing jurisdiction over China's defense industry. While 108 the launching of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the withdrawal of Soviet advisors elevated the importance of the NDSTC in China's defense industry, the initial organizational division was to significantly contribute to the uneven development of China's weapons systems in the coming decades.

The history of China's naval and air force development is illustrative of the extent of Soviet military assistance in the 1950s. By the time the Chinese communists declared victory in 1949, there was no national PLA Navy (PLAN).‘^ The nascent naval force consisted of 4,000 former Nationalist navy personnel who were captured or defected in 1948-49, and there were less than 100 operable ships out of a total 200.

Training centers were set up on a regional basis. Following the formation in

November 1948 of the first naval force, the Northeast Navy, another regional navy called the East China People's Navy was created on April 23, 1949, with veteran army general as its commander and political commissar. The national

PLAN headquarters was established only on April 14, 1950 in Beijing, with Xiao

Jingguang as its first commander.

The early Soviet naval assistance program included the creation of the Soviet

Naval Advisory Mission in Beijing and the dispatch of 500 naval advisors and maintenance personnel in 1950. In July 1950, the Soviets began to deliver naval weapons, equipment, and spare parts for the installation or replacements in the old

Chinese ships. The first Soviet transfers of the finished naval craft were about 50

World War Il-vintage torpedo boats, which transpired in 1951. The PLAN'S first 109 submarine was the non-operational Soviet M-class, shipped to China in July 1953.

China had received additional eight S-1 and M-V class submarines in 1954-55 designed for coastal operations.*®

The Soviet naval assistance was known to have stepped up from 1955 on.

Since then, the Chinese assembled the Soviet W-class submarines and Riga-class frigates from components shipped from the Soviet shipyards. At the time of the Soviet withdrawal in August 1960, the PLAN'S inventory was made up of 350 surface ships and submarines. They include: nine coastal submarines directly transferred from the

Soviet Union and 17 of the W-class assembled in Chinese shipyards; four Soviet

Gordyy-class destroyers and four Riga-class frigates; and 24 Kronstadt-class large patrol craft, some 140 torpedo boats, and a dozen ocean minesweepers.*^

The Chinese also endeavored to build the indigenously-designed naval craft and shipbuilding industry. One such major attempt was the founding on July 1, 1956 of the Institute of Shipbuilding, which subsequently produced the first

Chinese-designed naval craft in 1959-the Shanghai-class coastal patrol boat. By the end of the 1950s, China was able to develop a modest operational naval force to such point that a U.S. intelligence assessment opined, "The years since 1949 have brought a fantastic growth in Chinese Communist naval power, so much so that for the first time in modem history China is a factor in the Far Eastern naval picture.

The growth of Chinese air power in the 1950s also illustrates the extensive nature of the Soviet aid.^* Compared to the naval development, the history of the 110 Chinese air force barkens back to 1924, when the Aviation Bureau of the KMT was set up. In the 1946-49 period, the number of communist Chinese military aircraft fluctuated widely due to war losses, captures, and the defections by KMT pilots. By the end of the civil war, however, there were less than 200 aircraft left. The establishment of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) was formally announced on November

11, 1949, with as its first commander and as its political commissar. The PLAAF was modelled closely after the Soviet lines in terms of organization, doctrines, and training. As was the case with the overall Chinese military modernization, the Korean War was a catalyst in the rapid development of the Chinese air power in the 1950s.

The first air battle was fought between the Chinese MiG-15s and the U.S. F-

51 Mustang fighters over North Korea on November 1, 1950, a few days after the

Chinese intervention in the war.^^ The growing threat posed by the MiG-15s led to the U.S. deployment of a new fighter plane, F-86 Sabres, to the Korean theater soon thereafter. PLAAF strength grew rapidly; in February 1953 U.S. intelligence estimates placed the Chinese air strength of 1,400 combat aircraft, including 830 jet and 250 piston fighters, excluding the combat losses of well over 1,000 fighters.

According to the U.S. Air Force data, the Far East Air Force Command "destroyed

976 and damaged 1,009 enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat" during the War.^'^

The effort to produce an indigenous aircraft began with the establishment of the Second MBI's National Aircraft Factory in Shenyang in 1951. In the early 1950s I l l the assembly lines with the Soviet components were set up for Yak-18 primary trainers, which began to appear in 1954. Based upon the agreements signed during

Khrushchev's October 1954 visit, the Soviet Union supplied China with production licenses, engineering drawings, and technical aid for the Chinese production of aircraft. Accordingly, Chinese aircraft-production capability grew rapidly to include the production of engines under license and the complete aircraft. By the fall of 1956,

Chinese produced its first combat aircraft, the Shenyang MiG-17.^

The Chinese also began to take the delivery of more advanced Soviet MiG-19 fighters in 1959. Production plans for the MiG-19s were based upon the October 1957 agreement between the two countries, but this time the goal was to make the MiG-19 an indigenous Chinese aircraft equipped with airframes, engines, and armaments which were locally built under license. The Soviet withdrawal in 1960, however, brought the MiG-19 production to a complete halt. The Chinese were managed to produce the first Shenyang MiG-19 (J-6) in December 1961—strongly suggesting that the production lines were near completion before the Soviet withdrawal.^® The number of Shenyang MiG-19s in the PLAAF inventory reached 100 by the summer of

1964 and grew rapidly thereafter.

The story of the MiG-21 was far more difficult to assess than those of MiG-19 and MiG-17 fighters. It seemed that only a few Russian-built MiG-21 prototypes made their way to China before the final Soviet withdrawal in August 1960, but apparently there were no production arrangements. In the early 1960s, however, the 112 PLAAF faced with the "problem of creeping obsolescence": a series of modem U.S. warplanes were introduced, including the F-4B Phantom and F-104 Starfighter aircraft, while the Soviet Union decided to supply India with the MiG-2 Is. With no engineering drawings, spare parts, and production know-how, the Chinese exerted an enormous effort—this time all by itself—to produce the aircraft. Finally, over 100

Chinese MiG-2 Is (J-7) entered service by the summer of 1967.^'

The first Soviet 11-28 light bomber entered the PLAAF inventory in October

1952 and the Tu-16 medium bomber in May 1959. The Chinese modified both bombers' design and technical specifications: the 11-28 was produced in Harbin as the

H-5, which entered the PLAAF in August 1967; the Tu-16, produced in Xian as H-6, entered the service in February 1969.^®

The year 1958 turned out to be another watershed in Sino-Soviet relations. Not only did China formally adopt a different path of socialist development called the

"Great Leap Forward," but its dismal failure put Mao's position vulnerable to both internal and external criticism. In particular, the Soviet lukewarm support for China's shelling of outlying islands of Taiwan lay bare the growing chasm between the two communist giants. In the Soviet view, Mao's insistence for the inevitability of war with imperialism runs against the "peaceful coexistence" thesis Khrushchev had pursued since 1956. In this turbulent domestic politics, Sino-Soviet relations turned from bad to worse. 113 The abrupt Soviet withdrawal was a severe blow to the fledgling Chinese defense industry. In August 1960, all 1,390 Soviet experts were withdrawn from

China, which left 257 scientific and technological cooperation projects high and dr>' and 343 technical aid contracts canceled.High-pitched exhortations to self-reliance, a recurrent theme in modem Chinese history, resurfaced on a national scale and were then the only recourse. Accordingly, in the early 1960s the Chinese defense industry underwent a major reorganization, and the two MBIs were divided into functionally- specific eight numbered-ministries of MBIs, with the First and the Eighth MBIs in charge of civilian production: the Second MBI (nuclear energy and weapons), the

Third MBI (aircraft), the Fourth MBI (electronics and radar), the Fifth MBI

(ordnance and artillery), the Sixth MBI (naval vessels) and the Seventh MBI (ballistic m issiles).The organizational line-ups reflect the Chinese leadership's decision for a long-term investment on the strategic as well as the major conventional hardware. By the mid-1960s, the Chinese defense industry was able to mass-produce a wide array of conventional weapons and began to field tactical nuclear weapons in small quantities.

The issue of Soviet assistance to China's nuclear program has probably been the most controversial one in Sino-Soviet relations and has left indelible mark on the subsequent development of China's nuclear weapons, military strategy, and national psyche on security. In the early years of the PRC government, China had to rely upon the Soviet nuclear protection from the possible U.S. nuclear threat. The fragility of such expectation, however, became soon clear to Chinese leaders as the frequency of 114 America's threat to use nuclear weapons mounted, especially during the Korean War.

In July 1950, for instance. President Harry Truman sent 10 nuclear-configured B-29s across the Pacific and in late 1950 warned the Chinese that he would take "whatever steps are necessary" to stop the Chinese intervention and that the use of nuclear weapons "had been [under] active consideration."^^ President Truman even added, to the consternation of many, that the military commanders in the field would be "in charge of" the use of atomic weapons. China's initial motivation in acquiring nuclear weapons was also reinforced by its repeated failure to invade Taiwan in the 1950s, which was foiled in part because of U.S. nuclear threat. Talcen together with the lukewarm Soviet response during the U.S. hostility, these events must have convinced the Chinese leadership the indispensability of nuclear weapons as a deterrent and guarantor of China's sovereignty, notwithstanding its public rhetoric that nuclear weapons were only "paper tigers."

The Chinese nuclear decision came in the winter of 1954-55, and the search for bringing the strategic decision into reality began in earnest the following year.^^ In

1955, not only was the Ministry of Nuclear Industry founded,but the Soviet Union also agreed in April to assist China in developing research on atomic energy and nuclear physics, the first of the six nuclear agreements that China and the Soviet

Union concluded between 1955 and 1958. Beginning in March 1956, hundreds of

Chinese nuclear scientists were trained at the Dubna Nuclear Research Institute in

Moscow, while nuclear-weapons research at the Institute of Physics and Atomic 115 Energy in Beijing was given priority in terms of funding and personnel/'* At the same time, the Soviets continued to help the Chinese to construct a gaseous diffusion plant in Lanzhou, Gansu, that produced bomb-grade uranium, and during Mao's October

1957 visit to Moscow the Soviet Union agreed "to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture" under the New Defense

Technology Pact/^

By late 1957, however, the gulf between China and the Soviet Union had

already been widened. What happened in 1958-59 was a rapid succession of ups and

downs in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet delivery of two R-2 (SS-2) and their

blueprints in January 1958 was followed by its proposal to set up a joint military

command in the Far East, which was immediately rejected by China.In May 1959

the Soviets delivered two Tu-16 bomber aircraft, along with an unassembled version

and a "component knocked down" (CKD) kit version; on June 20 of the same year the

Soviet Communist Party Central Committee sent a formal letter to the Central

Committee of the Chinese Communist Party notifying that the Soviet Union would

not provide China with the technical details of atomic bombs. Immediately after June

1959, China decided to develop atomic bombs with their own resources, and China's

first atomic test was given the code name "596" (for the year and month of the Soviet

final notice) to inspire the Chinese nuclear personnel.

After the Soviet withdrawal in August 1960, the NDSTC was given renewed

emphasis in coordinating nuclear weapons production. At the same time, the Chinese 116 leaders pulled an enormous capital and human resources to develop atomic bombs in an "all-at-once approach": the efforts to master the nuclear weapons theory, design, and construction were conducted simultaneously with the development of delivery means, such as ballistic missiles, aircraft, and submarines/^ In such a crash program, one failure in any of the stage or area would have a ripple effect on the entire program. Notwithstanding such attendant risks, China finally exploded its first experimental atomic bomb at Lop Nur on October 16, 1964. China's first hydrogen

(thermonuclear) bomb, dropped from a nuclear-configured Tu-16 (H-6), was successfully tested on June 17, 1967. China also developed various delivery means of the new strategic asset in rapid succession: China successfully test-fired its first satellite in April 1970; the first full-range test of an inter-continental ballistic missile

(Dong Feng-5) was conducted in May 1980; and China tested its first underwater launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (Julang-1) from its Golf-class training submarine in October 1982.^^

The Soviet Legacy and the Decades of Technological Isolation

The lessons of overdependence with the Soviet Union had an equally enduring impact on China's defense modernization for the coming decades as the massive

Soviet aid program to China in the 1950s. Deprived of the source of modem foreign technology, China had no option but to resort to its own scientific and technical

means to provide the requisite weapons and equipment to the PL A. Even if the 117 Chinese had gained invaluable experience in weapons production by the late 1950s, their inability to produce indigenous weapons systems became too clear after the

Soviet withdrawal in 1960.

Given the lack of indigenous production capability and foreign source, the only plausible solution was to gradually modify and improve the existing weapons inventory through reverse engineering. Beginning in the early 1960s, the Chinese have reverse-engineered most of its existing weapons inventory and a few foreign weapons prototypes, acquired through various channels, such as combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles.

Reverse engineering, however, is a gargantuan task, requiring huge capital and manpower, and invariably time-consuming. Moreover, the long process of reverse engineering precluded innovation, design capability, and absorption of new technology. By definition, reverse engineering could not improve on the technologies that had not been incorporated in the finished weapons system under reconstruction.

In fact, a majority of modem high-technology weapons are not as susceptible to labor- intensive reverse engineering as the 1950s-vintage weapons systems have been.

China's continuing lack of progress in electronics, communications, and radar technology were in part caused by its heavy reliance on the reverse engineering method since the early 1960s.'*”

Under such dire straits the leadership's best choice was to scare up very limited human and capital resources on a few priority weapons projects. Examples in 118 this category include ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, and satellites—which can be termed the "pockets of excellence. " In all other categories of conventional weapons and equipment, China had to face the growing problems of obsolescence.

Moreover, the combined effect of the abrupt Soviet withdrawal and the dismal failure of the Great Leap Forward was tellingly felt throughout the MBIs in the early

1960s. According to a ground-breaking study by Chu-Yuan Cheng,'** the MBIs' estimated gross output value in the 1961-62 declined by 60 percent from the 1960 peak. While the MBIs began to recover in 1964, their output value in 1966 were still about 10 percent below the level in 1960. Furthermore, the MBIs' annual average growth in 1957-66 in terms of gross output value was 12.3 percent, which was less than half that of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), 31.1 percent.

By the mid-1960s, when China's defense industry was back to full production cycle did the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) set in. Notwithstanding the wishes of the central leadership to shield the military industry from the nondiscriminating attacks from the , the Cultural Revolution had seriously disrupted military production.'*^ In addition, its long duration not only kept an entire generation of scientists, technicians, and engineers from schools and laboratories, but also its anti- foreign nature prohibited the Chinese defense industry from taking advantage of advanced technology available at the international level, particularly during its height between 1966 and 1969. 119 Finally, the painful lesson of China's overdependence on the Soviet Union in the 1950s seemed to have left an indelible imprint on the minds of Chinese leaders and inculcated them of the political and security dangers of overdependence on a single supplier of weapons and weapons technology. In addition, as long as the Sino-

Soviet conflict had been a given factor in world politics for the next three decades,

China's renewed military relations with the Soviet Union in general and its acquisition of Soviet weapons were out of the question—until the early 1990s.

China's Changing Defense Requirements in the 1980s

Due to the "years of neglect" during the Cultural Revolution, the post-Mao

Chinese leadership inherited over four million troops with questionable morale and combat readiness, a huge inventory of obsolete weaponry, and the Maoist "people's war" doctrine. The inadequacy of China's war strategy and force structure was amply manifest during its punitive war against Vietnam in 1979.

Even if the post-Mao Chinese leadership embarked on a comprehensive national development plan called the Four Modernizations in December 1978 to transform China into a developed socialist state by the year 2000, defense modernization could not be immediately dealt with for well-known reasons: 1) other modernization priorities such as agriculture, industry, and science and technology; 2)

China's insufficient level of defense science and technology, including the lack of 120 personnel; 3) a chronic shortage of capital and other resources; and 4) Western countries' reluctance to transfer advanced weapons and technology.

Moreover, had post-Mao Chinese leaders felt an imminent security threat from the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, they would have seriously considered the massive acquisition of advanced foreign weapons and accelerated defense buildup. This was clearly not the case, however. As Ellis Joffe, a noted China scholar, has persuasively argued, "in reality since the turn of the decade [1980s] the Chinese have been operating on the assumption that a limited conventional war was the only real threat

China was likely to face, and China's post-Mao military doctrine has been based on this assumption. For these reasons, post-Mao Chinese leaders opted for a low- cost, gradual approach in defense modernization. Given the lack of funds for defense

modernization and China's huge but outmoded defense industry, it was probably the only rational and sensible choice for Chinese leaders and largely guided China's efforts for defense conversion and arms acquisition for the rest of the 1980s.‘*^

First of all, China's defense modernization required a massive reorganization of its defense industrial base. With the notable exception of ballistic missile and

submarine programs, China's defense industry was based upon the 1950s-vintage

Soviet production lines and organizations, and it suffered from a host of chronic

problems including bureaucratic inertia, overstaffing, and low productivity. Despite

China's hugh investment on the so-called Third Line industries during the earlier

decades, the size and inefficiency of defense industries became a liability in China's 121 drive for economic development in the early 1980s. Therefore, China's defense industry was relegated to a low-priority sector supporting the national economy with fewer resources. A continuing decline in defense budget and procurement also requires the defense industry to make up for the shortfalls by producing civilian goods and to be closely integrated into the civilian economy, as in the case of the 1982 reorganization of machine-building ministries.'^

Caught between the rock and the hard place, China's snail-paced technological progress and the chronic lack of funds, the PLA opted for a low-cost, incremental solution of joint ventures and selected Western technical assistance in the 1980s.

China's efforts to build a high-tech defense industrial infrastructure would be a long and protracted process. Hence, selected importation of advanced foreign weaponry and technology would be made to redress the present deficiencies. But the wholesale import of foreign weapons was out of the question. Also clear to the mind of the

Chinese leadership was the nightmare of Summer 1960. The Chinese emphasis was on self-reliance with selective importation of advanced foreign technology to overcome the areas of major weaknesses. In sum, this selected and gradual approach was then the best of all options, for it could maximally utilize China's existing technological base and its huge inventory of low-tech weapons.

The same operational assumption of a limited conventional war, however, was only formally encapsulated in the June 1985 CMC meeting, three months after

Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to power in the Soviet Union. Since then, the PLA no 122 longer upheld the single-minded doctrine of "people's war," which was essentially to swamp an incoming conventional land attack with a numerically superior defensive force. As Chinese leaders perceived that the "people's war" strategy, based upon the assumption of "an early war, a large-scale war, and a nuclear war," had become increasingly ineffectual in meeting the requirements of the limited warfare that China was likely to face, the PLA has been gradually reconfigured into a smaller mobile force with enhanced maneuverability and fire power designed to meet the requirements of "limited local conflicts" (youxian jubii zhanzheng) of varying degrees of intensity and duration.'*^

In addition, at the heart of China's defense modernization in the 1980s lied the

PLA's efforts to enhance its combat effectiveness, an emphasis that led to a series of organizational and structural reforms in the second half of the 1980s: reduction of one-million troops (1985-87), streamlining of redundant chains of command, reduction of military regions (MRs) from eleven to seven, and the formation of 24 group armies (GAs) from the 36 field armies.'** Military training was intensified at all levels to incorporate the requirements of modem warfare, such as enhanced mobility, individual skills, and inter-service coordination.

In the late 1980s, some selected PLA units began to receive better military hardware to enhance their mobility and fire power. In particular, the creation of the rapid reaction units (RRUs or kuaisu fanying budui) was geared to strengthen mobility and operational coordination in preparation for small-scale, low-intensity warfare 123 along border areas. The RRUs were mostly brigade- or division-size forces and received priorities in funding and weaponry. All of this was a reflection of a new doctrine called "peripheral defense," oriented toward low-intensity border operations with short duration.'*®

Overall, China's efforts in the 1980s to enhance niHilary capability had mixed results. In terms of the PLA's combat readiness, China scored significant progress mainly through the reduction of its troops, streamlining of its organizations, and training of its soldiers. The PLA became leaner, more professional, and better trained than anytime in its existence. The acquisition of advanced hardware and technology, however, had been highly eclectic and made in piecemeal and blind fashion, and the assimilation of Western technologies into the outdated Chinese defense industry turned out to be a Herculean task. China's low-cost, selected approach to Western arms and technology was aimed at maximally utilizing its current inventories, which were based upon the 1950s-vintage Soviet technologies, designs, and production methods. But most Western technologies were invariably expensive and quite different in nature.

Moreover, the production of advanced weapon systems requires a high-level coordination among various horizontal units, integration of R&D and manufacturing, and skilled workers—production factors for which China has not been renowned. This cannot be done without massive importation of Western engineering technology and design methods. While it is true that the Soviet weapons systems are two generations or more advanced than the Chinese ones, Soviet technology primarily takes an 124 evolutionary progress, and it is arguably easier, faster, and cheaper for China to assimilate than Western technology

More important, by the end of 1980s the inherent limits of the selected acquisition of Western arms and technology became apparent to both China and the

Western countries. From Chinese leaders' point of view, not only did the Western governments restrict the transfer of high-tech weapons to China, mostly through

COCOM, but the imported equipment often had lower efficiency than initially expected and were hard to digest and reproduce.^* The Western countries, on their part, became increasingly frustrated with China's extensive shopping excursions with few concrete deals. The Western countries were also wary of the prospects that China would eventually use the imported technology to boost its arms sales to the developing countries. A sharp increase in the volume of China's arms sales during the second half of the 1980s only worsened the Western fear.^^ It was this historical background that stood behind the emergence of the Soviet Union as China's alternative source of arms and military technology in the early 1990s.

After the Sino-Soviet Normalization in 1989

Gorbachev's rise to power in March 1985 turned out to be the beginning of new Soviet policy toward China. Gorbachev's new foreign policy was intended to bury the hatchet with China, a move to maintain the Soviet Union's international status with fewer resources, while keeping a hard-line stance against NATO.^^ As 125 announced in July 1986 Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev was more willing to address

China's concern than his predecessors over "Three Obstacles" in the normalization of

Sino-Soviet relations—that is, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, discontinuation of Soviet assistance in the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and reduction of Soviet troops on the Sino-Soviet border.

For the Soviets, China held a central position in their new Asia policy, and an improved relationship with China would bring substantive benefits, including economic savings accruing from border troop reductions, development of the Soviet

Far East, and an apparently successful economic model. By 1990, moreover, the

Soviets needed a new market for its industrial and military goods to compensate for

the rapidly dwindling orders from Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, China’s successful opening to the West in the 1980s brought home with mixed results—more wealth to the nation and the Chinese people, but not without all the attendant social and economic control problems for the

leadership. Intense infighting among Chinese leaders over the future direction of

reform, especially during the phase of economic contraction, resulted in a series of

ideological campmgns against the West such as "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois

liberalization," and resulted in the demotion of two party general secretaries Hu

Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in January 1987 and May 1989, respectively. On the other

hand, notwithstanding its domestic retrenchments in the immediate years preceding 126 Tiananmen, China scored fair success in its overall foreign relations, including those with the Soviet Union and the United States,

In the wake of Tiananmen, however, as hard-liners gained the upper hand and political conservatism set in, anti-Western and anti-American tone was quite strong in both China's domestic and foreign policy and remained unabated until the summer of

1991. The post-Tiananmen Western economic and military embargoes against China not only delayed the pace of the Four Modernizations, but in Chinese conservatives' view heightened the danger of Western "peaceful evolution" against the communist party rule in China.

Thus, it seems fair to say that China's strained post-Tiananmen relations with the West, the Western embargoes as well as the Sino-Soviet rapprochement served as the immediate background for the resumption of military ties between China and the

Soviet Union. More fundamentally, however, both the Soviet Union and China saw the utility in forging renewed bilateral military cooperation, including substantive benefits accruing from trade, exchanges, and easing of tensions along the border, and a long-term development of institutionalized relationship between their militaries. It is the interplay of geopolitical and pragmatic considerations that have guided their evolving military ties and that can partially explain why their military ties have developed much more rapidly in both pace and scope than many experts thought would have been possible.^'* 127 In the early 1990s there were other precipitating factors which contributed to the rapid development of Sino-Russian military relations. First of all, a series of international developments including the drawdown of U.S. troops in Asia, a virtual dissipation of the Soviet/Russian threat, and China's growing diplomatic influence in the region since 1990, as well as high-growth rates of its economy, have all presented

China with an unprecedented opportunity to extensively modernize the PLA—one which has not been available since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949.

At a minimum, the substantial reduction of the land force requirements along the 4,300-km Sino-Russian border has not only allowed the Chinese to divert the surplus troops elsewhere but also freed limited resources to the development of military technology and the acquisition of advanced foreign weapon system. It would also certainly help secure its maritime interests, such as its long-term goal of a deep- water navy and its sovereignty over the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands in the

South China Sea.

Another important factor that made possible China's acquisition of advanced

Russian arms and technology in the early 1990s has been a continuous increase of

China's defense budget. During the first half of the 1990s, China was the only major power in the world which maintained a double-digit increase in its official defense budget. Between 1989 and 1994 China's defense budget more than doubled; it rose by an annual average of over 15 percent: China's official defense budget in 1989 was

Rmb24.5 billion, a 12.4 percent increase from Rmb21.8 billion in 1988. This was 128 followed by consecutive increases of 17,9 percent (Rmb28.9 billion) in 1990, 12.5

percent (Rmb32.5 billion) in 1991, 13.8 percent (Rmb37 billion) in 1992, 14.8

percent (Rmb42.5 billion) in 1993, and 22.4 percent (Rmb52 billion) in 1994.^^

Figure 4.1 presents China's announced official defense budget since 1986.

Billions of Yuan

60 T

50

40

30 52 43.5 20 37 32.5 25.2 28.9 10 20 21 22

0 L+J l+J 1+ 1 L+J_ L+J L+J ------1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Figure 4.1 Official Chinese Defense Budget, 1986-1994 (In Current Yuan)

Sources: FBIS-CHl, April 3, 1989, p. 52, March 29, 1990, p. 33, March 29, 1991, p. 3, April 10, 1992, p. 4, March 23, 1993, p. 68, March 11, 1994, p. 19.

China's announced defense budget in 1993 was a mere U.S.$7.3 billion at the

official exchange rate, only a fraction of those in other major powers. It should be emphasized here, however, that China's official defense budget is notorious for its gross underestimation, given that some major defense expenditures are hidden in other 129 state budget categories. For one thing, funds for defense science and technology research, military construction, and state security are appropriated in other budget categories such as "education, technology and health" and "administrative expenses for building state power." For another, some generic military expenditures involved in the procurement of foreign weaponry, special weapons projects, the demobilization of soldiers, and the operation and maintenance costs for the People's Armed Police

(PAP) and the militia are believed not to be allocated as the State Council's official defense budget.For still another, the PLA's off-budget revenues come from its arms

sales, sideline agricultural production, and commercial activities. Taken together,

China's total defense resources are widely estimated at least twice to four times larger

than the official defense budget indicates.

On the other hand, the former Soviet Union was obliged to the Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in November 1990 and now Russia has either

to move the surplus of treaty-limited weapons to east of the Urals, scrap them

altogether, or sell them to foreign countries. Russia's continuing financial pinch has

meant that its arms and technology sales will come at bargain-basement prices and

often in barter terms. Unlike weapons deals with the West, the Russian weapons also

come without political strings attached.

After the Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989, the Soviets first invited the

Chinese to observe their military exercises and regularly exchange military personnel,

but the Chinese initially limited military contacts to Army-Day goodwill messages. 130 The resumption of Sino-Soviet military contacts began in earnest in November 1989.

From this time to June 1990, Sino-Soviet military contacts were mostly devoted to the issues of border troop reductions and confidence-building measures (CBMs) as well as to military personnel exchanges. A Chinese military delegation visited Moscow in

November to discuss mutual troop reductions along their border.^* It was followed by

Chinese Premier Li Peng's April 1990 visit to Moscow, which resulted in the signing of an agreement on mutual troop reductions. In particular, he was accompanied by

PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Xu Xin, who held several meetings with high-ranking

Soviet officers.

In June 1990 the first high-level Soviet military delegation to Beijing in almost thirty years was headed by Rear Admiral Vladimir Khuzhokov, Deputy Head of the

External Relations Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Given his post,

Khuzhokov's main business also seemed to be creating CBMs along the border.

During the same month General Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman of the powerful CMC, led a high-level military delegation to Moscow, which included Aeronautics and

Astronautics Minister Lin Zongtang, Major General Shen Rongjun, Deputy Director of the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense

(COSTIND) and Li Lanqing, then Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign

Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT).^^ Not only were Liu's meetings with

Soviet Chief of Staff Mikhail Moiseyev and Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov the

highest military contact in decades, but at the end of the delegation's trip both sides. 131 according to Moiseyev, agreed on a number of "principles indispensable for the establishment of mutual relations in military economic field. He also added that the

Soviet Union wanted to have a long-term cooperation with China in military technology. It all points to the fact that it was Liu's visit to Moscow that expanded

Sino-Soviet ties to a higher plane of military-industrial cooperation, and it opened formal negotiations on the sale of advanced Soviet aircraft.

During the summer of 1990 Sino-Soviet negotiations on warplanes were focused on the MiG-29 fighter and the Su-24 ground attack aircraft. Despite the initial

Chinese doubts about the wisdom of Soviet warplanes purchase—e.g. the nightmare of summer 1960, the Chinese leadership apparently concluded that the strategic and technical benefits would outweigh the possible military dependency upon the Soviet

Union, and thus decided to proceed with the negotiations. Furthermore, the Soviets offered unbeatable terms such as low prices, partial barter payments, and technical and production assistance.

By October, however, it was reported that the Chinese interest had shifted to the Su-27. The Chinese opted for the Su-27 over the MiG-29 mostly for the technological and strategic reasons. Despite its high costs, the Su-27 has a longer range, more advanced avionics, and a wider array of mission capabilities than those of the MiG-29.®* Some defense analysts have noted that the Chinese preference of the

Su-27 over the much-cheaper MiG-29 indicates its willingness to use the advanced combat aircraft for longer-range, seaborne missions in a contingency in the South 132 China Sea, rather than for relatively shorter-range missions along the Chinese border, such as in the Taiwan Strait/^

It is believed that the final deal for the 24 Su-27s was concluded during the long-delayed Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov's visit to Beijing in May 1991, one full year after the aircraft negotiations began. Yazov also signed an agreement allowing about 200 Chinese pilots to be trained in the Soviet Union.

Three months after Yazov's visit to Beijing, a coup attempt in Moscow brought the burgeoning Sino-Soviet military ties to a temporary halt. Not only were some of key Soviet officers such as Yazov directly involved in the attempted coup, but the subsequent policy immobilism in Moscow delayed implementation of Sino-

Soviet deals and agreements over aircraft and military exchanges.

