CIVIL WAR IN BOSNIA, 1992-94 HUNGARY

ROMANIA

SEA

N t

o, 50 , 100 , 150, Miles

Yugoslavia 1990 Civil War in Bosnia 1992-94

Edgar 0' Ballance First published in Great Britain 1995 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-13668-1 ISBN 978-1-349-13666-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-13666-7

First published in the United States of America 1995 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

ISBN 978-0-312-12503-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data O'Ballance, Edgar. Civil War in Bosnia, 1992-94/ Edgar O'Ballance. p. Col. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-312-12503-5 I. Yugoslav War, 1991- -Bosnia and Hercegovina. 2. Bosnia and Hercegovina-History-1992- 1. Title. DR 1313.3.02 1995 949.702'4---<\c20 94-32534 CIP

© Edgar O'Ballance 1995 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1995

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the temlS of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottcnham Court Road, London WIP 9HE Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. II 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 04 03 02 0 I 00 99 98 97 96 95 Contents

Preface vii Acknowledgements xiv Abbreviations xvi Chronology xviii List of Maps xxiii 1 Sovereign Independence 1 2 As it Happened 17 3 Civil War 27 4 : April-May 1992 39 5 The UN Returns: June-July 1992 53 6 The Geneva Conference: August 1992 78 7 UNPROFOR-2: September-October 1992 97 8 The Vance-Owen Plan: November-December 1992 118 9 American Involvement in Bosnia: January-March 1993 136 10 Sterile Negotiations: April-June 1993 155 11 Alliances of Convenience: July-August 1993 179 12 The Approaching Second Winter: September-December 1993 207 13 Unexpected Initiatives: 1994 235 14 Retrospect and Prospect 245 Maps 255 Index 261

v Also by Edgar 0 'Ballana THE ALGERIAN INSURRECfION: 1954-62 ARAB GUERRIllA POWER THE ARAB-ISRAEU WAR: 1948-9 CML WAR IN THE CYANIDE WAR THE ELECTRONIC WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 1968-70 THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION THE GREEK CML WAR: 1944-49 THE GULF WAR THE INDO-CHINA WAR: 1946-54 THE KURDISH REVOLT: 1961-70 THE LANGUAGE OF VIOLENCE THE MAlAYAN INSURRECTION: 1948-60 THE RED ARMY OF CHINA THE RED ARMY OF RUSSIA THE SECOND GULF WAR: The Liberation of Kuwait THE SECRET WAR IN SUDAN: 1955-72 THE SINAI CAMPAIGN: 1956 TERROR IN IRElAND: The Story of the IRA IN THE 19805 THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAEU WAR: 1967 NO VICTOR, NO VANQUISHED: The Middle East War 1973 TRACKS OF THE BEAR: US-USSR Relations in the 19705 WAR IN THE YEMEN: 1962-69 WARS IN AFGHANISTAN: 1839-1992 WARS IN VIETNAM (1954-73) Preface

This is a brief account of the short, stormy, wartorn existence of the sovereign independent Balkan Republic of Bosnia­ Hercegovina, which formally began on 7 April 1992 when it was reluctantly recognised by the European Community (EC), even though it did not conform to demanded specifications, one of which was that it should have internal stability. At the time a Serb separatist armed insurrection, supported by the 'rump' government of former Yugoslavia, was gathering mo­ mentum in Bosnia. The sovereign Republic of Bosnia had been largely the dream of one man, President Alija Izetbegovic, a dedicated Muslim who had almost single-handedly worked and planned to turn his multiethnic country, whose population of about 4.3 mil­ lion people consisted of about 44 per cent Muslims, 33 per cent , 19 per cent and 4 per cent others, into a unitary sovereign state, while his secret agenda was to give it a predominantly Islamic-orientated character. The Republic of Bosnia lies on a fault line of history, where over the centuries the rough edges of great empires had rubbed abrasively together, leaving a residue of multiethnic, multi­ religious groups conditioned by their backgrounds, fears and prejudices, having only really been brought together by Pres­ ident Tito's administrative divisions of YUgoslavia, which created the present boundaries of the republic. in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), consisting of six constituent republics, was slowly re­ placed in 1989-91, not by Western-style democracy as had been hoped, but by rabid and separatism. Suddenly ethnic origin became paramount. At first the EC and the com­ peting Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which set themselves up as arbiters of European dif­ ferences, strove to keep the SFRY intact, but were unsuccessful. Two ethnic, separatist wars were fought against the Federal authority. The 'Ten-Day War' in June 1991 gained sovereign independence for the Republic of , and the longer one, from June to November that year, brought the same status to . The defeated Yugoslav National Army

