DISAGREEMENT AND CHANGE OF VIEW By KIRK LOUGHEED, B.A. (HONS), M.A., M.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctorate in Philosophy McMaster Univeristy © Copyright by Kirk Lougheed Acknowledgements There are many people who contributed to the success of this dissertation. I first started thinking about disagreement when I wrote a major research paper on religious disagreement under Klaas Kraay at Ryerson University. Klaas continues to be an excellent interlocutor on these issues. I begun work on this dissertation at Monash University under the direction of Graham Oppy and Robert Mark Simpson. While the project evolved a lot since my time at Monash, their early input was invaluable. My supervisor at McMaster University, Nicholas Griffin, provided detailed and timely feedback on multiple drafts. The finished project benefited greatly from his careful reading. The other members of my departmental committee in Sandra Lapointe and Mark Johnstone also provided helpful comments along the way. Their comments at the defense were particularly helpful. Christopher Tindale (Windsor) served as an external and offered written feedback prior to the defense. During the defense he helped me to think about how this project hangs together as a whole and so I’m very grateful for his challenging questions. Three professors from earlier in my philosophical education have remained supportive of my philosophical endeavors. They are Rich Davis, Paul Franks, and Myron A. Penner. I have also had the privilege of discussing the epistemology of disagreement with two emerging stars in the field, Nathan Ballantyne and Jonathan Matheson. They have been extremely generous with their time. Many chapters and subsections of this dissertation have been presented at conferences. There are too many individuals to name, but I’m grateful to the audiences of those presentations. Finally, I’m grateful to feedback from anonymous referees who offered comments on sections of this dissertation that are published. Ideas from this dissertation appear in the following places: (forthcoming). “Catherine Elgin on Peerhood and the Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement.” Synthese. (2018). “The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements.” Informal Logic 38 (2): 263-292. (2017). “The Role of Idealized Cases in the Epistemology of Disagreement.” Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2): 251-270. I have many friends outside of academia who have offered encouragement throughout my time in graduate school. However, I would most like to thank my parents, Stephenson and Diane Lougheed. They have supported me emotionally and financially throughout my studies in ways that surely go beyond the normal obligations that parents have to their adult children. It’s unlikely I would have finished this without their support. I dedicate this dissertation to them. i Table of Contents Acknowledgements…..i Table of Contents…..ii Introduction…..1 I. Introduction to Disagreement and Change of View…..1 II. Chapter Summary…..2 Part I. The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Current Debate Chapter One: Introduction to the Epistemology of Disagreement I. Introduction to the Epistemology of Disagreement…..5 II. Conciliationism…..8 III. Objections to Conciliationism…..11 IV. Non-Conciliationism…..15 V. Conclusion…..18 Chapter Two: The Special Insight View I. Introduction…..20 II. Four Explanations of the Special Insight View…..21 III. Three Additional Considerations…..33 IV. Conclusion…..37 Chapter Three: An Analysis of Toy Cases of Disagreement I. Introduction…39 II. The Different Disagreements Argument…..39 III. Classic Cases Supporting Conciliationism…..42 IV. Unclear Cases…..46 V. Cases Supporting Non-Conciliationism…..51 VI. Objections…..57 VII. Conclusion…..60 Chapter Four: An Analysis of Epistemic Peerhood I. Introduction…..62 II. The Strict Notion of Epistemic Peerhood…..62 III. Problems with the Strict Notion of Peerhood…..63 IV. Two Reformulations of Peerhood and of the Problem of Disagreement…..72 ii V. The Significance of Disagreement Reformulated…..78 VI. Objections to Sceptical Epistemic Peerhood…..87 VII. Conclusion…..89 Part II. A Limited Version of Non-Conciliationism: The Benefits to Inquiry Argument Chapter Five: The Benefits to Inquiry Argument I. Introduction…..92 II. The Benefits to Inquiry Argument…..92 III. Empirical Support…..104 IV. Connections to Mill’s Political Philosophy…..117 V. The Benefits to Inquiry Argument and Toy Cases…..119 VI. Conclusion…..120 Chapter Six: Objections to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument I. Introduction…..121 II. Initial Objections to the Benefits to Inquiry Argument…..121 III. Epistemic Rationality versus Practical Rationality…..138 IV. All-Things-Considered Epistemic Rationality.....152 