Arresting a Chinese Tech-Princess: discourses in the Canadian national news media
by Daniella Silva
B.A. (International Communications), Walla Walla University, 2018
Extended Essay Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts
in the School of Communication (Dual Degree Program in Global Communication) Faculty of Communication, Art and Technology
© Daniella Silva 2019 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Summer 2019
Copyright in this work rests with the author. Please ensure that any reproduction or re-use is done in accordance with the relevant national copyright legislation. Approval
Name: Daniella Silva Degree: Master of Arts Title: Arresting a Chinese Tech Princess: discourses in the Canadian national news media Program Director: Katherine Reilly
Sarah Ganter Senior Supervisor Assistant Professor Katherine Reilly Program Director Associate Professor
Date Approved: August 15, 2019
ii Abstract
By arresting Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, Canada lit the fuse for an international incident that has had serious consequences for the nation and its allies. Meng’s arrest is therefore a valuable case study to identify whose voices have the most power over messaging in the Canadian national news media. Using a critical discourse analysis of news quotations, this study identifies three main discourses circulating in news about Meng’s arrest and provides insight into how those discourses are linked to powerful individuals and interest groups at five levels of analysis. This study finds that the national news media positions Meng’s arrest as part of a larger geo-political struggle between East and West. An analysis of quotation patterns and citation routines show that Chinese government quotes are positioned less objectively than quotes from either the US or Canadian government suggesting a bias toward “Western” elite sources, especially governments and experts.
Keywords: Meng Wanzhou; Canadian national news; Huawei; hierarchy of influences; critical discourse analysis
iii Acknowledgements
This project would not have been possible without the support of many individuals. I would especially like to thank my advisor, Dr. Sarah Ganter, for her detailed feedback and commitment to critical scholarship. I would also like to thank this year’s GCMA co-directors and professors, Dr. Adel Iskandar, Dr. Katherine Reilly, Dr. Enda Brophy, and Dr. Kirsten McAllister for their ongoing support and outstanding classroom management during the program’s core seminars. The seminars greatly contributed to my thought processes and pointed me in the direction of invaluable literature for my project. Each of these individuals greatly contributed to my growth as an academic and helped prepare me for the program’s upcoming year in Beijing.
The acknowledgement section would be remiss without mentioning my wonderful cohort. Throughout the year, they have been a source of community and a safe space to destress and just have fun. Many of them have also provided thoughtful feedback on my work. I am excited to spend the next year with each of these individuals. A special thanks to Maxine Yeo, Muyi Yang, Ejilayomi Mimiko, Abdelrahman Fakida Amr, and Cecilia Shi.
My loving family and boyfriend have also been an endless source of love and support whenever I was feeling overwhelmed. At times, they graciously listened to my rants and helped make sense of my abstract thoughts related to this project. Without them, I would not be where I am today. Thank you Debbie Silva, Lucas Silva, and Michael Jensen. You mean the world to me.
Finally, I would like to thank my co-workers at Playland Guest Services who took such an interest in what I was writing. A special thank you to my supervisor, Tony, and my manager, Connor, for their insights and enthusiasm for the project.
iv Table of Contents
Approval ...... ii Abstract ...... iii Acknowledgements ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v List of Tables ...... vii List of Figures...... viii List of Acronyms ...... ix
Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 1
Chapter 2. Huawei as a Political Economy of Communications Case Study ...... 3 Controversy and the Failure of American Market Penetration Efforts ...... 3 Huawei as a Benevolent Corporation: Win-Win Rhetoric ...... 6
Chapter 3. Literature Review ...... 8 Western Media and China Representation ...... 8 Common Approaches to studying China Representation and Critiques ...... 10 Responding to the Critiques: Media Sociology and the Hierarchy of Influences Approach ...... 11
Chapter 4. Methodology ...... 14 Describing the Sample ...... 14 Critical Discourse Analysis ...... 16 Citation Routines ...... 17
Chapter 5. Hierarchy of Influences: Findings and Analysis ...... 19 Ideological Analysis ...... 19 Rule-of-Law Discourse...... 20 Political Economy Discourse ...... 22 Immoral Act Discourse ...... 25 Organizational Analysis ...... 28 Extra-Media (Social Interest Groups and Institutions) ...... 29 Linking Interest Groups to Discourses ...... 32 Linking Interest Groups to News Organizations ...... 34 Individual Level ...... 36 Authors ...... 36 Quoted Individuals ...... 39 News Routines Analysis: A micro-case study ...... 40 Quotation Types ...... 41 Reporting Verbs ...... 42
Chapter 6. Interpretation of Findings ...... 44
Chapter 7. Conclusions ...... 47
v Acknowledgement of Limitations ...... 47
References ...... 49
Appendix A: Coding Manual ...... 55
Appendix B: Quoted Institutions (> 1% coverage) ...... 59
vi List of Tables
Table 1: Risks associated with Chinese TNCs in the "West" ...... 5 Table 2: Major discourse groups and sub-categories ...... 20 Table 3: Interest groups and sub-categories represented in news quotations...... 31 Table 4: Representation of discourses according to interest groups ...... 32 Table 5: Top 10 quoted institutions ...... 33 Table 6: Top authors (> 2% coverage) and affiliations ...... 39 Table 7: Top 10 quoted individuals ...... 40 Table 8: Comparison of quotation types (Western vs Chinese government) ...... 41 Table 9: Reporting verb comparison (Western vs. Chinese government) ...... 42 Table 10: Coding Manual ...... 55
vii List of Figures
Figure 1: The Hierarchy of Influences model (Reese, 2016) ...... 12 Figure 2: Comparative article distribution, N=157 ...... 15 Figure 3: Richardson’s spectrum of news quote objectivity (taken from Eissa, 2014) .... 18 Figure 4: Major discourse groups, N = 1,296 ...... 20 Figure 5: Comparison of discourses between news organizations (% values) ...... 28 Figure 6: Quotation sources, N=1,296 ...... 30 Figure 7: Distribution of interest groups between news organizations (% values) ...... 35 Figure 8: Job titles of authors in the sample ...... 37 Figure 9: Author specializations...... 38
viii List of Acronyms
CBC Canadian Broadcasting Corporation CDA Critical discourse analysis CCP Chinese Communist Party IA Immoral act PE Political economy PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) ROL Rule of law TNC Transnational corporation
ix Chapter 1. Introduction
In December 2018, Canadian RCMP officers arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou as she was transiting through Vancouver International Airport. Meng is accused of violating US sanctions of Iran by knowingly misleading US banks about Huawei’s relationship with Skycom, a company based in Tehran. Canada’s extradition treaty with the US allowed Meng to be legally arrested in Canada where she currently faces hearings to determine whether her case merits extradition. As of August 2019, extradition proceedings were still ongoing, and the process could continue for several years before a decision on the case is finally reached. However, her arrest has already set off a chain of events ushering Canada into what former ambassador to China, Guy Saint-Jacques, has called the “worst crisis” in Sino-Canadian relations since diplomatic relations were established in 1970 (Fife, Chase, & Vanderklippe, 2019).
Since the arrest, numerous individuals have linked the Meng affair to retaliatory actions from China, including the arrests of Canadian citizens in China and to the Chinese government’s recent bans on Canadian canola and pork imports. At the same time, the United States has escalated its trade war with China and passed legislation effectively banning Huawei from participating in global telecom markets. Such an event has unsurprisingly sparked a frenzy of media coverage and investigations.
In light of the political and economic events surrounding Meng’s arrest, there is little doubt that Meng has come to represent more than just a wealthy CFO. She is the daughter of company founder and CEO, Ren Zhengfei, a former officer for the People’s Liberation Army of China and member of the Chinese communist party (CCP). She is, in the words of James Lewis, a Washington DC-based analysist, “a Chinese tech princess” (Kwong, 2018).
By calling Meng a “princess” Lewis is putting words to an increasingly familiar sentiment: those who rule the telecommunications industries rule the world. Scandals involving telecom companies are not just about business, they involve nation-states and international relations. Arresting a techno-princess is almost unthinkable. It is as if Japan or Korea had arrested Facebook COO, Sharyl Sandberg on China’s behalf, said Li Daokui, a scholar and director of the Center for China in the World Economy at Tsinghua
1 University. “Imagine what the political response would be in the US,” he said (Vanderklippe, 2018). Imagine what the newspapers would say. Imagine whose voices would be heard and which messages would circulate.
The Canadian national news media is the public’s first source of information in the Meng affair. The discourses surrounding the arrest of this Chinese tech princess are therefore an excellent micro-case study for identifying who has power to shape messaging in the Canadian national news media; because the consequences of this case have been so severe for Canada, there is a greater motivation for those with power to ensure that their messages are heard. Such a study can examine how different news actors position key discourses through the use of quotations and citation routines. These quotations are one of the readers’ only window into understanding the Meng affair. Because the outcomes of Meng’s arrest have enormous political, economic, and social consequences for Canada, understanding how the national news media positions key messages is vital to an understanding of the case. Analyzing quoted content and citation routines can also help link key messages to their structural contexts and institutional interests. This study addresses the following three research questions:
RQ1: What are the most prominent discourses surrounding the arrest of Meng Wanzhou in the Canadian national news media?
RQ2: Whose voices are represented?
RQ3: What does the positioning of different discourses and news actors tell us about who has power over messaging in the Canadian national news media?
In order to address the research questions, this paper will first provide a review of three interconnected bodies of literature: Huawei as a case study in the political economy of communications, common approaches to the study of China representation in Western news and its critiques, and media sociology through the lens of Reese and Shoemaker’s hierarchy of influences model. This last body of literature will be used to lead into the methodology section which proposes a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of quoted sources in articles related to Huawei and the arrest of Meng Wanzhou.
2 Chapter 2. Huawei as a Political Economy of Communications Case Study
Key to any case study is an understanding of the context that will inform the analysis. More than most corporations, Huawei has been studied because of its unique blend of political, economic, and social associations. It is a private transnational company, widely regarded as a ‘national champion’ for China’s techno-nationalist aspirations (Backaler, 2014; Hensmans, 2017; Wen, 2017; Zhao, 2010). These Chinese nationalist associations have historically created problems for Huawei as it tries to integrate into Western telecom markets. Huawei’s controversies in the West, as well as its unique development history directly inform the way the Meng affair is positioned in the Canadian national news media.
This chapter will first explore the difficulties Huawei has faced in US dominated telecom markets. Next, the chapter will reveal how Huawei has developed a unique business structure that positions Huawei as a “model citizen” and innovation partner. This structure is essentially a public relations strategy that helped it survive during past controversies and informs the company’s current media strategy for handling the Meng affair. Finally, this chapter highlights how Huawei has been positioned as a Chinese techno-nationalist project which creates insecurities for countries like Canada who are fearful of Chinese aggression. At the same time, the techno-nationalist project creates insecurities for China because of the contradictions inherent in a communist state with a liberalized economy.
Controversy and the Failure of American Market Penetration Efforts
Even before the most recent controversies surrounding the arrest of Meng Wanzhou in Canada, Huawei has been viewed with suspicion in the West. As early as 2003, Huawei was blocked from US markets after networking hardware company, Cisco, sued them for alleged IP theft (Wen, 2017, p. 139). Although the lawsuit was eventually dropped, Huawei had to withdraw many of its router products from US markets (p. 151).
