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6 X 10.5 Long Title.P65 Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86386-5 - Arguing about Gods Graham Oppy Index More information Index absolute value, 355 beauty, 411 Adams, Bob, 70, 86, 89, 92, 328 begging the question, 5, 11, 30, 51, 52, 57, addition, successive, 142 58, 64, 67, 91, 101, 102, 106, 125, 142, adventitious ideas, 110 182, 229, 347, 354, 356, 364, 367 agnosticism, 37, 39, 53, 58, 129, 179, 231, behaviourism, 396 235, 244, 307, 333, 414, 416, 417 Behe, Michael, 187 Alston, William, 289, 309 belief: coherence, of, 9; and motivation, 40; Anderson, Tony, 70 web of, 8 Anselm, St., 65, 72, 88 Bergmann, Mike, 289, 304, 309 Aquinas, St. Thomas, xvi, 101, 120, 124, 329, big-bang cosmology, 101, 138, 149, 154, 158, 338; Five Ways, 98, 107, 130; The First 172 Way, 102, 103; The Second Way, 99, 102; Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, 130, 132 The Third Way, 103, 107 Bigelow, John, 274 arguments from evil, xvii, 4, 103, 123, 208, Boyle lectures, 185, 230 259, 321, 328, 402; evidential arguments Brennan, Geoff, 284 from evil, 4, 289, 313; logical arguments Bridgewater treatises, 185, 230 from evil, 4, 262, 289 Bringsjord, Selmer, 395, 398 arguments, minor evidential, 4 brute contingency, 120, 134, 136, 160, 234, arguments, moral, see moral arguments 239 arguments, successful, 7, 10 Bugge, Thomas, 196 arguments, teleological, see teleological Burman, David, 333 arguments Byrne, Alex, 256 Armstrong, David, 274 atheism, 1, 15, 34, 37, 229, 246, 333 Campbell, Richard, 89 Augustine, 328 Cantor, Georg, 33, 139, 140 axiom of choice, 124 Carnap, Rudolf, 67 causation, 3, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 170 background knowledge, 176, 177, 182, 209, central state materialism, 396 217, 218, 221, 224, 347, 391 Chalmers, Dave, 399 bacterial flagellum, 192, 195 Chambers, Timothy, 72, 88 Barbour, Ian, 175 Charlesworth, Max, 89 Barcan principle, 125 choice, axiom of, 124 Barnes, Jonathon, 89 Churchland, Pat, 384 Bayesianism, 8, 38, 202, 203, 204, 208, 209, Churchland, Paul, 384 212, 227, 296 Clark, Romane, 101 445 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86386-5 - Arguing about Gods Graham Oppy Index More information 446 Index clear and distinct perception, 108 distributive pantheism, 61 Clifford, William, xviii, 416; Clifford’s divine hiddenness, 407 Principle, xviii, 416, 418, 420, 422, Doolittle, Russell, 196 425 doxastic conservatism, principle of, 15 Clifton, Rob, 132 Duff, Anthony, 254, 256 clutter avoidance, principle of, 29 COBE data, 145, 233 Earman, John, 146 cognitive basicality, 25 efficacy of prayer, 403 cognitive limitations, human, 310 Einstein, Albert, 135, 145, 416 coherence of beliefs, 9 eliminative materialism, 384 collective pantheism, 61 Engels, Friedrich, 360 Collins, Robin, 201 Euthyphro question, 354 combinatorial conception of sets, 139 evil, xvi, 17, 43, 62, 251, 260, 262. See also common consent, 4, 332, 336 arguments from evil Conjunctive Contingent Fact, Big, 130, expert testimony, xviii, 340, 343, 345 132 explanation: personal, 386, 387; scientific, conscience, 369, 371 376, 386, 387, 388, 394, 398; conservatism, principle of, 29 self-explanation, 120, 