Putin's Politics of Re-Stalinization
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
E.V. Tarle $875-1955) As a Case Study
Soviet System and the Historian; E.V. Tarle $875-1955) as a Case Study MEL ROBERT SH1TEE WAYNE STATE UNIV. HISTORY DEPT, Copyright by SIDNEY R. SHERTER 1968 THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE HISTORIAN: E.V. TARLE (1875-1955) AS A CASE STUDY by Sidney Robert Sherter A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Office for Graduate Studies, Graduate Division of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 1968 MAJOR: HISTORY APPROVED BY: Adviser Date O rd er No No. Of Volumes . « Color ........................ Dreciation to all my dissertation. P a rt No. Stephen Fisher and M onths 3 , and Professor Y e a r . their constructive Imprint ( ) yes ( ) no essor Richard V. Burks of Wayne State University for graciously consenting to read my dissertation and agreeing under the circumstances to serve as Chairman of the defense committee. I wish to thank Professor Goldwin Smith of Wayne State University for allowing me to undertake the initial research on E.V. Tarle in his Ph.D. seminar. I would like to praise the staff of the Wayne State University Library, especially the personnel in the inter-library loan section, for their aid in locating source materials from all over the country. My father-in-law Samuel Tattelbaum of Newton, Massachu- setts, Elizabeth Poniewerska of Chicago, Illinois, Professor Frank Gambacortta and William Kluback of Southampton College deserve mention for their assistance in translating some dif ficult passages in Russian, Polish, Italian, and German. I also wish to commend my typist, Miss Barbara Dubikowicz, for a superlative job. -
The Basics and Functions of Putinism in Russia
International Journal of Political Science ISSN: 2228-6217 Vol 9, No 1, Spring 2019, (pp.1-15) The Basics and Functions of Putinism in Russia Jahangir Karami 1*, Mahin Niroomand 2 1 Department of Russian and Eurasian Studies, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran 2 Department of Political Science, South Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran Received: 24 May 2018 ; Accepted: 20 Feb 2019 Abstract: The present Russian political system is tied up with Putin's name; and Putin is consi- dered as a full-fledged political reality. Today's powerful Russia, which has got a new life after the Cold War and the weak collapse period, and has a major impact on global developments including the Middle East, is not understandable except under this title. What inspired writers to analyze Putin's performance is to study the causes of the exis- tence of a personality such as him and the formation of Putinism in today's Russian so- ciety. Knowing the performance of Putin and Putinism requires a clear answer to some questions like, why the phenomenon of Putinism in the 21st century whit democratic structure has emerged and persisted, and what is Putinism at all? The hypothesis that will be presented to understand this issue is that the long-standing political culture of Russia and the geographical and historical imperative of Russian nation have led to the emergence and continuation of Putinism in today's Russian society, as well as the secu- rity and economic problems of the 1990s, humiliation, pressure, and blockade of the west against Russia is the mainstay of the emergence and continuation of Putinism. -
Voter Alignments in a Dominant Party System: the Cleavage Structures of the Russian Federation
Voter alignments in a dominant party system: The cleavage structures of the Russian Federation. Master’s Thesis Department of Comparative Politics November 2015 Ivanna Petrova Abstract This thesis investigates whether there is a social cleavage structure across the Russian regions and whether this structure is mirrored in the electoral vote shares for Putin and his party United Russia on one hand, versus the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its leader Gennady Zyuganov on the other. In addition to mapping different economic, demographic and cultural factors affecting regional vote shares, this thesis attempts to determine whether there is a party system based on social cleavages in Russia. In addition, as the Russian context is heavily influenced by the president, this thesis investigates whether the same cleavages can explain the distribution of vote shares during the presidential elections. Unemployment, pensioners, printed newspapers and ethnicity create opposing effects during parliamentary elections, while distance to Moscow, income, pensioners, life expectancy, printed newspapers and ethnicity created opposing effects during the presidential elections. The first finding of this thesis is not only that the Russian party system is rooted in social cleavages, but that it appears to be based on the traditional “left-right” cleavage that characterizes all Western industrialized countries. In addition, despite the fact that Putin pulls voters from all segments of the society, the pattern found for the party system persists during presidential elections. The concluding finding shows that the main political cleavage in today’s Russia is between the left represented by the communists and the right represented by the incumbents. -
The Siloviki in Russian Politics