In addition to fears about IP theft and inter-capitalist competition, fears have been raised about Huawei’s “Chinese identity.” In September 2012, Huawei and ZTE were called into a series of congressional hearings by the US House Intelligence Committee.
3 The goal of the hearings was to ascertain whether these two companies had positions within the company whose jobs were directly managed by the CCP. The hearings also raised concerns about Wanzhou’s father and Huawei CEO Ren Zhengfei’s connections to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Before founding Huawei, Zhengfei served as an officer in the army for several years. Zhengfei’s Chinese military career further linked Huawei to China’s military ambitions and alleged weaponizable phone technologies. (Backaler 2014, p. 113). The formal report one month later “concluded that Huawei and ZTE both pose potential national security risks”, especially if these two telecom companies were allowed to provide equipment to US critical infrastructure projects (p. 116). That same year, the EU Trade commission launched an anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation of Huawei and ZTE (Wen, 2017, p. 147).]
Canadian publics have also had concerns about Huawei. Even before the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, The Globe and Mail published an investigative piece in May 2018 that claimed Huawei was using Canadian IP to help China become a global telecom superpower (Silcoff, Fife, Chase, & Dobby, 2018). The report demonstrated that Huawei has been integrating itself into the R&D departments of several Canadian universities including UBC and Waterloo; Huawei offers funding for research labs and initiates partnership programs to mentor scientists in the field of telecommunications. In exchange, Huawei receives some of the IP and patents produced at these universities. If a majority of the IP produced by Canadian telecom researchers is going to Huawei, that puts local Canadian telecom companies at a disadvantage and may hurt the Canadian economy long into the future. Since Meng’s arrest, multiple news stories in Canada have claimed Huawei cannot be trusted as a private company, citing a Chinese Intelligence Law that states: “an organization or citizen shall support, assist in and co-operate in national intelligence work in accordance with the law and keep confidential the national intelligence work that it or he knows.” (Grauer, 2019). This law, it has been suggested, is proof that Huawei cannot operate as a private company, even if it wants to.
Many of the concerns plaguing Huawei’s integration into North American markets are consistent with Joel Backaler’s (2014) findings which show a few major areas of concern that are commonly associated with Chinese companies trying to integrate into Western capitalist markets. His study also specifically looked at Huawei as a case study. The table below summarizes these risks (p. 118). As this table predicts, Huawei has been criticized for IP theft, labor standards, and its associations with the CCP which
4 could potentially threaten national security. The difficulties Huawei faces in integrating into North American markets are not unique to itself but affect all Chinese transnational corporations (TNCs). They are targeted for their potential to upset the political, economic, and social order of the “West.”
Table 1: Risks associated with Chinese TNCs in the "West"
From another perspective, Yun Wen (2017) attributes the difficulties Huawei faces in penetrating North American markets to a “US state-corporate alliance’s” attempt to suppress the “potential for Chinese capital to challenge the US-led global capitalist order…” (p.133). For Wen, the legitimacy of claims that Huawei is a national security threat are secondary to the motivating force behind those claims – “US imperialist efforts to maintain its leadership in the global capitalist system.” (p. 149). Indeed, numerous scholars have studied how US multinationals ally with the state to maintain a monopoly on global telecom markets and networked systems (Hills, 2007; Perelman, 2014; Schiller, 2013). Dan Schiller (2013) demonstrates that these monopolies are usually maintained in the name of protecting the Western values of free flow of information and open markets. However, when threatened by international competitors, like Huawei, the US becomes distinctly protectionist. This protectionism is especially evident in the way US trade negotiations with China have centered on strong-arming China to reform its IP laws to Washington’s standards (p. 6).
In December, 1991, the US delivered an ultimatum to Beijing: either rewrite its IP laws or lose hundreds of millions of dollars in punitive tariffs. Although Beijing initially responded in-kind with its own tariffs, it ultimately agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the US. The document specified they must continue to strengthen their IPRs according to US and international standards (Alford, 1995, p. 102). Since then, scholars have documented China’s efforts to further liberalize its economy and strengthen IPRs in order to successfully compete in an American-dominated neoliberal marketplace (Alford, 1995; Croix & Konan, 2002; Yu, 2001). This history is invaluable to
5 understanding the current frustrated rhetoric surrounding Huawei – a company that has been repeatedly accused of international IPR violations and, most recently, of conspiring to defraud US banks into doing business with a subsidiary company that violates US sanctions in Iran.
Huawei as a Benevolent Corporation: Win-Win Rhetoric
Huawei has desperately tried to shed its negative image in the West by branding itself as a team player and a private company with no ties to the CCP. Even before the Meng arrest, Huawei was investing heavily in PR and image building. During the 2012 congressional hearings in the US, Huawei spent $820,000 on government lobbying in just the first six months (Backaler, 2014, p. 115). However, these lobbying and PR efforts were only minorly successful; the congressional hearings still concluded that Huawei and ZTE posed national security threats (Backaler, 2014, p. 120).
In addition to the PR campaigns and lobbying, Manuel Hensmans (2017) observes the company has developed a unique organizational structure based on competing through “joint innovation.” This strategy places the company in partnership- based programs to build trust with foreign corporations, institutions, and governments. For example, Huawei will offer to fund locally based R&D labs that will be available for other telecom companies in the region to use. In exchange, Huawei will have access to certain niche markets and, in the case of its R&D labs in Canada, will receive some of the intellectual property rights for technology produced in those labs (Silcoff et al., 2018).
Hensmans also draws attention to Huawei’s three-phase market integration strategy that moves from epiphery to the center. First, Huawei will seek out areas that are being ignored by mainstream telecom companies in the region and offer customized technologies. Second, Huawei will launch long-term joint innovation centers that are co- owned between Huawei and a local partner company; this helps build customer loyalty. Third, Huawei enlists support from “core institutions” including governments and universities; this helps them to be viewed as “model citizens.” During an economic recession in France, for example, Huawei voluntarily paid taxes to the French government, even though it could have avoided those taxes as a foreign company. In 2012, Huawei willingly gave up some of its source codes to the French and European governments in response to “national security concerns.” (Hensmans, 2017).
6 Using Hensmans’ model it appears that Huawei’s close involvement with many Canadian universities, noted in the investigative article by Silcoff et. al (2018), indicates that Huawei has already attained level three of its integration strategy in Canada. This should come with a degree of trust. However, these trust-building actions in the past seem to have done little to assuage the fears surrounding the company’s ties to the CCP, as evidenced by the rhetoric surrounding Meng’s arrest.
Wen (2017) notes that one way Huawei has tried to distance itself from China is by marketing itself as a private transnational company.
To consolidate the company’s position in the global North, Huawei has attempted to weaken its nationalistic discourse that had been advocated in the company’s initial expansion into developing countries…the company has attempted to blur its Chinese identity in its activities of transnationalization and conformed to the more universal market norms advocated by Western countries (Wen, 2018: 146).
As a private company, Huawei positions itself as a fair player in the global capitalist system and aligns itself, at least in name, with the West. Despite these efforts to distance itself from Chinese techno-nationalistic rhetoric, Huawei finds itself in the uncomfortable position of continuing to be viewed with suspicion in the West while also trying to distance itself from Chinese nationalistic discourses at home. This is what Wen (2017) refers to when she underscores the “contradictions between the techno- nationalistic impulse and the logic of capital accumulation underlying [Huawei’s] R&D activity.” (Wen, 2018, p. 178). Huawei cannot be viewed solely as a capitalist project nor can it be viewed as a puppet of the Chinese government. This historical context sets the stage for understanding how the Canadian national news media positions news discourses in the arrest of Huawei CFO, Meng Wanzhou.
7 Chapter 3. Literature Review
Western Media and China Representation
As has been briefly illustrated in this paper’s introduction, much of the discourse surrounding Huawei’s involvement in Canada has unfolded in the pages of national newspapers like The Globe and Mail and Toronto Star. Acknowledging the national media’s power over China discourse, Chinese ambassador to Canada, Lu Shaye, has on several occasions accused the Canadian media of bias and even of “white supremacy” (MacCharles, 2019a). However, the accusation of Western media bias against China is not a new one, and Chinese citizens have taken note. A poll by Didi Tatlow (2013) found that many Chinese citizens are angry at a perceived bias against China in all ‘Western’ media, particularly US news media. As Sabine Mokry (2017) has pointed out, China’s coverage in global media “remains a contentious issue.” The “controversial debates around international media’s coverage” of China make it “vital” to understand how the media represents China to the public (p. 1,2).
Indeed, the accusation that the Canadian national news media is biased against China and Chinese companies like Huawei has some academic support. A large number of news analyses examining China representation have found that China is negatively represented in Western media (Allen, Lawlor, & Graham, 2018; Goodrum, Godo, & Hayter, 2011; Mokry, 2017; Shi, 2014; Sun, 2009; Yang & Liu, 2012). For example, Shi (2014) and Sun (2009) found Western media overwhelmingly portrays negative images of China’s poor human rights record, censorship, environmental pollution, and corrupt trade deals. Edward Yang and Xinsheng Liu (2012) similarly found the US media often uses the term ‘China threat’ to portray China as a political, economic, ideological, and military threat to the ‘West’ (p. 697). Five years later, a similar study by Lejin Zhang and Doreen Wu (2017) found that the US media and the American public have tended to regard China “as a militant obstructive force and as engaging in hegemonic behavior” (p. 31).
Some of these negative images of China in Western media may be rooted in socio-cultural biases which influence gatekeepers like journalists and editors. Qing Cao (2012) argues that journalists and editors are biased in their coverage of China because the ‘macrostructure’ of reporting on China is imbedded in Western ideas about morality
8 and good government. He writes, “…the media compose a series of highly structured but simple messages about China to a Western audience, confirming and reinforcing a central version of themselves rooted in Western experience and modernity” (p. 18). The notion that news messages reinforce a sense of identity is consistent with Abby Goodrum et. al’s (2011) findings that foreign news coverage across different Canadian news mediums served to reinforce a sense of national identity (2011). Furthermore, Gertrude Robinson and Vernone Sparks (1976) found a strong correlation between foreign news coverage and countries that share similar cultural traits.
A notable exception would be Nathan Allen et. al (2018)’s study which found that news coverage in Canadian national news media has been increasingly positive or neutral since 2005. However, this may have changed since the Meng’s affair. Regardless, at the time, Allen et. al identified several potential reasons for the shift toward increasingly positive China coverage. For example, the changing tone of Canadian news media may be due to structural factors like increased trade and immigration between Canada and China. Their finding is supported by scholars of factors influencing international news flow including Haoming Wu (2000). Wu found that structural factors including political, economic, and social relations are the most valuable predictors of international news coverage. He found that trade is the leading determinant of foreign news coverage in 37 out of the 38 countries he examined, including Canada (the US being the only exception) (p. 126). Another study by Robinson and Sparks (1976) found a strong correlation between trading relationships and foreign news coverage in Canadian papers. These studies combined indicate it is likely that discourses in Canadian national news’ coverage of the Meng affair will focus on conflict, the economy, and trade.
