SPACE SECURITY index 2012 www.spacesecurity.org
SPACE SECURITY INDEX 2012
SPACESECURITY.ORG iii FOR PDF version use this Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publications Data Space Security Index 2012
ISBN: 978-1-895722-92-5 ISBN: 978-1-895722-92-5 © 2012 SPACESECURITY.ORG
Edited by Cesar Jaramillo
Design and layout: Creative Services, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Cover image: This unusual image was photographed through the Cupola on the International Space Station by one of the Expedition 30 crew members. Taken December 29, 2011. Image Credit: NASA
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First published September 2012
Please direct inquires to: Cesar Jaramillo Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario Canada N2L 6C2 Telephone: 519-888-6541, ext. 7708 Fax: 519-888-0018 Email: [email protected] Governance Group
Julie Crôteau Foreign A airs and International Trade Canada
Peter Hays Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
Ram Jakhu Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University
Ajey Lele Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
Paul Meyer The Simons Foundation
John Siebert Project Ploughshares
Ray Williamson Secure World Foundation
Advisory Board
Richard DalBello Intelsat General Corporation
Theresa Hitchens United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Dr. John Logsdon The George Washington University
Dr. Lucy Stojak HEC Montréal
Project Manager
Cesar Jaramillo Project Ploughshares
TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents of Table
Awareness of space debris threat and efforts to develop and and Awareness of space debris threat and efforts to develop implement international measures to tackle the problem space activities Demand for radio frequency (RF) spectrum and communications Demand for radio frequency (RF) spectrum and communications bandwidth International normative and regulatory framework for outer Indicator 3.2: National space policies Indicator 3.2: National space policies Indicator 3.3: Multilateral forums for outer space governance Indicator 1.3: toward possible solutions Indicator 1.4: Threat from NEO collisions and progress Chapter 2: Space Situational Awareness: This chapter examines the ability to such as space debris detect, track, identify, and catalog objects in outer space, weather and monitor and active or defunct satellites, as well as observe space spacecraft and payloads for maneuvers and other events. in the United States Indicator 2.1: Space situational awareness capabilities Indicator 2.2: Global space situational awareness capabilities awareness Indicator 2.3: International cooperation on space situational Chapter 3: Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines: This chapter examines national institutions, and military and international laws and regulations, multilateral policies and doctrines relevant to space security. Indicator 3.1: Acronyms Introduction Acknowledgements Executive Summary security and : This chapter examines the Chapter 1: The Space Environment environment with an emphasis on space debris, sustainability of the space by near-Earth objects, and the allocation of scarce the potential threats posed space resources. Indicator 1.1: Amount of orbital debris Indicator 1.2: PAGE 44 PAGE 55 PAGE 1 PAGE 7 PAGE 10 PAGE 11 PAGE 27 Space Security Index 2012
PAGE 71 Chapter 4: Civil Space Programs: This chapter examines the civil space sector comprised of organizations engaged in the exploration of space or scientific research related to space, for non-commercial and non-military purposes as well as space-based global utilities provided by civil, military, or commercial actors. Indicator 4.1: Priorities and funding levels within civil space programs Indicator 4.2: International cooperation in civil space programs Indicator 4.3: Space-based global utilities
PAGE 89 Chapter 5: Commercial Space: This chapter examines the commercial space sector, including the builders and users of space hardware and space information technologies. It also examines the sector’s relationship with governments and militaries. Indicator 5.1: Growth in commercial space industry Indicator 5.2: Commercial sector support for increased access to space products and services Indicator 5.3: Interactions between public and private sectors on space activities
PAGE 105 Chapter 6: Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations: This chapter examines the research, development, testing, and deployment of space systems that aim to advance terrestrial based military operations, such as communications, intelligence, navigation, and early warning. Indicator 6.1: U.S. military space systems Indicator 6.2: Russian military space systems Indicator 6.3: Chinese military and dual-use space systems Indicator 6.4: Indian multiuse space systems Indicator 6.5: Development of military and multiuse space capabilities by other countries
PAGE 129 Chapter 7: Space Systems Resiliency: This chapter examines the research, development, testing, and deployment of capabilities to better protect space systems from potential negation efforts. Indicator 7.1: Vulnerability of satellite communications, broadcast links, and ground stations Indicator 7.2: Capacity to rebuild spacecraft and integrate distributed architectures into space operations Table of Contents
PAGE 137 Chapter 8: Space Systems Negation: This chapter examines the research, development, testing, and deployment of capabilities designed to negate the capabilities of space systems from Earth or from space. Indicator 8.1: Capabilities to attack space communications links Indicator 8.2: Earth-based capabilities to attack satellites Indicator 8.3: Space-based negation enabling capabilities
PAGE 149 Annex 1: Space Security Working Group Expert Participation
PAGE 151 Annex 2: Types of Earth Orbits
PAGE 152 Annex 3: Outer Space Treaty
PAGE 157 Annex 4: Spacecraft Launched in 2011
PAGE 162 Endnotes
Acronyms
3GIRS Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (U.S.) ACRONYMS ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ADR Active Debris Removal AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency system (U.S.) AIS Automatic Identification System ALTB Airborne Laser Test Bed ASAT Anti-Satellite Weapon ASI Agenzia Spaziale Italiana ASSIST Assured SATCOM Services in Single Theater BOC Besoin Opérationnel Commun (Europe) CASC China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite CD Conference on Disarmament CFE Commercial and Foreign Entities CHIRP Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload CNES Centre national d’études spatiales (France) CNSA China National Space Administration COIL Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser COPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space COSIF Common SSA Integration Framework COTS Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (U.S.) CSA Canadian Space Agency CSO Composante spatiale optique (Optical Space Component) DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (U.S.) DART Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (U.S.) DGA Délégation générale pour l’armement (French Agency for Defense Development) DISA Defense Information Systems Agency DISCOS Database and Information System Characterising Objects in Space DLR German Aerospace Center DND Department of National Defence (Canada) DoD Department of Defense (U.S.) DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation (India) DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System (U.S.) DSP Defense Support Program (U.S.) DTH Direct-to-home DWSS Defense Weather Satellite System EC European Commission EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (U.S.) EHF Extremely High Frequency EMP Electromagnetic pulse EO Earth Observation ESA European Space Agency 1 Space Security Index 2012
ESAT Ethiopian Satellite Television EU European Union EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites FAA Federal Aviation Administration (U.S.) FCC Federal Communications Commission (U.S.) FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty FOBS Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (Russia) FREND Front-End Robotics Enabling Near-Term Demonstration (U.S.) FSS Fixed Satellite Service GAO Government Accountability Office (U.S.) GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit GEOSS Global Earth Observation System of Systems GGE Group of Governmental Experts GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Russia) GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (Europe) GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System GPS Global Positioning System (U.S.) GRAIL Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory GRAVES Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale (France) GSO Geosynchronous Orbit GSSAC German Space Situational Awareness Center HAND High Altitude Nuclear Detonation HELLADS High Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense System HEO Highly Elliptical Orbit HEOSS High Earth Orbit Space Surveillance HIGPS High-integrity GPS HTS High-throughput Satellite IAA International Academy of Astronautics IADC Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IGS Information Gathering Satellite (Japan) IIRS Indian Institute of Remote Sensing ILS International Launch Services Inmarsat International Maritime Satellite Organisation Intelsat International Telecommunications Satellite Organization IOV In-Orbit Validation IRNSS Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System ISON International Scientific Optical Network ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation ISS International Space Station ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations (U.S.) 2 Acronyms
ITU International Telecommunication Union JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency JFCC Space Joint Functional Component Command for Space JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory (U.S.) JPSS Joint Polar Satellite System JSpOC Joint Space Operations Center (U.S.) LEO Low Earth Orbit LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging MDA Missile Defense Agency (U.S.) MEO Medium Earth Orbit MEV Mission Extension Vehicle MiDSTEP Microsatellite Demonstration Science and Technology Experiment Program Milstar Military Satellite Communications System (U.S.) MIRACL Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (U.S.) MiTEX Micro-satellite Technology Experiment (U.S.) MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime MUSIS Multinational Space-based Imaging System NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration (U.S.) NEA Near Earth Asteroids NEC Near Earth Comets NEO Near-Earth Object NEOSSat Near-Earth Object Surveillance Satellite (Canada) NEOWISE NEO Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer NFIRE Near-Field Infrared Experiment satellite (U.S.) NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (U.S.) NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S.) NPEF National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Systems Engineering Forum (U.S.) NPO Science and Production Association (Russia) NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System NRC National Research Council (U.S.) NRL Naval Research Laboratory (U.S.) NRO National Reconnaissance Office (U.S.) NSAU National Space Agency of Ukraine NSSS National Security Space Strategy (U.S.) ODWG Orbital Debris Working Group (U.S.) ORF Observer Research Foundation (India) ORFEO Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation (France/Italy) ORS Operationally Responsive Space (U.S.) PAROS Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration PHA Potentially Hazardous Asteroid PHO Potentially Hazardous Object PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) 3 Space Security Index 2012
PLNS Pre-Launch Notification System PPWT Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects PSLV Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle PTSS Precision Tracking Space System QZSS Quazi-Zenith Satellite System (Japan) RAIDRS Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and Reporting System RF Radio Frequency RFI Radio Frequency Interference Roscosmos Russian Federal Space Agency RRB Radio Regulations Board SATCOM Satellite Communications SBIRS Space Based Infrared System (U.S.) SBSS Space Based Space Surveillance (U.S.) SDA Space Data Association SHF Super High Frequency SIS Space Infrastructure Servicing SMC Space and Missile Systems Center (USAF) SOA Service Oriented Architecture SSA Space Situational Awareness SSN Space Surveillance Network (U.S.) SSS Space Surveillance System (Russia) SST Space Surveillance Telescope (U.S.) SSTC Space Surveillance and Tracking Centre (ESA) STRATCOM Strategic Command (U.S.) STSS Space Tracking and Surveillance System (U.S.) TCBM Transparency and Confidence-Building Measure TICS Tiny, Independent, Coordinating Spacecraft program (U.S.) TIRA Tracking and Imaging Radar (Germany) TOTAS Teide Observatory Tenerife Asteroid Survey TSAT Transformational Satellite Communications system (U.S.) TT&C Tracking, Telemetry and Command TTL Tagging, Tracking and Locating UARS Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UHF Ultra High Frequency UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNIDROIT International Institute for the Unification of Private Law UNISPACE United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
4 Acronyms
UN-SPIDER United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response USAF United States Air Force USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command USML United States Munitions List USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command VHF Very High Frequency VSAT Very-Small-Aperture Terminal WGS Wideband Global SATCOM XSS Experimental Spacecraft System (U.S.)
5
Introduction INTRODUCTION Space Security Index 2012 is the ninth annual report on developments related to security in outer space, covering the period January to December 2011. It is part of the broader Space Security Index project, which aims to improve transparency on space activities and provide a common, comprehensive knowledge base to support the development of national and international policies that contribute to the security and sustainability of outer space. e de nition of space security guiding this report re ects the express intent of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that outer space should remain open for all to use for peaceful purposes now and into the future: The secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space and freedom from space-based threats.
e primary consideration in the SSI de nition of space security is not the interests of particular national or commercial entities, but the security and sustainability of outer space as an environment that can be used safely and responsibly by all. is broad de nition encompasses the security of the unique outer space environment, which includes the physical and operational integrity of manmade assets in space and their ground stations, as well as security on Earth from threats originating in space. e developments covered by the report are organized according to eight chapters: 1) e space environment 2) Space situational awareness 3) Space laws, policies, and doctrines 4) Civil space programs 5) Commercial space 6) Space support for terrestrial military operations 7) Space systems resiliency 8) Space systems negation. e Space Security Index report attempts to take stock of all areas that may have an impact on the sustainability of outer space. In this context, issues such as the threat posed by space debris, the priorities of national civil space programs, the growing importance of the commercial space industry, e orts to develop a robust normative regime for outer space activities, and concerns about the militarization and potential weaponization of space are critical. From search-and-rescue operations to weather forecasting; from banking to arms control treaty veri cation, the world has become increasingly reliant on the bene ts of space applications. e key challenge is to maintain a sustainable outer space domain so that the social and economic bene ts derived from it can continue to be enjoyed by present and future generations. e total amount of human-created space debris in orbit continues to grow and is concentrated in the high value orbits where space assets are primarily located. In recent years awareness of the space debris problem has grown considerably, in part because various spacecraft have been hit by pieces of debris, intentional debris- generating events have occurred, and satellites have collided with one another. As a result, e orts to mitigate the production of new debris through compliance with national and international guidelines have become highly important. e future development and deployment of technology to remove debris promises to increase the sustainability of outer space.
7 Space Security Index 2012
Likewise, the development of space situational awareness capabilities to track space debris provides signi cant space security advantages if used to avoid collisions. Although greater international cooperation to enhance the predictability of space operations would advance space security, the sensitive nature of some information and the small number of leading space actors with advanced tools for surveillance have traditionally kept signi cant data on space activities shrouded in secrecy. But recent developments covered in this report suggest that there is a greater willingness to share space situational awareness data via international partnerships. e distribution of scarce space resources, including the allocation of orbital slots and radio frequencies to spacefaring nations, has a direct impact on the ability of actors to access and use space. Growing numbers of space actors, particularly in the communications sector, have created more competition and sometimes friction over the use of orbital slots and frequencies, which have historically been allocated on a rst-come, rst-served basis. e existence of international policy instruments to regulate space activities has a direct impact on space security since they establish key parameters for space activities. ese include the right of all countries to access space, prohibitions against the national appropriation of space and the placement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in space, and the obligation to ensure that space is used for peaceful purposes. International space law can improve space security by restricting activities that infringe upon the ability of actors to access and use space safely and sustainably, or by limiting space-based threats to national assets in space or on Earth. While there is widespread international recognition that the existing regulatory framework is insucient to address the current challenges facing the outer space domain, the development of an overarching normative regime has been painstakingly slow. International space actors have been unable to reach consensus on the exact nature of a space security regime despite having speci c alternatives on the table for consideration—either legally binding treaties, such as the Sino-Russian proposed ban on space weapons (known as the PPWT), or politically binding norms of behavior, such as the European Union’s proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. e establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts on Space by the UN General Assembly, which is to start deliberations in 2012, is widely seen as a positive step that may lead to the adoption of agreed transparency and con dence-building measures for space activities. International cooperation remains a key aspect of both civil space programs and global utilities, a ecting space security positively by enhancing transparency of the nature and purpose of certain civil programs. Collaborative endeavors in civil space programs can assist in the transfer of expertise and technology for the access to, and use of, space by emerging space actors. International cooperation can also help nations undertake vast collaborative projects in space, such as the International Space Station, or space exploration, the complex technical challenges and prohibitive costs of which are dicult for any one actor to assume. e role that the commercial space sector plays in the provision of launch, communications, imagery, and manufacturing services, and its relationship with government, civil, and military programs, make this sector an important determinant of space security. A healthy space industry can lead to decreasing costs for space access and use, and may increase the accessibility of space technology for a wider range of space actors. is can have a positive impact on space security by increasing the number of actors that can access and use space or space-based applications, thereby creating a wider pool of stakeholders with a vested interest in the maintenance of space security.
8 Introduction
e military space sector is an important driver behind the advancement of capabilities to access and use space. It has played a key role in bringing down the cost of space access, and many of today’s common space applications, such as satellite-based navigation, were rst developed for military use. Space systems have augmented the military capabilities of several states by enhancing battle eld awareness, including precise navigation and targeting support, early warning of missile launch, and real-time communications. Furthermore, remote sensing satellites have served as a national technical means of veri cation of international nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament regimes. Space capabilities and space-derived information are integrated into the day-to-day military planning of major spacefaring states. is can have a positive e ect on space security by increasing the collective vested interest in space security, as a result of heightened mutual vulnerabilities. Conversely, the use of space to support terrestrial military operations can be detrimental to space security if adversaries, viewing space as a new source of military threat or as critical military infrastructure, develop space system negation capabilities to neutralize the advantages of those systems. In this sense, the security dynamics of protection and negation are closely related and, under some conditions, protection systems can motivate adversaries to develop weapons to overcome them. Although each major issue is covered in a di erent chapter, the Space Security Index report recognizes that the boundaries that separate civil, military, and commercial space assets are dissolving, creating interdependence and mutual vulnerabilities. e information contained in Space Security Index 2012 is solely from open sources. Great e ort is made to ensure a complete and factually accurate description of events, based on a critical appraisal of the available information and consultation with international experts. Project partners and sponsors trust that this publication will continue to serve as both a reference source and a tool to aid policymaking, with the ultimate goal of enhancing the sustainability of outer space for all users. Expert participation in the Space Security Index is a key component of the project. e primary research is peer reviewed prior to publication through various processes: 1) Technical and policy experts are asked to provide critical feedback on the draft research, which is sent to them electronically. 2) e Space Security Working Group in-person consultation is held each spring for two days to review the draft text for factual errors, misinterpretations, gaps, and misstatements about the impact of various events. is meeting also provides an important forum for related policy dialogue on recent outer space developments. 3) Finally, the Governance Group for the Space Security Index reviews the penultimate draft of the text before publication. For further information about the Space Security Index, its methodology, project partners, and sponsors, please visit the website www.spacesecurity.org, where the publication is also available in PDF format. Comments and suggestions to improve the project are welcome.
