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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2019-04-30 The Argument from Logical Principles Against Materialism: A Version of the Argument from Reason Hawkes, Gordon Hawkes, G. (2019). The Argument from Logical Principles Against Materialism: A Version of the Argument from Reason (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/110301 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY The Argument from Logical Principles Against Materialism: A Version of the Argument from Reason by Gordon Hawkes A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY CALGARY, ALBERTA APRIL, 2019 © Gordon Hawkes 2019 i Abstract The argument from reason is the name given to a family of arguments against naturalism, materialism, or determinism, and often for theism or dualism. One version of the argument from reason is what Victor Reppert calls “the argument from the psychological relevance of logical laws,” or what I call “the argument from logical principles.” This argument has received little attention in the literature, despite being advanced by Victor Reppert, Karl Popper, and Thomas Nagel. The versions of it that exist are more outlines than fully developed arguments. My aim in this thesis is (i) to clarify the argument, especially with regard to what issues are at stake; (ii) to develop the argument beyond Popper and Reppert’s initial versions of it; and (iii) to evaluate it as an anti-materialist argument. I have isolated five key premises in the argument: (1) the laws of logic are objectively real, (2) the laws of logic are abstract entities, (3) materialism entails that we cannot have knowledge of abstract entities, (4) knowledge of logical principles is essential for justified rational inferences, and (5) we have knowledge of logical principles. I break down each premise in detail, evaluating each in light of materialist responses. The goal of this thesis, then, is to fill in the gaps, so to speak, in an argument that merits more attention than it has received up until now. ii Acknowledgements First and foremost, I want to thank my wife, Sarah, who has supported me through all stages of this project. I couldn’t have done it without you. Would you like to go for a walk now? Thank you to my daughter, Emma, for constantly reminding me to get to work. (“Get in your office, daddy! You need to write your thesis!”) Even though I know you’ll never read it, I must thank you, Denise, for all you’ve done. “The Best = Denise Retzlaff” really is a tautology at this point. Justin Caouette, you were an invaluable mentor. Aaron Thomas-Bolduc, thanks for answering many of my logic questions. Mark, Ann, and Nicole, thank you for providing a spirit of fun in the department. To my office mate, Rob Armstrong: thanks for the late night conversations when I should have been working, for The Protomen, and for eating all my ham. To all my friends and family who prayed for me, encouraged me, dropped off meals when we were sick (especially in the last few weeks of writing), thank you. There are too many of you to list here, and I’m blessed to have you all in my life. John Baker, I thought you were a ruthless philosopher, demanding and exacting in argument; it turns out you’re a saint: thank you for giving up an entire day to help me format this beast. Last but not least, thank you, Noa, for shepherding this project from start to finish. I enjoyed our conversations very much, and thank you for challenging my thinking all along the way. iii Table of Contents I. A Very Brief History of the Argument from Reason ............................................................. 1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 1 A Very Brief History of the Argument from Reason .................................................................. 1 Karl Popper’s Argument from Logical Principles ....................................................................... 8 Thesis Statement .......................................................................................................................... 9 II. The Argument From Logical Principles .............................................................................. 12 A. The Argument from Logical Principles ................................................................................ 12 A1. Popper’s Reconstructed Argument ..................................................................................... 15 The Key Question in Popper’s Argument: By What Standards Is It Valid or Invalid? ......... 18 Physicalistic Alternatives to Abstract Non-Corporeal World 3 Objects as the Standards of Logic ...................................................................................................................................... 20 Popper’s Argument in Syllogistic Form ................................................................................ 23 Criticisms of Popper’s Argument ........................................................................................... 31 A2. Reppert’s “Argument from the Psychological Relevance of Logical Laws” ..................... 33 Reppert’s Argument in Syllogistic Form ............................................................................... 34 Reppert’s Argument Summary .............................................................................................. 39 Improvements in Reppert’s Argument ................................................................................... 39 Problems with Reppert’s Argument ....................................................................................... 40 B. The Key Premises ................................................................................................................. 41 i. Logical principles are objectively real. ............................................................................... 42 ii. Logical principles are non-physical, abstract entities. ....................................................... 42 iii. Causal closure entails that we cannot have knowledge of non-physical entities. ............. 43 iv. Logical principles play an essential role in the process of rational inference. .................. 44 v. We know the principles of logic. ....................................................................................... 44 C. The Form and Type of the Argument ................................................................................... 46 i. The Target of the Argument from Reason .......................................................................... 46 ii. The Three Stages of the Argument from Reason ............................................................... 55 iii. The Type of Argument ..................................................................................................... 57 iv. Logical Contradiction vs. Performative Contradiction ..................................................... 66 D. Three Ways to Object to the Argument............................................................................. 68 III. The Ontological Status of Logical Principles ..................................................................... 70 Overview: .................................................................................................................................. 70 A. An Initial Sketch of the Principles of Logic ...................................................................... 70 B. The Ontological Status of the Principles of Logic and Mathematical Objects Compared (and Contrasted) ..................................................................................................................... 73 Part I. Logical Principles Exist and Are Objective .................................................................... 76 The Meaning of “Objective” and “Subjective” ...................................................................... 77 Monism, Pluralism, and Instrumentalism .............................................................................. 80 Is Logic Revisable? ................................................................................................................ 82 The Case for Objective Logical Principles ............................................................................ 86 Nagel’s Argument Against Subjectivism and for Logical Realism ....................................... 89 Summary of Part I .................................................................................................................. 96 Part II. Logical Principles are Non-Physical Abstract Objects ................................................. 98 A. Overview ........................................................................................................................... 98 B. What Are “Abstract Objects”? ........................................................................................ 100 iv C. What Are
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