Although the increase in positive or neutral China representation noted by Allen et. al. may be related to structural factors like increased trade, it was not at all correlated to Canadian public opinion polls. Canadian public opinion of China remains negative. During the same time period, increased positive or neutral economic coverage of China was correlated to increasingly critical public opinion (p. 15). Somewhat contradictorily, an earlier study by Goodrum et. al (2011) found that the national news does have an important role in shaping Canadian perceptions of China and Chinese immigrants. Allen et. al hypothesize that the disconnect between public opinion and news representations of China noted in their study is caused by an already developed public bias against
9 China. Although news about China may be increasingly positive, the Canadian public may have already accepted the “China threat” narrative. Furthermore, although reporting overall may be increasingly positive or neutral, they propose that future research should look for evidence of “elite cues” in the news stories that continue to push negative representations of China (p. 15). One way to identify elite cues is to look at the discourses of frequently quoted elite individuals and institutions in the Canadian national news media.
China coverage in Western news media has tended to portray China negatively. However, scholars have shown that negative news coverage is not caused solely by gatekeeper bias (journalists and editors); it is also caused by socio-cultural, political, and economic factors. These factors will be considered in relation to the common discourses of quoted sources and quotation patterns identified in national news stories about the Meng affair.
Common Approaches to studying China Representation and Critiques
Scholars have tended to use similar theories and methodologies to study China representation in the news. At the theoretical level most scholars of China representation have tended to use agenda-setting and framing theory (Allen et. al., 2018; Goodrum et. al, 2011; Yang and Liu, 2012; Mokry, 2017). These theories take the position that the media filters reality surrounding news events, choosing to highlight certain stories or details more than others. These filters thereby influence public perceptions of reality. For example, Allen et. al. (2018) examine first and second level agenda setting in an attempt to draw a link between news coverage of China and public opinion (4). Goodrum et. al. (2011) similarly use agenda setting to establish that the media does have a strong impact on public and political agendas. Methodologically, most studies of China representation rely on content analysis or some form of statistical analysis to identify dominant media themes.
Some scholars have critiqued these dominant theoretical and methodological approaches. Wu (2000) critiques the agenda-setting and framing theories, claiming they are insufficient for studying international news flows. He believes scholars tend to use these theories to narrowly look at news gatekeepers without considering the larger
10 structural and contextual factors that determine the ‘menu’ of stories available to gatekeepers (p. 111). These include international relations, access to resources, and cultural similarities. Too much focus has been placed on individual gatekeeper bias without also considering the potential structural biases and institutional interests. Cao (2011) also critiques these limited frameworks, opting instead for research that considers cultural narratives and critical discourse analysis (p. 3).
Critiques have also been raised about the subject of study. Mokry (2017) critiques past studies of China representation for only analyzing content in elite US or international news media. While these studies are valuable, her study expands on the narrow focus to examine quotation patterns and to include in-person interviews with journalists. These interviews help her to identify limiting factors on reporting news about China. Wu (2000) also critiques the narrow focus on US or international elite media. He advocates for more studies of international news flows to the global south or other underrepresented fields in academia (p. 113).
These critiques suggest there is a need for more creative theoretical and methodological approaches to study international news, including news and representations of China. These approaches should take structural and contextual factors affecting news production into account. They should also move away from narrowly quantifying China representation and move towards critical discourse analysis that considers dominant narratives and interpretations.
Responding to the Critiques: Media Sociology and the Hierarchy of Influences Approach
Given the critiques that have been considered in Western news media’s representations of China, this paper proposes a theoretical approach taken from the media sociology tradition – Reese and Shoemaker’s (1996) Hierarchy of Influences model. This model allows the researcher to identify individuals and institutions who exercise power over messaging in news media. The Hierarchy of Influences model takes a holistic approach to media sociology; it analyzes factors that shape media content at five levels of analysis and suggests how one level may interact with another. The five levels are: “individual characteristics of specific news workers, their routines of work,
11 organizational-level concerns, institutional issues, and larger social systems” (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016) (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The Hierarchy of Influences model (Reese, 2016)
Each level identifies “the main factors that shape the symbolic reality – revealed through content, constituted and produced by media-work – and how these factors interact across levels and compare across different contexts (e.g. national, technological)” (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016, p. 396). In other words, the model encourages the researcher to consider how different factors in news production interact at different stages of the news process and in different contextual settings. Using a holistic approach allows the scholar to distinguish between individual agency and structure or system. This addresses Wu’s (2000) concern that studies identifying the factors shaping international news content are overly reliant on studying “gatekeepers” (e.g. journalists and editors). Instead, the Hierarchy of Influences model considers individual news actors as “both constrained and enabled by the structures surrounding them” (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016, 397).
A holistic approach such as this is useful to this paper’s case study because the messaging and ideology presented in news about Meng Wanzhou’s arrest is not defined solely by the “gatekeepers”, but by a combination of historical, political, economic, and social factors. This approach is consistent with Robinson and Spark’s (1976) findings that international news representation is based on four factors that include political- historical, technical-economic, and availability of foreign news due to larger politico-
12 economic context and editorial process. (pg. 204-205) One limitation to this model is that it tends to look at hierarchy in media from a traditional perspective that must be reconsidered in light of evolving media ecosystems (e.g. social media news, citizen journalism, etc.) (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016, p. 398). For the purposes of this case study, however, it provides a useful theoretical model to document the factors and individuals that have power over messaging in the Canadian national news media at different levels of news production.
In this study, the model is narrowly defined in corpus to consider which individuals and interest groups have power over messaging in the Canadian national news media’s coverage of one news story, the Meng affair. Power over messaging is evidenced through the frequency of quotes and dominant discourses represented in those quotes. The study will not answer questions outside the scope of the quoted content collected in the sample. For example, although the organizational level of analysis traditionally asks questions about social processes in the newsroom, this study uses the organizational level to ask questions about how key discourses are positioned by journalists using reporting verbs and quotation types. This will be further explained in subsequent sections.
13 Chapter 4. Methodology
This study uses a mixed method approach that combines critical discourse analysis with documentary research and a quantification of findings. The general outline of paper is to first identify key discourses presented in quoted sources. Next, a quantification of findings will be used to link institutions and individuals to those discourses. These sections will also consider differences between the news organizations examined. Finally, the study will consider how quotes are positioned by individual journalists and editors using two metrics: quotation type and reporting verbs.
Describing the Sample
This study collected articles published between December 1, 2018 and March 31, 2019. Notably, this time frame encompasses the initial arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the arrests of Canadian citizens in China, including Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, the firing of Canadian ambassador to China, John McCallum, and the Chinese government’s ban on Canadian canola products. Since then there have been further developments in the Meng affair, but these are beyond the scope of the current research. Each article had either “Huawei” or “Meng” in the title. The articles were taken from three national news organizations: The Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, and The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). These three news organizations were chosen because they are all national-level news organizations and because they all have high readership and circulation numbers. In 2019, the CBC was the most popular Canadian online news organization followed by The Globe and Mail. Toronto Star recently nationalized and is now Canada’s largest online news site (“Top 10 Canadian Newspapers,” 2019; “Top 60 Canadian News Websites in 2019,” 2019). Online and offline, these three national news organizations are at the top for readership and online engagement in Canada.
Articles were collected primarily from Factiva; however, because Factiva, did not have many articles from CBC, the articles from CBC are taken from LexisNexis. In total, the researcher collected 157 articles in the sample. The following table shows how those articles were distributed across the three news organizations by month (Table 2). A majority of articles for all three news organizations were published in December, the
14 same month as the arrest. Notably, there were no CBC articles in February that met the corpus criteria.
Figure 2: Comparative article distribution, N=157
From those articles, the researcher collected 1,296 unique quotes. Each quote was manually coded into four primary nodes: discourse group, source type, quote type, and individual. Some additional sub-nodes were coded for depending on the level of analysis. A full coding manual is available in Appendix A. The discourse group node separates quotes into categories according to similar types of messages or positions on the Meng affair taken by different quoted sources. The source type node separates quotes into categories according to similar types of individuals or institutions quoted. The quote type node separates quotes into categories based on whether it is a direct quote, indirect quote, or strategic quote. This is further explained in a subsequent section. Finally, the “individual” node creates a separate category for each quoted source in order to see if any one individual is quoted significantly more than any other. In addition to these nodes, quotes were coded in separate NVivo projects for each of the three news organizations. This allows for content to be easily compared between the three organizations.
15 Critical Discourse Analysis
Critical discourse analysis considers language as social practice. In this branch of linguistic analysis, scholars attempt to establish how linguistic structures produce and maintain uneven power relations between different groups in society. Norman Fairclough (1989) defines critical discourse analysis as a tool that aids understanding into the role of discourse in the reproduction and challenge of dominance as well as to uncover how discourses legitimate certain frames. John Richardson (2007) specifically uses discourse analysis to analyze how the media, as an institution, legitimates certain messages based on political, economic, and cultural factors. Following in this tradition, linking common news discourses surrounding the Meng affair with their institutional interests and individual speakers will better position readers to think critically about who has power over messaging in the Canadian national news media and whether those messages can or should be challenged.
There is some precedent for using critical discourse analysis to compare ideological representations of China and China-related issues. For example, Zhang and Wu’s (2017) study uses critical discourse analysis and corpus-assisted methodologies to compare attitudes about China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative in the Chinese state media English-language publication, China Daily, and the Financial Times (UK). The study specifically identified key words and themes from the headers and found that China Daily portrayed China positively while Financial Times’ portrayals were conflicting. The Financial Times presented China as an important political and economic power while also presenting the nation as a threat to Western society and ideals (p. 40-41). Using critical discourse analysis allowed Zhang and Wu to first identify differences in the key discourses between the two newspapers and then to recommend how Chinese state-media can challenge the negative China representation in the Financial Times. For these scholars, critical discourse analysis is a tool to challenge dominant frames about China and recommend media practice changes for Chinese state media. This study follows in the tradition of CDA by first identifying common discourses and citation routines and then linking those linguistic structures to powerful interest groups.
16 Citation Routines
News citations are an interesting medium to study using CDA because they represent the views of the quoted sources and, potentially, of the journalists and editors as well. Teun Van Dijk (1988) notes the importance of analyzing quotes in news stories because they are more likely to contain “evaluative statements, that is, opinions. Allen Bell (1991) similarly argues that studying quotation patterns allows scholars to gain insights into the ideologies of individual journalists and news organizations. Any deviations from traditional news values like “objectivity” could indicate gatekeeper bias. Despite the common news value of “objectivity,” Carmen Caldas-Coulthard (2002) believes journalists will tend to only report the quotes that were significant to them according to their individual world view (p. 298). In this way, quotes in news stories will tend to reflect the author’s own point of view (p. 303). When evaluative statements are not balanced therefore, examining citation routines can give scholars insights into gatekeeper bias.
Moving into methodology, Richardson (2007) believes it is possible to identify journalist and editor level bias in citation routines by examining the types of quotes used. For example, he asserts that a direct quote would be the most objective style of quotation while a strategic quote with only a few words quoted for emphasis would be one of the least objective. The farther removed a quote is from its original form, the more room there is for gatekeeper interpretation to manifest. This is what Richardson (2007) refers to as “quotation’s progressive line of accuracy.” (Figure 3). In this study’s news routines analysis section (p. 40), quotations have been coded as either direct, strategic, or indirect to determine whether citation routines in articles about Meng’s arrest show a gatekeeper-level bias for Western government quotes over Chinese government quotes. This will be explained in greater detail in subsequent sections.