The Siloviki in Russian Politics Andrei Soldatov and Michael Rochlitz Who holds power and makes political decisions in contemporary Russia? A brief survey of available literature in any well-stocked bookshop in the US or Europe will quickly lead one to the answer: Putin and the “siloviki” (see e.g. LeVine 2009; Soldatov and Borogan 2010; Harding 2011; Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky 2012; Lucas 2012, 2014 or Dawisha 2014). Sila in Russian means force, and the siloviki are the members of Russia’s so called “force ministries”—those state agencies that are authorized to use violence to respond to threats to national security. These armed agents are often portrayed—by journalists and scholars alike—as Russia’s true rulers. A conventional wisdom has emerged about their rise to dominance, which goes roughly as follows. After taking office in 2000, Putin reconsolidated the security services and then gradually placed his former associates from the KGB and FSB in key positions across the country (Petrov 2002; Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003, 2009). Over the years, this group managed to disable almost all competing sources of power and control. United by a common identity, a shared worldview, and a deep personal loyalty to Putin, the siloviki constitute a cohesive corporation, which has entrenched itself at the heart of Russian politics. Accountable to no one but the president himself, they are the driving force behind increasingly authoritarian policies at home (Illarionov 2009; Roxburgh 2013; Kasparov 2015), an aggressive foreign policy (Lucas 2014), and high levels of state predation and corruption (Dawisha 2014). While this interpretation contains elements of truth, we argue that it provides only a partial and sometimes misleading and exaggerated picture of the siloviki’s actual role. -
Putinism: a Praetorian System?
Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 106 Putinism: A Praetorian System? Jean-Robert RAVIOT March 2018 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) under “Russia, Caucasus and Eastern Europe Observatory”. ISBN: 978-2-36567-808-7 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2018 How to quote this document: Jean-Robert Raviot, “Putinism: A Praetorian System?”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 106, Ifri, March 2018. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Written by leading experts, these policy-oriented papers deal with strategic, political and economic issues. Author Jean-Robert Raviot is a doctor of political science with accreditation to supervise research and professor of contemporary Russian civilization at Paris Nanterre University. -
Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation
Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation J. MICHAEL WALLER "They write I'm the mafia's godfather. It was Vladimir Ilich Lenin who was the real organizer of the mafia and who set up the criminal state." -Otari Kvantrishvili, Moscow organized crime leader.l "Criminals Nave already conquered the heights of the state-with the chief of the KGB as head of a mafia group." -Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin.2 Introduction As the United States and Russia launch a Great Crusade against organized crime, questions emerge not only about the nature of joint cooperation, but about the nature of organized crime itself. In addition to narcotics trafficking, financial fraud and racketecring, Russian organized crime poses an even greater danger: the theft and t:rafficking of weapons of mass destruction. To date, most of the discussion of organized crime based in Russia and other former Soviet republics has emphasized the need to combat conven- tional-style gangsters and high-tech terrorists. These forms of criminals are a pressing danger in and of themselves, but the problem is far more profound. Organized crime-and the rarnpant corruption that helps it flourish-presents a threat not only to the security of reforms in Russia, but to the United States as well. The need for cooperation is real. The question is, Who is there in Russia that the United States can find as an effective partner? "Superpower of Crime" One of the greatest mistakes the West can make in working with former Soviet republics to fight organized crime is to fall into the trap of mirror- imaging. -
Putin: Russia's Choice, Second Edition
Putin The second edition of this extremely well-received political biography of Vladimir Putin builds on the strengths of the previous edition to provide the most detailed and nuanced account of the man, his politics and his pro- found influence on Russian politics, foreign policy and society. New to this edition: Analysis of Putin’s second term as President. More biographical information in the light of recent research. Detailed discussion of changes to the policy process and the elites around Putin. Developments in state–society relations including the conflicts with oli- garchs such as Khodorkovsky. Review of changes affecting the party system and electoral legislation, including the development of federalism in Russia. Details on economic performance under Putin, including more discus- sion of the energy sector and pipeline politics. Russia’s relationship with Nato after the ‘big-bang’ enlargement, EU– Russian relations after enlargement and Russia’s relations with other post- Soviet states. The conclusion brings us up to date with debates over the question of democracy in Russia today, and the nature of Putin’s leadership and his place in the world. Putin: Russia’s choice is essential reading for all scholars and students of Russian politics. Richard Sakwa is Professor of Politics at the University of Kent, UK. Putin Russia’s choice Second edition Richard Sakwa First edition published 2004 Second edition, 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. -
The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin's Russia I. Back to Our Future!
