The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

By Leon Hartwell The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

CONTENTS ABOUT THE AUTHOR Executive Summary...... 1 Dr. Leon Hartwell is a Title VIII Transatlantic Introduction...... 2 Leadership Fellow at the Center for European Background...... 2 Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. He Key Factors Determining Ripeness ...... 5 specializes in mediation, negotiation, and conflict resolution. Key Findings...... 23 Policy Recommendations...... 24 Endnotes...... 28 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank Donald N. Jensen, Edward Lucas, Jason Israel, Bodo Weber, Visar Xhambazi, and Benjamin Zalinger for their ABOUT CEPA valuable feedback during the research process. This research project would also not have been The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) possible without the wonderful support of works to reinvent Atlanticism for a more secure CEPA’s Transatlantic Leadership Team, notably future. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., and Milda Matačiūnaitė-Boyce and Bruna Celic, as led by seasoned transatlanticists and emerging well as CEPA’s Communications Team, especially leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, CEPA Michael Newton. Last, but not least, the author brings an innovative approach to the foreign would like to thank the generous support from policy arena. Our cutting-edge analysis and the U.S. State Department for the Title VIII timely debates galvanize communities of influence while investing in the next generation Program. of leaders to understand and address present and future challenges to transatlantic values and principles. CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution.

All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. Cover: Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping walk down the stairs as they arrive for a BRICS summit in Brasilia, Brazil November 14, 2019. REUTERS/Ueslei Marcelino.

ii The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

to end the dispute, at least not under Executive Summary current conditions and in a manner During the last year of the Trump that will produce a prompt and administration, the U.S. broke too many comprehensive agreement. eggs in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue without making an omelet. Following the landmark • The main influencers, Russia and China, transition from President Donald Trump to are undermining the normalization President Joe Biden, and in the context of process. Russia is set on protecting its the September 4, 2020, agreement between energy interests in Serbia and keeping the Serbia and Kosovo brokered by the Trump Western Balkan countries out of the EU administration in Washington, D.C., it is and NATO. China’s goal is not necessarily important to reassess U.S. mediation efforts to undermine the normalization process, in the Serbia-Kosovo dispute. This policy but its developing relationship with paper will ask how “ripe for resolution” Serbia may compromise Serbia’s ability the dispute is and whether U.S. and other to integrate into the EU, which in turn diplomatic efforts are pushing it toward makes it more difficult for the EU to use resolution. prospective membership as a carrot for normalization. Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo should ideally include: • Divisions within the EU mean that the dialogue lacks a clear, explicit goal • Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s — sovereignty for Kosovo — which independence. weakens the process.

• A solution to issues of insecurity • Trump’s special envoy for the Serbia- between the two entities. Kosovo dialogue, Ambassador Richard Grenell, undermined the chances for a • Guarantees and promotion of minority comprehensive agreement by splitting rights. the dialogues into one led by the U.S. • Some form of transitional justice. on economic matters and another led by the EU on political issues. A package deal This paper examines the following factors jointly coordinated with the EU stands a and their role in promoting and preventing much greater chance of succeeding than normalization of relations between Serbia Grenell’s fractionating approach. and Kosovo: Given that a comprehensive agreement 1. The key issues underpinning the dispute. between Serbia and Kosovo is not in sight, this paper recommends that the U.S. return 2. The main players (adversaries, to the long game in Serbia and Kosovo by: influencers and mediators). • Maintaining the position of U.S. special 3. Contextual factors. envoy for the Western Balkans.

4. Strategies available to the adversaries in • Protecting Kosovo’s independence and pursuit of their goals. territorial integrity.

The main finding of this research paper is • Supporting liberal democracy in the that the Serbia-Kosovo dispute is not ripe Balkans. for resolution: • Acting in tandem with the EU and U.K. • The two top issues, sovereignty and security, are notoriously difficult to resolve. The adversaries are not ready

1 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Introduction The dispute between Serbia The dispute between Serbia and Kosovo and Kosovo is often referred is often referred to as a “frozen conflict,” but that term encourages a false sense of to as a “frozen conflict,” security.1 As the fighting over Nagorno- but that term encourages Karabakh in 2020 showed, frozen conflicts can heat back up. On May 12, 2020, long a false sense of security before the White House talks in September and the more recent European Union-led initiatives that brought Serbs and Kosovars Background to the table, Balkans expert Janusz Bugajski The crumbling of the Socialist Federal noted that although the Serbia-Kosovo 2 Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which dialogue “hasn’t died, it smells.” Bugajski’s existed from 1963 to 1992, began in Kosovo. words still ring true. SFRY consisted of six republics — Bosnia In the mid-1990s, the U.S. built credibility and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, in the Balkans by playing a central role Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia — and in ending some of the main conflicts and two autonomous entities inside Serbia, halting genocide. Its success was so great Vojvodina and Kosovo. In 1987, the then- that some experts talk about U.S. “path president of the League of Communists dependency” in the Balkans, especially in of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, made a peacemaking.3 During the last year of the landmark speech to a crowd of angry Serbs Trump administration, however, some in Pristina declaring, “No one should dare 7 inside the U.S. State Department and among to beat you.” His speech was misleading close European allies increasingly criticized as Kosovo Albanians in the 1980s were the 8 the U.S. approach to the Serbia-Kosovo prime victims of systematic discrimination. dialogue.4 The Biden administration has an Nonetheless, Milošević actively promoted opportunity to resituate U.S. foreign policy the dangerous process of “othering,” and in the Balkans in a manner that is bipartisan henceforth, ditched Yugoslavism for Serbian and geared toward serving long-term U.S. nationalism, sparking a series of violent 9 interests. conflicts.

The primary question guiding this research By 1992, Milošević was at the helm of rump is whether the Serbia-Kosovo conflict is Yugoslavia, which consisted only of Serbia “ripe for resolution.”5 Peace studies scholar and Montenegro. His promotion of Serbian William Zartman coined the term “ripeness” nationalism and “Greater Serbia” — that is, to describe the timing of peacemaking.6 It is uniting all Serbs in one territory, including based on the assumption that parties to a those outside Serbia — led to increased conflict will make peace only when a range discrimination against non-Serbs, some of of conditions favor such an outcome. In the whom suffered mass atrocities, including absence thereof, mediators will struggle to genocide. Consequently, Kosovo Albanians bring a dispute to a halt, even when the began to push for the independence of mediator is seemingly powerful. The final Kosovo. section explores policy recommendations relevant to U.S. policymakers.

2 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Key events in the run-up to Kosovo’s declaration of independence

1987 (April 24): Slobodan Milošević delivers a speech in Kosovo that further incites ethnic tensions between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians.

1989 (May 8): Milošević becomes president of Serbia.

1990 ( January 20-22): Slovenian, Croatian and Macedonian delegates abandon the last Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia and the party is dissolved.

1991 ( June 25): Slovenia and Croatia declare independence.

1991 ( June 27): Start of Ten-Day War in Slovenia, which lasts until July 6, 1991.

1991 (September 25): Macedonia declares independence.

1991 (October 8): Croatia declares independence from Yugoslavia.

1991-1995: Croatia enters a four-year war with the Yugoslav army.

1992 (March 3): Bosnia declares independence.

1992-1995: The Bosnian war begins April 6, 1992, and ends on December 14, 1995. Bosnian Serbs with the support of Milošević’s rump Yugoslavia commit mass atrocities against non-Serbs.

1994 (April): NATO carries out the first airstrikes in its history against Bosnian Serbs targets.

1995 (December 14): The Dayton Accords are signed by the leaders of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, putting an end to the Bosnian war. The issue of discrimination against Kosovo Albanians does not feature in Dayton’s agenda.

1996: The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launches sporadic attacks against Serbian authorities in Kosovo in response to Serbia’s suppression of student and ethnic movements in Kosovo.

1998 (March 31): UN Security Council Resolution 1160 condemns Yugoslavia’s excessive use of force, imposes economic sanctions and bans arm sales to Serbia.

1998 ( June 23-24, 1998): Richard Holbrooke meets with Milošević and travels to Kosovo to talk directly with KLA commanders.

1998 (August): Serbian forces step up their offensive, attack KLA and Kosovar villages.

1999 ( January 15): Serbian security forces kill 45 Kosovo Albanians in the Račak massacre.

1999 (March 24): NATO begins bombing Serbian targets in response to ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians.

1999 ( June 10): NATO bombing ends. The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1244, which authorizes an international civilian and military presence in rump Yugoslavia and establishes the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

1999 ( June 20): Serbs complete withdrawal from Kosovo and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana formally ends the alliance’s bombing campaign.

2008 (February 17): Kosovo declares independence from Serbia.

3 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

At first, Kosovo Albanians largely followed Ibrahim Rugova, the pacifist leader of Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). But in the face of increasing oppression, many Kosovo Albanians turned to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to wage an armed struggle against Serbia in their quest for independence. War with Serbia escalated in February 1998 and lasted until June 11, 1999.10 In Kosovo, as in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian forces committed ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities. In 1998 and 1999, the Kosovo conflict claimed the lives of about 10,000 Kosovo Albanians and displaced 900,000 people, nearly half of the population. Milošević’s atrocities were halted by the KLA with significant air support from NATO.11

Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008. While the U.S. and most European states recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty, the most important actors opposing Kosovo’s independence include Serbia, Russia, China and five EU member states.

There are two main tracks of Western diplomacy. The first is the “Belgrade- Pristina dialogue,” the EU process that kicked off in March 2011 with the ultimate goal of normalizing relations between the two states.12 The mediation process started off as a dialogue about technical measures to facilitate the exchange of goods and people, but it rapidly evolved into a political dialogue, which led to, among others, the 2013 Brussels Agreement. From late 2018 until fairly recently, the EU dialogue was largely at an impasse. Miroslav Lajčák, the EU special representative for the Belgrade- Pristina dialogue since April 2020, has breathed some life into it by facilitating more contact sessions between the adversaries. At the same time, high-level meetings have not yet produced a major breakthrough in the normalization process.

The second track is the U.S.-led “Serbia- Kosovo dialogue.” In August 2019, some Balkans watchers were excited by the appointment of Matthew Palmer as U.S. special envoy to the Western Balkans.13

4 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Palmer is an old hand in the Balkans and the Serbia, leading to a vote of no confidence in first U.S. special envoy to the region since him; and of sidelining the EU.16 the 1990s. Then in September 2019, the White House named Richard Grenell, who In the context of increasing diplomatic was then the U.S. ambassador to Germany, efforts to normalize relations between Serbia as special presidential envoy for the Serbia- and Kosovo, and given the Trump-Biden Kosovo talks. Along the way, Grenell began transition, how likely is it that the dispute his own diplomatic initiative, and instead will be resolved under current conditions? of supporting the EU’s Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, the U.S. opened up the Serbia- Key Factors Kosovo dialogue. According to a high-level EU official, the U.S. initiative was “not Determining Ripeness coordinated” with the EU.14 The outcome of the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue depends chiefly on the issues, the players The initial hype about U.S. re-engagement in (adversaries, influencers and mediators), the the Balkans faded during the last few months context and the strategies of the adversaries.17 of the Trump administration. Gorana Grgić, a Balkans expert, criticized the U.S. for squandering “long-term investments” in the Issues region in exchange for short-term foreign At the heart of the dispute are five 15 policy victories for Trump. The U.S. stood fundamental issues: sovereignty, security, accused of supporting controversial “land minority rights, transitional justice swap” deals between Serbia and Kosovo; and economic issues. A comprehensive of bullying Kosovo’s then-prime minister, agreement should ideally address all of Albin Kurti, into dropping tariffs against them.