17 Figure 3: Richardson’s spectrum of news quote objectivity (taken from Eissa, 2014)
Eissa’s (2014) study was also helpful in forming this paper’s examination of quoted sources because he uses CDA to examine quotes as “ideological tools” that can direct how readers think about or interpret a news event. Specifically, Eissa examines how quotes can contribute to the polarization of readers on politically opposed Egyptian news blogs. His critical discourse analysis considers three different aspects of quoted sources: choice of quotation types (Richardson, 2007), choice of sources quoted, and choice of reporting verbs. This study also examines each of these factors but uses the Hierarchy of Influences model as a framework. Furthermore, Mokry (2017)’s study was helpful because it provided a precedent for quantifying and categorizing news quotes in order to draw links between China representation and reporting conditions. Mokry’s focus on quantifying quotes in international news articles about China allows this study to compare its findings with those of other researchers.
Quotations and citation routines have both been shown to give valuable insights into the ideologies, biases, and reporting conditions of journalists and news organizations. Using CDA as a methodological framework further highlights the relations of power inherent in the news production process. By tailoring the Hierarchy of Influences approach to study quotation patterns in the Canadian national news media, scholars can gain insights into the ideological positioning and news routine biases in reporting the Meng affair.
18 Chapter 5. Hierarchy of Influences: Findings and Analysis
Ideological Analysis
The ideology or “social systems” level is the most macro level of analysis in the Hierarchy of Influences model. It traditionally looks at how the media projects ideas and meaning “in the service of power” (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016, p. 404). From this level, scholars can make inferences about how media framing serves powerful interest groups like governments and corporations. This level of analysis is also used to consider the globalization of news flows and whether or not the news is influenced by a universal journalistic culture (404).
For the purposes of this study, the ideological analysis is more narrowly defined. This analysis identifies the most common messages or ‘discourses’ circulated in news about the Meng affair. By first identifying the discourses, the study can draw links between powerful discourses and the interest groups most commonly associated with those messages. The key questions for this analysis is: what are the most common messages being conveyed about Meng’s arrest in the Canadian national news media?
Each of these groups was defined inductively by first examining specific quotes and then manually grouping them into similar categories. From this process, the researcher found that messages could be broadly categorized into one of three dominant discourse groups: rule-of-law (ROL) discourse (23.8%), political economy (PE) discourse (63.4%), and immoral act (IA) discourse (12.8%) (Figure 4).
19 Figure 4: Major discourse groups, N = 1,296
PE discourse was by far the largest grouping. Within these umbrella discourse groups, the researcher also identified several sub-discourses circulating in news about the Meng’s affair (Table 2). Each of the sub-discourses gives greater context for the types of issues being discussed in relation to Meng’s arrest. These discourses are presented below.
Table 2: Major discourse groups and sub-categories
Rule-of-Law Political Economy Immoral Act Extradition treaty and due East-West incompatibility Abuse of process process Trade War Human rights violation Canadian sovereignty and legal National security No evidence system neutrality Aggressive China Meng as a helpless victim No political involvement Losing Huawei is bad for Huawei unfairly targeted business Canada as a US pawn
Rule-of-Law Discourse
The ROL discourse (23.8%) asserts that the Canadian government was not politically motivated in the arrest of Meng Wanzhou. Not only was there no political involvement leading up to the arrest, but it is wrong for other countries, including the US
20 and China, to take political action based on the outcome of due process during the Meng hearings. Doing so would impinge on the Canadian legal system’s neutrality and Canadian sovereignty over its legal processes. This is a case best left to legal experts and appointed judges and lawyers. Furthermore, in order to uphold standards in international governance, Canada must be allowed to follow due process in order to fulfil its extradition treaty obligations with the US. Below are some examples of this discourse taken from the quotes:
Scott Bardsley, a spokesman for Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale, said Canada is “a country governed by the rule of law. Canada is conducting a fair, unbiased, and transparent legal proceeding with respect to the arrest of Ms. Meng Wanzhou," he said Sunday in an e-mail. (Scott Bardsley)
“This is an opportunity and, equally, a challenge for Canada to demonstrate the independence and fairness of our court system,” Mr. Yan said. “There is adequate room for Ms. Meng to defend herself.” (Michael Yan)
Both Bardsley and Yan’s quotes highlight the independence and fairness of the Canadian legal system. The insistence that Canada is “governed by the rule-of-law” also positions Canada in a morally superior position to denounce any individual or government who dares to politicize the extradition hearings. This is evidenced by Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland’s harsh response to President Donald Trump’s suggestion that he would consider using Meng as a bargaining chip in US- China trade negotiations (MacCharles, 2019b).Freeland responded:
“The rule of law and extradition ought not ever to be politicized or used as tools to resolve other issues,” she said. “The extradition process is a criminal-justice process. This is not a tool that should be used for politicized ends.” (Chrystia Freeland)
Freeland’s message could not be more clear. The Canadian government will uphold the ideals of an independent and fair legal system. The ROL discourse centers on the idea that justice must be blind to Meng’s status and wealth in order to convict justly. The Meng case must be free from messy political bargaining. Furthermore, this discourse positions Canada as a trustworthy ally:
In his statement, [ambassador to China, John] McCallum said: “Canada respects its international legal commitments, including by honouring its extradition treaty with the United States.” (John McCallum)
21 McCallum underscores Canada’s commitment to uphold its obligations, even if there are consequences. In addition to Meng’s legal proceedings, the ROL discourse is also used to defend Canada’s decision-making process on whether to ban Huawei from Canadian 5G telecommunications networks. This has been an important side discussion in the Meng affair as the US and other members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance have urged Canada to ban Huawei because of its potential to spy for the Chinese government (Fife & Chase, 2019).
“It shouldn’t at all be a political decision made on how we engage but a decision made by experts and a decision based on recommendations by our intelligence and security agencies who have an extraordinary depth of expertise," Mr. Trudeau said. (Justin Trudeau)
The clear message in Prime Minister Trudeau’s statement is that Canada will behave rationally based on the recommendations of ‘experts’ and not based on vindictive political agendas. The Meng affair and coinciding 5G debate will in no way be treated as a political attack against China. Although Trump’s comments have undermined the ROL discourse, other US government representatives also echoed the ROL discourse. In a statement recorded by the CBC, US ambassador to Canada, Kelly craft said all parties involved should respect the legal process:
"Once again, this is a judicial process, it is a very delicate process, and I don't want to be involved in something that is an ongoing independent judiciary process," she said. "(Canadian and American) law enforcement works very closely together." (Kelly Craft)
Here, the word “independent” is again used to suggest that legal proceedings in no way reflect the interests of the Canadian or US government. Once again, the ROL discourse insists that the Meng case is purely a legal matter. Due process must be followed, and Canada will respect its obligations to the international community and its extradition treaty with the US. This is in no way a calculated attack against China.
Political Economy Discourse
The political economy discourse (63.4%) is perhaps the hardest to define because it comprises so many sub-discourse categories. As a result, it is also the largest discourse grouping. This discourse highlights all the ways in which the Meng affair is intertwined with political and economic interests between China, Canada, and the US.
22 Examples of this discourse include concerns about Chinese tech compromising national security, trade war, and the arrests of Canadian citizens living in China.
The indisputable dominance of the PE discourse is interesting because it directly challenges the position held by the ROL discourse – that the case is purely a legal matter. Furthermore, breaking up the PE discourse into smaller umbrella discourses would be challenging because many of the quotes express multiple sub-discourses simultaneously. For example, a quote talking about national security issues may also be talking about China threat and Canada’s unstable relationship with the US. Therefore, from a macro-perspective, it is useful to define all of these sub-discourses as the PE discourse.
Some of the quoted sources, including former Canadian ambassador to China, David Mulroney, said it was surprising the Canadian government is even discussing the Meng case publicly if it really is a routine case of due process (Chase, Zilio, & Vanderklippe, 2018). Instead, the quotes in the sample suggest a majority of quoted individuals believe the case is at least partially influenced by political and economic factors. For some sources, including another former Canadian diplomat, Phil Calvert, the ROL discourse does not matter as long as China believes the case to be politically motivated:
“No matter how much the Canadian side says that we're just following legal procedures, Chinese officials probably will believe that the arrest was directed or tacitly supported at very senior levels," he said. (Phil Calvert)
In other words, Calvert suggests the real outcomes of the case will reflect the way the arrest is perceived. The dominance of the PE discourse in news quotations suggest the Meng affair is overwhelmingly perceived as a case directly involving political and economic interests, not as a criminal justice proceeding. Indeed, it is unlikely that a routine justice proceeding would be receiving as much national news coverage as the Meng affair has already received. One of Meng’s lawyers, Richard Peck expressed this political economy discourse well when he said:
“The political overlay of this case is remarkable. That’s probably the one thing that sets it apart from any other extradition case I’ve ever seen. It’s got this cloud of politicization hanging over it.” (Richard Peck)
23 While the case is still a legal one involving due process, it is also political because of the perceptions – the “cloud of politicization” – that are associated with the Meng affair. This ‘cloud of politicization’ is perhaps not a choice for Canada. Professor Paul Evens believes the case has forced Canada into a political position in which it must choose to ally itself with either US or Chinese interests. If it chooses China and refuses to extradite Meng, Canada will destroy diplomatic relations with its closest historical ally and trading partner.
The Meng affair “plays to the fundamentals of the Canada-U.S.-China interactions" Prof. Evans said. “This is a choice Ottawa has feared having to make for a long time … this one is going to be very, very difficult." (Paul Evans)
If it chooses the US, Canada will shut the door China. It could miss out on partnering with China to implement the most advanced telecommunications systems and isolate itself from the fast-rising economic power. Canada has become a pawn in a much larger trade war between the US and China. Although Canada may have reason to be cautious of positioning itself strongly against either China or the US in the Meng affair, President Donald Trump certainly has not shied away from linking Meng’s arrest to US political and economic interests. When asked if Meng’s arrest could be used as a bargaining chip in the trade negotiations with China, Trump said he would consider it if he thought it was good for the US:
If I think it's good for what will be certainly the largest trade deal ever made – which is a very important thing – what's good for national security – I would certainly intervene if I thought it was necessary, he said, adding: It's possible that a lot of different things could happen. It's also possible [the Meng arrest] will be a part of negotiations. But we'll speak to the Justice Department … we'll get a lot of people involved. (Donald Trump)
Using Meng’s arrest as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with China is overtly politicizing the arrest. By saying he would “intervene,” Trump is also suggesting he may use his authority to bypass due process in both the US and Canadian Justice Departments. Furthermore, Trump expresses the relationship the case has to national security concerns about Huawei’s alleged connections to the CCP. Trump’s quote is just one of many expressing concerns about national security and international IP exchange.
