THE STRUCTURE AND GROUNDING OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By William A. Roche, B.S., M.S. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2006 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor George Pappas, Advisor Professor Louise Antony _______________________________________ Professor William Taschek Advisor Graduate Program in Philosophy Copyright by William A. Roche 2006 ABSTRACT I articulate and defend a new version of the coherence theory of epistemic justification. It is new, in part, because, unlike traditional varieties of coherentism, it is externalist—viz., it has the consequence that justification supervenes, in part, on things that are neither mental nor supervenient on the mental. In other words, my theory entails that there could be mental duplicates (i.e., cognizers with the same beliefs, the same experiences, etc.) whose beliefs differ in justification. The theory, overall, has three distinguishing components. First, there is an explanationist component, which says, in short, that an inductive inference (or inferential relation) is cogent only if it is explanatorily virtuous—where one way to be explanatorily virtuous is to be an instance of inference to the best explanation. In this respect, my account is in the spirit of both William Lycan’s brand of coherentism, and the brand oft attributed to Gilbert Harman and Wilfrid Sellars. Second, there is a meta-perspectivalist component, which says (among other things) that S has good reason for thinking that p obtains only if from S’s perspective it is likely that he is connected (e.g., causally) to p. This, when fully spelled out, has the result that S’s belief system is coherent only if S has a view as to how he (or, better, his belief system) is connected to the outside world, and according to which the mechanisms involved (e.g., vision) are reliable. And third, there is a veridicality component, which requires that S’s reasons be true, and that S’s reasons for his reasons be true, and so on. This, together with the meta- perspectivalist component, requires that S be correct as to how he is reliably connected to the outside world. This is what makes my position externalist. I argue positively for each of these ii three distinguishing components, and, in doing so, refute my theory’s chief rivals in the coherentist camp. It is widely thought that coherence theories are hopeless, because of objections such as the Alternative-Systems Objection (which starts with the claim that there are lots of incompatible yet fully coherent belief systems such that any belief whatsoever is a member of at least one such system) and the Isolation Objection (which focuses on the alleged fact that coherence neither involves nor requires any sort of connection, such as a causal connection, to the outside world). I argue against these objections on three fronts. I argue that the coherentist can be an externalist, and that the objections fail against externalist coherentism. I argue that internalist foundationalism is faced with similar objections—so that were internalist coherentism to fall, internalist foundationalism too would fall. And, last, I argue against the objections directly, arguing that each version thereof, when fully fleshed out, has either a false premise or a fallacious sub-argument. The upshot is that, contrary to orthodox epistemology, there is nothing to be learned—vis-à-vis the question of whether justification is skyscraper-like in structure (as the foundationalist supposes)—from either the Alternative-Systems Objection or the Isolation Objection. It is also widely thought that, even setting aside these stock objections, foundationalist theories are superior to coherentist theories because, unlike coherentist theories, they allow a role for experiences in justification. With coherentist theories, the space of reasons (to borrow a phrase from Sellars) is restricted to the space of beliefs—so that only beliefs can serve as reasons. With foundationalist theories, in contrast, the space of reasons includes not just the space of beliefs, but also the space of experiences. The view, in brief, is that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially by experiences (e.g., visual experiences), and that the beliefs so justified serve as the foundation of justification. I argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, experiences are unfit to serve as reasons—either for or against beliefs. I argue in addition, however, that there is a contingent respect in which experiences are nonetheless required for justification, in that, iii though they cannot themselves serve as reasons, they can (and contingently do) help in enabling beliefs to serve as reasons. The ultimate payoff is philosophical understanding of the structure and grounding of justification—an understanding, that is, that justification is coherentist in structure and externalist in grounding. iv To my parents, Kent and Brenda v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am greatly, if not immeasurably, indebted to George Pappas, my advisor. He has thoughtfully read and commented on several versions of nearly every chapter, and—both in person and in writing—has always served for me as a model of how to do philosophy properly. This project has benefited immensely from his guidance (though, as he is a reliabilist and this project is a defense of coherentism, probably not as much as he would have liked). I owe a special thanks to Louise Antony and William Taschek (my other two readers), Robert Batterman, and to the rest of the faculty in the philosophy department here at the Ohio State University. The encouragement and critical feedback that I have received from them have helped tremendously. I have discussed nearly every aspect of this dissertation with William Melanson, Joshua Smith, and my brother, Michael. This has aided not just in clarifying and strengthening my overall position, but also in keeping what turned out to be a rather cumbersome task relatively enjoyable. I should also mention T. M. Reed, whose mentoring (while I was an undergraduate in philosophy at the University of Utah) I will always remember, and will surely never be able to repay. To all these people (and countless others), I give my sincere thanks. vi VITA BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION July 4, 1975, Born, Pocatello, Idaho 1997, B.S., University of Utah, Philosophy 1998, M.S., University of Utah, Philosophy 1999 - 2002, Teaching Assistant, The Ohio State University, Philosophy 2002 - Present, Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University, Philosophy FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Philosophy Areas of Specialization: Epistemology, Philosophy of Science vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................II ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..............................................................................................................VI VITA............................................................................................................................................. VII 1 THE VIEW—ROUGHLY SKETCHED......................................................................................1 1.1 The Question ..........................................................................................................................1 1.2 The Foundationalism/Coherentism Debate ............................................................................6 1.3 Some Examples....................................................................................................................11 1.4 Looking Ahead.....................................................................................................................14 1.4.1 Moderate Explanationism..............................................................................................16 1.4.2 Meta-Perspectivalism ....................................................................................................22 1.4.3 Veridicalism...................................................................................................................23 1.5 Conclusion............................................................................................................................30 2 THE ALTERNATIVE-SYSTEMS AND ISOLATION OBJECTIONS....................................33 2.1 The Objections .....................................................................................................................34 2.1.1 The Alternative-Systems Objection (ASO) ...................................................................35 2.1.2 The Isolation Objection (IO) .........................................................................................38 2.2 The First Rebuttal.................................................................................................................40 2.3 The Second Rebuttal ............................................................................................................44 2.4 The Third Rebuttal ...............................................................................................................50 2.4.1 Against the ASO 1.........................................................................................................50 2.4.2 Against the ASO 2.........................................................................................................52 2.4.3 Against the ASO 3.........................................................................................................53