9 Space Security Index 2012 ACKNOWLE D e research process for Space Security Index 2012 was directed by Cesar Jaramillo at Project Ploughshares. Dr. Ram Jakhu and Dr. Peter Hays provided on-site supervision at, respectively, the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University and the Space Policy Institute at e George Washington University. e research team included: Timiebi Aganaba, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University Kate Becker, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University Joyeeta Chatterjee, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University Ti©any Chow, Secure World Foundation Travis Cottom, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University Laura Delgado, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies Joel Hicks, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University Diane Howard, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University Samantha Marquart, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University David McArthur, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University Tabitha Smith, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University
GEMENTS e Governance Group for the Space Security Index would like to thank the research team and the many advisors and experts who have supported this project. Cesar Jaramillo has been responsible for overseeing the research process and logistics for the 2011-2012 project cycle. He provides the day-to-day guidance and coordination of the project and ensures that the myriad details of the publication come together. Cesar also supports the Governance Group and we want to thank him for the contribution he has made in managing the publication of this volume. anks to Wendy Stocker at Project Ploughshares for copyediting, to Creative Services at the University of Waterloo for design work, and to Pandora Print Shop of Kitchener, Ontario for printing and binding. For comments on the draft research we are in debt to the international experts who provided feedback on each of the report’s chapters during the online consultation process, and to the participants in the Space Security Working Group. For hosting the Space Security Working Group meeting held on 13-14 April 2012 in Montreal, we are grateful to the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University. is project would not be possible without the generous nancial and in-kind support from: • Secure World Foundation • The Simons Foundation • Project Ploughshares • International Security Research and Outreach Programme at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada • Erin J.C. Arsenault Trust Fund at McGill University.
While we, as the Governance Group for the Space Security Index, have bene ted immeasurably from the input of the many experts indicated, responsibility for any errors or omissions in this volume nally rests with us. Julie Crôteau Peter Hays Ram Jakhu Ajey Lele Paul Meyer John Siebert Ray Williamson
10 Executive Summary
The Space Environment EXEC U INDICATOR 1.1: Amount of orbital debris — Space debris poses a signi cant, constant, and indiscriminate threat to all spacecraft. Most space missions create some space debris, mainly rocket booster stages that are expended and released to drift in space along with bits of hardware. Serious fragmentations are usually caused by energetic events such as explosions. ese can be both unintentional, as in the case of unused fuel exploding, or intentional, as in the testing of weapons in space that utilize kinetic energy interceptors.
Traveling at speeds of up to 7.8 kilometers (km) per second, even small pieces of space TIVE S U debris can destroy or severely disable a satellite upon impact. e number of objects in Earth orbit has increased steadily; today the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is using the Space Surveillance Network to catalog approximately 17,000 objects 10 centimeters (cm) in diameter or larger. Experts estimate that there are over 300,000 objects with a diameter larger than one centimeter and several million that are smaller. e annual rate of new tracked debris began to decrease in the 1990s, largely because of national debris mitigation e orts, but has accelerated in recent years as a result of events such as the Chinese intentional destruction of one of its satellites in 2007 and the accidental 2009 collision of a U.S. Iridium active satellite and a Russian Cosmos defunct satellite. MMARY 2011 Developments: • Cataloged space debris population increases by 7.8 percent since 2010, with lowest number of fragmentation events since 2002 • 2011 experiences the largest deployment of new spacecraft in a decade Space Security Impact Although 2011 experienced an increase in the number of launches and new satellites put in orbit, it also saw the lowest number of fragmentation and debris-creating events in almost a decade. is trend is positive for the security of outer space. Nevertheless, the overall number of pieces of tracked and cataloged debris and of active objects in orbit continues to increase, further congesting already crowded orbits and increasing the risk of accidental collisions. Several spacecraft, including the permanently inhabited ISS, have had to use evasive maneuvers on various occasions to avoid being hit by space debris. Some debris in LEO will reenter the Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrate relatively quickly because of atmospheric drag, but debris in orbits of more than 600 km in altitude will remain a threat for decades and even centuries.
INDICATOR 1.2: Awareness of space debris threat and eorts to develop and implement international measures to tackle the problem — Signi cant debris- generating events as well as improved tracking abilities have encouraged the recognition of space debris as a signi cant threat. e 2007 Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT) test conducted by China, the 2008 U.S. destruction of its failed USA-193 satellite, and the 2009 accidental collision between a Russian and a U.S. satellite have served to underscore the need for e ective measures to curb the creation of space debris. Spacefaring states, including China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, as well as the European Union (EU) have developed debris mitigation standards. e United Nations (UN) has adopted voluntary guidelines. Most states require that residual propellants, batteries, ywheels, pressure vessels, and other instruments be depleted or passivated at the end of their operational lifetimes. All major national debris mitigation guidelines address the disposal of Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites, typically in graveyard orbits 235 km above the GEO orbit; most seek the removal of dead spacecraft from LEO within 25 years. However, these guidelines are not universally or regularly followed. 11 Space Security Index 2012
2011 Developments: • Uncontrolled satellite reentries receive mainstream media attention • Orbital debris continues to have a growing impact on operational spacecraft • Various states signal compliance with international space debris mitigation guidelines • International awareness of orbital debris problem increases and progress on solutions continues Space Security Impact e growing worldwide appreciation of the threat posed by space debris to the sustainability of outer space is a positive development, as are the e orts to nd solutions to the problem. While policymakers are working to strengthen existing debris mitigation guidelines, scientists and engineers have begun research on the next phase: orbital debris removal, a necessary complement to debris mitigation to ensure continued space security. However, voluntary guidelines are not sucient to address the problem, as demonstrated by the recurring failure of some spacecraft operators to comply with end-of-life requirements in the GEO belt.
INDICATOR 1.3: Demand for radio frequency (RF) spectrum and communications bandwidth — e growing number of spacefaring nations and satellite applications is driving the demand for access to radio frequencies and orbital slots. More satellites are operating in the frequency bands that are commonly used by GEO satellites, increasing the likelihood of greater frequency interference. Satellite builders and operators are coping by developing new technologies and procedures to manage greater frequency usage, allowing more satellites to operate in closer proximity without interference. As well, frequency hopping, lower power output, digital signal processing, frequency-agile transceivers, and software-managed spectrum have the potential to signi cantly improve bandwidth use and alleviate con icts over bandwidth allocation. Newer receivers have a higher tolerance for interference than those created decades ago. e increased competition for orbital slot assignments, particularly in GEO, where most communications satellites operate, has caused occasional disputes between satellite operators. e International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has been pursuing reforms to address slot allocation backlogs and other related challenges. 2011 Development: • LightSquared telecommunications plan interferes with Global Positioning System (GPS) signals in the United States Space Security Impact e nite nature of space resources such as orbital slots and radio frequencies continues to pose complex governance challenges for the ongoing use of space by established and emerging spacefaring actors. e demands of emerging spacefaring states for their own orbital slots and radio frequencies not only add stress to an already congested environment, but also call into question the inherent fairness of an allocation system that has operated on a rst-come, rst-served basis. Moreover, the occurrence of both intentional and unintentional frequency interference will remain a signi cant space security concern for the foreseeable future and will require more e ective regulatory regimes, as illustrated by the LightSquared development described in this chapter.
INDICATOR 1.4: Threat from NEO collisions and progress toward possible solutions — Near-Earth Objects are asteroids and comets in orbits that bring them into close proximity to the Earth. Over the past decade a growing amount of research has started to identify objects that pose threats to Earth and to develop potential mitigation and de ection strategies. e e ectiveness of de ection—a dicult process because of the
12 Executive Summary extreme mass, velocity, and distance of any potentially impacting NEO—depends on the amount of warning time. Kinetic de ection methods include ramming the NEO with a series of kinetic projectiles. Some experts have advocated the use of nearby explosions of nuclear devices, which could create additional threats to the environment and stability of outer space and would have complex legal and policy implications. 2011 Developments: • International awareness of the NEO problem and discussions on solutions continue to increase • Progress in UN COPUOS toward possible creative threat mitigation solutions Space Security Impact Progress made in terms of collaborative NEO detection, warning, and decision-making encourages and strengthens international cooperation on space situational awareness data sharing and enhanced space security. While an NEO collision would have detrimental e ects, cooperative multilateral e orts to address this challenge will likely yield positive results for space security by strengthening ties among diverse space actors.
Space Situational Awareness
INDICATOR 2.1: Space situational awareness capabilities in the United States — e United States continues to lead the world in space situational awareness capabilities with the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). Sharing SSA data from the SSN could bene t all space actors by allowing them to supplement the data collected by national assets at little if any additional cost. Still, there is currently no operational global system for space surveillance, in part because of the sensitive nature of surveillance data. Since the 2009 Cosmos-Iridium satellite collision there has been an increased push in the United States to boost conjunction analysis—the ability to accurately predict high-speed collisions between two orbiting objects—and to undertake collaborative agreements with international partners that will allow for an increase in data sharing, thus allowing individual space actors to supplement the data collected by national assets. 2011 Development: • U.S. SSA capabilities continue to improve Space Security Impact Although the United States remains the single largest collector and provider of SSA data worldwide, signi cant gaps remain in its ability to detect and track smaller objects, which are still capable of in icting damage on expensive and strategically important spacecraft. If the U.S. SSA Sharing Program continues, recent developments, which are aimed at lling those gaps, will signi cantly enhance safety for all space actors. Increased political capital and budgetary allocations spent on improving SSA capabilities in the United States constitute a major positive step for space security, and could become even more bene cial insofar as the United States continues to pursue international collaboration on SSA.
INDICATOR 2.2: Global space situational awareness capabilities — As the importance of space situational awareness is acknowledged, more states are pursuing national space surveillance systems and engaging in discussions over international SSA data sharing. Given the sensitive nature of much of the information obtained through surveillance networks and the resulting secrecy that often surrounds it, states are striving to develop their own SSA systems to supplement and reduce their reliance on the information released by other space actors such as the United States. For example, Russia maintains a Space Surveillance System 13 Space Security Index 2012
using its early-warning radars and monitors objects (mostly in LEO), although it does not widely disseminate data. Similarly, the EU, Canada, France, Germany, China, India, and Japan are all developing space surveillance capabilities for various purposes, although none of these states has aspirations to develop a global system on its own. Amateur observations by individuals have also proven to be useful in gathering and disseminating data on satellites. 2011 Developments: • Europe continues to develop its own SSA capabilities • China emphasizes debris monitoring in White Paper • Space Data Association reaches full operational capability • Sapphire Satellite System enhances Canada’s Space Surveillance System • Amateur observers continue to demonstrate their capabilities Space Security Impact e increase in global SSA capabilities has a positive impact on the security of outer space as it allows for multiple sources of data, improving quality, coverage, and validity. Greater global capabilities also permit the use of SSA data to monitor activities in space, increasing transparency and con dence among space actors, and, eventually, serving as a potential veri cation mechanism for future agreements.
INDICATOR 2.3: International cooperation on space situational awareness — While the United States moderates access to information from its SSN, it has expanded its SSA Sharing Program. Since the 2009 Cosmos-Iridium satellite collision, the U.S. military has increased the personnel and resources devoted to its SSA program in order to monitor more active satellites for potential collisions. e eventual goal is to provide timely warning of potential collisions for all active payloads on orbit. As part of this development, the United States is seeking more outside partners with which to share data on potential collisions. In addition, commercial entities (such as the Space Data Association, formed by a group of major satellite operators) have established independent surveillance and data-sharing mechanisms that will allow them to share data on the positions of members’ satellites to help prevent collisions and reduce electromagnetic interference. 2011 Developments: • International cooperative effort to track and reestablish contact with Russian Phobos-Grunt spacecraft • The United States signs cooperative bilateral agreements with Canada and France on space debris • The U.S. government continues to expand its SSA Sharing Program Space Security Impact Because no single government or entity can provide comprehensive SSA, international cooperation and collaboration are vital. More bilateral agreements and international cooperation on SSA and data sharing create a very positive impact on space security and sustainability. A good example of the collective bene ts of sharing SSA data is the widely publicized tracking of the Russian Phobos-Grunt spacecraft in 2010.
Laws, policies, and doctrines
INDICATOR 3.1: International normative and regulatory framework for outer space activities — e international legal framework for outer space early on established the principle that space should be used for “peaceful purposes.” Since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) in 1967, this framework has grown to include the Astronaut Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), the Registration Convention 14 Executive Summary
(1979), and the Moon Agreement (1979), as well as a range of other international and bilateral agreements and relevant rules of customary international law. While the existing normative framework is widely considered outdated and insucient to address the current challenges to space security, the focus on multilateral space treaties has been complemented by the pursuit of governance tools that include principles, resolutions, con dence-building measures, and technical regulatory guidelines. 2011 Developments: • The Permanent Court of Arbitration adopts Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities • International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities proposed by the EU continues to receive mixed support • Satellite industry opposes the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Space Assets Protocol to the Cape Town Convention • Orbital slot and frequency allocations continue to be disputed by companies and states • Reports of significant harmful radiofrequency interference (RFI) or infringements of RF regulations continue Space Security Impact Di ering opinions continue to dominate international discourse on a normative framework for outer space activities. Likewise, instances of deliberate radiofrequency interference continue to underscore the governance challenges facing current regulatory mechanisms. Although several alternatives are being considered, space actors have been unable to reach consensus on the exact nature of a space security regime. While this lack of consensus has signi cantly slowed down the development of international norms, it has generated important debate and revealed a variety of perspectives and priorities that may contribute to more inclusive rules. It is also becoming apparent that emerging rules will need to acknowledge private sector actors as legitimate stakeholders in the space domain. e extent to which their concerns are addressed in policymaking processes and governance structures will be an important determinant of space security going forward.
INDICATOR 3.2: National space policies — While all spacefaring states emphasize the importance of cooperation and the peaceful uses of space, the military doctrines of a growing number of states emphasize the use of space systems to support national security. e increasing development of multiuse space systems, for example, has led some states to view space assets as critical national security infrastructure. In addition, more states have come to view their national space industries as fundamental drivers and components of their space policies. Bilateral cooperation agreements on space activities are increasingly common among spacefaring actors. A number of nations, including the U.K., Germany, Australia, and the United States, have made the innovation and development of their industrial space sectors a key priority of their national space strategies. 2011 Developments: • U.S. National Security Space Strategy released • China issues five-year White Paper on space • The EU releases communication on a EU space policy • Austria promulgates new domestic space law Space Security Impact e ongoing focus of national space policies on the long-term sustainability of the space domain and a renewed focus on the bene ts of international cooperation generally bode well for space security. However, an overreliance on space for national security could lead to a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust that could ultimately be detrimental to the
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space domain. Clear rules, greater transparency, and international cooperation are positive indicators of space security, but tensions could also build as more policymakers become aware of the vulnerabilities and fragility of many space capabilities. Greater transparency and openness in national policies would be welcome developments toward the goal of increased cooperation.
INDICATOR 3.3: Multilateral forums for outer space governance — International institutions including the UN General Assembly, the UN First Committee, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the ITU, and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) constitute the key multilateral forums in which issues related to space security are addressed. e adoption of a Program of Work at the CD in 2009, after more than a decade of deliberations with no tangible results, could have allowed the CD to move forward on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and to further discussions on a legal instrument to regulate space activities. But stalemate quickly resumed its grip. While at the end of 2011 the adoption of a Program of Work remained an elusive pursuit for the CD, support for the PAROS Resolution at the UN General Assembly—with 176 in favor, none opposed, and only two abstentions (Israel and the United States)—is indicative of the broad international consensus supporting the need to consolidate and reinforce the normative regime for space governance and enhance its e ectiveness. COPUOS remains active, with a principal focus on non-binding, technical approaches to security in space. 2011 Developments: • The United States confirms engagement with Group of Governmental Experts for Transparency and Confidence- Building Measures in Space • The CD could not agree on a Program of Work during 2011 • Terms of reference for COPUOS Working Group on Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities agreed Space Security Impact e continuing failure to adopt a Program of Work at the CD (the result of issues unrelated to outer space) is highly problematic; it is unclear if the deadlock will end in the near future. e fact that the deadlock at the CD has prevented substantive negotiations on one of its core agenda items, PAROS, has a negative impact on the security of outer space. While ine ective multilateral forums such as the CD stagnate, the Group of Governmental Experts established by the UN General Assembly and the COPUOS Working Group on the Long- Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities are very promising developments that may advance important and necessary con dence-building measures related to peaceful space operations, and could complement an eventual code of conduct for outer space activities.