Finally, the PE discourse also encompasses the notion of East-West incompatibility. East-West incompatibility specifically suggests that China is incapable of
24 respecting “Western democratic norms” because of its cultural and political differences. Because of these differences the incompatibility discourse asserts that China is a geopolitical enemy intent on aggressively promoting its agenda. Former Prime Minister, Steven Harper gives just one example of this discourse in action. In a quote from The Globe and Mail, he said:
Western countries must recognize that China is a geopolitical rival that has made ‘no secret of the desire to spread an alternative to Western democratic norms. (Steven Harper)
Positioning China as a direct rival to Canada and the Canadian way of life makes it much more likely that the Meng arrest will continue to be surrounded by antagonistic rhetoric and politicization. This discourse is consistent with Cao’s (2011) findings that negative representations of China in Western media are linked to Western modernity discourses that position China as “backwards,” and at odds with traditional Western ideologies. From such a position, it is likely news actors will display an anti-China bias.
Although the PE discourse encompasses many issues ranging from trade war to national security, each express a different way in which the Meng arrest is politically and economically implicated. As the largest discourse group, this suggests the Canadian national news media positions Meng’s arrest as a symbol of East-West incompatibility. However, it is not yet clear how this discourse can be linked to specific news actors and interest groups.
Immoral Act Discourse
The IA discourse (12.8%) holds that Meng’s arrest goes beyond ROL and routine political motivations; it is an immoral action taken against an innocent woman. The discourse is characterized by inflammatory language that positions Canada and the US as immoral and “wrong.” From this position, Meng’s arrest may even be considered a ‘kidnapping’ and a ‘violation of Meng’s human rights.’ Furthermore, this discourse also criticizes Canada and the US for hypocritically asking China to abide by Western laws and norms while disrespecting those of China. The US and Canada have both made mistakes, they are wrong, and nothing short of Meng’s immediate release can begin to make things right. Notably, the IA discourse directly attacks the ROL discourse. Chinese
25 Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying expressed this anti-ROL discourse well when she said:
[Meng’s arrest], which is far from legal, legitimate and reasonable, is what truly merits the name of arbitrary detention," Hua said. "The Canadian cannot stop talking about its so-called legal obligations under its bilateral extradition treaty with the U.S. Does that mean that it can turn a blind eye to and trample on the basis norms of international law and international relations? (Hua Chunying)
Hua positions Meng’s arrest as “arbitrary” suggesting it is completely without merit. She throws the ROL discourse on its head, making it seem like the discourse is disingenuous. Furthermore, Hua turns to international law and international norms, two things she knows Western governments claim to value, and accuses Canada of deliberately ignoring its obligations. Other Chinese representatives including Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Geng Shuang and Chinese research fellow, Mei Xinyu, also attempt to shame Canada for violating Meng’s human rights.
Detaining a person without providing an explanation has undoubtedly violated her human rights… (Geng Shuang)
Without any solid evidence, the Canadian and U.S. governments trampled on international law by basically ‘kidnapping' Chinese citizen Meng Wanzhou… (Mei Xinyu)
In just these two statements, Canada is accused of kidnapping a Chinese citizen, trampling on international law and violating Meng’s human rights. Everything Cao’s (2011) Western modernity discourse claims to value is thrown back in Canada’s face. Like Hua’s earlier statement, these assertions absolutely reject the ROL discourse which presents the extradition hearings as a neutral legal process in accordance with international norms and laws. The Chinese embassy in Ottawa went even further, calling the case a “political conspiracy” and a “political persecution” in two separately released statements.
“This is not an ordinary judicial case, but a political conspiracy,” the embassy said in a statement to The Globe. “It is a political persecution against Chinese enterprise and [a] Chinese citizen. When the Canadian side professed that there was no political involvement or interference in detaining Ms. Meng, such remarks per se [were] a political posture.” (Chinese Embassy)
26 This statement even goes so far as to accuse the Canadian ROL discourse of being a “political posture”, asserting that Canada is absolutely treating the Meng case as a political affair. This is a direct attack on Canada’s moral high ground in the Meng affair. Like the PE discourse, the immoral act discourse also evokes the discussion of East- West ideological struggle and China representation in Western news. Readers will recall from the literature review that international news about China had tended to focus on discourses of “China threat”, political struggle, and human rights violations. From the position of the immoral act discourse, Canada is accused of these same things in the way it has handled the Meng affair. Canada is even accused of “white supremacy.” Chinese ambassador to Canada, Lu Shaye, wrote this about the Meng affair:
“It seems that, to some people, only Canadian citizens should be treated in a humanitarian manner and their freedom deemed valuable, while Chinese people do not deserve that,” he wrote. “The reason why some people are used to arrogantly adopting double standards is due to Western egotism and white supremacy." (Lu Shaye)
The tone taken in this last quote is one of shock value. It inverts traditional images of China threat and accuses Western nations of “egotism” and “white supremacy.” It is clear Meng has become a symbol for China to rally behind – a position to defend. Mr. Lu goes even farther, accusing Canada of “backstabbing.”
“In China, we have a saying that a good friend would die for his friend, would shield the knife attack of a friend, but in this case, we feel it is completely the opposite," Mr. Lu said. “It is backstabbing." (Lu Shaye)
The image Lu projects depicts Canada and China as ex-friends. Canada has backstabbed China by kidnapping one of its leaders on behalf of the US. Now, China does not want to speak to either Canada or the US until they agree to give Meng back, no questions asked. Friends would never hurt each other. Although this metaphor is simplistic, it clearly summarizes the emotions expressed as part of the IA discourse.
This ideological analysis has categorized quotes into three major discourse groups: ROL, PE, and IA. The PE discourse is by far the largest, comprising 63.4% of all quotes coded. This demonstrates that the Meng is overwhelmingly positioned as a political and economic affair in the Canadian national news media. Furthermore, both the IA discourse and the PE discourse directly challenge the ROL discourse. This suggests the ROL discourse is not organically generated but is deliberately promoted by certain
27 individuals or institutions. The relationship between discourses and interest groups will be further explored at the “social institutions” level of analysis.
Organizational Analysis
In this study, the organizational analysis asks the question: how do The Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, and CBC comparatively position key ideological discourses in the Meng affair? A simple quantification of findings shows that the PE discourse is the top discourse across all three news organizations (Figure 5). The IA discourse is almost equally covered between all three news organizations, with values ranging from 10.6% coverage in Toronto Star to 14.4% in The Globe and Mail. The ROL discourse is comparatively most common in the CBC (38.5%) coverage and lowest in The Globe and Mail (16.5 %).
Figure 5: Comparison of discourses between news organizations (% values)
Because the PE discourse is, by a large margin, the most common discourse group overall (63.4%), it is not surprising that it is also the most common across all three news organizations. However, there are a couple interesting differences to note between news organizations and their relative coverage of different discourses. First, the margin between the PE discourse and the ROL discourse is much wider in The Globe and Mail
28 and The Toronto Star’s coverage compared to CBC. In The Globe and Mail, the PE discourse receives 52% more coverage than the ROL discourse. Compare that with the 9% gap between the CBC’s coverage of PE verses ROL. This suggests The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have a much stronger bias toward the PE discourse than the CBC. Second, the stronger bias toward PE discourse in The Globe and Mail and Toronto Star means that CBC has a proportionately stronger bias toward the ROL discourse than any other news organization. This would suggest that the CBC gets more of its quotes from sources that support the ROL discourse.
This level of analysis has established that The Globe and Mail and Toronto Star have a proportionately stronger bias toward the PE discourse compared to the CBC. It has also established that CBC has a proportionately stronger bias toward the ROL discourse. All three organizations tend to give little coverage to the IA discourse, and its representation is equal between all three news organizations.
Extra-Media (Social Interest Groups and Institutions)
This level of analysis traditionally examines any institution outside of the media institution. This can include everything from audiences to technological forces to public relations. Specifically, this level focuses on the interplay between non-media institutions and social interest groups. Attention is given to “the interplay of economic, political, and cultural factors” that form the context for media messaging in society (Reese and Shoemaker, 2016: 402).
For the purpose of this study, the extra-media level of analysis asks the following questions: what social interest groups and institutions are most often quoted in articles about Meng’s arrest? How discourses positioned between these powerful groups and institutions? The analysis first identifies broad categories of quoted sources and then links those categories to the discourses that have already been identified: ROL, PE, and IA. During the data collection phase, quotes were categorized inductively into a broad social interest group. All quotes from similar types of institutions or job titles were placed into a few umbrella categories representing social interest groups. For example, a quote could come from an ‘expert’, ‘government’, ‘business,’ ‘news organization,’ or ‘citizen’ (Figure 6).
29 Figure 6: Quotation sources, N=1,296
Because the categories for “citizen”, “news organization”, and “other” were each less than 5% of the total number of quotes, they were considered insignificant for the purposes of this case study. Instead, this case study solely focuses on the “business”, “expert”, and “government” categories. After these small categories were removed, there were 1,183 quotes left. Next, each of these three dominant categories were broken down into sub-categories according to a few major divisions. For example, an ‘expert’ quote could come from a ‘Chinese scholar’ or a ‘Western’ scholar. In this study, “Western” refers to sources coming from Canada, the US, Europe, and Australia. However, a majority of the “Western” quotes do come from Canada, as it is a case primarily involving Canadian actors and news organizations. Table 2 shows all the different sub-categories identified, and the following sections further define the sub- categories by dominant institutions.
30 Table 3: Interest groups and sub-categories represented in news quotations Government Expert Business Western Western scholar/analyst Western Chinese Chinese scholar/analyst Chinese Former government Legal expert Meng’s lawyers The government category includes ministers, officials, spokespersons, heads of state, ambassadors, statements from government institutions, and crown prosecutors. This broad category is broken into two sub-categories, Western governments and Chinese governments. The “Western” category mostly represents Canadian government representatives; however, it was more efficient to include all Western sources including US and European sources into one category because their individual numbers were so small, and because they tend to represent similar discourses. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the “Western” category represents Canadian government institutions and their spokespersons. The specific individuals and their affiliations will be further developed at the individual level of analysis.
The business category includes business representatives, employees, and official statements from businesses. Huawei was overwhelmingly the most common business covered in quotes, making up 50% of all business quotes. As a Chinese company, Huawei overwhelmingly represents the “Chinese” business sub-category (88%).
The expert category includes scholars, analysts, former government officials, legal experts, directors of scholarly institutions, and lawyers. This is by far the largest interest group, and therefore represents the greatest diversity in discourses and quoted individuals. However, there were still some trends for the group overall that made it interesting to study as a group. These trends will be further explored in the section, “Linking Interest Groups to Discourses.”
The largest percentage of quotes comes from government sources, in particular, “Western” government sources, followed closely by “Western” experts. This demonstrates a news preference for “Western” sources over Chinese sources; however, it is unclear from these findings what forces may be motivating that preference. The lack of Chinese sources could be due to individual biases and gatekeeping or to a lack of reporting resources in China. Additionally, there were far fewer quotes from businesses
31 compared to governments and experts, suggesting that discourses circulating in government and expert circles have more power over messaging than the discourses presented by businesses.
Linking Interest Groups to Discourses
At this level of analysis, the government, business, and expert categories are linked to specific discourses and institutions. At each interest group node, sources were manually coded into either ROL, PE, or IA discourse. At this stage, one can begin to see how powerful groups and institutions are associated with specific discourses. One can also begin to speculate on how specific discourses can best represent the interests of these groups and institutions.