However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 did not seriously affect the development of military ties between China and the successor states to the Soviet Union. In fact. Chief of Staff of the newly-formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Victor Samsonov visited Beijing in February 1992 to ensure that the agreements concluded between China and the former Soviet Union would be honored and that the negotiations over an array of military cooperation would continue. Samsonov specifically promised the delivery of 24 Su-27s by early

1 9 9 3 63 addition, he allegedly forwarded to his Chinese counterparts a list of military items that could be sold to the Chinese, including heavy military transport aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. 133 At the end of April, General Zhao Nanqi, head of the General Logistics

Department which oversees the weapons acquisition, left for Moscow to discuss the purchase of additional weapon systems from Russia. In August Chinese Defense

Minister held in Moscow a series of meetings with high-ranking Russian military officers, including his counterpart General Pavel Grachev. Included in the discussion were not only border troop reductions, military personnel exchanges, and military scientific cooperation, but also a host of weapons and technologies Russia plans to sell, such as aviation technology, advanced fighter planes, transport planes, and air defense complexes.®'*

The flurry of mutual visits was culminated with Russian President Boris

Yeltsin's state visit to China in mid-December. In Beijing Yeltsin signed twenty-four agreements covering such various fields as foreign policy, trade and economic relations, and military-technical cooperation. As is the case with most summits, however, the significance of Yeltsin's visit should be found in its political and strategic implications: it has set the tone for, and has maintained the momentum of, the development of bilateral relations that grew apace in 1992, overcoming the lingering doubts over the different ideologies, political systems, and security concerns with each other.

At a press conference winding up his visit to Beijing, President Yeltsin hailed that the trip not only ushered in "a new chapter," but also brought "an entirely new impetus" in Sino-Russian bilateral relations.®® Reiterating the historical and economic 134 importance of China to Russia, he cited the proposed two-way trade in 1992 of over five billion U.S. dollars, a level that far exceeded the record Sino-Soviet trade figure of $4.3 billion 1990. As to the scope and the level of military relations with China, the visiting Russian President opined-to the consternation of many neighboring nations-that "We [Russians] are prepared for cooperation in all fields [with China], including the most sophisticated weapons and armaments (emphases added).

As the above broad and fast development of Sino-Russian military ties has shown, both sides doubtless decided to forge amicable diplomatic and military relations with one another. As noted earlier, one primary interest for both nations was economic benefit. The sale of high-value-added military items would not only enable the Russians to acquire much-needed hard currency but would help run their sagging defense plants. The troop reductions along the Sino-Soviet border will certainly help alleviate the cash-strapped government coffer and facilitate economic developments in the Russian Far East. By resuming military ties with Russia, Beijing could also send a strong political signal to the West that it has other sources of technology supply. As noted earlier, China's well-known decision in April 1990 to forgo the F-8 II (J-8 II) upgrade project with the U.S. known as Peace Pearl was pointedly followed by its another decision to negotiate the acquisition of Soviet fighter aircraft a few weeks later. After all, China's new military ties with Russia present an unprecedented opportunity for its leaders to modernize the PLA by acquiring requisite weapons, equipment, and technologies. 135 Table 4.1 Selected List of Mutual Visits by Chinese and Russian Leaders since 1989

Date To China To USSR/Russia Major Agenda

1989 Feb FM E. Shevardnadze Summit preparation and Cambodia May Pres. M. Gorbachev Summit and normalization Jul SC S&T exhibition VP Joint Commission on S&T Sep SS VC A. Lukyanov Parliamentary relations ILD Zhu Liang Party relations Nov MOF Liu Guangzhi Military exchanges and troop reduction SPC VC ,K. Ivlalakhov Economic issues E) M. l aiin Party relations and events in E. Europe Dec MOFERT Li Lanqing Economic issues

1990 Feb MOF G. Kireyev Military exchanges and troop reduction Mar MVES K. Katushev Terms of trade and economic relations PD Wang Renzhi Party relations Apr MG Song Wenzhong Military exchanges PM Li Peng Comprehensive agreement (Xu Xin) Jun CMC VC Liu Huaqing Arms negotiation, inc. Su-27 (Lin Zongtang, Shen Rongjun) RA V. Khuzhokov Border issues Jul NPC VC Parliamentary talks Sep FM E. Shevardnadze Border issues and Soviet ties with ROK Ding Guangen Party relations Oct MG Wen Guangchun Logistics cooperation DMAI Yuri Bardin Air exhibition DPM Igor Belousov Arms talks, including Su-27

1991 Mar DPM Y. Maslyukov Eonomic cooperation, including loans DMAI A. Geratchehko Air exhibition Apr FM A. Bessmertnykh Border, preparation for Jiang’s visit May DM Dmitri Yazov Finalization of the Su-27 deal Summit (Qin Jiwei) Jun DDM V.M. Arkhipov CCP GS Jiang Zemin Follow-up arms talks Aug Military exchanges, arms talks, missiles COS Chi Haotian (Wang Chengbin, Qian Gui) Dec Economic ties with CIS states Marshal V. Kulikov MOFERT Li Lanqing Good-wül visit

1992 Feb CIS COS V. Samsonov Reassurance of arms delivery Mar MVES Petr Aven Resumption of arms negotiation FM Andrei Kozyrev Diplomatic resumption Apr GLD Zhao Nanqi Arms purchase AFDC A. Malyukov Air force persormel exchange May DPM A. Shokhin Military-industrial cooperation Aug PCMR V. A. Balusink Provincial-level MC DM Qin Jiwei Border, technology, arms issues Oct DDM Andrei Kokoshin Conversion and missiles 136 Table 4.1 (continued)

1992 Nov DPM A. Shokhin Defense industrial cooperation FMQianQichen Summit preparation MAE V. N. Mikhaylov Nuclear cooperation Dec Pres. B. Yeltsin Summit, MC (A. Shokhin)

1993 Mar LG Bagedanov Provincial-level MC Apr N.V. Chekov Building and Barracks cooperation DPM A. Shokhin Border trade, transportation NC Zhang Lianzhong Naval cooperation, submarine CLMR S. P. Seleznev Provincial-level MC Jun DNC He Pengfei Follow-up on submarine CMC VC Liu Huaqing Arras talks, inc. tank technology Jul DPM Sergei Shakhrai Economic issues DCINC I. Kasatonov Naval cooperation Aug COS Zhang Wannian Details for MC agreement Gen. Kokolayev Border troops issues VA Igor Khmelnov Port visit to Qingdao Nov DM Pavel Grachev MC agreement

1994 Jan FM Andrei Kozyrev Economic cooperation Apr COS M Kolesnikov Arms talks and preparation for PMs visit DPM A. Shokhin Military technology May SDC Ivan Rybkin Parliamentary talks PM V. Chernomyrdin Economic and border agreements (Aleksandr Shokhin, Andrei Kokoshin) VA Wang Jiying Port visit to Vladivostok Jun AFC Cao Shuangming Air force cooperation FM Qian Qichen Summit preparation, border talks DPM A. Shokhin Military conversion Jul DM Chi Haotian Agreement on PDMA Sep Pres. Jiang Zemin Summit Nov NC Feliks Gromov Kilo submarine deal

Abbreviations: AFC: Air Force Commander AFDC: Air Force Deputy Commander CLMR: Commander of Leningrad Military Region CMC: Central Military Commission COS: Chief of Staff DDM: Deputy Defense Minister DM: Defense Minister DMAI Deputy Minister of Aeronautics Industry DNC: Deputy Naval Commander DPM: Deputy Prime Minister FM: Foreign Minister GLD: General Logistics Director ID: International Director HD: International Liaison Director MAE: Minister of Atomic Energy MC: Military Cooperation MOFERT: Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade MVES: Minister of Foreign Economic Relations NC: Naval Commander NPC: National People's Congress PCMR: Pacific Coastal Military Region PDMA: Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities RA: Rear Admiral SDC: State Chairman SS: Supreme Soviet VA: Vice Admiral VC: Vice Chairman VP: Vice Premier

Sources: Various issues of Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-^hina (FBIS-CHI) and Daily Report-Soviet Union/Central Eurasia (FBISSOV). 137 Table 4.1 summarizes the mutual visits by their senior political and military leaders since 1989. It illuminates that China's purchase of Russian arms and technology is based upon the rapid deepening of diplomatic and military ties between the two countries. Since the 1989 normalization, all foreign, defense ministers of both sides have visited the other's capital, and virtually every service of Chinese and

Russian militaries has established military exchanges on a regular basis. Their military contacts in recent years were expanded to include provincial-level cooperation, exchange of intelligence delegations, and first-ever mutual port calls.®’

Working-level military contacts, which include educational exchanges, good­ will visits, and provincial logistical coordination, have vastly expanded over the years as well. Their growing military ties are primarily aimed at promoting mutual understanding and probably facilitating arms transfer, rather than at developing an alliance or expedient relationship. Given the rapid growth of their recent military ties, it seems reasonable to expect that Sino-Russian military relationship will grow further in the years to come.

It is worthy of note parenthetically that between June 1989 and December

1994 there were only five mutual visits by ranking U.S. and Chinese military officials: U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman (November 1993), U.S.

Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner (March 1994), Commander of the U.S.

Pacific Command Charles Larson (July 1994), PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Xu Huizi

(August 1994), U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry (October 1994), and 138 Director of U.S. DIA James Clapper (November 1994).^® Reflecting their frosty political relations, American and Chinese leaders have not taken measures to formulate new security relations in the post-Cold War era, thus making any improvements of their overall relations unlikely in the near future.

On the other hand, Sino-Russian relations now include such diverse areas as trade, military-industrial exchange, party-to-party relations, and parliamentary talks.

In short, the frequency and the level of mutual visits by Chinese and Russian political and military leaders strongly suggest that Sino-Russian military cooperation is not a transitory "marriage of convenience" based solely on cold cash and buyer's-market considerations, but aimed at a long-term development of institutionalized relationship between their militaries. The forging of an institutionalized relationship would become more critical when it come to the Russian transfer of weapons, military technology, and production know-how to China in the latter's defense modernization. 139 NOTES

1. Steven Goldstein has convincingly argued that the existing literature's one-sided focus on Mao's nationalism has spawned the view of China as a "reluctant and suspicious ally" forced into the alliance with the Soviet Union by the hostility of the United States. He instead calls for a more balanced treatment of nationalism and internationalism in Mao's thought, which would shed new light on Mao's motivations behind China's relations with the Soviet Union and the U.S. in the 1950s. See Steven Goldstein, "Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 224-65.

2. For the text of the Sino-Soviet treaty, see China and the Soviet Union 1949-84, Keesing's International Studies (Burnt Mill, Harlow, UK: Longman, 1985), pp. 1-2.

3. Ellis Ioffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 4.

4. Of particular importance is the recent opening of the Soviet archives on the Korean War. In June 1994, for instance, Russian President hand-delivered the declassified Soviet Korean-War documents to the visiting South Korean President Kim Young Sam as a good-will gesture. The documents have revealed that Chinese leaders had been more deeply involved in war planning than scholars and officials assumed for the last 40 years: Mao agreed as early in May 1949 to transfer three Korean PLA divisions to North Korea and help the latter's liberation war after Chinese unification. See "Classified Korean-War Documents Released by the Russian Government," Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), seven parts, July 26-August 4, 1994. English translation is available from the author. For the recent Korean War literature on the Chinese role, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 122-54; Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," China Quarterly, No. 121 (March 1990); Rosemary Foot, "New Light on the Sino-Soviet Alliance: Chinese and American Perspectives," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Autumn 1991), pp. 16-29.

5. For a Chinese account of the battlefield need for heavy equipment and aircraft, see , Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi(Recollection of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea) (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1990), esp. chap. 10. Hong Xuezhi was a CPV deputy commander in charge of logistics, including armament; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W, Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain 140 Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Press, 1993), pp. 200-201, 346-47.

6. The "bean counts" of the Chinese air strength are only rough estimates, due to combat losses and the Soviet assistance to Chinese aviation industry not directly related to the Korean War. Most of the Korean War differential, however, can be regarded as direct Soviet supply of aircraft to China. For various estimates of the Chinese air force during the Korean War, see John Gittings, The Role o f the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 121-31, 136-41; Samuel B. Griffith, Jr., The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), pp. 166-71; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations, 1945-66," in Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 85.

7. The Chinese recently reported that during the Korean War China spent 6.2 billion yuan (about U.S.$2 billion) in direct war expense and over 10 billion yuan (about U.S.$3.3 billion) in indirect war expenditure, including the direct cost. They claimed that the Chinese debt for the Soviet weaponry was 3 billion yuan (U.S.$1.1 billion). The Chinese claim, in my judgment, roughly corresponds to Western estimations given the Soviet indistinction among "aid," "credits," and "trade." See Yang Fu, "Number of Chinese Troops and Casualties in the Korean War," Kuang Chiao Ching (Hong Kong), April 16, 1993, pp. 48-52, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-China (FBIS-CHI), May 6, 1993, pp. 21-25, esp. p. 25;China and the Soviet Union 1949-84, p. 3; Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications fo r U.S. Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 154-55; John Gittings,Sun>ey o f the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics 1963-1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 128-34.

8. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945-1990 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), p. 18.

9. The number of Soviet projects in China differs from one source to another. The total of 258 projects were formally signed between China and the Soviet Union by the end of 1958.

10. Wendy Frieman, "Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernization," in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr. and Bruce. W. Watson, eds., China's Military Reform: International and Domestic Implications (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 55.

11. Samuel B. Griffith, Jr., The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 178. 141 12. The official Soviet account was made on February 14, 1964 during a CPSU CC speech by Mikhail Suslov, a chief Soviet ideologue on the Sino-Soviet dispute. See Mikhail Suslov, "The Struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the Unity of the International Communist Movement," , April 3, 1964. Excerpts of the speech are available in Gittings, Survey o f the Sino-Soviet Dispute, pp. 134-35. Suslov's famous speech was reciprocated by the Chinese side, which claimed that the leaders of the CPSU "unscrupulously withdrew the 1,390 Soviet experts working in China, tore up 343 contracts...scrapped 257 projects of scientific and technical co­ operation, all within the short span of a month...." See "The Reply of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the CPSU Letter" (February 29, 1964), Renmin Ribao, May 9, 1964; Excerpts are in Gittings, Survey of the Sino- Soviet Dispute, pp. 55, 139-40.

13. R. K. I. Quested, Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History (Sydney, : George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 124-25; Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, pp. 21-22.

14. For a historical overview of China's defense industry, see Benjamin C. Ostrov, Conquering Resources: The Growth and Decline o f the PLA's Science and Technology Commission fo r National Defense (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991); Wendy Frieman, "China's Military R&D System: Reform and Reorientation," in Dennis F. Simon and Merle Goldman, eds.. Science and Technology in Post-Mao China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 251-86; Richard J. Latham, "People's Republic of China: The Restructuring of Defense-Industrial Policies," in James E. Katz, ed.. Arms Production in Developing Countries: An Analysis o f Decision Making (Lexington, MA: D C. Heath and Company, 1984), pp. 103-22; David L. Shambaugh, "China's Defense Industries: Indigenous and Foreign procurement," in Paul H. B. Godwin, ed.. The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s(Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 44-47, 54- 69.

15. John Frankenstein, "The People's Republic of China: Arms Production, Industrial Strategy and Problems of History," in Hubert Wulf, ed.. Arms Industry Limited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 279-80.

16. Ostrov, Conquering Resources, pp. 30-33.

17. The historical account of the PLA Navy is drawn from the PLA Navy History Editorial Committee, Haijun shi [History of the (PLA) Navy] (Beijing: PLA Publishers, September 1989), pp. 14-27.

18. David G. Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 29-30. 142

19. Ibid., p. 40; Haijun shi, pp. 336-37.

20. ONI Review, Secret Supplement, Spring-Summer 1957, p. 44; as cited in Muller, China as a Maritime Power, p. 32.

21. For a historical and organizational review of the PLA Air Force, see U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), People's Republic o f China People's Liberation Army Air Force, Report No. DIG-1300-445-91 (Washington, DC: U.S. DIA, May 1991); PLA Air Force Headquarters Editorial and Research Office, Kongjun shi [History of the (PLA) Air Force] (Beijing: PLA Publishers, November 1989); Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968). Bueschel's is a pioneering study on the PLA Air Force. His 238-page book, however, does not reveal any sources for the information; its account needs to be corroborated with other sources.

22. China's official account cites "early 1951" as the beginning date for air battle between the CPV and the United States. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p. 347.

23. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power, pp. 26-27.

24. As cited in U.S. DIA, People's Republic of China People's Liberation Army Air Force, p. F-42. On the other hand, the PLA Air Force "shot down 330 aircraft and damaged another 95" during the Korean War. See Kongjun shi, pp. 84-85.

25. U.S. DIA, ibid., p. C-4; Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power, p. 40.

26. Jane's Encyclopedia of Aviation, Vol. 4 (Danburry: Grolier Educational Corporation, 1980), pp. 812-13. At least in the case of the Soviet transfer of MiG fighter aircraft to China, the Soviet and Western scholars' claim that the Soviets provided to China the best they had is questionable. The Soviet MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21 were delivered to China in 1954, 1959, and 1960, respectively and Chinese production and deployment dates are considerably later. In the Soviet Union, however, those fighter aircraft were deployed in 1953, 1955, and 1958, respectively. The Chinese MiG-21 (J-7) began production only in June 1967, ten years after it had entered the Soviet Air Force inventory. In addition, the huge loss of MiG-15s during the Korean War put China financially dependent on the Soviet Union in the following years.

27. U.S. DIA, People's Republic o f China People's Liberation Army Air Force, p. C- 5. Bueschel notes, however, that 12-15 MiG-2 Is entered evaluation service as early as March 1965. See Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power, p. 89. 143

28. Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Vol. 5 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 331-36, 366-67.

29. Gittings, Survey o f the Sino-Soviet Dispute, pp. 55, 139-40.

30. Specific production responsibilities of each MBI varied slightly because of a series of major reorganizations between the late 1950s and the early 1960s. See Shambaugh, "China's Defense Industries," pp. 44-47, 54-69; Sydney Jammes, "Military Industry," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, eds., Chinese Defense Policy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 124-28; Frankenstein, "The People's Republic of China," pp. 279-80, 282-83.

31. Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 60-69. The quotations are on pp. 65- 66.

32. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 34-35. It is believed that in a January 1955 Politburo meeting, Mao Zedong approved the development of nuclear weapons program after a presentation by Qian Sanqiang, the "father of China's atom bomb." For a meeting summary, see Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Bruce J. Dickson, A Research Guide to Central Party and Government o f Meetings in China (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), p. 24.

33. The Ministry of Nuclear Industry was then called the "Second MBI," one of the six MBIs in charge of atomic energy and weapons development. With the creation of the Third MBI in November 1956, some of the Second MBI's responsibility was transferred to the Third MBI. See Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 49. Norris et ah. Nuclear Weapons Databook, however, notes (p. 331) that the name of Third MBI was changed to the "Second MBI" on 11 February 1958. For an overview of the organizational setups, see Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he gongyebu (PRC Ministry of Nuclear Industry), "Woguo he gongyede chuangjian yu fazhan" (The Creation and Development of Our Country's Nuclear Industry), in Renmin chubanshe, ed., Guanghuide chengjiu (Brilliant Achievements) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), pp. 283-85.

34. Lewis and Xue, ibid., p. 42.

35. Gittings, Survey o f the Sino-Soviet Dispute, p. 106. 144 36. See Norris et al.. Nuclear Weapons Databook, p. 331; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 212.

37. Norris et al., ibid., p. 337.

38. Lewis and Xue have argued that China's strategic missile program had already begun in 1956. See China Builds the Bomb, p. 50.

39. See the Chinese nuclear chronology in Norris et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, pp. 331-36.

40. For problems of reverse engineering, see Wendy Frieman, "Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernization," pp. 56-58.

41. Chu-Yuan Cheng, "Growth and Structural Changes in the Chinese Machine- Building Industry, 1952-1966," China Quarterly, No. 41 (January-March 1970), pp. 46-48.

42. Ibid., p. 48.

43. There are some debates over the impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's defense industry. Ostrov points out in Conquering Resources (p. 91) that China's nuclear program suffered during the Cultural Revolution. In China Builds the Bomb Lewis and Xue notes (p. 214), "The Cultural Revolution took a major toll on both DF-4 and the DF-5 program, causing serious delays." On the other hand, Shambaugh argues that some defense industries were insulated from the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution and that the "curtailment in military production during the Cultural Revolution was not so severe or lengthy as during the Great Leap Forward." See his "China's Defense Industries," p. 47.

44. Ellis Ioffe, "The PLA Toward the Year 2000: The Decision Making Calculus," in Richard H. Yang, ed., SCPS Yearbook on PLA Affairs, 1988-89 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan, ROC: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, 1989), pp. 67-78. The quotation is from page 75.

45. See, for example, Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection," China Quarterly, June 1982, pp. 254-70; John Frankenstein, "People's Republic of China: Defense Industry, Diplomacy, and Trade," in James Everett Katz, ed.. Arms Production in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984), pp. 89-102; Wendy Frieman, "Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernization," pp. 51-68. 145 46. Richard J. Latham, "China's Defense Industrial Policy: Looking toward the Year 2000," in Richard H. Yang, ed., SCPS Yearbook on PLA Affairs 1988-89 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, 1989), pp. 79-93.

47. Paul H. B. Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1978-87," China Quarterly, No. 112 (December 1987), pp. 572-90; Ellis Joffe, "'People's War under Modem Conditions': A Doctrine for Modem War," China Quarterly, No. 112 (December 1987), pp. 555-71.

48. Harlan W. Jencks, "Organization and Administration in the PLA in the Year 2000," in Richard H. Yang, ed., SCPS Yearbook on PLA Affairs 1988-89 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, 1989), pp. 43-65.

49. See Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations." See also his "Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local and Limited War," The Annals o f theAAPSS, January 1992, pp. 191-201.

50. For a discussion on the overall capability of China's defense industry, see Wendy Frieman, "China's Defense Industries," The Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1993), pp. 51-62; Ronald D. Humble, "Science, Technology and China's Defense Industrial Base," Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1992, pp. 3-11.

51. For an excellent discussion of China's difficulties in assimilating foreign technology, see Denis Fred Simon, "China's Acquisition and Assimilation of Foreign Technology: Beijing's Search for Excellence," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, ed., China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems o f Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 565-98.

52. According to R. Bates Gill, the total value of China's arms sales over the period 1986 to 1990 (i.e., $7.569 billion) was more than the total for the preceding 14 years' worth of Chinese arms transfer combined (1972 to 1985: $7.381 billion). See his Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 38.

53. See Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastem Rappallo, " Asian Survey, March 1993, pp. 285-301. Hung P. Nguyen has persuasively argued that Soviet military policy toward China is primarily based upon the Soviet need to ally itself with another continental power in the East, as it did with Germany in the 1920s to offset its weakening geopolitical position vis-a-vis the West. 146 54. For analyses on Sino-Soviet/Russian relations, see Tai Ming Cheung, "Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Military Relations in the 1990s," in Richard H, Yang, ed., China's Military: The PLA in 1992/1993 (Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, Taipei, ROC), Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 61-77; Bin Yu, "Sino- Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security," Asian Survey, March 1993, pp. 302-316; Dennis Van Vranken Hickey and Christopher Craig Harmel, "United States and China's Military Ties with the Russian Republics," Asian Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 241-54.

55. The percentage increase is calculated from China's announced official defense budget and may differ slightly from one source to another, due to rounding and exchange rate variations. In addition, announced defense budget and actual spending at the end of fiscal year may not be the same. For instance, China's actual defense spending in 1993 was Rmb43,25 billion, slightly more than the original budget, Rmb42.5 billion. For China's annual defense budget announcements since 1989, see FBIS-CHI, April 3, 1989, p. 52, March 29, 1990, p. 33, March 29, 1991, p. 3, April 10, 1992, p. 4, March 23, 1993, p. 68, March 11, 1994, p. 19;Far Eastem Economic Review, April 5, 1990, August 8, 1991, April 2, 1992, May 26, 1993; South China Morning Post (International Weekly Edition), March 19-20, 1994. For China's official position on defence spending, see Mu Huimin, "'Chinese Military Threat Theory' Is Totally Groundless," Renmin Ribao, April 17, 1993, p. 6, inFBIS- CHI, April 28, 1993, pp. 20-21. See also U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1994), p. 58.

56. An in-depth analysis on this opaque issue of Chinese military resources and the nature of PLA's economic activities is available. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Profits over Professionalism: The People's Liberation Army's Economic Activities and Its Impact on Military Unity," paper presented at the Conference on Security Dimensions of Chinese Regionalism, cosponsored by IISS and CAPS, Hong Kong, June 25-27, 1993. See also his "Serve the People," "Arms Reduction," and "Elusive Ploughshares," Far Eastem Economic Review, October 14, 1993, pp. 64-66, 68, and 70-71, respectively. See also SlPRl Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 386-90.

57. For detailed analysis on Chinese defense budget, see Ai Shiuan, "Yijiujiuemiande zhonggong junshi" (Chinese communist military in 1992), Zhonggong Yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism Monthly), Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 68-77. For a discussion on the complexities and methodological problems involved in calculating China's actual defense spending, see Richard A. Bitzinger, "Off the Books: Analyzing and Understanding Chinese Defense Spending," paper presented at the Fifth Staunton Hill Conference on the PLA, Staunton Hill, Virginia, United States, July 17-19, 1994; David Shambaugh, "Wealth in Search of Power: The Chinese Military Budget 147 and Revenue Base," paper presented at the Conference on "Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security Policy," cosponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), Pacific Place Conference Center, Kong Kong, July 8-10, 1994.

58. It is important to note that Sino-Soviet/Russian border talks have two tracks: one for the settlement of perennial border disputes and the other for troop reductions and military confidence-building measures (MCBMs). The eastem sector of the border was settled in May 1991 and ratified by both countries in 1992. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991, however, left unresolved the western sector of the former Sino-Soviet border. The western border talks were held between China, Russia, and three Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), and an agreement was signed during Jiang Zemin's second visit to Moscow in September 1994. On the other hand, talks on border troop reductions, have been coordinated between each side's foreign ministry and military personnel for security implications. Thirteen rounds of talks were held between November 1989 and September 1994 on a wide range of issues such as troop relocation, reduction of troops and arms, and MCBMs. By the end of 1993 both sides agreed to withdraw troops outside 100 kilometers to either side of the border. See Tian Zengpei, ed., Gaige kaifang yilaide zhongguo waijiao (Chinese Diplomacy after Reform and Open- door) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, October 1993), pp. 328-29. Tian Zengpei is an incumbent Chinese deputy foreign minister whose responsibility includes Sino- Russian relations; FBIS-CHI, September 6, 1994, pp. 10-11.

59. An excellent analysis on the implications of Soviet aircraft sales to China is available. See Harlan W. Jencks, Some Political and Military Implications of Soviet Warplanes Sales to China, SCPS Papers No. 6 (Kaohsiung, ROC: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, April 1991). For Liu Huaqing's visit to Moscow, see Jane's Defence Weekly, July 21, 1990.

60. "China Seeking Soviet Fighters," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 21, 1990, p. 70; "Soviet Chief of General Staff on Prospects for Development of Soviet-Chinese Military Relations," Renmin Ribao, June 7, 1990, p. 4, in FBIS-CHI, June 8, 1990, p. 3.

61. Cheung, "Ties of Convenience," p. 62.

62. The 26 Su-27s that China bought from Russia were based at the Wuhu air base, 100 km south of Nanjing, for conversion training. They are, however, likely to be relocated elsewhere such as Hainan Island in future contingencies.

63. Tai Ming Cheung, "Absence of Trust," Far Eastem Economic Review, March 19, 1992. 148

64. Umit Enginsoy, "Russians Consider New Sales of Arms to China," Defense News, September 7-13, 1992; Tai Ming Cheung, "Arm in Arm," Far Eastem Economic Review, November 12, 1992, p. 28.

65. FBIS-CHI, December 18 and 21, 1992, p. 9 and pp. 9-10, respectively.

66. Ibid.

67. Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Sign Pact Restoring Intelligence Ties," Washington Times, October 21, 1992, p. A7.

68. See New York Times, November 3, 1993 and November 9, 1994; FBIS-CHI, August 18 and 19, 1994, pp. 3-4 and 2, respectively. CHAPTERV

SINO-RUSSIAN MUJTARY TIES AND CHINA'S DEFENSE MODERNIZATION

Historians may well view the early 1990s as a "take-off stage" for China's defense modernization drive. The economic capability and strategic environment that shape

China's defense modernization in general and weapons acquisition in particular underwent a dramatic change during the last decade. Entering the 1980s, China's economic future was at best uncertain and its defense budget remained stagnant. Some Western defense studies estimated the overall cost of China's weapons modernization in the U.S.$41-63 billion range.^ Others confidently concluded that China's chance for becoming a major military power by the end of century was remote, and added that the gap in military capability between China and the advanced Western nations was widening.^ Roughly ten years after the pessimistic Western assessments, how accurate are they now?

This chapter attempts to answer the question by analyzing the current state of

China's defense modernization drive and the role of the Russian factor in it. In so doing, this chapter seeks to present a case that Sino-Russian military ties will have a long-term but very significant impact on the overall PLA modernization efforts. At a minimum, the

Russian connection has provided the Chinese with an access to a host of advanced weapon

149 150 systems and technologies that had not been available in its quest for advanced Western

technology during earlier decades. The arms contracts with Russia can also be made in

partial barter terms and with no political strings attached. The real long-term success for

China, however, would depend upon its acquisition of production technologies and offset

arrangements, which will allow the production of sophisticated weapons at home. The actual and potential impact of Russian arms and technology on China’s defense

modernization wiH be assessed below in terms of China’s military strategy, each PLA

service, and technology transfer.

China's New Military Strategy

Military strategy is a body of operational knowledge regarding the use of military force to achieve military as well as political objectives. It is more specific than, and is informed by, military doctrine, which can be defined as a broad set of principles concerning the employment of force and the nature of warfare. A nation’s military doctrine is principally shaped by its leaders’s perceived security need, historical experiences, and some objective conditions surrounding the military. Military doctrine, once established, subsequently shapes the nation’s military strategy and force structure.^

In the Chinese context, its military doctrine has been primarily formed by China's historical and revolutionary experiences since the 1840s, especially by Chinese political- military leaders’ experiences, security environment, and Mao Zedong’s political vision.'* Since the establishment of the People’s Republic, China had also 151 confronted for four decades the United States or the Soviet Union, or both. For this reason

alone, China had maintained some unique military doctrines different from those of other

major powers. The Maoist "people's war" doctrine, for instance, was deemed the best

formulation for Cliinese defense needs when its most competitive war resources were the population and land mass and its low level of economic development could tolerate war

losses at the early stage of war. It thus required specific strategy of "luring deep" the

incoming enemy and engaging it with the war of attrition.^ Consequently, the "people's

war" doctrine tended to overemphasize the human factor over others, and the force

structures of each service were a logical extension of these essentially guerrilla tactics.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, Chinese military strategists have aired more divergent views from the basic tenets of Maoist military doctrine. The "people's war" doctrine was outmoded, they argued, and inadequate to meet the security challenges China was likely to face.® For one thing, the "people's war" doctrine required a mass mobilization of the population in preparation for a total war, which was highly unlikely to happen. For another, the Soviet forces, China's main threat, were equipped with modem armaments with increasing lethality and mobility. In all probability, they were geared to a quick, limited warfare, against which the Maoist military doctrine would be irrelevant. Still another was the growing awareness that China could no longer afford losing territories and industrial bases near its borders.

