0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page iii The West Bank Wall Unmaking Palestine Ray Dolphin Introduction by Graham Usher Pluto Press London • Ann Arbor, MI 0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page iv First published 2006 by Pluto Press 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA and 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 www.plutobooks.com Copyright © Ray Dolphin 2006 Introduction © Graham Usher 2006 The right of Ray Dolphin to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0 7453 2434 7 hardback ISBN 07453 2433 9 paperback Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data applied for 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Designed and produced for Pluto Press by Curran Publishing Services, Norwich Printed and bound in the European Union by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne, England All reasonable efforts have been made to trace copyright holders of material quoted in this book. If any have been overlooked, the publishers will be happy to hear from them. 0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page v This book is dedicated to all those affected by the wall. May they hold on to their land and livelihoods. 0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page vii Contents Acknowledgements viii Preface ix List of acronyms xv Maps: Map 1 xvi Map 2 xvii Map 3 xviii Map 4 xix Introduction by Graham Usher 1 1 Wall and route 35 2 ‘The land without the people’: the impact of the wall 71 3 Enveloping Jerusalem 111 4 The wall and the international community 145 5 Activism and advocacy 187 Index 215 [ vii ] 0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page viii Acknowledgements Research for this book would not have been possible without the many individuals who gave me their valuable time and assistance throughout 2002–5. In particular, I would like to thank Abdul-Latif Khaled and Shareef Omar (Abu Azzam), in Jayous, Mohammed Shaheen in Ras Atiya and Yousef Dirawi in Nu’man. Thanks are also due to the staff of all the municipalities and village councils I visited, in particular Marouf Zahran and Nidal Jaloud in Qalqilya, Taisir Harashi in Qaffin, and Jamal Husseini in Zeita. For their suggestions and encouragement from the start I would also like to thank Jamal Juma and Robyn Long of PENGON. The book would not have been possible without the support of UNRWA, although the views expressed are the author’s and should not be taken to reflect the official views of the United Nations, or UNRWA. I would like to thank especially the UNRWA West Bank Operations Department, in particular Jihad Fararjeh and Adeeb Salman. I also thank Graham Usher for giving me the idea for the book and for the Introduction. For their suggestions, feedback and comments on the text I am indebted to Lucy Mair, Beverly Milton- Edwards, Susan Rockwell, Janet Symes, Isabel de la Cruz and Stefan Ziegler. Special thanks to Beatrice Metaireau and Majed Abu Kubi, and to UNOCHA for permission to reproduce the maps. Finally for permission to include longer extracts, I am indebted to Uri Avnery and Gush Shalom, Ha’aretz newspaper, and the World Council of Churches. [ viii ] 0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page ix Preface Two years ago, when the fence was built here, we had a hard time convincing people in Israel that the purpose of the fence was not security or prevention of suicide bombings, but that there were political and settlement interests. First they separated the people of Jayous from their lands, preventing them from working on it. And now everything is clearly visible: they are passing over the lands to settler possession. (Israeli peace campaigner, Uri Avnery, addressing Palestinian and Israeli activists who had come to the West Bank village of Jayous to replant olive trees uprooted behind the wall for the expansion of Zufin settlement.)1 In the second part of 2002, Israel began construction of a ‘secu- rity fence’ in the northern West Bank. The project went little noticed initially. The first half of 2002 had witnessed an unprecedented wave of suicide bombings inside Israel and a military offensive by the Israeli Defence Forces that caused widespread destruction to Jenin and other West Bank Palestin- ian cities. If Israel decided to build an obstacle to protect its citi- zens from Palestinian assailants – which would have the added benefit of separating the two warring sides – this seemed reasonable – even desirable – in the eyes of many. However, as construction proceeded of what was alleged to be [ix] 0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page x PREFACE a temporary, preventative obstacle, disquiet grew. Despite official assurances that the barrier ‘does not annex any lands to Israel nor does it establish any borders’, large areas of prime Palestinian land were alienated from their owners, whose