Table 4: Representation of discourses according to interest groups Rule of Law Political Economy Immoral Act Government 56% (max.) 36% 50% (max.) Western 55% 31% 4% Chinese 1% 5% 46% Business 6%(min.) 24% (min.) 23%(min.) Western 0.4% 12% 1% Chinese 6% 12% 22% Expert 38% 40% (max.) 27% Western scholar/analyst 3% 22% 1% Chinese scholar/analyst 1% 4% 14% Legal expert 17% 3% 1% Former government 8% 9% 0% Meng’s lawyers 10% 2% 10% TOTAL 100% 100% 100% The ROL discourse is most voiced by “government”, specifically, by “Western” governments; 54.6% of all ROL quotes came from Western governments, 38.3% came from experts, and only 6% came from businesses. This shows that Western governments and their spokespersons are the most likely to advocate for the ROL discourse in news quotations.
The PE discourse is most voiced by “experts”, specifically, by non-Chinese scholars and analysts (39.5%). However, expert PE discourse is followed closely by government PE discourse (36.1%). This suggests the PE discourse cannot be narrowly identified with one group; instead the PE discourse is almost evenly spread between all
32 the interest groups. This means that quoted sources from each interest group at some point acknowledge the political and economic nature of Meng’s arrest.
The IA discourse is most voiced by “government”, specifically, by the Chinese government (46.1%). The IA discourse is also represented by Chinese businesses (22.4%) and Chinese scholars/analysts (14.0%). This suggests that the IA discourse is overwhelmingly a Chinese discourse that challenges Western-dominated discourses in the Meng affair. The IA discourse overall, however, is underrepresented compared to the ROL or the PE discourse, suggesting again that Western governments, experts and their discourses have more power over messaging in the Canadian national news media.
However, power over messaging is not wholly defined by social interest groups. Specific institutions within those interest groups have varying levels of representation in news about Meng’s arrest. The following table highlights the links between social interest groups, discourses, and specific institutions. Specifically, it presents the top ten most often quoted institutions along with which social interest groups those institutions represent and which discourses they are most likely to voice. Interestingly, none of the top 10 institutions are scholarly or research oriented, even though ‘experts’ are more represented than ‘businesses’ overall. This suggests that expert quotes do not overwhelmingly come from a few top institutions but are instead spread out between many institutions. This is also supported by the complete list of institutions (Appendix B).
Table 5: Top 10 quoted institutions Institutions Interest Groups Dominant Discourses Huawei (16%) Business PE (59%); IA (22%); ROL (19%) Canadian Ambassadors (7%) Government PE (55%); ROL (32%); IA (13%) Prime Minister’s Office (4%) Government PE (61%); ROL (39%) Chinese Ambassadors (4%) Government IA (71%); PE (29%) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Can.) Government PE (56%); ROL (44%) (4%) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government IA (80%); PE (20%) (China) (4%) Department of Justice (Can.) Government ROL (100%) (3%) Capital Economics (2%) Business PE (100%) Richardson International (2%) Business PE (100%) Huawei is the most often quoted institution with 16% of total coverage. This is to be expected, as Meng is Huawei’s CFO, and much of the PE discourse revolves around Huawei’s alleged IP theft and collusion with the CCP. Unsurprisingly, Huawei’s
33 spokespersons tend toward the PE discourse (59%). It is in the company’s best interests to distance themselves from the criminal charges surrounding Meng and instead focus on the ways in which the company has been treated unfairly because of political and economic tensions. Although Huawei does at times voice the ROL discourse (19%) this is likely a part of the company’s well-know PR strategy of endearing itself to hosting nation-states. Huawei is well-known for positioning itself as ‘model citizen’ (Hensmans, 2017) which in this case includes supporting the independent judicial system of Canada and trusting them to make the right decision on a complicated political case.
Canadian ambassadors, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Prime Minister’s office also tend to voice the PE discourse more than the ROL discourse. This is also, however, not too surprising as these two institutions are required to respond to political and economic tensions. The only government institution in the top 10 that preferentially voices the ROL discourse is the Department of Justice (100%), which also makes sense considering its responsibilities revolve around the proper administration of justice. If anything, it is surprising how high the ROL discourse is for these first three government institutions considering the overtly political nature of their positions. This suggests the ROL discourse may be used by government institutions as a political strategy. By insisting the Meng affair should be treated as an independent legal case, they are distancing themselves from taking direct responsibility for the outcomes of Meng’s extradition hearings.
None of the non-government institutions in the top 10 voice the ROL discourse. Both of the Chinese institutions overwhelmingly voice the IA discourse, positioning them against the Canadian and American governments in this case. Furthermore, the two businesses in the top ten only voice the PE discourse. Aside from Huawei, none of the non-government institutions in the top 10 voice the ROL discourse. This further supports the interpretation that the ROL discourse is a political posture.
Linking Interest Groups to News Organizations
Some news organizations represent certain social interest groups more than others. By association, organizations that represent some interest groups more than others will also represent some discourses more than others. Experts are proportionately the most represented in Toronto Star, while businesses are the least represented.
34 Notably, CBC relies on government quotes far more than either The Globe and Mail or Toronto Star (Figure 7). Given that Western government quotes are prominently associated with the ROL discourse, the CBC should represent ROL more than either The Globe and Mail or Toronto Star. Indeed, this is fully supported by the organizational analysis which showed that the CBC does represent the ROL discourse proportionately more than the other two news organizations (Figure 5). Because most of the ROL quotes come from ‘Western’ governments, particularly the Canadian government, it can be assumed that CBC most represents Canadian government individuals and institutions in its coverage of the Meng affair.
Figure 7: Distribution of interest groups between news organizations (% values)
As the CBC is a Crown corporation, it is possible that it has a greater motivation to represent discourses and institutions that support Canadian government interests. However, it is also possible that, as the only broadcasting organization in the sample, it does not have the same resources for investigative journalism and expert interviews as the other two organizations. More research would need to be done on each of these three news organizations to see if these tendencies are consistent over time. It would also be interesting to study whether CBC is more likely to support Canadian government interests than other national news organizations.
35 Individual Level
Reese and Shoemaker (2016) use the individual level of analysis to consider the “personal traits of newsmakers” and the values they adhere to. This analysis may also consider demographic figures like gender, race and class. This type of analysis can help scholars make inferences about how professional roles and personal characteristics relate to larger structures (p. 398).
The individual level of analysis is narrowly defined in this study to consider how quoted content reflects on the individual journalists and quoted individuals in the sample. This gives a better idea of which individuals have power over messaging in the Canadian national news media. Returning to the original definition from Reese and Shoemaker, this micro-analysis can help us relate these powerful individuals to “larger structures.” In this case, the “larger structures” are previously identified discourse groups, news organizations, and social interest groups.
Authors
Authors covering the Meng affair tended to have similar profiles and job descriptions. Out of the 67 individual authors identified in the sample, an overwhelming majority (47) were staff reporters (Figure 8) This is 70% of the total sample. In comparison, only 8 were foreign correspondents and of those, only 3 were based in China; the rest were based in the US, Europe, and South America. This suggests that the Meng affair was mostly reported from a Canadian perspective with few articles coming from journalists with any experience writing about China or China-related topics. It may also suggest that the three national news organizations examined simply have few resources to hire foreign correspondents and therefore rely more on staff reporters and news wires for news with international significance. This supports Robson and Sparks (1976) findings that the Canadian press has historically failed to develop “an acceptable foreign correspondent corps” to report international news. Without foreign correspondents who specialize in reporting on China or China-related news stories, it is more likely that reporters will parrot the discourses of governments, experts, and even other journalists.
36 Figure 8: Job titles of authors in the sample
There were also a small number of senior reporters, columnists, and investigative reporters covering the Meng affair. The presence of some more specialized journalist positions covering the Meng affair may speak to the arrest’s perceived political and economic importance for Canada. To determine the significance of these findings, however, more studies need to be done to see if the relative numbers of journalist job types stay consistent in national news story coverage or whether this distribution of journalist job types is unique to the Meng affair.
In addition to the authors’ job types, there were also some news story specializations. Most journalists who covered the Meng affair, however, did not have a specialty noted on their professional bio page. This indicates the majority of journalists covering the Meng affair are generalist staff reporters. As “generalists” (Figure 9) most of the journalists likely have no special experience or knowledge writing about China or Chinese businesses. Without individual knowledge, journalists may be more likely to parrot common narratives about the case instead of presenting unique perspectives or interviewing underrepresented but relevant voices. However, more research needs to be done interviewing Canadian journalists and editors to asertain whether this is true.
37 Figure 9: Author specializations
The most common specialty in the articles was “politics.” This is significant because it correlates with the most prominent discourse group, “political economy.” If a large percentage of journalists writing about the Meng affair specialize in covering politics, this could also suggest that the news organizations consider the arrest to be political in nature because political journalists were assigned to report on the case.
Notably, only three journalists specialized in “Asia” and only two in “technology.” As the case involves an Asian tech giant, this is surprising. It also speaks to the relative lack of Chinese sources quoted in articles. Fewer journalists specializing in Asia likely means fewer connections to Chinese sources and less overall knowledge about local Chinese perspectives in the Meng affair. This lack of Chinese contacts and resources could result in stories being unbalanced or biased in their analysis China-Canada relations
38 Table 6: Top authors (> 2% coverage) and affiliations Name Organization Job Title Specialization Perrin Grauer (7%) Toronto Star staff reporter generalist Steven Chase (6%) The Globe and Mail staff reporter politics/parliament Robert Fife (5.5%) The Globe and Mail bureau chief politics Michael Mui (5%) Toronto Star Investigative reporter generalist Nathan Vanderklippe The Globe and Mail foreign correspondent Asia (5%) Tonda MacCharles Toronto Star senior reporter federal politics (3%) Katie Simpson (2.5%) CBC senior reporter politics/parliament Andrea Woo (2.5%) The Globe and Mail staff reporter generalist Xiao Xu (2.5%) The Globe and Mail staff reporter generalist Jeremy Nuttall (2%) Toronto Star lead investigative generalist reporter Joanna Chiu (2%) Toronto Star bureau chief (former generalist Asia correspondent) Mike Hager (2%) The Globe and Mail staff reporter generalist The top quoted journalist is Perrin Grauer from Toronto Star with 7% total coverage of all articles in the sample. Grauer represents the typical journalist in the sample, as he is a staff reporter and a generalist. However, although a majority of total authors in the sample are staff reporters, Table 6 shows that only five of the twelve authors with more than 2% coverage of all news stories are staff reporters. The rest of the top individual authors have more specialized job titles like “bureau chief,” “foreign correspondent,” and “investigative reporter.” This suggests that authors that are given repeat articles covering the Meng affair are more likely to be specialized in some way, especially preferencing senior positions and specializations in politics.
