Spotlight on Global Jihad (September 3-9, 2020)
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( רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ"ל ןיעידומ ש ל מ כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ו רטל ו ר ט ןיעידומ ע ה ר Spotlight on Global Jihad September 3-9, 2020 Main events of the week Syria: in the Idlib area, routine incidents continued, consisting mainly of exchanges of artillery fire between the Syrian army and the rebel organizations, chiefly the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham. ISIS’s provinces in Africa and Asia continued their routine attacks. Noteworthy activity during the past week: In Iraq, the intensity of ISIS’s attacks this week decreased, after several weeks of intensive activity. However, the Iraq Province continues to be the epicenter of ISIS’s activity. In northern Sinai, the Egyptian army appears to have regained control of most of the area of Rabi’a. At the same time, ISIS’s activity against the Egyptian army is still ongoing, but at low intensity. This week, local residents reportedly began to return to their villages. In Mozambique, the security forces of Tanzania and Mozambique failed to regain control of the port of Mocimboa da Praia, in the northeast of the country. According to ISIS, 20 Tanzanian soldiers were killed or wounded in the failed counterattack. In Tunisia, ISIS operatives carried out a ramming and stabbing attack near the Mediterranean resort town of Sousse. A member of the Tunisian National Guard was stabbed to death and another was wounded. Tunisian security forces surrounded the attackers and killed three terrorists. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack. In recent years, ISIS has carried out several terrorist attacks in Tunisia, most of them suicide bombing and shooting attacks, mainly in the city of Tunis and the resort town of Sousse. 225-20 2 ISIS’s activity in the various provinces around the world Summary of ISIS activity this week On September 3, 2020, ISIS’s Al-Naba’ weekly published an infographic entitled “The Harvest of the Fighters,” summarizing ISIS’s activity on August 27 until September 2, 2020. During this period ISIS carried out 82 attacks around the world, compared to 71 in the previous week (i.e., an increase of about 15% in the scope of the attacks). A total of 58 attacks were carried out in Iraq, 16 of them in the Diyala Province. Attacks were also carried out in ISIS’s other provinces in Africa and Asia: Syria (10); the Sinai Peninsula (6); West Africa (5); Central Africa (1); Khorasan, i.e., Afghanistan (1); and East Asia (1) (Al-Naba' weekly, Telegram, September 3, 2020). Over 204 people were killed and wounded in these attacks (similarly to last week). The largest number of casualties (117) was in Iraq. The other casualties were in the following provinces: West Africa, mainly Nigeria (35); Syria (22); the Sinai Peninsula (15); Central Africa (mainly the Democratic Republic of the Congo) (9); Khorasan, i.e., Afghanistan (5); and East Asia (the Philippines) (1) (Telegram, August 27, 2020). The Syrian arena The Idlib region In the Idlib region, artillery exchanges between the Syrian army and the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham and the other rebel organizations also continued this week. As in previous weeks, most of the incidents took place in Jabal al-Zawiya and in areas south and southwest of Idlib. In addition, snipers of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham reportedly fired at Syrian soldiers. 225-20 3 Left: Syrian army artillery fire at a village southwest of Idlib (Idlib Plus Facebook page, September 2, 2020). Right: Syrian army artillery hitting Ariha, south of Idlib (Idlib Plus Facebook page, September 6, 2020). Sniper fire by the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham at the Syrian army On the evening of September 3, 2020, a sniper squad equipped with thermal binoculars infiltrated an area under Syrian army control about 4 km southwest of Saraqib (about 14 km southeast of Idlib). Two soldiers were killed. In addition, snipers fired at forces supporting the Syrian army about 40 km south of Idlib. Several fighters were killed and others were wounded (Ibaa, September 4, 2020). A sniper of the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham firing at the Syrian army (Ibaa, September 4, 2020) Various perceptions of jihadi Islamist organizations: the controversy between the realists and the purists Following are the highlights of an article by journalist-researcher Tam Hussein. The article examines the various approaches represented by the jihadi rebel organizations in the 225-20 4 Idlib region, chiefly the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS) and Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations. 