V. Conclusion…..158 Chapter Seven: The Benefits to Non-Inquiry Argument I. Introduction…..159 II. The Benefits to Non-Inquiry Argument…..159 III. Objection: Including Non-Inquiry Beliefs Makes the Argument Too Permissive…..162 IV. Non-Inquiry Beliefs, Different Cases of Disagreement, and Worldview…..163 V. Conclusion…..166 Chapter Eight: Worldview Disagreement I. Introduction…..168 II. The Due Diligence Argument…..168 III. Motivating the Due Diligence Argument…..171 IV. The Criteria for Worldview Evaluation…..172 V. Objections to Worldview Evaluation…..175 VI. Worldview Disagreement and Deep Disagreement…..182 VII. Conclusion…..189 Chapter Nine: Disagreement and Change of View I. Introduction…..189 II. Intellectual Humility as an Objection…..189 iii III. Competing Epistemic Values…..194 IV. Two Dynamic Views on Disagreement…..198 V. The Difficulty of Changing Worldviews…..211 VI. Conclusion…..214 Bibliography…..215 iv Introduction I. Introduction to Disagreement and Change of View In his 2006 paper, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement” Richard Feldman argued for the highly sceptical conclusion that an agent ought to suspend judgment about any belief over which she encounters peer disagreement.1 David Christensen’s 2007 paper “The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News” suggests that at very least peer disagreement entails that an agent ought to lower the confidence she had in a belief that is disputed by an epistemic peer. While I feel the intuitive force of Feldman and Christensen’s position, if they are correct then many of people’s most cherished political, ethical, and religious beliefs turn out to be unjustified, or at least less justified than originally thought. But many also have the intuition that such widespread scepticism is not plausible. This project is intended to explore competing intuitions about the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. In many ways this project is a direct response to Feldman (2006), Christensen (2009). In this project I offer a relatively unexplored argument that they and other conciliationists (those defending the view one should conciliate in the face of disagreement) are incorrect in their initial articles. I argue that in the face of peer disagreement there are at least some cases where an agent need not necessarily lower confidence or suspend judgment regarding the belief in question. This project consists of two main parts. ‘Part I. The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Current Debate’ is primarily methodological and sets the stage for the second part. To begin, I argue that much of the current literature on the epistemology of disagreement is misguided in its focus. This is for a variety of reasons including the fact that authors often shift inappropriately between simple 1 Feldman 2009 appears to take a weaker stance. He suggests that peer disagreement is always additional evidence that needs to be weighed with the total evidence. But he thinks it is impossible to offer general principles about how to weigh the evidence of peer disagreement (other than the simple fact that it ought to be weighed). 1 and complex cases of disagreement, implicit definitions of epistemic peerhood are overly strict, and completely shared evidence is impossible in real-life scenarios. In sum, there has been too much focus on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement – where parties are (near) cognitive and evidential equals – which cannot offer insight into everyday real-life cases of disagreement. For the sake of argument, in ‘Part II. A Limited Version of Non-Conciliationism: The Benefits to Inquiry Argument’ I assume that Feldman, Christensen, and other conciliationists are correct. I explore and defend an underdeveloped and underappreciated argument that appeals to future potential epistemic benefits of remaining steadfast in a disputed belief as the proximate epistemic justification for that belief. If successful, my argument constitutes a new response to Feldman and Christensen. II. Chapter Summary The first four chapters of the dissertation make up Part I. In the introductory chapter I introduce the epistemology of disagreement in more detail. I conclude with an outline of some of the main arguments in the literature. In Chapter Two I focus on why the special insight view is not a plausible response to peer disagreement. This is the view that an agent can be rational to remain steadfast in her own beliefs because she enjoys a special insight her opponents lack. Chapter Three is an analysis of the toy cases of disagreement often used in the literature. I argue that there are important differences between simple and complex cases of disagreement that are often overlooked in the literature. These differences show that lessons from simple cases of disagreement