DOCSLIB.ORG

DISAGREEMENT and CHANGE of VIEW by KIRK LOUGHEED, BA

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
DISAGREEMENT and CHANGE of VIEW by KIRK LOUGHEED, BA DISAGREEMENT AND CHANGE OF VIEW By KIRK LOUGHEED, B.A. (HONS), M.A., M.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctorate in Philosophy McMaster Univeristy © Copyright by Kirk Lougheed Acknowledgements There are many people who contributed to the success of this dissertation. I first started thinking about disagreement when I wrote a major research paper on religious disagreement under Klaas Kraay at Ryerson University. Klaas continues to be an excellent interlocutor on these issues. I begun work on this dissertation at Monash University under the direction of Graham Oppy and Robert Mark Simpson. While the project evolved a lot since my time at Monash, their early input was invaluable. My supervisor at McMaster University, Nicholas Griffin, provided detailed and timely feedback on multiple drafts. The finished project benefited greatly from his careful reading. The other members of my departmental committee in Sandra Lapointe and Mark Johnstone also provided helpful comments along the way. Their comments at the defense were particularly helpful. Christopher Tindale (Windsor) served as an external and offered written feedback prior to the defense. During the defense he helped me to think about how this project hangs together as a whole and so I’m very grateful for his challenging questions. Three professors from earlier in my philosophical education have remained supportive of my philosophical endeavors. They are Rich Davis, Paul Franks, and Myron A. Penner. I have also had the privilege of discussing the epistemology of disagreement with two emerging stars in the field, Nathan Ballantyne and Jonathan Matheson. They have been extremely generous with their time. Many chapters and subsections of this dissertation have been presented at conferences. There are too many individuals to name, but I’m grateful to the audiences of those presentations. Finally, I’m grateful to feedback from anonymous referees who offered comments on sections of this dissertation that are published. Ideas from this dissertation appear in the following places: (forthcoming). “Catherine Elgin on Peerhood and the Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement.” Synthese. (2018). “The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements.” Informal Logic 38 (2): 263-292. (2017). “The Role of Idealized Cases in the Epistemology of Disagreement.” Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2): 251-270. I have many friends outside of academia who have offered encouragement throughout my time in graduate school. However, I would most like to thank my parents, Stephenson and Diane Lougheed. They have supported me emotionally and financially throughout my studies in ways that surely go beyond the normal obligations that parents have to their adult children. It’s unlikely I would have finished this without their support. I dedicate this dissertation to them. i Table of Contents Acknowledgements…..i Table of Contents…..ii Introduction…..1 I. Introduction to Disagreement and Change of View…..1 II. Chapter Summary…..2 Part I. The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Current Debate Chapter One: Introduction to the Epistemology of Disagreement I. Introduction to the Epistemology of Disagreement…..5 II. Conciliationism…..8 III. Objections to Conciliationism…..11 IV. Non-Conciliationism…..15 V. Conclusion…..18 Chapter Two: The Special Insight View I. Introduction…..20 II. Four Explanations of the Special Insight View…..21 III. Three Additional Considerations…..33 IV. Conclusion…..37 Chapter Three: An Analysis of Toy Cases of Disagreement I. Introduction…39 II. The Different Disagreements Argument…..39 III. Classic Cases Supporting Conciliationism…..42 IV. Unclear Cases…..46 V. Cases Supporting Non-Conciliationism…..51 VI. Objections…..57 VII. Conclusion…..60 Chapter Four: An Analysis of Epistemic Peerhood I. Introduction…..62 II. The Strict Notion of Epistemic Peerhood…..62 III. Problems with the Strict Notion of Peerhood…..63 IV. Two Reformulations of Peerhood and of the Problem of Disagreement…..72 ii V. The Significance of Disagreement Reformulated…..78 VI. Objections to Sceptical Epistemic Peerhood…..87 VII. Conclusion…..89 Part II. A Limited Version of Non-Conciliationism: The Benefits to Inquiry Argument Chapter Five: The Benefits to Inquiry Argument I. Introduction…..92 II. The Benefits to Inquiry Argument…..92 III. Empirical Support…..104 IV. Connections to Mill’s Political Philosophy…..117 V. The Benefits to Inquiry Argument and Toy Cases…..119 VI. Conclusion…..120 Chapter Six: Objections to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument I. Introduction…..121 II. Initial Objections to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument…..121 III. Epistemic Rationality versus Practical Rationality…..138 IV. All-Things-Considered Epistemic Rationality.....152 V. Conclusion…..158 Chapter Seven: The Benefits to Non-Inquiry Argument I. Introduction…..159 II. The Benefits to Non-Inquiry Argument…..159 III. Objection: Including Non-Inquiry Beliefs Makes the Argument Too Permissive…..162 IV. Non-Inquiry Beliefs, Different Cases of Disagreement, and Worldview…..163 V. Conclusion…..166 Chapter Eight: Worldview Disagreement I. Introduction…..168 II. The Due Diligence Argument…..168 III. Motivating the Due Diligence Argument…..171 IV. The Criteria for Worldview Evaluation…..172 V. Objections to Worldview Evaluation…..175 VI. Worldview Disagreement and Deep Disagreement…..182 VII. Conclusion…..189 Chapter Nine: Disagreement and Change of View I. Introduction…..189 II. Intellectual Humility as an Objection…..189 iii III. Competing Epistemic Values…..194 IV. Two Dynamic Views on Disagreement…..198 V. The Difficulty of Changing Worldviews…..211 VI. Conclusion…..214 Bibliography…..215 iv Introduction I. Introduction to Disagreement and Change of View In his 2006 paper, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement” Richard Feldman argued for the highly sceptical conclusion that an agent ought to suspend judgment about any belief over which she encounters peer disagreement.1 David Christensen’s 2007 paper “The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News” suggests that at very least peer disagreement entails that an agent ought to lower the confidence she had in a belief that is disputed by an epistemic peer. While I feel the intuitive force of Feldman and Christensen’s position, if they are correct then many of people’s most cherished political, ethical, and religious beliefs turn out to be unjustified, or at least less justified than originally thought. But many also have the intuition that such widespread scepticism is not plausible. This project is intended to explore competing intuitions about the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. In many ways this project is a direct response to Feldman (2006), Christensen (2009). In this project I offer a relatively unexplored argument that they and other conciliationists (those defending the view one should conciliate in the face of disagreement) are incorrect in their initial articles. I argue that in the face of peer disagreement there are at least some cases where an agent need not necessarily lower confidence or suspend judgment regarding the belief in question. This project consists of two main parts. ‘Part I. The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Current Debate’ is primarily methodological and sets the stage for the second part. To begin, I argue that much of the current literature on the epistemology of disagreement is misguided in its focus. This is for a variety of reasons including the fact that authors often shift inappropriately between simple 1 Feldman 2009 appears to take a weaker stance. He suggests that peer disagreement is always additional evidence that needs to be weighed with the total evidence. But he thinks it is impossible to offer general principles about how to weigh the evidence of peer disagreement (other than the simple fact that it ought to be weighed). 1 and complex cases of disagreement, implicit definitions of epistemic peerhood are overly strict, and completely shared evidence is impossible in real-life scenarios. In sum, there has been too much focus on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement – where parties are (near) cognitive and evidential equals – which cannot offer insight into everyday real-life cases of disagreement. For the sake of argument, in ‘Part II. A Limited Version of Non-Conciliationism: The Benefits to Inquiry Argument’ I assume that Feldman, Christensen, and other conciliationists are correct. I explore and defend an underdeveloped and underappreciated argument that appeals to future potential epistemic benefits of remaining steadfast in a disputed belief as the proximate epistemic justification for that belief. If successful, my argument constitutes a new response to Feldman and Christensen. II. Chapter Summary The first four chapters of the dissertation make up Part I. In the introductory chapter I introduce the epistemology of disagreement in more detail. I conclude with an outline of some of the main arguments in the literature. In Chapter Two I focus on why the special insight view is not a plausible response to peer disagreement. This is the view that an agent can be rational to remain steadfast in her own beliefs because she enjoys a special insight her opponents lack. Chapter Three is an analysis of the toy cases of disagreement often used in the literature. I argue that there are important differences between simple and complex cases of disagreement that are often overlooked in the literature. These differences show that lessons from simple cases of disagreement
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ontological Arguments
    Ontological Arguments Graham Oppy Ontological arguments are arguments, for the conclusion that God exists, from premises which are supposed to derive from some source other than observation of the world — e.g., from reason alone. In other words, ontological arguments are arguments from nothing but analytic, a priori and necessary premises to the conclusion that God exists. The first, and best-known, ontological argument was proposed by St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th. century A.D. In his Proslogion , St. Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived . St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being — namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists — can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived — i.e., God — exists. In the seventeenth century, René Descartes defended a family of similar arguments. For instance, in the Fifth Meditation , Descartes claims to provide a proof demonstrating the existence of God from the idea of a supremely perfect being. Descartes argues that there is no less contradiction in conceiving a supremely perfect being who lacks existence than there is in conceiving a triangle whose interior angles do not sum to 180 degrees. Hence, he supposes, since we do conceive a supremely perfect being — we do have the idea of a supremely perfect being — we must conclude that a supremely perfect being exists.