Civil Space Programs INDICATOR 4.1: Priorities and funding levels within civil space programs — As the social and economic bene ts derived from space activities have become more apparent, civil expenditures on space activities have continued to increase in several countries. Virtually all new spacefaring states explicitly place a priority on space-based applications to support social and economic development. Such space applications as satellite navigation and Earth imaging are core elements of almost every existing civil space program. Likewise, Moon exploration continues to be a priority for such established spacefaring states as China, Russia, India, and Japan. New launch vehicles continue to be developed. Following the cancellation of the Constellation program, the United States has focused on encouraging private sector development of new launchers rather than by NASA. e China Academy of 16 Executive Summary
Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) is proceeding with development of the Long March-5, the next generation of launch vehicles. Russia continues to develop the new Angara family of space launchers, which are to replace some of the aging Molniya-M launch vehicles currently in service. 2011 Developments: • Changing budgetary allotments for civil space programs • Various countries pursue human space exploration programs • Scientific exploration missions continue to be developed worldwide • States continue to pursue Moon exploration programs Space Security Impact e fact that government spending on space activities saw some global increase during 2011 indicates that spacefaring states attach high priority to their national space programs. is positive development demonstrates that states see a strong link between space exploration and socioeconomic development. More scienti c exploratory missions and a renewed interest in manned space ight and lunar missions by national space agencies may further enhance international cooperation on space activities.
INDICATOR 4.2: International cooperation in civil space programs — International cooperation remains a key feature of both civil and global utilities space programs. It enhances transparency into the nature and purpose of certain civil programs that could potentially have military purposes. e most prominent example of international cooperation continues to be the International Space Station (ISS), a multinational e ort with a focus on scienti c research and an estimated cost of over $100-billion to date. By allowing states to pool resources and expertise, international civil space cooperation has played a key role in the proliferation of the technical capabilities needed by states to access space. Cooperation agreements on space activities have proven to be especially helpful for emerging spacefaring states that currently lack the technological means for independent space access. Likewise, cooperation agreements enable established spacefaring countries to tackle high-cost, complex missions as collaborative endeavors with international partners. 2011 Developments: • Increasing number of cooperation agreements on space activities • The United States eases export controls with India • U.S. bill limits NASA interaction with China • Various states continue to pursue cooperation with China on space activities Space Security Impact e increased cooperation in space activities is a positive development; it builds con dence and fosters transparency among various spacefaring nations. In addition, international cooperation leads to tangible bene ts from such collaborative space activity as scienti c research. Given the sometimes prohibitively costly nature of space endeavors, international cooperation makes major missions possible through shared costs and technologies.
INDICATOR 4.3: Space-based global utilities — e use of space-based global utilities, including navigation, weather, and search-and-rescue systems, has grown substantially over the last decade. While key global utilities such as the GPS and weather satellites were initially developed by military actors, these systems have grown into space applications that are almost indispensable to the civil and commercial sectors and spawned such equally indispensable applications as weather monitoring and remote sensing. Advanced
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and developing economies alike depend on these space-based systems. Currently Russia, the United States, the EU, Japan, China, and India have or are developing satellite-based navigation capabilities. Although these systems can increase the accuracy and reliability of satellite-based navigation, their simultaneous operation faces signi cant coordination challenges. 2011 Developments: • Improvement in access to Earth observation data • Satellite navigation systems around the globe continue to evolve Space Security Impact Increasing reliance on space systems for global utilities such as disaster management, earth observation, telecommunications, weather, position, navigation, and timing may constitute a positive development for space security. Spacefaring nations are encouraged to promote safe and responsible space behavior and to focus on the long-term sustainable use of space resources. e growing use of remote sensing data to manage a range of global challenges, including disaster monitoring and response, is positive for space security insofar as it further links the security of Earth to the security of space, expands space applications to include additional users, and encourages international collaboration and cooperation on an important space capability.
Commercial Space INDICATOR 5.1: Growth in commercial space industry — Commercial space revenues have steadily increased since the mid-1990s. From satellite manufacturing and launch services to advanced navigation products and the provision of satellite-based communications, the global commercial space industry is thriving, with estimated annual revenues in excess of $200-billion. Individual consumers are a growing source of demand for these services, particularly satellite television and personal GPS devices. In addition to orders for satellite eet replenishment, manufacturers and launch providers are looking to the robust demand for new space-based services to spur new satellite orders. 2011 Developments: • Despite predictions of downturn, satellite industry positioned for continued growth • Inmarsat develops business by securing financing from U.S. Export-Import Bank for Global Xpress system, while expanding maritime operations • High-throughput satellites (HTS) drive growth • Eutelsat leases Chinese satellite to preserve orbital slot • Commercial launch market continues to expand • LightSquared telecommunications plan interferes with GPS signals in the United States Space Security Impact e pool of stakeholders with a direct interest in preserving space as a peaceful domain has increased in recent years as a result of the continued overall growth in the commercial space industry. is constitutes a positive development for space security. Moreover, cooperative e orts and the resulting cost-e ectiveness will likely encourage greater space access and socioeconomic development for both established and emerging spacefaring states. Development of new products and services lessens dependence upon one facet of commercial activity, thus helping to insulate against uctuations in speci c markets. However, as commercial space activity increases, issues of congestion, competition, and spectrum management become of greater concern. 18 Executive Summary
INDICATOR 5.2: Commercial sector support for increased access to space products and services — Lower launch costs for commercial satellites have enabled greater accessibility to space, particularly by developing countries that found space access prohibitively expensive in the past. A few years ago, Earth-imaging data were only available to a select number of governments. Today any individual or organization with access to the Internet can use these services at no cost, through various widely available online mapping applications. An embryonic private space ight industry continues to emerge, seeking to capitalize on new advanced, reliable, reusable, and relatively a ordable technologies for launch to suborbital trajectories and low Earth orbit. 2011 Developments: • Various companies continue to develop services for the commercial human spaceflight and space tourism markets • AISSata-1 improves Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking • Full control regained over Intelsat’s Galaxy 15 satellite • Plans advance for on-orbit servicing of satellites Space Security Impact Increased access to space a ects space security both positively and negatively. As more entities, both governmental and private, are able to reach space, the bene ts of the resource spread, ideally in an equalizing manner. However, increased access to space also translates into a more congested environment, making more urgent e ective regulatory mechanisms for the allocation of scarce resources. e increasing number of private citizens with a vested interest in space security may yield a positive impact on space security. However, such access may challenge space security, both in terms of the sustainability of the space environment and in the applicability of international law to the largely uncharted realm of space tourism. Finally, although e ects seem positive, it is too early to assess the full impact of on-orbit satellite servicing, which aims to extend the operational life of active satellites.
INDICATOR 5.3: Interactions between public and private sectors on space activities — e commercial space sector is signi cantly shaped by the particular security concerns of national governments. Various national space policies place great emphasis on maintaining a robust and competitive industrial base and encourage partnerships with the private sector. e retirement of the NASA space shuttle will certainly provide new opportunities for the commercial sector to support U.S. government activities. Moreover, national export regulations could gradually be in uenced by the growing number of international partnerships formed by the commercial sector. 2011 Developments: • Hosted payloads gain traction • NASA awards contracts, funding to various commercial space companies • Australia invests in national broadband network • European Space Agency continues to scrutinize Arianespace finances
Space Security Impact e increased synergy between the public and private sectors has a positive impact on space security insofar as the concept of space security broadens to re ect the needs of the commercial sector as well as the national security of spacefaring states. However, the bene ts of such partnerships could be o set by an increased reliance on commercial dual-use assets by the militaries of several countries. As this mutual dependence deepens, multiple-use spacecraft built by commercial operators could become military targets, resulting in an
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overall decrease in security. On the other hand, the proliferation of dual-use assets in space could make a military attack less useful and, therefore, less likely.
Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations INDICATOR 6.1: U.S. military space systems — e United States has dominated the military space arena since the end of the Cold War, and continues to give priority to its military and intelligence programs. Building upon the capabilities of its GPS, the United States began to expand the role of military space systems, integrating them into virtually all aspects of military operations, from providing indirect strategic support to military forces to enabling the application of military force in near-real-time tactical operations through precision weapons guidance. e DoD Space-based and Related Systems funding category includes, inter alia, the development of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation, the Space Based Infrared System, and the Wideband Global SATCOM System. e United States currently leads in deployment of dedicated space systems to support military operations, accounting for roughly half of all dedicated military satellites, and currently outspends all other states combined on military space applications. 2011 Development: • The United States continues to update existing space capabilities Space Security Impact e use of space systems in U.S.-led military operations—a key example of the critical role of space systems in defense—has mixed impacts on the security of outer space. Signi cant reliance on space systems encourages the United States to reduce con ict in space. However, that same reliance enhances the strategic value for adversaries to target U.S. military space systems in the event of terrestrial con ict. Nevertheless, U.S. e orts at international cooperation, along with repeated statements and practices that advocate for the responsible use of space and deterring aggression in space through resiliency and transparency, have a markedly positive e ect on long-term space security. Interdependence and cooperation increase, while uncertainty among other space actors is reduced.
INDICATOR 6.2: Russian military space systems — Russia maintains the second largest eet of military satellites. Its early warning, imaging intelligence, communications, and navigation systems were developed during the Cold War. Because between 70 and 80 percent of spacecraft have exceeded their designed lifespan, their current operational status is uncertain. Forced by funding constraints to prioritize upgrades, Russia focused rst on its early warning systems. It continues work to complete the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), which was allocated 3.7-billion rubles for 2010-2011. Since 2004 Russia has focused on “maintaining and protecting” its eet of satellites and developing satellites with post-Soviet technology. In 2006, the rst year of a 10-year federal space program, Russia increased its military space budget by as much as one-third, following a decade of severe budget cutbacks. Despite the recent growth in Russia’s spending, capabilities will only gradually increase, because signi cant investments are required to upgrade virtually all of its military space systems.
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2011 Development: • Amid continuing launch failures, Russia updates some satellite constellations, declares GLONASS fully operational Space Security Impact Russia’s progress in updating its military space systems has been hindered by widespread launch failures that impact both civil and military activities. While Russian critics have focused on the cost of setbacks and failures, they have also praised the value of successes such as a fully operational GLONASS. e latter, coupled with Russian international collaborative e orts in launch and navigation capabilities, may provide incentives for further cooperation with international partners and bode well for the security of outer space.
INDICATOR 6.3: Chinese military and dual-use space systems — China’s governmental space program does not maintain a strong separation between civil and military applications. Ocially, its space program is dedicated to science and exploration, but like the programs of many other actors, it is believed to provide support to the military. China’s space program is led by the Space Leading Group, whose members include three senior ocials of government bodies that oversee the defense industry in China. Most of China’s satellites are civilian or commercial, but many have capabilities that could also be used for military purposes. China has advanced remote sensing capabilities that could support imagery intelligence and also operates the Beidou regional navigation system designed to augment the data received from the United States. GPS system and enable China to maintain navigational capability if the United States were to deny GPS services in times of con ict. 2011 Development: • China continues deploying space-based military capabilities Space Security Impact China conducted more launches in 2011 than in any previous year, demonstrating a commitment to growing space capabilities, including its military space constellation. Continued limited transparency of China’s space capabilities and intentions is a concern for space security. For example, China continues to classify satellites believed to be of dedicated military or dual use as “scienti c,” increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation and mistrust and negatively impacting space security. is trend further highlights the value of transparency and information sharing among actors to reduce the possibility of con ict in space.
INDICATOR 6.4: Indian multiuse space systems — India has one of the oldest and largest space programs in the world, with a range of indigenous dual-use capabilities. Space launch has been a driving force behind the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). India has several remote sensing and at least one dedicated military surveillance satellites. e Cartosat series of remote sensing satellites are generally considered dual-use. e Indian National Satellite System is one of the most extensive domestic satellite communications networks in Asia. To enhance its use of U.S. GPS, the country has been developing GAGAN, the Indian satellite-based augmentation system. is will be followed by the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), which is to provide an independent satellite navigation capability. Although these are civilian-developed and -controlled technologies, they are used by the Indian military for its applications. 2011 Development: • India continues growing its remote sensing constellation
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Space Security Impact Future dedicated military satellites are part of India’s plan to continue growing its space capabilities. Growing reliance on space systems could have a bene cial impact on long-term space security. e deciding factor may be India’s willingness to maintain transparency about its space activities and intentions; a lack of openness could increase misinterpretation and mistrust, spurring competition and con ict.
INDICATOR 6.5: Development of military and multiuse space capabilities by other countries — States such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Israel, Italy, and Spain have recently been developing multiuse satellites with a wider range of functions. As security becomes a key driver of these space programs, expenditures on multiuse space applications go up. Hence, in the absence of dedicated military satellites, many actors use their civilian satellites for military purposes or purchase data and services from other satellite operators. Europe continues to pursue the development of the Galileo navigation system; EU member states exhibit a strong predisposition for collaboration by sharing space capabilities with partners. 2011 Developments: • Canada joins Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) Project • Chile’s first military intelligence satellite launched • Europe raises cost estimate to fund Galileo; launches delayed In-Orbit Validation (IOV) satellites • Iran launches second indigenous remote sensing satellite “Rasad,” plans for bigger, more complex satellites • Japan launches reconnaissance satellites, approves national global navigation satellite system (GNSS) capability Space Security Impact Increased access to space by more actors reduces the advantage of those countries that already rely on space assets and increases the community of actors with a stake in protecting this resource through long-term space security. An ongoing positive impact will depend on continuous cooperative e orts by both established and emerging actors to enhance space situational awareness, avoid interference between systems, and promote transparency and information sharing.
Space Systems Resiliency
INDICATOR 7.1: Vulnerability of satellite communications, broadcast links, and ground stations — Satellite ground stations and communications links constitute likely targets for space negation e orts, since they are vulnerable to a range of widely available conventional and electronic weapons. While military satellite ground stations and communications links are generally well protected, civil and commercial assets tend to be less well protected. Many commercial space systems have only one operations center and one ground station, making them particularly vulnerable to negation e orts. e vulnerability of civil and commercial space systems raises security concerns, since a number of military space actors are becoming increasingly dependent on commercial space assets for a variety of applications. While many actors employ passive electronic protection capabilities, such as shielding and directional antennas, more advanced measures, such as burst transmissions, are generally con ned to military systems and the capabilities of more technically advanced states. Because the vast majority of space assets depend on cyber networks, the link between cyberspace and outer space constitutes a critical vulnerability.
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2011 Developments: • Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS) Block 10 nears initial operational capability • Programs under way to mitigate risk of cyber attack • High-integrity GPS (HIGPS) demonstrates full functionality Space Security Impact E orts to identify and report sources of interference and to continue operations despite degradation to critical systems are leading to increased resiliency. Space actors may refrain from interfering with well protected space systems if such attacks seem both futile and costly. Moreover, the consolidation of cybersecurity e orts internationally and across agencies and programs will mitigate the damage posed to space security infrastructures by potential cyberattacks. Policies that allow o ensive action against cyberthreats have potential implications for space security.
INDICATOR 7.2: Capacity to rebuild spacecraft and integrate distributed architectures into space operations — e ability to rapidly rebuild space systems after an attack could reduce vulnerabilities in space. Although the United States and Russia are developing elements of responsive space systems, no state has perfected this capability. A key U.S. responsive launch initiative is the Falcon program developed by Space Exploration Technologies (Space X), which consists of launch vehicles capable of rapidly placing payloads into LEO and GEO. Organized under NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, the Falcon 9 uses less expensive components and systems than traditional rockets, including nine kerosene/liquid-oxygen-burning Merlin engines. Similarly, the development of fractionated architectures, such as the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) System F6, is meant to provide system redundancy and increase assurance of continued operation of critical space infrastructures. 2011 Developments: • The United States launches and deploys two Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) satellites • U.S. Combatant Command utilizing Cubesats for missions • DARPA System F6 program selects prime contractor • Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP) mission begins Space Security Impact Multiple programs show the prioritization of, and progress in, new technologies that can be integrated quickly into space operations. Smaller, less expensive spacecraft that may be fractionated or distributed on hosts can improve continuity of capability and enhance security through redundancy and rapid replacement of assets. While these characteristics may make attack against these assets less attractive, they may decrease trust and transparency if assets are more dicult to track.
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Space Systems Negation INDICATOR 8.1: Capabilities to attack space communications links — Ground segments, including command and control systems and communications links, remain the most vulnerable components of space systems, susceptible to attack by conventional military means, computer hacking, and electronic jamming. Several instances of intentional jamming of satellite communications continued throughout 2011. For example, European satellite signals, including broadcasts of BBC Persian language, Deutsche Welle, and France’s Eutelsat, have been intentionally jammed from Iran, though it has not been determined that the jamming is state-sponsored. e challenges in addressing cases of jamming that are not always easily attributable to one particular actor have been at the forefront of space security debates. 2011 Development: • Jamming incidents and capabilities continue to proliferate Space Security Impact Jamming is clearly widespread, a ecting both wealthy and poor nations. e ubiquity of the problem should encourage international cooperation, although e ective enforcement of anti-jamming regulations will likely remain challenging for the foreseeable future. Countermeasures will likely be developed to protect against military jamming, thus ensuring continued satellite communications and producing a positive e ect on space security.