vii viii Preface

UNA), now almost completely Serb in content, withdrew in ignominy from those two republics. Two other constituent re­ publics, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, were now both demanding independence, leaving a Yugoslav rump of and Montenegro. Macedonia eventually peacefully obtained its independence in March 1992 when the JNA marched out, but it was not generally recognised internationally as objected to the use of the name, which it insisted had aggres­ sive implications. Meanwhile, in December 1991 Germany broke EC ranks by formally recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Overtaken by events, and its facade of unity disrupted by this disloyalty, the EC did a smart policy V-turn, laying down con­ ditions for the recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina. By this time the Serbs, the largest ethnic group in the SFRY, in their al­ leged quest for a , demonised and drenched in odium, were universally regarded as being responsible for the chaotic Yugoslav problem. It took some time for Western public opinion to realise that all, including Croats and Muslims, were equally guilty of atrocities, and that there was little to choose between them. Independence was declared in Bosnia-Hercegovina in Janu­ ary 1992, and the required (by the EC) referendum (in which Bosnian Serbs abstained) was held at the end of February, showing a majority to be in favour. In the 'One Day Revolu­ tion' (2 March), impromptu street-fighting between insurgent Serbs and government forces in Sarajevo, the republic's capi­ tal, was contained, and independence was duly proclaimed on the 3rd. Meanwhile Bosnian Serbs, under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic, had established their own breakaway Assembly in October 1991, and on 27 March 1992 proclaimed their own separate Bosnian Serb Republic. Serb militias, which had been actively fighting government forces since September 1990, now launched their Valley Campaign, followed by their North­ ern Corridor one, and within a few months held over 60 per cent of the countryside of the republic. The of Sarajevo began with a heavy burst of shellfire on 21 April. The city has continued to hold out, although incessantly shelled by Serb guns positioned in the surrounding hills. At first the Bosnian Croats, led by and his militia (the HVO), ostensibly supported the government, but did not Preface ix

involve themselves wholeheartedly in the struggle against in­ surgent Serbs. They too had their secret agenda, and quickly formed their own 'Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna' in eastern Bosnia-Hercegovina, the area in which they mainly lived. Adjacent Croatia gave them covert support. The occupying JNA forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina were slow to evacuate and there were many incidents, but by the end of April they had left. General Mladic, ex:JNA and a Bosnian Serb, became commander of the army of the insurgent SD­ BiH (Serbian Democratic Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina). This vicious three-sided (as later the Croats declared their hand) civil war, dominated by a siege-and-starvation strategy and involving , detention camps, atrocities and hordes of refugees, dragged on month after month, as neither faction could raise sufficient military force to defeat the others. It became a confused struggle between territorial warlords and rival militias. The (UN), the EC and the CSCE, already on the Yugoslav scene, having settled as they thought the Slovenian and Croatian problems, now turned their attention to Bosnia-Hercegovina, but their peacemaking efforts proved futile. None of the faction leaders wanted peace, but only to achieve their individual objectives, which conflicted with each other. The numerous ceasefires were almost instantly broken, and promises were seldom kept. The UN Security Council approved a series of threatening resolutions, including an arms and economic embargo on Serbia. The presence of international TV teams kept the world viv­ idly informed of the horrors of the , and occasionally elsewhere, but most of the remainder of the re­ public was a dark, unknown area, from which journalists Were mostly barred and through which UN-sponsored and individual aid convoys struggled to penetrate to deliver aid to besieged cities and regions. Only belatedly did Western governments come to realise that a proportion of the food aid sent to Bosnia went to feed the warring militias, enabling them to continue fighting. It was a catch-22 situation, as unless this unofficial diversion continued to operate no food aid would reach the people who desperately needed it. The EC envoy, Lord Carrington, advocated that Bosnia­ Hercegovia be partitioned into three ethnic regions, but West­ ern policy was that it must remain a unitary state, as demanded x Preface