Quoted Individuals
Of the original quotes collected, 1,103 can be directly attributed to an individual. The total number of individuals quoted in the sample is 258. Of these 258 individuals, the top 10 make up more than a quarter of all the total quotes (27.4%). This is significant because it indicates that journalists across all three news platforms rely on the same small pool of individuals for a large percentage of comments on the Meng case. Table 7 shows these top 10 individuals:
39 Table 7: Top 10 quoted individuals Name Job Title/Institution Interest Group Discourse Group Justin Trudeau (4%) Prime Minister Government (Can.) PE/ROL John McCallum (4%) Canadian ambassador Government (Can.) PE/ROL David J. Martin (4%) Meng’s lawyer Expert (Law.) ROL/IA Lu Shaye (3%) Chinese ambassador Government (Chin.) IA Chrystia Freeland (3%) Foreign Affairs Minister Government (Can.) ROL John Gibb-Carsley (2%) Crown Counsel (lawyer) Government (Law.) ROL Meng Wanzhou (2%) Huawei CFO Business (Chin.) IA David Mulroney (2%) Former ambassador Expert (Former gov.) PE/ROL Ralph Goodale (2%) Public Safety Minister Government (Can.) PE Of the top individuals 60% come from Canadian government sources with the top two quoted individuals being Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, and now former Canadian ambassador to China, John McCallum. Interestingly, even though these top 6 Canadian government officials often voice the ROL discourse, their positions suggest a PE discourse. For example, the top 10 quoted sources include the Canadian Prime Minister, the Canadian ambassador to China, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a former Canadian ambassador to China, and the Minister of Public Safety. None of these positions deal directly with Meng’s legal proceedings. Instead, they are, by default, political figures who represent Canadian interests to the world. This again suggests that the ROL discourse is itself a political position that insists neutrality in dealing with the Meng case. However, the discourse does not detract from the political and economic suggestion associated with these quoted sources’ positions and associated institutions.
However, McCallum is a particularly interesting to note in relation to the ROL discourse because he was fired as ambassador following a series of comments suggesting Meng Wanzhou had “good arguments” on her side in the extradition proceedings, even going so far as to suggest that President Trump might cut a deal with China to avoid extradition proceedings which would be “good for Canada” (Gollom, 2019). These comments undermined the ROL discourse because they suggest that Canada does have political interests in the case. McCallum’s firing demonstrates just how important the ROL discourse is for the Canadian government.
News Routines Analysis: A micro-case study
At the routines level, the hierarchy of influences model considers news as a social practice. Examination is given to the “patterns of behaviour that form the
40 immediate structures of media work.” For example, analysis at this level can consider news values and occupational norms (Reese and Shoemaker, 2016, p. 399).
In this case study, the news routine level of analysis will be used to examine citation routines. Specifically, this analysis considers how journalists position Western government sources compared to Chinese government sources. The extra-media analysis in this study has already established that the ROL discourse is most voiced by “Western government” sources while the immoral act discourse is most voiced by “Chinese government” sources. Therefore, studying how journalists position quotes using reporting verbs and source types between these two groups could indicate either an individual or a news routine bias in reporting Chinese government sources compared to Western government sources. This micro-analysis could also indicate a gatekeeper bias for either the ROL or the IA discourse.
Quotation Types
Quotes in each of the two categories were manually coded as either direct quote, strategic quote, or indirect quote. Direct quotes are considered the most objective form of quotation because it uses all of the speaker’s original words while indirect is the least objective because it uses none of the speaker’s original words. A strategic quote is mostly indirect quotation with some words from the speaker put in for emphasis (Richardson, 2007). Comparing quotation types between Western government quotes and Chinese government quotes is one potential indicator of news routine bias for one over the other.
The analysis found that Western government sources are more often quoted using direct quotes (50.8%) compared to Chinese government quotes (39.3%) (Table 6). Already, this indicates that Western governments are positioned more objectively than their Chinese government counterparts. Western government representatives are given more word-for-word coverage where they can speak for themselves directly.
Table 8: Comparison of quotation types (Western vs Chinese government) Indirect Strategic Direct Western Gov. 25.3% 24.0% 50.8% Chinese Gov. 13.1% 47.7% 39.3%
41 The largest percentage of quotes from Chinese government sources are strategic quotes (47.7%). While strategic quotes are more objective than indirect quotes, they are still primarily quotes framed by the journalists and editors so that only a few key words are emphasized. Chinese government sources are not given the same ability to have their messages represented in their own words. In future studies, it would be interesting to see if there is a pattern dictating which words are emphasized when reporting Chinese government sources using strategic quotes.
Reporting Verbs
Journalists use reporting verbs to introduce a quote to the readers. According to Eissa (2014), reporting verbs can be neutral (said/told), positive (affirmed/stressed) or negative (decried/threatened). The journalists’ choice of reporting verbs can give readers insights into the journalists own feelings or biases toward the speaker. A speaker can be presented as either legitimate or invalid, reasonable or unhinged depending on the reporting verbs the speaker chooses to use (p. 49). In this micro-analysis, reporting verbs for quotes in each of the two categories (Western/Chinese) were recorded manually and compared (Table 9).
The most frequent reporting verb in both categories is “said.” This is consistent with Bell’s (1991) finding that “said” is the “most common speech verb in news reporting” (p. 206). However, it is clear there is a greater diversity of reporting verbs for the Chinese government sources when compared with the Western government sources. Journalists have a greater variety of reporting verbs for Chinese government sources suggesting more varied and potentially biased responses.
Table 9: Reporting verb comparison (Western vs. Chinese government) “Western” government sources (>1% “Chinese” government sources (>1% coverage) coverage) said 64% said 59% told 10% called 10% added 2% warned 7% argued 2% told 4% noted 1% added 3% according to 1% accused 2% stressed 1% wrote 2% warned 1% threatened 2%
42 called 1% according to 2% suggested 1% expressed 1% pointed out 1% decried 1% alleged 1% insisted 1% cited 1% suggested 1% dismissed 1% denounced 1% confirmed 1% questioned 1% expressed 1% repeated 1% stated 1% railed 1% questioned 1% blasted 1% read 1% cited 1%
condemned 1% dictated 1%
When comparing reporting verbs with at least 1% coverage, the study found that Chinese sources are more likely to be quoted using “negative” reporting verbs like “threatened, decried, and denounced” compared to Western government quotes. These reporting verbs evoke feelings of hostility and China theat. Chinese government sources “dictate” they do not “note” or “argue.” They “accuse” and “denounce.” Readers get the sense that the Chinese government is unreasonable, and this reinforces the commonly identified “China threat” discourse. Readers will feel that China and its representatives are tyrannical and controlling.
On the other hand, Western government quotes are more likely to be reported using positive power verbs like “expressed, questioned, and countered.” These verbs evoke reason and restraint. The implicit suggestion is that Western governments are guided by logic and the rule of law. They will weigh the consequences of their actions carefully and act appropriately.
Journalists are more biased in their coverage of Chinese government sources as compared to Western government sources. This is evidenced by the unbalanced use of negative reporting verbs to introduce Chinese government sources. It is also evidenced by the greater reliance on strategic quotes compared to direct quotes when representing Chinese government voices.
43 Chapter 6. Interpretation of Findings
This paper began by asking what the positioning of discourses and news actors in news coverage of Meng Wanzhou’s arrest reveals about the political economy of Canada’s national news media. Specifically, who has power to shape messaging in Canadian national news? An analysis of the quoted sources in the Canadian national news media’s coverage of the Meng affair has shown that ‘Western’ governments and experts have the most power over messaging. Throughout the process of different levels of analysis, there are three key findings and interpretations highlighted below.
The Canadian National news media positions Meng as a symbol of ongoing political and economic struggle between East and West.
Meng, as a Chinese ‘tech princess,’ has become a symbol in the Canadian national news media for a political and economic struggle between East and West. This is evidenced by the dominance of the PE discourse in quoted sources. The PE discourse is also the most dominant across all three news organizations, although the CBC tends to represent the ROL discourse to almost the same degree. Clearly, most news actors believe the case to be motivated by the political and economic interests of China, Canada, and the US. Furthermore, the IA discourse also highlights the ways in which Meng has become a pawn in the political dance between these three nation- states. The only real difference is that the IA discourse supports Chinese interests while the PE discourse supports the interests of Canada and the US.
Even the ROL discourse, which claims zero politicization of the Meng arrest, is suspect because it is voiced primarily by Western government sources. These Western, and especially Canadian, government officials are also among the top quoted individuals across all three news organizations. Their job descriptions imply a certain level of politicization the moment they are quoted in a news article about Meng’s arrest. Why would the Minister of Public Safety be quoted so often if it wasn’t that Meng’s arrest is connected to the ongoing discussion of Huawei as a national security threat? It is odd, as former Canadian ambassador David Mulroney pointed out, that so many government officials would need to comment on the Meng affair if it really is a routine extradition procedure (Chase et al., 2018). Instead, it is far more likely that the Canadian government uses the ROL discourse as a defense mechanism against retaliation from
44 both China and the US. Regardless of the eventual outcomes of Meng’s extradition hearings, the Canadian government will need to defend the court’s decision as independent, neutral, and fair. The firing of John McCallum for his comments suggesting the Canadian government’s does have a political position – that Canada would prefer the US dropped the extradition request – prove just how important it is for Canada to appear neutral on the Meng affair. Ironically, this conclusion suggests the ROL discourse is itself a political posture. The ROL discourse, although small in comparison to the PE discourse in the national news media, could give the Canadian government plausible deniability in response to accusations that it was politically motivated in the eventual outcomes of Meng’s extradition hearings.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the issues brought up in the PE discourse closely resemble Backaler (2014)’s table showing key concerns associated with Chinese TNC integration into Western capitalist markets (Table 1). This further supports the assertion that Meng’s arrest is positioned as a continuing discourse about the dangers associated with China and Chinese companies and less about Meng as an individual facing judicial hearings. Meng is positioned as a symbol of ‘China threat’.
The IA discourse is overwhelmingly a Chinese discourse that challenges Western- dominated discourses in the Meng affair.
The IA discourse is almost entirely voiced by the Chinese government, Chinese experts, Huawei, and by Meng’s lawyers. The IA discourse’s rebuke of both Canada and America’s treatment of Meng position it as a counter-discourse to the overwhelming dominance of both the PE and the ROL discourse, which support Western interests or Western ideals of judicial sovereignty. It is mainly voiced by Chinese Foreign Ministry representatives and ambassadors including Lu Shaye and Hua Chunying. Lu Shaye was the fourth most often quoted individual overall, and he 100% voiced the IA discourse. This suggests that the IA discourse, although small compared with the PE discourse, is still powerfully represented in the Canadian national news media by frequently quoted individuals. Furthermore, the IA discourse supports this paper’s finding that Meng is positioned as a symbol of ongoing political and economic struggle between East and West. In particular, it asserts that the West has long bullied the East – Meng’s arrest is just the latest iteration in a formula for Western domination.
45 There is an ‘elite’ reporting bias for Western sources compared to Chinese sources in the Canadian national news media
Chinese government voices are positioned less objectively than Western government voices as evidenced by quotation types and reporting verbs. Less objective quotation types and more negative reporting verbs suggests an individual and organizational gatekeeper bias in the Canadian national news media. This could also be partly due to a lack of reporting resources for covering stories involving China (Mokry, 2017). For example, few of the journalists in the case study sample have experience writing about Asia or interviewing Asian sources. These reporting conditions may encourage them to parrot dominant discourses about China and citation routines of other journalists around them. However, more studies of Canadian journalists and reporting conditions would need to be done to support this interpretation.