INDICATOR 8.2: Earth-based capabilities to attack satellites — Some spacefaring nations possess the means to in ict intentional damage on an adversary’s space assets. Ground-based anti-satellite weapons employing conventional, nuclear, and directed energy capabilities date back to the Cold War, but no hostile use of them has been recorded. e United States, China, and Russia lead in the development of more advanced ground- based kinetic-kill systems that are able to directly attack satellites. Recent incidents involving the use of ASATs against their own satellites (China in 2007 and the United States in 2008) underscore the detrimental e ect that such systems have for space security. Such use can not only aggravate the space debris problem, but contribute to a climate of mistrust among spacefaring nations. 2011 Developments: • India continues to signal interest in the development of ASAT capabilities • U.S. Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) comes to an end, but directed energy weapons continue to be developed Space Security Impact e continued development of capabilities that can enable a spacefaring actor to intentionally compromise the physical and operational integrity of space assets has a negative e ect on space security as it can directly restrict the secure access to space by others. While possession of such capabilities does not necessarily entail their imminent use, their very development may heighten tensions and have a negative e ect on regional and international stability. Clearly, the interest in ASAT capabilities expressed by India and the recent use of ASAT weapons by the United States and China do not bode well for the security of outer space. Despite continued research on directed energy weapons, the ALTB program has been terminated and there are no indications that such capabilities will materialize in the near future.
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INDICATOR 8.3: Space-based negation enabling capabilities — Space-based negation e orts require sophisticated capabilities, such as precision on-orbit maneuverability and space tracking. Deploying space-based ASATs—using kinetic-kill, directed energy, or conventional explosive techniques—would require enabling technologies somewhat more advanced than those used for orbital launch. While microsatellites, maneuverability, and other autonomous proximity operations are essential building blocks for a space-based negation system, they have dual-use potential and are also advantageous for a variety of civil, commercial, and non-negation military programs. For example, microsatellites provide an inexpensive option for many space applications, but could be modi ed to serve as kinetic-kill vehicles or o er targeting assistance for other kinetic-kill vehicles. While several nations have developed such technologies, there is no evidence to suggest that they have been integrated into a dedicated space-based negation system. 2011 Developments: • Pursuit of greater abilities for small spacecraft to rendezvous with satellites • China successfully conducts docking maneuver • X-37B 2 space plane successfully launched Space Security Impact While space-based systems negation remains largely theoretical and no space assets have been deployed with a dedicated negation mission, many extant capabilities could potentially be used for this purpose. e further development of technologies that potentially enable space- based ASAT capabilities may force spacefaring nations to incorporate greater protection measures into their spacecraft and invest more in e ective space situational awareness. Rendezvous and proximity operations, for example, could be perceived as having hostile applications, unless they are conducted transparently.
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The Space Environment
The Space Environment CHAP is chapter assesses indicators of space security related to the physical condition of the space environment, with an emphasis on the impact of human activity in space. e developments described under said indicators cover such areas as the creation of space debris, the use of scarce space resources—such as the registration of orbital slots and the allocation of radio frequencies—and the potential threat posed by Near Earth Objects (NEOs). Space debris, which predominantly consists of objects generated by human activity in space, represents a growing and indiscriminate threat to all spacecraft. e impact of space debris on space security is related to a number of key issues examined in this volume, including the amount of space debris in various orbits, space surveillance capabilities that track space debris
to enable collision avoidance, as well as policy and technical e orts to reduce new debris and TER to potentially remove existing space debris in the future. While all space missions inevitably create some amount of space debris, mainly as rocket booster stages are expended and released to drift in space along with bits of hardware, more serious fragmentations are usually caused by energetic events such as explosions. ese can be both unintentional—as in the case of unused fuel exploding—or intentional—as in the testing of weapons in space that utilize kinetic energy interceptors. Events of both types have created thousands of long-lasting pieces of space debris.1 e year 2010 broke the trend of the preceding three years, in all of which there was a notable debris-generating event. In January 2007 the Chinese weather satellite FY-1C was destroyed with an Anti-Satellite ONE Weapon (ASAT), in February 2008 the United States used a modi ed missile as an ASAT to destroy malfunctioning satellite USA-193 (most pieces of debris resulting from this event were short lived), and in February 2009 two satellites—the Russian satellite Cosmos 2251 and the U.S. satellite Iridium 33—collided. ere were no major debris-generating events during 2011. A growing awareness of the impact of space debris on the security of space assets has encouraged space actors to take steps to mitigate the production of new debris through the development and implementation of national and international debris mitigation guidelines, also examined in this chapter. Earth orbits are limited natural resources. Actors who wish to place a satellite in orbit must secure an appropriate orbital slot in which to do so and secure a portion of the radio spectrum to carry their satellite communications. Both radio frequencies and orbital slots are indispensable tools for all space operations, and in certain orbits their national assignments are coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Developments related to the demand for orbital slots and radio frequencies, as well as the regulatory dynamics associated with the distribution and use of these scarce space resources, are therefore critical for space security. is includes compliance with existing norms and procedures developed through the ITU to manage the use and distribution of orbital slots and radio frequencies.
Space Security Impact Space is a harsh environment and orbital debris represents a growing threat to the secure access to, and use of, space due to the potential for collisions with spacecraft. Because of orbital velocities of up to 7.8 km per second (~30,000 km per hour) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), debris as small as 10 cm in diameter carries the kinetic energy of a 35,000-kg truck traveling at up to 190 km per hour. While objects have lower relative velocities in Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO), debris at this altitude is still moving as fast as a bullet—about 1,800 km per
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hour. No satellite can be reliably protected against this kind of destructive force. While some satellites and spacecraft have been hardened to withstand minor impacts from space debris, it is considered impractical to shield against objects bigger than a few centimeters.
Figure 1.1: Types of Earth orbits*
* See Annex 2 for a description of each orbit’s attributes.
e total amount of manmade space debris in orbit is growing each year and is concentrated in the orbits where human activities take place. LEO is the most highly congested area, especially the Sun-synchronous region. Some debris in LEO will reenter the Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrate in a relatively short period of time due to atmospheric drag, but debris in orbits above 600 km will remain a threat for decades and even centuries. ere have already been a number of collisions between civil, commercial, and military spacecraft and pieces of space debris. Although a rare occurrence, the reentry of very large debris could also potentially pose a threat on Earth. e development of space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities to track space debris and avoid collisions, covered in Chapter 2, provides signi cant space security advantages. E orts to mitigate the production of new debris through compliance with national and international norms, guidelines, standards, and practices can also have a positive impact on space security. Technical measures to eciently remove debris, once developed and used, could have a positive impact in the future. e distribution of scarce space resources, including the assignment of orbital slots and radio frequencies to spacefaring nations, has a direct impact on the ability of actors to access and use space. Growing numbers of space actors, particularly in the communications sector, have led to more competition and sometimes friction over the use of orbital slots and frequencies, which have historically been allocated on a rst-come, rst-served basis. Measures to increase the number of available orbital slots and frequency bands, such as technology to reduce interference between radio signals, could reduce competition and increase the availability of these scarce resources. Con dence in the sustainability of their use creates a strong incentive for space actors to cooperate in the coordination, registration, and use of radio frequencies and orbital slots. Cooperation in this area can also strengthen support for the application of the rule of law to broader space security issues.
Indicator 1.1: Amount of orbital debris e U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is the system that most comprehensively tracks and catalogs space debris, although technological constraints limit it to spot checking rather than continuous surveillance and limit the size of currently cataloged objects to those greater than 10 cm in LEO, and larger in GEO. Currently, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
28 The Space Environment is using the SSN to catalog approximately 17,000 objects 10 cm or larger, of which fewer than 5 percent are operational satellites.2 It is estimated that there are over 300,000 objects with a diameter larger than 1 cm and millions smaller.3 Two key factors a ecting the amount of space debris are the number of objects in orbit and the number of debris-creating launches each year. Growth in the debris population increases the probability of inter-debris collision, which may in turn create further debris. A study by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has shown that, in LEO, inter-debris collisions will become the dominant source of debris production within the next 50 years. As debris collides and multiplies, it could eventually create a “cascade of collisions” that would spread debris to levels threatening sustainable space access.4 Additional space debris in LEO could be created by use of ground- and space-based midcourse missile defense systems, or other weapons testing in space.5
Figure 1.2: Growth in on-orbit population by category 6
Note: This graph depicts the number of objects entering Earth’s orbit in a given year.
Between 1961 and 1996 an average of approximately 240 new pieces of debris were cataloged each year. ese pieces were largely the result of fragmentation and the presence of new satellites. Between 8 October 1997 and 30 June 2004 only 603 new pieces of debris were cataloged—a noteworthy decrease, particularly given the increased ability of the cataloging system. is decline can be directly related to international debris mitigation e orts, which increased signi cantly in the 1990s, combined with a lower number of launches per year. In the three-year period from 2007-2009, an increase in the annual rate of debris production was observed, due to the aforementioned major debris-creating events occurring in each of these years. During 2011 the SSN added more than 1,200 pieces of debris (i.e., 10 cm in diameter or larger) to its catalog; this number constitutes a 7.8 percent increase over 2010. Of course, some of the newly discovered pieces might not have resulted from debris events in 2011. As number and quality of sensors increases, so does the number of tracked and cataloged orbital debris. Collisions between such space assets as the International Space Station (ISS) and very small pieces of untracked debris are frequent but manageable.7 While collisions with larger objects
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remain rare, in April 2011 the ISS had to be repositioned to avoid a collision with a large piece of debris. e close approach of another piece of debris in the same month prompted the ISS crew to take precautionary measures. Both events are described below. Collisions with space debris of varying severity are noted in Figure 1.3 below.
Figure 1.3: Unintentional collisions between space objects 8 Year Event 1991 Inactive Cosmos-1934 satellite hit by cataloged debris from Cosmos 296 satellite 1996 Active French Cerise satellite hit by cataloged debris from Ariane rocket stage 1997 Inactive NOAA-7 satellite hit by uncataloged debris large enough to change its orbit and create additional debris 2002 Inactive Cosmos-539 satellite hit by uncataloged debris large enough to change its orbit and create additional debris 2005 U.S. rocket body hit by cataloged debris from Chinese rocket stage 2007 Active Meteosat-8 satellite hit by uncataloged debris large enough to change its orbit 2007 Inactive NASA Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) believed hit by uncataloged debris large enough to create additional debris 2009 Retired Russian communications satellite Cosmos 2251 collides with U.S. satellite Iridium 33.
2011 Development Cataloged space debris population increases by 7.8 percent since 2010, with lowest number of fragmentation events since 2002 e absence of major debris-generating events in 2011 contributed to the lowest annual total of identi ed satellite breakups since 2002.9 Moreover, only a few dozen pieces of long-lived debris greater than 10 cm in size were created.10 e U.S. SSN detected three standard satellite breakups in 2011. Two involved small auxiliary motors from the Russian Proton Block-DM upper stage. e rst breakup involved a small ullage motor from the 2007 deployment of Cosmos navigation satellites, which fragmented in an orbit of 540 by 18,965 km on 18 August 2011. In the second breakup, an ullage motor from a 1990 Cosmos mission fragmented on 17 November 2011 in an orbit of 420 by 18,620 km. No pieces of debris from either breakup were cataloged by the U.S. SSN.11
Figure 1.4: Total cataloged on-orbit population by launching state by the end of 2011 12
A third breakup took place on 19 December 2011 when a Chinese CZ-3B/E launch vehicle third stage broke up into a few dozen pieces a few days after launch. is occurred at a GSO
30 wThe Space Environment transfer orbit with an altitude of 230 by 41, 715 km and an inclination of 24.3 degrees.13 Despite the relatively low number of breakups, the U.S. SSN had cataloged 17,147 objects as of December 2011, representing a 7.8 percent increase in trackable space debris since 2010.14 By way of comparison, the increase in trackable debris from 2009 to 2010 was 5.1 percent or 809 objects.15 e 7.8 percent increase accounts for an additional 1,248 tracked objects larger than 10 cm in diameter in the U.S. catalog.16 e increase is likely at least partly because the U.S. Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) added tracked, but previously uncataloged, objects to the catalog or cataloged already existing debris from past breakups. While JSpOC may track some 22,000 objects, it only catalogs objects that it can identify and attribute to a speci c launch and launching state.
Figure 1.5: Top 10 breakups of on-orbit objects 17 Common name Launching Year of Altitude of Total Pieces Cause of state breakup breakup cataloged of debris breakup (km) pieces of still debris* in orbit* Fengyun-1C China 2007 850 3,218 3,012 Intentional Collision Cosmos 2251 Russia 2009 790 1,541 1,375 Accidental Collision STEP 2 Rocket Body United States 1996 625 713 63 Accidental Explosion Iridium 33 United States 2009 790 567 493 Accidental Collision Cosmos 2421 Russia 2008 410 509 18 Unknown SPOT 1 Rocket Body France 1986 805 492 33 Accidental Explosion OV 2-1 / LCS-2 Rocket United States 1965 740 473 36 Accidental Body Explosion Nimbus 4 Rocket Body United States 1970 1,075 374 248 Accidental Explosion TES Rocket Body India 2001 670 370 116 Accidental Explosion CBERS 1 Rocket Body China 2000 740 343 189 Accidental Explosion Total: 7,903 5,172 *These totals only include trackable debris (generally >10 cm)
2011 Development 2011 experiences the largest deployment of new spacecraft in a decade More launches took place in 2011 than in any of the previous 10 years. A total of 80 space launches occurred,18 placing 126 new satellites in orbit.19 e last year with this many launches was 2000.20 As of 31 December 2011 a total of 994 operating satellites orbited Earth.21 Most active spacecraft are located in LEO and GSO and many belong to U.S. and Russian entities.22 Four hundred and seventy-one active satellites are located in LEO and 419 in GSO; 441 satellites are of U.S. origin and 101 are from Russia.23
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Figure 1.6: Number of launches by year 24
Space Security Impact Although 2011 experienced an increase in the number of launches and new satellites put in orbit, it also saw the lowest number of fragmentation and debris-creating events in almost a decade. is trend is positive for the security of outer space. Nevertheless, the overall number of pieces of tracked and cataloged debris and of active objects in orbit continues to increase, further congesting already crowded orbits and increasing the risk of accidental collisions. Several spacecraft, including the permanently inhabited ISS, have had to use evasive maneuvers on various occasions to avoid being hit by space debris. Some debris in LEO will reenter the Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrate relatively quickly because of atmospheric drag, but debris in orbits of more than 600 km in altitude will remain a threat for decades and even centuries.
Indicator 1.2: Awareness of space debris threat and eorts to develop and implement international measures to tackle the problem
Growing awareness of space debris threats has led to the development of a number of e orts to decrease the amount of new debris. NASA rst issued guidelines on limiting orbital debris in the August 1995 NASA Safety Standard 1740. In December 2000 the U.S. government issued formal orbital debris mitigation standards for space operators, developed by DoD and NASA. In 2004 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed requirements for satellite operators to move geostationary satellites at the end of their operating life into “graveyard orbits” some 200 to 300 km above GEO. In 2005 new rules went into e ect requiring satellite system operators to submit orbital debris mitigation plans.25 In 2008 NASA published the rst edition of the Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris, which contained the scienti c background for debris mitigation procedures.26 e European Space Agency (ESA) initiated a space debris mitigation e ort in 1998. e ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook was published in 1999 and revised in 2002.27 Also in 2002 ESA issued the European Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standard28 and issued new debris mitigation guidelines in 2003. As well, the European Union’s (EU) proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, the latest draft of which was still the subject of international consultations by the end of 2011, calls on states to “refrain from intentional destruction of any on-orbit space object or other activities which may generate long-lived space debris.”29
32 The Space Environment
e Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) was formed in 1993 as an international forum to harmonize e orts of various space agencies to address the problem posed by orbital debris. As of 2010 the IADC comprised ASI (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana [Italy]), CNES (Centre national d’études spatiales [France]), CNSA (China National Space Administration), CSA (Canadian Space Agency), DLR (German Aerospace Center), ESA, ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation), JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency), NASA, NSAU (National Space Agency of Ukraine), Roscosmos (Russian Federal Space Agency), and the United Kingdom Space Agency. While there are di erences among national debris mitigation guidelines, they are broadly consistent. For example, all address the minimization of debris released during normal operations. However, inconsistent compliance with debris mitigation guidelines continues to be a critical problem for outer space security. Most states require residual propellants, batteries, ywheels, pressure vessels, and other instruments to be depleted or made passive at the end of their operational lifetimes.30 All major national debris mitigation guidelines address the disposal of GEO satellites, typically in graveyard orbits some 235 km above GEO, and most seek the removal of dead spacecraft from LEO within 25 years.31 e Scienti c and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) began discussions on space debris in 1994 and published its Technical Report on Space Debris in 1999. In 2001 COPUOS asked IADC to develop a set of international debris mitigation guidelines, on which it based its own draft guidelines in 2005.32 In 2007 these guidelines were adopted by UN COPOUS and endorsed by the UN General Assembly as voluntary measures with which all states should comply.33 e draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities also calls on signatories to rearm their commitments to the UN COPUOS space debris mitigation guidelines. e progressive development of international and national debris mitigation guidelines has been complemented by research on technologies to physically remove debris. To date, however, no active debris removal (ADR) mechanisms have been implemented, although research into this area continues.