    [Show full text]
  • Uncaused Beginnings" Revisited
    Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 32 Issue 2 Article 8 4-1-2015 "Uncaused Beginnings" Revisited Graham Oppy Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Oppy, Graham (2015) ""Uncaused Beginnings" Revisited," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 32 : Iss. 2 , Article 8. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil20154932 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol32/iss2/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. "UNCAUSED BEGINNINGS" REVISITED Graham Oppy William Lane Craig's "Reflections on 'Uncaused Beginnings" is a sustained critique of my "Uncaused Beginnings." 1 argue that the central arguments of my essay survive that critique unscathed. When we make a fair and accurate comparison of naturalist and theist claims about global causal reality, we see that considerations about causation and the shape of causal reality do not decide between naturalism and theism. Moreover, the Edwards/Prior/Craig objection does not rule out the view that there is an initial global causal state involving none but contingently existing entities. 1 Compare two views about global causal reality. Both views suppose that there is a contingent initial global causal state involving at least one neces• sarily existent entity. Both views suppose that the initial global causal state is the only global causal state that has no cause; both views also suppose that the only further causal states that have no cause are initial states of en• tities that belong to and/or are sub-states of the initial global causal state.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy for Us
    Philosophy for Us First Edition Edited By Lenny Clapp Northern Illinois University Bassim Hamadeh, CEO and Publisher Kassie Graves, Director of Acquisitions and Sales Jamie Giganti, Senior Managing Editor Jess Estrella, Senior Graphic Designer Angela Schultz, Acquisitions Editor Michelle Piehl, Project Editor Trey Soto, Licensing Associate Christian Berk, Associate Production Editor Bryan Mok, Interior Designer Copyright © 2018 by Cognella, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be re- printed, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information retrieval system without the written permission of Cognella, Inc. For inquiries regarding permissions, translations, foreign rights, audio rights, and any other forms of reproduction, please contact the Cognella Licensing Department at [email protected]. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Cover image copyright © 2014 iStockphoto LP/alvarez. Printed in the United States of America. ISBN: 978-1-63487-487-8 (pbk) / 978-1-63487-488-5 (br) This book is dedicated to my friend and mentor Tomis Kapitan. Tomis believed that philosophy could improve the lives of everyone, and this belief influenced not only his teaching, but his courageous approach to life. This book is inspired by his example. Contents Part I: Does God Exist? 1 1. An Argument for Atheism from Naturalism ..............................................3 by Graham Oppy, Monash University 2. The Case for Divine Creation from Cosmic Fine-tuning .......................................................................................................15 by Robin Collins, Messiah College 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Century Atheism, in the History of Western Philosophy of Religion : V
    This is the published version Oppy, Graham and Trakakis, Nick 2009, Late-twentieth-century atheism, in The history of western philosophy of religion : v. 5. Twentieth-century philosophy of religion, Acumen Publishing Ltd, Durham, England, pp.301-312. Available from Deakin Research Online http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30022451 Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in Deakin Research Online. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact [email protected] Copyright: 2009, Acumen Publishing 24 LATE-TWENTIETH -CENTURY ATHEISM Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis In 1948, the BBC broadcast a debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick Copleston on the existence of God (Russell & Copleston 1957). In that debate, Copleston claims: (i) that the existence of God can be proved by a meta­ physical argument from contingency; and (ii) that only the postulation of the existence of God can make sense of our religious and moral experience. Russell replies by giving diverse reasons for thinking that these two claims are incorrect: there are various ways in which Copleston's argument from contingency fails to be persuasive, and there are more plausible alternative explanations of our religious and moral experience. While there are many significant changes of detail, it is fair to say that the debate between Russell and Copleston typifies exchanges between theists and atheists in the second half of the twentieth century, and it is also fair to say that Russell's contribution to this debate typifies the approaches of late twen­ tieth-centuryatheists.