Figure 1. Determining Conflict Resolution Outcomes

5 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

First, on the issue of sovereignty, the discrimination in Serbia.21 For example, Serbian government maintains that Kosovo Mayor Shqiprim Arifi of the Albanian- is part of Serbia, while Kosovo’s government dominated Preševo municipality in Serbia asserts that it is independent. Second, and blames systematic discrimination for the flowing from the issue of sovereignty, the roughly 50 percent unemployment rate Serbia-Kosovo dispute is connected to among his constituents, compared with the security. In the 1980s and 1990s, Kosovo national average of about 13 to 15 percent.22 Albanians increasingly faced an existential threat following systemic discrimination Fourth, many Kosovars, convinced that and ethnic cleansing, which eventually led Serbia has not faced up to serious crimes to the Kosovo War in 1998 and 1999.18 While it committed during the Kosovo war, are guns are no longer blazing between Serbs demanding some form of transitional 23 and Kosovars, a sense of insecurity will justice. That could range from cooperation remain until Serbia relinquishes its claim on missing persons to reparations, as part of 24 to Kosovo’s territory. As Kosovo’s former a normalization package with Serbia. foreign minister, Glauk Konjufca, has said, Finally, although economic issues — such as Serbia will fight for Kosovo for as long disputes over ownership of natural resources as its constitution defines it as part of its or territorial delineation impacting on territory.19 transportation routes — have not been Third, and closely linked to security and central to the onset of the dispute, they could sovereignty, are issues about ethnicity grow in importance, especially given the and minority rights. Serbs claim that impact of covid-19 on the Western Balkans. Kosovo Serbs are discriminated against, Economic matters are also closely linked which is partly why they are pushing to prospective regional cooperation, which for an Association of Serb Municipalities will remain constrained in the absence of (ASM),20 while non-Serbs complain about agreement on political normalization.

6 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

If normalization between Serbia and of the adversaries to resolve it.31 To gauge Kosovo requires that all the issues are how willing Serbia and Kosovo are, it helps included in a comprehensive agreement to consider their political situations, stated — sovereignty, security, ethnicity, minority positions and actual goals for an agreement. rights, transitional justice and economic issues — and then implemented, then U.S. The following two subsections will focus and EU mediators are in for a rough ride. on Serbia’s and Kosovo’s public positions — As one Western diplomat noted prior to the which may differ from their intentions — Washington agreement in 2020, the U.S. and explore what their leaders require from can “strongarm” Kosovo and Serbia into a “normalization.” The section on strategies limited deal, but that will not resolve the will identify how the two adversaries intend 32 underlying dispute.25 However, if the U.S. to pursue their goals. seeks to eventually integrate Serbia into the Serbia EU and Kosovo into the EU and NATO, it will “need to take collective action” with Darko Brkan, president of the Zašto Ne the Europeans.26 (Why not?) nongovernmental organization in Sarajevo, said the success of the Serbia- In fact, Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Kosovo dialogue will hinge on “how far Serbia Houston’s empirical study of 137 mediated is willing to compromise” on recognizing disputes determined that conflicts about Kosovo’s sovereignty.33 More specifically, sovereignty and security, the two top given his dominant role in Serbian politics, issues defining the Serbia-Kosovo dispute, President Aleksandar Vučić holds the key to are notoriously hard to resolve, with a the outcome. Will he be willing to take the success rate of only 44.7 and 40.7 percent leap toward full normalization? respectively.27 And that’s even with the bar set low: Bercovitch and Houston’s study defines Vučić is a “hardcore traditional realist” who a successful outcome merely as reduced “understands power,” according to Marko violence or securing an agreement.28 For Savković, executive director of the Belgrade civil wars between 1940 and 1990, only one Fund for Political Excellence.34 On June 21, out of three ended in a peace agreement that 2020, Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) was implemented successfully.29 In short, won the election by a landslide, or some brokering a comprehensive agreement 190 of the Serbian parliament’s 250 seats. will be hard and implementing it will be Igor Novaković, research director of the even harder. Of the 33 agreements the EU Belgrade-based International and Security has brokered between Serbia and Kosovo, Affairs Center, notes that Vučić depends on a implementation has been slow or spotty.30 “clientelist network” to maintain his power.35 It is thus noteworthy that SNS, which is was Players only established in 2012, has a membership base of 750,000 — nearly 10 percent of the The Serbia-Kosovo dispute brings together entire population — making it the largest three sets of players: adversaries, influencers political party in Europe (if one excludes and mediators. Adversaries are the direct Russia and Turkey).36 By comparison, if 10 parties to the dispute, influencers have some percent of Russians signed up to President form of influence over the adversaries and Vladimir Putin’s United Russia, it would mediators are actively seeking a resolution have a membership 14.5 million (instead of to the dispute. 2.1 million).

Adversaries Several people interviewed for this paper likened Vučić to Hungary’s controversial The primary factor determining the prime minister, Viktor Orbán.37 Serbia outcome of any conflict is the willingness under Vučić is experiencing “the rise of

7 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

centralization of power and a backsliding live with these people” so there becomes of democracy.”38 Over the last few years, he a “need to demarcate” the border between has led Serbia closer to a semi-authoritarian Serbia and Kosovo along the lines of state.39 In the most recent edition its flagship “Trump’s wall.”48 Vučić and Kosovo’s former Nations in Transit report, Freedom House president, Hashim Thaçi, once saw the so- concluded that for the first time since called “land swap” between Serbia and 2003, Serbia can no longer be considered a Kosovo as the key to normalizing relations. democracy.40 Kosovo would have ceded areas north of the Ibar river in Mitrovica with majority-Serb Serbian analyst Stefan Vladisavljev said populations to Serbia, in return for areas in Vucic’s advantage is that his “radical” the southern Preševo Valley (Serbia) with leaning in the past gives him “legitimacy majority-Albanian populations.49 among the right wing.”41 Unlike previous Serbian leaders, he thus has more leeway Additionally, some observers argue that to make some form of a deal with Kosovo despite his considerable power, Vučić still without giving Serbian radicals and other has to color within the lines. International spoilers an opening to say he sold out. Still, negotiation is often described as a “two- it is hard to pinpoint what Vučić means by level game” in the sense that parties have “normalization” of relations with Kosovo. A to negotiate with the other side as well as large part of it has to do with the fact that with their own constituencies.50 In May he himself may be “torn” about the issue.42 2019, during a tête-à-tête with the former U.S. Army commander in Europe, retired Vučić’s public position, at least to the Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, Vučić international community, is that he wants said he would be considered a “traitor” if to participate in the dialogue to normalize he recognized Kosovo.51 He faces a lot of relations with Kosovo and to bring Serbia into pressure from a variety of groups, including the EU. His EU aspirations seem key, given the Orthodox Church, war veterans and that they depend on normalizing relations the Kremlin. The Serbian public at large with Kosovo. In fact, EU membership is views Kosovo as “the Serbian Jerusalem,” often posited as an essential carrot to get sacrosanct.52 This strong emotional 43 Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty. attachment to the territory means that the matter is not a rational, transactional issue. Some Serbian analysts argue that Vučić accepts that Serbia cannot “reimpose” itself As mentioned earlier, Vučić says he wants to 44 over Kosovo. The president understands launch Serbia into the EU.53 It is a popular that the Serbia-Kosovo dispute creates idea that resonates with the Serbian public, obstacles to regional cooperation and as long as EU membership is not tied to presents impediments to Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo’s recognition. Serbian analysts Others say Vučić has even started to prepare describe recognition of Kosovo as political the Serbian public to accept that some hard suicide.54 A 2019 poll by the Center for Social 45 choices will have to be made about Kosovo. Dialogue and Regional Initiatives found Even one high-level Kosovo official said, that although 55 percent of respondents “Serbia is serious about normalization, as supported the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, only 46 Vučić wants Serbia to be part of the EU.” “14.1% of [Serbs] would agree to support recognition of Kosovo’s independence Savković, of the Belgrade Fund for Political if it were a precondition for Serbia’s EU Excellence, said that although the state- membership, while 71.7% opposed it.”55 controlled Serbian media less frequently Vučić is known for paying close attention to portray Kosovo Albanians as “the enemy,” public opinion. In a June 2020 interview, he they still freely use the term “Šiptar,” told Reuters: “In reply to a possible offer [to an epithet equivalent to the n-word in Serbia] to recognize Kosovo and that Kosovo English.47 The message is that Serbs “can’t

8 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

European Council President Charles Michel (right) walks with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic (left) prior to a meeting at the European Council building in Brussels, Belgium, June 26, 2020. Credit: Olivier Matthys/Pool via REUTERS enters the UN, and we receive nothing in accept and that would make him look like return, except EU membership, our answer the winner. Although the land swap idea would be ‘no.’ ”56 was once seen as a silver bullet, Kosovo will not accept it, especially now with Still, analyst Bodo Weber of the Thaçi out of the picture. More recently, Democratization Policy Council said that Vučić started hinting that the formation of given his influence over Serbian society, the ASM — a self-governing association of “Vučić can change public opinion in six Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo — 57 months if he wants to.” Accordingly, Vučić as per the Brussels Agreement may suffice is not merely a thermometer reflecting the to facilitate further dialogue. However, the public’s mood, but rather he is a thermostat establish of the ASM was declared partly leader with the ability to adjust their attitudes unconstitutional by Kosovo’s Constitution to accept Kosovo’s recognition. Preparing Court in December 2015, leading to a the Serbian public for a comprehensive deadlock in the negotiations.60 deal is important, given that the Serbian constitution stipulates that recognition of Konjufca, the former foreign minister for Kosovo would require a referendum.58 Kosovo, said he believed Vučić was open to the idea of “two Germanies,” in which Serbia Žarko Trebješanin, a prominent would not recognize Kosovo but they would Serbian psychologist, describes Vučić as merely coexist.61 That arrangement, though, 59 “narcissistic,” which could complicate would not necessarily encourage the kind of deal-making as Vučić seeks a face-saving recognition that Kosovo needs from other settlement that the Serbian public would

9 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

“within a week.”63 Given that Kurti’s party, A comprehensive agreement the Self-determination Movement (LVV), between Serbia and Kosovo campaigned against land swaps during the 2019 election, Kurti objected to the idea. is going to be hard to achieve, Thaçi then mobilized against the prime minister, who was removed after serving especially if it hinges on for a mere 51 days. Thaçi (temporarily) Vučić’s willingness maintained his primacy in the negotiations. Following Kurti’s ousting, Balkan watchers to compromise also blamed the U.S. for the collapse of his government on June 3, 2020, shortly after covid-19 escalated.64 governmental organizations, including the UN, EU and NATO, and therefore would Kurti’s successor as prime minister, Avdullah not resolve territorial and security issues Hoti, came not from LVV, but from its between the two entities. erstwhile coalition partner, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which before the To summarize this section, a comprehensive February 2021 parliamentary election was agreement between Serbia and Kosovo the second-most popular party in Kosovo’s is going to be hard to achieve, especially Assembly. LVV’s leaders felt a deep sense of if it hinges on Vučić’s willingness to betrayal by the LDK, which they felt had compromise. “sabotaged the government of Albin Kurti,” Kosovo according to Kreshnik Ahmeti, LVV’s secretary of external and international Kosovo has recently experienced two relations.65 Consequently, LVV refused to fundamental changes that will affect the take part in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue negotiations: Thaçi’s resignation as president with Hoti, whom it deemed “illegitimate.”66 and the shift of political power following the February 2021 parliamentary election. LVV’s absence in the dialogue following Kurti’s removal mattered: With 29 seats Thaçi’s resignation on November 5, 2020, as in Kosovo’s 120 member parliament president following his indictment by the before the February 2020 election, it had Balkan war crimes tribunal in The Hague only to team up with a handful of other was an earthquake in Kosovo’s political lawmakers to block the two-thirds majority landscape. The undisputed dominant that international agreements need for political figure in Kosovo, Thaçi was ratification in Kosovo.67 intimately involved with the dialogue from 2011 until his indictment in June 2020. Kurti’s short stint in office was somewhat Researcher Teuta Kukleci with the Peace extraordinary but nonetheless an accurate Research Institute Oslo said many Kosovars reflection of the instability of Kosovo thought of Thaçi as someone with “war politics. Aside from the incoming prime credentials,” and it was akin to “treason to minister, the country has had four prime go against him.”62 ministers since 2014, from three different political parties: Isa Mustafa from the LDK Consider the fate of Thaçi’s former prime (2014 to 2017); Ramush Haradinaj from the minister, Albin Kurti, who defied his wishes. Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) Konjufca said Thaçi summoned Kurti to his (2017 to 2019); Kurti from LVV (February office after the prime minister assumed 3, 2020, until June 3, 2020); and, most power in 2020 and tried to convince him recently, Avdullah Hoti, also from the LDK that “border corrections,” a euphemism ( June 3 to present), who will most likely for land swaps, would help normalize hand back the torch to Kurti. Each brought relations between Serbia and Kosovo