2011 Development Uncontrolled satellite reentries receive mainstream media attention On 24 September 2011 NASA’s Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) reentered the atmosphere and fell to Earth.34 UARS entered the dense portion of the atmosphere at 0400 GMT over the middle of the Paci c Ocean at 14.1ºS, 170.2ºW.35 Despite the fact that satellites similar in size reenter the Earth’s atmosphere on average once a year,36 UARS received major news coverage in the weeks and days leading up to its reentry. Stories on UARS were featured in mainstream publications and news services such as ABC News,37 e New York Times,38 and Fox News.39 Many of the features adopted a fearful tone, suggesting that the reentry of the satellite and its uncertain point of impact were cause for concern to those on Earth.40 Other stories attempted to allay this fear by, for example, pointing out that the odds of a piece of UARS debris hitting a person on Earth was 1 in 3,200.41 Almost exactly a month later, on 23 October 2011 the German X-ray astronomy satellite ROSAT reentered the Earth’s atmosphere over the Bay of Bengal.42 It is unclear if any pieces of the satellite reached Earth.43 ROSAT’s reentry also received signi cant mainstream media attention all over the world, with feature stories in major news sources such as ABC News,44 e Telegraph,45 Fox News,46 and the Daily Mail.47 As with the UARS coverage,
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the stories surrounding the ROSAT reentry focused on whether or not the satellite pieces would endanger people on Earth.48 Mainstream media coverage of both incidents was so pervasive that they were named number one on a list of the Most Memorable Space ight Stories of 2011.49 While these reentry events received the most mainstream media attention, UARS and ROSAT were just two of 39 satellites to reenter Earth’s atmosphere in 2011.50 e reentry of Phobos-Grunt in early 2012 also received mainstream media coverage (see Chapter 2 for further information on Phobos-Grunt).51 is increase in reentries is not unexpected as a period of high solar activity (i.e., solar maximum) will occur in 2013.52 Greater solar activity will expand the atmosphere, creating increased atmospheric density, and thus more drag, to objects below 900 km in altitude. During periods of high solar activity, objects in these lower altitudes are expected to have their altitudes lowered as much as ten times more quickly than during periods of low solar activity (i.e., solar minimum).
2011 Development Orbital debris continues to have a growing impact on operational spacecraft On 1 April 2011 a potentially threatening piece of orbital debris from the 2009 Iridium- Cosmos satellite collision led ight controllers to reposition the International Space Station at 0236 GMT.53 Four days later, on 5 April 2011, a piece of orbital debris from the 2007 Chinese ASAT test passed within 4.5 km of the ISS, forcing the crew to take precautionary measures.54 e three-person ISS crew closed hatches between some station modules and took shelter in the Soyuz TMA-20 spacecraft, which served as the crew’s lifeboat.55 e piece of debris made its closest approach at 2021 GMT, according to NASA.56 No avoidance maneuver was conducted because the approaching debris was not noticed in time.57 On 29 September 2011 the ISS did conduct another avoidance maneuver in response to a piece of debris from a Tsyklon rocket body.58 e Canadian RADARSAT satellites had to be maneuvered ve times in 2011 to avoid space debris.59 ese maneuvers were based on alerts received from U.S. Strategic Command and mathematical conjunction analyses conducted by the CSA.60 According to agency director general of space science and technology David Kendall, “the numbers of near-misses are going up, rather alarmingly.”61 Between April and December 2011 there were 14 close approach alerts for RADARSAT-1, two of which required avoidance maneuvers and 14 alerts for RADARSAT-2, three of which required maneuvers.62 In 2011 NASA conducted nine collision avoidance maneuvers of its robotic satellites.63 Four of those nine maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris generated by the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the Iridium-Cosmos collision of 2009.64
34 The Space Environment
Figure 1.7: Collision avoidance maneuvers of NASA robotic satellites during 2011 65 Spacecraft Maneuver Date Object Avoided Aqua 2 January Cosmos 2251 Debris Aqua 8 February Iridium 33 Debris Calipso 18 February OV2-1 Aqua 1 March Agena D Debris Cloudsat 18 June Aqua TDRS 7 18 October Ekran 4 Cloudsat 6 November Terra Landsat 7 29 November Cosmos 374 Debris Cloudsat 14 December Fengyun-1C Debris
2011 Development Various states signal compliance with international space debris mitigation guidelines Over the course of two months between July and September 2011 the ESA maneuvered its Earth observation satellite ERS-2 into a shorter-lived disposal orbit.66 ESA conducted more than 60 maneuvers to move the 2.1 metric ton ERS-2 from an orbit of 785 km to one with a mean altitude of 573 km.67 At this altitude ERS-2 will de-orbit in about 15 years, a timeframe in accordance with its own guidelines and international recommendations.68
Figure 1.8: UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 69 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
1. Limit debris released during normal operations. 2. Minimize the potential for breakups during operational phases. 3. Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit. 4. Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities. 5. Minimize potential for post-mission breakups resulting from stored energy. 6. Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission. 7. Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission.
In an ocial white paper outlining its space activities in 2011, China stated that it “has steadily pushed forward its work on space debris mitigation, fully inactivating Long March rockets, and moving a few aging GEO satellites out of orbit.”70 It committed to further strengthening “its work on space debris monitoring and mitigation and its work on spacecraft protection,” as well as taking “measures to reduce space debris left by post-task spacecraft and launch vehicles.”71 NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) moved two large GSO satellites into graveyard orbits in accordance with U.S. and international guidelines during 2011.72 NASA’s communications satellite TDRS 4 was maneuvered on 28 November 2011 using two major burns, shifting it to a disposal orbit 300–500 km above the geosynchronous orbit.73 Additional maneuvers on 9 December 2011 were used to deplete the expired satellite’s remaining fuel.74 NOAA replaced the GOES 11 satellite with GOES 15 on 6 December 2011.75 On 16 December 2011 NOAA conducted two maneuvers to transfer
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GOES 11 to an orbit 350 km above GSO and then depleted its remaining propellants.76 In addition to TDRS 4 and GOES 11, four other U.S.-owned satellites in GSO were disposed of in accordance with guidelines during 2011.77
Figure 1.9: U.S. GSO satellites moved to disposal orbit 78 Spacecraft International Designator Minimum Height above GEO Maximum Height above GEO TDRS 4 1989-021B 460 km 560 km INTELSAT 2 1994-040A 265 km 355 km INTELSAT 705 1995-013A 290 km 445 km INTELSAT 3R 1996-002A 295 km 380 km ECHOSTAR 4 1998-028A 340 km 410 km GOES 11 2000-022A 340 km 355 km
After ceasing operations in June 2011 the JAXA Akari infrared astronomical telescope was maneuvered into a lower orbit to limit its remaining time in space, “where the vehicle might pose a hazard to operational spacecraft or be the subject of a debris-creating collision by another resident space object.”79 Akari, which initially operated at an altitude of approximately 700 km, was moved to an orbital altitude of 440 km to ensure that it decays within 25 years, following national and international guidelines.80
2011 Development International awareness of orbital debris problem increases and progress on solutions continues On 1 September 2011 the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) released a detailed report reviewing “NASA’s current e orts with regard to meteoroids and orbital debris and [providing] recommendations as to whether NASA should increase or decrease its e orts or pursue new directions.”81 e NRC’s Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board formed the Committee for the Assessment of NASA’s Orbital Debris Programs to write and compile the report.82 Dr. Donald Kessler, a retired NASA senior scientist, headed the committee of 13 experts. e report states that “under a handful of reasonable assumptions,” the population of orbital debris may have already reached its “tipping point.”83 e “tipping point” refers to the moment at which the amount of debris already in orbit will continually collide with itself, creating even more debris in a cascading and irreversible way, otherwise known as the Kessler syndrome.84 is process has been most rapid in LEO, but will also occur in GSO over a longer time period.85 Once this threshold has been crossed, argues the report, mitigation e orts will no longer be sucient to stabilize the debris population in near-Earth orbit. At this point, active debris removal (ADR) or remediation will become necessary for safe and a ordable space operations. However, the manifestation of this situation—increasingly frequent accidental collisions—may take decades to become evident. In the interim, the probability that operational satellites will be severely disrupted or have missions terminated becomes much likelier and conditions must be monitored carefully. e report argues that, while NASA already acknowledges the need for ADR, more work must be done to put it into practice.86 Since any orbital debris removal scheme will cross “crucial national and international legal thresholds,” the report recommended that NASA engage with the U.S. State Department through NASA’s General Counsel to explore the legal and diplomatic aspects of ADR.87
36 The Space Environment
NASA and the U.S. Department of Defense met on 1 March 2011 for the 14th Orbital Debris Working Group (ODWG) Meeting in Houston, Texas.88 At the meeting, the two agencies discussed a directive in the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy for both NASA and DoD to pursue research and development of technologies and techniques “to mitigate and remove on-orbit debris, reduce hazards, and increase understanding of the current and future debris environment.”89 e policy called on DoD and NASA to “identify potential debris removal technology options across [both agencies] and to foster a collaborative environment between NASA and DoD for orbital debris technology synergies.”90 It was decided in Houston that the ODWG was not the proper forum for such collaboration.91 On 29 August 2011 the Space Policy Oce of the Under-Secretary of Defense Policy hosted a workshop with NASA to coordinate the agencies’ activities on the policy direction outside of the ODWG.92 As mentioned in the previous development, the People’s Republic of China released a White Paper on 29 December 2011, China’s Space Activities in 2011.93 e White Paper highlights orbital debris mitigation as a key priority for its space activities over the past ve years and into the future.94 On 3 February 2011 the International Interdisciplinary Congress on Space Debris released its report Towards Long-term Sustainability of Space Activities: Overcoming the Challenges of Space Debris and presented it to UN COPUOS.95 e report was the product of two international, interdisciplinary conferences held in Montreal, Canada on 8-9 May 2009 and in Cologne, Germany on 29-30 April 2010. e report aims to “objectively demonstrate the current status of space debris, assess the e ectiveness of current debris mitigation measures, and o er recommendations to improve current and future space debris mitigation and/or remediation e orts.”96 It concluded that widespread public awareness of the debris problem and its associated risks was necessary before any solutions could be implemented97 and that maintaining the status quo was no longer feasible.98 e report also considered other potential solutions, including transforming the COPUOS Debris Mitigation Guidelines into Principles, adopting a space code of conduct and industrial standards, and establishing a “public, open-source, world-wide SSA space objects catalogue and tracking network.”99 Ultimately, the report represented a multiyear, interdisciplinary, international, and concerted e ort to address the challenges stemming from space debris and the options available for addressing them. In March 2011 Intelsat signed an agreement with Canadian company MDA Corporation to become the anchor tenant for a satellite on-orbit servicing spacecraft, known as the Space Infrastructure Servicing (SIS) vehicle.100 On 16 January 2012, however, Intelsat and MDA decided to cancel their collaborative agreement involving SIS servicing.101 (See Chapter 5 for further details on this development.) On 2 November 2011 the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced its new Phoenix program, created to “develop and demonstrate technologies to cooperatively harvest and re-use valuable components from retired, non-working satellites in GEO and demonstrate the ability to create new space systems at greatly reduced cost.”102 Essentially, the Phoenix program aims to “repurpose space junk thousands of miles above Earth back into valuable satellite parts, or even completely new spacecraft.”103
Space Security Impact e growing worldwide appreciation of the threat posed by space debris to the sustainability of outer space is a positive development, as are the e orts to nd solutions to the problem.
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While policymakers are working to strengthen existing debris mitigation guidelines, scientists and engineers have begun research on the next phase: orbital debris removal, a necessary complement to debris mitigation to ensure continued space security. However, voluntary guidelines are not sucient to address the problem, as demonstrated by the recurring failure of some spacecraft operators to comply with end-of-life requirements in the GEO belt.
Indicator 1.3: Demand for radio frequency (RF) spectrum and communications bandwidth Radio frequencies e radio frequency spectrum is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum that allows the transmission of radio signals. It is divided into portions known as frequency bands. Frequency is generally measured in hertz, de ned as cycles per second. Radio signals can also be characterized by their wavelength, which is the inverse of the frequency. Higher frequencies (shorter wavelengths) are capable of transmitting more information than lower frequencies (longer wavelengths), but require more power to travel longer distances. Certain widely used frequency ranges have been given alphabetical band names in the U.S. Communications satellites tend to use the L-band (1-2 gigahertz [GHz]) and S-band (2-4 GHz) for mobile phones, ship communications, and messaging. e C-band (4-8 GHz) is widely used by commercial satellite operators to provide services such as roving telephone services and the Ku-band (12-18 GHz) is used to provide connections between satellite users. e Ka-band (27-40 GHz) is now being used for broadband communications. Ultra-High Frequency, X-, and K-bands (240-340 megahertz, 8-12 GHz, and 18-27 GHz, respectively) have traditionally been reserved in the United States for the military.104 Most satellite communication falls below 60 GHz; thus actors are competing for a relatively small portion of the radio spectrum, with competition particularly intense for the segment of the spectrum below 3 GHz.105 Additionally, the number of satellites operating in the 7-8 GHz band, commonly used by GEO satellites, has grown rapidly over the past two decades.106 Since many satellites vie for this advantageous frequency and ever closer orbit slots, there is an increased risk of accidental signal interference. Originally adopted in 1994, the ITU Constitution107 governs international sharing of the nite radio spectrum and orbital slots used by satellites in GEO. Article 45 of the Constitution stipulates that “all stations…must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other members.”108 Military communications are exempt from the ITU Constitution, though they must observe measures to prevent harmful interference. It is observed that “interference from the military communication and tracking systems into satellite communications is on the rise,”109 as military demand for bandwidth grows. While crowded orbits can result in signal interference, new technologies are being developed to manage the need for greater frequency usage, allowing more satellites to operate in closer proximity without interference. Frequency hopping, lower power output, digital signal processing, frequency-agile transceivers, and software-managed spectrum have the potential to signi cantly improve bandwidth use and alleviate con icts over bandwidth allocation. Current receivers have a higher tolerance for interference than those created decades ago, re ecting the need for increased frequency usage and sharing.110 Signi cant research is also being conducted on the use of lasers for communications, particularly by the military. Lasers transmit information at very high bit rates and have very tight beams, which could allow for
38 The Space Environment tighter placement of satellites, thus alleviating some of the current congestion and concern about interference. Issues of interference arise primarily when two spacecraft require the same frequencies at the same time, and their elds of view overlap or they are transmitting in close proximity to each other. While interference is not epidemic, it is a growing concern for satellite operators, particularly in crowded space segments. One way to reduce such interference is to ensure that all actors have access to reasonable and sucient bandwidth. To this end the U.S. DoD released a portion of the military-reserved spectrum from 1.710-1.755 GHz to the commercial sector for third-generation wireless communications.111 As described below, the situation that arose in 2011, when it was determined that thousands of high- powered transmitters to be deployed by telecommunications company LightSquared would interfere with GPS signals in the United States underscores the importance of such issues for sustainable space operations. Orbital slots Today’s satellites operate mainly in three basic orbital regions: LEO, MEO (Medium Earth Orbit), and GEO (see Figure 1.1). As of 1 April 2012 there are approximately 999 operating satellites, of which 470 are in LEO, 69 in MEO, 424 in GEO, and 36 in Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO).112 HEO is increasingly being used for speci c applications, such as early warning satellites and polar communications coverage. LEO is often used for remote sensing and earth observation, and MEO is home to space-based navigation systems such as the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS). Most communications and some weather satellites are in GEO, as orbital movement at this altitude is synchronized with the Earth’s 24-hour rotation, so that a satellite in GEO appears to “hang” over one spot on Earth. GEO slots are located above or very close to the Earth’s equator. Low inclinations are also desired to maximize the reliability of the satellite footprint. e orbital arc of interest to the United States lies between 60° and 135° W longitude, because satellites in this area can serve the entire continental United States;113 these slots are also optimal for the rest of the Americas. Similarly desirable spots exist over Africa for Europe and over Indonesia for Asia. GEO satellites must generate high-power transmissions to deliver a strong signal to Earth, due to distance and the use of high bandwidth signals for television or broadband applications.114 To avoid radio frequency interference, GEO satellites are required to maintain a minimum of two and up to nine degrees of orbital separation, depending on the band they are using to transmit and receive signals, the service they provide, and the eld of view of their ground antennas.115 us, only a limited number of satellites can occupy the prime equator (0 degree inclination) orbital path. In the equatorial arc around the continental United States there is room for only an extremely limited number of satellites. To deal with restricted availability of orbital slots, the ITU Constitution states that radio frequencies and associate orbits, including those in GEO, “must be used rationally, eciently and economically…so that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access” to both.116 However, in practice the orbital slots in GEO have been secured on a rst-come, rst-served basis. Equitable treatment has been further compromised by a rash of early registrations with the ITU, often of so-called “paper satellites,” combined with ITU revenue shortfalls and disputes over satellite network ling fees. “At one time there were about 1300 lings (applications) for satellite networks before the ITU and about 1200 of them were for paper satellites.”117 e ITU fee schedule, which links charges to the complexity and size of a ling, was last updated in 2008. While there is a at fee of $570, fees can reach almost $60,000 for complex requests requiring extensive coordination.118 Additional measures to reduce unnecessary registrations
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include a requirement that satellites be brought online within seven years of a request, a requirement for the provision of advanced publication information at the time of ling to verify the seriousness of intention, and payment of ling fees within six months.119 Originally, crowding in the MEO region was not a concern, as the only major users were the United States with GPS and Russia with its Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). However, concern is increasing that problems could develop in this area when Russia adds more satellites and if both China and the EU progress with plans for constellations of their own. e ITU requires that the operational frequencies for these constellations be registered, but does not stipulate speci c orbital slots. All four of these systems use or will use multiple orbits in di erent inclinations, and each system has a di erent operational altitude. While not necessarily a problem for daily operations, the failure to properly dispose of MEO satellites at the end of their operational life could cause future problems if the disposal is done within the operational altitude of another system.