    [Show full text]
  • Inscrutable Evils, Skeptical Theism, and the Epistemology of Religious Trust
    University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 8-2013 Inscrutable Evils, Skeptical Theism, and the Epistemology of Religious Trust John David McClellan [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the Epistemology Commons Recommended Citation McClellan, John David, "Inscrutable Evils, Skeptical Theism, and the Epistemology of Religious Trust. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2013. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2459 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by John David McClellan entitled "Inscrutable Evils, Skeptical Theism, and the Epistemology of Religious Trust." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Philosophy. E. J. Coffman, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Richard E. Aquila, John E. Nolt, Carl G. Wagner Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) Inscrutable Evils, Skeptical Theism, and the Epistemology of Religious Trust A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville John David McClellan August 2013 Copyright © 2013 by John David McClellan All rights reserved.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter *** Philosophy, Religion, and Worldview Graham Oppy This
    Chapter *** Philosophy, Religion, and Worldview Graham Oppy This chapter consists of a series of reflections on widely endorsed claims about Christian philosophy and, in particular, Christian philosophy of religion. It begins with consideration of some claims about how (Christian) philosophy of religion currently is, and then moves on to consideration of some claims about how (Christian) philosophy of religion ought to be. The Triumphalist Narrative An oft-told triumphalist narrative holds that we are currently in a golden age for Christian philosophy of religion. While the details of the narrative vary, the central thread is that the bad old days have been replaced by good times. In the bad old days, philosophy of religion was in the doldrums, Christian philosophers were not pursuing philosophy of religion, Christian philosophers were hiding their Christian credentials under a bushel, Christian philosophers were held in contempt by ‘establishment’ philosophers, philosophy of religion had low status, philosophy of religion was not published in high-status generalist journals, philosophy of religion had no presence in major philosophy conferences, major presses were not taking on books in philosophy of religion, and philosophy of religion was not being taught in the higher education sector. But good times have returned: philosophy of religion is booming, Christian philosophers are pursuing Christian philosophy of religion, Christian philosophers are proudly proclaiming their Christianity to the academy and the world at large, philosophy of religion has high status, philosophy of religion is published in high-status generalist journals, philosophy of religion has a significant presence in major philosophy 1 conferences, major presses are publishing loads of books in philosophy of religion, and philosophy of religion is widely taught in the higher education sector.
    [Show full text]
  • From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability 1 Introduction
    From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability Brian Weatherson Abstract We generalize the Kolmogorov axioms for probability calculus to obtain conditions defining, for any given logic, a class of probability functions relative to that logic, coinciding with the standard probability functions in the special case of classical logic but allowing consideration of other classes of “essentially Kolmogorovian” probability functions relative to other logics. We take a broad view of the Bayesian approach as dictating inter alia that from the perspective of a given logic, rational degrees of be- lief are those representable by probability functions from the class appro- priate to that logic. Classical Bayesianism, which fixes the logic as classi- cal logic, is only one version of this general approach. Another, which we call Intuitionistic Bayesianism, selects intuitionistic logic as the preferred logic and the associated class of probability functions as the right class of candidate representions of epistemic states (rational allocations of de- grees of belief). Various objections to classical Bayesianism are, we argue, best met by passing to intuitionistic Bayesianism – in which the proba- bility functions are taken relative to intuitionistic logic – rather than by adopting a radically non-Kolmogorovian, e.g. non-additive, conception of (or substitute for) probability functions, in spite of the popularity of the latter response amongst those who have raised these objections. The interest of intuitionistic Bayesianism is further enhanced by the availabil- ity of a Dutch Book argument justifying the selection of intuitionistic probability functions as guides to rational betting behaviour when due consideration is paid to the fact that bets are settled only when/if the outcome betted on becomes known.