136, 389 constitution and identity, 68 explanatory filter, 211, 214 contingency, brute, see brute contingency extreme no-devil corollary, 73 converse Barcan principle, 125 Conway, John, 139, 256 fallibilist atheism, 15, 34 cosmological arguments, xv, xvi, 3, 57, 97, fictitious ideas, 110 173, 276, 289, 383 fideism, Wittgensteinian, 50 cosmological constant, 202 Fitch, Frederic, 131 cosmology, 172, 230, 236, 238; see also Fitelson, Branden, 211 big-bang cosmology flagellum, bacterial, 192, 195 costs of irreligion, 365 Flew, Tony, 315 counterfactuals, 155, 159, 277; of freedom, Forrest, Peter, 31, 33 267, 273, 276, 319 freedom, see libertarian freedom Craig, William Lane, 137, 154, 203, free-will defence, 103, 263, 268, 275, 280, 211 316, 321, 328 Craig’s library, 140 free-will theodicies, 103, 260, 316, 317, 321, credulity, principle of, 347 328 cumulative arguments, 5 Frege, Gottlob, 139 Freud, Sigmund, 360 Daniels, Charles, 41 FRW models, 145, 146 Darwin, Charles, 186, 192, 199, 230, 236, 239, 411; The Origin of Species, 232 G. E. Moore shift, 291 Davey, Ken, 132 Gaine, Simon, 316, 320 Dawkins, Richard, 186, 194, 229, 231 Gale, Richard, 50, 130, 262 deism, 31 Gaunilo, xvi, 73, 93 Dembski, William, 211, 216 general relativity, 141, 145, 146, 170, 172 depravity, transworld, 279, 319 Geroch, Robert, 146 ∗ Descartes, Ren´e, xvi, 93, 97, 107, 119; god , 35 Meditation III, 107, 118 god , 43 devil corollary, 73 G¨odel, Kurt, 70 Devine, Philip, 72 Godfrey-Smith, Peter, 284 disagreement between reasonable people, god-likeness, 70 7 gravitation, 201 dispositional theory of mind, 274 Gr¨unbaum,Adolf, 147, 148 dissective sentential operator, 131 Guy, Reed, 161 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86386-5 - Arguing about Gods Graham Oppy Index More information Index 447 Hacking, Ian, 223 Kripke, Saul, 134 H´ajek, Alan, 256, 257 Kvanvig, Jonathon, 323 Hall, Barry, 196 Kwang, Cha, 403 happiness, 358, 361 Harman, Gilbert, 29 La Croix, Richard, 89 Harris, William, 403 Langtry, Bruce, 50 Hartle, Jim, 154 Lavine, Shaughan, 118 Hartle-Hawking cosmology, 160 law of the simplest beginning, 160 Hawking, Stephen, 154 Leibniz, Gottfried, xvi, 119, 124, 130 Hazen, Allen, 70 Leslie, John, 216, 239 heaven, 62, 250, 254, 256, 260, 314, 329, Lewis, David, 31, 32, 58, 89, 92, 163, 315 368 libertarian freedom, 102, 103, 113, 123, 152, Hempel, Peter, 387 265, 272, 275, 286, 316, 321, 327 Hick, John, 411 Locke, John, 382, 395 Hilbert’s Hotel, 140 logical conception of sets, 139 historical tradition, 336, 339 Howard-Snyder, Dan, 262, 289, 303, 309 Mackie, John, xvii, 229, 236, 262, 283, 288, human cognitive limitations, 310 333, 353, 371, 384, 398, 400 Hume, David, 183, 187, 228, 244, 333, 376, Malcolm, Norman, 89 379, 417; Dialogues Concerning Natural Mann, William, 89 Religion, xvii, 44, 231; Humeanism, 42 Manson, Neil, xvii, 202, 204 many gods objection, 250, 254 ideas: adventitious, 110; fictitious, 110 Markosian, Ned, 161, 163, 167 identity of arguments, 11 Martin, Charlie, 274 identity of indiscernibles, 220 Martin, Michael, 315, 321 illness, 403, 404 Marx, Karl, 360 indifference, principle of, 205 materialism, 384, 396 infinite regress, 3, 98, 101, 106, 117, 120, mathematical knowledge, 14, 