2011 Development LightSquared telecommunications plan interferes with GPS signals in the United States On 24 January 2011 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conditionally approved the U.S. telecommunications company LightSquared’s plan to deploy 40,000 high-power transmitters for providing broadband service to customers, despite awareness that they would interfere with nearby GPS signals.120 is interference would occur because “the lower limit of the GPS band is less than 5 MHz away from the edge of the LightSquared allocation.”121 If deployed, LightSquared’s transmitters would generate enough noise to prevent receivers from “hearing” the weak GPS signal.122 ese conclusions were supported by two technical reports, one by a White House-chartered panel, National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Systems Engineering Forum (NPEF), and the other by a technical association, the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics.123 e FCC granted its approval to LightSquared on the condition that it would work with the U.S. Global Positioning System Industry Council and U.S. military, which operates GPS, “to determine the extent of interference and develop mitigation measures.”124 Tests were to be completed by 31 May 2011, with a nal report presented to the FCC in mid- June.125 e report stated that “although the results vary among devices, transmissions in the 10 MHz band at the top of LightSquared’s downlink frequencies—the band nearest to the GPS frequencies—will adversely a ect the performance of a signi cant number of legacy GPS receivers.”126 Nevertheless, LightSquared made the claim that this interference resulted from a failure on the part of GPS receiver manufacturers to ensure that their devices were adequately equipped to block out noise from neighboring frequencies.127 e U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee approved action that would halt further FCC expenditure regarding LightSquared’s conditional waiver until resolution of the GPS interference issue.128 LightSquared countered by seeking a declaratory ruling from the FCC con rming its right to use the spectrum licensed to the company by the FCC and the lack of any legal basis for GPS to ask for interference protections.129 e company claims that GPS devices tune not only into the RNSS band, in which they are authorized to operate, but also into the MSS band where LightSquared is assigned. LightSquared then recommended a three-part solution to address interference with GPS signals: it “would reduce its terrestrial base stations” power below authorized levels, agree to a standstill on using the upper 10 MHz of its L-band downlink frequencies, and initiate
40 The Space Environment commercial operation using only the lower 10 MHz of its L-band downlink frequencies.130 However, this proposal failed to allay fears about interference, so federal agencies and executives called for further testing.131 is testing concluded that both the “original and modi ed plans” for LightSquared’s network “would cause harmful interference to many GPS receivers.”132 On 14 February 2012 the FCC issued a statement saying that it would revoke LightSquared’s conditional license.133
Space Security Impact e nite nature of space resources such as orbital slots and radio frequencies continues to pose complex governance challenges for the ongoing use of space by established and emerging spacefaring actors. e demands of emerging spacefaring states for their own orbital slots and radio frequencies not only add stress to an already congested environment, but also call into question the inherent fairness of an allocation system that has operated on a rst-come, rst-served basis. Moreover, the occurrence of both intentional and unintentional frequency interference will remain a signi cant space security concern for the foreseeable future and will require more e ective regulatory regimes, as illustrated by the LightSquared development described in this chapter.
Indicator 1.4: Threat from NEO collisions and progress toward possible solutions
Near Earth Objects are asteroids and comets whose orbits bring them in close proximity to the Earth or intersect the Earth’s orbit. NEOs are subdivided into Near Earth Asteroids (NEAs) and Near Earth Comets (NECs). Within both groupings are Potentially Hazardous Objects (PHOs), those NEOs whose orbits intersect that of Earth and have a relatively high potential of impacting the Earth itself. As comets represent a very small portion of the overall collision threat, in terms of probability, most NEO researchers commonly focus on Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHAs) instead. A PHA is de ned as an asteroid whose orbit comes within 0.05 astronomical units of the Earth’s orbit and has a brightness magnitude greater than 22 (approximately 150 m in diameter).134 By the end of 2011 there were 8,453 known NEAs, 839 of which were 1 km in diameter or larger.135 Initial e orts to nd threatening NEOs focused on the so-called “civilization-killer” class, which are NEOs 1 km in diameter or larger. It is estimated that there are approximately 1,100 objects in this class,136 and their impacts would have the potential to wipe out regions of the Earth’s surface. However, there is now a growing consensus that the greatest threat is not from asteroids that can destroy the entire Earth, but those that have the potential to destroy large areas such as cities. ese are objects approximately 45 m in diameter, one of which caused the Tunguska explosion in Siberia in 1908. Ongoing technical research is exploring how to mitigate a NEO collision with Earth. e challenge is considerable due to the extreme mass, velocity, and distance of any impacting NEO. Mitigation methods are divided into two categories that depend on the amount of warning time before a potential impact event. If warning times are in the order of years or decades, constant thrust applications could potentially be used to gradually change the NEO’s orbit. If warning times are relatively short, then certain kinetic methods could potentially be applied. Kinetic de ection methods could include ramming the NEO with a series of kinetic projectiles, but some researchers have advocated the use of nearby explosions of nuclear weapons to try to change the trajectory of the NEO. However, this method would create additional threats to the environment and stability of outer space and would have complex technical challenges and policy implications. 41 Space Security Index 2012
e increasing international awareness of the potential threat posed by NEOs has prompted discussions at various multilateral forums on the technical and policy challenges related to mitigation, as described below.
2011 Development International awareness of the NEO problem and discussions on solutions continue to increase e International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) held the fourth Planetary Defense Conference on 9-12 May 2011 in Bucharest, Romania, hosted by the Romanian Space Agency.137 e conference produced a white paper summarizing key points and recommendations from the meeting.138 Key points were compiled under the headings “Discovery and Characterization,” “ reats,” “De ection and Disruption,” “Educating the Public,” “Civil Defense,” and “Legal and Policy.”139 Recommendations to major space agencies included, inter alia, planning for events in which an object is discovered with little warning and for missions that demonstrate various de ection and disruption options, and grasping “‘teachable moments’ such as this November’s close approach of asteroid 2005 YU55 to help the public understand asteroid risk and mitigation.”140 In late 2011 the German Aerospace Center (DLR) announced that it would coordinate a multiyear international e ort to “investigate in detail the three most promising mitigation techniques” for addressing NEO threats: “the kinetic impactor, blast de ection, and the gravity tractor.”141 is initiative, NEOShield, brings together 13 partner organizations from six di erent countries, including the United States and Russia, to examine mitigation methods, the physical properties of NEOs, technology development, demonstration missions, and a global response campaign roadmap.142 Canada’s Near-Earth Object Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSat) is the “world’s rst space telescope dedicated to detecting and tracking asteroids and satellites.”143 While the launch of NEOSSat was originally scheduled for 2010,144 the new launch date is in 2012.145 Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) and CSA are jointly funding the project.146 Microsat Systems Canada Inc., with support from Spectral Applied Research and COM DEV International, are building the suitcase-sized microsatellite.147 NEOSSat will collect hundreds of images a day, which the University of Calgary’s NEOSSat science operations center will download and analyze.148 e program will enable Canada to “contribute to the international e ort to catalogue the near-Earth population of asteroids, producing information that will be crucial to targeting new destinations for future space exploration missions.”149 (See Chapter 2 for further information on NEOSSat.) While international awareness of NEOs has been growing, the number of objects threatening Earth is lower than was previously thought. In accordance with a 1998 U.S. Congressional directive, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in the United States announced on 29 September 2011 that it had completed a more accurate count of NEOs.150 JPL’s survey determined the number and rough location of at least 90 percent of the objects within 195 million km of Earth.151
42 The Space Environment
Figure 1.10: Number of large* Near-Earth Asteroids discovered by year (2002-2011) 152
* Diameter 1 km or larger
Astronomers previously estimated that there were 35,000 midsize NEOs (between 100 and 1,000 m) and 1,000 larger NEOs.153 Upon completion of the study, JPL revised the number of midsize NEOs to 19,500 and the number of larger NEOs to 981.154 is data was gathered by the NEO Wide- eld Infrared Survey Explorer (NEOWISE).155 Between January 2010 and February 2011 “NEOWISE scanned the entire bowl of the sky twice.”156 e resulting data was used in a sampling technique to generate the nal numbers.157 Fifty- two hundred midsize and 911 large objects were cataloged and are now being tracked.158
2011 Development Progress in UN COPUOS toward possible creative threat mitigation solutions UN COPUOS Action Team 14 (AT-14) “is developing recommendations for processes to coordinate information on NEO discoveries and tracking from international sources, bring together spacefaring nations to design mitigation missions and campaigns, involve the civil defense and disaster response agencies in campaign planning, and make decisions associated with mitigation e orts.”159 e work is based on inputs received from Action Team members and in particular the report of the Association of Space Explorers and its Panel on Asteroid reat Mitigation entitled “Asteroid reats—A Call for Global Response.” In August and November 2011 Secure World Foundation and the Association of Space Explorers hosted two NEO workshops in support of AT-14.160
Space Security Impact Progress made in terms of collaborative NEO detection, warning, and decision-making encourages and strengthens international cooperation on space situational awareness data sharing and enhanced space security. While an NEO collision would have detrimental e ects, cooperative multilateral e orts to address this challenge will likely yield positive results for space security by strengthening ties among diverse space actors.
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CHAP Space Situational Awareness is chapter assesses space security indicators and developments related to the technical ability of di erent spacefaring actors “to monitor and understand the changing environment in space.”1 is includes the ability to detect, track, identify, and catalog objects in outer space, such as space debris and active or defunct satellites, as well as observe space weather and monitor spacecraft and payloads for maneuvers and other events.2 Also assessed in this chapter are the growing international e orts made to improve the predictability of space operations through data sharing. A subset of Space Situational Awareness is space surveillance—information about the locations of objects in Earth orbit. ere is no international space surveillance mechanism,
TER but e orts to create one date from the 1980s. In 1989 France proposed the creation of an international Earth-based space surveillance system consisting of radar and optical sensors to allow the international community to track the trajectory of space objects. Such an initiative could complement the United States-Russia agreement to establish the Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Noti cation of Missile Launches.3 In the absence of an international surveillance system, countries are establishing independent capabilities, with a limited degree of information exchange. Driven by Cold War security concerns, the United States and the USSR were pioneers in the development of space surveillance capabilities. Today, a growing number of space actors are investing in space surveillance to facilitate debris monitoring, satellite tracking, and TWO NEO detection. SSA is also a key enabling capability for potential space systems negation, since tracking and identifying targeted objects in orbit are prerequisites to most negation techniques. At present the U.S. Space Surveillance Network is the primary provider of space surveillance data. Although the United States maintains the most capable space surveillance system, Russia continues to have relatively extensive capabilities in this area, and China and India have signi cant satellite tracking, telemetry, and control assets essential to their civil space programs. e satellite intercepted by China on 11 January 2007 was tracked and targeted using such indigenous surveillance technology. Space-based surveillance, rst demonstrated by the United States with the Space Visible Sensor experiment that was decommissioned in 2008,4 is being pursued through the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) system, “a constellation of optical sensing satellites to track and identify space forces in deep space to enable defensive and o ensive counterspace operations.”5 e $823.9-million program is designed to collect real-time data and track satellites that are orbiting from LEO to a higher position,6 using satellites equipped with “an optical telescope that is highly responsive to quick tasking orders, allowing it to shift from target to target quickly in space.”7 SBSS will be able to track every satellite in GEO at least once every 24 hours using its two-axis, gimbaled visible light sensors.8 After several delays, the rst SBSS satellite was placed in orbit on 25 September 2010.
Space Security Impact Improved SSA capabilities can have a positive impact on the security of outer space inasmuch as they can be used to predict and/or prevent harmful interference with the assets of spacefaring states and private satellite operators. In an increasingly congested domain, with new civil and commercial actors gaining access every year (see Chapter 4), SSA constitutes a vital tool for the protection of space assets. Additionally, increasing the amount of SSA data
44 Space Situational Awareness available to all states can help increase the transparency and con dence of space activities, which can reinforce the overall stability of the outer space regime. However, the positive impact that SSA has on space security must be quali ed by the fact that currently advanced SSA capabilities are not widely available and, therefore, space actors must rely on the information provided by those states with advanced SSA—most notably, the United States. Moreover, while militaries and intelligence agencies used to be the primary users of SSA data, the number and diversity of civil and commercial actors that would bene t from SSA data have grown substantially since the end of the Cold War and will likely exert mounting pressure for cooperative approaches to SSA and increased data sharing. e sharing of SSA data a ords bene ts to all space actors, as it enables them to supplement the data collected by national assets at little or no additional expense. Still, there is currently no operational global system for space surveillance, in part because of the sensitive nature of surveillance data. In addition, technical and policy challenges put constraints on data sharing, although e orts among select actors are under way to overcome these challenges, as exempli ed by the U.S. government’s recent measures to continue the expansion of its SSA Sharing Program, as described below. In addition to being a vital tool for preventing accidental collisions and otherwise harmful interference with space objects, SSA capabilities can be used for the protection and potential negation of satellites. At the same time, SSA enhances the ability to distinguish space negation attacks from technical failures or environmental disruptions and can thus contribute to stability in space by preventing grave misunderstandings and false accusations of hostile actions. It bears noting that, to avoid collisions, the operator of a space asset needs to know that there is an object it could collide with, not the exact nature of that object.
Indicator 2.1: Space situational awareness capabilities in the United States e U.S. SSN, the most advanced system for tracking and cataloging space objects, is a network of radar and optical sensors strategically located at more than two dozen sites worldwide. e SSN can reliably track objects in LEO with a radar cross-section of 10 cm or greater and 1 meter or greater in GEO. Because it uses a tasked sensor approach—not all orbital space is searched at all times—objects are only periodically ‘spot checked’. e U.S. Air Force (USAF) Space Surveillance System or Space Fence is the oldest component of the SSN and consists of three transmitters and six receivers spread across the southern U.S. It provides the greatest number of observations of any sensor in the network and is capable of making ve million detections each month of objects larger than a basketball to an altitude of 10,000 km.9 A new S-Band Space Fence (the current phase of development is described below) could cost more than $6-billion to design and procure.10 e system, which will include a series of S-band radars in separate locations, has a target completion date of 2017.11 Many of the other SSN sensors also do double duty as missile warning radars. e sensors that currently make up the SSN can be grouped into three categories:12 Dedicated: e primary mission of these USAF Space Command sensors is space surveillance. Collateral: ese USAF Space Command sensors contribute to the SSN, but have a primary mission other than space surveillance, such as missile warning. Contributing: ese sensors belong to private contractors or other government agencies and provide some data under contract to the SSN. 45 Space Security Index 2012
Data from all SSN sensors is used to maintain positions on as many as 22,000 manmade objects in Earth orbit. ose objects that can be tracked repeatedly, and whose sources have been identi ed, are recorded in the satellite catalog, which currently has more than 17,000 entries. A low accuracy version of this catalog is publicly available at the Space Track website,13 but the data is not suciently precise to adequately support collision avoidance. e USAF uses a private high-accuracy catalog for a number of data products. Operators outside the U.S. government can also request surveillance information through the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) program, a pilot initiative started in 2004 that allows satellite operators to access space surveillance data through a website. Initially, the USAF Space Command oversaw the CFE pilot program and its website, Space-Track.org. In 2009, however, responsibility for CFE, renamed SSA Sharing Program, was transferred to the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)—speci cally, to the Joint Functional Component Command for Space. But while some operators would like direct access to orbital data, there is some reluctance to release it widely.14 For instance, regulations for the CFE program restrict the sharing of surveillance information with a non-U.S. government entity to agreements in which “providing such data analysis to that entity is in the national security interest of the United States.”15 In recent years there has been increased impetus in the United States to boost conjunction analysis—the ability to accurately predict high-speed collisions between two orbiting objects. However, this will necessitate certain changes in the way space objects are monitored by the DoD. At the time of the Cosmos-Iridium collision in 2009, approximately 140 spacecraft were being monitored for potential collisions and the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) had ve operators supporting a single position for conjunction prediction.16 To conduct more e ective collision avoidance, more personnel and computing equipment are needed. According to Lt. Gen. Larry James, former commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC Space) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, collision analysis of roughly 1,300 satellites—including approximately 500 that are not maneuverable—would require as many as 20 more people than were available in February 2009.17
2011 Development U.S. SSA capabilities continue to improve Major infrastructure projects intended to expand U.S. SSA capabilities are moving forward. In January 2011 a $107-million USAF contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon18 to “perform preliminary system design, conduct radar performance analyses and evaluations, and develop a functional [preliminary design review] radar system prototype” for the planned S-Band Space Fence.19 e Space Fence is expected to become operational in 2017 and “will allow for monitoring of much smaller objects.”20 e plan is for two Southern Hemisphere radar stations to replace nine in the United States that are now over 50 years old.21 ese new stations will be “geographically dispersed large-scale S-band phased array radars” and will “provide comprehensive Space Situational Awareness through net-centric operations and integrated decision support.”22 By enabling the decommissioning of the very high frequency (VHF) Air Force Space Surveillance System, the Space Fence will “facilitate cost saving force structure changes in the SSN.”23 e USAF will select a contractor for the project, which could cost as much as $6.1-billion, next year.24
46 Space Situational Awareness
On 25 September 2011 the Space Tracking and Surveillance System celebrated the second anniversary of its tandem launch.25 e two nearly identical satellites already “had completed on-orbit mission objectives ahead of schedule.”26 In fact, the twenty-second, and nal, test focus area as de ned by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was successfully demonstrated in April 2011, ve months early.27 e original purpose of STSS was to support the work of MDA; STSS has since been transferred to USAF Space Command to provide “support for the SSA mission area.”28 e Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) developed by DARPA took its rst images in February 201129 and was readied for a demonstration set to begin in October 2011.30 Once this demonstration period is completed, SST will undergo an Air Force Space Command utilization study before it can join the Space Surveillance Network.31 e $110-million SST is expected to be able to “scan the skies faster than any other of its size” and has “superior data-collection capacity,” which is a result of its 3.5-m aperture.32 If it passes its evaluation and becomes a part of the SSN, it is expected to signi cantly enhance the quality and quantity of SSA data.33 ese projects demonstrate two trends in U.S. SSA activities. First, there is a move toward deploying systems dedicated to SSA, rather than using systems purposed for other missions to perform SSA tasks as well. Second, these systems aim to detect and track smaller objects with greater precision, thus expanding the number of objects trackable by the United States. (See Chapter 7 for further information on U.S. SSA capabilities.)