10 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

different interests to the negotiation table, country is ready for change. As researcher which made Kosovo an unstable party.68 Visar Xhambazi of Kosovo’s Democracy for Development Institute notes, unlike some To add to the complexity, Kosovo’s of the old establishment parties, LVV’s Constitutional Court ruled that Hoti’s reputation is not tarnished by corruption government was “illegal,” which meant and criminal scandals.74 Kosovo had to hold early elections on February 14, 2021.69 In mid-January 2021, Kurti has said his domestic agenda — “jobs Kurti and Vjosa Osmani announced they and justice” — will take priority over would join forces to compete in the election. dialogue with Serbia.75 But as Xhambazi Shortly afterward, Kurti was barred from notes, given the significance of the dialogue, running in the parliamentary election Kurti cannot put the talks on the back because he had been convicted of a crime — burner.76 It is thus not a question of whether, using teargas in the Assembly — within the but how, LVV will engage in the dialogue. last three years.70 “The overwhelming victory of [LVV] marks Osmani, the chairwoman of the Assembly the beginning of a more assertive Kosovo and, since Thaçi’s resignation, the acting in negotiations with Serbia,” according president, is a popular figure. She was to Sidita Kushi, an assistant professor removed from the LDK’s leadership in June of political science at Bridgewater State 2020 for opposing a motion of no confidence University in Massachusetts. “Unlike against the Kurti-led government. Upon previous old-guard politicians who were becoming acting president, Osmani asked more malleable to Western demands, Kurti for the dialogue to be postponed to provide has made it clear that he will continue talks space to Kosovo’s parties to forge a unified under conditions of reciprocity and the front.71 goal of mutual recognition — meaning that greater concessions and an ultimate path to At the time of writing, votes are still being recognition will be expected from Serbia.”77 counted, but LVV is on track to secure Kukleci broadly agrees, and says Osmani approximately 48 percent of the vote. While and Kurti have both hinted that “Pristina those results may fall short of the 50.83 made too many concessions and Belgrade percent needed to form an exclusively LVV too few.”78 cabinet, they will put Kurti and Osmani in strong positions.72 The duo’s pre-February Despite differences among Kosovo’s political election pact was that Kurti will become parties, most Kosovars want a comprehensive prime minister once again while Osmani agreement with Serbia, with recognition of will be the country’s next president. Kosovo’s sovereignty the ultimate goal.79 Kosovo’s Assembly elects the president, who Where Kosovars sometimes differ is the has the prerogative to appoint the candidate issue of territorial integrity. Some Kosovars, for prime minister following consultation especially LVV’s leaders, are determined that with the majority party or coalition in the territorial integrity of Kosovo should be the Assembly.73 Despite being barred from upheld,80 while others are open to some running for parliament during the February form of “border correction” that would 2021 election, Kurti will most likely reclaim help Kosovo attain its main goal.81 Given the the position of prime minister. His exclusion outcome of the 2021 parliamentary election, from government could cause political the camp opposing land swaps and an ASM instability. with strong executive powers will have the upper hand. LVV’s February 2021 electoral victory represents a major shift in the political Kosovo’s minister of justice, Selim Selimi, landscape in Kosovo. PDK and LDK’s says many Kosovars also want to see some poor performance demonstrates that the form of transitional justice for heinous

11 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

12 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

crimes committed during the Kosovo war.82 Some stakeholders have even proposed A primary objective for Russia amnesty for war crimes and crimes against is to keep the region divided humanity in order to smooth relations between Serbia and Kosovo.83 However, it is to prevent the Balkans from unlikely that LVV will support an agreement if it provides blanket amnesty to Serbia. 84 integrating into the EU and

In sum, the fractured nature of Kosovo’s NATO, and from adopting political landscape has made reaching Western-style democracy. a comprehensive deal hard to achieve. Following the 2021 parliamentary election, 88 LVV will dominate Kosovo politics, adopting Western-style democracy. At the which could bring greater stability to the same time, Russia has strategic economic negotiations. Still, given LVV’s view that interests in the Western Balkans, especially Kosovo’s past negotiators already conceded in Serbia. Naftna Industrija Srbije, Serbia’s oil too much, it is unlikely that a deal and gas monopoly, is majority-owned by acceptable to Vučić — involving land swaps, Gazprom — the world’s largest publicly listed an ASM with formidable executive powers, natural gas company, and Russia’s largest or blanket amnesty — will be reached. company in terms of revenue. Recently, Russia also made significant progress in the Influencers construction of Gazprom’s TurkStream II pipeline, which will branch off of the newly The Serbia-Kosovo dynamics are strongly opened TurkStream gas line between Turkey shaped by Russia and, more recently, and Russia to bring gas to Bulgaria, Serbia, China. The U.S. and EU are also important and eventually Hungary, solidifying Russia’s influencers, but they have different goals energy hegemony in the CEE region.89 for the region from Russia and China and For Russia, “energy is everything,” said are better understood as mediators. The key Ivana Stradner of the American Enterprise question is, what are Russia and China’s Institute.90 Full integration of Serbia into goals and how will their pursuit of those the EU would strike a huge blow to Russia’s goals affect the Serbia-Kosovo normalization oil and gas monopolies in the region. process? Bugajski said President Vladimir “Putin is not Russia a chess player … his sport is judo. He throws his larger opponent to the ground” by using Hodges, the former U.S. Army commander “pressure points” such as , energy in Europe, called the Kremlin “the number kompromat dependency, funding strategic political one obstacle to ever getting any resolution” parties, cyberattacks and propaganda.91 In the to the Serbia-Kosovo dispute.85 According to Western Balkans, propaganda is particularly a Western diplomat, Russia is “vehemently important. According to Balkans expert opposed to Kosovo’s independence” and Dimitar Bechev, the Kremlin is less willing continues to threaten to use its veto to interfere militarily in the Western power in the UN Security Council to Balkans than in states that were part of the block recognition.86 Russia’s traditional Soviet Union.92 In other words, Russia may relationship with Serbia runs “deep” and it not go to war to keep Serbia out of Western is “unmatched” compared with any other institutions as it did in Ukraine, but it will state.87 rely on alternative means to achieve its goal. A primary objective for Russia is to keep the That said, Russia plays a “disruptive” role in region divided to prevent the Balkans from the Western Balkans, which increases the integrating into the EU and NATO, and from importance of disinformation.93 It is often

13 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Common Sputnik Srbija Narratives

Atlantic Council of Montenegro, Russia’s Narratives Towards the Western Balkans: Analysis of Sputnik Srbija, NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, 2020, https://stratcomcoe.org/russias-narra- tives-toward-western-balkans-analysis-sputnik-srbija said that “the Balkans produce more history Russia is married to the UN Security Council’s than they can consume.”94 Russia knows Resolution 1244, which authorizes the UN how to manipulate history to maintain to facilitate a political process to determine divisions among Balkan identity groups. Kosovo’s future. Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Sputnik Srbija and other propaganda outlets foreign minister, recently said Russia would in Serbia tend to promote a wide assortment accept only a deal that has been approved by of narratives, ranging from “the EU is Serbia and the Security Council.98 As for the hegemonic” to “NATO is not beneficial.”95 EU, even if Russia allows Serbia to enter the supranational structure, some observers are Importantly, Russia’s presence in the Balkans concerned that it may become the Kremlin’s is a two-way street: The Kremlin wants to “Trojan horse.”99 play a disruptive role, but there are also actors in the Balkans demanding an active Russian China presence. In 2019, the culture ministries of Like Russia, China continues to side with Russia and Serbia released an action-packed, Serbia, and it has the power to block Hollywood-style film called Balkanska međa Kosovo’s recognition by the UN Security (Balkan Line).96 The film fictionalizes events Council. Furthermore, Serbia is one of at the close of the Kosovar war. Serbs are the only countries in central and eastern portrayed as the victims, Kosovars as savage Europe (CEE) that defends China on highly perpetrators supported by NATO aggressors, controversial political matters, especially while the Russians come in on the side of human rights.100 Support for each other is Serbs as their saviors. Although Balkanska a case of mutual back-scratching. China’s presents the events as true, the film is međa refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence packed with colorful disinformation.97 is not merely in solidarity with its Serbian These narratives help to keep alive and ally, but also because it does not want to open forge anti-Western animosities in the region up discussion about secession of Taiwan and 101 and undermine the EU and U.S.’s image as Hong Kong. credible mediators. Even when Russia’s China is rapidly becoming a prominent propaganda does not attack the dialogue, player in the Balkans. The growing Chinese it makes it hard to find a solution to the economy is roughly six times larger than Serbia-Kosovo dispute, especially one where the stagnating Russian one.102 Serbia is the U.S. or EU are expected to play the role probably the most pro-China country in the of honest brokers. Western Balkans, and from 2017 to 2019, it