This new military thoughts were collectively called the "people's war under modem conditions."^ While the new military doctrine stressed the importance of modem 152 weaponry over the human factor and required a forward and positional defense strategy

near the border, it was not certain how much doctrinal changes were actually conceived in

the late 1970s. In any case, the immediate years following the death of Mao Zedong in

1976 engulfed China's political and military leaders in a sustained power struggle, which

included the leadership disputes over the rehabilitation of victims during the Cultural

Revolution, the assessment of Mao's achievements, and the Four Modernizations.* Amid

sustained political struggle, persistent external threat, and an uncharted domestic reform program, any dramatic shift in military doctrines was out of the question.

By the early 1980s, it became apparent that the only real threat to Chinese security was a limited conventional warfare from the north. The changes in post-Mao Chinese leaders' threat perceptions, however, need to be balanced with China's grim realMes-in particular, the lack of funds, the emphasis on economic development, and the existence of huge low-technology weapons inventory. For these reasons, post-Mao Chinese leaders opted for a low-cost, gradual approach to enhance the PLA's combat effectiveness.

The strategic shift at the seminal CMC meeting in June 1985 envisioned that there would be no major or nuclear wars until the early 21st century and upheld the continued priority of economic development over defense modernization.^ It is the strategic decisions made in this meeting that have guided China's current military strategies and force development tUl this day. Domestically, this strategic shift led to a series of organizational and structural reforms, including the reduction of one-million troops in 1985-1987, the streamlining of redundant chains of command, the reduction of Military Regions (MRs) 153 from eleven to seven, and the formation of 24 Group Armies (GAs) from 36 field armies.

Additionally, training was intensified at all levels; the military rank system (abolished since 1965) was restored in 1988; and inter-service coordination was emphasized.

Externally, in order to fill the important gaps in China's defense industry, the

Chinese opted for a selective importation of Western technologies. To repeat, this was probably the best of aU options, for it allowed China to maximally utilize its existing technological base and its huge inventory of low-technology weapons, even if the end result by the late 1980s of the selective technology importation turned out to be less than satisfactory from the Chinese viewpoint.

Thus, the 1985 strategic re-orientation not only called for a shift in military strategy, but also the reconfiguration of the PLA force structure to cope with new challenges to Chinese security. Since the second half of the 1980s, the PLA was gradually geared toward low-intensity border operations with short duration, a new doctrine called the "peripheral defense."^” For this purpose, the PLA have begun to emphasize the formation of a smaller mobile force with enhanced maneuverability and fire power designed to meet the requirements of "limited local wars" (yowcian jubu zhanzheng), the most likely type of warfare. This is part and parcel of China's renewed emphasis on the frontier defense strategy which Chinese strategists call "active defense" Q'iji fangyu).

As David Shambaugh has reminded us, this is a "classic example of [China's] extended deterrence."" The frontier defense strategy, together with China's willingness and capability to wage war beyond its borders, is a principal strategy China has employed 154 since 1949 to enhance its security. Prime examples include the Cliinese intervention in the

Korean War, the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnam conflict. Tliese war experiences have reinforced the Chinese view that the frontier defense strategy had prevented hostile nations from invading Chinese mainland.

It was in this context that the so-called "fist units" (quantou budui), later renamed as the "rapid reaction units" (RRUs or kuaisu fanying budui), were created in each of the seven MRs in the late 1980s.The "fist units," specially trained for different geographical and climactic conditions, were geared to strengthen mobility and operational coordination in preparation for small-scale, low-intensity warfare on and beyond China's border areas.

This type of military strategy is particularly pertinent to China's defense need in the 1990s. There are several reasons for this: first of all, China has been involved in territorial disputes with virtually all of its 15 neighboring nations, with which it shares land borders. Second, all of the open cities and special economic zones are located along

China's 18,000-km coastline.

The new military strategy also called for an enhanced airlift capability. The airlift capability requirement subsequently led to the creation of China's only airborne force, the

15th Airborne Army (or GA), in Taiyuan, Province. The 15th Airborne Army received a wide international attention when its elements were flown to Tiananmen in May

1989. Its airlift capability has been enhanced by the locally-produced Yun-8 light transport and the recent import of Russian -76 heavy transport aircraft. It should also be recalled that the Chinese military authorities regularly employ civilian planes for military 155 purposes, such as training and emergencies and that the phenomenal expansion of China's wide-bodied civil airliners would significantly increase the PLA's airlift capabilities.

China's new naval doctrine began to take shape in the early 1980s. The Maoist

"people's war" doctrine offered little role for the navy to play in the overall war plan. The navy was a mere logical extension of the "people's war" on the ground and thus should be equipped lightly to perform "guerrilla skirmishes against invaders at sea." China's naval strategy before the 1980s was also influenced by the Soviet "small battle" doctrine, which emphasized the development of torpedo boats, shore-based planes, and submarines.*^

It was not until 1982, when Admiral Liu Huaqing, "China's Gorshkov," became the Naval Commander, did China revise its naval strategy and launch a major naval buildup program. In line with the new PLA war strategy, its naval component emphasizes a multi-service "offshore active defense"*"* against any incursions into the Chinese territorial waters, whose definition remains controversial today. China's new naval strategy reflected the changes in the Chinese leadership's threat perceptions and maritime interests. Even if the major wars were unlikely, local conflicts were likely to persist and originate at China's surrounding seas. China's maritime interests now included the safeguarding of China's territorial waters, coastal economy, seaborne trade, maritime resources, and strategic depth.

A dramatic reduction of its ground force requirement on the former Sino-Soviet border freed a considerable number of troops from north to elsewhere and also resources from ground force to other services. In particular, China's expanding strategic horizon and 156 growing maritime interests in the early 1990s have meant that China would make a series of efforts to develop the power projection capability, in particular its naval and air capabilities. One such notable example is the resuscitation in 1980 of the PLA Marine

Corps. It is believed to be about 5,000 strong and has been deployed on Hainan Island.

Its training and location strongly indicate that its main mission calls for a rapid deployment in case of contingencies in the South China Sea.

A China in the early 1990s could be likened to the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s, when the latter launched a major military buildup program to catch up with the United

States. Soviet leaders also perceived threat to their interest in and outside the Soviet

Union, which could not be protected without military power. Twenty-five years later,

China saw no immediate threat to its security, but new opportunities and need to safeguard its expanding national interest. It is the interplay of China's new security environment and

Chinese leaders' perceived need for force requirement that would shape the respective structure of each PLA service.

PLA Ground Force

The PLA Ground Force is the world's largest at 2.2 million, after the 1985-87 reduction of one million in the overall PLA manpower.’® Its weapons inventory, while diverse in kind and huge in size, is outmoded and obsolescent. For this reason alone, the modernization of the ground force has been very selective and has received the lowest funding priority among the three services of the PLA. Chinese leaders have apparently 157 concluded that the current size and annament of its ground force are adequate to meet any land attack and that the prospects for land attack are slim for the foreseeable future.

A glace at the PLA Ground Force’s weapons inventory reveals a huge, but outmoded force; a total of 12,000 tanks, mostly the T-59 MBTs; over 3,000 APCs, including 2,800 Type 531s; 14,500 towed artillery pieces; 4,000 MLRSs; and over

15,000 air defense guns. The majority of the PLA's ground weapons and equipment are based upon the 1950s-vintage Soviet technology and have been reverse-engineered from earlier versions. As a result, they are deprived of the cutting edge of modem technology, especially in the areas of electronics, laser, and optics.

There are, however, some isolated pockets of technological leaps as well. One of the latest Chinese MLRSs, the WM-80 rocket system, is equipped with the computerized fire control system; it includes command and control system, radar, weather station, on­ board fire control system, and maintenance equipment. Its rockets have a minimum range of 34 kilometers and a maximum range of 80 kilometers. Its warhead contains 380 bomblets each of which can penetrate 80-100 mm of armor. The rockets can be fitted with an impact or proximity fuse.

Other outmoded equipment, however, have long been ceased to be produced; the

Chinese military planners decided in 1982 to convert most of the estimated 50,000 defense plants to the production of civilian goods, leaving only those few that roll out the latest versions of weapons and equipment. While at least one-thirds of them are now in red ink. 158 the goal is to convert 80 percent of the defense industry into full production of civilian goods by the end of 199S/*

Amicable Sino-Russian relations have also allowed Chinese leaders to reduce substantially the number of ground troops, and the budget savings accruing from the troop reductions can be diverted to other areas, including better living standards for PLA soldiers, operation and maintenance of RRUs, and the development or purchase of modem weapon systems. In this regard, there seems to be an unmistakable linkage between troop reductions and the acquisition of modem weapon systems.

The creation of the Group Armies (GAs)—which are comparable to the Westem corps—was meant to enhance, among others, the inter-service coordination. The standard armament inventory of a GA includes helicopters and some fixed-wing aircraft, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, multiple launch rocket systems, and mine- laying systems. It is known that each GA would eventually operate a helicopter regiment.

Some GAs and all RRUs are equipped with the latest models of the main battle tanks

(MBTs), such as the Chinese latest T-85/T-85 II model, together with force multipliers such as rangefrnders and rapid calculators.

Since the late 1980s funding priority within the ground force has been given to the selected RRUs. The PLA has been operating different types of RRUs. The oldest and largest ones are the 38th GA stationed in the Beijing MR and the 39th GA in tlie Shenyang

MR. These are equipped with a mix of three tank and infantry divisions, and both GAs 159 operate anti-tank helicopter regiments. The location of the 38th and 39th GAs would make them suitable for domestic instabilities as well as for militât}' contingencies.

Other RRUs are smaller in size. In recent years three ground force divisions became light-armed, mobile RRUs to prepare for military contingencies: the 162nd

Division of the 54th GA in the Jinan MR is focused on Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula; the 63rd Division of the 21st GA, based in the Lanzhou MR, is oriented toward Xinjiang area and Central Asia; and the 149th Division of the 13th GA, in the Chengdu MR, is geared toward contingencies along the border areas with India and Vietnam.*^ The recent spread of the RRUs in the PLA order-of-the-battle was also made by upgrading brigades to divisions, as in the case of three brigades (43rd, 44th and 45th) of the 15th Airborne

Amy.^° PLA brigades normally comprise 3,000-4,000 troops and divisions anywhere between 13,000 and 15,000 men. Military planners seemed to have judged that the brigade-level forces are too small for the military contingencies.

Some of the RRUs wül be equipped with the latest weaponry, such as the Russian

Type-72 tanks and BMP vehicles.^' These efforts, in tandem with the creation of combined-arms units, are geared to strengthen mobility and operational coordination in preparation for a small-scale, low-intensity warfare along border areas. Recent PLA military exercises also emphasize inter-service coordination, multiple MR participation, and new types of military maneuvers, such as rapid reaction.^^

In sum, a combination of financial, operational, and organizational constraints will force the PLA Ground Force to remain a huge defensive army for the coming years. But, 160 the current PLA military strategy of "local warfare" (jubu zhanzheng), embodied in "the strategic shift" at the 1985 CMC meeting, also emphasizes the offensive operations in limited regional conflicts. Due to financial and strategic considerations, China's acquisition of Russian land systems has been modest: there are several press reports that

China purchased 50 T-72 MBTs and 70 BMP vehicles at a cost of about $250 million, in addition to a large number of old T-62s firm Russia for scrap.^ The Russian connection would, however, contribute to the PLA Ground Force's current emphasis on enhanced mobility and more fire power by supplying the required weapon systems and equipment.

China's acquisition patterns of Russian weapons and technologies since 1989 strongly suggest that regional contingencies along its long borders wiU remain PLA's priority in the years ahead.

PLA Navy

In recent years, Chinese naval analysts have repeatedly aired an alarmist view on

China's need for naval expansion. They often attribute the past failures in naval development to the "tendency to acquire second-rate weapons technology" and argue for the acquisition of "top-notch technical experts and research methods." China's top priority in defense modernization should be naval expansion, according to them, because "the biggest threat to national security and development [of China] comes primarily from the ocean. Included in China's crusade for a blue-water navy are the acquisition of aircraft carrier and the construction of new large naval bases. 161 The PLA Navy (PLAN) has received special attention since defense modernization efforts began in the early 1980s. This partly reflects Chinese leaders' intention to secure

China's growing maritime interests and regional challenges: a long-term goal of developing a blue-water navy, the 2(X)-nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and China's sovereignty over disputed island groups and territorial waters in the South China Sea.

The PLAN has a troop level of 260,(XX) and is organized into three fleets-East,

South, and North Sea Fleets. It is comprised of five major branches: submarine, surface combatants, marine corps, naval air force, and shore-based defense units. A large fleet of medium-sized ships is the mainstay of the PLAN fighting force. Principal surface combatants consist of some 18 destroyers, mostly in Luda class (Type-051), and 37

Jianghu (Type-053), Jiangdong, Jiangnan, and Chengdu frigates. Patrol and coastal combatants, totalling about 900, include 217 missile craft, 160 torpedo craft, and about

500 patrol craft. The PLAN'S submarine fleet, despite its low level of operation, comprises 48 submarines of different types (excluding additional 50 mothballed Romeo- class patrol submarines): one Xia-class strategic missUe, five Han-class attack, nine improved Ming-class, and 33 Romeo-class submarines.^

For the last few years the PLAN has been able to commission various new models and types of vessels. They include: the Luhu (Type-052) guided missile destroyer,

Jiangwei (Type-055) guided missile frigate, Houxin and Houjian FAC, Huludao coastal patrol craft, the Dayun resupply ship, and new LSMs (amphibious assault ships).^ In particular, the Luhu and the Jiangwei are indigenously-designed second-generation vessels 162 and are apparently much better equipped than their predecessors in terms of engines, control and command, and armaments. Reportedly, however, they lack some sophisticated electronic equipment such as ESM and ECM, as well as air defense systems, which might expose them to the enemy attack in a sustained, high-sea mission. Taken together, this new generation of warships represents a shift of emphasis from a coastal defense to the off-shore operations.

The PLAN Air Force has approximately 880 shore-based combat aircraft and 68 armed helicopters. Bomber forces include some 25 H-6s loaded with C-601 anti-ship

ALCMs. The naval version of tlie MiG-21s, even if less sophisticated than those buüt for export, is equipped with advanced Western avionics such as HUDWAC system and has acquired limited all-weather and day and night capability,^^

For some years, there has been a spate of reports on China's possible purchase of a foreign-made aircraft carrier. In February 1992, for example, Jane's Defence Weekly reported that China was negotiating the purchase of the 67,500-ton Varyag, a sister ship of the carrier Kuznetsov, which was being fitted out in the Ukraine,^ For military planners in

Beijing the carrier temptation is hard to resist, given its effectiveness as a force multiplier.

It is estimated that "if the [FLA] Navy has a carrier with 40 aircraft on board, it can achieve the combat effectiveness of 200 to 800 coast-based fighters in air support functions. And the sea area under control is fifty times as large as that controlled by a convoy of destroyers, 163 At the present time, however, the aircraft carrier deal may not be a viable option, due mainly to financial and operational problems. At a minimum China faces no immediate maritime threat and its potential rivals in the region, especially those in

Southeast Asia, are mostly inferior to the PLAN in terms of naval and air-strike capabilities. In addition, towering barriers in acquiring an aircraft carrier persist: the astronomical acquisition cost, lack of special equipment, training, and defense—not to mention probable diplomatic and military repercussions against China's acquisition of such an offensive capability

By all accounts, China's interest in purchasing a foreign-made aircraft carrier has dried up. An alternative might be a helicopter carrier or a smaller carrier of 20,000-

30,000 ton displacement, which according to Admiral Ku Chung-lien, commander-in- chief of Taiwan's Navy, is already being built by the PLAN.^* At least future carrier captains have been trained in the Guangzhou naval academy since the late 1980s.

In this connection it is worth noting that in late September 1992 Yang Shangkun, then state president and first vice chairman of the CMC, reportedly made a speech at the

PLA General Staff Headquarters calling for the acquisition of an aircraft carrier within the next ten years.^^ Yang's speech was apparently a reaction to the stepped-up Western arms sales to Taiwan such as F-16s and the Mirage 2000-5, but it underscored China's intention to buUd a blue-water navy in the region on the one hand and to settle territorial claims in the South China Sea on the other. Even if Yang did not specify whether China would 164 build or purchase an aircraft carrier, China's military ties with Russia could become quite instrumental in its quest for such a vessel.

The effect of Yang Shangkun's removal from the CMC in October 1992 on the aircraft carrier is not immediately clear. However, his successor to the CMC vice chairmanship Liu Huaqing is far better connected to Russian officers than is Yang. Not only did Liu study for several years in the mid-1950s at the Voroshilov Naval Academy in

Leningrad, but he has been very active in developing Sino-Soviet/Russian military ties.

His career as a former PLA Navy Commander (August 1982-November 1987), together with his concurrent posts of CMC Vice Chairman and Politburo Standing Committee

Member, would certainly enable him to continuously supervise the overall PLA modernization, especially its naval component, and to have a major say in the acquisition of advanced weapons and technologies for years to come.

On the other hand, despite China's growing maritime interests and Russia's huge sale potential for naval equipment, actual contracts on the naval area have been modest.

The foremost reason has been that China is in itself a major shipbuilder which produces a wide array of military vessels. For this reason, China's interests in Russia's naval equipment and technology have focused on the latter's assistance in enhancing limited power projection capability and strategic assets, such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and possibly naval weapons. Despite a considerable increase in naval contacts in 1993-94, there has been only one major naval contract between China and Russia-submarine sale. 165 The long-discussed Kilo submarine sale was clinched during Russian Navy

Commander Feliks Gromov's visit to China in November 1994.^^ China is known to have a contract for four Type-877EKM Küo-class submarines at about $250 million per piece.

The original submarine package offered by Rosvoorouzhenie, the state armament trading corporation, reportedly included six Kilo submarines, a simulator, accompanying base infrastructure and an 18-month training program.^'* While the number of the order has been apparently reduced to four, it is likely that it meets the quantity requirement in securing technology transfer.

The negotiation of the Kilo submarines began during the April 1993 trip to

Moscow by PLA Navy Commander Zhang Lianzhong, who is a submarine officer himself. Admiral Zhang's visit was foUcwed two months later by Deputy Naval

Commander He Pengfei, who was accompanied by submarine experts from Wuhan.^^

China's interest in acquiring the Russian Kilos stems from the fact that, despite the PLA's full inventory of over 100 submarines, half of them are non-operational and the ageing

Romeo and, its upgraded version. Improved Ming submarines have increasingly spent longer maintenance hours at the docks.

To China’s aging submarine fleet, the Kilos would be a significant addition. The

Kilo is diesel-electric powered and is designed for both anti-surface and ASW roles. With a maximum submerged speed of 17 kt and cruising range of 6,000 miles, it can endure up to 45 days under sea with the complement of 51 crew.^® The four Kilos are likely to be assigned to China's South and East Fleets and would be ideal for the PLAN'S mission to 166 safeguard the Chinese-claimed territorial waters far out to the Spratly islands in the South

China Sea as well as for contingencies which intend to impose a naval blockade in the

Taiwan Strait.

In sum, China's rapid economic development in the 1980s has significantly elevated the importance of protecting its maritime interest in the overall national security and development planning. While China, as a major shipbuilder, is likely to rely upon its own know-how to build most of its naval vessels, the Russian military cooperation would be a significant factor in fulfilling China's blue-water ambitions. China's recent decision to acquire Russian submarines and related technology indicate this is precisely what is occurring. In particular, China would find the Russian connection instrumental in the acquisition of aircraft carrier technology, such as steam catapult systems, defense systems, and the naval aircraft.

PLA Air Force

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is now 470,000-man strong and has a total inventory of some 5,000 aircraft of varying types. This includes 120 Tu-16 (H-6) bombers, 4,000 fighters (including 3,000 J-6s of 1950s vintage), some 600 transport, and more than 400 helicopters. The PLAAF has also reportedly begun producing the new H-7 bombers and Z-8 helicopters in 1992.^^ The H-7 carries four C-802 sea-skimming anti­ ship missiles. 167 In the early 1990s the Chinese military, despite its huge aircraft inventory, consistently and vigorously pursued the acquisition of advanced Russian aircraft and related technologies—for good reasons. The air force is the most technologically-oriented service in any armed forces, but China's relatively backward aviation industry has long failed to meet the PLAAF's requirement. Intermittent contacts with selected Western aircraft manufacturers since the 1970s produced no breakthroughs in either upgrading the existing inventory or developing new generations of fighter aircraft. As a result, China's most advanced indigenous fighter aircraft to date has been the Shenyang J-8 "Finback," a hybrid version of the MiG-23 and the Ye-152.

On the other hand, the PLA's strategic shift since the 1985 CMC meeting envisions "limited local wars" (yowcian jubu Tjiamheng) on border areas as the most likely type of warfare which requires rapid mobility and fire power. The PLAAF, however, has been ill-equipped to perform the new challenges. It is the gap between the doctrinal requirements and the existing aircraft inventory that has sharpened the sense of urgency among the Chinese top brass. For this reason, air force modernization received the top priority in China's defense modernization and foreign weapons acquisition.

Sino-Soviet negotiations for advanced Soviet aircraft began during General Liu

Huaqing's two-week trip to Moscow in June 1990, which included a visit to Mikoyan aircraft plant.^* At that time, the discussions were focused on the MiG-29 "Fulcrum" fighter and the Su-24 "Fencer" ground attack aircraft. By October, Chinese interest shifted to the Su-27 "Flanker" air superiority aircraft. The Chinese opted for the Su-27 over the 168 MiG-29 mostly for the technological and strategic reasons. Despite its high cost of $30 million a piece, the Su-27 has a longer range, more advanced avionics, and a wider array of mission capabilities than the MiG-29.

The Sukhoi-27 Flanker is a high performer currently deployed by the Russian Air

Force. The Su-27 is powered by the Saturn AL-31F turbofan and has a combat radius of

1,500 km. It carries a look-down/shoot down radar and has air-refiielling and FLIR capabilities. Its armament includes one multibarrel 30-mm cannon, R-27ER/AA-10

Alamo semi-active radar homing missile, R-60/AA-8 Aphid and R-73/AA-11 Archer infrared guided air-to-air missiles.^^ The Su-27 is comparable to the F-15 in overall performance and mission capability.

The final deal was believed to be concluded during Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri

Yazov's visit to Beijing in May 1991, one full year after General Liu's visit to Moscow.

China acquired 24 Su-27s, including four Su-27UB two-seaters for training purposes. Tire

Chinese also purchased 144 R-27ERs, 96 R-60s, 40 spare engines, and a Su-27 flight simulator. It is believed that China bought two additional Su-27s at the end of 1992, bringing the total to 26. The total cost, including the aircraft, armament, spare engines, and training support, has been estimated at U.S.$1.3-1.5 billion.'*®

In the 1991-93 period Chinese also imported small numbers of military transports to enhance its airlift capability. In 1991 China was believed to have taken delivery of two dozen Mi-17 transport helicopters, under a contract signed in 1990.'** China further acquired in 1991-92 ten 11-76 heavy transport, which can provide airborne early warning 169 for Su-27 operations as well as troop transportation.'*^ Under mysterious circumstances,

China also swapped in 1993 a huge amount of canned fruit for a crealg H-28 transport.

Since the Su-27 deal, there has been a deluge of unconfirmed reports on the follow-on sales of various Mikoyans and , namely the MiG-29s, MiG-3 Is, MiG-

338, Su-30s, and Su-35s.'*^ Given the extent of their air force contacts, including several air exhibitions held in Beijing and Moscow, it is reasonable to assume that the Russian side has provided China with detailed information on various kinds of advanced aircraft.

The PLA's financial constraints, however, effectively ruled out the importation of the

Russian aircraft in massive numbers. As of December 1994, none of the MiG sales to

China has been confirmed, and several Russian officials at various occasions denied the reports that MiG sales or their productions arrangements have been made.'*^

A potentially more important transfer was the Chinese contract in 1992 with NPO

Klimov to import 100 Klimov/Sarkisov RD-33 turbofan engines, which power the MiG-

29. The Chinese secured the latest model, RD33K, and all engines had been delivered to

China by the end of 1993.“*^ They are believed to power the Super-7 fighter, an export version of the Chinese F-7.

In 1992-93 China also placed an order for the second batch of 26 Su-27 aircraft, whose production had been completed by early 1994. It delivery had been delayed by unresolved issues such as payment terms and the transfer of technology and production equipment.'*^ The Russians insisted payment be 70 or higher percent in hard currency, compared to 35 percent for the first batch of the Su-27 in 1992, since the second-batch Su- 170 27s incorporate the same latest technologies, such as latest avionics and digital fly-by- wire, as those for the Su-35.

The Chinese have also been keenly interested in obtaining the license for local production of advanced Mikoyan models or, more recently, the Su-35 Super Flanker under license. The Su-35 is a highly advanced version of the Su-27, which has yet to enter service in the Russian Air Force. According to Mikhail Simonov, head of tlie Sukhoi

Design Bureau, the Su-35 is a significant upgrade of the Su-27 with a variety of new features, including thrust-vectored engines, a rearward facing air interception radar, and new digital fly-by-wire controls.**^

The Sukhoi bureau officials reportedly proposed the co-production of the Su-35 in

China, on the condition that the latter purchase up to 120 Su-35s."^ While the purchasing price for such a large number will be a towering barrier for China, the point is that there is now a better chance for China to secure both highly advanced warplanes and their production lines in China. In particular, in light of the declining orders for the MiGs and

Sukhois from either Russian or foreign air forces, tire two Russian fighter aircraft makers must compete with each other to keep their production lines open. As long as such conditions persist, both companies could well compromise their positions with China in the latter's favor. 171 PLA Nuclear Force and Missile Systems

China is the only Asian country with a strategic nuclear force. Since its first atom bomb test on October 16, 1964, China has gradually but steadily developed its nuclear force so that its inventory now includes about 300 warheads on land-based systems, bombers, and nuclear submarines. Compared with the arsenals of the other nuclear powers, China's nuclear force lacks technological sophistication and accuracy. This has necessitated China's nuclear doctrine which emphasizes a counter-value strategy. The minimum deterrent role of its relatively small nuclear force is that no potential enemy would launch a nuclear strike against China without suffering retaliation from the Chinese.

About 14 land-based missiles (DF-4 and DF-5) have an inter-continental range; they are liquid-fuelled and deployed in silos. Other land-based nuclear force consists of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, which are mostly liquid-fuelled and in a cave-roUout mode. As is the case with nuclear development elsewhere, an increase in Chinese missile's accuracy would require less amount of payload. The Chinese are on the stage of mastering the MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle) technology, and China's much-touted space program will apparently have an impact on its current effort to extend the range of its ICBMs.'*^

The Chinese have also deployed strategic bombers to deliver nuclear warheads.

They are mostly Beagle (H-28) or Badger (Tu-16) bombers with ranges of 2,000 to 4,500 kilometers. A small number of A-5s were also nuclear-configured to perform short-range missions. Most recently, new supersonic bomber Hong-7 (H-7) has been developed by the 172 Xian Aircraft Company. Its prototype was completed in August 1988 and reportedly entered series production in 1992.^°

The last leg of the Chinese nuclear triad is sea-based. The Xia-class nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), first deployed in 1986, is armed with 12 intermediate-range, solid-fuUed missiles aboard. On September 1988, China successfully launched a JL-1 SLBM from a Xia submarine to a target about 1,500 km away in East

China Sea. China is currently developing second-generation SLBM, JL-2 with the range of 8,000 kilometers.

China's ongoing nuclear development in all triad has an impact on its nuclear testing. Since 1964, China has persistently argued that it would maintain the nuclear no- first-use principle and that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations.

It also emphasizes that China has conducted the fewest number of nuclear tests in the postwar period: since 1945 the U.S. conducted 942 tests; the Soviet Union, 715; ,

715; U.K., 44; and China, 41.^‘

The Chinese claim, however, obscures the fact that China is the only country who conducted nuclear tests since President George Bush's nuclear moratorium in 1992. Since then China conducted nuclear tests three times: October 1993, June 1994, and October

1994. The recent Chinese nuclear tests of different low-yield warheads (all less than 90 kUotons) strongly indicate that China is developing different types of new weapons. At least two types have been under development: one is a dual-purpose ballistic missile for both submarine (JL-2) and ground (DF-31) launch with a range of 8,(XX) kilometers; the 173 other is an inter-continental ballistic missile, DF-41, with a range of 12,000 kilometers/^

All missiles are solid-fuelled.

Despite Russia's potential in nuclear assistance, there is no indication that Russia is transferring nuclear material or know-how or assisting China's nuclear weapons program.

Russia's nuclear cooperation with China has so far been limited to the supply of nuclear analysis apparatus, joint nuclear research, and scientific personnel exchange.Russia's cooperation has been focused on enhancing China's nuclear energy capability in preparation for the latter's future demand. For this purpose, China has already agreed to buy one Russian-made nuclear power plant and has announced its intention to co-design a fusion-fission hybrid reactor with Russia.^**

On the other hand, both sides had held an intense dialogue on missile systems.

China has been keenly interested in improving its missile systems through Russia's advanced technologies. One indication is the number of Chinese missile experts who shuttled between Beijing and Moscow, including Maj. General Shen Rongjun (June 1990),

Deputy Commander of the Second Artillery Corps Qian Gui (August 1991). The potential areas for cooperation include guidance systems, testing equipment, and cruise missiles.^^

In addition, China began in 1993 to take delivery of four launchers of the Russian

S-300PMU (SA-10) Grumble air defense missile system, with a total of over 100 missiles.^® The S-300 system has an engagement range of 100 kilometers and, in principle, is capable of intercepting both incoming missiles and aircraft, depending upon the types of missiles used. The S-300 system, however, was originally developed to 174 engage the enemy aircraft and would have a limited effectiveness in intercepting long- range missiles.