Space Security Impact Although the United States remains the single largest collector and provider of SSA data worldwide, signi cant gaps remain in its ability to detect and track smaller objects, which are still capable of in icting damage on expensive and strategically important spacecraft. If the U.S. SSA Sharing Program continues, recent developments, which are aimed at lling those gaps, will signi cantly enhance safety for all space actors. Increased political capital and budgetary allocations spent on improving SSA capabilities in the United States constitute a major positive step for space security, and could become even more bene cial insofar as the United States continues to pursue international collaboration on SSA.
Indicator 2.2: Global space situational awareness capabilities Russia also has a dedicated space surveillance system, the Space Surveillance System (SSS), although it is not as advanced as the U.S. SSN. e system relies mainly on the country’s network of early warning radars, as well as more than 20 optical and electro-optical facilities at various locations on Earth.34 e main optical observation system, Okno (“window”), which began operations in 1999, is located in the mountains near the Tajik city of Nurek and used to track objects from 2,000-40,000 km in altitude.35 e space surveillance network also includes the Krona system at Zelenchukskaya in the North Caucasus, which includes dedicated X-band space surveillance radars.36 e SSS has signi cant weaknesses. Due to a limited geographic distribution, it cannot track satellites at very low inclinations or in the Western hemisphere. Operation of Russian surveillance sensors is reportedly erratic.37 e network as a whole is estimated to carry out some 50,000 observations daily, contributing to a catalog of approximately 5,000 objects, mostly in LEO.38 While information from the system is not classi ed, Russia does not have a formal process to widely disseminate space surveillance information.39
47 Space Security Index 2012
Figure 2.1: Russia’s early warning system land-based radars 40 Radar station Radars Year built Olenegorsk (RO-1) Dnestr-M/Dnepr 1976 Olenegorsk (RO-1) Daugava 1978 Mishelevka (OS-1) Dnestr (space surveillance) 1968 Mishelevka (OS-1) two Dnestr-M/Dnepr 1972-1976 Mishelevka (OS-1) Daryal-U non-operational Balkhash, Kazakhstan (OS-2) Dnestr (space surveillance) 1968 Balkhash, Kazakhstan (OS-2) two Dnestr-M/Dnepr 1972-1976 Balkhash, Kazakhstan (OS-2) Daryal-U non-operational Sevastopol, Ukraine (RO-4) Dnepr 1979* Mukachevo, Ukraine (RO-5) Dnepr 1979* Mukachevo, Ukraine (RO-5) Daryal-UM non-operational Pechora (RO-30) Daryal 1984 Gabala, Azerbaijan (RO-7) Daryal 1985 Baranovichi, Belarus Volga 2002 Lekhtusi Voronezh-M 2006 Armavir Voronezh-DM 2009-2010 Kaliningrad Voronezh-DM construction Barnaul Voronezh-DM planned * Operated by Ukraine. No longer used by Russia
France and Germany also use national space surveillance capabilities to monitor debris. France’s Air Force operates the Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale (GRAVES) space surveillance system, which has been fully operational since 2005. e system is capable of monitoring approximately 2,000 space objects, including orbital debris, in LEO up to 1,000 km, and follows more than a quarter of all satellites, particularly those that France considers threatening and those for which the United States does not publish orbital information.41 France has cited the necessity of developing this system to decrease reliance on U.S. surveillance information and to ensure the availability of data in the event of a data distribution blackout.42 Germany’s Tracking and Imaging Radar (TIRA), with a of 34-meter antenna, carries out observations in the L- and Ku-bands and can see objects as small as 2 cm at altitudes of 1,000 km.43 In 2009 Germany inaugurated the German Space Situational Awareness Center (GSSAC) in Uedem, with a mission to coordinate e orts to protect German satellites from on-orbit collisions.44 Included are the ve satellites in the SAR-Lupe radar imaging constellation. German ocials indicated that the GSSAC would rely heavily on U.S. SSA data until the new European program could get under way, but that data from the GSSAC would be made available to international bodies.45 e ESA maintains information in its own Database and Information System Characterising Objects in Space (DISCOS), which also takes inputs from the U.S. public catalog, TIRA, and ESA’s Space Debris Telescope in Tenerife, Spain. DISCOS contains information on launch details, orbit histories, physical properties, and mission descriptions for about 33,500 objects tracked since Sputnik-1—a total of approximately 7.4 million records.46 e Space Debris
48 Space Situational Awareness
Telescope, a 1-m Zeiss optical telescope, focuses on observations in GEO and can detect objects as small as approximately 15 cm.47 According to ESA, approximately 75 percent of detections during GEO observation campaigns with the Space Debris Telescope are objects not contained in the U.S. space surveillance catalog.48 Other optical sensors in Europe, including three Passive Imaging Metric Sensor Telescopes operated by the U.K. Ministry of Defence, the Zimmerwald 1-m telescope at the Astronomical Institute of the University of Berne in Switzerland, and the French SPOC system and ROSACE telescope, contribute to debris surveillance in GEO.49 In 2010 ESA announced plans for a satellite tracking campaign using existing European capabilities as the basis for a European SSA system. Space surveillance is an area of growth for China. Since joining the IADC in 1995, China has maintained its own catalog of space objects, using data from the SSN to perform avoidance maneuver calculations and debris modeling.50 Prior to the launch of the Shenzhou V in 2003, as part of the country’s manned space ight program, it was revealed that the spacecraft had a debris “alarm system” to warn of potential collisions.51 In 2005 the Chinese Academy of Sciences established a Space Object and Debris Monitoring and Research Center at Purple Mountain Observatory, which employs researchers to develop a debris warning system for China’s space assets.52 To support its growing space program, China has established a tracking, telemetry, and command (TT&C) system consisting of six ground stations in China and one each in Namibia and Pakistan, as well as a eet of four Yuan Wang satellite-tracking ships.53 ese assets provide the foundation for space surveillance, but are believed to have limited capacity to track uncooperative space objects. China is believed to have phased array radars that can track space objects, but little is known about them or their capabilities. Since 2004 Japan has operated a radar station in Okayama prefecture dedicated to the observation of space debris. e Kamisaibara Spaceguard Center radar can detect objects as small as one meter to a distance of 600 km, and track up to 10 objects at once.54 Two optical telescopes at the Bisei Astronomical Observatory—a 0.5-m tracking telescope and a 1.01-m re ecting telescope capable of viewing objects as small as 30 cm55—are dedicated to space debris surveillance in GEO. e Canadian military’s Sapphire satellite, which will be the largest part of the Canadian Space Surveillance System, is also intended to contribute space-based surveillance data to the U.S. SSN. Initially scheduled to be launched in 2011 by Indian Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle #20,56 following delays in India’s launch manifest,57 Sapphire is now tentatively scheduled to launch in the second half of 2012. Once Sapphire is launched, the system is expected to provide SSA information on objects located 4,000-40,000 km from Earth.58
2011 Development Europe continues to develop its own SSA capabilities On 7-9 June 2011 the rst European Space Surveillance Conference convened in Madrid, Spain.59 e conference brought together over 150 global experts “to exchange ideas, concepts and solutions to the many challenges [that] stand in the way of safer satellite operations in space.”60 e conference also focused on ESA’s SSA Preparatory Program.61 In addition, 2011 was a busy year for SSA surveillance development activities, considered “the most urgent leg of the programme.”62 Since it was announced in 2009 the Agency’s SSA team has been working “to de ne the system’s overall technical structure, while actively evaluating existing European assets, such as scienti c research radars and telescopes, which could contribute to SSA.”63 Further, the rst generation of software to be used in the 49 Space Security Index 2012
European SSA program was recently implemented. It is currently undergoing testing using the known debris population.64 On 29 September 2011 Poland hosted a special seminar “to foster discussions toward de ning Europe’s future Space Situational Awareness activities.”65 Seminar attendees included key stakeholders in the evolution of Europe’s SSA capability, including senior managers, policymakers, and scientists from ESA, ESA Member States, the EU, European institutions and international partner organizations.66 France maintains a satellite catalog, which contains 2,700 objects observed using their GRAVES radar.67 Germany contributes data from its Tracking and Imaging Radar (TIRA) to the European SSA Programme,68 but does not keep a satellite catalog. e European SSA Preparatory Program, rst approved in 2008 and initially slated for three years, has since been extended for a year and is expected to end in 2012.69 e plan is for the SSA ground data systems to use a Common SSA Integration Framework (COSIF), based on a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). e COSIF will enable the integration of existing sensors and applications available from ESA Member States, and will serve as the backbone integration framework for all SSA ground data systems.70 Additionally, the Space Surveillance and Tracking Centre (SSTC) will be installed at the European Space Astronomy Centre in Spain to manage the collected data.71 Initial precursor space weather monitoring services were established in 2011.72
2011 Development China emphasizes debris monitoring in White Paper On 29 December 2011 the People’s Republic of China released a White Paper, China’s Space Activities in 2011.73 e White Paper highlights orbital debris monitoring and mitigation as a key priority for its space activities over the past ve years and into the future.74 e White Paper also commits China to develop “technologies for monitoring space debris and pre-warning of collision, and begin monitoring space debris and small near-Earth celestial bodies and collision pre-warning work.”75 (See Chapters 1 and 3 for further information on China’s 2011 White Paper.)
2011 Development Space Data Association reaches full operational capability e Space Data Association, a not-for-pro t SSA data-sharing initiative pioneered by the three largest satellite owner-operators (Intelsat, Inmarsat, SES), reached full operational capability on 15 September 2011.76 e SDA Chairman stated that, “with this achievement, [the SDA] will seek to further expand [its] membership.”77 Notably, the next largest satellite company, Eutelsat Communications, joined the SDA as an Executive Member in June 2011.78 As an Executive Member, Eutelsat will have a seat on the board.79 Other members include Avanti, Echostar, GeoEye, Paradigm, SS/L, and StarOne.80 e SDA continues to pursue “data-sharing agreements with a variety of government and industry data providers to enhance the scope and quality of data available.”81 It already has reached data-sharing arrangements with the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT)82 and NOAA.
50 Space Situational Awareness
2011 Development Sapphire Satellite System enhances Canada’s Space Surveillance System In March 2011 Canadian company MDA announced that it had signed a CAD$11.7- million contract with the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) to maintain and operate the Sapphire System for ve years following system commissioning.83 e Sapphire System will “be the largest part of the Canadian Space Surveillance System, and will become the newest space-based sensor of the SSN.”84 MDA will relay assigned tasks from DND to Sapphire, process its collected data, and then send it to the Sensor System Operations Center, where it will be correlated, identi ed, archived, and transmitted to the U.S. Joint Space Operations Center.85 Initially intended to be launched in 2011, the Sapphire System is now slated to be launched in 2012 by India.86 In addition, the Canadian Space Agency is moving forward with its space telescope (NEOSSat) program. One of its two missions is the High Earth Orbit Space Surveillance (HEOSS) project, which will monitor space objects and space junk in an e ort to minimize collisions.87 e NEOSSat program has completed the rst two design phases and demonstrated feasibility and risk retirement.88 Its ability “to track satellites and space debris in a wide variety of locations and not be limited by geographic location, the day-night cycle, or weather” is a major advantage for national and international SSA.89 (See Chapter 1 for further details.)
2011 Development Amateur observers continue to demonstrate their capabilities e volunteer amateur organization Teide Observatory Tenerife Asteroid Survey (TOTAS) located asteroid 2011 SF108 during an observation slot sponsored by ESA’s SSA Program in September.90 is asteroid is the rst NEO to be found under ESA’s SSA sponsorship91 and the forty-sixth asteroid found by a retired school teacher who lives in Germany.92 e TOTAS group “is helping to lay the foundation for a future European asteroid survey as part of the full SSA programme, which is to be decided in 2012.”93 is discovery demonstrated the important role of amateur observers for Europe’s indigenous SSA e ort. Amateur observers further demonstrated their abilities in 2011 by locating both the U.S. space plane X-37B.94
Space Security Impact e increase in global SSA capabilities has a positive impact on the security of outer space as it allows for multiple sources of data, improving quality, coverage, and validity. Greater global capabilities also permit the use of SSA data to monitor activities in space, increasing transparency and con dence among space actors, and, eventually, serving as a potential veri cation mechanism for future agreements.
Indicator 2.3: International cooperation on space situational awareness ere has been increased recognition in recent years that SSA e ectiveness is enhanced by sharing data among diverse governmental and nongovernmental space actors. is view was underscored by the 2009 collision between the Iridium and Cosmos satellites—the rst such event—which prompted numerous calls for improved conjunction prediction and data sharing among satellite owners and operators. Lt. Gen. James noted that, “as events like the
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February 2009 collision between the Iridium and Cosmos satellites show, space situational awareness and the sharing of that information with owners and operators in a position to take action is crucial.”95 In response to the collision, the U.S. military announced that it would add personnel and resources to enable it to screen up to 800 maneuverable, active satellites for potential collisions, with the eventual goal of screening active payloads on orbit.96 As part of this development, it would expand the number of outside partners and ‘push’ them information about potential collisions. e U.S. military also announced that it was transferring oversight of its CFE program from Air Force Space Command to U.S. Strategic Command, changing its name to SSA Sharing Program. e transition was complete on 22 December 2009.97 Any entity that becomes a partner in the SSA Sharing Program must enter an agreement under which it may not transfer any data or technical information obtained through the program to a third party without explicit consent by the U.S. government.98 Requests for data sharing with third parties are assessed on a case-by-case basis, using an Orbital Data Request.99 e conjunction assessment criteria used in the framework of the SSA Sharing Program are as follows:100 • JFCC Space will notify the owners/operators of any active satellite above LEO of predictions that their satellite will approach within 5 km of another orbiting object in the next 72 hours. • JFCC Space will notify the owners/operators of any active satellite in LEO of predictions that their satellite will approach within 1 km (overall miss distance) of another orbiting object AND within 200 m in the radial direction in the next 72 hours. In addition to the U.S. SSA Sharing Program, other e orts that exemplify the growing importance a orded to e ective data-sharing mechanisms among space actors are under way. As described below, during 2011 Europe continued to make progress on various aspects of both national and European SSA. France, for instance, continued working on an improved version of its GRAVES ground-based radar, which was originally conceived of as only a technology demonstrator. By the end of 2011, it had its own catalog of approximately 2,700 space objects.101 In 2009 the United States and Russia announced a renewed e ort to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center to share information on space and missile launches,102 and the establishment of a Pre-Launch Noti cation System (PLNS). Since the original 2000 agreement for the center, which was designed to promote con dence between the U.S. and Russia over space and missile launches, the e ort had stalled. In its report following the 2010 plenary session UN COPUOS noted that no mechanism existed for sharing information among all states and it was “essential for all states to actively contribute to the work under this item.”103 Nongovernmental actors have also recognized the increased importance of data sharing. ree major commercial satellite operators—Intelsat, SES, and Inmarsat—announced in 2009 that they had established the non-pro t Space Data Association (SDA) on the Isle of Man.104 SDA serves as a central hub for sharing data among participants. Initial operations began in July 2010 and full capabilities were online by April 2011, as described below.105 e SDA’s main functions are to share data on the positions of members’ satellites and information to prevent electromagnetic interference.