by Izetbegovic, even though his military position was weak. Separatism had been carried far enough, thought vacillating Western statesmen. The Vance-Owen negotiating team followed, producing a plan to split the republic into ten cantons on mixed ethnic lines, the object being to break up the contiguity of the Serbs, who now held some 70 per cent of the terrain. Executing another neat U-turn, the EC backed the plan, which was designed to punish the Serbs for their aggression. Endless fruit­ less meetings and discussions followed in Geneva and else­ where, but no agreement could be found between rival leaders, each demanding more and refusing to accept less. The root of the trouble was that all would-be peacemaking negotiators in­ sisted that all three factional leaders must agree to a solution, which enabled Izetbegovic, who strove throughout to attract foreign military assistance, to stubbornly and defiantly hold out. Initially standing back to let Europeans sort out the Bosnian problem themselves, the USA advocated NATO intervention, which meant they would have the dominant influence. The USA continually offered to provide the 'wings' if its allies would provide the 'legs', but Europeans shied away from the military option. In his final weeks in office, President Bush turned away from this seemingly intractable problem, but his succes­ sor, Bill Clinton, initially rushed towards it, only to back away when his European allies refused to 'run with him' and pro­ vide infantry. Both Bush and Clinton were at odds with the new UN sec­ retary general, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who was appointed in January 1992. Unlike his predecessor, Ghali had a mind of his own and firm views on the dominance of the UN in all peace­ keeping operations carried out in its name. The Americans just wanted UN legal authority, and then to be left alone to get on with it as they thought best, using NATO - which had been unemployed since the end of the Cold War and was anxiouly looking for a new role - as their instrument. Ghali wanted to be a 'hands on' secretary general. The French, not part of the military framework of NATO, objected to American dominance and refused to serve under a US general, while the Americans refused to serve under a non-US general. Other members shuffled and dragged their Preface xi

feet. The American-advocated military option eroded as Euro­ pean enthusiasm for the Bosnian problem waned. The plain fact, which none would admit, was that no one knew how to stop the ongoing war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The continual media-hyped suggestion 'that something must be done' long bugged statesmen, but gradually fell on deaf ears. This three-sided civil war has caused some two million peo­ ple to be displaced, well over 200 000 casualties (no one knows exactly), and aroused old hatreds and prejudices, involving slaughter reminiscent of medieval times. Reaction to, and re­ laxation from, tight central communist control aided the re­ surrection of tribalism and nationalism. The EC, the CSCE and certain governments constantly V-turned, shedding inconven­ ient previously enunciated principles to catch up with rapidly changing events. Faulty analysis led to faulty assumptions, bring­ ing about the very situation the West was vainly seeking to avoid - the emergence of a Greater Serbia and a , with a small, non-viable Muslim entity left in the middle to be divided between them. High-minded principles tumbled one by one. The much vaunted 'roll-back' - returning refugees to their original homes, and militias withdrawing from territory awarded to their enemies - is now seldom spoken of as all negotiators shied away from the issue. Who, indeed, would or could do the 'rolling-back'? European and American intervention, in whatever form, has been ineffectual and often amounted to sheer troublemaking. A cynic might say that it would have been better not to have interfered at all in such an ethnically orientated civil war. Rather it would have been better to have stood back and let them fight it out amongst themselves until the guns fell silent and both soldiers and resources were finally exhausted, and then step in with relief aid, refugee rehabilita­ tion and economic reconstruction. Future boundaries between Croat, Muslim and Serb entities would be where forward battle lines had halted. In other words, where they are today, and may remain tomorrow. It is a truism that generals like to refight their old battles, which is certainly what American generals wanted to do in Bosnia, being obsessed with military air power, as demonstrated in the Gulf War. They failed to recognise that the terrain and people of Bosnia are unlike those in the Arabian desert, and xii Preface