14 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

was the largest beneficiary of loans under has no qualms with it. More importantly, the Belt and Road Initiative, with borrowing China will not call out Vučić’s increasingly amounting to €5.5 billion.103 Those loans autocratic regime. In turn, Serbia supports come with conditionalities and provide the the One China Principle, which goes further creditor great leverage over the debtor.104 than the One China Policy as it considers Taiwan an inalienable part of China.112 Serbia is among China’s top four trade Serbia is also willing to defend the Chinese partners in CEE. Chinese imports into regime’s genocide against Uighurs.113 China’s Serbia have increased by 94 percent since relationship with Serbia is bound to have 2012 and the country’s trade deficit with serious political consequences, especially 105 China tops $2 billion. At the same time, for democracy, media freedom and other Serbia has gone from being a small recipient liberties.114 In Serbia, China helped to of Chinese foreign direct investment to the institute Huawei’s surveillance system of 106 second largest in the Balkans. Chinese FDI facial and license plate recognition and has 107 could soon surpass that of Russia. held joint counterterrorism exercises with Serbian police.115 The Serbian government is by far the biggest promoter of China in the Balkans. Some observers express concern that deeper In the midst of the covid-19 crisis, China cooperation of a dubious nature with China actively engaged in “mask diplomacy,” could, in the medium to long term, threaten sending medical supplies to some European Serbia’s prospects for EU integration.116 108 countries, including Serbia. In March Serbia’s increasing economic cooperation 2020, Vučić stood in front of the world’s with China may also eventually make EU cameras and claimed that China is “the membership less important. While China’s only one who can help Serbia” and that economic relationship with Serbia is less 109 “European solidarity” is “just a fairy tale.” significant dollar-for-dollar than the Serbia- Chinese flags and symbols were rolled out EU relationship, Vučić is also expanding all over Belgrade and other cities, even on the country’s relationship with Russia, the government buildings, and a video of Vučić United Arab Emirates and others, and he kissing the Chinese flag was reportedly is pushing for greater integration of the 110 viewed by more than 1.1 billion people. It Western Balkans and the Eurasian Economic reinforced the perception that the Chinese Union. The overall effect is that actual EU government is a much stronger and a more membership becomes less important to responsible partner than the EU, even Serbia and therefore less of an incentive for though the EU provides significantly more progress in the dialogue with Kosovo.117 aid to Serbia than any other partner (see figure below). Similarly, in January 2021, Mediators Vučić extolled China’s role in “saving” Serbia by providing covid-19 vaccinations To a degree, the outcome of the conflict to his nation while blaming the EU for the resolution process can be determined by slow rollout of the COVAX program. That the mediators, who can facilitate agreement is a misrepresentation of the reality, as by providing “ripening agents,” such as COVAX is managed by Gavi, the Coalition development aid, political support, security for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and assurances, military assistance, instituting the World Health Organization.111 or lifting sanctions, and trade incentives.118 The two top mediators in the Serbia-Kosovo Part of the Chinese attraction can be dispute are the EU and U.S. explained by the fact that China plays by different rules than the U.S. and EU. EU: the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue While the EU, for example, has certain Henry Kissinger is frequently but wrongly environmental standards when investing credited for asking, “Who do I call if I want in some high-carbon industries, China

15 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

to speak to Europe?”119 It is nonetheless an appropriate question, highlighting cleavages among EU countries that are particularly pronounced in the Serbia- Kosovo dialogue. While most EU members on technical issues would have a positive recognize Kosovo’s independence, there are spillover effect into more political matters. five non-recognizing states that fall into Although the EU had initial success in two categories: “hard” non-recognition producing 33 agreements between Serbia states — Spain and Cyprus — and “soft” and Kosovo, many agreements were never non-recognition states — Greece, Romania implemented. and Slovakia.120 Consequently, the EU talks about the “Belgrade-Pristina” rather From November 2018 until recently, the than the “Serbia-Kosovo” dialogue, and it EU dialogue was particularly deadlocked. cannot fully leverage its economic power to Lajčák has injected new energy into the facilitate the process. effort since his appointment in April 2020. In the midst of the covid-19 crisis, France The EU high representative for foreign and Germany hosted a virtual summit on affairs and security policy, Josep Borrell, July 10 between Vučić and Hoti, while the and the EU special representative for the EU facilitated face-to-face discussions on Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, Miroslav Lajčák, July 16 between the two leaders. Those are from non-recognizing states, Spain and meetings marked the first EU-led dialogues Slovakia, respectively. As a result, some in 18 months. Since then, Lajčák has Kosovars doubt that the EU can mediate an conducted regular engagements between end to the dispute.121 the Serbian and Kosovar leaders. He is The Brussels dialogue initially kicked off in pursuing a “comprehensive agreement” 2011 by focusing on technical issues, such as and “expects the sides to implement all telecommunications, regional cooperation agreements reached in the past.”123 As for and freedom of movement, before the EU unresolved issues, those are expected to be escalated the talks to a political level.122 The “resolved in parallel in the negotiations for hope was that agreement and implementation a comprehensive agreement.”124

16 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Albin Kurti (left), leader of Vetevendosje (Self-determination) party, attends a final campaign rally in Pristina, Ko- sovo February 12, 2021. Credit: REUTERS/Florion Goga.

Some Balkan observers argue that one of the percent of Serbia’s exports head to the EU greatest carrots in the mediation process market. Between 2009 and 2018, the value is eventual EU membership,125 which the of Serbia’s exports to the EU more than bloc has conditioned upon normalization tripled, from €3.2 billion to €10.9 billion. of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.126 Furthermore, FDI from the EU amounted Normalization, however, does not explicitly to €13 billion from 2010 to 2018, or 70 entail “recognition” of Kosovo by Serbia.127 percent of Serbia’s total FDI.132 Overall, Furthermore, although some member the economic relationship between Serbia states, notably Germany, have spoken out and the EU is much more significant than against land swaps, Borrell said in May 2020, Serbia’s relationship with China.133 “I see no need for us to be more Catholic than the Pope.”128 In other words, it is not Serbia further benefits from the EU’s up to the EU to tell Serbs and Kosovars Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance what they should agree on or not. Lajčák (IPA), which includes aid for transition has nonetheless called a territorial exchange and institution building, cross-border “extremely dangerous.”129 cooperation, regional development, human resources and rural development.134 The importance of the EU in the Serbia- IPA II assistance from 2014 to 2020 Kosovo dialogue lies in geography and amounted to €1.54 billion for programs for potential economic leverage. That is, “Serbia competitiveness and growth; environment, [and Kosovo are] in Europe,” not in the U.S., climate change and energy; transport; and as Stefan Vladisavljev has pointed out.130 agriculture and rural development.135 In fact, the EU remains Serbia’s largest investor and trading partner.131 Nearly 70 EU membership is also a high priority for Kosovo, according to Ambassador Mimoza

17 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Ahmetaj, head of the Kosovo mission to the On the Serbia-Kosovo dispute, Grenell’s Council of Europe and a former minister of appointment signaled a shift from the U.S. EU integration. However, Kosovo is behind State Department toward the White House, Serbia in the line for accession, given and observers questioned whether Grenell that the Serbian government initiated the aligned his efforts with Matthew Palmer, Stabilization and Association Agreement a career diplomat and the special envoy with the EU around the same time Pristina for the Western Balkans. The shift may declared independence.136 The EU and the have been precipitated by Trump’s general U.K. are Kosovo’s largest export markets, distrust of the State Department, but it absorbing 49.4 percent of its exports, probably also occurred because Grenell and the largest import markets, sending brought his own agenda to the table. The 53.4 percent of imports.137 The EU’s IPA II Serbia-Kosovo dialogue was allegedly a way assistance to Kosovo from 2014 to 2020 was for Trump to get a quick and easy foreign- €602.1 million.138 Still, Kosovo remains the policy win in advance of the 2020 U.S. only state in the Western Balkans that does presidential election.146 According to former not have an agreement on visa liberalization senior State Department official Nicholas with the EU, even though it has met all the Burns, this was a departure from past U.S. requirements since mid-2018. administrations’ bipartisan approach to foreign policy, especially on Balkan issues.147 In theory at least, the EU also gains in importance considering that the path Since the turn of the century, U.S. foreign toward EU membership should help to policy goals for the Balkans have been facilitate Serbia and Kosovo’s move toward fairly consistent: EU and NATO accession democracy.139 The closer Serbia moves and regional integration. Burns said those toward EU integration, the more political goals were largely derived from George H. the requirements become, dealing with W. Bush’s formulation in 1989 of “Europe issues such as the rule of law, media freedom whole and free.”148 Interlinked to Bush’s and freedom of expression.140 idea, Daniel Serwer argues that U.S. foreign policy goals for Serbia and Kosovo rested on In October 2019, France vetoed opening EU three pillars:149 membership accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. Since then, • Protection of Kosovo’s population and the EU has shied away from words such sympathy for Kosovo’s independence as “enlargement” and “accession.”141 As a aspirations as well as a commitment to result, Western Balkan officials and others Bosnian sovereignty. worry that the prospect of EU membership is no longer realistic enough to get Serbia to • Support for liberal democracy commit to a comprehensive agreement.142 143 throughout the Balkans. US: the Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue • A commitment to act in tandem with the Europeans, especially with Germany Serbia is often called the most anti-American and the U.K. state in the Balkans, while Kosovo is called the most pro-American state, not only in • During the last year of his presidency, the Balkans, but perhaps in the world.144 Trump ventured away from the three That changed a bit under Trump. While the foreign policy pillars. U.S. was still popular in Kosovo, it would probably be more accurate to say that the First, although Trump initially highlighted 150 U.S. briefly become less hated in Serbia. the need for “mutual recognition,” his Vučić in particular was a fan of Trump’s and administration went weak-kneed on the his special presidential envoy for the Serbia- goal of promoting Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo talks, Richard Grenell.145 undermining Kosovo’s sovereignty and

18 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

aspirations by entertaining the idea of “land swaps.”151

Second, the Trump administration undercut stability and liberal democracy in the Balkans by freezing $50 million in economic aid for Kosovo and threatening to withdraw U.S. troops from Kosovo if Kurti’s government did not lift tariffs against Serbia, which had been levied following the Serbian government’s escalation of its de-recognition campaign.152 The Trump administration’s threats caused great concern in Kosovo and ultimately led to Kurti’s ouster. Kosovars depend heavily on the U.S. and the NATO-led peacekeeping force, Kosovo Force (KFOR), for security. As Ben Hodges notes, both Serbs and Kosovars will tell you in private, “Please don’t pull KFOR because it is the only anchor of stability in the region.”153

The Trump administration’s approach of putting pressure on Kosovo did not fit the reality of the situation. Serbia and Kosovo are “not at war” with each other, so there normalization is not solely about whether was “no need to rush” the process at that Kosovo can export its goods to Serbia particular moment, said Kreshnik Ahmeti, without barriers to trade, but also about if the LVV official.154 labels reading ‘made in Republic of Kosovo’ Third, Grenell’s approach assumed a division will be on the packages,” said Austin of labor between the U.S. and EU, with Doehler, a visiting scholar at the Penn Biden the U.S. responsible for solving economic Center.157 Besides, Grenell made no effort to issues and the EU in charge of political coordinate the U.S. and EU dialogues.158 normalization. The Washington agreement brokered in Burns said Grenell’s approach to separate September 2020 by the White House seemed U.S. and EU efforts was deeply flawed. “Most aimed at scoring points ahead of the U.S. Americans of both parties who have been election rather fulfilling long-standing U.S. involved with the Balkans in the past 20 to foreign policy goals.159 It was also the epitome 30 years understand that diplomacy works of Grenell’s flawed approach. In Kosovo, best when the U.S. and EU member states some referred to the agreement as “çorbë,” work together, when we are integrating our which translates to “mishmash.”160 A list of policies,” he said.155 commitments rather than an international agreement, it did not deal with many The irony of Grenell’s economic economic issues, as Grenell had promised, normalization approach is that U.S. strength and because of lack of coordination, the EU in the Balkans lies not so much in economic expressed concern that certain aspects of it weight. For example, the U.S. is not among could undermine Serbia and Kosovo’s future Serbia’s top five import or export partners.156 EU membership.161 Not to mention that political issues and economic issues are intertwined in the Relations among the U.S., Serbia and Kosovo Serbia-Kosovo context. “The issue of trade may change in the coming months. Before