The bias against Chinese government sources further supports the case study’s main finding: that Meng’s arrest is positioned as a political and economic affair. While quoted individuals from both the West and from China voiced political and economic opinions on the Meng affair, a majority of quoted individuals overall were from Western ‘elites.’ These voices are still well-educated, and well-positioned in either government, research, or businesses. Very little space was dedicated to common citizen voices or non-government Chinese perspectives. This finding is supported by other scholars of China representation in media who found a common bias towards “eliteness.” Dominant interest groups and individuals are likely to come from Western, privileged backgrounds – these groups tend to have the most power over messaging (Cao, 2012; Mokry, 2017; Robinson & Sparkes, 1976; Wu, 2000). These findings are also supported by Bell (Bell, 1991) who finds that the more elite the source, the more newsworthy it is considered (p. 192). An examination of voices in the sample of quotations for this study is no exception to this trend. At the news routines level, this suggests that news organizations or journalists are conducting interviews with similar types of individuals who share similar interests and worldviews.
46 Chapter 7. Conclusions
As a ‘tech princess’ Meng’s arrest could hardly have been anything but political. Her arrest has severely affected international relations between Canada, the US, and China. Such a nationally significant case provides a perfect case study for exploring whose voices and which groups are given the biggest platform in the Canadian national news media Through an examination of news quotations, the study has shown that ‘Western’ elites and political figures overwhelmingly set the tone for news stories – a finding which is supported by countless other scholars of Western news media bias. In the Meng case, these elites voiced the PE discourse much more than the ROL discourse. Even when the ROL discourse was presented, it was usually presented by a government institution with an overtly political position. This suggests that, despite arguing for a de-politicization of Meng’s arrest, the ROL discourse is itself a political posture used primarily by Canadian government spokespersons to protect their own political and economic interests. Furthermore, an analysis of quotation patterns and positioning demonstrates a news routine bias in how journalists position quotes between ‘Western’ and Chinese government quoted individuals. Quotations from Chinese government representatives are often prefaced by negative or hostile-sounding reporting verbs. They are also less likely to be directly quoted and more likely to have a few key words quoted for emphasis. Other Chinese sources also tend toward the IA discourse, blaming the US and Canada for unfairly treating Meng (and by association, China itself) because of pre-existing tensions. There is also a historical power imbalance between the West and East, allowing the IA discourse to also encompass accusations of Western supremacy and egotism in dealing with Meng. These findings further support this paper’s interpretation of Meng as a symbol of ‘China threat’ and her arrest as proof of East-West incompatibility. For Canada, arresting a Chinese tech princess will likely continue to have political and economic consequences for years to come.
Acknowledgement of Limitations
While this research has primarily identified powerful institutions and interests in the Canadian national news media, revealed through discourses and citation routines, it has not been able to speculate on effects. Future research could study media effects by drawing links between dominant media discourses and future government actions or
47 policies related to key news stories. Also, research should consider Canadian public opinion and how the public’s interests are reflected in news reporting of specific China- related news stories.
This study was also limited by a few methodological constraints. First, an overreliance on manual coding by a single researcher. This could lead to overly narrow interpretations of the findings. Second, the inclusion of CBC as one of the three national news media. Unlike newspapers like Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail, CBC is a broadcasting corporation. As such, CBC has a variety of different news gathering and reporting practices that may make its findings significantly different from the other two. Finally, the time and scope of the research project. Ideally, this type of study would cover a news story from beginning to end (until the end of the extradition hearings, for example). Future research can therefore build on this study to examine how citation routines and discourses are linked to developments in the news story and also look at how the public reacts to these events.
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54 Appendix A: Coding Manual
All the coding for this case study was done manually in NVivo. Although there were a few pre-set nodes including: “government,” “expert,” and “business,” most categories and sub-categories were created organically throughout the coding process as trends in the sample were identified. The table below summarizes the resulting categories and their characteristics.
NOTE: Separate quotations in the same article were coded individually, even if they were taken from the same individual or institution.
Table 10: Coding Manual Nodes Characteristics Examples Discourses Rule-of-law Quotations stress the importance of “We respect the independence of following an independent legal procedure our judicial processes.” (Justin in evaluating the Meng affair. This Trudeau) discourse rejects any politicization of the Meng affair. Quotations will insist that the “It is a very delicate process and Meng affair has nothing to do with the I don’t want to be involved in political or economic interests of any something that is an ongoing nation-state. independent judiciary process,” (Kelly Craft) This category also includes quotations discussing specific details of Meng’s legal proceedings such as how much bail was posted, etc. Political Economy Quotations emphasize all the ways in “I’m seeing a lot of nationalism. which the Meng affair is politically and I’m seeing a lot of China versus economically implicated. These ways the world,” (Michael Yen) include, but are not limited to: national security, trade war, intellectual property “If tensions escalate much theft, and an aggressive China/US. Unlike further, we suspect the most the ROL discourse, this discourse does likely response from China will not deny that an analysis of the Meng be measures to boycott affair includes an examination of the Canada’s exports.” (Stephen political and economic interests of all Brown) parties involved. Immoral Act Quotations are characterized by strong “I want to object to what the U.S. moral condemnation of both Canada and has done. This kind of politically the US in their dealings with Meng. Issues motivated act is not acceptable,” are raised regarding Meng’s human rights (Ren Zhengfei) and also about Western egotism in dealing with China.
55 This category also includes quotations “Without any solid evidence, the defending China’s arrest of two Canadian Canadian and U.S. governments citizens as more moral and humane than trampled on international law by what Canada has done to Meng. basically ‘kidnapping' Chinese citizen Meng Wanzhou," (Mei Xinyu) Quote Type Direct Quotations are presented word-for-word “Ms. Meng personally from the original speech or script. represented to those banks that Skycom and Huawei were separate when in fact they were not separate,” he said. “Skycom was Huawei.” Indirect Quotations are paraphrased by journalists U.S. national security adviser and editors. John Bolton said on Thursday that he knew of the arrest in advance. Strategic Some words and short phrases are Canada will pay “a heavy price” if directly quoted for emphasis while it does not recognize and accept everything else is paraphrased. Chinese demands, the People’s Daily wrote,
Canadian business leaders currently in China should be “careful,” he said Sunday. (John McCallum) Source Type Government The government category includes any The United States has warned quotations and statements taken from the Chinese government could acting government ministers, use Huawei technology to spokespersons, or judicial members. For threaten the national security of example, Crown prosecutors are coded as countries that install its devices. ‘government.’ This umbrella category is roughly divided into two sub-categories: “Detaining a person without providing an explanation has Western gov.: this category includes undoubtedly violated her human government representatives from Canada, rights,” said Chinese Foreign the US, and some other commonwealth Ministry spokesman Geng countries like the UK and Australia. Shuang. Although there is some differences in discourses between these groups, the researcher decided that they do share enough similar discourses to be grouped together. Additionally, the majority of these quotes came from Canadian government representatives, making the trend of this sub-category even more unified.
Chinese gov.: This category includes all Chinese government representatives.
56 Expert ‘Expert’ includes any individual quotations Tom Fowdy, a British political coming from a background or job analyst writing for the state-run description that specially qualifies them to CGTN network, called Canada a speak on the Meng affair (excluding party to a “political hostage- government and business taking by the Trump representatives).The researcher identified administration." (Western a few distinct types of experts: analyst)
‘Western’ scholars/analysts: these experts Zuo Chuanchang, chief research come from scholarly institutions or fellow with the Academy of organizations based in either North Macroeconomic Research at the America or Europe. National Development and Reform Commission, declined an Chinese scholars/analysts: these experts interview with The Globe and come from scholarly institutions based in Mail, saying, “you are the ones mainland China or Hong Kong. While who arrested her and caused including Hong Kong institutions with this. mainland China is a controversial I refuse to talk to Canadian decision, there were only two quotes media." (Chinese scholar) coming from Hong Kong in total, making the decision’s overall impact irrelevant. In a broader study, each nation’s experts should be evaluated independently.
Lawyers/legal experts: these include any lawyers or legal experts not directly affiliated with Meng’s legal proceedings. All individuals in this category come from either Canada or the US.
Former government: This category includes any former ‘Western’ government representatives (former diplomats, prime ministers, etc.). There were no former Chinese government representatives quoted in the sample.
Meng’s lawyers: As Meng’s defense team, these lawyers had a unique enough discourse to be coded as their own sub- category.
Business Business quotations came from business “We are proud to bring these representatives, employees, and official devices to Canada, and have no statements. The category can be broken reason not to continue promoting down into two sub-categories: these great products," Huawei Canada's senior vice-president Western business: Any business based in of corporate affairs, Scott either Canada or the US. No other non- Bradley, said in an emailed Chinese businesses were represented in statement. the sample of quotes.
57 Orange CEO Stéphane Richard Chinese business: Any businesses based told reporters in Paris that the in or founded in China. This category security concerns about Huawei mostly consists of quotes from Huawei, as are legitimate. it is the primary business involved in the “I absolutely understand that all Meng affair. This includes quotes from our countries and the French Meng herself. authorities are preoccupied [with Huawei]. We are too," he said. Citizen These quotations include any Mr. Xu, who attended Huazhong observational comments from interested University of Science and members of the public. The category also Technology in China, where Ms. includes comments gathered from the Meng graduated, said he paid a public on social media. lot of attention to this case because of that connection, but also because he is a Huawei cell phone user. News Organizations This category includes any quotations or “Canada’s misdeeds, which are statements gathered from news lawless, unreasonable and organizations, journalists, or editors. callous, have caused serious damage to its relations with China," Xinhua said in a commentary attributed to writers Chen Yong and Wu Liming.
58 Appendix B: Quoted Institutions (> 1% coverage)
Below is a list of institutions represented in news quotes from the sample. Only the institutions with greater than 1% coverage of all news quotes are included in this table. The top quotes come primarily from business and government institutions with Huawei being the most represented (16%).
Institution Interest Group % Coverage Huawei Business 16% Canadian Consulate/Ambassadors Government 7% Prime Minister's Office (Can.) Government 4% Chinese Ambassadors Government 4% Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Can.) Government 4% Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chin.) Government 4% Department of Justice (Can.) Government 3% Capital Economics Business 2% Richardson International Business 2% Chinese Embassy in Ottawa Government 2% Department of National Security (U.S.) Government 2% Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Government 2% US President Government 2% University of Toronto Expert 2% US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Government 2% University of Alberta Expert 2% ABC Communications Business 1% Ministry of Public Safety Government 1% Brock University Expert 1% Canola Council of Canada Business 1% Viterra Business 1% University of British Columbia Expert 1% Renmin University Expert 1% Royal United Services Institute Expert 1% University of Ottawa Expert 1% WilmerHale Business 1% Department of Justice (US) Government 1% Chinese University of Hong Kong Expert 1% SOAS University Expert 1% Dui Hua Foundation Expert 1% Beijing Lianxing Seafood Business 1% Jiangsu Tongliang International Business 1%
59 Conservative Party of Canada Government 1% Tsinghua University Expert 1% Hofstra University Expert 1% Center for China and Globalization Expert 1% Harvard Kennedy School Expert 1% Amnesty International Expert 1% Aige Agriculture Expert 1%
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