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography
    BIBLIOGRAPHY Abraham, William J., and Steven W. Holtzer (eds). The Rationality of Religious Belief: Essays in Honour of Basil Mitchell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Adams, Marilyn McCord. “Redemptive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the Problem of Evil,” in Audi and Wainwright (eds), Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, 1986, pp. 248–67. ———. “Problems of Evil: More Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988): 121–43. ———. “Theodicy Without Blame,” Philosophical Topics 16 (1988): 215–45. ———. “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1989): 297–310. ———. “God and Evil: Polarities of a Problem,” Philosophical Studies 69 (1993): 167–86. ———. “Evil, Problem of,” in Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol.3, 1998, pp. 466–72. ———. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1999. Adams, Marilyn McCord, and Robert Merrihew Adams (eds). The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Adams, Robert Merrihew. “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” in Outka and Reeder (eds), Religion and Morality, 1973, pp. 318–47. ———. “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7 (1979): 66–79. ———. “Plantinga on the Problem of Evil,” in Tomberlin and van Inwagen (eds), Alvin Plantinga, 1985, pp. 225–55. ———. The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Ahern, M.B. The Problem of Evil. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971. Allen, Robert Francis. “St. Augustine’s Free Will Theodicy and Natural Evil,” Ars Disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2003), URL ϭϽhttp://www.ArsDisputandi.orgϾ.
    [Show full text]
  • Metaphysical Naturalism and the Ignorance of Categorical Properties
    Copyright © 2017 by Lok-Chi Chan Thesis supervisor: Professor David Braddon-Mitchell Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney Cover design: Chan Man Yuk i Declaration I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work. Assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. Lok-Chi Chan ii Abstract The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the connections between metaphysical naturalism and the categorical ignorance thesis – offered by Rae Langton (1998), David Lewis (2009), Frank Jackson (1998), and Simon Blackburn (1990) – and determine whether the latter will challenge the former. According to metaphysical naturalism, the actual world contains only metaphysically natural things. According to the categorical ignorance thesis, all we can know about things are their dispositional properties, but the categorical properties that bear these properties remain in principle unknowable. In this dissertation, I will determine whether the ignorance of categorical properties – as Rae Langton (1998), David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson (2007), John Foster (1993) and Alyssa Ney (2007) argue (or worry about) – is consistent with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism), and whether it will lead to a scepticism about the metaphysical naturalness of categorical properties, which will, in turn, significantly decrease the probability that metaphysical naturalism is true. Being attracted to metaphysical naturalism, the categorical ignorance thesis, and also the philosophical position that the two theses are consistent, I will argue that the answer to the former question is yes, and that the answer to the latter question is no. Russellian Monism, an influential doctrine in philosophy of mind that is relevant to the topic, will also be considered.