that consequently the problem required a different strategy, weaponry and military know-how. The USA desperately wanted to pound the Serbs with air-strikes (and seemingly still does), but fortunately Britain and France did not and carried the day, saving many lives but causing a top-level rift between allies. Military threats aimed at scaring the combatants into com­ ing to heel, so often repeated, proved to be empty and were soon ignored. Taking military action would have simply turned this three-sided war into a four-sided one, refuelling rather than quenching it. In the meantime, everybody said 'some­ thing must be done' to stop the fighting, but as no one knew what to do, nothing positive was done. Blindly, naively and over-optimistically, the UN blundered into a 'peacemaking' situation - a quantum leap from peace­ keeping by invitation - for which it was neither conditioned nor capable. Local factions did not want UN neutrality, they wanted it to side with them against their enemies, and so the UN had no friends. However the good humanitarian work done by the UN must not be overlooked, nor the fact that it saved the lives of probably over one million destitute, displaced people and is still striving to save even more, despite extreme adversity. The UN did not always get it right. It became over­ bureaucratic, inclined towards empire-building and was ever angling for a UN protectorate over Bosnia. Not wishing to offend, it pleased hardly anyone. Not to be forgotten are the countless private charities and individuals who, generally without fuss, limelight or complaint and ignored by the UN (which wanted to bring them into its orbit), at considerable personal risk delivered humanitarian aid to those most in need, and evacuated countless desperately ill and wounded people. They are the real and unsung heroes and heroines of this sad saga. War clouds grew ever darker over Bosnia as the New Year of 1994 dawned, and throughout January and February forecast­ ers predicted a momentous spring campaign with a dreadful casualty toll. Suddenly, in March, competing American and Russian initiatives brought about a ceasefire in Sarajevo, chang­ ing the atmosphere and bringing new hope for an end to active hostilities in the republic. Unexpectedly, Bosnian Mus­ lims and Croats, then bitterly fighting each other, agreed to form a confederation. Additionally, the Bosnian government Preface xiii

agreed to enter into a confederation with Croatia, which prom­ ised a ceasefire in Krajina. The Bosnian Serbs stood aside. The Bosnian government retained its sovereignty and inter­ national recognition, although it lost half its territory. The over-optimistic hope is that the Bosnian Serbs will join this federation. The guns may have fallen silent in Sarajevo, and a few other places, but they are still busily shelling parts of Bosnia that are in media darkness. A UN protectorate may be established in Bosnia - if sufficient troops can be obtained - to monitor the mutually hostile armed camps, within which ethnic cleansing may occur. At Prijedor the UN HCR and the Red Cross are already evacuating Muslims and Croats in fear of their lives, only to be accused of aiding ethnic cleansing. Only continued pressure on the combatants by America, Russia and EU countries can prevent this situation from deteriorating and ensure a gradual progression toward a general ceasefire, followed by economic cooperation between the former warring factions. Peace settlements, roll-back, eth­ nic cleansing and returning refugees to their homes are imponderables of the future.

EDGAR O'BALLANCE Acknowledgements

A major part of my research for this book involved personal visits to Bosnia and the other constituent republics of former Yugoslavia, where I had a series of briefings, interviews and discussions with VIPs, combatants and others involved, or in­ terested, in this subject. Where material has been obtained from other sources due credit is given within the text. All comments, deductions and opinions are my own, and at times may differ from current, generally perceived wisdom. Map sources include The Times Atlas of the Wor~ The Times and the Daily Telegraph. The following works are among the many consulted, and I would like to record my sincere thanks and appreciation to the authors, editors or compilers. Where quotations or other matter has been used, appropriate credits are given within the script.

Glenny, Misha, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (Harmondsworth: Penquin, 1993). Gow, James, Legitimacy and the Old Yugoslavia (London: Pinter, 1992). Zametica, John, The Yugoslav Conflict, Adelphi Paper no. 270. (London: IISS, 1992).

Television stations, periodicals and news agencies include:

UK: BBC 1V and radio Channel Four Daily Telegraph ITN I1V Guardian Middle East Reuters Sunday Times Times

xiv Acknowkdgements xv

USA: CNN International Herald Tribune Newsweek New York Ti11W Time magazine Washington Post USA Today

France: Agence France Presse

Yugoslavia (translated extracts): Belgrade 1V Borba Politika Radio Belgrade Tanjug Vreme