19 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

the U.S. election, Vučić explicitly stated that Context Trump’s re-election would be better for U.S.- Serbia relations.162 Trump was perceived It is difficult to identify contextual issues as an outsider, given that he was not in and to see, in the moment, if they will help government when Biden advocated for or hinder resolution of the conflict.168 Yet NATO bombing of Serb targets in the 1990s two issues will be explored in relation to in order to stop Milošević’s atrocities and the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue: the lack of a genocide. At the time, Vučić supported the “hurting stalemate” and the covid-19 crisis. idea of Greater Serbia, and in 1999 as minister of information, he dubbed NATO’s actions The Stockholm International Peace “criminal” and characterized the military Research Institute uses the term “dispute” alliance as a “Neo-Nazi” organization.163 rather than “conflict” for situations, like Kosovo’s and Serbia’s, that claim fewer Nor was Trump in government, unlike than 1,000 casualties per year.169 This is an Biden, when the U.S. recognized Kosovo’s important point. While it does not follow independence. As vice president, Biden that the Serbia-Kosovo dispute should visited Serbia and encouraged Vučić to remain unresolved — disputes can escalate normalize relations with Kosovo. Biden’s into conflicts, and Balkan conflict situations long-term engagement with the Balkans tend to spill over — there is no “hurting explains why Vučić was unenthusiastic about stalemate,” in which the costs of continuing the prospect of a Biden administration prior the dispute exceed the benefits of ending to the election, stating that Biden’s actions it.170 The absence of a costly, violent conflict “did not bring much luck to Serbia in the means that neither Serbia nor Kosovo has past.”164 Vučić nonetheless congratulated a sense of urgency to immediately end the Biden following his win and expressed a dispute. wish for greater cooperation with the U.S., leaving some room for strengthening U.S.- Given the mammoth global consequences of Serbia relations.165 covid-19, this research paper also considered the possible effects of the pandemic on the In Kosovo, Biden enjoys liberation credentials negotiations. As the pandemic is fluid, a lot and he is deeply popular. His relationship can still happen in the coming months, but with the region is also personal. Biden’s late we can make some initial observations. son, Beau, even served the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) In Serbia, the covid-19 crisis largely in Kosovo to develop the country’s judicial strengthened Vučić’s hand. In the first few system. After Beau passed away, Kosovo months, he exploited it to monopolize the named a 21-mile stretch of highway after media and then eased covid-19 restrictions him. Expectations will be high that Biden briefly to facilitate elections while the iron will continue to help Kosovo’s struggle to was hot. Then Serbia experienced mass protests, some of which were related to attain security and to gain international 171 recognition. Vučić’s covid-19 measures. In a dramatic turn of events, by the beginning of February Prior to the election, Kurti urged Albanians 2021, Serbia, with strong support from in the U.S. (from both Kosovo and Albania) China, boasted that it had the second-fasted to vote for Biden.166 Following the U.S. vaccine rollout in Europe.172 election, Osmani and several other Kosovo politicians also expressed optimism about Given LVV’s strong support during the the Biden administration, which will have a February 2021 election, expectations are lot of clout in bringing Kosovars, including high that Kurti should effectively deal with Kurti, back to the negotiation table.167 the pandemic and accompanying challenges. Over the past few months, covid-19 cases have started to surge in Kosovo, which could

20 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

have major implications for health care, the goals should they reject a comprehensive economy and political stability.173 Although agreement? covid-19 did not directly lead to the collapse of Kurti’s 2020 government, it was used as For Serbia, Vučić’s public positions are that an excuse to unseat him in Kosovo.174 he wants to normalize relations with Kosovo and to get Serbia into the EU. However Some observers noted that the covid-19 crisis sincere he is or is not about ending the forced Western Balkan countries, including dispute, just by engaging in the dialogues Serbia and Kosovo, to cooperate with one Vučić has softened his image among another. The two countries were even praised international players while extracting major for sending medical aid and health workers benefits from the EU and, to a smaller back and forth and for coordinating border extent, from the U.S. inspections.175 But a closer look shows that cooperation was largely along ethnic lines. Goals are even more important than Serbia sent aid to northern Kosovo to areas public positions. When asked what inhabited by Kosovo Serbs, while Kosovo Vučić essentially wants to achieve, many sent aid to non-Serb areas in Serbia. There interviewees answered that he sees himself was no reciprocity across ethnic lines, as a historic figure. He wants to deliver which hindered the trust-building needed economic prosperity for Serbia and to stay to facilitate an agreement. In a provocative in power. To do that, Vučić does not need a move, Vučić even sent vaccines to Serb- comprehensive agreement that would lead majority municipalities in Kosovo.176 to recognition of Kosovo, even if it means his country will not be joining the EU. Overall, covid-19 stings, but so far it has not Rather, the EU is merely a means to an end. hit hard enough to force the adversaries to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that Visar Xhambazi counts Serbia among the 181 would lead to full normalization of relations. Balkans’ “stabilitocracies,” defined as Serbia’s economy shrunk by approximately 3 “governments that claim to secure stability, percent in 2020, and by mid-February 2021, pretend to espouse EU integration and rely the country had had nearly 4,500 covid-19 on informal, clientelist structures, control deaths.177 By comparison, Kosovo’s economy of the media, and the regular production declined by 8.8 percent in 2020 and, with of crises to undermine democracy and the 182 a population about one-quarter that of rule of law.” Politically, it does not make Serbia’s, it experienced about 1,500 deaths sense for Serbia to become a full-fledged by mid-February 2021.178 Kosovo’s economic EU member, because the closer the country hardships may be offset by remittances comes to entering the supranational from the diaspora. structure, the harder some member states will push Belgrade to get serious about accountability, democracy and the rule Serbia and Kosovo’s Strategies of law. And the EU’s bad experience with to Achieve Their Goals Hungary and Poland has taught it a lesson. The two adversaries can choose from a “The EU won’t let Serbia join the body variety of strategies, from war to bilateral without solving those political issues,” one 183 negotiations, to achieve their goals. At this European ambassador said. point, neither is likely to revert to war, but In this context, Vladisavljev said, “Serbia it is not impossible for a frozen conflict is satisfied with the current status.”184 to reignite at some point.179 That said, One Western diplomat similarly said what would be Serbia’s and Kosovo’s “best it is questionable whether Vučić truly alternative to a negotiated agreement” (or wants Serbia to become an EU member.185 BATNA)?180 Put differently, what alternatives Serbia has already reaped a range of pre- do the adversaries have to achieve their accession benefits, from greater investment

21 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

justice also remains a key goal, not merely Kosovo will continue to bank a position.

largely on the mediation In stark contrast to Serbia, Kosovo has a weak processes to promote BATNA. In the absence of a comprehensive agreement, there are only a few options international recognition available to Kosovo’s government to partially of its sovereignty. satisfy its goals. Kosovo will continue to bank largely confidence to better access to EU markets. on the mediation processes to promote What would be rational for Serbia as a international recognition of its sovereignty. whole (that is, EU integration), may not be “There is no alternative to the EU dialogue,” rational for Serbian elites, who would like said Selim Selimi, Kosovo’s minister of 189 to remain free of strict EU regulations on justice. He also expressed a strong desire environmental issues, transparency and to have the U.S. at the negotiation table. tendering. Being associated with the EU Although LVV’s leaders had misgivings without actual membership allows Serbian about the role of the Trump administration elites to continue to benefit from Chinese, in the mediation process between Serbia Russian and other investment with little or and Kosovo, their tone following Biden’s no regard to those concerns.186 To be clear, win suggests that they would also like the EU membership and economic cooperation U.S. to play a more constructive and active with Russia and China are not mutually role in the dialogue. exclusive (except where sanctions against If a deal cannot be reached through Russia come into play), but joining the EU mediation, Kosovo could again revert to will make it harder for Vučić and his cronies imposing tariffs on Serbia, especially if to engage in dubious business practices. Serbia restarts its de-recognition campaign. Vučić would suffer politically if he did not Kosovo will also again seek recognition say the EU is still a priority for Serbia, even as from individual states, as it has been doing he starts to publicly question the merits and since 2008 until the Washington agreement credibility of the EU while exaggerating the put a temporary stop to it. benefits that Serbia accrues from China and Furthermore, Kosovo will continue to beef 187 Russia. Vučić is also promoting a common up its security sector, building a military market in the Western Balkans, which could that can make it less vulnerable to a Serbian 188 increase the region’s GDP by 6.7 percent. takeover. In December 2018, Kosovo started The combined effect is a stronger BATNA the transformation of the Kosovo Security for Serbia as full EU membership comes to Force (KSF) from a lightly armed security seem less necessary. Once EU integration and civil defense force into a professional is no longer the main carrot that drives army. Serbia strongly opposes the KSF’s the normalization process, recognition of transformation. The KSF expects to build Kosovo also becomes less important. a standing army of 5,000 troops and 3,000 As mentioned earlier, Kosovo’s position is reserves over the next decade. Still, Serbia’s that it wants a comprehensive agreement military budget (€590 million) is more than 190 with Serbia only if it entails recognition. 10 times that of Kosovo’s (€53 million). Unlike Serbia, its public position is As for transitional justice, under current indistinguishable from its real goal: It conditions, it will remain limited. Kosovo wants sovereignty — in a manner that it will merely be able to continue its own is recognized by the UN and EU — and work on the issue.191 A transitional justice security. For most parties, transitional approach without Serbia’s participation is

22 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

unlikely to facilitate normalization of the • The main influencers, Russia and China, two entities. are both undermining the normalization process. Russia is set on protecting its energy interests in Serbia and on Key Findings keeping the Western Balkans out of After assessing issues, players, the context of the EU and NATO. It therefore actively the Serbia-Kosovo dispute and the strategies promotes anti-EU, anti-US and anti- of the adversaries, the main finding of this Kosovo propaganda that undermines a research paper is that the dispute is not ripe possible deal. for resolution for the following reasons: China is not necessarily intentionally • The two most fundamental issues in undermining the normalization process, but dispute — sovereignty and security — the relationship that it is developing with are hard to resolve. More importantly, the Serbian government could compromise the adversaries are not ready to end Serbia’s ability to integrate into the EU, the dispute, at least not under current which in turn makes EU integration a less conditions and in a manner that powerful incentive for normalizing relations will soon produce a comprehensive with Kosovo. agreement. Divisions within the EU mean that the • Even though Vučić has the political dialogue lacks a clear, explicit goal — power to make a deal with Kosovo, sovereignty for Kosovo — which weakens he and the Serbian public are dead set the process. against recognition of Kosovo. He is also not preparing his public to make major Grenell’s insistence on splitting the dialogues concessions as part of the negotiation into one led by the U.S. on economic matters process. and another led by the EU on political issues undermined the chances of reaching • Kosovars agree that the basis of a comprehensive agreement. A package deal normalization should be recognition, jointly coordinated with the EU stands a but it is unlikely that an LVV-led much greater chance of succeeding than government will agree to territorial Grenell’s fractionating approach.193 exchanges, blanket amnesty or an Association of Serb Municipalities with In terms of contextual factors, there is strong executive powers. currently no “hurting stalemate.” Although covid-19 could worsen the economies in • EU integration, long an important Serbia and Kosovo, it has not yet produced incentive for normalization, is starting enough pain to prod the parties to negotiate to lose its luster for Serbian elites. Vučić a comprehensive agreement. wants to have a courtship with the EU and all of the benefits that come with As for strategy, Serbia has a strong BATNA it, but he is unwilling to put a ring on while Kosovo has a weak one, which means her finger. Given the outcome of the Kosovo needs the dialogue more than Serbia. 2020 parliamentary election in Serbia, Further EU integration (without actual Vučić’s true goals will increasingly membership) for Serbia, together with crystalize. “Vučić cannot hide behind the strengthening of relations with China, the parliament anymore — the next few Russia and the benefits that will come with months will show who he is” as he now a common market in the Western Balkans, has the power to do almost whatever he all bolsters Vučić’s hand even further. wants, one European ambassador said.192