    [Show full text]
  • The University of Chicago the Ontological Argument, Its Criticisms and Consequences a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of T
    THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, ITS CRITICISMS AND CONSEQUENCES A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVINITY SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY JASON GRANT CATHER CHICAGO, ILLINOIS AUGUST 2017 Copyright c 2017 by Jason Grant Cather All Rights Reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . vi 1 NEOCLASSICAL METAPHYSICS FOR THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT . 1 1.1 Overview . .1 1.2 The Appeal of the Ontological Argument . .2 1.3 On the Nature of Argument . .5 1.4 The Appeal of Neoclassical Metaphysics . .5 1.5 How to Think About Divine Greatness . .9 1.5.1 The Ontological Principle . .9 1.5.2 Actual Entities . .9 1.5.3 Societies . 10 1.5.4 Eternal Objects . 11 1.5.5 God . 12 1.6 Neoclassical Metaphysics as a Modal Metaphysics . 13 1.7 Neoclassical Understandings of Existential Statements . 14 1.8 Conclusion . 16 2 WHAT MAKES AN ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL? . 18 2.1 Overview . 18 2.2 Identifying Arguments as Ontological . 19 2.3 An Absurdly Brief History of the Debate Surrounding the Argument . 22 2.4 Parameters for Successful Arguments, or What Can We Expect an Argument toDo?....................................... 33 2.5 What Does a Parody Do? . 36 2.6 Are the Parodies Ontological? . 39 2.7 From Parody to Parity . 41 2.8 Conclusion . 42 3 ON FORMULATIONS OF ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS . 43 3.1 Overview . 43 3.2 From Parody to Caricature . 43 3.3 Two Interpretations . 45 3.4 Is the Argument Just for Theists? . 51 3.5 Ontologically Neutral Formulations . 53 3.5.1 Is Neutrality Really Desirable? .
    [Show full text]
  • Graham Oppy Logic and Theism Is a Very Fine Book, Crammed With
    REVIEW ARTICLE LOGIC AND THEISM: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST BELIEFS IN GOD, BY JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL (CAMBRIDGE: CUP), XIX+652 PP. HARDBACK. Graham Oppy Logic and Theism is a very fine book, crammed with detailed analyses of arguments for and against belief in God. It is not a book that can be read quickly; but it is a book that repays effort invested in it by readers. Despite the fact that it is a very large book, and despite the wide range of the arguments that are considered, the book is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of arguments for and against belief in God. This is one way in which it contrasts with, say, John Mackie’s The Miracle of Theism or Michael Martin’s Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. There is no serious discussion in Sobel’s book of, for example, arguments from religious experience, arguments from consciousness, arguments from morality, arguments from the natural history of religion, and sundry other minor arguments for the existence of God. Moreover, the book contains no serious discussion of, for example, the meaningfulness of religious talk, anti-realist construals of religious talk, the critiques of religion offered by Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, Freud, and Nietzsche, and so forth. The book makes considerable use of technical logical and mathematical machinery. Arguments are frequently given symbolisations in first-order predicate calculus or extensions thereof; and, where these symbolisations correspond to valid arguments in the relevant logical systems, detailed derivations are supplied. Several chapters make use of the mathematics of probability, in ways that require more than just nodding acquaintance with standard formulations of Bayes’ Theorem.
    [Show full text]
  • ABSTRACT Explanation in Metaphysics Daniel M. Johnson, Ph
    ABSTRACT Explanation in Metaphysics Daniel M. Johnson, Ph.D. Mentor: Alexander R. Pruss, Ph.D. One of the primary tasks of the philosopher is to explain what it is for something to be the case—what it is for one event (substance, fact) to cause another, what it is for an action to be obligatory, what it is for an object to bear a property, what it is for a proposition to be true necessarily, what it is for a person to know something. This activity of explaining what something is or what it is for something to be the case, of identifying what I call ontological explanations, is of special importance to metaphysics, since the task of metaphysics generally is to get to the bottom of reality. The concept of ontological explanation is usually buried a layer deep in most discussions, however, and theses about it are either presupposed or clothed as claims about other things. In some cases, this leads to confusion and frustration, and in many other cases the discussion could benefit from a long look at ontological explanation even if that look isn’t strictly necessary to remedy confusion. My goal is to give ontological explanation that long look, and then use the clarity gained to reinterpret, reorganize, and even make progress on some long-standing disputes in metaphysics. In the first two chapters I examine ontological explanation itself and connect it to a host of important metaphysical issues, including ontological commitment and truthmaker theory. In the third and fourth chapters, I apply the work done in the first two chapters to a pair of important metaphysical arguments that crucially employ infinite regresses of ontological explanations—Bradley’s Regress and McTaggart’s Paradox.
    [Show full text]