The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I. Back to our Future! History, Modernity and Patriotism According to Nashi, 2015‐2012. By Ivo Mijnssen. Stuttgart: ibidem‐Verlag, 2012. 215pp. Bibliography. Index. Appendix I. Appendix II. Paperback. The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia II. The search for Distinctive Conformism in the Political Communication of Nashi, 2005‐2009. By Jussi Lassila. Stuttgart: ibidem‐Verlag, 2012. 205 pp. Bibliography. Paperback. Regina Smyth, Indiana University In 2005, the Kremlin’s grey cardinal, Vladislav Surkov, orchestrated the formation of a youth organization, Nashi, in order to counter youth apathy and the potential for opposition protest in Russia’s capital. By 2013, Mr. Surkov, was dismissed from his position as the daunting architect of the political strategy that guided the first decade of Putin’s rule. Nashi’s founder, Vassily Iakamenko, registered a new political party named Smart Start that quickly failed. Most importantly, the Nashi existed in name only, eclipsed by competing youth organizations, including Stal’, the Young Guard, and the multi-headed All-Russian Youth Society. Against this vast shift in the political landscape, two complementary studies exploring the arc of Nashi’s development appeared under the common title, The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia. Together, these significant works by Jussi Lassila and Ivo Mijnssen illuminate the persistent central tension inherent in Putinism, the negotiation of the line between modernization (openness) and stability (state control). Further, demonstrate how this tension produced Nashi’s downfall. There are a number of similarities across these paired studies. -
Interview with Yulia Malysheva
A Revolution of the Mind INTERVIEW WITH YULIA MALYSHEVA ulia Sergeevna Malysheva is one of the leading youth activists in Russia. An elected Y municipal deputy in Moscow, a researcher at the Institute for the Economy in Transi- tion, and leader of the youth organization Oborona (which she cofounded) and of the youth branch of the SPS party, Malysheva also later became the leader of the youth branch of the People’s Democratic Union, the political movement led by former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. In this interview, she speaks about the possibility of a color revolution in Russia, cooperation with other domestic and international youth groups, the Kremlin’s worried reaction, the nature of the Nashi pro-Kremlin youth group, the attempts to unite the Russian democrats, the successes of Oborona, the chances the democrats have of returning to power, and what she expects from the West. Demokratizatsiya: Tell us about Oborona. Malysheva: Oborona is a youth organization that appeared with the Orange wave in Ukraine. It was important for us that many others were waiting for us, since youth have always been in the avant-garde. At that time, our adult colleagues kept arguing as to who was more important. In the end, they got 3 percent [in the Duma elections]. It was evi- dent that they were not well presented before the Russian voters. We founded Oborona not only with young people who sympathize with SPS, Yabloko, the [former SPS leader and independent candidate Irina] Khakamada movement and other such formations—but also with those who support the democratic process and oppose the Putin regime. -
10.1057/9780230282940.Pdf
St Antony’s Series General Editor: Jan Zielonka (2004– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Othon Anastasakis, Research Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford and Director of South East European Studies at Oxford Recent titles include: Julie Newton and William Tompson (editors) INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS AND LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIAN POLITICS Celia Kerslake , Kerem Oˇktem, and Philip Robins (editors) TURKEY’S ENGAGEMENT WITH MODERNITY Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century Paradorn Rangsimaporn RUSSIA AS AN ASPIRING GREAT POWER IN EAST ASIA Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin Motti Golani THE END OF THE BRITISH MANDATE FOR PALESTINE, 1948 The Diary of Sir Henry Gurney Demetra Tzanaki WOMEN AND NATIONALISM IN THE MAKING OF MODERN GREECE The Founding of the Kingdom to the Greco-Turkish War Simone Bunse SMALL