23 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Finally, the mediators need to recognize Policy that a comprehensive agreement between Recommendations Serbia and Kosovo may not be forthcoming During the last year of the Trump in the short to medium term, which means administration, the U.S. did more harm the U.S. should return to playing the long than good in the Serbia-Kosovo dispute. The game in the Balkans. That would require Trump administration disproportionately maintaining the special envoy for the focused on securing a short-term political Western Balkans position created during victory at the expense of finding a the Trump administration and, more comprehensive solution to the Serbia- importantly, once again taking a bipartisan Kosovo dialogue. It risked not only undoing approach that would mark a return to the U.S. leadership and success in the Balkans, three main pillars of U.S. foreign policy but also stifling the relationship between the on the Serbia-Kosovo dispute: protecting U.S. and the EU. The Biden administration Kosovo’s independence, supporting liberal has an opportunity to do things right from democracy in the Balkans and acting in the start. tandem with the EU and U.K. There is no need to rush the Serbia- Protecting Kosovo’s Kosovo dialogue, as the situation is not at a critical point. Rather, the mediation independence process should first be decelerated to allow The U.S. must make preservation of Kosovo’s for mainstreaming U.S.-EU coordination as sovereignty the top goal. The Trump well as to help prepare the parties, especially administration’s threats to pull troops from Kosovo, for upcoming negotiations. Kosovo unless it dropped tariffs, rather than punishing Serbia for its de-recognition For negotiation purposes, Serbia is stable campaign, was misplaced. It appeased the and “monolithic” while Kosovo, because of perpetrator rather than helping the victim, major political changes, has been unstable even though preservation of Kosovo’s 194 and “heterogenous.” The February 2021 territorial integrity has been a bipartisan election results may bring more stability issue for successive U.S. administrations. The to Kosovo, but LVV may still need support problem with appeasement is, to paraphrase from other parties to forge consensus on an negotiations expert William Ury, if you keep agreement. And the LVV-led government on throwing steaks to a tiger, the tiger will will be preoccupied with its domestic agenda not become a vegetarian.”195 before it can give any energy to the dialogue. The U.S. should advocate for slowing down The protection of Kosovo’s independence the current pace of the mediation process so also entails preservation of the country’s that the incoming Kosovo government can existing territorial integrity. The U.S. needs get its house in order and form a one-team not only to continue to disavow the idea approach — an internal agreement on a basic of a land swap, but also to clarify that the framework among Kosovo’s leading parties idea is, as Balkans expert Gorana Grgić put before they go back to the negotiation table. it, “dangerous” and “disconnected from the historical and regional contexts.”196 The U.S. and EU should invest more in Territorial exchanges along ethnic lines will fighting disinformation in the Balkans and have regional implications and “Bosnia is should call out Vučić for allowing narratives put second in line on the chopping block … against Kosovo, the U.S., EU and NATO to it is a recipe for another war,” said Muhamed fester. Demonization makes agreement and Sacirbey, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s foreign implementation exceptionally difficult, and minister during the Bosnian war and a it should be replaced by positive, trust- chief negotiator during the Dayton peace building messaging. process.197

24 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Ethnic Albanian children wave U.S. and Kosovo flags as they welcome U.S. Vice President Joe Biden in Pristina Airport May 21, 2009. Biden received a tumultuous welcome upon his arrival to Kosovo on Thursday just hours after leaving Serbia where thousands of police kept streets empty to avoid protests. Credit: REUTERS/Hazir Reka.

The idea of territorial exchanges breathes life Another study puts that figure at closer to into Milošević’s idea of a Greater Serbia, and half a billion euros annually.200 Kosovo’s an ethnically homogenous state is anathema government budget in 2019 was €2.37 to the EU’s and even NATO’s diversity. EU billion.201 Removing the €300 million to integration comes as a package — member €500 million burden from Serbia’s budget states sign up to a set of economic and may be the “win” that Vučić is looking for. political practices.198 If integration — into the EU, NATO or both — is a strategic goal Supporting liberal democracy for Serbia and Kosovo, they should not be in the Balkans discussing land swaps. Rather, they should focus on promoting and protecting minority Vučić’s move toward authoritarianism is rights. concerning, and he should not be rewarded by the U.S. and EU for bad behavior. In Support for minorities will involve more warning Serbian officials against trying to than developing and protecting political align their country with often-conflicting rights. It may also involve a large economic Western and Russian interests, a top U.S. commitment, at least initially, from the diplomat quoted an old Serbian proverb back U.S. and EU. According to a Kosovo Serb to them during a 2017 visit: “You cannot sit activist, Serbia provides over €300 million on two chairs at the same time.”202 in salaries, pensions and a wide range of social programs for Kosovo Serbs each year With China’s fast-growing influence, Serbia — money that Kosovo does not have.199 is starting to sit on three chairs rather than

25 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

two. The Biden administration should call The U.S., U.K. and EU member states that it out. This year marks 140 years since recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty should the establishment of diplomatic relations encourage non-recognizing EU countries, between Serbia and the U.S. There is room to starting with “soft” ones (Greece, Slovakia grow those relations, but those discussions and Romania), to follow suit. Recognition should coincide with greater support for of Kosovo by more, or even better, all EU programs promoting liberal democracy, member states, could help to add pressure media freedom, human rights and good on Serbia to move the process forward.208 governance. One role of a mediator should be to provide political cover to the parties, which is The new U.S. administration should also what a transatlantic alliance can do. More back liberal democracy in Kosovo rather importantly, recognition of Kosovo by all EU than undermining it, as its predecessor countries would help to facilitate the greater did. Like Serbia, Kosovo still needs serious cohesion needed to support a transatlantic 203 support with its democratization project. dialogue. Mediation with clear goals stands a much greater chance of succeeding in the Acting in tandem with the EU long run. “There is need for clearer goals and the U.K. about the dialogue,” said David L. Phillips, director of the program on peace-building Another lesson from ending the Yugoslav and humanrights at Columbia University. wars in the 1990s is that the U.S. needs allies “We haven’t defined what normalization in order to end the Serbia-Kosovo dispute, means,” he said. “Normalization should mean especially as the U.S. does not have nearly sovereignty for Kosovo and recognition of as much economic clout as the EU in the its independence by Serbia within Kosovo’s 204 Balkan region. current borders.”209

Given the historic baggage with Kosovo, Mediators should consider the current Vučić will only accept an agreement that can inequities in their dealings with Kosovo and 205 be presented to Serbia as a “win.” The U.S. Serbia. Kosovo needs much greater support alone, especially the way Grenell operated, to be prepared for EU and NATO integration, cannot offer an acceptable package deal that which would more adequately guarantee would lend itself to “logrolling,” whereby Kosovo’s sovereignty and security, the two losses in one area can be offset by gains in fundamental issues of the Serbia-Kosovo 206 others. U.S. and EU ripening agents will dispute. As mentioned earlier, Kosovo still work only if they are collectively employed reaps fewer benefits from the EU than and geared toward the same goal. Serbia does. Furthermore, Serbia joined The prospect of stronger EU economic NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 2006 cooperation remains attractive to both and has developed a growing relationship Kosovo and Serbia (even though Vučić may with the alliance, even though it is closely allied to Russia and does not aspire to be ambivalent about actual EU membership). 210 At the same time, the EU is less able to become a NATO member. Importantly, Kosovo’s participation in NATO’s PfP should dangle membership as a carrot due to a 211 perception that it is not serious about further be a priority. The December 31, 2020, enlargement.207 But even if EU membership invitation by the Iowa National Guard to is not a reality, the road toward EU the Kosovo Security Force to partner on integration is still valuable and the benefits international peacekeeping missions is a of it should not be underestimated. The key good start to fostering stronger U.S.-Kosovo would be to channel the EU’s leverage into cooperation. transformative power to facilitate liberal democracy in the Western Balkans.

26 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

Endnotes 1 Amy MacKinnon and Robbie Gramer, Vucic: Most Serbs Prefer a ‘Frozen Conflict’ with Kosovo. Foreign Policy Magazine. 4 March 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/04/serbian-president-aleksandar-vucic-interview- frozen-conflict-kosovo/ 2 Janusz Bugajski, CEPA lecture on Challenges to Security, Democracy, and Development, 12 May 2020.

3 Gorana Grgić, Interview with author, 14 May 2020. 4 Various interviews with U.S. diplomats and European officials. 5 Zartman, ‘Ripeness’: the importance of timing in negotiation and conflict resolution, 20 December 2008, https://www.e-ir.info/2008/12/20/ripeness-the-importance-of-timing-in-negotiation-and-conflict-resolution/ 6 Ibid.

7 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), p.37. 8 David, L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention (Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012), p. 10. 9 John A Powell, the director of the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at the University of California, Berkeley, says “Othering … is based on the conscious or unconscious assumption that a certain identified group poses a threat to the favored group.” John A. Powell, Us vs them: the sinister techniques of ‘Othering’ – and how to avoid them, The Guardian, 8 November 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/nov/08/us- vs-them-the-sinister-techniques-of-othering-and-how-to-avoid-them

10 Ambassador Hajdin Abazi, Interview with author, 20 August 2020. 11 David, L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention (Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012), p. xv. 12 Mose Apelblat, Belgrade-Pristina dialogue resumed but normalisation still far away, The Brussels Times, 9 September 2020, https://www.brusselstimes.com/news/eu-affairs/130507/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-resumed- but-normalisation-still-far-away/ 13 Robbie Gramer, U.S. Plans to Jump Back Into the Balkans With New Envoy, Foreign Policy Magazine, 30 August, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/30/us-plans-to-jump-back-into-balkans-with-new-envoy-serbia-kosovo- dialogue-dispute-state-department-diplomacy-europe/ 14 On background discussion with high-level EU official. 28 October 2020.

15 Gorana Grgić, Interview with author, 14 May 2020. 16 David L. Phillips, Trump Betrays Kosova, Illyria, 4 May 2020, http://illyriapress.com/trump-betrays-kosova/ 17 Leon Hartwell, The Mediation Dilemma and the Utility of Mediation in Conflict Resolution: A Case Study Approach, (University of Leipzig: Leipzig, 2019), pp 46-86. 18 David, L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention (Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012).

19 Glauk Konjufca, Interview with author, 19 June 2020. 20 Kosovo Serb activist, Interview with author, 13 July 2020. 21 Flora Ferati-Sachsenmaier, Serbia is Depopulating Albanians in the Presevo Valley at Alarming Levels, Exit News, 10 May 2020, https://exit.al/en/2020/05/10/serbia-is-depopulating-albanians-in-the-presevo-valley-at- alarming-levels/

22 Shqiprim Arifi,Interview with author, 12 October 2020. 23 Selim Selimi, Kosovo’s Minister of Justice, Interview with author, 15 October 2020. 24 Teuta Kukleci, Interview with author, 17 February 2021. 25 Interview with Western diplomat. 30 May 2020.

26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.

27 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

28 Ibid. p37. 29 Barbara F. Walter, “Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars”. 2002, Princeton: Princeton University Press. p3.

30 David L. Phillips, Interview with author, 30 October 2020. 31 Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson and Pamela Aall, Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (U.S. Institute of Peace Press: Washington D.C., 1999), p.54. 32 Goals are different from positions in the sense that the latter are statements of what the parties want, while the former are the underlying reasons why the parties take those positions. While positions are often incompatible, it is sometimes easier to reconcile goals. See Roger Fisher and William Ury. 1991. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. 2nd Edition. Penguin Books: New York.p41. 33 Darko Brkan, Interview with author, 3 June 2020. 34 Marko Savković, Interview with author, 23 June 2020. 35 Igor Novaković, Interview with author, 16 July 2020. 36 N1, Naprednjaci stižu komuniste - svaki deveti građanin Srbije član SNS, 19 September 2020, https://rs.n1info. com/Vesti/a641445/Naprednjaci-stizu-komuniste-svaki-deveti-gradjanin-Srbije-clan-SNS.html 37 Aside from comparing him to Viktor Orbán, some also described Vučić as Nikola Gruevski (former prime minister of North Macedonia) and even “Putin light”.