Moreover, the number of S-300 missiles is too small to provide an effective air defense for major cities such as Beijing and , but will be a supplement to the

Chinese RF-61A SAM designed to engage the incoming targets at low altitude. Rather, at least part of the imported systems will be used for testing and research purposes, especially guidance and radar systems. The S-300PMU incorporates phased-array radar technology and multitarget combat system, which might be utilized to improve Chinese

Second ArtUlery Forces' early warning capability.^^ The S-300 also has a naval variant,

SA-N-6.

Russia's likely transfer of missile technology would be a significant boost in

China's missile program in improving its systems, in particular its intermediate- and short- range missiles. Not only does the PLA’s new emphasis on regional contingencies have redefined the role of IRBMs (e.g. DF-21 and DF-25 series) in conventional warfare, but they are new sources of earning arms export revenue, given the sophistication demanded by China's potential customers.^* In particular, China's export-oriented M-series missiles would benefit from the Russian technology transfer in customizing the overseas demand in the future. 175 Transfer of Technology and Scientific Personnel

Unlike the one-time sale of weapons off-the-shelf, the transfer of technologies invariably involves a long-term and sustained commitment from both sides. It also indicates more intimate military relations. Military technological cooperation between

China and Russia seems to be no exception to this truism. While the secretive and ongoing nature of the topic does not allow the analyst to make a definitive statement on each technology transfer, available sources indicate that the transfer of aviation technology has been the thrust of Sino-Russian military dialogue. Table 5.1 (See the next page) summarizes Russia's actual and potential transfer of weapons and defense technology to

China since 1990..

The Chinese contract for 100 RD-33K turbofan engines is believed to have involved an agreement to jointly produce the aircraft engine between China and Russia for the Chinese Super-7 export fighter. According to one report, Russia has agreed to gradually transfer technology on "each stage of production until China can produce the engine all by itself. Another source, citing Sukhoi Design Bureau officials, revealed that China had officially requested production rights of the Saturn AL-31F turbofan engine, which powers the Su-27.^ China purchased 40 AL-31F engines for spares as part of the 26 Su-27 acquisition in 1992. 176 Table 5.1: Russia’s Actual and Potential Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons and Selected Military Related Items to China, 1990-1994

Weapon type Year Amount Comments Actual transfers Mi-17 helicopters 1990-91 24 for transport Su-27 fighter 1992-93 26 incl. 4 Su-27UB trainers additional 26 on order 11-76 transport 1991-93 10 for AWACS/troop transport 11-28 bomber 1993 1 exchanged for canned fruit RD-33 engines 1993 100 for Super-7 export fighters AL-31F engines 1992-93 40 spares for Su-27

R-60/AA-8 Aphid 1992-93 96 for Su-27 R-27ER/AA-10 Alamo 1992-93 144 for Su-27 R-73/AA-11 Archer 1992-93 for Su-27 SA-10/S-3G0PMU SAM 1993 4 launchers over 100 missiles

Type-877EKM Kilo sub 1995 4 on delivery

T-72 MET 1992-93 50 (unconfirmed) BMP 1992-93 70 (unconfirmed)

Potential tranfers Avionics, engines. for coproduction airframes MiG-29/31, new fighter for coproduction S-300PMU/P/V under negotiation Sub and ASW technology transfer likely Tank technology under negotiation Aircraft carrier probably shelved

Sources: The Military Balance 1993-1994, pp. 147-48; Jane's Defence Weekly, February 19, 1994, pp. 26-28, 30-31 and November 19, 1994, p. 1;Defense News, March 28-April 3, and April 18-24; Far Eastern Econmic Review, September 3, 1992, p. 21 and July 8, 1993, pp. 24, 26; Pinkov (Ping Kefu), “The Analysis of Current Status of Talks on Arms Reduction in the Border Area andArms Trade between Russia and China,” Kanwa Translation Information Centre (Toronto, Canada), August 1994, pp. 1-7. 177 The talks on the co-production of advanced MiGs and Sukhois, while speculations abound, seemed to have made only modest progress so far. At the least, the first batch of

Su-27s involved no technology transfer, according to the well-known first chief test phot of the Su-27, Major General Vladimir Ilyushin, of the Sukhoi Design Bureau. He added, however, that "Export of [Su-27] technology is still under negotiation."®* On balance,

China's order for additional 26 Su-27s could mean that any MiG purchase is unlikely in the near future. A more likely course would be that China requests co-production right of the Su-27, or its advanced version, the Su-35, on the ground that a total of 52 Su-27s meets the Russian-imposed quantity requirement for technology transfer.

On the other hand, the Chinese purchase of four Russian Kilo-class submarines at the end of 1994 strongly suggests that related submarine technologies must have accompanied the deal. China has for years tried to overcome several specific technological difficulties associated with submarines and surface combatants. In particular, PLA submarines' noise problem would make them vulnerable to Taiwan's sophisticated ASW capabilities. This also partially explains why the first Ming-class submarine, an upgraded and enlarged version of the Romeo-class submarine, appeared in 1975 but its serial production was not made for well over a decade. In fact, Cliina's commissioning of new type of diesel-electric submarine, Wuhan-C, in August 1994 prompted some security analysts to believe that China preferred the indigenous submarine production to importation of foreign technology.®^ China's acquisition of the Kilo submarine, however, strongly suggests China's continuing interest in foreign naval technology. Seen from this 178 perspective, the Kilo deal could well be a significant boost to both PLAN'S war-fighting capability and submarine technology. Conventional weaknesses of the PLAN'S submarines had been noise, propulsion systems, periscope technology, and torpedoes.

On the other hand, China's efforts to acquire advanced technology firom Russia can take many paths: one such path has been the transfer of "dual-use technologies" through military conversion. In April 1994, for example, Moscow announced the establishment of a joint venture firm with China.The company wül reconfigure the designs of the existing electro-optic defense items to make commercial laser and optical devices, which obviously have military applications.

As noted earlier, while the Soviet weapons systems are generally several generations more advanced than the Chinese ones, the Soviet technology takes an evolutionary progress. For this reason, Chinese military planners are keenly interested in the Russian technology transfer on selected areas to fill the important gaps in the PLA's overall capabilities. Due also to China's reverse-engineering of the Soviet weapons obtained from Egypt, Iran, and Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese weapons specialists are far more familiar with the advanced in Soviet technology than is commonly assumed by Western analysts.

In addition, China has recruited an abundant pool of unemployed Russian scientists and engineers in nuclear and missile research and has responded favorably to Russia's proposals for regular and close exchanges of information and personnel in scientific communities of both nations. A conservative estimate had that in 1993 there were over 179 1,000 Russian scientific personnel working at various institutes under the Chinese

Aeronautics Ministry,^ The same Russian sources acknowledged that a few hundred

Chinese defense scientists are current working at Russian research institutes.

Furthermore, new Sino-Russian military ties have also enabled the PLA to resume several aborted past programs such as the development or upgrade of J-8 U, Super-7 fighter, and Karakoram-8 (K-8) trainers.®^ Russian scientists and engineers are currently providing technical assistance for the development of a variety of indigenous aircraft, including the F-7 (a MiG-21 variant) at Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, the Q-5 (a MiG-19 variant) at the Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company, and the Chinese-designed fighters J-8 and H-7, at the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and the Xian Aircraft

Manufacturing Company, respectively.

To sum up, the prospects for China's acquisition of the Russian defense technology have improved in recent years. One such example has been the five-year agreement on military cooperation signed during Russian Defence Minister Pavel

Grachev's visit to China in November 1993. While the agreement is not publicly available, it reportedly covers not only weapon sales but also cooperation in technical field, personnel exchanges, trmning and mutual logistic support.^ 180 NOTES

1. “U.S. Military Sales and Technology Transfers to China: The Policy Implications,” The Mershon Center Quarterly Report, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 1981), p. 4. This conference report also notes that "Every dollar [China] spent on technology imports must be matched by three dollars in domestic infrastructural investment in order to absorb it. " See p. 5.

2. Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection," China Quarterly, June 1982, pp. 264-65.

3. One primary distinction between military doctrine and strategy is that the former refers to fundamental principles, while the latter connotes instrumentality. The Chinese translation of "military doctrine" as "junshi xueshuo” does not make this distinction. It literally means a "school of military thought. " For further discussion, see Chong-pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition and Evolution (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988), p. 3.

4. See Mao Zedong's famous exposition on Chinese revolutionary war, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," in Selected Military Writings o f Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), pp. 77-152.

5. On Mao's "people's war" doctrine and its subsequent changes, Ellis Joffe's analysis remmns the best. See his The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 71-77.

6. See, for example, "Speech at the All-Army Conference on Political Work," in Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 127-40.

7. Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao, pp. 77-83.

8. See, for example, Michel Oksenberg, "Economic Policy-Making in China: Summer 1981," China Quarterly, June 1983, pp. 165-94; John Bums, "Reforming China's Bureaucracy, 1979-82," Asian Survey, June 1983, pp. 698-722; Hong Yung Lee, "The Implications of Reform for Ideology, State and Society in China," Journal o f International Affairs, Winter 1986, pp. 77-89.

9. For the text of Deng Xiaoping's speech at the enlarged meeting of the CMC, seeDeng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, October 1993), pp. 126-29. See also Shulong Chu, "The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War," Orbis, Spring 1994, pp. 177-91. 181

10. Paul H. B. Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1978-87," China Quarterly, No. 112 (December 1987), pp. 572-90.

11. David Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Ear," Survival, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 88-106.

12. For an analysis on 's changing security climate and China's military buildup, see Taeho Kim, "China's Military Buildup in a Changing Security Climate in Northeast Asia," in Richard H. Yang, ed., China's Military: The PLA in 1992-1993 (Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, Taipei, Taiwan), Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 121-36; Zhang Jiangning, "Shallow Analysis of Several Characteristics of Rapid Reaction Unit," Jiefangjun Bao, August 3, 1990, p. 3, in FBIS-CHI, September 7, 1990, pp. 37-39.

13. Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance (Newport, RI: Naval War CoUege Press, 1988).

14. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications," Naval War College Review, Summer 1994, pp. 7-32,

15. Tai Ming Cheung, Growth o f Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions, and Regional Implications, Pacific Strategic Papers No. 1 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 30, 32; Li Yuling, Zhongguo haijun shili (Chinese Naval Power) (Hong Kong: Kuang Chiao Ching, June 1993), pp. 141-54.

16. Unless noted otherwise, statistical data on the PLA's order of the battle are drawn from The Military Balance 1994-1995 (London: Brassey's for the nSS, October 1994), pp. 170-73.

17. Christopher F. Foss, "Chinese Multiple Rocket System," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1992, pp. 418-22.

18. Tai Ming Cheung, "On Civvy Street," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 6, 1992, pp. 40-42.

19. "PLA Airborne Brigades Become Divisions," Jane's Defence Weekly, October 2, 1993, p. 12. See also. Ai Shiuan, "Yijiujiuemiande zhonggong junshi (The Chinese Communist Military in 1992)," Zhonggong Yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism Monthly) (Taipei, ROC), January 15, 1993, pp. 68-77, especially p. 73; Ge Xiangxian 182 and Wu Dongfeng, "Divine Troops of the Republic: A Visit to Our Country's First Quick-Reaction Unit," Liaowang, December 3, 1990, pp. 16-17, in FBIS-CHI, December 1990, pp. 35-37.

20. Jane's Defense Weekly, October 2, 1993, p. 12.

21. Tai Ming Cheung, "China's Buying Spree," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993, pp. 24, 26.

22. "China Adopts a New Stance," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 26, 1994, pp. 19, 21; Tai Ming Cheung and Nayan Chanda, "Exercising Caution," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 2, 1993, p. 20; Hsu Ching-yue, "Four Major Changes in the Land Forces Last Year," Ta Rung Pao, April 27, 1989, p. 24, in FBIS-CHI, May 6, 1989, pp. 19-20. For a list of PLA's recent exercises, see Republic o f China National Defense Report, 1993-1994 (Taipei, Taiwan: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, Co., 1994), p. 75.

23. FBIS-CHI, July 14, 1993, p. 7. There are also unconfirmed reports that China ordered 400 T-72 MBTs from Russia in 1992. See FBIS-CHI, May 5, 1992, p. 5.

24. FBIS-CHI, February 24, 1993, p. 29. For a discussion of the "seapower mentality," see Jun Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea," Journal o f Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 180-208.

25. There are additional 30 mothballed Whisky-class submarines.

26. "Chasing the 20th Century," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 19, 1994, pp. 26-27; Robert Kamiol, "China's New Navy Takes Shape," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 6, 1992, p. 958. For a discussion on the relationship between China's maritime interests and its current naval capabilities, see Tai Ming Cheung, "China's Perception of Security in Asia," paper presented at the Third International Seapower Symposium on the "Changing Maritime Environment and Policy," cosponsored by the Sejong Institute and the Republic of Korea Navy, Seoul, Korea, August 4-5, 1993.

27. Li Yuling, Zhongguo haijun shili, pp. 123-40; FBIS-CHI, February 26, 1992, pp. 57- 59.

28. Jane's Defence Weekly, February 8, 1992.

29. You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s," Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1991), p. 145. 183 30. See Tangtai, May 15, 1993, pp. 66. 74-77, in FBIS-CHI, June 1, 1993, pp. 46-49.

31. Interview with Admiral Ku Chung-lien is cited in Barbara Opall, "Taipei Cites Rising Need for Diesel Sub Fleet," Defense News, July 18-24, 1994. The feasibility of building a helicopter carrier has been raised by many analysts, including the Chinese. It is interesting to note that in June 1993 a Chinese Public Security Ministry publishing house published a 87-page book entitled Military Special Magazine (Junshi Te^i), which said the high cost of construction as well as the lack of support vessels have forced Beijing to shift its focus to first building a smaller carrier for helicopters. See Korea Herald, July 14, 1993, and Joong-ang Daily News (Seoul), July 13, 1993. For a further discussion, see Paul Beaver, "Carriers Key to Chinese Air Power," Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 25, 1993, pp. 23-24; FBIS-CHI, July 20, 1993, p. 23 and May 10, 1994, pp. 16-19.

32. For Yang Shangkun's speech on the acquisition of an aircraft carrier, see FBIS-CHI, November 30, 1992, p. 36 and December 14, pp. 25-26. According to a naval report allegedly compiled by General Zhao Nanqi, head of the General Logistics Department, China is also building three large naval bases at Dalian, Shanghai, and Zhanjiang. See FBIS-CHI, January 11, 1993, pp. 22-23.

33. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV), November 1, 1994, p. 10; FBIS-CHI, November 8, 1994, pp. 11-12.

34. Robert Kamiol, "China to Buy Russian 'Kilo' submarines," Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 19, 1994, p. 1.

35. Cheung, "China's Buying Spree," pp. 24, 26.

36. For the gist of technical presentation of Oboroneksport's defense products, including the Kilo submarine, see "Defence Products from Russia," Military Technology, February 1993, pp. 40-47.

37. Ng Ka Po, "A Review of China's Military Modernisation since 1977," (China News Analysis (Hong Kong), No. 1511, June 1, 1994, pp. 1-9.

38. See FBIS-CHI, June 1, pp. 4-5.

39. Steven J. Zaloga, "Current Trends in Russian Aviation Missiles," The Future o f the Russian Air Force, Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report No. 4 (September 1994), pp. 21-24. See also his, "Russian Missile Designations," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1994, pp. 342-49. 184 40. Cheung, "Ties of Convenience"; Pinkov (Ping Ke-fii), "The Analysis of Current Status of Talks on Arms Reduction in the Border Area and Arms Trade between Russia and China," Kanwa Translation Information Centre Canada, August 1994, pp. 4-5.

41. The scheduled delivery of ten Mi-17 helicopters and three H-76s was revealed by Soviet Minister of Foreign Economic Relations K. Katushev in an interview. See Jingji Ribao, April 21, 1990, p. 1, inFBIS-CHI, May 3, 1990, pp. 3-4. See alsoSouth China Morning Post, November 9, 1992.

42. The official Xinhua (New China) News Agency reported in September 1991 that China had placed three IL-76TDs in October 1990 and that their delivery had been arranged by China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation. See FBIS-CHI, September 27, 1991, p. 18. Tai Ming Cheung reported in 1993, however, that Poly, the arms trading company of the PLA General Staff Department, purchased seven Il-76s for U.S.$2(X) million with 40 percent in hard currency and the rest in barter goods. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Arms Reduction," Far Eastern Economic Renew, October 14, 1993, p. 68.

43. Some press reports argued that China's purchased the MiG-29s or MiG-3 Is in 1992, while others cited China's purchase or co-production of as many as 300 MiGs. See Sheryl WuDunn, "China Shops for Russian Aircraft Carrier," International Herald Tribune, June 8, 1992, pp. 1-2; Prasun Sengupta, "China Expands Air Forces,"Military Technology, August 1992, pp. 49-50; Edmond Dantes, "The PLA Air Force Build-up: An Appraisal," Asian Defence Journal, November 1992, pp. 42-48; Malcolm R. Davis, "Russia's Big Arms Sales Drive," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, August-September 1994, pp. 11-12.

44. In a March 1994 interview with a Hong Kong correspondent, Gregory S. Logvinov, Director of the China Bureau of the Russian Foreign Ministry, confirmed the China's purchase of the first-batch 26 Su-27s and the ongoing negotiations for additional 26 Su- 27s, but denied that any MiG-29s or MiGs-31 had been sold to China. See Pinkov (Ping Ke-fu), "The Analysis of Current Status of Talks."

45. "Sino-Russian Talks on Carrier-based Aircraft," International Defense Review, September 1994, p. 13.

46. Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 January 1994, p. 3.

47. "Su-35 'as Capable as EFA or Rafale'," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 12, 1992, p. 7; "Su-35 to Have 'Over the Shoulder' Ability," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 20, 1993, p. 6. For Taiwan's assessment of the impact of Su-35 acquisition by China, see FBIS-CHI, October 17, 1994, p. 14. 185 48. David Eœy, "Chinese May Choose Su-35 over MiG-29," Defense News, March 28- April 3, 1994, Gennady Yanpolsky, Vice Chairman of the State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry, insisted that Russia intend to sell the Su-27 and the Su-30 only, but not the more advanced Su-35. See FBIS-SOV, August 10, 1994, p. 11.

49. For a discussion of the impact of China's space program on its ICBM, see Craig Covault, "Chinese Space Program Sets Aggressive Pace," Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 5, 1992, pp. 48-49; Philip S. Clark, "China's Recoverable Satellite Programme," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1993, pp. 517-22. For China's ballistic missile program, see John W. Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 5-40; Duncan Lennox, "China's Development of Ballistic Missiles,"Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1991, pp. 374-75; Yang Kong and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Bureaucracy," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1993, pp. 36-41.

50. Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Vol. 5 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 368. For China's nuclear capable aircraft, see ibid., pp. 365-68.

51. See "Nuclear Test Monitor," Pacific Research, Vol. 7, No. 4 (November 1994), p. 5.

52. Brahma Chellaney, "The Dragon's Rise: Implications of China's Military Buildup," Pacific Research, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May 1994), pp. 10-12; "China's Nuclear and Conventional Forces 1993," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 29.

53. FBIS-CHI, May 13, 1992, p. 13; Xi Minghua, "Sino-Russian Nuclear Analysis Laboratory Established in Harbin," Heilongjiang Ribao, May 12, 1992, p. 1, in FBIS- CHI, July 17, 1992, p. 2; FBIS-CHI, April 19, 1993, pp. 3-4 and July 12, 1993, p. 18.

54. South China Morning Post, April 20, 1993;FBIS-CHI, July 12, p. 18.

55. Michael Gordon, "Russian Sales Fuel Arms Race," International Herald Tribune, October 19, 1992.

56. Barbara Starr, "USN Keeps an Eye on Old Foes and Allies," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 22, 1993, p. 8.

57. Tseng Hui-yen, "Russia Delivers Five Sets of Missiles to Mainland China," Lien Ho Pao (Hong Kong), October 20, 1993, p. 10, in FBIS-CHI, October 20, 1993, p. 9. 186 58. "China Switches IRBMs to Conventional Role," Jane's Defence Weekly, Richard F. Grimmett, CRS Report to Congress: Conventional Arms Tranters to the Third World, 1985-1992, Congressional Research Service, No. 93-656 F, July 19, 1993.

59. Pinkov (Ping Ke-fii), "The Analysis of Current Status of Talks," p. 4.

60. "Sino-Russian Talks on Carrier-based Aircraft," International Defense Review, September 1994, p. 13.

61. FBIS-CHI, October 20, 1992, pp. 2-3.

62. Barbara Starr, "USN Fears Growth in Nuclear Chinese Navy," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 7, 1995, p. 6.

63. Paul Beaver, "Russian Industry Feels the Cold," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 7, 1994, p. 30. According to Igor Rogachev, Russian Ambassador to China, as of the end of 1992 there were over 2,(XX) Russian enterprises that had been granted the right to sell directly to China. See FBIS-SOV, January 13, 1993, pp. 24-25. See also Konstantin Sorokin, "Russia's 'New Look' Arms Szdes Strategy," Arms Control Today, October 1993, pp. 7-12.

64. Cheung, "China's Buying Spree," pp. 24, 26; "Asia Scared about Expansion of Russo-Chinese Military Cooperation," Izvestiya, November 9, 1993, pp. 1, 3, in FBIS- CHI, November 10, 1993, pp. 10-11.

65. Keith Jacobs, "China's Military Modernization and the South China Sea," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1992, pp. 278-81, especially, p. 281.

66. FBIS-CHI, November 15, 1993, p. 13; FBIS-SOV, August 15, 1994, pp. 10-11. CHAPTER Vî

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND REACTIONS

This chapter focuses on the possible ramifications of Sino-Russian military cooperation on the regional balance of power in East Asia/ It first discusses the changing security environment m East Asia and then analyzes how China now perceives its own security and how ether regional actors perceive and react to China's rising power and influence. The importance of studying threat perceptions can hardly be overemphasized; threat perceptions add up to the motivational basis upon which a nation's long-term strategic planning as well as short-term responses are decided. More often than not, they spUl over to non-military areas and affect overall interstate relations.

Understandably, regional perceptions of and reactions to the PRC's growing military capability have not been uniform. Each regional actor's relations with China are shaped by a wide array of factors, including geographical proximity, historical and cultural inheritance, territorial disputes, and economic relations. Moreover, their strategic calculus has often been significantly influenced by the consideration of security relations with the United States and among themselves. It is the interplay of these factors that informs each nation's threat assessment of the PRC's military power. The first section offers a brief introduction on major security trends in post-Cold War East Asia and

187 188

China's own threat perceptions. The remaining sections analyze the mutual perceptions between China and selected ]&ist Asian states—i.e. Taiwan, Japan, the two Koreas, and the

ASEAN—as weU as those between China and the United States in this fast-moving, yet uncharted security environment.

The China Factor in Post-Cold War East Asian Security

The reopening of Sino-Russian military ties, especially the sale of advanced weapon systems and military technology, would have far-reaching implications on the regional balance of power in the form of enhanced Chinese power projection capabilities.

Longer strategic reach for the PL A, backed by advanced Russian weapons and technologies, could also increase the possibility that China would translate its growing military muscle into concrete political gains when opportunities present themselves in the coming years.

The post-Cold War East Asian security environment, characterized foremost by the reduced military presence of the U.S. and Russia in the region, has not only raised a sense of insecurity among smaller regional actors, but has also increased the relative influence of major powers such as China and Japan in regional security affairs.

A Summer 1992 international workshop, for example, devoted to "Real Threat

Perceptions in Asian States" has well reflected the growing concerns over the new security climate and the role of major powers. It has found that the most significant concern among leading defense experts was the aftermath of the gradual U.S. disengagement which would 189

"increase prospects for a new polarization of power within the region around China and

Japan with consequences difficult to predict. "" While some participants aired the view that today's Asian security had become most stable within the last 50 years, there was a virtual consensus that potential threats were primarily coming from Japan and China: "Japan was frequently mentioned...as taking a more assertive role," while "China was as [wc] focal topic throughout workshop discussions."^ Therefore, as one Southeast Asian participant pointedly summed up, "it would be desirable that the United States continue to play a moderating influence particularly to balance off China and keep a leash on Japan.

Notwithstanding its military-imperial past dotted with atrocities against its neighbors, Japan has since 1945 maintained an essentially defensive military posture. In addition to its non-nuclear principles, lack of strategic missiles, no significant landing capabilities, and no arms export, Japan is still dependent upon the United States for its own security. The immediate concerns of regional actors are not Japan's military threat, but its economic expansion emanating from its superior technological and economic prowess. Thus, it seems safe to say that Japan is predominantly an economic power with vast military potential. In contrast, China is predominantly an independent military power with growing economic and diplomatic clout in the region. The China factor, in short, need to be reckoned with in any major discussion of Asian security issues.

The initial worries about the Japanese threat on the heels of the collapse of the

Cold War, which was noted in the workshop, have considerably diminished mostly recently.^ In retrospect, those perceptions of Japanese assertiveness were primarily shaped 190 by rapid global and regional changes, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the reduction of U.S. military presence in East Asia, as well as by

Japan's increased profile under the UN auspices, including the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the 1991 war, the passing of the Japanese

Operations (PKO) bill through the Diet in June 1992, and the sending of 700 Japanese

soldiers to Cambodia in September 1992 for noncombat PKO missions-the first Japanese

ground troops sent overseas since World War H.

For the last two years, however, Japan has not only actively supported the

continued U.S. military presence, but it has also kept its military profile low—as seen in its

record-low defense budget increases, manpower reduction, and support for regional CBMs

and security dialogues. In particular, it is worthy of note that despite North Korea's

growing nuclear and missile threat to Japan in 1992-1994, it did not seriously consider

unilaterally responding with military means at its disposal, as "normal" major powers

would typically do. Japan instead chose to collaborate with the U.S. and South Korea

diplomaticaHy and take passive, but probably effective security measures—Theater Missile

Defense (TMD). A series of recent Japanese policy choices seemed to have allayed the

regional fears of a resurgent Japan.

In a litchi nutshell, the path to Japan's rearmament hinges upon two major factors:

the future of U.S.-Japanese security relations and a shift in the Japanese consensus on the

"pacifist" domestic and foreign policy. The perennial trade frictions between the U.S. and

Japan could boil over to the security alliance relationship, which is the linchpin of Asian 191 stability today. The dramatic end of the 38-year rule of the Liberal Democratic Party in

July 1993 drove the Japanese politics into a sustained period of political uncertainty and instability, in which the rightists and nationalists are likely to gain more influence than ever before. For the immediate years, Japan's dilemma would be that it has to find solutions to meet the U.S. demand for Japan's increased political and security role in the region without raising the "specter of a remilitarized Japan" in the minds of Asian leaders and people alike. ^

In contrast, China is the only Asian nation with strategic nuclear forces, and it maintains the world's largest military of about three-million soldiers. Its huge population, territorial size, and geographical location have long contributed to China's unique status in

Asian affairs. Despite its clear capability to effect a major change in Asia's strategic environment, China's recent growth in economic and military power has not been followed by its efforts to assuage the fear of its neighbors. On the contrary, the Chinese authorities have often accused foreign governments and scholars of spreading "totally groundless" allegations against China, such as the "China threat thesis."’

In Beijing's view, the end of the Cold War has been a mixed blessing for East

Asian security. It resulted in a significant reduction of conventional land threats to China and other East Asian states, especially those emanating from Russia, India, and Vietnam.

In the early 1990s China restored relations with all three countries and established some

CBMs along the extensive common borders. On the other hand, the passing of the Cold

War opened up old rivalries and led to some independent agendas by regional actors. In 192

particular, strategic uncertainty in the region led nearly every East Asian state to spend

more on national defense than before, and each has launched a set of force improvement

measures, especially in naval and air capabilities/

China will be hard-pressed to catch up in the regional trend for defense

modernization. On its part, however, China did not make much effort to allay the fear of neighboring nations about its military buildup, which is partly informed by its own assessment of threats to China's security. Chinese militaiy planners are equally well aware that Northeast Asian states' naval and air forces, though smaller in number than theirs, are relatively modernized and well trained, which could make a telling difference in the limited contingency that the PLA envisions most likely in the 1990s.

In particular, China's unresolved claims over vast territorial waters in East and

South China Seas undergird its need to beef up its power projection capability. China took over the Paracel Island group from the flagging South Vietnamese government in 1974, and its sovereignty is currently claimed by China, Taiwan, and Viemam. The Spratlys are claimed by the above three as well as by Malaysia, the , and Brunei. Even if

China's March 1988 naval clash with Vietnam in the Spratlys was conducted over 1,000 kilometers away from the Hainan Province, it currently has little capability to project power over a long distance for a sustained period.

On the other hand, China's security assessment need to be balanced with its own economic imperative, which requires a peaceful international environment conducive to its economic modernization. For this reason. Northeast Asia has always held high priority in 193

China's economic agenda. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are not only economic powerhouses by themselves, but they are important sources of capital, technology and management skills for China's economic development.^ China's relations with the three

Northeast Asian states since the late 1970s have been primarily informed by this economic imperative, which is also likely to lead them to emphasize a continued stability over possible conflicts in Northeast Asia in the near future.

To sum up, the primary motivation behind East Asian states' recent defense modernization has been the strategic uncertainty created by the reduced military presence of the United States in the region. But one major leitmotif of the current arms buildup in

East Asia has been the haunting possibility of having to confront China's growing military capability in the future with little or no reassurance from the United States.

Notwithstanding the dramatic decline of land threat, China on its part perceives a growing need to enhance its naval and air capability to safeguard its expanding regional and maritime interests. It is these overall security perceptions on the part of China that have undergirded its bilateral relations with other East Asian states and with the United States.

Taiwan

No country in the world is more directly susceptible to China's military capability than the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. At the heart of Taiwan's perception lies the fact that its relations with the mainland are still construed m an "unresolved " context. Taiwan remains a "renegade province" in the eyes of the PRC government. 194

Beijing is thus watchful of any developments that might militate against the eventual unification of Taiwan into mainland China, from Taiwan's defense modernization to international representation. Due to the lack of effective means, Chinese military planners have so far been unable to invade and occupy Taiwan. Tliis does not, however, rule out the possibility of other forms of the PRC's military action against the ROC, and the "PRC factor" has never been far back in the minds of ROC security planners.

In order to implement the Four Modernizations successfully, the PRC leadership has since 1979 placed a continued emphasis on the importance of a stable and peaceful international environment and has tried to project a benign and pragmatic image over the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan has become an increasingly important source of capital, technology, and know-how for China's economic development, and the "Taiwan economic experience" was officially promoted. Since April 1991, furthermore, authorities from both sides have negotiated for the establishment of regular government communication channels.