109, 139, 404, 146, 148, 234 405 infinity, 96, 104, 114, 118, 141, 143, 168, Matson, Wallace, 186 169, 237, 240, 249, 254, 257, 329 McGrew, Tim, 205 information, xviii, 7, 26, 46, 61, 71, 122, 168, McLaughlin, Robert, 22 199, 210, 214, 250, 286, 287, 403, 409, mereological ontological argument, 49, 56, 410, 419 59, 69, 96 innate ideas, 110 meta-ethics, 42 innocent, 37 Meyer, Bob, 123 innocuity thesis, 80, 84 Miller, Kenneth, 196 inverse gambler’s fallacy, 216, 223 minor evidential arguments, 4 irreducible complexity, 188, 197 miracles, 4, 43, 331, 347, 350, 376, 381 modal interpretations, 92 Jackson, Frank, 397 modal logic, 59, 70, 103, 125, 126, 132 James, William, xviii, 418, 422 modal ontological arguments, 49, 374 Jesus, 406 modal principles, 125 justice, 363, 365, 373 modal realism, 31, 62, 66 modality, 3, 98, 100, 134, 171, 220, 272, 404 kala¯m cosmological arguments, 97, 101, 106, Molinism, 155, 319 124, 137, 153, 155 moral arguments, xviii, 4, 33, 331, 352, 356, Kant, Immanuel, 72, 97, 372; Classification 372, 375 of Arguments, 1, 2; First Antinomy, 144 moral belief, 40 Kenny, Anthony, 98 moral evil, 260, 262, 280, 328 Koons, Rob, 97, 125, 130 moral knowledge, 40, 44 Kragh, Helge, 145 moral perfection, 77 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86386-5 - Arguing about Gods Graham Oppy Index More information 448 Index morality, 122, 248, 278, 313, 352, 372, 405 principle of clutter avoidance, 29 mystery, 236, 408, 412 principle of conservatism, 29 mystical experience, 346, 347, 350 principle of credulity, 347 principle of doxastic conservatism, 15 negative undermining, principle of, 29 principle of indifference, 205 Newman, John, 369 principle of negative undermining, 29 Newton, Isaac, 233 principle of positive undermining, 29 Newtonian cosmology, 233 principle of sufficient reason, 119, 121, 130, nihilism, ontological, 60 137, 141, 152, 171, 275, 282 no-devil corollary, 73 principle of testimony, 348 Nolan, Daniel, 69 prior belief, 8 non-arbitrary improvement, 293, 294 prior probability, 8 non-evidential arguments, 5 proper function of arguments, 10 null part, 69 Proslogion, 65, 72 Proslogion II, 58, 89 objective chance, 163, 167, 170, 221, 223, providence, 401 224 Pruss, Alex, 130 objective values, 352, 356 observational selection effects, 209 quantifier-exchange fallacy, 60 Ockham, William of, 329 Quine, Willard, 8, 67 Ockham’s Razor, 20, 22, 29 ontological arguments, xv, 2, 3, 49, 96, 232 Rashdall, Hastings, 353 Ontological Arguments and Belief in God redundancy thesis, 77, 80 (Oppy), xvi, 35, 49, 96 regularity, 38, 246 ontological nihilism, 60 Rowe, William, 289 Oppenheimer, Paul, 89 Russell, Bertrand, 139, 363 Oppy, Graham, 49, 64, 70, 96, 133, 144, 206 Russell, Bruce, 308 Rutherford, Ernest, 381 Paley, William, 174, 187; Natural Theology, Ryle, Gilbert, 274 175, 187, 200 pantheism, 61 sceptical theism, 289 paradox of the preface, 35 scientific explanation, 376, 386, 387, 388, Parfit, Derek, 315 394, 398 parsimony, 212 scope, 391 Pascal, Blaise, 21; Pascal’s wager, 21, 258, Scott, Dana, 70 368; Pensees´ , 243 Scotus, Duns, 320, 329 Paul, Gregory, 357 scripture, xviii, 4, 17, 27, 35, 43, 259, 304, Penrose,
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