STATES AND EU GOVERNANCE Leadership through the Council Presidency Judith Marquand DEVELOPMENT AID IN RUSSIA Lessons from Siberia Li-Chen Sim THE RISE AND FALL OF PRIVATIZATION IN THE RUSSIAN OIL INDUSTRY Stefania Bernini FAMILY LIFE AND INDIVIDUAL WELFARE IN POSTWAR EUROPE Britain and Italy Compared Tomila V. Lankina, Anneke Hudalla and Helmut Wollman LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Comparing Performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia Cathy Gormley-Heenan POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS Role, Capacity and Effect Lori Plotkin Boghardt KUWAIT AMID WAR, PEACE AND REVOLUTION Paul Chaisty LEGISLATIVE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC POWER IN RUSSIA Valpy FitzGerald, Frances Stewart -
Background to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact Legends and Facts
Miklós Mitrovits Central European Horizons, Vol I Issue 1 (2020) I Issue Vol Horizons, Central European Miklós Mitrovits Background to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact Legends and Facts The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed on 23 August 1939. Today, eighty years on, it still stirs up controversy in public life and among academics. One side still voices the Stalinist argument, according to which the Soviet Union had no alternative: prioritizing its own security interests, it had to sign the agreement. According to the advocates of this view, the Soviet Union was forced into the situation as it was on the defensive and wanted nothing but peace. However, the archival sources that have become accessible in Ger- many, Poland and Russia contradict the view that paints Stalin as a passive victim. In these documents, expansionist imperial policies surface, moreover, one may find abundant cases for military, economic and political cooperation between the two totalitarian dictatorship. This study presents the Stalinist arguments, their sources, then, turns to the documentary evidence contradi- cting these. The old debate about the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which was signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939, has resurfaced. The alliance between Nazi Germany and Com- munist Soviet Union has been a matter for controversy since the time of signing. Even contemporaries had difficulties comprehending how two countries with such diametrically opposing ideologies could come to an agreement. Surely, these cont- emporaries did not know about the secret clause attached to the pact of non-aggres- sion, which divided Central Europe between the two powers. It was in the context of this agreement that the Wehrmacht attacked Poland on 1 September 1939, and the World War II began. -
Hacks, Leaks and Disruptions | Russian Cyber Strategies
CHAILLOT PAPER Nº 148 — October 2018 Hacks, leaks and disruptions Russian cyber strategies EDITED BY Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM Siim Alatalu, Irina Borogan, Elena Chernenko, Sven Herpig, Oscar Jonsson, Xymena Kurowska, Jarno Limnell, Patryk Pawlak, Piret Pernik, Thomas Reinhold, Anatoly Reshetnikov, Andrei Soldatov and Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer Chaillot Papers HACKS, LEAKS AND DISRUPTIONS RUSSIAN CYBER STRATEGIES Edited by Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru CHAILLOT PAPERS October 2018 148 Disclaimer The views expressed in this Chaillot Paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or of the European Union. European Union Institute for Security Studies Paris Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2018. Reproduction is authorised, provided prior permission is sought from the Institute and the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. Contents Executive summary 5 Introduction: Russia’s cyber prowess – where, how and what for? 9 Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru Russia’s cyber posture Russia’s approach to cyber: the best defence is a good offence 15 1 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan Russia’s trolling complex at home and abroad 25 2 Xymena Kurowska and Anatoly Reshetnikov Spotting the bear: credible attribution and Russian 3 operations in cyberspace 33 Sven Herpig and Thomas Reinhold Russia’s cyber diplomacy 43 4 Elena Chernenko Case studies of Russian cyberattacks The early days of cyberattacks: 5 the cases of Estonia,