38 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 39 Kosovo Serb activist, Interview with author, 13 July 2020. 40 Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2020, p.2, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/05062020_ FH_NIT2020_vfinal.pdf

41 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 42 Ben Hodges, Interview with author, 10 July 2020. 43 Sarah E. Garding, , Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, 5 May 2020, p8. Available https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46175.pdf

44 Marko Savković, Interview with author, 23 June 2020. 45 Igor Novaković, Interview with author, 16 July 2020. 46 High-level Kosovo official,Interview with author, 25 May 2020. 47 Marko Savković, Interview with author, 23 June 2020. 48 Ibid.

49 High-level Kosovo official,Interview with author, 25 May 2020. 50 Leon Hartwell, 2019 Conflict Resolution: Lessons from the Dayton Peace Process, Negotiation Journal, Vol.35(4):448.

51 Ben Hodges, Interview with author, 10 July 2020. 52 Leon Hartwell, What ‘Twiplomacy’ reveals about the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. 9 July 2020, New Eastern Europe, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/07/09/what-twiplomacy-reveals-about-the-serbia-kosovo-dialogue/ 53 European Western Balkans, Vučić: I notified Macron that Serbia accepts the new EU enlargement methodology, 10 July 2020, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/07/10/vucic-i-notified-macron-that-serbia-accepts-the- new-eu-enlargement-methodology/

54 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 55 Center for Social Dialogue and Regional Initiatives, 2019, Normalization of Relations Between Belgrade and Pristina From Citizens Perspective: What We Know and What We Feel. Belgrade, October. p.4. 56 Aleksandar Vasovic, Serbia ready to sacrifice EU membership over Kosovo deal, 18 June 2020,Reuters , https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-russia-kosovo/serbia-ready-to-sacrifice-eu-membership-over-kosovo-deal- idUSKBN23P2G0

28 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

57 Bodo Weber, Interview with author, 22 September 2020. 58 International Crisis Group, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue, p.14, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe- central-asia/balkans/kosovo/262-relaunching-kosovo-serbia-dialogue 59 Žarko Trebješanin in «Vladalac», politička biografija Aleksandra Vučića, prvi deo, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=qxR6hWb_uW8 60 Bodo Weber and Agron Bajrami, Collective Ethnic Protection as a Means of (Dis-) Integration: The Association/ Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities. A DPC-KFOS Policy Note Paper, December 2018.

61 Glauk Konjufca, Interview with author, 19 June 2020. 62 Teuta Kukleci, Interview with author, 16 July 2020. 63 Glauk Konjufca, Interview with author, 19 June 2020. 64 Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski and Victor Peskin, Trump Is Stirring Chaos in Kosovo at the Worst Possible Time, Foreign Policy Magazine, 16 April 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/16/kurti-thaci-kosovo-coronavirus- trump/

65 Kreshnik Ahmeti, Interview with author, 19 June 2020. 66 Ibid. 67 Leon Hartwell and Visar Xhambazi, Kosovo’s Disunited Negotiators can’t Compete With ‘Monolithic’ Serbia, Balkan Insight, 16 July 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/07/16/kosovos-disunited-negotiators-cant-compete- with-monolithic-serbia/ 68 Ibid. 69 Reuters, Kosovo’s highest court rules parliamentary vote electing government was illegal, 22 December 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-court-ruling-government-idUSKBN28V2SU 70 The Associated Press, Kosovo court bars ex-prime minister from running in election, 30 January 2021, https:// abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/kosovo-court-bars-prime-minister-running-election-75567051

71 Bledar Qalliu, Kosovo Acting President Also Asks for Suspension of Dialogue with Serbia, Exit News, 10 November 2020, https://exit.al/en/2020/11/10/kosovo-acting-president-also-asks-for-suspension-of-dialogue- with-serbia/ 72 Central Electoral Commission, Republic of Kosovo, 2021, Early Election for Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 17 February, https://rezultatet2021.org/en/parl/r 73 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 86, paragraph 5-14. Available http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/ repository/docs/Constitution1Kosovo.pdf 74 Visar Xhambazi, Interview with author, 17 February 2021. 75 Orlando Crowcroft, I would vote to unify Albania and Kosovo, election winner Albin Kurti tells Euronews, 16 February 2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/02/16/i-would-vote-to-unify-albania-and-kosovo-election- winner-albin-kurti-tells-euronews 76 Visar Xhambazi, Interview with author, 17 February 2021. 77 Sidita Kushi, Interview with author, 17 February 2021. 78 Teuta Kukleci, Interview with author, 17 February 2021.

79 Selim Selimi, Kosovo’s Minister of Justice, Interview with author, 15 October 2020. 80 Glauk Konjufca, Interview with author, 19 June 2020. 81 High-level Kosovo official,Interview with author, 25 May 2020. 82 Selim Selimi, Kosovo’s Minister of Justice, Interview with author, 15 October 2020. 83 Council for Inclusive Governance, Advancing Normalization Between Kosovo and Serbia, New York, 2017. P8- 11. Available http://www.cigonline.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Advancing-Normalization-Between-Kosovo- and-Serbia-1.pdf

84 Teuta Kukleci, Interview with author, 16 July 2020.

29 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

85 Ben Hodges, Interview with author, 10 July 2020. 86 Interview with Western diplomat. 30 May 2020.

87 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 88 Paul Stronski and Annie Himes, Russia’s Game in the Balkans, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 February 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/06/russia-s-game-in-balkans-pub-78235 89 Leon Hartwell. Snarky Facebook post sparks diplomatic incident between Russia and Serbia: What’s behind it? New Eastern Europe, 14 October 2020, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/10/14/snarky-facebook-post-sparks- diplomatic-incident-between-russia-and-serbia-whats-behind-it/

90 Ivana Stradner, Interview with author, 3 November 2020. 91 Janusz Bugajski. Discussion. 15 May 2020. 92 Dimitar Bechev, Discussion video: Russia’s footprint in the Western Balkan information environment, NATO Stratcom COE, 13 May 2020, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/discussion-video-russias-footprint-western-balkan- information-environment 93 Ibid.

94 David, L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention, Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012.p3. 95 Atlantic Council of Montenegro, Russia’s Narratives Towards the Western Balkans: Analysis of Sputnik Srbija, NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, 2020, https://stratcomcoe.org/russias-narratives-toward- western-balkans-analysis-sputnik-srbija 96 Interview with Western diplomat. 30 May 2020. 97 Polygraph Info, ‘The Balkan Line’ – Russian Disinformation on the Big Screen, 28 June 2020, https://www. polygraph.info/a/the-balkan-line-russian-disinformation-on-the-big-screen/30026068.html 98 Aleksandar Vasovic, Serbia ready to sacrifice EU membership over Kosovo deal, 18 June 2020, Reuters, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-russia-kosovo/serbia-ready-to-sacrifice-eu-membership-over-kosovo-deal- idUSKBN23P2G0

99 High-level Kosovo official,Interview with author, 25 May 2020. 100 China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE), Empty Sell No More: China’s Growing Footprint in Central and Eastern Europe, Policy Paper, 7 April 2020, p.33 https://chinaobservers.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2020/04/CHOICE_Empty-shell-no-more.pdf 101 Ibid. p.30 102 Austin Doehler, “From Opportunity to Threat: The Pernicious Effects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on Western Balkan-EU Integration,” CEPA, September 2019, p.15, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ ugd/644196_0d99c0297f58418d854607e3eb2078bc.pdf 103 Ibid. p.2, 104 Ibid. p5. 105 China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE), Empty Sell No More: China’s Growing Footprint in Central and Eastern Europe, Policy Paper, 7 April 2020, p.38 https://chinaobservers.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2020/04/CHOICE_Empty-shell-no-more.pdf 106 Ibid. p44.

107 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 108 Brian Wong, China’s Mask Diplomacy, The Diplomat, 25 March 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/chinas- mask-diplomacy/ 109 Sofija Popović, “Steel friendship” between Serbia and China criticised by European commentators, European Western Balkans, 30 March 2020, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/03/30/steel-friendship-between- serbia-and-china-criticised-by-european-commentators/ 110 Ibid.

30 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

111 Sandra Maksimović, Vuksanović: By criticizing the EU and promoting China, Belgrade continues its balancing policy, 28 January 2021, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2021/01/28/vuksanovic-by-criticizing-the-eu-and- promoting-china-belgrade-continues-its-balancing-policy/ 112 N1, Vucic: Serbia is against Taiwan independence, 13 January 2020, https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/ a560075-serbia-supports-one-cihna-policy/ 113 Leon Hartwell and Stefan Vladisavljev, Serbia’s Delicate Dance with the EU and China, Just Security, 22 December, https://www.justsecurity.org/73885/serbias-delicate-dance-with-the-eu-and-china/ 114 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 115 Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2020, p.10, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/ files/2020-04/05062020_FH_NIT2020_vfinal.pdf 116 China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, Empty Sell No More: China’s Growing Footprint in Central and Eastern Europe, Policy Paper, 7 April 2020, p.30. https://chinaobservers.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ CHOICE_Empty-shell-no-more.pdf 117 Leon Hartwell and Stefan Vladisavljev, Serbia’s Delicate Dance with the EU and China, Just Security, 22 December, https://www.justsecurity.org/73885/serbias-delicate-dance-with-the-eu-and-china/ 118 Hartwell, 2019. P.448. 119 Marcin Sobczyk, Kissinger Still Lacks a Number to Call Europe, Wall Street Journal, 27 June 2012, https://blogs. wsj.com/emergingeurope/2012/06/27/kissinger-still-lacks-a-number-to-call-europe/#:~:text=Kissinger%2C%20 who%20worked%20in%20the,but%20it’s%20a%20good%20phrase.%E2%80%9D

120 Marko Savković, Interview with author, 23 June 2020. 121 EURACTIV.com with Reuters, Kosovo president rejects EU mediator for talks with Serbia, 27 May 2020, https:// www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/kosovo-president-rejects-eu-mediator-for-talks-with-serbia/

122 Martin Russell, Serbia-Kosovo Relations: Confrontation or Normalization?European Parliamentary Research Service, February 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635512/EPRS_ BRI(2019)635512_EN.pdf 123 N1, EU spokeswoman tells Pristina daily only comprehensive agreement to be signed, 28 July 2020, http:// rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a624408/EU-spokeswoman-tells-Pristina-daily-only-comprehensive-agreement- to-be-signed.html 124 Ibid.

