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Analytical Digest Russian No. 217 26 March 2018 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html www.laender-analysen.de RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ■■ANALYSIS The Fight for Turnout: Growing Personalism in the Russian Presidential Elections of 2018 2 By Margarita Zavadskaya, Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki & European University at St. Petersburg ■■ANALYSIS Putin Wins! Engineering an Election without Surprises 5 By Eugene Huskey, Stetson University ■■DOCUMENTATION Election Report by the “Golos” Movement 8 EPDE Protests Against Classification As “Undesirable Organization” in Russia 10 ■■STATISTICS Coverage of Candidates in the Russian Presidential Elections 2018 by Various Russian TV Channels 11 ■■DOCUMENTATION Results of the Presidential Elections 2018 12 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies Security Studies Eastern European Studies East European Studies The George Washington University University of Bremen ETH Zurich University of Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 217, 26 March 2018 2 ANALYSIS The Fight for Turnout: Growing Personalism in the Russian Presidential Elections of 2018 By Margarita Zavadskaya, Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki & European University at St. Petersburg Abstract The role of presidential elections in sustaining authoritarianism differs from legislative elections because they are closely intertwined with the personalism associated with presidential power. The Russian political regime is moving toward a consolidated personalist authoritarianism where presidential elections signal the leader’s strength and divide the opposition by increasing voter turnout. Why Hold Elections? Elections support autocracies in a variety of ways: In “Fiddler on the Roof,” the well-known musical based decreasing the uncertainty that is endemic in all non- on the works of Sholem Aleichem, Tevye the milkman democratic regimes, coopting the elites, and dividing suddenly questions his wife Golda after several years of the opposition. In this sense the State Duma elections marriage: “Do you love me?” Taken aback, she retorts: perform a number of useful functions of power shar- “Do I love you? For twenty-five years I’ve washed your ing, spoils distribution, and splitting the opposition. In clothes, Cooked your meals, cleaned your house, Given 2003 the newly formed United Russia absorbed a large you children, milked the cow, After twenty-five years, number of independents and deputies from other politi- why talk about love right now?” The Russian presiden- cal parties. In 2007 the political arena imploded four sys- tial elections, held on March 18, the anniversary of what temic parties and cut out the stronger opposition. In 2011 the Kremlin celebrates as Crimea’s “reunion” with Rus- the authorities lost control of the Duma elections, when sia, took place almost 20 years into Vladimir Putin’s ten- United Russia only managed to win 49.32% of the votes. ure. To continue the metaphor, these elections rhetori- The perception that the regime had cheated to gain even cally question whether Russian voters still support the this result caused the massive For Fair Elections move- president after the “rally round the flag effect” generated ment and protests. To calm the situation, the author- by Russia’s successful military operations faded away. ities had to make concessions to allow the registration Vladimir Putin competed against seasoned vet- of a large number of new parties. Finally, in September erans—Vladimir Zhirinovsky from the LDPR and Ser- 2016, United Russia won a majority, but the elections gei Baburin representing the puppet party Russian All- were marred by low turnout rates and poor media cov- People’s Union, Grigorii Yavlinski from Yabloko, and erage. The legislative elections of 2003 aimed at power- new faces—Ksenia Sobchak, the daughter of former sharing and extensive cooptation, while the elections Putin boss Anatoly Sobchak who described herself as of 2007, 2011 and 2016 sought to send a credible sig- “the against all” candidate, Pavel Grudinin, replacing nal about the regime’s strength. Only in 2011 did the Communist Gennady Zyuganov, and outright spoilers administration fail to send such a signal. Boris Titov from the Party of Growth and another com- munist Maxim Suraykin. Signaling Strength The question was rhetorical since no one doubted The role of presidential elections in sustaining authoritar- that electoral results were a foregone conclusion. But ianism differs from the role that legislative elections play there is another question: Why hold elections and what and is closely intertwined with the degree of personalism is their purpose for those in power? and presidential power. Under party-based