1 Overview In June 2020, a conflict broke out between the HTS and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Hurras al- Din (the Guardians of the Religion Organization), which operate in the Idlib region.2. For now, the dispute has been resolved. But perhaps the conflict goes a bit deeper, and could be a milestone for the jihadi project itself. Maybe it is an indication of where the Jihadi project might be heading towards. This small clash may be the beginning of the battle for the heart of Jihadism. This is a conflict between the inflexible purists who are meticulous when it comes to Salafist-jihadi Islam and oppose any deviation from it and the more realistic ones who are willing to compromise and adopt a pragmatic approach. The realists, led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani The establishment of ISIS was a milestone for those who believe in the establishment of an Islamic state that implements sharia. It was an attempt to establish a “moral state,” while establishing an orderly (in their view) but merciless administration and government. This venture was a resounding failure. But the fact that it was crushed showed other Jihadists that perhaps it could not succeed without a heavy dose of realism. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani appears to be flexible in his conduct: he maintains a dialogue not only with Al-Jazeera reporters, but also with the International Crisis Group, an NGO seeking to resolve conflicts around the world. Al-Julani is aware that the organization that he heads will not survive unless it adapts itself to the international political reality. Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the famous jihadi ideologue3, also conveyed a clear message that the current climate is not conducive for an Islamic state, let alone a Jihadi project to flourish. According to him, for the time being, it is better not to establish such a state, because its 1 Tam Hussein, Into the heart of Jihadism. MENA ETC – A Blog about Middle Eastern & North African Politics, Society and Culture. 19 July 2020: https://www.tamhussein.co.uk/2020/07/into-the-heart-of- jihadism/ 2In late June 2020, there were violent clashes in the Idlib enclave between the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham and the Guardians of the Religion Organization and other Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadi organizations. The reason for the clashes was the effort by the Headquarters for the Liberation of Al-Sham to impose its control over the other jihadi organizations, coupled with the fear of an imminent attack by the Syrian army. 3Sheikh Omar Mahmoud Abu Omar, AKA Abu Qatada al-Filistini, is considered a key ideologue of radical Islamic movements. He influenced Al-Qaeda and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the founding father of ISIS. 225-20 5 establishment would require the creation of a geopolitical change in the region, in order for it to be able to survive and develop, and therefore it is better to establish a statelet or quasi-state in the meantime. In practice, HTS, which operates in Idlib, is germinating and fast becoming a quasi-state: it controls the arms of state, taxation, administration and aspects of the judiciary. HTS has been forced to come to terms with the existing world order, postponing the optimal jihadi venture to sometime in the future. This is on the assumption that the fighters for the Islamic venture will not succumb to the pleasures of the good life that will be created for them within the governmental framework. In order to become a full-fledged Islamic state in the future, it is essential for such a statelet to possess an army, police and security forces, and so on. Indeed, the statelet headed by Al-Julani has begun to take control over armed groups that are not subordinate to it. The most important of these is the Guardians of the Religion Organization, which is loyal to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Expectations of the future The author estimates that the conflict which broke out in June 2020, which is currently limited in scope, may be a spark that will develop into a broader conflict in scope between the realists and the purists. This is because the purists will not accept an Al-Julani-style statelet. They are liable to wonder whether the bloodshed that took place and the large amount of money that was spent justify the creation of such an Islamic statelet. Such a conflict could have implications for other countries where jihadist elements operate, such as Somalia and Afghanistan. ISIS activity in the Syria Province4 The area of Deir ez-Zor, Al-Mayadeen, and Albukamal In the past week, ISIS operatives in the Euphrates Valley concentrated their efforts on attacks against SDF commanders. It seems that at least three commanders were killed. In addition, IEDs were detonated against notables and facilities belonging to local councils operating under SDF sponsorship. On September 6, 2020, hand grenades were thrown at an SDF vehicle about 20 km southeast of Al-Mayadeen.