On the ROC side as well, even though its relations with the PRC in the early

1980s were stalemated in the quagmire between the latter's unification formula of "One

Country, Two Systems" and the former's "Three Nos" (i.e., no official contact, no compromise, and no direct negotiation), a series of major policy initiatives did emanate from Taipei, including the November 1987 lift of ban on travel to the mainland, the adoption of the "Pragmatic Diplomacy," and the May 1991 termination of the "Period of

Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion. Probably the single most 195 important domestic factor for the increased dialogue with mainland has been the growing pace of political liberalization and representative democracy in Taiwan.

Not surprisingly, economic, cultural, and person-to-person exchanges have surged across the Taiwan Strait since 1988. By 1993, Taiwanese investment in mainland China reached $4 billion and the indirect trade between the two was estimated to be about $14 billion. For the foreseeable future, this kind of harmless and mutually beneficial ties would continue to develop.

On the security front, however, mistrust and hostility are likely to prevail for an almost indefinite period. In fact, the Chinese leadership has never ruled out the possibility of using force to "liberate" Taiwan. After reviewing the PRC leaders' remarks over the years, the ROC Ministry of National Defense has identified the following seven circumstances under which the PRC might attack Taiwan; 1) if Taiwan declares independence; 2) if a major turbulence occurs in Taiwan; 3) if the strength of the

Nationalist forces [in Taiwan] becomes relatively weak; 4) if foreign forces (e.g. Russia) interfere in Taiwan's internal problems; 5) if Taiwan refuses talks on long-term unification; 6) if Taiwan develops nuclear weapons; and 7) if Taiwan's "peaceful evolution" on the mainland threatens the Chinese Communist regime.**

Among all contingencies, the "Taiwan Independence" (Taidu) is the most likely

scenario in the long term. From the perspective of the octogenarian leaders in Beijing,

there emerged an array of new international and domestic factors in the early 1990s that

might militate against the eventual unification of China. For one thing, the end of the Cold 196

War has opened up new possibilities for Taiwan to expand its diplomatic representation in international organizations. For another, the generational change of the ruling Kuomintang

(Kh-ST) and the growing influence of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose main political platform isde jure "Taiwan's Independence," loom large in China's unification calculus. China's old guards may also find it discomfiting that China's current reform drive will produce new generations of pragmatic leaders in China whose political interests are better served by economic performance and continuing interdependence with the West than by the costly unification venture. All in aU, China's revolutionary leaders could have judged that time was not on their side.

On the other hand, the current strained and downward Sino-U.S. relations could make the Chinese leadership feel less restrained in their overall unification policy. The normalization of China's relations with Russia, Vietnam, and India would allow transfer of the extra land forces elsewhere, possibly near the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the continuing improvement in China's military capability may hasten the day when the PLA flexes its muscle against Taiwan.

It is in this context that the U.S. decision to sell 150 F-16s to Taiwan in September

1992 should be understood. In particular, the Russian Su-27 sale—along with the then ongoing Chinese negotiations with Russia over the purchase of additional Su-27s and other military items—was perceived to be encroaching on Taiwan's air superiority, which has largely maintained military stability across the Taiwan Strait since 1949. 197

In both academic and policy communities, there has been an ongoing debate over the question whether China's growing economic interdependence with the outside world would restrain China from launching an attack on Taiwan, if the latter declares independence. Many academics and policy analysts, especially those in Taiwan and the

U.S. tend to argue that in light of the low level of the PLA's war-readiness, high invasion cost, and most importantly, negative international repercussions, such an invasion is highly unlikely to happen.*^ In any event, they further argue, such a military venture would surely set back China's economic modernization by many years.

On the other hand, some Western scholars and Chinese policy makers have unmistakably pointed out that such a line of argument is flawed in several points; first of aU, it grossly underestimates the gravity of the unification issue for the Chinese people on the mainland in general and for the PRC leaders in particular.'^ Second, there are many alternatives other than a fijU-scale invasion of Taiwan, including naval blockade, limited anti-shipping operations, and internal subversions.''* The third possibility is a combination of unforeseen internal developments in China, such as national disintegration, economic failure, and anti-Western stance, which could lead to China's reassertion of its sovereignty along its borders.

In order to deter any possible attack from the mainland, Taiwan has embarked upon an impressive military modernization program with emphasis on its air and naval assets. After 12 years of development, the first squadron of 22 Indigenous Defense

Fighters (IDFs) became operational on December 27, 1994 with great fanfare. With the 198 combat radius of 550 nautical miles and the air speed of Mach 1.2, its main mission would be maintaining the air superiority in the Taiwan Strait. Given its underpowered engine, hardware problems, and growing sophistication of the PLAAF, however, quite a few defense analysts in and outside Taiwan doubt the adequacy of the IDF program for

Taiwan's air defense needs.

In all probability, the awareness of the IDF's persistent problems has pushed the

ROC to acquire 150 Lockheed F-16s from the U.S. and 60 Dassault Mirage 2000-5 multi­ role aircraft from France and curtail the initial requirement of 250 IDFs by 120 before any

IDF enters the service. By the end of this decade, Taiwan's ageing stock of 100 F-104s and 298 F-5s wUl eventually be replaced by more advanced aircraft, thus ending what the

ROC Air Force Commander Tang Fei called a "window of vulnerability" in its air defense. Taiwan's complement then will include 150 F-16A/B Mid-life Updates, 130

Ching Kuo IDFs, 60 Mirage 2000-5s, and 90 F-5Es.'®

In a partial response to the reduced naval presence of the U.S. in East Asia,

Taiwan has also stepped up its naval buildup. It has contracted to purchase six Lafayette- class frigates from France and is building ten similar class and eight Perry-class frigates domestically. It currently operates four submarines and plans to acquire another six to eight. Taiwan's other priority defense programs include the ASW, missile, and reconnaissance capabilities. 199 Japan

As befits their traditional rivalry for regional influence and as the present-day two most powerful states in East Asia, Japan and China have a quite broad range of economic and security concerns with each other. This should surprise no one, as Akira Iriye has recently shown,given the fact that both countries have since the 1880s developed multifaceted rivalry relations on the power, culture, and economic dimensions. Traditional mutual perceptions between the Chinese and the Japanese have been very complex but far from cordial, as the following long quotation typifies:

Scholars who have examined Chinese and Japanese mutual perceptions have suggested misunderstanding, or indifference, or condescension, or arrogance- anything but communication. The Chinese are usually depicted as having clung to traditional images and looked down on Japan as a country of imitative dwarfs. They had not bothered to leam anything about Japan until it was too late. The Japanese in the Meiji era, for their part, avidly Westernized themselves untU they no longer considered their country Asian, a member of the Chinese sphere of civilization....Such mutual arrogance and condescension was conducive to misunderstanding, a reflection of the two countries' antagonistic power relationship.*®

As Iriye has correctly noted, it is a distorted interpretation, and both countries had known one another's history and people for centuries. It may even be added that their pace of

"learning" each other became quicker in the second half of the 20th century than before.

It can be equally plausibly argued, however, that their mutual and growing knowledge with each other could also generate conflictual rather than cooperative bilateral relations, contrary to Iriye's suppositions. Historically, their traditional mutual 200 condescension was sharply aggravated by the Japanese invasion of China in the first half of this century. Different ideological subscription after 1945 set them apart into different

"camps" until the early 1970s. It was only during the last two decades that China and

Japan tried to consciously set aside historical and cultural baggages and hammer out a new working relationship.

It thus seems safe to say that Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s and 1980s were an amalgam of practical need for economic and, to a lesser extent, strategic considerations on the one hand and historically deep-seated suspicions about the other's intentions and behavior in the region on the other. Seem from this perspective, the removal of the strategic garb after the end of the Cold War and China's growing economic and military power could weU pit China and Japan against each other in a competitive bid for economic influence and regional role in East Asia.

At the heart of their official relationship lie trade, investment, and aid. Bilateral trade between Japan and China in 1993 reached a record $39 billion, making Japan

China's largest trading partner. In fact, Japan now constitutes what the Chinese call "three firsts": Japan is the first in China's trade relations, technology imports, and domestic investments. China is also the largest recipient of Japan's Official Development Aid

(CDA) which is aimed at building China's social and economic infrastructures. Due to the asymmetrical importance of economic relations to China, it has largely abstained itself from openly and directly criticizing Japan's security policy, while Japan has tried to link the ODA with enhanced "transparency" in Chinese military affairs. 201

On the security front, Japanese concerns include China's uncertain future, the territorial disputes over the Senkakus/Diaoyudao,^^ Sino-Russian military cooperation, and the PLA's increasing strategic reach to the South China Sea. China's growing regional influence and its power projection capability at the time of reduced U.S. military presence could well complicate Japan's economic and security policy in two major ways: first,

China's expanding maritime interests, manifested in its recent moves in the South China

Sea, could pose a challenge to Japan's hugh trade and investment stakes in Southeast Asia.

Not only has Japan been the largest investor in that subregion, but as an energy-deficient nation Japan needs to continuously secure the extensive sealanes for trade and energy, which he at the heart of Japan's security pohcy.^° It is noteworthy that Japan's 1,000-nm defense perimeter overlaps with China's maritime claims and that both navies are increasingly operating on the same area.

Second, China can also indirectly influence Japan's current problems with North

Korea and Russia. Japanese defense officials are well aware that China is either directly or indirectly related to any existing missile threat to an insular Japan. Sino-Russian mUitary cooperation could not only raise the general level of arms buildup, but it could specifically precipitate China's development of its power projection capabihty—a prospect Japan intends to delay by linking economic aid to Russia with the latter's arms sales to China.^*

To Chinese security planners, Japan's future security "unilaterahsm," defense budget (U.S.$44.6 bilhon in 1994) and naval modernization pose a source of concern. For this reason, there have been only hmited bilateral security dialogues between the two 202

sides.^ Of particular importance is Japan's 1,000-nm defense perimeter to secure the

SLOG for trade and raw material, which has obvious implications for China's expanding

maritime interests. As such, each side has been critical of the other's moves toward a

greater military capability or a larger regional role. Japan's use of the COCOM vote

against the transfer of advanced technology to China, including an in-flight refuelling

system, is one example. In addition, Japan is suspicious of a reincarnation of China's traditional cultural dominance in Asia once China achieves its military modernization, while Japan has long been a rallying point for a renewal of nationalism in China.

Recent high-level visits such as Jiang Zemin (April 1992) and Emperor Akihito

have aU emphasized that both countries wanted to put aside historical enmities against each other, and their growing trade and investment relationships have largely restrained open criticisms against each other. But the point is that their traditional rivalry and historical distrust linger on.

It is in this connection that China sees U.S.-Japanese security ties as crucial in restraining Japanese military power and as beneficial to its own security. As Paul Godwin has noted:

There is...a logical discontinuity between Chinese analysts' apprehension about a unipolar system dominated by the United States and its coalition of Western industrialized states and their belief that America plays a crucial role in restraining Japan's nationalism and militarism. It is a dilemma that China cannot resolve to its own satisfaction.^ 203

Despite the Chinese analysts' pessimistic view of the U.S. role in Post-Cold War

East Asia, they are well aware that the U.S.-Japanese security relations remain to be the primary linchpin to East Asian stability. In addition, the Chinese analysts believe that the disappearance of the common foe and the new dynamics in both American and Japanese domestic politics could lead to the redefinition of U.S.-Japanese security relations in the years ahead.^"* Thus, the so-called "double containment" role of the U.S. forces over

Japan's possible unilateral military role is seen in the positive light among many Chinese security analysts.

Under the New Mid-term Defense Program {ChuMbo, 1991-1995),^ Japan plans to acquire some five new submarines in addition to its current holding of 16. The first of the four 7,250-ton Kongo-class destroyers with the Aegis air-defense system was commissioned in March 1993 and the remaining three are being buUt by the Mitsubishi

Heavy Industries. The Japanese SDF procurement program also includes 29 more F-15s by 1995 in addition to its continued development of FS-X combat aircraft program. Two of the four AWACS (E-767s) is scheduled to enter service in 1998 during the Next Mid­ term Defense Program (1996-2000) and would provide longer-range reconnaissance than the current 13 E-2Cs.

The Korean Peninsula

Until the end of 1970s, China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula was a derivative of its rivalry relations with the Soviet Union. There was one and only one 204

Korea on the peninsula-that is, North Korea. China's close ties with North Korea were of strategic importance in securing the former's most industrial region, socialist camaraderie, and the worldwide anti-hegemonic campaign. In addition, Sino-North Korean ties were further cemented by their leaders' common revolutionary experience, the Korean War, and security treaty.

For this reason, official contacts between South Korea and China were notable for their total absence until the late 1970s. In the eyes of Beijing, South Korea was at best a

"puppet" of the "imperialist" United States. Worse stiU, South Korea was the only Asian country hosting the embassy of Taiwan, which Beijing regarded as a renegade province.

In the Cold War context, shunning contact with South Korea was also an important foreign policy instrument to win the friendship of the Pyongyang regime and thus to keep

Moscow at bay.

On both international and domestic fronts, however, sea changes loomed large over China's traditional calculus since China's adoption of reform programs and open-

door policy in 1978. Since then, Chinese foreign policy has pursued a de facto "two-

Korea" policy aimed at continued stability on the peninsula. Moreover, the gradual

improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in the 1980s not only deprived North Korea of the

time-proven tool for playing off Moscow and Beijing against each other, but it also

drastically reduced Chinese and Soviet economic assistance to North Korea.

China and South Korea had rapidly expanded their two-way trade to about $5.8

billion in 1991, $8.2 billion in 1992, and $8.9 billion in 1993 wliich were well over ten 205 times larger than those between China and North Korea, The flow of person-to-person exchanges soared to 100,000 in 1991, and their diplomatic relationship was established on

August 24, 1992. These remarkable developments between the two nations for the past few years have resulted in a shift of the South Korean public perception of China to tliat of a non-threatening neighbor. From a security planning perspective, however, China's military capability poses three potential sources of security concern to South Korea.

The foremost concern is the continued Chinese-North Korean military relationship.

The adoption of two historic documents between North and South Korea in December

1991—the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation, and the Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—as well as North

Korea's signing of the IAEA safeguards agreement in January 1992 seemed to have contributed to the relaxation of tension for a short time. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of various forms of Chinese military involvement if unexpected conflicts were to occur on the peninsula. A continuing supply of Chinese weapons parts and military assistance will only heighten South Korea's security concern and will be detrimental to the establishment of a peace process on the peninsula.

The second security concern is the possibility of maritime accidents in the Yellow

Sea and its adjacent waters. They are within the operational area of the PLAN'S North Sea

Fleet and are a source of tension between China and South Korea for securing maritime resources and sea transportation lines. For the past few years, there have been quite a few minor maritime incidents involving illegal Chinese fishing and obstruction of South 206

Korean oil exploration and drilling operations in these seas. In January 1992, for example, over 150 Chinese fishing boats operating illegally near Cheju Island were taken by the

South Korean navy, and another incident of similar scale transpired as recent as September

1993. Moreover, several foreign commercial ships passing through the Yellow Sea, the

East China Sea, and the adjacent international waters were fired upon by Chinese armed vessels.^^ This has led the Russian Pacific Fleet to send cruisers to escort Russian merchant ships passing these seas. They have so far been concluded without military conflict. But the frequency of such incidents has been on the rise recently and unless certain measures are taken to prevent accidental conflicts at sea, they have the potential to escalate into maritime conflicts involving the navies of regional powers.

The third concern to the security of South Korea is the long-term implications of

China's growing military capability. In the mid and long term, China's vast military size and its strategic reach coupled with the reduced U.S. regional presence could complicate

South Korean security planning. Even if South Korea is now pursuing a more self-reliant defense posture, it remains wary of how the potential power vacuum left by the USFK withdrawal might be filled.^^ As long as this concern continues in the 1990s, South

Korean security planners need to remain watchful of China's growing military power and influence toward the Korean peninsula.

On the other hand, the importance of the China factor to South Korean security is further attested by its influence on North Korea, especially on the resolution of the latter's nuclear program, which both Bush and Clinton Administrations identified as the most 207 significant threat to Asian security. While China and North Korea no longer maintain the

"lips to teeth" relationship, Chinese leaders do have significant security concerns over the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime-e.g., refugees, armed conflicts, and production disruptions in China's most industrial Northeast region. After all, North Korea is the neighbor located closest to China's capital, Beijing, and is the only country China maintains security treaty.

For this reason, Chinese leaders occasionally paid a lip service to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and offered the role of good office for political dialogue between the United States and North Korea. In addition, thanks to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China has now emerged as North Korea's number one trading partner since 1991^ and has continually provided North Korea with oil, food, and even weapon parts.

However, the sudden death on July 8, 1994 of Kim D Sung would be a watershed that presages a major change in Sino-North Korean relations. Unlike Kim H Sung, who had long revolutionary and leadership credentials comparable to those of octogenarians in

Beijing, his son and heir Kim Jong H lacks military background, administrative skills, and international stature. Worse, most of senior leaders in Beijing are victims of the Cultural

Revolution, and they abhor personality cult on which Kim Jong H's claim for power and legitimacy builds.^^ Over the next few years, the passing of first-generation leaders in both

China and North Korea is likely to come with the erosion of personal, revolutionary, and ideological bonds between their leadership. 208

To summarize, China still sees North Korea as its strategic cordon sanitaire and has a high stake in continued stability on the Korean peninsula. In particular, Chinese military planners have significant concerns over the impact of Korean unification on

Chinese security and remain guarded on the possible role of the American military in the process, which is further complicated by the sudden death of Kim H Sung and the unresolved nuclear stalemate.

Due largely to China's secrecy in military issues and its consideration of North

Korea, bilateral security dialogue between South Korea and China has been quite limited.^® Amid the continuing land threat from the North, on the other hand. South Korea has also expanded its naval and air power. Not only has it acquired 120 F-16C/Ds, but it intends to acquire ten domestically-built destroyers and nine German Type 209 submarines before 2000.^*

ASEAN and the South China Sea

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is comprised of Brunei,

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and . Since its founding in

August 1967, the main purpose of the ASEAN has been a subregional economic and

political cooperation aimed at what was essentially a state-building effort among its

member-states, including counterinsurgency, ethnic integrity, and territorial settlement.

Even if the ASEAN adopted in 1976 the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to

acknowledge territorial integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes among its 209 member-states, the formation of a cooperative defense arrangement has been hindered by a host of factors, including territorial disputes, historical animosities, and linguistic diversity within the ASEAN. In particular, different strategic priorities among its member-states arising from a mainland-maritime divide and their divergent relations with outside powers produced a remarkable heterogeneity in terms of military doctrines, force structures, and training.

During the Cold War, its evolution had been strongly influenced by external regional security threats posed by Vietnam and China as well as by the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s, however, major changes occurred in their internal and external environments: the suppression of communist insurgency in all states except the Philippines led to a shift from their inward- looking defense posture. Externally, the war-torn Viemam began to offer an olive branch to its southern neighbors, and the Soviet withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay was complete, followed by the U.S. pullout from the Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station at the end of 1992.

It is in this new security environment that the ASEAN need to cope with in the early 1990s and the "China factor" has taken on a new prominence. In other words, the

ASEAN was gearing to modernize its military assets to safeguard its maritime interests just at a time when China's expanding strategic horizon put an emphasis on maritime resources and naval expansion, especially in the South China Sea. 210

In comparison with China, however, ASEAN member-states look rather liUiputian in terms of territorial size, population, and military power. In 1993, for example, the

PLAAF had over 5,000 combat aircraft, while the ASEAN save Brunei had a total inventory of 615. China's naval strength is also overwhelming: China's submarine force has 45 operable vessels, excluding additional 50 which were believed to be mothballed.

Only Indonesia maintained two submarines, and no other ASEAN states had a submarine.

In the principal surface combatants category as well, China held 56, while the ASEAN had a total 31.^^

Given the present military gap between China and the ASEAN states, the only realistic barrier for China in enforcing its claim over the disputed Spratlys has been its own limited power projection capability: the Spratlys lie between 1,000 km and 1,600 km from the nearest Hainan province. Due to this lack of enforceable means, the Chinese claim, about one-thirds of China's nine-million-square-kilometer territorial waters are being encroached upon by foreign countries.^'*

China is the world's fifth largest oü producer but, due to a high domestic energy demand, became a net importer of oil m 1994 for the first time. The increasing cost for using inland energy also means that the offshore oü and resources would become increasingly important for China's economic development in the future. In fact, according to an internal Chinese document prepared by the theoretical department of theZhongguo

Qingnian Bao (China Youth News),^^ at least some Chinese government experts seem to believe that the South China Sea could provide China with shengcun kongjian ("survival 211 space") or lebensraum—a term with ominous connotations reminiscent of Nazi Germany.

Pointing at China's growing energy shortage, the document reads, "In terms of resources, the South China Sea holds reserves worth U.S.$1 trillion. Once Xinjiang has been developed this wiU be the sole area for replacement of resources, and it is a main fallback position or lebensraum for the Chinese people in the coming century. In short, they argue, it is a struggle for strategic space and economic resources.

At the declaratory level, Beijing has repeatedly emphasized that China strongly opposes hegemonism and that China's Four Modernizations require a peaceful external environment. In a series of attempts to break China's post-Tiananmen isolation, in addition, it has found the ASEAN connection particularly instrumental: not only has

China's economic relations with the ASEAN expanding, but China has since 1989 restored or normalized relations with Indonesia (August 1990), Singapore (October 1990), and Vietnam (November 1991).

China's peace rhetoric, however, is suspect in the eyes of the ASEAN.

Particularly disturbing to the Southeast Asian nations is a series of China's recent determined moves into the South China Sea. For one thing, China's promulgation in

February 1992 of the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Its Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas" laid jurisdictional claims to practically all disputed island groups in the South China Sea, including the Paracels (Xisha), the Spratlys (Nansha), the Pratas

Bank (Dongsha), and the Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha) and defined the surrounding 212 waters as China's "inland waters," implying that all foreign military vessels must have permission for passage from the Chinese authorities/^

In particular, the Spratly islands are partly or wholly claimed by China, Taiwan,

Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. The island group and its surrounding waters are thought to be rich in oil, natural gas, and other maritime resources. At present, all six claimants except Brunei station troops in their occupied areas, and their territorial and jurisdictional claims, like any other territorial disputes, are unyielding, inflammatory, and inconclusive.

For another, less than three months after the proclamation of the territorial law,

China accorded a right for joint oil exploration to a Colorado-based Crestone Energy

Corporation in a contested water in the South China Sea. The oil prospect block is about

160 km from the Vietnamese coast, and the company has been assured of fuU PLAN backup, if necessary.^* In response, Vietnam not only protested strongly against the

Crestone deal, but it also signed a contract with a Norwegian company to conduct deep- water surveys in an area in the vicinity of the Crestone concession.^®

Still another, the South China Sea issue seems to serve as the current leitmotif of

China's naval expansion and the greater allocation of fund for PLAN modernization. The growing importance of the PLAN'S South Sea Fleet in terms of funding allocation, ship transfers, and naval exercises should be understood in this connection. In addition, the expansion work of a one-kilometer-long airstrip on Woody Island (yongxingdao) in the

Paracel Island group is now reportedly complete, which would extend the PLA's air reach 213 by 330 kilom eters.China took over in 1992 two more islets which had been claimed by

Vietnam, including the occupation of Da Lac coral reef, 1,200 km south of the Hainan

Province. In February 1995, China also put a sovereignty mark on the Mischief Reef

(Panganiban Reef), which had been occupied by the Philippines. China's latest move is potentially significant since it was the first time China occupied the territory disputed by claimants other than Vietnam.'**

A rapid succession of China's maritime assertiveness since 1992 not only rang an alarm bell ringing in Southeast Asian capitals but it led to a reassessment of ASEAN approaches to China, part of which had previously been based upon China's peaceful intentions. After examining the factors that prohibited the ASEAN from discussing the security agenda. Ton That Tien, a noted Southeast Asian defense analyst, has insightfully noted that "it was only after China dramatically asserted its territorial claims in the South

China Sea [especially in 1992] that security ceased to be a 'taboo' for discussion among its

[ASEAN] members."'*^

It is in this context that regional security issues, long rejected by the ASEAN, became the agenda for the first time in the ASEAN summit held in Singapore in January

1992.“*^ The Singapore summit agreed to discuss security issues through ASEAN Post-

Ministerial Conference (PMC). In July 1993 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the

first multilateral regional security forum in Asia, was inaugurated in Singapore. The first

meeting of ARF, held in Bangkok in July 1994, began to discuss a wide range of security

topics in the region.'*^ 214

Seen in the context of the South China Sea issue, the ARF and other regional

security networks represent an effort by the ASEAN member-states to "internationalize"

the Spratly dispute. First and foremost, it is an effort by the smaller regional actors to compensate for the loss of the superpower clout in the new post-Cold War in their dealings with major regional powers such as China.

In contrast, China has traditionally resisted joining international security fora. With the exception of the UN Security Council in which it maintains the prerogatives as a permanent member, China has rarely participated in any multilateral security talks and has a deep-seated suspicion over security arrangements with a multilateral tint. Rather,

China's preferred approach has been bilateral negotiations, such as Sino-Russian border troop reductions. In particular, bilateral negotiations with smaller states could provide

China with a lopsided advantage and may even allow Beijing to define what and how to discuss with whom.

Viewed in this light, it is rather surprising to note that in July 1993 China decided to join the newly-created ARF. In aU probability, China seemed to hope that China’s participation in a multilateral security dialogue would assuage for now the fear of its neighboring nations who are unsettled by Chinese efforts to build up its military muscle.

While it is too early to tell the impact of the ARF on China's behavior in the South China

Sea dispute, China could well be driven back to resort to its own courses as China itself becomes a "major agenda" of the ARF. 215

The options that Southeast Asian states can take against China's deliberate moves are quite limited, if there are any. For one thing, most of the Southeast Asian states have unresolved territorial disputes with one another, left from their colonial past and the geography.'*^ For another, naval and air capabilities of Southeast Asian nations—even if they were put together—cannot match those of China. In other words. Southeast Asian nations at present have neither political cohesion nor military capability to counter China's stepped-up efforts to lay claims in the South China Sea.

To partially redress the military gap, most Southeast Asian nations have recently charted out procurement plans to augment their modest naval and air capabilities:'^

Malaysia has ordered two guided-missile frigates from Great Britain and plans to acquire four Beech King Air 200 maritime patrol aircraft and two submarines. In June 1993 it made a long-awaited decision to acquire 18 MiG-29s and eight F/A-18s in addition to 28

Hawks being delivered beginning in late 1993. Brunei also plans to acquire 16 to 36

Hawks and three missile-carrying patrol boats from Great Britain. Both Singapore and

Thailand are believed to be considering acquiring submarines. Thailand has plan to acquire 18 F-16s and E-2C Hawkeyes and its naval buildup programs include two amphibious landing ships, seven Chinese-built frigates, and a 12,000-ton helicopter carrier from . Singapore Navy has also acquired six corvettes. The Philippine Air Force currently plans to acquire 18 Israeli Kfir fighters and 18 Albatros strike trainer aircraft from the Czech and Slovak Republics. The Philippine Navy's modernization programs include the acquisition of three Spanish missUe-carrying patrol boats and 28 fast patrol 216 boats by the U.S. Haider Marine. Under the major re-equipment program, Indonesia is acquiring up to 24 Hawks from British Aerospace and two submarines from Germany. It has also started to take delivery of 37 ex-East German warships.

The United States

There exists a substantial body of evidence to suggest that Chinese analysts initially believed the end of the Cold War would bring a truly multipolar world order. In their view, a nation's power should no longer be measured solely in term of its military capability, but of the "comprehensive national power" (zonghe guoli), including its economic, industrial, and technological components. In this regard, America's economic difficulties, defense budget and personnel cuts, and strong demand for better public welfare would force it to share its strategic burden with its major allies such as Japan and

European states. Now that the Soviet Union is gone, moreover, such Cold-War alliance relations between the U.S. and its allies will surely undergo transformations and generate a host of frictions, such as U.S-Japanese trade problems.

This initial but long-term prognosis, however, must be balanced by the rapidly deteriorating Sino-U.S. relations since Tiananmen. China's post-Tiananmen America policy can be summed up as how to deal with a nation that is vital to China's economic development but whose values pose a major threat to the legitimacy and ideology of the

Chinese government.'*’ 217

On the bilateral level America poses an ideological, rather than military, threat.

Immediately after Tiananmen, not only did political conservatism set in, but anti-

American tone was strong among Chinese conservatives, who feared the heightened danger of U.S.-led "peaceful evolution" against the communist rule in China. Evidence of the American "hegemonic acts" abound, including the Persian Gulf War, sale of 150 F-

16s to Taiwan, surveillance and search of the Chinese freighter Yinhe, and U.S. lobbying against China's bid for the 2000 Olympics. In particular, Chinese analysts spare no time in singling out the U.S. as "the primary barrier" in the resolution of the Taiwan issue.**®

In post-Cold War Asia, Chinese security planners see that the reduced U.S. military presence provides China with an opportunity to expand its national interest. As observed by several Asian security scholars, China no longer views the US presence as contributing to regional security and stability.**^ With the exception of the U.S. forces in

Japan in which they perform the role of "double containment" over the rise of Japanese military power, the US forces elsewhere in Asia are viewed by Beijing either as a source of instability—as in the case of the Korean Peninsula—or as a hinderance in China’s expanding strategic horizon—as in the case of the South China Sea.

The steep, downhill nature of Sino-U.S. relations was shaped not only by how

China perceived, but also by what it did. For one thing, Tiananmen has fundamentally called into question a long-held Western view of the benign and pragmatic nature of the

reformist Chinese government. The geostrategic concerns that had guided U.S. policy

toward China since the early 1970s evaporated all but in name. Other factors include: 218

China's alleged transfer of M-11 missile components and technology to Pakistan, underground atomic tests in October 1993, June 1994, and October 1994, and persistent human-rights violations.

The U.S.'s growing frustration over the lack of progress in any of the outstanding bilateral issues led to the search for leverages against the Chinese behavior, most notably in the form of linking renewal of the MFN (Most Favored Nation) trade status with human-rights progress in China. Since 1989, as Roger Sullivan heis noted, the annual renewal of MFN treatment for China "became the outlet for congressional frustration and the vehicle for engaging the [Bush] administration in a general policy debate. Even if the prospect for the Presidential veto and the blocking third of the Senate saved the actual withdrawal of the MFN status, its renewal was made increasingly conditional to specific changes in China, especially after the inauguration of the Clinton administration. After a careful consideration of the possible negative impact of the withdrawal and Chinese leaders' brinkmanship. President Clinton finally announced in May 1994 to delink the

MFN status from China's human-rights issue, thus admitting the failure of much-touted major foreign policy.^*

Despite China's tainted human-rights record and authoritarian rule, American policy makers must understand that China is a country of growing importance to U.S. interests at both regional and global levels. As a permanent member of the UN Security

Council, for example, China could delay, hamper, or block U.S.-led international efforts to curb proliferation of n u c l^ and missile technologies and to promote world-wide arms- 219 control regimes. It could also indirectly but adversely affect U.S. strategic and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, with which the U.S. has two-thirds more trade than witii West Europe.