authoritarian regimes, presidential elections largely serve the purpose of Do Elections Support or Subvert Autocracy? rotating the leadership among party members and infor- The political science literature suggests that elections mation gathering, as in Mexico under the Partido Rev- under autocracies are a double-edged sword that seek to olucionario Institucional (PRI) or Tanzania under the sustain authoritarian rule, but under certain conditions Chama-Cha Mapendusi (CCM). The degree of personal- may turn against the master. Some claim that repetitive ism is limited under such regimes. In contrast, the Russian elections gradually socialize politicians and voters and at political regime is moving toward a consolidated personal- some point democratize the regime. On the other hand, ist authoritarianism where presidential elections are a dem- there is a good deal of evidence that clearly contradicts this onstration of strength signaling the regime’s invincibility. proposition. Repetitive Russian elections—both legisla- On March 18 Putin ran for his last term as the pres- tive and presidential—do not seem to liberalize the regime. ident under the revised constitution and sought to signal RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 217, 26 March 2018 3 his political strength with renewed vigor. Elite coopta- tions sought to mobilize voters by entertaining them tion does not play a big role when it comes to executive and varying the choice of new candidates, especially elections since there is only one person running for office. those with ambiguous political reputations, such as the Nevertheless, the ability to send a strong and convinc- show-woman Ksenia Sobchak. ing signal to the elites, voters, and international com- munity is of ultimate importance for Putin’s political The Boycott Controversy survival and his further plans to retain power. The electoral competition is obviously unfair when the Elite groups should acknowledge once again that opposition is prevented from running. Aleksei Navalny the incumbent is far from becoming “a lame duck”, he and his supporters unleashed a countrywide campaign still enjoys popular support and continues to serve as to boycott the elections after the authorities failed to reg- the main intermediary in intra-elite negotiations and ister Navalny as a candidate. If turnout was the Krem- conflicts. Voters learned that there is no other viable lin’s main goal, the boycott campaign hit at the very alternative and the overwhelming majority of citizens heart of the idea to mobilize as many voters as possi- apparently support the incumbent, even if some do not. ble. Ultimately, the boycott did not seem to be effective. The opposition supporters received a message that they It came as no surprise that the leaders of Yabloko— are now deep in enemy territory and their resistance is one of the systemic opposition parties that was permitted futile. Lastly, the relevant decision makers from abroad to run—opposed the boycott, claiming it would not obtained another piece of evidence that Putin, regard- achieve the goals it sought. Along the lines of their logic, less of his ambiguous foreign policies, enjoys massive absent voters are no better than those who would not support as his main political asset. go anyway. As Boris Vishnevsky put it: “If opposition voters had not gone on strike in previous years, perhaps The Turnout Controversy we would have had a different parliament and, maybe, The results of the elections in March did not make for a different president.”2 Ksenia Sobchak’s Civic Initia- a worthwhile intrigue. The leading state-sponsored Rus- tive and Pavel Grudinin’s CPRF advocate for the same sian pollsters—FOM and VTsIOM—reported expected approach: opposition voters should go to the polls to vote shares above 70%. The final tally was 76.69%. The support their cause and to fulfill their civic duty. These independent pollster Levada Center was not allowed to statements clearly show how presidential elections keep publish its ratings since the state had declared it “a for- dividing the opposition by allowing some of them to run eign agent.” However, the main battlefield unfolded and preventing others from doing so. around the expected turnout that demonstrated the Boycotts decrease the odds of protests after elec- legitimacy of the political credentials given to the pres- tions since the voters already know that the quality of ident. Thus, the indicator to be maximized and deliv- the elections fell short of international standards. Boy- ered by the regional governors at these elections was the cotting elections under personalist rule and under cer- turnout statistics together with the election outcomes. tain conditions could compromise the regime’s signal- According to preliminary
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