125 Darko Brkan, Interview with author, 3 June 2020. 126 Conference on Accession to the European Union: Serbia. Brussels, 30 November 2015, http://data.consilium. europa.eu/doc/document/AD-12-2015-INIT/en/pdf

127 Martin Russell, Serbia-Kosovo Relations: Confrontation or Normalization?European Parliamentary Research Service, February 2019, p.7. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635512/EPRS_ BRI(2019)635512_EN.pdf 128 Augustin Palokaj, Borrell nuk është kundër ndryshimit të kufijve të Kosovës, KOHA, 5 May 2020, https://www. koha.net/arberi/220523/borrell-nuk-eshte-kunder-ndryshimit-te-kufijve-te-kosoves/ 129 N1 Belgrade, EU’s Lajčak: Land swap between Kosovo and Serbia would be hazardous, 27 January 2021, https:// rs.n1info.com/english/news/eus-lajcak-land-swap-between-kosovo-and-serbia-would-be-hazardous/

130 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 131 Igor Novaković, Interview with author, 16 July 2020. 132 EU delegation to Serbia, Benefits from Serbia-EU Trade, 2020, http://europa.rs/serbia-and-the-eu/trade/ benefits-from-serbia-eu-trade/?lang=en

133 Leon Hartwell and Stefan Vladisavljev, Serbia’s Delicate Dance with the EU and China, Just Security, 22 December, https://www.justsecurity.org/73885/serbias-delicate-dance-with-the-eu-and-china/ 134 European Commission, Overview: Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance, 15 January 2020, https://ec.europa. eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en

31 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

135 European Commission, Serbia - financial assistance under IPA II, 14 April 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/serbia_en

136 Mimoza Ahmetaj, Interview with author, 23 August 2020. 137 Kosovo Agency of Statistics, International Trade Statistics in Goods, January 2020, https://ask.rks-gov.net/en/ kosovo-agency-of-statistics/add-news/international-trade-statistics-in-goods-january-2020 138 EU, European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, 21 August 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/kosovo_en

139 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 140 Igor Novaković, Interview with author, 16 July 2020. 141 Aleksandar Ivković, Takeaways from EU-WB Summit: Enlargement hidden behind euphemisms, but still important, European Western Balkans, 8 May 2020, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/05/08/ takeaways-from-eu-wb-summit-enlargement-hid-behind-euphemisms-but-still-important/

142 Kosovo official,Interview with author, 25 May 2020. 143 Ian Bancroft,Interview with author, 28 May 2020. 144 Gorana Grgić, Interview with author, 14 May 2020. 145 Ksenija Pavlovic McAteer, President Aleksandar Vucic aims to get Serbia back on the world stage and this time will not allow it to be cast as a villain, The Pavlovic Today, 23 July 2020, https://www.thepavlovictoday.com/ exclusive-interview-president-vucic-aims-to-get-serbia-back-on-the-world-stage-and-this-time-will-not-allow- it-to-be-cast-as-a-villain/ 146 Leon Hartwell, Diplomacy is not The Apprentice: Serbia-Kosovo issue requires a long-term commitment, 15 September 2020, New Eastern Europe, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/09/15/diplomacy-is-not-the-apprentice- serbia-kosovo-issue-requires-a-long-term-commitment/

147 Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Interview with author, 23 July 2020. 148 Ibid. 149 Daniel Serwer, The Future of Kosovo Event, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, 19 May 2020, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=U1h7VwVQKAc&feature=youtu.be 150 EWB, Trump supports mutual recognition in new letters to Vučić and Thaçi, 15 February 2019, https:// europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/02/15/trump-supports-mutual-recognition-new-letter-vucic-thaci/ 151 Ivan Angelovski, Trump Ex-Adviser Bolton Laments Lost Opportunity on Kosovo, Balkan Insight, 15 July 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/07/15/trump-ex-adviser-bolton-laments-lost-opportunity-on-kosovo/ 152 @DonaldJTrumpJr: Agree. There are 650 US troops in Kosovo. Time to bring them home. https://twitter.com/ DonaldJTrumpJr/status/1237361127513784322?s=20

153 Ben Hodges, Interview with author, 10 July 2020. 154 Kreshnik Ahmeti, Interview with author, 19 June 2020.. 155 Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Interview with author, 23 July 2020. 156 OSCE, Serbia, 2020, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/srb

157 Austin Doehler, Interview with author, 7 July 2020. 158 High-level EU official, not for attribution discussion about the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, 28 October 2020.

159 Leon Hartwell, Diplomacy is not The Apprentice: Serbia-Kosovo issue requires a long-term commitment, New Eastern Europe, 15 September 2020, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/09/15/diplomacy-is-not-the-apprentice- serbia-kosovo-issue-requires-a-long-term-commitment/

160 Kreshnik Ahmeti, Secretary of External and International Relations for LVV, Interview with author, 9 September 2020. 161 Lorne Cook, EU warns Serbia, Kosovo over Israel embassy move, AP, 8 September 2020, https://apnews.com/ article/international-news-europe-61cac994c0b1e7a3221ef8ea74d4f9f1

32 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

162 Ksenija Pavlovic McAteer, Exclusive interview: President Aleksandar Vucic aims to get Serbia back on the world stage and this time will not allow it to be cast as a villain, The Pavlovic Today, 23 July 2020, https://www. thepavlovictoday.com/exclusive-interview-president-vucic-aims-to-get-serbia-back-on-the-world-stage-and- this-time-will-not-allow-it-to-be-cast-as-a-villain/ 163 N1, Documentary ‘Ruler’ about President Aleksandar Vucic’s political life on N1 TV, 17 February 2020, https:// rs.n1info.com/english/news/a570112-n1-airs-two-part-documentary-about-political-portrait-of-serbias- president-aleksandar-vucic/ 164 Ksenija Pavlovic McAteer, President Aleksandar Vucic aims to get Serbia back on the world stage and this time will not allow it to be cast as a villain, Pavlovic Today, 23 July 2020, https://www.thepavlovictoday.com/ exclusive-interview-president-vucic-aims-to-get-serbia-back-on-the-world-stage-and-this-time-will-not-allow- it-to-be-cast-as-a-villain/ 165 Betabriefing and EURACTIV.rs, Vučić congratulates Biden, invites him to visit Serbia, 21 January 2021, https:// www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/vucic-congratulates-biden-invites-him-to-visit-serbia/ 166 Euronews Albania, US Elections, Albin Kurti to Albanian diaspora: Vote for Joe Biden, 16 October 2020, https:// euronews.al/en/kosovo/2020/10/16/us-elections-albin-kurti-to-albanian-diaspora-vote-for-joe-biden 167 @VjosaOsmaniMP, My full statement on the historic election of @JoeBiden and @KamalaHarris, Twitter, 8 November 2020, https://twitter.com/VjosaOsmaniMP/status/1325184454864773121/photo/1 168 Contextual issues can have major impacts (positive and negative) on the outcome of conflict resolution. For example, Hutu extremists in Rwanda became more eager to derail the Arusha peace process following the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected Hutu president in neighboring Burundi. Contextual issues can also impact on the willingness of mediators to do peacemaking. For example, after the bodies of U.S. soldier were dragged around on camera following the Battle of Mogadishu on October 7 1993, the U.S. appetite for intervention in the Balkans faded until major atrocities – notably the Srebrenica massacre – were televised.

169 Bruce D. Jones, “Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure”, 2001, p11, Colorado: International Peace Academy.

170 I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 66- 78.

171 Marija Pantelic, What were the protests in Serbia really about? Al Jazeera, 21 July 2020, https://www.aljazeera. com/indepth/opinion/protests-serbia-200718175749533.html

172 Richard Good, Serbia has second fastest COVID-19 vaccine rollout in Europe thanks to China, Euronews, 27 January 2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/01/27/serbia-has-second-fastest-covid-19-vaccine-rollout-in- europe-thanks-to-china 173 Nedim Dervisbegovic, Europe’s Southeast Grapples With COVID-19 Resurgence, 3 August 2020, https:// balkaninsight.com/2020/08/03/europes-southeast-grapples-with-covid-19-resurgence/ 174 France24, Newly minted Kosovo government ousted over coronavirus policy dispute, 26 March 2020, https:// www.france24.com/en/20200325-kosovo-prime-minister-albin-kurti-no-confidence-vote-parliament- government-dissolved-coronavirus 175 Council for Inclusive Governance, Cooperation During a Pandemic: Genuine or Pretended, May 2020, http:// www.cigonline.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Cooperation-During-a-Pandemic-Genuine-or-Pretended-1.pdf 176 Meliza Haradinaj-Stublla, Facebook, TË SANKSIONOHEN SHKELJET E SERBISË, 28 December 2020, https:// www.facebook.com/melizaharadinajstublla/posts/211914937221240

177 Radomir Ralev, World Bank expects Serbia’s GDP to shrink 3.0% in 2020, rise 2.9% in 2021, SEE News, 7 October 2020, https://seenews.com/news/world-bank-expects-serbias-gdp-to-shrink-30-in-2020-rise-29- in-2021-716383 178 World Bank, Recession Deepens as COVID-19 Pandemic Threatens Jobs and Poverty Reduction in Kosovo, 22 October 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/10/22/recession-deepens-as-covid-19- pandemic-threatens-jobs-and-poverty-reduction-in-kosovo 179 The 2017 “Serbia is Kosovo” train that was sent to Kosovo was a clear provocation by Serbia that could have escalated the conflict situation.

33 The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?

180 Leon Hartwell, 2019, Conflict Resolution: Lessons from the Dayton Peace Process,Negotiation Journal, Vol.35(4):454.

181 Visar Xhambazi, Interview with author, 17 June 2020. 182 Florian Bieber, The Rise (and Fall) of Balkan Stabilitocracies, 2018, https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons- winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies

183 European ambassador, Interview with author, 6 July 2020. 184 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 185 Interview with Western diplomat. 30 May 2020.

186 Ibid. 187 Igor Novaković, Council for Inclusive Governance, Interview with author, 16 July 2020. 188 N1, CEFTA adopts Western Balkans’ Declaration on common market, 10 November 2020.

189 Hon. Selim Selimi, Kosovo’s Minister of Justice, Interview with author, 15 October 2020. 190 Kosovar Center for Security Studies, Transformimi i FSK-së në Forcat e Armatosura të Kosovës, Maj 2019, http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/FactSheet-FSK(2)_770792.pdf 191 Kosovo is setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

192 European ambassador, Interview with author, 6 July 2020. 193 Leon Hartwell, What ‘Twiplomacy’ reveals about the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, 9 July 2020, New Eastern Europe, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/07/09/what-twiplomacy-reveals-about-the-serbia-kosovo-dialogue/ 194 Leon Hartwell and Visar Xhambazi, Kosovo’s Disunited Negotiators can’t Compete With ‘Monolithic’ Serbia, Balkan Insight, 16 July 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/07/16/kosovos-disunited-negotiators-cant-compete- with-monolithic-serbia/

195 William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating in Difficult Situations. [Bantam Books: New York, 1993]. pp.35. 196 Gorana Grgić, Interview with author, 14 May 2020. 197 Muhamed Sacirbey, Interview with author, 12 June 2020. 198 Gorana Grgić, Interview with author, 14 May 2020. 199 Kosovo Serb activist, Interview with author, 13 July 2020. 200 Gordana Andric, Kosovo ‘Costing Serbia €450m a Year’, NGO, Balkan Insight, 16 March 2011. https:// balkaninsight.com/2011/03/16/kosovo-cots-serbia-e6-billion/ 201 Kosovo’s budget in 2019 was 2.37 billion euro. See Fatos Bytyci, 3 February 2020, Reuters, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-kosovo-budget-idUSKCN1PS065

202 Deputy Assistant Secretary Yee’s Interview, Voice of America, 25 October 2017, https://xk.usembassy.gov/deputy- assistant-secretary-yees-interview-voice-america/ 203 Freedom House, Nations in Transit: Kosovo, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/country/kosovo/nations- transit/2020

204 Gorana Grgić, Interview with author, 14 May 2020. 205 Stefan Vladisavljev, Interview with author, 21 May 2020. 206 Leon Hartwell, What ‘Twiplomacy’ reveals about the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. 9 July 2020, New Eastern Europe, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/07/09/what-twiplomacy-reveals-about-the-serbia-kosovo-dialogue/

207 Teuta Kukleci, Interview with author, 16 June 2020. 208 Daniel Serwer, From War to Peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine. Washington D.C.: Palgrave Macmillan. p85.

209 David L. Phillips, Interview with author, 30 October 2020. 210 NATO, Relations with Serbia, 26 March 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50100.htm

211 David, L. Phillips, Discussion with author, 8 November 2020.

34 © 2021 by the Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington, DC. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the Center for European Policy Analysis, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews.

Center for European Policy Analysis 1275 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20004 [email protected] | www.cepa.org