Bosnia: Oswbodjenje Radio Sarajevo SRNA

Croatia: HINA Radio List of Abbreviations

ARY Army of the Republic of Yugoslavia AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System AWADS Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System BDF Bosnian Defence Force CAP Combat air patrols CDF Croatian Defence Force CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CNGC Croatian National Guard Corps CSCE Conference on Security and CQ-()peration in Europe DEMOS Democratic Opposition of Slovenia DoD Department of Defense (USA) DS Democrat Party (Serbian) EC European Community ECMM EC Monitor Mission EU European Union FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia GPS Global Positioning System HDZ Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvat = Croat) HEO Croatian Self Defence Force HOP Croatian Liberation Movement HOS HSP Croatian Party of Justice HVO ICO Islamic Conference Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund JCS Joint Chiefs of JNA Yugoslav National Army KOS Yugoslav Secret Service LC League of Communists LC-MY League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia LCY League of Communists of Yugoslavia MBO Organisation of Bosnian Muslims MoD Ministry of Defence (Britain)

xvi List of Abbreviations xvii

MSC Military Staff Committee (UN) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDH Independent State of Croatia POW Prisoner-of-war RDF Rapid Deployment Force RPGs Rocket-propelled grenades RSK Republic of Serbian Krajina R-T-E Ready-to-eat meals SAR Serbian autonomous region SDA Party of Democratic Action SD-BiH Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina SDF Serbian Defence Force SDS Serbian Democratic Party SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia SOE Special Operations Executive SPO Serbian Renaissance Party SPS Socialist Party of Serbia TDF Territorial Defence Force UN United Nations UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNPROFOR UN Protection Force USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WEU Western European Union

Note: Some abbreviations do not coincide with the English translation. Chronology

1969 Muslims in Bosnia classed as a separate 'people' 1970 Alija Izetbegovic published his '' 1980 Death of Tito 1984 Olympic Winter Games at Sarajevo 1990 January: 14th Congress of the LYC September: ethnic clashes in Foca November: Izetbegovic elected President of Bosnia-Hercegovina December: first multiparty elections in Bosnia 1991 June: Serb-Slovene 'Ten-Day War' June-November: Serb-Croat War September: EC Carrington Commission appointed October: Bosnian Assembly declares its own independence; Bosnian Serbs form their own Assembly 1992 3 January: Bosnian Republic declares its independence 29 February-l March: Bosnian referendum 2 March: One Day Revolution 3 March: Izetbegovic proclaims independence of Bosnia 18 March: SaraJevo Agreement (rejected on the 25th) 27 March: Bosnian Serbian Republic proclaimed 3 April: Bijelina falls to Serbs 7 April: EC recognises Bosnian independence (followed by others) 8 April: Serbs seize Kupres and 16 April: Serbs take Visegrad 17 April: Foca falls to Serbs 21 April: commencement of the siege of Sarajevo 27 April: new constitution for Yugoslavia 1 May: Bosnian president detained by ARY 2 May: the Sarajevo ambush 19 May: the ARY officially withdraws from Bosnia 20 May: sanctions against the FRY 25 May: most ARY troops leave Sarajevo 27 May: 'bread queue' bombing

xviii Chronology xix

5 June: final evacuation of ARY troops from Sarajevo 14 June: Croats occupy parts of Mostar 15 June: Izetbegovic declares state of war in Bosnia; joint Bosnian-Croatian statement 19 June: the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna declared; Serbs evacuate Sarajevo airport 28 June: President Mitterrand visits Sarajevo 29 June: UN flag raised at Sarajevo airport; UN Canadian troops moved from Croatia into Bosnia; US naval flotilla moves into the Adriatic 30 June: UNPROFOR expanded to include Bosnia 8 July: the 'Posavina rout' 12 July: receives first UN aid on 71st day of its siege 15 July: Carrington London Talks 18 July: the '39th' ceasefire 3 August: Izetbegovic asks UN to lift against Bosnia 4 August: atrocities discovered - blamed on Serbs 25 August: London Conference 28 August: Serbs ambushed near Gorazde 3 September: Italian cargo plane shot down near Sarajevo 4 September: Geneva Conference convened; illegal Iranian arms discovered at Zagreb airport; UN aid convoy reaches Gorazde 17 September: Muslim volunteers ambushed near Mostar 22 September: Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace 23 September: Bosnian-Croatian Defence Pact 3 October: Sarajevo airport reopens 7 October: Bosanski Brod falls to Serbs 9 October: UN 'no-fly zone' over Bosnia approved 26 October: Prozor falls to Croats 29 October: Vance-Owen Peace Plan launched; Jajce fell to Serbs 9 November: regular Croatian armed forces operating in Bosnia; refugee column leaves Sarajevo xx Chronology