Reflecting the diplomatic ebb in Sino-U.S. relations, contacts between their militaries were also minimal. Few senior military officers were exchanged since

Tiananmen, and the U.S. maintains tlie probably the last-remaining Tiananmen sanction— i.e., the prohibition on shipment of U.S. military equipment and other goods to the

Chinese military. Any progress in both countries' militaries must await the overall improvement in their political relations.

Taken together, it is perhaps these differing threat perceptions between Beijing and

Washington that have increasingly pitted the two countries against each other in a simulated war or in the blue water.^^ A future contingency that both militaries would find themselves at the opposite sides is remote enough, but both sides seem to have already taken the other as a long-term security risk to their national interests. At least, China's defense modernization is geared at safeguarding its growing regional interests from the extensive reach of the remaining superpower. 220 NOTES

1. In any area study, it is imperative to define specifically what the geographical designations refer to. Concerning Asia’s geographical regions, different authors often call the same region differently, or sometimes different authors called the different regions under the same name. This study adopts the most common geographical subdivisions of Asia—Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. It concerns with the first two subregions and excludes the third, which includes India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Northeast and Southeast Asia are collectively called "East Asia." Northeast Asia is comprised of China (PRC), Japan, North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), South Korea (Republic of Korea), Russian (former Soviet) Far East, and Taiwan (Republic of China). Southeast Asian states are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, , Malaysia, Myanma (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

2. Paul H. Kreisberg and Daniel Y. Chiu (with Jerome H. Kahan and Kazurai Ogawa), eds., "Real Threat Perceptions in Asia and the Role of the Major Powers: A Workshop Report," Alexandria, VA and Honolulu, HI: The Center for Naval Analysis and the East- West Center, September 1992. The widely-distributed workshop report summarizes the discussions at the workshop on "Real Threat Perceptions in Asian States," co-sponsored by the East-West Center and the Center for Naval Analysis and held at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 24 and 25, 1992. The citation is on p. 1.

3. Ibid., pp. 16 and 19.

4. Ibid., p. 13.

5. Based upon extensive interviews with Asian officials and scholars, David J. Hitchcock, Jr. has examined the changing security perceptions of Asian states over the years. See his "The United States in a Changing Pacific Rim: Asian Perceptions and the U.S. Response," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. 123-38 and "East Asia's New Security Agenda," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 91-105.

6. For a discussion of Japan's security policy, see John E. Endicott, "Japanese Security Policy: Stability in an Era of Change?" Korean Journal o f Defense Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 19%), pp. 97-114.

7. Mu Huimin, "'Chinese Military Threat Theory' Is Totally Groundless," Renmin Ribao, April 17, 1993, p. 6, inFBIS-CHI, April 28, 1993, pp. 20-21. 221

8. According to the SIPRI database, Asia's share of the world's total transfers in major conventional weapons increased substantially from 15.5 percent in 1982 to 34 percent in 1992. See Ian Anthony, Agnes Courades Allebeck, Paolo Miggiano, Elisabeth Skons, and Herbert Wulf, "The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 308.

9. Japan was China's largest trading partner in 1993 with the total trade volume of $39 billion. In the same year, Taiwan ($14 billion) and South Korea ($9 billion) were China's fourth and sixth largest trading partners, respectively. See China's official statistics in FBIS-CHI, January 19, 1994, pp. 1-2. On the other hand, China's trade volume with ASEAN in 1993 was $7.5 billion. See FBIS-CHI, October 28, 1994, p. 3.

10. See Taiwan Foreign Minister's view, Fredrick F. Chien, "A View from Taipei," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991/92, pp. 93-103.

11. Guofang baogaoshu (National Defense Report) (Taipei, Taiwan: Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, January 1992), pp. 42-43; FBIS-CHI, February 27, 1992, pp. 63-65.

12. A wide body of literature addresses the question. Those who argue that China's interdependence would restrain its behavior against Taiwan include Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "China's Threat to Taiwan," Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1993), pp. 250-58; Martin L. Lasater, U.S. Interest in the New Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Robert F. Ash and Y. Y. Kueh, "Economic Integration within Greater China: Trade and Investment Flows Between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan," China Quarterly, No. 136 (December 1993), pp. 711-45; "Conclusion," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds.. If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 1993), pp. 165-94.

13. According to a recent opinion poll conducted by one of the flourishing private organizations in Beijing, about 95 percent of the 600-some respondents said they would support the Chinese government's use of force against Taiwan, if the latter declares independence. Four percent of them said they do not know. The remaining one percent said they would join the PLA! The poll was conducted in ten different Chinese cities in the Summer of 1994 and was funded by a Taiwanese organization. The identity of the private organization is withheld. On the other hand, a 1991 Gallop poll on Taiwan indicated that 57 percent of the respondent believed China would attack if Taiwan declares independence. See "57% Believe Beijing Would Invade Taiwan," China Post (International Airmail Edition), November 5, 1991, p. 4; as cited in Hickey, "China's Threat to Taiwan," p. 252. 222

14. Paul H. B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force Against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds.. If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The International Response (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 1993), pp. 15-33.

15. See, for example, Julian Baum, "Winged," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 12, 1995, p. 21.

16. Hu Hsun, "Building Up the Island Bastion," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 22, 1994, pp. 24-25.

17. Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). He strongly argues, however, that the future of Sino-Japanese relations will be determined by cultural cooperation, as a part of the global trend toward cultural interdependence, rather than by economic or military competition between them. The questions why global cultural interdependence has become the "primary definer" of recent international affairs or why this applies to Sino-Japanese relations are not clear.

18. Ibid., p. 28.

19. In any territorial disputes, each claimant has its own name for the territory under question. The disputed small island group off Taiwan is currently occupied by .Japan and is called Senkakus by Japan, Diaoyudaos by mainland China, and Diaoyutai by Taiwan. For further details, see Ji Guoxing, "The Diaoyudao (Senkaku) Disputes and Prospects for Settlement," Korean Journal of D^ense Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 1994), pp. 285- 311.

20. Japan's naval modernization is in part influenced by China's growing strategic reach. See Shigeo Hiramatsu, "Chinese Navy and the Revival of 'Sinocentrism'," Shin Boei Ronshu (Journal of National Defense), Vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1992), pp. 16-37.

21. , "An Arms Race in East Asia," Washington Post, July 14, 1992, p. A13; Richard C. Thornton and Bruce A. Babcok, "Japan's Response to Crisis: Not with a Bang but with a Buck," Global Affairs, Winter 1993, pp. 1-11.

22. There have been only two official-level bilateral security meetings between China and Japan: one in March 1994 in Beijing and the other in January 1995 in Tokyo. The Japanese side in essence asked for enhanced "transparency" in China's military budget and modernization, while the Chinese were known to have repeated its official position that its defense budget increases were due to inflation and that its military is defensive purpose only. Interestingly, in the January 1995 meeting the Chinese side reportedly asked, "Against whose missile the Japanese TMD system will be deployed?" For further details. 223 see FBIS-CHI, March 2, 1994, pp. 7-8; Chosim Ilbo (Chicago Edition), January 17, 1995. As part of a good-will tour. General Tetsuya Nishimoto, Chairman of the Japan's Joint Staff Council, visited both China and South Korea in late February 1995. See Defense News, March 13-19, 1995, p. 12;FBIS-CHI, February 21 and 22, 1995, pp. 6-7 and 5-6, respectively.

23. Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to the Post-Cold War Environment," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed.. East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk, NY: M. F. Sharpe, 1993), p. 131. See also Sheldon W. Simon, "Regional Security Structures in Asia: The Question of Relevance," pp. 11-27 in the same volume.

24. David I. Hitchcock, "Revitalizing U.S.-Japan Security: New Roles for Both Countries," Yomiuri Shimbm, July 21, 1994; author's interview with Ambassador Hitchcock, Maryland, October 3 and 4, 1994.

25. Ken Fbata, "Japanese Budget Cut Despite 'Destabilizing Factors'," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 9, 1993, p. 13; "Asia’s New Dawn?" International Defense Review, November 1993, pp. 869-72.

26. Lincoln Kaye, "Signal Guns," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18, 1993; "China Boats in Fishing Dispute in South Korean Territorial Waters," BBC, Summary o f World Broadcasts, Asia-Pacific {FE), No. 1772, August 20, 1993, pp. Al/2 and No. 1793, September 14, 1993, pp. G/2, 7; "Russia Sends Patrol to Protect Merchant Ships in Fast China Sea," International Defense Review, August 1993, p. 594. At least one known incident involved a North Korean ship. See also FBIS-CHI, July 21, 1993, pp. 8-9 and February 4, 1993, p. 1.

27. James A. Winnefeld, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin N. Lewis, Lynn D. Pullen, John Y. Schrader, and Michael D. Swame, A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension, R-4089/2-USDP (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1992), pp. 46-49.

28. Joong-ang Daily News (Seoul), June 15, 1993. The 1992 two-way trade between North Korea and China was U.S.$697 million, a 28 percent increase from the previous year. Import from China constituted about 35 percent (U.S.$541 million) of North Korea's total import in 1992 (U.S.$1,554 million).

29. For an analysis of Kim Jong Il's profile and the prospects for his political survival, see Taeho Kim, "Kim Jong-U: North Korea's New Leader," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1994, pp. 421-24. The death of Marshal Oh Jin U on February 25, 1995 could further complicate the prospects for the younger Kim's political survival. Marshal Oh had been the loyal supporter of the Kim family and the third most powerful man in North 224

Korea after Kim H Sung and Kim Jong D. He was also North Korea's Defense Minister between 1976 and 1995. See Chosim Ilbo (Chicago Edition), February 27, 1995.

30. The first official South Korean military delegation visited China only in late February 1995, two and a half years after the Sino-South Korean normalization in August 1992. See Chosim Ilbo (Chicago Edition), February 24, 1995; FBIS-CHI, February 23, 1995, p. 5.

31. Robert Kamiol, "Acquiring a Global Viewpoint" and "Effecting a Shift in Strategy," Jane's Defence Weekly, November 5, 1994, pp. 18, 20 and 21-22, respectively; A. W. Grazebrook, "More Regional Naval Growth," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 1995, Annual Reference Edition (December 1994-January 1995), pp. 12-17.

32. Sheldon W. Simon, "The Regionalization of Defence in Southeast Asia," Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1992), pp. 112-24.

33. The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's for the USS, October 1993). See also the inserted table on "Asia: The Rise in Defence Capability" in the same volume.

34. FBIS-CHI, July 27, pp. 10-11.

35. The internal document was obtained by U.S. agencies and was carried in Nayan Chanda et al., "Treacherous Shoals," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 13, 1992, pp. 14 and 16.

36. Ibid., p. 16. The cash value (i.e. U.S.$1 trillion) of the oil deposit supposedly lying beneath the South China Sea is only a vague and probably an incorrect reference.

37. Far Eastern Economic Review, March 12, 1992, pp. 8-9. For a full text of the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Its Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas," see FBIS-CHI, February 28, 1992, pp. 2-3.

38. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Chinese Navy to Back Oil Exploration," International Herald Tribune, June 19, 1992.

39. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 20, 1992, p. 6.

40. International Herald Tribune, June 19, 1992; Dato Mohammed Alialwi, "The Conflicting Claims in the China Sea," Asian Defence Journal, June 1992, pp. 6-19; Nayan Chanda et al., "Treacherous Shoals," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 13, 1992. PLA has reportedly deployed additional aircraft on Woody Island in early 1994. See International Defense Review, May 1994, p. 10. 225

41. Nayan Chanda, "Territorial Imperative," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23, 1995, pp. 14-16.

42. Ton That Tien, "Southeast Asia's Post Cold War Geopolitics," Global Affairs, Winter 1993, p. 49.

43. For a summary of the ARF formation and the unofficial "track two" approaches to regional security, see Pauline Kerr, "The Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific," Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1994), pp. 397-409. The ARF is comprised of the six ASEAN member-states, seven "dialogue partners" (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States), one "observer" (Papua New Guinea), and two "guests" (China and Russia).

44. Kevin P. Clements, "Regionalism Accelerates in the Asia-Pacific," Pacific Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (August 1993), pp. 6-9. For analyses on the nature and possible solutions of the South China Sea dispute, see Mark J. Valencia, "Spratly Solution Still at Sea," Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1993), pp. 155-70; J. N. Mak, "The Chinese Navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian Assessment," Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1991), pp. 150-61; Chen Jie, "China's Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10 (October 1994), pp. 893-903; Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-94; Samuel S. G. Wu and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Assessing the Dispute in the South China Sea: A Model of China's Security Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1994), pp. 379-403; Nayan Chanda et ah, "Perils of the South China Sea," China in Transition (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 175-81.

45. Biiveer Singh, "ASEAN's Arms Procurement: Challenge of the Security Dilemma in the Post Cold War Era," Comparative Strategy, April-June 1993, pp. 199-223, especially, 212-13.

46. Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 78-112; Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, "The Military Build-up in Asia-Pacific," Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1992), pp. 197-208; Robert Salvy, "Updating Military Aircraft of the Pacific Rim Nations," International Defense Review, January 1990, pp. 44-51; David Saw, "Defence Spending in Southeast Asia," Military Technology, F^ruary 1992, pp. 12-23; Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 9, 30, June 19 and July 10, 1993; Edmond Dantes, "An Indepth Look at the Asia-Pacific Air Forces and Future Procurement" and Amitav Acharya, "Explaining the Arms Build-up in Southeast Asia," Asian Defence Journal, January 1993, pp. 20-33 and 66-68; Michael Richardson, "Arms Race Feared in East Asia if U.S. Leaves Too Quickly," International Herald Tribune, April 10-11, 1993; 226

Michael Mecham, "Malaysia Buys MlG-29s, F/A-18Ds," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 5, 1993. As one nation's weapons procurement plans change over time for a variety of reasons, only the most recent information is cited here.

47. Xiaoxiong Yi has persuasively argued that the Tiananmen crisis opened up a fundamental dilemma in China's US policy—i.e. how to balance autonomy and interdependence—and eventually led China to devise new strategies toward America. See his "China's U.S. Policy Conundrum in the 1990s: Balancing Autonomy and Interdependency," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 8 (August 1994), pp. 675-91.

48. See Xu Xiaojun, "China's Grand Strategy for the 21st Century," paper presented at the 1994 NDU Pacific Symposium on "Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities," National Defense University, Washington, DC, February 15-16, 1994.

49. See, for example, David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 43-59.

50. Roger Sullivan, "Discarding the China Card," Foreign Policy, No. 86 (Spring 1992), p. 11.

51. From the economic point of view, the MFN withdrawal would cause a higher tariff, raising the price of Chinese goods imported by the U.S. This would not only dampen the Chinese exports to the U.S., but it would pass the higher cost to American consumers. The withdrawal would also have an adverse impact on several East Asian economies, which run in joint ventures China whose products are exported to the U.S. The withdrawal would hurt the prospering small private businesses in China rather than the Chinese government, the intended target. For a detailed discussion on the MFN issue, see James R. Lilley and Wendell L. Willkie, Jr., eds.. Beyond MFN: Trade with China and American Interests (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1994); Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994); Harry Harding, "Asia Policy to the Brink," Foreign Policy, Fall 1994, pp. 57-74.

52. The frequency of "simulated warfighting" between the two militaries has been on the rise. See BaÂara Opall "China Sinks U.S. in Simulated War," Defense News, January 30- February 5, 1995, pp. 1, 26; Patrick Tyler, "China's Military Regards U.S. as Main Enemy in the Future," New York Times, November 16, 1993; Ross H. Munro, "Eave^ropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War—Where It Doesn't?" Orbis, Summer 1994, pp. 355-72. In a recent encounter in the Yellow Sea, a Chinese Han-class nuclear submarine followed USS Kitty Hawk for three days. See Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1994; Barbara Starr, "'Han Incident' Proof of China's Naval Ambition," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 7, 1995, p. 5. CHAPTER Vn

CHINA'S DECISION-MAKING CALCULUS IN NORMALIZATION: A HISTORICAL COMPARISON

The penultimate chapter intends to extend the potential applicability of the perceptual analysis into China's decision-making in normalizing relations with foreign

countries. Establishing diplomatic relations is a major foreign policy decision that directly

touches upon the national interest of the states involved. Not only has China been no

exception to this truism, but its normalization of relations with the U.S. (),

the Soviet Union (May 1989), and South Korea (August 1992) enabled China to

significantly enhance its own national interests. Due also to the surprise factor, China's

normalization with the three countries was seen as a diplomatic coup to some countries or

threat to others. This chapter takes stock of China's decision-making calculus in

normalizing interstate relations. In particular, it seeks to discern the motives, patterns, and

consequences of China's decisions by relating Sino-U.S. and Smo-South Korean

normalization to Sino-Soviet normalization, which was elaborated in Chapter 4.

The three countries, of course, differ significantly from each other in many

respects: territory, population, economic level, military capability, and international

status, to name a few. Their respective relations with China have also varied over time.

227 228

Despite their seeming differences, the selection of the three countries is justified in that: 1)

China's normalization with such different countries as the U.S., the USSR, and the ROK at different times, partially reflects China's changing motivations and priorities over time;

2) the very difference among the three countries does highlight the variations in China's responses to its continuing concerns such as unification, security, and economic development; and 3) there has been no scholarly effort to systematically compare the three historical cases, largely because of the fact that Sino-Soviet and Sino-South Korean normalization is of recent origin.

Moreover, notwithstanding the growing body of literature on the three cases, it has mostly been a one-way effort on the part of non-Chinese scholars; Chinese writings on the subject independent of official account are still rare.* Until the diplomatic minutes of the negotiation meetings for the three cases become available to the outside researcher, the findings of the following sections should be regarded as tentative. Finally, it is hoped that the following analysis many accrue more heuristic and comparative value when more information becomes available on China's recent decisions to establish or restore relations with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Israel.

Sino-U.S. Normalization

Ever since what President Richard Nixon called "the week that changed the world" in February 1972, quite a few American scholars and participants in Sino-U.S. relations have written an impressive array of historical accounts which now become classics in the 229

field.^ Given their scope and detail, it would be unwise to write another account of Sino-

U.S. normalization in a short essay. Rather, what follows is a brief highlight of major

aspects of Sino-U.S. normalization for a historical comparison.

The primary motive for China's rapprochement with the U.S. in 1972 was

security concern with the Soviet military threat. As a major power but not a superpower, a

newly-created Communist China found its security niche in the Soviet camp in the 1950s.

After the Sino-Soviet rift, however, China became vulnerable to the attack by either

superpower or by both in collusion. On the other hand, the 1968 Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia, the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash, and the continued Soviet

military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border since the mid-1960s have all pointed to the

fact that the Soviet Union was a more direct and immediate threat to Chinese security than

the United States.^ Moreover, America's continued entanglement in Vietnam contributed

to the withdrawal of its forces from Asia. Thus, China decided to seek strategic alignment with the latter.

Sea changes in American China policy were in the offing as well. Having long conceived the need for rapprochement with the PRC, Richard Nixon began to take concrete steps immediately after his inauguration in January 1969."* Nixon's initial motive was to promote a smooth American disengagement in Vietnam, one of his major campaign pledges. Fearing the Soviet countermove and possibly a domestic reaction, however. President Nixon instructed his national security adviser Henry Kissinger to conduct a quiet probe on the issue and keep it from the inquisitive media.^ It then was 230 soon enmeshed with the Kissingerian triangular logic-the U.S. would stand in the pivotal position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the PRC. The huge potential benefits of the U.S-

PRC rapprochement allowed the two countries to sidestep their past enmities and confrontation in the Korean War, Taiwan Strait crises, and the Vietnam War.

In the 1969-71 period, each side sent a series of discreet signals and public messages to the other, and both have reciprocated the other's initiatives. Not only had the

U.S. been operating by 1970 several communication channels with the PRC through

France, Romania, and Pakistan, but it also conveyed at the Warsaw ambassadorial talks its intention to send a high-level emissary to Beijing to discuss a fundamental change in the

U.S.-PRC relations.® The U.S. also took a host of consistent steps in rapid succession, which were entirely or partly directed toward Beijing: gradual lifting of trade and travel restrictions, the announcement of the Guam Doctrine, and the opposition of the Soviet- proposed Asian collective security system. China also sent feelers to the United States. In a December 1970 interview with Edgar Snow, Chairman Mao Zedong opined that Nixon would be welcome to visit China "either as a tourist or as President."^ The most dramatic was the sudden invitation in April 1971 of an American ping pong team to China, who was then participating in an international tournament in Japan. During the same month,

China formally invited a high-level American emissary to visit China, thus finally clearing the way for Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July of that year.

Yet, both sides had to cope with the most serious of all possible agendas in their normalization-the Taiwan question and its associated problems. The first battle ground 231 turned out to be the UN General Assembly on October 25, 1971, when it met to vote the

PRC's admission to the international body. By that time, however, President Nixon had already announced in July to visit China in the near future, and Kissinger began his second, but public, visit to China. In the eyes of the UN member-states, the future course of U.S. actions on the issue became too obvious. Despite U.S. administration's official stance and U.S. Ambassador to UN George Bush's last-ditch effort to keep the Taiwan seat, the PRC was admitted to and Taiwan was expelled from the international body by a vote of 76 to 35, with 17 abstentions.*

The Shanghai Communique, signed at the end of Nixon's visit to China in

February 1972, was a highly unusual diplomatic document in that both sides "candidly" presented their "essential differences" on a variety of issues. The U.S. side, for example, maintained the peace plan forwarded jointly by South Vietnam and the U.S. and emphasized its support for South Korea and Japan, while the Chinese side backed up

Vietcong's peace proposal and North Korea's unification plan and squarely opposed the

"revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism."^

The Taiwan question was predictably the most controversial. In the Shanghai

Communique the Chinese side unambiguously pointed out: "The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United

States"; the PRC government is the "sole legal government of China"; and the "liberation of Tmwan is China's internal affair." It further called on the U.S. to withdraw forces and military installations from Taiwan. On the other hand, the U.S. "acknowledges" that all 232

Chinese "maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." While unilaterally stating its interest in the peaceful settlement among the Chinese, the U.S.

"affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it wiU progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. "

Notwithstanding its point-scoring appearance, the Shanghai Communique is also notable for what it did not raise. That is to say, the PRC side did not raise the question of the diplomatic and military alliance relations the U.S. had held with Taiwan—a non-legal entity in the PRC's view. The fact that the Communique, without the resolution of the

Taiwan question, became the basis upon which both sides began the long journey for normalization indicates, first and foremost, the genuine fear China held toward the Soviet

Union and the importance China attached to rapprochement with the United States.

While the normalization of diplomatic relations became a major foreign policy goal of both sides, there was no specific timetable. Moreover, being a diplomatic coup engineered by a few top leaders in botli countries, Sino-U.S. rapprochement needed to generate domestic constituency and supporting mechanism in their respective countries.

American public reacted favorably to the rapprochement, according to several opinion polls conducted before and after February 1972.” In addition, the two-way trade soared from a mere $4.7 million in 1971 to $95.4 million in 1972, $752.6 million in

1973, and $921.2 million in 1974.” Tourism and cultural activities grew apace in the years to come as well. 233

Beginning in 1973 till 1976, however, a set of major domestic events in both countries and the changing international atmospherics seriously impeded progress in normalization of diplomatic relations. In China, for one thing, the balance of post-Lin

Biao politics was precariously maintained by two major factions: one was the radical leaders led by Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, and other members who rose during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution (1966-1976); and the other was the moderate forces represented by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping (after 1973, except in 1976) who were veteian party cadres with an emphasis on economic development. The ascendant of the radical group in the summer of 1973 led to the ideological struggle called "Anti-

Confucius, Anti-Lin Biao Campaign." The physical failure of Zhou Enlai and Mao

Zedong, the two architects of Sino-U.S. rapprochement on the Chinese side, took its toll.

China's political paralysis, characteristic of Mao's last years, left the radical leaders an upper hand over Zhou Enlai, who died in January 1976, and Deng Xiaoping, who fell from power again in April 1976. The radical leaders were also able to engineer the appointment of an undistinguished figure, , as China's premier to succeed

Zhou. It was only after the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 and the arrest of the

Gang of Four the following month by Marshal and Hua Guofeng was China in a shape to pursue the normalization process, now that the most significant opposition to the U.S. was gone.''*

Despite the favorable American public response to the rapprochement, on the other hand, American politics also underwent a series of domestic and international crises as 234 well, preventing it from fuUy engaging with the normalization process. First and foremost, the unfolding of the Watergate scandal in late 1973 foreshadowed the political demise of President Nixon, who finally left the White House in August 1974. The succeeding Ford administration lacked the personal thrust in pushing the normalization, which was characteristic of President Nixon. The fall of Saigon in early 1975 and the

U.S. presidential election in 1976 also precluded President Ford from pursuing controversial foreign policies such as the normalization of relations with the PRC. Not surprisingly. Ford's December 1975 trip to China was a disappointment in the view of

Beijing, while presidential candidate in 1976 called for the re-examination of the normalization process so as to give a due respect to Taiwan's interest.

At the international level U.S. detente with the Soviet Union raised the Chinese fear of the superpower "collusion" at its expense. At the time of the 1975 U.S.-Soviet summit, China launched a campaign denouncing the superpower behavior. The American withdrawal from Vietnam in early 1975 made the Chinese leadership strongly suspect whether the U.S. had the necessary resolution to counter the Soviet aggression worldwide and, in particular, in Asia. Amid international and internal uncertainties Sino-U.S. normalization process made no progress and became stagnant.

The resumption of the normalization talks became possible only after the establishment of a new leadership in both countries. In a fascinating coincidence, the

Carter administration was inaugurated in January 1977, and Deng Xiaoping was finally rehabilitated in July of the same year. Deng's power struggle against Mao's anointed 235 successor Hua Guofeng involved a multifaceted strategy: promotion of Deng's proteges, such as and Zhao Ziyang, to the position of responsibility to shift power balance in his favor; the rehabilitation of veteran cadres victimized during the Cultural

Revolution, thus undercutting Hua's political legitimacy; and the launching of economic reform. The inexperienced and hapless Hua Guofeng was no match to a veteran revolutionary like Deng Xiaoping whose authority cut across the party, government, and the military. Deng’s struggle for political power and his reform program was culminated in the historic Third Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee held in December 1978.

After inauguration in 1977, President reaffirmed that Sino-U.S. normalization was his administration's major policy goal. During his first year of presidency, however. President Carter was soon inundated with immediate foreign policy problems such as SALT U negotiations, Panama Canal treaties, Africa, and the Middle

East. Under a strict order from President Carter not to initiate the formal normalization talk, but to test the political water in B eijing,State Secretary Cyrus Vance went to

Beijing in August 1977 and met with Deng Xiaoping, who was back to his previous position of vice premier only a month ago. Vance's discreet exploration with Deng apparently ran afoul, leading the latter to recall that Vance's visit was a "setback.

During the first half of 1978 two important events changed the prospects for normalization: one was the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations caused by the Soviet military buildup, Soviet-backed Cuban activities in Africa, and U.S. criticism of Soviet human rights violations; and the other was the passing of the Panama Canal Treaties in the 236

Senate, which provided Carter with a confidence in handling the Congress/* President

Carter's growing frustration with the Soviet inflexibility was manifest in his June 1978 speech at the U.S. Naval Academy, in which he asked the Kremlin to "choose either confrontation or cooperation" and rentinded that the "United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice."’^

By that time China's relations with Vietnam had already plummeted. After Hanoi finally unified the southern half, it tilted toward Moscow at the expense of Beijing.

Vietnam joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in November 1977, granted base rights to the Soviet forces, and worst of aU, began to encroach upon the territories of

Cambodia, the traditional ally of Beijing. Finally, Vietnam concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union in November 1978.

It was in this changing context that President's Carter's national security adviser

Zbigniew Brzezinski made a trip to China in May 1978. Brzezinski, as instructed by

Carter, relayed the message that the U.S. had "made up its mind" to realize the normalization as quickly as possible and shared "strategic interest in a cooperative relationship with China...that is fundamental and enduring.To the delight of his

Chinese hosts, Brzezinski even made a well-publicized remark during a trip to the Great

Wall: "Last one to the top fights the Russians in Ethiopia!

Since then, it took about six months of formal negotiations to achieve the

normalization of full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC. Difficult and

hard bargains were expected on a variety of issues. First of all, to prevent the outside 237 influence on the negotiation, presumably from Taiwan and its lobby and possibly from

Congress, both sides agreed to a secret negotiation and decided to limit the number of participants to a minimum: Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Harold Brown, Leonard

Woodcock, Richard Holbrooke, and Michel Oksenberg on the U.S. side and ,

Chai Zemin, and other supporting staff on the Chinese side. Three communication channels were set up: the official negotiation was conducted between

Woodcock and Huang Hua in Beijing; the Brzezinski-Chai Zemin channel in Washington dealt with specific cooperative issues in diplomatic, economic, and military areas; and the third line of communication was set up between Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Han Xu, a senior diplomat at China's liaison office in Washington, to exclusively deal with the Taiwan question and its associated problems.^^

The redundant lines of communication were deemed necessary due to the issue complexity and differing positions, particularly on the Taiwan question.

On the terms of normalization, the Chinese earlier advanced three conditions: the

U.S. should break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, "abrogate" (later changed to

"terminate") the defense treaty with Taiwan, and withdraw all U.S. troops from Taiwan.

China could be "patient," Deng said, but "normalization could not be achieved on any other terms. The U.S. side forwarded five counterproposals: the U.S. would maintain unofficial presence in Taiwan after normalization, continue American commercial, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan, continue selected defensive arms sales to

Taiwan after normalization, issue a public U.S. statement expressing hope for a peaceful 238 solution to the Taiwan problem, and "terminate" (rather than "abrogate") the defense treaty with Taiwan in accordance with the terms of the treaty/'*

Concerning the timing of the normalization a set of factors was taken into consideration. One was the strategic factor: Vietnam and the Soviet Union concluded an alliance treaty in November 1978, and the former's "hegemonic ambition" in Indochina was unacceptable to the Chinese leadership. By that time, Chinese leaders apparently decided to "teach Vietnam a lesson." The Sino-U.S. normalization, Deng thought, would at least restrain the possible Soviet action against China during the latter's pedagogic war against Vietnam.