access became dependent on a gate and permit regime.2 As for the disclaimer concerning borders, in the words of Israeli commentator Aluf Benn, ‘it looks like a border and behaves like one with barbed wire, electronic devices, concrete walls, watchtowers and checkpoints’.3 Then there was the circuitous course of the wall, which far from separating the incompatible populations left large numbers of Palestinian villagers and Israeli settlers on the ‘wrong side’. If it was to serve as a border – which Israel still officially denies – why not build the wall along the armistice line of 1949, the inter- nationally recognised Green Line? The 670-kilometre wall route – as opposed to the 315 kilometres of the Green Line – meant a proportionate rise in cost and in the time spent in construction, which seemed at odds with the project’s paramount objective of saving lives. Furthermore, why did a route supposedly designed to prevent Palestinians from infiltrating Israel leave tens of thousands of potential assailants on the ‘Israeli side’ of the wall, with no physical obstacle to prevent them from entering Israel?4 In reality, the primary purpose of the wall is not security: in the words of UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard, ‘what we are presently witnessing in the West Bank is a visible and clear act of territorial annexation under the guise of security’.5 Specifi- cally, the route was designed for the de facto annexation to Israel of the major settlement blocs, which had been implanted throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem in contravention of international law. Furthermore, the wall took in not only the existing built-up areas of these settlements but abundant land and water reserves for their future expansion. Indeed, according to the Israeli human rights organisation B’Tselem, ‘not only were security-related reasons of secondary importance in [x] 0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page xi PREFACE certain locations, in cases where they conflicted with settlement expansion, the planners opted for expansion, even at the price of compromised security’.6 These latest land expropriations and restriction on access to land and water resources come as no surprise to the Palestinians affected. After all, they had experienced expulsion and disposses- sion in 1948 and in 1967, and a determined campaign by Israel since the 1967 occupation to expropriate much of the West Bank as ‘state land’. The introduction to this book places the wall and the disengagement from Gaza in their historical context as the latest attempts by Israel to manage its intractable ‘native problem’. Both initiatives are ultimately driven by Prime Minister Sharon’s recognition that territorial expansion must come to terms with the demographic realities of a superior Palestinian birth rate. Chapter 1 outlines the background to the decision to build a wall. Although born of genuine security concerns, the route was ultimately determined by Sharon and settler interests. Subsequent pressure, both domestic and international, has led to a less intru- sive route but the wall still joins the major settlement blocs to Israel, in addition to enclosing large tracts of the West Bank’s most fertile land and productive water resources. Although it constitutes a new border there is no indication, however, that the wall marks the final frontier or that Israel’s territorial designs are confined to the 10 per cent of the West Bank annexed de facto. Success for the settlers’ choice of route meant disaster for Palestinian communities cut off from families, clinics and schools in ‘closed zones’, as well as for the thousands of farm- ers whose access to lands, crops and water supplies depends on a restrictive and arbitrary gate and permit regime. Chapter 2 examines the devastating effect that the routing of the wall around Alfei Menashe settlement has inflicted on the city of Qalqilya and surrounding Palestinian communities. While wall-protected Israeli settlements thrive, the fear is that these [xi] 0_7453_2434_7_00_prelims.qxd 30/11/2005 15:09 Page xii PREFACE Palestine communities will wither away, deprived of land and livelihoods and the opportunity for future growth. Chapter 3 focuses on East Jerusalem, where the wall repre- sents the most significant alteration to the physical and political landscape since its capture and annexation by Israel in 1967. The route has been designed to improve the ‘demographic balance’ of Jews vis-à-vis Arabs, taking in the Jewish settle- ments in East Jerusalem and the annexed environs while ‘walling out’ densely populated Palestinian areas. Many Jerusalem Palestinians have already moved to the Israeli side through fear of losing residency and social service benefits, adding to the poverty and overcrowding in Arab localities, already heavily under-resourced in terms of infrastructure and public services.