12 November: France and Germany recognise Bosnia 1 December: aircraft hit near SaraJevo airport (also on the 4th) 16 December: US names 'war criminals' 17 December: first Russian volunteers arrive in Belgrade 18 December: Karadzic appointed 'president' of the SD-BiH 19 December: the Josanica massacre 31 December: Boutros Ghali visits Sarajevo 1993 8 January: Bosnian deputy prime minister killed 14 January: fighting between Bosnian Muslims and Croats 15 January: shell hits water queue in Sarajevo 16 January: ARY in action in Bosnia 20 January: SD-BiH Assembly issues its own peace plan 1 February: Peace Conference moves briefly from Geneva to New York 11 February: American Six-Point Programme 17 February: UN HCR orders suspension of UN aid in Bosnia 19 February: UN HCR order countermanded by Ghali 2 March: Cerska falls to Serbs 11 March: UN British troops detained at Konjevic Polje 11 March: General Morillon enters Srebrenica 28 March: UN aid convoy reaches Srebrenica 8 April: illegal arms discovered on UN vehicles 12 April: NATO mission over Bosnian no-fly zone begins 15 April: HVO orders in-area Bosnian units be be under its command 16 April: Srebreilica declared a UN safe area 21 April: Srebrenica declared a UN demilitarised zone 27 April: USA promises not to take action without UN authority 1 May: Athens Conference Chronology xxi

5 May: SD-BiH Assembly again rejects the Vance-Owen Peace Plan 6 May: UN approves safe areas in Bosnia 9 May: Croat offensive begins in Bosnia 15 May: Bosnian Serb referendum 22 May: Washington Agreement for Joint Action in Bosnia 25 May: NATO Conference 1 June: football crowd shelled in Dobrinja 6 June: Travnik taken by Muslims from Croats 10 June: Convoy of Joy; British troops detained and robbed 13 June: hospital shelled in Gorazde, over 50 killed 21 June: Copenhagen Conference 23 June: Bosnian-Croatian plan put to Geneva Conference 26 June: joint Serb-Croat campaign against Muslims begins 1-5 July: UN Canadian troops blockaded 2 July: Muslims lose Zepce following joint Croat-Serb attack 13 July: Trnovo captured by Serbs 16 July: Fojnica falls to Muslims 18 July: pontoon bridge at Maslanica (RSK) opens 30 July: UN Spanish troops attacked at Jablanica 2 August: Maslanica bridge damaged by Serbs; Serbs commence their Mount offensive; NATO agrees to act under UN authority 5 August: 25 August: UN troops and convoy held hostage in Mostar 1 September: Geneva Peace negotiations again collapse 6 September: President Izetbegovic addresses the UN Security Council 10 September: the mutiny 11 September: the Uzdor massacre 16 September: joint declaration (Izetbegovic­ Tudjman) 20 September: Invincible talks 27 September: President Clinton address the UN xxii Chronology

General Assembly; Muslim Sabor (meeting) in Sarajevo; Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia declared at Bihac 29 September: Bosnian Assembly rejects Peace Plan 20 October: Milosevic dissolves Federal Assembly in Belgrade 22 October: the Stupni Do massacre 24 October: Bosnian government military action against organised crime in Sarajevo 4 November: Vares occupied by Muslims 5 November: Bosnian government disbands HVO in SaraJevo 9 November: Mostar Bridge collapses 17 November: UN War Crimes Tribunal established 18 November: Geneva joint declaration on UN aid delivery 2 December: Geneva Conference adjourned 12 December: elections in the RSK 19 December: elections in Serbia 22 December: EU meeting on Bosnia 23 December: Christmas truce (fails to materialise) 31 December: said to be the 604th day of the siege of Sarajevo 1994 22 January: shell falls on children in Sarajevo (6 killed and 35 injured) 5 February: shell falls on central market in SaraJevo (68 killed and 197 injured) 9 February: NATO gives 20 February deadline for Serbs to withdraw guns 22 February: General Rose requests air-strike (not granted) 28 February: NATO combat aircraft shoot down four Serb warplanes 7 March: ceasefire in Sarajevo 17 March: four routes into Sarajevo opened 18 March: the Washington Initiative 20 March: grand spectacular in SaraJevo 30 March: the Russian Initiative 31 March: USA refuses to contribute to increase in UNPROFOR List of Maps

Yugoslavia 1990 ii Bosnia: main cities, locations and UN routes 255 Sarajevo 1993 256 The Vance-Owen Plan 257 Krajina 258 Bosnia: March 1994 259

xxiii