Another factor was the upcoming Third Plenum in December 1978, when Deng's political power would be indisputably consolidated and he would chart out domestic reform and open-door policy to the outside world. At the Third Plenum not only would

Deng launch "Four Modernizations," but he thought the announcement of the Sino-U.S. normalization would be instrumental in promoting reform programs.

Still another was the Chinese anxiety to achieve the Sino-U.S. normalization, as the Carter administration insinuated several times, before the upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit sometime early in 1979. The impending SALT agreement, which would surely entail the U.S.-Soviet summit was a factor which facilitated the Chinese decision to set the timing of Sino-U.S. normalization before the end of 1979.^

In all probability, Deng would have thought that given the overriding importance of the above considerations it would be better conclude the normalization before the end of 239

1978 and deal with the some knotty issues associated with the Taiwan question after normalization. On this most difficult question in normalization, the negotiation record is unambiguous: there was no agreement on the arms sales issue.^ More important, while

China strongly objected to the U.S. position to sell weapons in the post-normalization period after one-year moratorium, it did not allow the arms sales issue to prevent the normalization. It was just temporarily set aside. According to Ambassador Woodcock who informed Deng on December 13 of the U.S. intention to sell carefully selected defensive weapons to Taiwan after normalization, Deng was furious and stated that the United States knew that the PRC would never agree with Washington's intention, but added that to complete the normalization process was the first priority.^’

The normalization announcement was made simultaneously in Washington and

Beijing: on the evening of December 15, 1978 in Washington and on the following morning in Beijing. It consisted of three sets of documents: one joint communique and two unilateral statements written respectively by the U.S. and the PRC governments. In the joint communique, both sides agreed to establish diplomatic relations effective on

January 1, 1979, and the U.S. side "recognizes" that the PRC government is the "sole legal government of China. In the unilateral statement, the U.S. announced that it would terminate diplomatic relations and defense treaty with Taiwan and withdraw its remaining military personnel from Taiwan. The U.S. government, however, stated that it would seek "commercial, cultural and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations. " Furthermore, the U.S. reasserted in the 240 statement its continued interest in the peaceful resolution of die Taiwan question, but the

U.S. intention to sell arms to Taiwan after normalization was not explicitly stated but was supposedly understood by the Chinese side.^^ This ambiguity led to the Chinese claim in its unilateral statement that the Taiwan question "has now been resolved" between the

PRC and the U.S. and that the "way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland...is entirely China's internal affair." To sum up, the ambiguities and contradictory interpretations contained in the parallel presentation of differing official positions of both governments have foreshadowed a perennial debate between the U.S. and China over the agreed principles, to which neither side now subscribes.

The Carter administration informed the congressional leaders of the normalization only hours before its announcement and during a congressional recess, thus effectively preventing any possible opposition to the decision. The congressional reaction was predictably "highly indignant. Many members of Congress sharply attacked the Carter administration for not securing a pledge from the PRC government that it would not resort to force against Taiwan and for paying little respect to the continued U.S. commitment on the security of Taiwan. The end result was the enactment in April 1979 of the Taiwan

Relations Act (TRA), which among others reaffirms the continuing arms sales to Taiwan and its interests in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.Needless to say,

Beijing regarded the TRA a violation of the agreement contained in the two joint communiques between the PRC and the U.S. governments. 241

The arms sales issue, however, has remained a highly controversial issue that pit the U.S. and Chinese governments against each other. Another battle over arms sales was drawn in July 1980 when the Carter administration authorized American aircraft manufacturers to begin negotiations with Taiwan on a relatively advanced fighter aircraft— the so-called "FX decision. The controversy over the FX decision was temporarily defused on August 17, 1982 by announcing another joint communique between the two government. In essence, the U.S. government agreed that its arms sales to Taiwan would

"not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries," and intend to "reduce gradually its sale of arms to Taiwan. The American side, however, did not agree upon the "final settlement or termination" of arms sales, as the

Chinese government demanded. On the contrary, the Reagan administration further issued a set of unilateral statements which effectively qualified the August 17, 1982 communique on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

In retrospect, the Taiwan question and its associated problems were the knottiest agenda in achieving and managing diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC in

the 1970s and in the early 1980s. Even if the primary importance of concluding

normalization with the United States had allowed the Chinese leadership to temporarily set

aside the Taiwan issue, the changes in both domestic and international contexts of their

relationship throughout the 1980s led both countries to distance themselves from each

other on the strategic front and to put a new emphasis on economic benefits (in China's 242 view) and the compatibility of social values (in the U.S. view). Their differing policy priorities, which had previously been secondary and apparent, crowded their bilateral agenda in the post-Tiananmen period.

Sino-South Korean Normalization

The initial process for China's normalization with South Korea and, to a lesser extent, with the Soviet Union began from where Sino-U.S. normalization left. It was only after Deng Xiaoping's consolidation of power in the late 1970s that China put an end to ideological struggle and launched the economic modernization program. China's domestic economic reform not only required a peaceful external environment but it also dictated that China expand foreign relations in the years ahead. As the strategic consideration became less critical in the 1980s, the relative importance of the economic factor increased in formulating and implementing Chinese foreign policy. China's decision to forge relations with South Korea best illustrates China's changing priorities from strategic to economic consideration.

During the Cold War, interstate relations between China and South Korea were deadlocked in the framework of unbridled mutual antagonism and suspicion due mostly to the bipolar configuration of the world's power relations, the Chinese intervention in the

Korean War, and China's continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union over the friendship of

North Korea. In the early 1980s as well, while secret and indirect trade between the two countries grew steadily, there was no official contacts. 243

Curiously enough, geographical proximity played a role in the opening of quasi­ official contacts between the two sides. In May 1983 a hijacked Chinese commercial plane flew to South Korea, which necessitated the Beijing government to contact Seoul for the return of passengers and the plane. Two incidents of a kind occurred again in 1985: one was the defection of a Chinese PLA air force pilot to South Korea, who sought asylum in

Taiwan; the other transpired when a mutiny aboard a Chinese PLA torpedo boat resulted in the landing of the boat in South Korea.

It was, however, only in the second half of the 1980s when a combination of factors, including the growing trade ties, China's participation in Seoul's 1986 Asian

Games and 1988 Olympics, and the new global trend toward detente, formed unofficial but substantive ties between the two sides. Two-way trade, for example, grew from a mere U.S.$19 million in 1979 to U.S.$1.2 bülion in 1985 and over three bUlion US dollars in 1988.^® Such a tremendous growth in trade relationship between the two was partly aided by the export-oriented South Korean economy's strong performance between

1986 and 1988. For the three-year period South Korea recorded an average annual real

GNP increase of over 12 percent, thanks to the combination of propitious external factors such as "three lows"—i.e., low oU prices, low interest rates, and a weak dollar.

On the other hand, an array of domestic economic factors in South Korea including the surge in land prices, wage increases, and high inflation foreshadowed the decline of GNP growth rates and the diminishing comparative advantage of its export goods by the end of the 1980s. In the South Korean economy's structural adjustment from 244 a simple, labor-intensive to more technologically-sophisticated industries, China turned out to be a ready trade partner.^^

More important domestic factor was the initiation of a major diplomatic overture by the Roh Tae Woo government in 1988, known as Nordpolitik or "Northern

Diplomacy. Nordpolitik was aimed at the creation of a solid foundation for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula through improved ties with then-socialist countries: the East European countries, the Soviet Union, and the PRC. In essence, it was a diplomatic means to induce North Korea to open up and to improve North-South Korean relations. The initial success of the Nordpolitik is well known: beginning with Hungary in

January 1989, South Korea established diplomatic relations with all East European states.

The Soviet Union, a principal supplier of economic, technological, and military assistance to North Korea, followed suit in September 1990.

Although normalization of relations did not materialize. South Korea and China rapidly expanded their trade to U.S.$5.8 billion in 1991. In tandem with the increased economic interaction, the flow of person-to-person exchanges soared to 100,000 in 1991.

Both sides also agreed on October 20, 1990, to set up a trade ofirce in each other's capital.

On June 10, 1991, the PRC's trade office in Seoul began issuing visas for Korean businessmen and tourists. A host of bilateral agreements were also concluded to bolster their burgeoning relations.

While it took over a decade to forge a substantive relationship between the two countries, the official negotiation process for normalization code-named Operation East 245

Sea was very briefBefore the official contact for normalization talks began, both governments have reportedly operated a secretive communication channel, at least since

March 1990. The Chinese messenger was PLA Senior Colonel Liu Yazhou,"^ a son-in- law of the late Chinese President Li Xiannian; the Korean was Li Soon Suk, president of the South Korean conglomerate Sunkyong Group's company. It was not unknown to the

Chinese leadership that Chairman Choi Chong Hyun of the Sunkyong Group was related to President Roh Tae Woo by marriage. Nor was it coincidental that Sunkyong was the

first South Korean conglomerate allowed to establish its Beijing branch office. While the

details of their work remain unknown, both Liu and Li must have ensured that the

messages from one government reach the other's top decision-makers. Recognizing the

enduring value of personal connections (guanxi) in Asian politics, both governments

employed them throughout.

The first meeting between Foreign Ministers Lee Sang Ock and Qian Qichen was

arranged during the contact between Kim Suk Woo, Director of Asian Affairs Bureau of

the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and Chen Huasun, Director of Chinese

Foreign Ministry's International Organizations Bureau, when the former visited Beijing in

August 1991 to negotiate over the details of the bilateral trade agreement between the two

countries. The first foreign ministerial meeting was held in New York at the United

Nations in October 1991, a few weeks after both North and South Korea were separately

but simultaneously admitted to the international body. The second was held the following

month, when Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen participated in the Asia-Pacific 246

Economie Cooperation (APEC) forum held in Seoul and paid a courtesy visit on President

Roh Tae Woo. The third meeting was convened during South Korean Foreign Minister

Lee Sang Ock's visit to Beijing in April 1992 to attend the UN Economic and Social

Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) convention. It was at the third foreign ministerial meeting that both governments finally agreed to begin negotiations for diplomatic normalization.

Operation East Sea was well under way the following month and led to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the ROK and the PRC on August 24,

1992. On that day, Kim Chong Whi, President Roh's national security adviser, shed light on the secretive Operation East Sea in the following statement: "On July 29 [ROK] Vice

Foreign Minister Roh Chang Hee and [PRC] Deputy Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin concluded the working-level negotiations over normalization which had begun since last

May. During that period there were four working-level negotiations in Seoul and

Beijing. He also added that the negotiation teams were headed by Ambassador Kwon

Byung Hyun on the ROK side and Ambassador Zhang Ruijie on the PRC and that a South

Korean businessman—i.e. Lee Soon Suk of the Sunkyong Group—played an important role at the early stage.

While the diplomatic minutes of the negotiation meetings will remain closed to the outside researcher, the above diplomatic odyssey allows the researcher to make the following tentative conclusions. First of all, the South Korean road to normalization was partly aided by a combination of fortuitous factors, such as geographical proximity, post- 247

Mao China’s emphasis on economy, and the new global trend toward detente. Second, due to the fear of provoking Taiwan and North Korea, both South Korea and China resorted to secretive personal connections in exchanging views on normalization. Third,

Nordpolitik, which was initiated in President Roh's first year, came to a fiill circle with the ROK-PRC normalization in August 1992—only six months before his term's expiration. In aU probability he must have pressed hard for the consummation of

Nordpolitik and the first ROK-PRC summit meeting before his tenure expires. Fourth, while South Korea has openly begun to reach out to the PRC since 1988 and especially after the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990, it was the

Chinese that actually decided on the timing of normalization. China's decision on the timing of Sino-South Korean normalization is an important puzzle, which would shed some light on Chinese foreign policy behavior and decision-making parameters.

In the 1980s China's traditional calculus toward the Korean peninsula underwent a transformation due to a combination of two factors: one was China's economic modernization, as noted earlier, and the other was China's gradual rapprochement with the

Soviet Union. In particular, the gradual improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in the

1980s, which culminated in Gorbachev's May 1989 visit to Beijing, not only deprived

North Korea of the time-proven tool for playing Moscow and Beijing off against each other, but also resulted in enhancing China's leverage over North Korea. By 1988 the

Soviet Union faced a serious economic cul-de-sac, coupled with the deepening global crisis of international communism. The combined effect of these developments was the 248 reduction of Soviet economic and diplomatic support for North Korea. Apparently, the

Soviet economic imperative and the strategic marginalization of North Korea in the era of

Sino-Soviet rapprochement led the Soviet Union to rush for normalization with South

Korea on September 30, 1990. Since that date tUl the end of 1991, rumors abound that the

Sino-South Korean normalization would be only a matter of time. To Beijing, however, there still were two towering barriers to overcome before making the decision—North

Korea and China's unification with Taiwan.

In the eyes of Beijing, the North Korean and Taiwan issues are inextricably intertwined, requiring the simultaneous resolution of both issues. As China’s imperative of economic development requires continued stability on the Korean peninsula, it has employed an array of measures to reduce tensions on the peninsula since the early 1980s.

As is well known, while applying the principle of "separation of politics from economics"

(jingzhengfenli) to its relations with South Korea, China has encouraged the North Korean leadership to take domestic economic reforms, to enhance North-South Korean relations, and to expand contact with the outside world. As North Korea's major ally, moreover,

China has played an intermediary role in the former's diplomatic contacts with the United

States and Japan.

What had been less clear during the period preceding the Sino-South Korean normalization was the question of exactly how the Beijing government would solve the dilemma—that is, how to formally recognize the "two Koreas" without jeopardizing

China's long-standing claim for "one China"? The Chinese solution first began with its 249 encouragement to North Korea on the resumption of a North-South Korean dialogue in

1990. In September 1990 the prime ministers of North and South Korea met for the very first time since the division of Korea in 1 9 4 5 .Subsequently, the prime ministerial talks became a regular, institutionalized mechanism under which both sides hammered out confidence-buUding measures on the peninsula. The talks, for example, led to the adoption on December 13, 1991, of the "Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and

Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea," under which both sides not only renounced the use of force against each other but agreed to "recognize and respect" each other's system.**^

Second, it is important to note that only a few days after Chinese Premier Li

Peng's visit to Pyongyang in May 1991 did North Korea agree to seek a simultaneous but separate entry into the UN with South Korea, dramatically departing from its long-held

"one-Korea" policy. The North Korean leadership hardly concealed their displeasure and announced that the decision was a very difficult choice, arrived at only "reluctantly.

Both the ROK and the DPRK became UN member-states on September 17, 1991.

Thus, the Chinese goal for the decoupling of the Korean and Chinese unification questions required: 1) ensuring both North and South Korea to recognize each other and

2) pressuring North Korea to enter the UN, albeit separately from South Korea. Only after both Koreas' admission to the UN did the foreign minister of China and South Korea meet in October 1991. Now the ROK and the DPRK officially recognized each other and became two separate sovereign member-states of the UN, in which only the PRC—not the 250

ROC—was represented and Taiwan was regarded as part of "one China." It is also no coincidence that China agreed to hold formal normalization talks in April 1992, two months after the Basic Agreement became effective. In the August 24, 1992 joint communique, the PRC further weeded out any linkage between the Korean and Chinese unification questions when it called on South Korea to recognize that the PRC government is the sole legal government of China and to respect the PRC's position that there is only one China, and Taiwan is part of China.

WWle the decision to begin normalization talks was made in April 1992, there were several Chinese domestic factors that might have influenced the actual timing of concluding diplomatic relations. First of all, in early 1992 Deng Xiaoping's campaign for a renewed reform drive was in full swing, as evidenced by his and other Chinese leaders' visits to southern China in January and February 1992.'*^ With the October 1992 14th

CCP Congress only a few months away, the Chinese reformist leadership ntight have well hoped that the announcement of normalization with South Korea, a major regional economic power, would promote its determined wUl to reform to the Chinese people and help set the tone for the upcoming Party Congress. As it turned out, the Party Congress laid down the blueprint for a post-Deng China by adopting the principle of the "socialist

market economy" and by appointing dozens of reform-minded provincial leaders and

ministers with economic portfolios to the pinnacle of power in China.

China's 1992 goal of six-percent GNP growth notwithstanding, on the other hand,

the first half of the year witnessed 12-percent GNP growth. In light of the accelerated 251 economic growth and pressing need for capital, technology, and management skills in

Shanghai's Pudong area and the newly-established free trade ports, an improved relationship with the nearby South Korea would bring substantive economic benefits and might induce American and Japanese participation.

On the diplomatic front, China's decision could be seen in the context of its post-

Tiananmen offensives against the West. China's diplomatic isolation after Tiananmen was short-lived due to the fortuitous outbreak of the Gulf War, which allowed China to take advantage of its prestigious position at the UN Security Council and to prove itself to be a major player in the emerging post-Cold War international order. China has also gradually but unmistakably increased its diplomatic influence in Asia by normalizing relations with its neighbors, including Indonesia and Singapore. By the early 1990s China restored ties with Russia, India, and Vietnam, thus standing in a position to counter U.S. pressure more effectively than before.

Moreover, by mid-1992 Taiwan's "Pragmatic Diplomacy," which was based upon its economic prowess, seemed to bear fruit. In the years leading to Sino-South Korean normalization, a coterie of small states such as Liberia, Belize, and Niger (June 1992) established diplomatic ties with the ROC on Taiwan at the expense of the PRC. China might have well intended to drive a wedge against Taiwan's Pragmatic Diplomacy by forging relations with South Korea, a major ally of Taiwan and tlie only Asian country which hosts the embassy of Taiwan. South Korea's reluctance notwithstanding, it withdrew recognition of Taiwan, with whom South Korea's anti-communist stance 252 barkening back to the 1940s, and unwittingly put cold water over Taiwan's bids for a growing international status and recognition.

To sum up, China's traditional calculus toward the Korean peninsula has undergone dramatic changes since 1979. Since then, China has pursued a de facto "two-

Korea" policy and put a premium on continued stability on the peninsula. In establishing diplomatic normalization, China did carefully craft the solution so as to dispel any misgivings of connections between the Korean and the Chinese unification issues. The above analysis has shown that it was only after North and South Korea officially recognized each other and entered the UN as separate sovereign member states—made possible in part by China's active maneuvering—did the Chinese government decide to begin normalization talks. China's behavior strongly suggests the primacy of economic

(i.e. reform) over political and ideological (i.e. North Korea) considerations in its calculus of foreign policy decisions.

China's Patterns of Engagement

China's decisions to normalize relations with the United States and the Republic of

Korea were made in the context of different policy priorities held at different time periods.

In the case of Sino-U.S. normalization, China's primary motive was the security consideration. China's vulnerability to the Soviet military threat was such an important issue that the apparent ideological problem of aligning with the "imperialist" U.S. had to be set aside. An economic rationale for normalizing relations with the U.S. was also out 253 of the question, given the "anti-capitalist" nature of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, the security consideration impelled China to seek rapprochement with the U.S. in the early

1970s and to conclude normalization talks at the end of the decade, as China's motivational system in the 1970s strongly indicates.

On the other hand, the domestic economic imperative was the primary motivational base in China's decision to forge relations with South Korea in 1992. As the strategic imperative became less paramount in the 1980s, the importance of domestic factors increased significantly in China's foreign policy calculus. The passing of the Cold

War entailed the end of Sino-Soviet rivalry over the Korean peninsula, further increasing the economic value of China's ties with South Korea. Amid China's changing priorities in the 1980s, North Korea turned from a strategic asset to an economic liability in China's calculus. A secondary motive was to expand China's diplomatic influence in the region in the post-Tiananmen period by consolidating ties with its neighbors, including South

Korea-a major U.S. ally in Asia.

In a similar vein, Sino-Soviet normalization should be seen in the context of the compatibility of their respective motivational systems at the end of the 1980s. In particular, the primacy of domestic reform and internal stability created the context in which both countries could buüd a new relationship. Ironically, the domestic factors, which had fuelled the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1950s and the 1960s, became a primary cause for the Sino-Soviet reconciliation in second half of the 1980s. 254

Thus, it can be argued that China's different motivational systems predisposed it to seek different foreign relations at different times. China's decisions to normalize relations with the three countries are congruent with its different policy priorities held at particular times. The three cases also illustrate that the cause for foreign policy change could be either externally or internally driven. Within the overall foreign policy orientation, however, China's actual decision-making calculus differs in significant ways from other countries. The difference in China's foreign policy patterns is largely the outcome of the gap in China's priorities, the role of individual leaders, and policy-making structure in

China. China's interactions with the three countries in the normalization process have shown the following patterns of engagement.

The foremost notable pattern is the secretive and informal nature of China's normalization process.**^ While this aspect could be partially justified given the nature of diplomatic work and the existence of the countries affected by the normalization, it seems to have extracted political cost on the part of China's counterparts. For instance, the U.S.

State Department was largely ignored and U.S. Congress was informed of the normalization only hours before its official announcement.'^* In the normalization with

South Korea, the announcement caught the entire ministries by surprise, including the

Foreign Ministry.'*^ In all probability, the secretive negotiation has not only shouldered the burden of implementing the remaining ambiguities on the following administrations, but it has also left lingering doubts about whether or not national interests were compromised in the process. 255

Second, notwithstanding the conventional characterization of Chinese foreign policy into "rigidity and flexibility or "principles and rhetorics, the above analysis presents the case that Chinese foreign policy behavior could be highly flexible and elastic even in the supposed "rigid principles." China's decision to conclude the normalization with the U.S. in spite of the irresolution over the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is a shining example. China’s adjustment from "One-Korea" policy, a principled stance during the

Cold War, to "Two-Korea" policy is another instance of China's flexibility. It seems that

China's tactical flexibility or about-face is affected by the distance in priorities—i.e., the overriding importance of the top policy priority over other policy goals.

The third pattern can be broadly termed as the systemic effect on Chinese foreign policy.The strategic consideration in China's rapprochement with the U.S. was the result of the bipolar structure of the international system. In the case of Sino-South Korean normalization, China did factor in the international principles and norms governing the sovereignty issue and actively maneuvered to separate the Chinese from the Korean unification issue so as not to leave any misgivings on its own unification issue with

Taiwan. China's normalization process with South Korea began only after both Koreas' entry into the UN and their mutual recognition.

Fourth, reflecting its cultural trait, China's lobby effort has focused on cultivating personal, rather than institutional, ties in the normalization process. China has consistently aired sympathetic views with Americans who share the "anti-Soviet" views, even if its impact on U.S. China policy was probably negligible. China's emphasis on personal ties 256 was most successful in the South Korean case, which appreciates the enduring nature of personal connections. China is also known to have adopted a similar approach in the

Soviet case.^^ One unforeseen upshot of China's emphasis on personal ties has been the lack of institutional support which would have bolstered the long-term relations. Even after the Sino-U.S. normalization, as Michel Oksenberg notes, "the bureaucratic residues of previous anti-China or anti-American missions were substantial in both capitals.

Despite a decade-long forging of economic relations before normalization, Chinese-South

Korean relations also had to overcome ideological, legal, and bureaucratic barriers.

Taken together, China's decisions to normalize diplomatic relations with the

United States, the Soviet Union, and South Korea generally reflect its motivational system held at given point in time. Its patterns of engagement in the normalization process, however, show some variations due to the interplay of China's domestic factors, such as leadership preferences, political culture, and decision-making processes. One consequence of the undue emphasis on normalization over other major agendas has been the continuation of security concern in the case of South Korea and major sources of instability in the case of the United States, running the gamut from the Taiwan issue to human-rights violations. China's primary emphasis on domestic stability after Tiananmen offers no optimism on the early resolution of these outstanding bilateral issues with South

Korea and the United States. 257

NOTES

1. Recent scholarly works analyzing China's foreign relations from tlie Chinese perspectives include Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan, eds., The Chinese View o f the World (New York: Pantheon, 1989); Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds., Decision- Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).

2. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) and Years o f upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982); Richard Nixon, UN: The Memoirs o f Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1978) and The Memoirs o f Richard Nixon, Vol. 2 (New York: Warner Books, 1979); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs o f the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983); Jimmy Carter, Keeping the Faith: Memoirs o f a President (New York: Bantam, 1982), A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977); Michel Olcsenberg and Robert Oxnam, eds.. Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1978); Richard H. Solomon, ed.. The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hah, 1981); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985).

3. This is the traditional perspective aired by the majority of scholars in Sino-U.S. relations. See Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development and the March 1969 Clashes," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 4 (December 1972), pp. 1175-1202; Harry Gelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1982); Jonathan D. PoUack, The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Chinese Security Debate, R-2907-AF (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1992). John W. Garver argues, however, that political motive was as important as the security consideration and adds that confronting the Soviet military threat, China relied primarily on its own strategic deterrent capability, rather than on its alignment with the United States. See his China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).

4. This came in the form of a Presidential memo to Henry Kissinger, instructing the latter to explore the possibility of rapprochement with China. Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 169.

5. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Vol. 2, p. 8. 258

6. These channels are described in detain in Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 22, Bk. 4 (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1986), pp. 30-33.

7. Edgar Snow, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung," Life, April 30, 1971, pp. 46-48; Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 709.

8. Chang, United States-Oiina Normalization, p. 33.

9. All citations of the February 1972 Shanghai Communique are drawn from Public Papers of the President of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1972 (Washington, DC Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 376-79. Reprinted in Chang, ibid., 190-94 Solomon, ed.. The China Factor, pp. 296-300; Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship. The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 373-77.

10. The problem of "building up domestic constituency" in both China and the United States is most cogently argued by Michel Oksenberg, "The Dynamics of Sino-American Relationship," in Richard Solomon, ed.. The China Factor, pp. 48-80.

11. Michael Y. M. Kau et al., "Public Opinion and Our China Policy," Asian Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (January-February 1978), p. 136; Chang, United States-China Normalization, p. 126. Harding incorporates the recent changes in the American public perception toward China after Tiananmen, see A Fragile Relationship, p. 363.

12. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistical Yearbook 1982 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1982); as cited in Harding, ibid., p. 364. It is interesting to note that Sino-U.S. trade plummeted in 1975-77, due mostly in China's domestic instability, and grew rapidly after 1978. Bilateral trade volume was $461,6 million in 1975, $335.9 million in 1976, and $372.1 in 1977, but soared to $1,144.6 million in 1978 and $2,316.3 million in 1979. See the IMF statistics above.

13. For discussion on the relationship between Chinese factionalism and its foreign policy, see Thomas M. Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle: A Report Prepared for Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary o f Defense (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1977).

14. Parris H. Chang, Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 2 (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 1983). 259

15, Reflecting the downhill nature of the bilateral relationship, Kissinger also noted after his November 1973 visit to China that his visit "either were downright chilly or were holding actions," see his Years o f Upheaval, p. 698,

16, Michel Oksenberg has noted that at the time of August 1977 China also was not in a better shape than the U.S. to make difficult decisions which normalization negotiations would certainly bring. See his "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982, pp, 182-83,

17, Stanley Kamow, "East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No, 3 (1979), p, 598,

18, Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp, 75-78; Chang, United States-China Normalization, pp, 38-39,

19, Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp, 593, 602,

20, Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp, 208, 214,

21, Ibid., p, 551,

22, The rationale behind the strategy of operating three communication channels is explained by Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," p, 186, For operation of the channels, see Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp, 78-80; Chang, United States- China Normalization, pp, 40-42,

23, Xue Mouhong and Pei Jianzhang, eds,, Dangdai Zhongguu waijiao (Contemporary Chinese diplomacy) (Beÿing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1987), p, 226, Harding notes that Deng requested his remarks not to be quoted. See Harding, ibid., pp, 51, 399n72,

24, Chang, United States-China Normalization, p, 39; U,S, Department of State, "Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of China and Future Relations with Taiwan, " News Release (Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, December 1978), p, 2,

25, Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p, 80,

26, For the last-minute clarification of both sides' position on arms sales issue, see Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," 187-88, 260

27. Deng's remarks were quoted in Ambassador Leonard Woodcock's interview with Joanne Chang. See Chang, United States-China Normalization, pp. 40-41.

28. One joint communique and two unilateral statements regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China are reprinted in Solomon, ed.. The China Factor, pp. 300-304; Harding,A Fragile Relationship, pp. 379-81. For the same documents and Taiwan's statement, see Chang, ibid., pp. 195-201.

29. The unilateral American statements regarding the Sino-U.S. normalization do not contain any clause which says U.S. intention to sell arms to Taiwan. They instead state that "The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves." This ambiguity has later provided Beijing with an ammunition in the perennial dispute over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In addition, it led some China experts, such as Harding, to believe incorrectly that "the American statements also contained a reassertion of...its intention to sell limited quantities of defensive arms to the island after the one-year moratorium it had promised to Deng Xiaoping." See Harding, ibid., p. 81.

30. On congressional reaction to tlie normalization, including the enactment of the TRA, see Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," 188-89; Harding, ibid., pp. 82- 87; Chang, United States-China Normalization, pp. 41-42.

31. A full text of the Taiwan Relation Act, which is U.S. domestic law governing U.S.- Taiwan relations without official recognition, is available in Solomon, ed.. The China Factor, pp. 304-14.

32. A Doak Bamett, U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

33. A full text of the August 17, 1982 Joint Communique on United States arms sales to Taiwan is reprinted in Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 383-85; Chang, United States-China Normalization, pp. 202-203.

34. See President Ronald Reagan's statement on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan issued on August 17, 1982. A full text is reprinted in Harding, ibid., pp. 385-86.

35. Probably reflecting the nature of Sino-South Korean relations, the existing literature on their bilateral relations predominantly focuses on the economic aspect and hardly discusses security issues. The oft-cited studies on Sino-South Korean economic relations include: Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea-China Economic Relations: The Current Situation and Its Implications," Asian Survey, October 1988, pp. 1031-48; David Dollar, "South 261

Korea-China Trade Relations: Problems and Prospects," Asian Survey, December 1989, pp. 1167-76; and Hee Mock Nob, "The Development of Korean Trade and Investment in the PRC," Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1989, pp. 421-39. Arecent Asian Survey article provides an elaborate explanation of external factors which might have affected the Chinese decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. It, however, insufficiently discusses the domestic factors and hardly mentions any security factor. See Hong Liu, "The Sino-South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation," Asian Surrey, November 1993, pp. 1083-94.

36. Hee Mock Noh, "The Development of Korean Trade and Investment in the PRC," p. 427.

37. For a discussion on South Korea's domestic economic consideration, see David Dollar, "South Korea-China Trade Relations: Problems and Prospects," pp. 1172-74.

38. The term "Northern Diplomacy" or Nordpolitik was coined by Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk in a speech to National Defense College in June 1983, the tenth anniversary of the "June 23 Declaration." For the background of President Roh Tae Woo's Nordpolitik, see "July 7 [1988] Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity," White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: ROK National Unification Board, 1988), pp. 381-403; B. C. Koh, "Seoul's 'Northern Policy' and Korean Security," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 127-43.

39. The following account on the ROK-PRC normalization negotiation is based upon an investigative report by Correspondent Doo Shik Park, "Donghae jakjun eul wansoo hara" (Carry out Operation East Sea), Wolgan Chosun (Chosun Monthly) (Seoul), October 1992, pp. 388-98.

40. For a speculation on Liu Yazhou's role, see Chosun llbo (Seoul), August 22, 1992.

41. As cited in Doo Shik Park, "Donghae jakjun eul wansoo hara" (Carry out Operation East Sea), p. 391. See also "Interview with Ambassador Kwon Byung Hyun," Joong-ang Daily News (Seoul), August 25, 1992. For the role of Kim Chong Whi in the implementation of Nordpolitik, see David Sanger, "Seoul Looks North, Balancing Hope and Anxiety," New York Times, December 16, 1992.

42. See various issues of South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: International Cultural Society of Korea). See also Taeho Kim and Young Koo Cha, "Prospects for Political Change and Liberalization in North Korea," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 155-69. 262

43. For a full text of the Basic Agreement, see Korea Herald, February 20, 1992.

44. Rodong Shinmm (Pyongyang), May 29, 1991, p. 3. For an analysis of the North Korean decision to seek membership in the UN, see Far Eastern Economic Review, June 6, 1991, p. 15.

45. For a full text of the ROK-PRC Joint Communique, see Chosun Daily, August 25, 1992 and FBIS-CHI, August 24, 1992, p. 16.

46. Parris H. Chang, "Deng's Last Stand on China's Reform Movement," Korean Journal o f Defense Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 105-28.

47. This is China's preferred negotiating behavior in other occasions as well. See Lucian Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style, R-2837-AF (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1982); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994); Paul Kreisberg, "China's Negotiating Behavior," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 453-77.

48. Nixon was quoted as having told Zhou that "our State Department leaks like a sieve." Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 1070. Kissinger also notes (p. 190) that after bureaucratic battles with the State Department President Nixon decided to handle the China issue at the White House.

49. This has probably been one of the most serious critiques of South Korea's Nordpolitik. For a critical evaluation of Nordpolitik, see Bookbang jengchak euihu Dongbooka jengse wa Hanbando tongil whankyimg (Northeast Asian situation and unification environment on the Korean Peninsula after Northern Policy) (Seoul: Research Institute for National Unification, December 1992); Sungjoo Han, "Dabyunjok jiyok hyupryok koochuk haeya" (Need for multilateral regional cooperation system), Sisa Journal (Seoul), September 10, 1992, p. 52; Chosun Daily, September 18, 1992.

50. Quansheng Zhao, "Patterns and Choices of Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 3-15. For a well-balanced overview of theories in studying Chinese foreign policy behavior, see Samuel S. Kim, "Chinese Foreign Policy Behavior," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 3-31.

51. Michael Ng-Quinn, "The Analytic Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27 (1983), pp. 203-24. 263

52. While details of China's normalization process are presently lacking, indirect reference can be gleaned from China's involvement in the August 1991 coup in Moscow. See Ting Mei, "CPC Gets Involved in the Soviet Coup," Chiushih Niemai (Hong Kong), No. 260, September 1, 1991, p. 20, in FBIS-CHI, September 4, 1991, pp. 5-6;South China Morning Post, August 23, 1991, p. 12.

53. See Oksenberg, "The Dynamics of Sino-American Relationship," in Solomon, ed.. The China Factor, pp. 59. CHAPTER Vm

CONCLUSIONS

From this analysis of Sino-Russian military cooperation, several basic conclusions can be drawn regarding the nature and implications of their ties. These conclusions may be fruitfully presented in terms of their theoretical, bilateral, and regional implications. Since the applicability of the perceptual approach in other foreign policy areas has already been explored in the previous chapter, section one here evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the approach and discusses its potential contributions to China area studies and international relations research. Section two assesses the future direction of bilateral military ties between China and Russia and its impact on the PLA's ongoing defense modernization. Finally, section three addresses the recent debate in both academic and policy communities on the possible consequences of a stronger China on East Asian stability and security.

Theoretical Issues Revisited

Probably the single most important contribution of the approach has been to capture the dramatic change in interstate relations by examining a state's motivational system and external factors. By analyzing China's motivational systems from the 1950s to

264 265

1989, this study has shown how its overall foreign policy predisposition, when combined with the superpowers', led to either conflictual or cooperative relations with the latter over the past four decades. It also helps illuminate the sources of change. Unlike the realist and the institutionalist, both of which tend to emphasize the systemic effect on state behavior, this study places the state at the center of its analysis and argues that the primacy source of state action could be either external—in the case of China's strategic alignment with the

U.S. in the 1970s-or intemal-in the case of China's normalization with the Soviet Union since 1989.

As a state-centered perceptual analysis,* this study joins the growing awareness in the international relations field that the reality of today's interdependent world requires the analyst to pay a balanced, systematic attention to both domestic and international factors.^

This study also suggests that even if the state's overall foreign policy direction is predisposed by its motivational system, its specific foreign policy outcomes are often the function of a wide array of domestic factors, including political culture, leadership preferences, and decision-making structure. In the Chinese case, moreover, historical legacies and predominant leaders' role in decision-making process remain two critical factors to be considered in any theoretical explanations.

The methodological and empirical problems these two fundamental factors pose for the explanation of Chinese foreign policy action are at best enormous and probably insurmountable. It is not surprising then to find out that China scholars have long debated about the continuing relevance of China's history on its contemporary policy^ and about 266 the policy-maMng role of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping/ Seen in the context of

China's decision to develop military cooperation with Russia, for example, a set of historical legacies must have influenced the final decision, including the 19th-century national humiliation by advanced nations, the Soviet legacy in the 1950s, China's aborted attempts to acquire Western military technology in the 1980s, and the Western military embargo against China since 1989. This has been much true, but it offers no clue to the question how, in the making of the fundamental decision, these historical factors weighed in comparison with the multitude of other major variables, such as lingering security and political concerns, technological and financial problems, the logistical and supply problems, and diplomatic and regional repercussions.

The analytical complexity posed by multiple and interactive variables is grievously pervasive in social science research. Samuel Kim echoes the same critique in terms of the nexus between domestic and international variables:

To note the substantial interaction between domestic and external variables is not to explain how and why the two intermix under certain circumstances and not under others. An understanding of the pattern of linkages between domestic/societal and external/systemic factors calls for closer attention to mediating intervening variables during the decision-making phase.^

On the other hand, this study has presented a considerable amount of circumstantial data to support the seemingly self-evident proposition: the decision has to be made by none other than Deng Xiaoping. It has pointed out, among others, Deng's record as a paramount policy-maker after 1978, the gravity of the decision, the nature of 267

Chinese domestic politics. Recent works, whose sources are as exiguous as this study's

military decision-making, on the relationship between China's authority structure and

decision-making point more strongly in the same direction: "National security policy [in

China], especially internal security and military issues, also remains highly centralized,"

and national security decisions are "relatively unconstrained by institutions at lower

levels. Again, this is no solace for the analyst who found that it was the same Deng

Xiaoping who decided the normalization with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and was

the major mouthpiece in the Sino-Soviet dispute in the 1960s. Human perception could

change, especially when the environment changes, but the point is that if the same cause

(e.g. personality) can produce different effects (e.g. policies).and the same effect can be

attributable to different causes, then no singular causal relationship can be established, and

the analyst must delve into the conditioning variables in the process.’

One possible solution might be to minimize the interactive effect of variables by

specifying the context and issue-areas in which decisions are made to achieve specific, purposeful goals. The decision units approach, for instance, sheds light on several specific conditions under which the particular decision unit opts for certain processes over the others, thus narrowing not only "the range of variables that need to be considered" but also the range of the options the government can take in the foreign policy arena.* The decision units approach also highlights the personal characteristics of individuals and their interactions as important variables in explaining foreign policy behavior. In addition, recognizing the primary significance of the decision-making units in providing both the 268 structure and process and of the key control variables which may impact on foreign policy behavior, the decision units approach argues that the "structure and the [internal] dynamics of such an ultimate decision unit help shape the substance of [a government's] foreign policy behavior."®

On the theoretical level, it seems that such a path-dependent, mid-range approach is entirely compatible with the state-centered perception analysis explored in this study.

Moreover, once a state's motivational system is established, the decision units approach can help illuminate how different variables come into consideration under specific decision structures. Such an integrative perspective offers the possibility of specifying which variables were at work for the particular issue at a given time and of inferring how decisions were made. It could also avoid a number of theoretical and methodological problems in the study of foreign policy, such as reductionism (e.g. global system and national attributes approaches), single-variable explanations (e.g. national interest), and idiographic tendencies (e.g. single-case study).

Taken together, such an integrative perspective reveals both the potential for future research and the limitations of present theoretical constructs. For one, it points at the synthetic function of an integrative perspective in coping with the inherently complex, multifaceted, interactive phenomena that all social scientists must cope with. However, it also points at the opposite direction: the level-of-analysis problem. In other words, an analytical framework cannot incorporate a multitude of individual, domestic, and systemic variables without specifying which variables are more important at different time and 269 under what conditions. This recurring analytical problem strongly calls for a prioritization of major variables, as in the case of this study's motivational system, and the specification of scope conditions, as in the case of the decision units approach.

On the other hand, this study also points to reassess the ways in which the important research questions have been addressed in social science research.

Notwithstanding a half-century-long coexistence between area studies and international relations, it remains true that a basic tension persists between the two fields. As this study has amply demonstrated, international relations theories tend to overemphasize the international system as the primary cause for change in a state's foreign and domestic policy and proffer an array of generalizable patterns, the "clocks," and forests. Area specialists, on the other hand, stay closer to the geographical confinement and remain wary of "conceptual stretching," standardized variables, and the covering laws. Area specialists are rather comfortable with unique cases, the "clouds, " and trees, Ifom which they believe most sources of state action spring.

In the case of China studies in the U.S., as Harry Harding and others have noted, the postwar American scholarship on China has achieved both institutional growth and intellectual maturation.” Furthermore, not only did contemporary China scholars acquire more detailed knowledge about different aspects of China than their predecessors, but they have applied to China studies an increasing number of sophisticated methodologies available in its mother disciplines such as international relations and comparative studies.

The balance sheet for such "cross-fertilization" between China area studies and academic 270 disciplines has been mixed: the contemporary China field's empirical richness and methodological rigor have entailed an increased empiricism and specificity at the expense of earlier American sinology's ability to put China's history, culture, and leaders into a coherent whole.

Acknowledging that "the joining up of area and discipline focuses should theoretically be a healthy development for the advancement of knowledge," Lucian Pye, a noted scholar in China and comparative studies, admonishes younger scholars pointedly:

"excellence lies not in the choice of methodology but the quality of the analysis."'^ Pye's advice deserves attention not only from those who cling to the sovereignty of their disciplines but also from those who seek to bridge area studies and parent disciplines.

In the finally analysis, the present study on Sino-Russian military cooperation is intended to be a reassurance that even one of China's most closed and sensitive aspects would eventually become susceptible to analysis by China scholars. International relations theorists may find this study as a clarion call for a renewed attention on nonsystemic factors as well as the interaction between domestic and international politics. As its topic touches upon China studies, international relations, and military issues, this study has not only tried to bridge the three domains, but it has also detailed its components in terms of history, motivation, extent, and implications. In retrospect, this study has tended to emphasize the rich aspects of its components, but has left some room to be desired on the question of the interrelatedness and synthesis of its components. This is mainly attributable both to the author's intellectual limitations and to the currently state of social science 271 theories. Nevertheless, it unmistakably points at a further integration of empirical richness and theoretical rigor, not at the opposite direction.

The Future of Sino-Russian Military Relations

Since their military ties were resumed in 1990, both Beijing and Moscow have increased the pace, scope, and level of their military cooperation faster than many scholars and officials would have thought possible. The immediate background for the reopening of the military relationship has been the combination of China's calculated move to cope with the negative consequences of Western embargoes following Tiananmen and the Soviet

Union's desperate need to underwrite its sagging economy. More importantly, as this study has argued, both Beijing and Moscow have had historical, economic, and strategic reasons to develop a long-term institutionalized relationship between their militaries. These considerations have helped Chinese and Russian leaders to overcome their bitter experience in the past and lingering security and political concerns.

Russia's transfer of miliary hardware and technology to China remains the hard core of their military ties. The acquisition of foreign technology, however, could be a double-edged sword: it could help buUd China's indigenous defense industry for producing advanced weapons but could lead to technological dependence on a foreign country. Thus, it might be useful to briefly reexamine the Chinese leadership's current attitude toward the age-old question of "self-reliance versus foreign technology." Admiral 272

Liu Huaqing, China's most senior active-duty military officer and a CCP Politburo

Standing Committee member, has provided guidance on how to reconcile the issue.

To modernize weapons and equipment, our foothold must be on our own strength. A big developing socialist country like ours cannot buy modernization of the whole [People's Liberation] Army, whereas other countries will not sell us the most advanced things and, even if we can buy those things, we wül still be under the control of others....When we stress self-reliance, [however] we do not mean we will close the door to pursue our own construction. What we mean is to actively create conditions to import advanced technology from abroad and borrow every useful experience. Military science and technology has no international boundary. One of the basic principles of modernization of weapons and equipment in our [People's Liberation] Army is to mainly rely on our own strength for regeneration, while selectively importing advanced technology from abroad, centering on some areas.

Guided by renewed determination at the top, the PLA has actively engaged in arms negotiations on a wide vaiiety of Russian weapons, equipment and technologies. Due to financial and security considerations and the existence of a huge outmoded inventory, however, the PLA has been very cautious in actually finalizing the deals. The Chinese priority has been undoubtedly to secure Russia's advanced military technologies, which would allow a gradual improvement of the existing PLA inventory. The extent of China's actual purchase of Russian weapons, however, has been more far-reaching than its efforts in earlier decades.

As a consequence, the current balance sheet for their military ties has been mutually satisfactory to both sides: China emerged as the largest foreign buyer of Russian weapons in 1992 with the purchase worth U.S.$1.8 biUion.*'* The total cost for China's 273 purchase of Russian weapons and equipment in 1991-94 has been estimated between $4.5 and $6 billion.*^ Undoubtedly, China has become one of the most valued customers of the

Russian armament sales. It is also highly likely that China, together with India, has now been accorded a special customer status so that they negotiate directly with the Soviet and

Russian Defense Ministry, rather than going through state armament export firms under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES) such as Oboroneksport,

Spetsvneshtekhnika, and since January 1994, Rosvoorouzhenie.'®

China also has unprecedented access to a whole variety of advanced Russian weapons and equipment at basement prices. The arms contracts with Russia can also be made in partial barter terms and, unlike those with the U.S., with no political strings attached. The real long-term success for China, however, would depend upon its acquisition of production technologies and offset arrangements, which will allow the production of sophisticated weapons at home.

In light of their close military contacts for the last five years, it is reasonable to expect that China would continuously acquire more weapons and weapons technologies

firom Russia in the coming years. Barring unforeseen disruptions in their relations,

Russia's financial considerations and China's defense modernization need will largely

shape the future course of their military transactions. The following areas are likely to be

the major agendas for an intense dialogue between the two militaries.

First and foremost, in light of China's technological difficulties in aerospace

industry to produce an advanced combat aircraft, it is highly likely that China will 274 continuously concentrate on acquiring various aerospace technologies and production rights from Russia in the coming years. They might include not only the aircraft themselves but also specific aerospace items such as avionics systems, aircraft engines and technical data for the design and construction of airframes. China's security planners may weU believe that China's past failures in air force modernization have left few alternatives now and that further delay in this area could incur substantive cost to China's growing national interest. China's acquisition of the Su-27s in particular and its aerospace cooperation with Russia seem to have been informed by this sense of urgency.

Of particular interest in this regard is the outcome of the current ongoing negotiation for the second batch of 26 Su-27s, which are tied up with the payment terms and technology transfer issues, as noted earlier. China's priority has been to develop an advanced indigenous fighter, with initial Russian technological assistance. Be it XJ-10, Su-

27, Su-35 or a new next-generation aircraft, Chinese military leaders have not yet secured requisite technologies. An informed source noted that in the joint aircraft development project the Russians would provide two-thirds of the technical input and design, as well as avionics and engines, for a Chinese next-generation fighter, while the Chinese would bear the initial start-up costs of an estimated U.S.$500 million.'^ If the joint aircraft project materializes as described, this could lay down a solid ground for the PLAAF’s modernization program.

On the other side of the border, the Russian Federation's continuing economic difficulties and domestic instabilities have created a strong political consensus to sell 275 advanced weapons to overseas/* Since the last days of the Soviet Union, state funding of defense production has been declining precipitously. According to the latest Russian official report, Russia's 1994 defense budget allowed the production of only 17 aircraft, and a mere seven percent of the naval shipbuilding program would get adequate funding.

In addition, the Russian government's State Committee for the Defense Industry

(Roskomoboronprom) reported that defense R&D appropriation for 1994 was only about

Rbl2.4 trillion (less that U.S.Sl billion), and the figure for 1995 wiU be only 70 percent of it.^° This means that Russian defense manufacturers must find sources for its own R&D funding, probably by adopting an aggressive overseas market strategy.

In an interesting historical irony, on the other hand, by mid-1994 Russia owed

U.S.$1.5 billion to China. In recent years, Russia has pushed the Thai and South Korean governments hard to accept Russian weapons and weapons technology to compensate for debts it owed or inherited from the Soviet Union.In the Thai case, the Russians proposed military helicopters to clear a U.S.$65 million debt for its rice imports. The

Russian government has also allegedly offered a reference list for weapons to the Chinese side to eliminate the growing debt issue.^^

Looking at the future, the Russian connection could have a significant long-term effect on the PLA's overall defense modernization, if the current level of Sino-Russian military cooperation is sustained. At a minimum, Russia has provided the Chinese with an access to a host of advanced weapon systems and selected technologies that have not been available to them in earlier decades. The PLA, on its part, seems eager to reap tlie benefits 276 of newly-developed Sino-Russian military links by focusing on the acquisition of technology and production rights.

Implications for East Asian Stability

WeU into the early decades of the 21st century, China wiU remain an Asian power with global ambition. At present China is undergoing a rapid transformation in its economic, diplomatic, and military power. In particular, China's economy has achieved an annual growth of over nine percent since 1979, making it one of the largest and highest growing economies. Prospects for China to become an economic superpower by the early

21st century are bright, even if major uncertainties remain within China regarding the outcomes of the impending power transfer, the possibUity of an internal disintegration, and a widening regional economic gap.^

As long as China's imperative of economic development prescribes a peaceful and stable environment, it may abstain from committing itself to any renewed local conflicts.

For one thing. Western capital and technology need to flow into the nation without interruption for the sake of the success of China's Four Modernizations. It is these considerations that have largely guided China's post-1979 foreign policy and have aUowed occasional "constructive engagement" with the West such as the resolution of the

Cambodian dispute and the beginning of a peace process on the Korean peninsula.

On the other hand, an economic disorder in China could lead to a highly centralized leadership in Beijing and the adoption of a hostile foreign policy. An 277 economically-crippled and anti-Western China would be more likely to reassert its sovereignty and interests along the disputed border and territorial waters such as Hong

Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea. Would then China's economic prosperity have a stabilizing effect on Asian security? This is a vitally important question which has recently received an intense attention from both academic and policy communities.^"*

Among Asian security scholars, Denny Roy has mostly eloquently put the question into the realist and liberal debate.^ According to him, the liberal's view of a pacific China consists of two propositions: the "prosperity-causes-peace" and "interdependence" arguments. At the risk of oversimplification, Roy’s argument has been that the first proposition is rejected for economic prosperity is unlikely to bring political liberalization in China, which would make the Chinese government accountable.^ The

"interdependence" argument is also untenable, Roy continues, for three major reasons: economic interdependence could heighten rather than defuse political tensions; self- interested Western countries could not capitalize on the deterrence value of interdependence; and a weaker China is vulnerable to interdependence, but a stronger

China will not.^^

From this analysis, Roy concludes that the realist has a stronger case. The realist, in any case, would argue that a stronger China seeks greater influence in the region, often at the expense of other regional actors. China is not a status-quo power, the realist would continue, and its growth from a weak and poor state to a powerful and rich one is likely to produce an assertive foreign policy. More pointedly, realists have long argued that a 278 power transition under which a major power with high-growth rates catches up the declining dominant power is highly dangerous and could result in a "hegemonic war."^*

Furthermore, judging from China's record of using force outside its border and the extent of its involvement in Asia's major sources of tension, from territorial disputes to arms build-up and from the Korean peninsula to the South China Sea, it is all the more likely that China is likely to translate its enhanced military muscle to political gains when opportunities present themselves and could eventually reassert its traditional position of dominance in Asia.

It is against this backdrop that China's growing military power, particularly its naval and air-strike capabilities, is perceived by its neighbors to be a major security threat.

In fact, virtually every nation in East Asia can agree that China's growing military capabilities will become a significant concern in the minds of security planners. And few nations would remain comfortable with any prospects of China's reassertion of sovereignty and influence over a host of issues in the region. Worse still, these regional perceptions have often been exacerbated by China's excessive secrecy on its defense issues.

As noted earlier, the present strategic uncertainty has primarily been caused by the

U.S. military adjustment in the region.^^ This strategic uncertainty, however, has

considerably been worsened by China's military buildup and its lack of military

"transparency. " The China factor, in other words, has been a major reason for the recent

spate of a regional arms buildup in Northeast and Southeast Asia. To most East Asian

nations the reduced American military presence in the region would be a fearful dream in 279 their security planning. Even more fearful is the prospect that they may have to cope with

China's subtle but calculated assertiveness in the future without reassurance from the

United States.

To conclude, notwithstanding its growing economic, diplomatic, and military prowess, China will hedge against any renewal of local conflicts, at least for now, and may even take a constructive role to ensure a stable environment conducive to its economic modernization. In the mid and long term, however, a prosperous and strong

China is likely find an environment in which it has expanding national interests and the military capability to resolve the erstwhile disputes with its neighbors in its favor. For years to come, Asian nations will aU have to cope with a changing but uncharted security environment in which a "reluctant" America, an "impotent" Russia, an "uncertam" Japan, and a "resurgent" China fortuitously coexist. 280

NOTTS

1. Scholars of Chinese foreign policy have long employed the perceptual analysis, due in part to the lack of pertinent and reliable information on China's foreign policy-making process. They are, however, essentially focused on individual leaders, not on the state. See Steve Chan, "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management," World Politics, Vol. 30 (April 1978); Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics o f Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1980); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War(New York: Macmillan, 1960) and The Chinese Calculus o f Deterrence (Ann Arbor: Press, 1975). Recent perceptual studies on China include Gilbert Rozman, The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); David L. Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). For a review of the recent perceptual studies on China, see Bin Yu, "The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospects," World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 235-61.

2. Similar calls are made in Benjamin Cohen, "The Political Economy of International Trade," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990); Helen Milner, "The Interaction of Domestic and International Politics: The Anglo-American Oü Negotiations and the International Civil Aviation Negotiations, 1943-1947, in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Doubled-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1978), pp. 881-912; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 427-60.

3. For an overview of the debate about the "continuity and change" of Chinese history, see John K. Fairbank, ed.. The Chinese World Order (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). For contrasting views, see Mark MancaU, China at the Center: 300 Years o f Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984); Michael Hunt, "Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective," in Harry Harding, ed., Chinese Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 1-42.

4. Book-length works in English include Lucian W. Pye, Mao Tse-tung: The Man in the Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Dick Wilson, ed., Mao Tse-tung in the Scales o f History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thoughts o f Mao Tse-tung, rev. and enl. (New York: Praeger, 1969); David Bonavia, 281

Deng (Hong Kong: Longman, 1989); Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle o f an Empire, trans. and ed. by Nancy Li, Peter Rand and Lawrence R. Sullivan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). Though not s

5. Samuel S. Kim, "China and the World in Theory and Practice," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War thirdEra, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 30.

6. Suisheng Zhao, "The Structure of Authority and Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework," in Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds., Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 240, 242. See also Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton, eds.. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

7. Michael Ng-Quinnn has emphasized this point in his explication of the systemic effect on Chinese foreign policy. See his "The Analytical Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27 (June 1983), p. 208.

8. Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann have made significant contributions to our understanding of the problem of interactive variables over the years. See Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33 (1989), pp. 361-87; Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermarm, and Joe D. Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior," in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds,. New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Margaret G. Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-maldng," in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown, eds.. Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in theHonor o f Alexander L. George (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 77-94; Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann, "The Synthetic Role of Decision-Making Models in Theories of Foreign Policy: Bases for a Computer Simulation," in Michael Don Ward, ed.. Theories, Models, and Simulations in International Relations: Essays in the Honor o f Harold Guetzkow (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 223-48.

9. Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan, ibid., p. 309. 282

10. In the case of China studies in the United States, see Raymond H. Myers and Thomas A. Metzger, "Sinological Shadows; The State of Modem China Studies in the United States," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1980, pp. 87-114; Edward Friedman, "In Defense of China Studies," Pacific Affairs, Summer 1982, pp. 252-66; Harry Harding, "From China, with Disdain: New Trends in the Study of China," Asian Survey, October 1982, pp. 934-58 and "The Evolution of American Scholarship on Contemporary China," in David Shambaugh, ed., American Studies o f Contemporary China (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), pp. 14-40.

11. Harding, "The Evolution of American Scholarship on Contemporary China, " pp. 14- 40. See also his eloquent discussion (pp. 29-30) of the "academicization" of area studies in the United States.

12. Lucian Pye, "Social Sciences Theories in Search of Chinese Realities," China Quarterly, December 1992, pp. 1161-62, 1165.

13. Liu Huaqing, "Unswervingly Advance along the Road of Building a Modem Army with Chinese Characteristics," Jiefangjun Bao, August 6, 1993, pp. 1-2, inFBIS-CHI, August 18, 1993, pp. 15-22. The quotation is on p. 19.

14. President Boris Yeltsin said that Russia's arms sales to China in 1992 was U.S.$1.8 billion. See South China Morning Post, March 19, 1993; Robert Kamiol, " Trade Dispute Halts Cam Ranh Talks," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 20, 1993, p. 12. On the other hand. Prime Minister told the Congress of People's Deputies that arms sales to China during the same period was U.S.Sl billion. The difference probably reflects the chaotic state of official accounting in Russia in recent years. See Jane's Defence Weekly, December 12, 1992, p. 10; FBIS-CHI, August 12, 1992, p. 7.

15. Jane's Defence Weekly, citing a published estimate in Moscow, reported on November 19, 1994 that Russian arms sales to China in 1992-93 was worth between U.S.$3 billion and U.S.$5 bUhon. This estimate does not include the four Kilo submarine purchase in November 1994 worth U.S.Sl-1.5 billion. See also FBIS-SOV, August 15, 1994, pp. 10- 11.

16. Andrei Martov, "Russia's Asian Sales Onslaught," International Defense Review, May 1994, pp. 49-54, especially, p. 49.

17. See Tai Ming Cheung, "China's Buying Spree," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993, p. 24, 26. Both Mikoyan and Sukhoi aircraft manufacturers have long competed for not only aircraft sales but also a variety of aviation deals with China in such areas as the Super-7 and F-8 upgrade, aircraft engines and the next-generation fighter. The Sukhois is leading the competition, but the sale of RD-33 engines, which power the MiG-29s, 283 opened the potential for Mikoyans' upgrade of various Chinese aircraft, majority of which are MiG-derivatives. The PLA, however, is currently more interested in the Su-27 technology acquisition.

18. There are some frictions in Sino-Russian border areas regarding the illegal immigration, crime, and even the agreements. They have not affected Sino-Russian military cooperation in any significant way, however. See Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai's discussion of border problems in Shijie Ribao (New York), May 16, 1994, p. AlO; Won Bae Kim, "Sino-Russian Relations and Chinese Workers in the Russian Far East," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 12 (December 1994), pp. 1064-76; V. Venevtsev and D. Demkin, "Governor on the Warpath against 'Chinazation' [jfc] and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Kommersant-Daily, January 17, 1995, p. 4, in FBIS-SOV, February 3, 1995, pp. 3-4.

19. Paul Beaver, "Russian Industry Feels the Cold," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 7, 1994, p. 30.

20. "Rosvoorouzhenie Funds New Projects," International Defense Review, November 1994, pp. 66-67.

21. FBIS-SOV, August 10, 1994, p. 9.

22. Chou Te-hui, "Russia Supplies Beijing with an Arms Sales List," Lien Ho Pao (Hong Kong), April 26, 1994, p. 2, inFBIS-CHI, April 26, 1994, p. 18.

23. See, for example, Gerald Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy, Adelphi Papers, No. 287 (London: USS, 1994).

24. See, for example, A. James Gregor, "China's Shadow over Southeast Asian Waters," Global Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 1-13; Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74; Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 136-52; Taeho Kim, "China's Military Buildup in a Changing Security Climate in Northeast Asia," in Richard H. Yang, éd., China's Military: The PLA in 1992/93 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 121-36; Larry W. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 157- 75; David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 43-59.

25. Denny Roy has made a major theoretical contribution to the debate about the consequences of China's economic growth for Asian security. See his "Consequences of China's Economic Growth for Asia-Pacific Security," Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No. 2 284

(June 1993), pp. 181-91; "Singapore, China, and the 'Soft Authoritarian' Challenge," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 3 (March 1994); "Hegemon on the Horizon: China's Threat to East Asian Security," Intematioml Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149- 68.

26. Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon," p. 157.

27. Roy, ibid., 158-59 and "Consequences of China's Economic Growth for Asia-Pacific Security," pp. 186-88. For further discussions on the relationship between democracy and war-proneness, see Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1983), pp. 205-35 and "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2," Philosophy card Rtblic Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1983), pp. 323-53; David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review," Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37.

28. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 208-209; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

29. It is worthy of note that by early 1995 the U.S. reaffiimed the forward presence of U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific, thus reversing the earlier trend for reduced military presence. See U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy fo r the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1995), pp. 23-29. Interestingly, the report discusses (pp. 14-15), albeit briefly, China's military build-up and its impact for the first time. Compare the 1995 report with the earlier ones: U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1990);A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to the Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 1992). LIST OF REFERENCES

Newspapers and Periodicals Arms Control Today.

Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. Prahran, Australia.

Asian Affairs.

Asian Defence Journal. Kuala Lumpur.

Asian Survey.

Aviation Week & Space Technology.

BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Asia-Pacific (abbreviated SWB/FE)

Beijing Review, (formerly Peking Review).

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