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2011 Development International cooperative e£ort to track and reestablish contact with Russian Phobos-Grunt spacecraft On 9 November 2011 Russia launched a Zenit-2 rocket from Baikonur carrying the Phobos- Grunt probe, which was intended to conduct a scienti c research mission of Mars.106 However, because of an onboard system failure, Phobos-Grunt failed to perform two booster ignitions that would have put it on course to Mars, thereby stranding it in LEO.107 Over the following weeks and months, an international, cooperative e ort attempted to reestablish contact with the probe.108 Working with the United States and the ESA, Russia was able to pick up the probe’s carrier frequency signal on 22-23 November 2011.109 When this e ort failed to regain control of Phobos-Grunt, they continued to cooperate in tracking the unresponsive spacecraft through its reentry in the Paci c Ocean o the coast of Chile on 15 January 2012.110
2011 Development The United States signs cooperative bilateral agreements with Canada and France on space debris en U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his French counterpart Alain Juppe signed an accord on space cooperation on 8 February 2011.111 e one-page statement of principles “aimed at bolstering the sharing of information on congestion and debris in space”112 and called for “sharing technical data and examining the potential for combined space surveillance networks,” but remained vague on speci cs.113 Gates stated that the “arrangement will foster safety and reduce the chances of mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust.”114 On 10 March 2011 Secretary Gates signed a similar agreement with Canada’s Minister of National Defence Peter MacKay.115 e agreement established the Statement of Principles for a Space Situational Awareness Partnership between the United States and Canada.116 A similar agreement was signed between Australia and the United States in 2010.117 Together with the French accord signed in February 2011, these bilateral agreements re ect Washington’s increased emphasis on greater international cooperation as directed in the 2010 National Space Policy.
2011 Development The U.S. government continues to expand its SSA Sharing Program e U.S. government shares SSA data through the SSA Sharing Program headed by USSTRATCOM.118 ree types of data are shared: Basic, Advanced, and Emergency.119 Basic services are obtained online in a public and free database known as Space Track and include historical and current satellite data, decay and reentry data, and Orbital Data Request forms.120 Advanced services require an ocial agreement between the U.S. government and recipient, but enable two-way information exchange and the provision of conjunction assessment, launch support, anomaly resolution, and other more precise data and analysis.121 USSTRATCOM has signed 30 such agreements with nongovernmental entities since September 2010 and may soon be signing more.122 In addition, as of November 2011 USSTRATCOM is authorized to sign these partnership agreements with other governments.123 Emergency services provide noti cations of close approaches, regardless of prenegotiated agreements. As part of the SSA Sharing Program, JSpOC provides 20 to 30 close-approach warnings per day and conjunction assessment to private sector companies and foreign actors.124 For
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example, JSpOC contacted China 147 times between June 2010 and June 2011 about close approaches.125 Additionally, the United States and China “have agreed in principle to hold regular military space consultations” from a shared interest in “preserving the space environment.”126
Space Security Impact Because no single government or entity can provide comprehensive SSA, international cooperation and collaboration are vital. More bilateral agreements and international cooperation on SSA and data sharing create a very positive impact on space security and sustainability. A good example of the collective bene ts of sharing SSA data is the widely publicized tracking of the Russian Phobos-Grunt spacecraft in 2010.
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Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines CHAP is chapter assesses indicators and developments related to national and international space laws and regulations, multilateral institutions, national space policies, and military space doctrines. International space law has gradually expanded to include, inter alia, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 Astronaut Rescue Agreement, the 1972 Liability Convention, the 1975 Registration Convention, and the 1979 Moon Agreement. ese treaties establish the fundamental right of all states to access space, as well as state responsibility to use space for peaceful purposes. ey also prohibit national appropriation of space and restrict certain military space activities, such as placing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in
outer space. TH TER is chapter also assesses trends and developments related to the multilateral institutions that address matters related to space activities, such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). While COPUOS tends to focus on technical matters and the promotion of international collaboration on space activities, the CD primarily addresses military space challenges through its agenda item on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), though substantive negotiations on this item have been halted for over a decade as the CD members have been unable to agree on a Program of Work. e ITU addresses matters related to the allocation of space resources such as orbital slots and radiofrequencies. e development of national space policies has been conducive to greater transparency and predictability of space activities as these policies delineate the principles and objectives of space actors with respect to the access to and use of space. ey provide the context within which national civil, commercial, and military space actors operate.
Re ecting the fact that space is increasingly being used to support military operations, REE some space actors also have designated national military space doctrines that support the development of military space applications such as navigation, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and meteorological capabilities. Despite the ongoing development of military space applications, for the most part, states continue to emphasize international cooperation and the peaceful uses of space in their national space policies.
Space Security Impact e existence of international policy instruments to regulate access to and use of space has a direct impact on space security since they establish key parameters for space activities, such as the right of all countries to access space, prohibitions against the national appropriation of space and the placement of certain weapons in space, and the principle that space is to be used for peaceful purposes. International space law can improve space security by setting standards of responsible behavior in space and by restricting activities that infringe upon the ability of actors to access and use space safely and sustainably or result in space-based threats to national assets in space or on Earth. Current national legislation and international space law also play important roles in establishing the building blocks for the development of a more robust, up-to-date regulatory regime on space activities that lls the voids of the existing space security normative architecture. Multilateral institutions like the CD and COPUOS play an essential role in space security by providing a venue to address common challenges related to space activities. Member states can discuss, for instance, solutions to potential disagreements over the allocation of scarce
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space resources and develop new international law that re ects the evolving challenges of the space domain. In addition, multilateral institutions also help to provide the technical support that is needed to ensure access to and use of space by all nations. e policies of some spacefaring nations emphasize the need for international cooperation in space, which enhances transparency and builds con dence among di erent stakeholders. Such international cooperation frequently supports the di usion of space capabilities, not only increasing the number of space actors with space assets, but also creating a greater interest in maintaining the peaceful and equitable use of space. On the other hand, national space policies and military doctrines may have adverse e ects on space security if they promote policies and practices that constrain the secure use of space by other actors. Furthermore, military doctrines that rely heavily on space could potentially push other states to develop protection and negation capabilities to protect valuable space systems. At the same time, making these doctrines and policies public also promotes transparency and can help to make the behavior of spacefaring states more predictable.
Indicator 3.1: International normative and regulatory framework for outer space activities e international framework that governs the use of outer space includes UN treaties, customary international law, bilateral treaties, and other space-related international agreements, which have gradually become more extensive since 1967. What began as a focus on multilateral treaties, however, has transitioned to a range of non-binding governance tools including principles, resolutions, con dence-building measures, and policy and technical guidelines. e UN Charter establishes the fundamental objective of peaceful relations among states, including their interactions in space. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations, while Article 51 codi es the right of self-defense in cases of aggression involving the illegal use of force.1
Outer Space Treaty (OST) A cornerstone of the existing space security regime, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty, represents the primary basis for legal order in the space environment, establishing outer space as a domain to be used by all humankind for peaceful purposes. However important this treaty may be for international space law, there have been repeated calls from di erent quarters for an updated space security normative regime. Lack of de nitional clarity in the OST presents several challenges for space security. e OST does not specify where airspace ends and outer space begins. is issue has been on the agenda of both the Legal and the Scienti c and Technical Subcommittees of COPUOS since 1959 and remains unresolved.2 A common view is that space begins at 100 km above the Earth, but some states continue to disclaim the need for the establishment of such a boundary.3 e implications of the OST’s notion of “peaceful purposes” have been the subject of debate among spacefaring states. e interpretation initially favored by Soviet ocials viewed peaceful purposes as wholly non-military.4 However, space assets have been developed
56 Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines extensively to support terrestrial military operations, and the position that “peaceful” in the context of the OST means “non-aggressive” has generally been supported by state practice.5 Article IV of the OST has been cited by some to advance the argument that all military activities in outer space are permissible, unless speci cally prohibited by another treaty or customary international law.6 Others contest this interpretation.7 While space actors have stopped short of actually deploying weapons in space or attacking the space assets of another nation from Earth, ASATs have been tested by some states against their own satellites—most recently by China in 20078 and the United States in 2008.9 ere is also no consensus on a de nition for “space weapon.” Various de nitions have been advanced around the nature and scienti c principle of weapons, place of deployment, and the location of targets. As well, there have been debates about whether weapons used against space assets but not placed in space, such as ground-based ASATs and anti-ballistic missile weapons, constitute space weapons.10 For the full text of the Outer Space Treaty, see Annex 3.
Liability Convention e Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects establishes a liability system for activities in outer space, which is instrumental when addressing damage to space assets caused by manmade space debris and spacecraft. e Convention speci es that a launching state “is absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in ight.”11 When a launching state causes damage to a space asset belonging to another state, it is liable only if it is at fault for causing the damage. e Convention has been used in only one settlement, when Canada received $3-million in compensation from the Soviet Union for cleanup following the 1978 crash of Cosmos-954, which scattered radioactive debris over a remote part of the country.12 Liability for damage caused by space debris is dicult to establish, as it may be dicult to determine the speci c source of a piece of debris, particularly when it is a small piece that has not been cataloged. e Liability Convention stipulates that states parties are responsible for the activities of their national and nongovernmental entities. Under the provisions of the OST and the Liability Convention, the “launching state” is the state that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space and the state from whose territory or facility an object is launched. However, the commercialization of space-related services is challenging the applicability of the Liability Convention. For example, the growing number of private commercial actors undertaking space launches is blurring the de nition of the term “launching state,” since a satellite operator may be ocially registered in one state, have operations in another, and launch spacecraft from the territory of a third country.
Registration Convention e Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space requires states to maintain national registries of objects launched into space and to provide information about their launches to the UN. e following information must be made available by launching states “as soon as practicable”:13 • Name of launching state; • An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number; • Date and territory or location of launch;
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• Basic orbital parameters, including: 1. Nodal period (the time between two successive northbound crossings of the equator, usually in minutes); 2. Inclination of the orbit (polar orbit is 90 degrees and equatorial orbit is 0 degrees); 3. Apogee (highest altitude above the Earth’s surface [in km]); 4. Perigee; (lowest altitude above the Earth’s surface [in km]); • General function of the space object. is data is maintained in a public “Convention Register,” the bene ts of which include e ective management of space trac, enforcement of safety standards, and attribution of liability for damage. Furthermore, it acts as a space security con dence-building measure by promoting transparency. As of 2011, 55 states have rati ed and four have signed the Registration Convention.14 e UN also maintains a separate register with information provided by states not party to the Convention (the Resolution Register), based on UNGA Resolution 1721B of 20 December 1961.15
Figure 3.1: Status of major UN space treaties as of July 2012 16 Treaty Date Total P* Total S* Outer Space Treaty 1967 101 26
Rescue Agreement 1968 92 24
Liability Convention 1972 90 23
Registration Convention 1975 57 4
Moon Agreement 1979 13 4
P*: Party S*: Signatory
e lack of timelines for UN registration remains a shortcoming of the Registration Convention. While information is to be provided “as soon as practicable,” it might not be provided for weeks or months, if at all. Moreover, the Convention does not require that a launching state provide appropriate identi cation markings for its spacecraft and its component parts. Various proposals have been advanced at the CD to resolve the shortcomings of the Registration Convention. In 2007 the UNGA adopted a resolution to improve state practice in registering space objects and adhering to the Registration Convention that included wider rati cation of the Convention by states and international organizations, e orts to attain uniformity of information submitted to the UN registry, and e orts to address gaps caused by the ambiguity of the term “launching state” based on recommendations by the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS.17
Moon Agreement e Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies generally echoes the language and spirit of the OST in terms of the prohibitions on aggressive behavior on and around the Moon, including the installation of weapons and military bases, as well as other non-peaceful activities.18 However, it is not widely rati ed due to contentious issues surrounding lunar exploration.19 States continue to object to its provisions for an international regime to govern the exploitation of the Moon’s natural resources and di erences exist over the interpretation of the Moon’s natural resources as
58 Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines the “common heritage of mankind” and the right to inspect all space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations belonging to any other party.
Astronaut Rescue Agreement e Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space requires that assistance be rendered to astronauts in distress, whether on sovereign or foreign territory. e Agreement also requires that astronauts and their spacecraft are to be returned promptly to the responsible launching authority, should they land within the jurisdiction of another state party.
UN space principles In addition to treaties, six UN resolutions known as UN principles have been adopted by the General Assembly for the regulation of special categories of space activities (see Figure 3.2). Although these principles are not legally binding, they establish a code of conduct re ecting the position of the international community on these issues.
Figure 3.2: Key UN space principles Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (1963)
Space exploration should be carried out for the benefit of all countries. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states and are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty or by any other means. States are liable for damage caused by spacecraft and bear international responsibility for national and nongovernmental activities in outer space. Principles on Direct Broadcasting by Satellite (1982) All states have the right to carry out direct television broadcasting and to access its technology, but states must take responsibility for the signals broadcasted by them or actors under their jurisdiction. Principles on Remote Sensing (1986) Remote sensing should be carried out for the benefit of all states, and remote sensing data should not be used against the legitimate rights and interests of the sensed state, which shall have access to the data and the analysed information concerning its territory on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms. Principles on Nuclear Power Sources (1992) Nuclear power may be necessary for certain space missions, but safety and liability guidelines apply to its use. Declaration on Outer Space Benefits (1996) International cooperation in space should be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all states, with particular attention to the needs of developing states. UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (2007) These are voluntary guidelines for mission-planning, design, manufacture, and operational phases of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages to minimize the amount of debris created.
Other laws and regimes Coordination among participating states in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) adds another layer to the international regulatory framework for space-related activities.20 e MTCR is a voluntary partnership among 34 states to apply common export control policy on an agreed list of technologies, such as launch vehicles that could also be used for missile deployment.21 Speci cally, the MTCR seeks to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology that would be used to carry payloads weighing 500 kg for 300 km or more, as well as systems that could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction.22 59 Space Security Index 2012
Another related e ort is the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Hague Code of Conduct), which calls for greater restraint in developing, testing, using, and proliferating ballistic missiles.23 To increase transparency and reduce mistrust among subscribing states, it introduces con dence-building measures such as the obligation to announce missile launches in advance. Treaties that have an impact on space during times of armed con ict include the body of international humanitarian law composed primarily of the Hague and Geneva Conventions— also known as the Laws of Armed Con ict. rough the concepts of proportionality and distinction, they restrict the application of military force to legitimate military targets and establish that the harm to civilian populations and objects resulting from speci c weapons and means of warfare should not be greater than that required to achieve legitimate military objectives.24 However, it is not clear how these laws apply to spacecraft and other space objects. e emergence of space commerce and the potential for space tourism has led several states to develop national laws to regulate these space activities in accordance with the OST, which establishes state responsibility for the activities of national and nongovernmental entities.25 While the proliferation of national legislation may increase compliance with international obligations and reinforce responsible use of space, in practice it has occasionally led to divergent interpretations of treaties.26 e ird United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III), held in 1999, adopted the Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development. It established an action plan calling for the use of space applications for environmental protection, resource management, human security, and development and welfare. e Vienna Declaration also called for increasing space access for developing countries and the promotion of international space cooperation.27 A concrete outcome of UNISPACE III is the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER), adopted by the UNGA under Resolution 61/110 on 14 December 2006. It is the rst program aimed speci cally at ensuring access to and use of space-based information for all countries and organizations during all phases of a disaster.
Space Security Proposals A number of proposals to address gaps in the existing space security regime have been put forth in the past three decades. At the 1981 UN General Assembly, the USSR rst proposed a “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space” to ban the orbiting of objects carrying weapons of any kind and the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies or in outer space and to prevent actions to destroy, damage, or disturb the normal functioning of unarmed space objects of other states. A revised version of the draft treaty was introduced to the CD in 1983 with a broader mandate that included a ban on anti-satellite testing or deployment as well as veri cation measures.28 During the 1980s several states tabled working papers in the CD proposing arms control frameworks for outer space, including the 1985 Chinese proposal to ban all military uses of space. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka made proposals to restrict the testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Canada, France, and Germany explored de nitional issues and veri cation measures.29 Since the late 1990s, Canada, China, and Russia have contributed several working papers on options to prohibit space weapons. In 2002, in conjunction with Vietnam, Indonesia,
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Belarus, Zimbabwe, and Syria, Russia and China submitted to the CD a joint working paper called Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space.30 e paper proposed that states parties to such an agreement undertake not to place in orbit any object carrying any kind of weapon and not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects. A treaty proposal containing elements from this paper was jointly introduced by Russia and China to the CD in 2008 as the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the reat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Still under consideration, the PPWT has failed to galvanize sucient support and has, notably, encountered resistance from the United States. In 2005 the UNGA rst adopted what has become an annual resolution sponsored by Russia, entitled “Transparency and con dence-building in outer space activities,” which invites states to inform the UN Secretary-General of transparency and con dence-building measures, and rearms that “the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger to international peace and security.”31 e United States consistently registers the only vote against the resolution and Israel the only abstention, because the text links such measures with negotiation of a treaty on arms control. Nongovernmental organizations have also contributed to this dialogue on gaps in the international legal framework. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists drafted a model treaty banning ASATs (1983).32 Since 2002 the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has periodically convened expert meetings to examine space security issues and options to address them.33 e most recent such meeting, “Space Security 2012: Laying the Groundwork for Progress,” was held in Geneva on 29-30 March 2012. In 2003 and 2007 the Henry L. Stimson Center proposed a code of conduct on dangerous military practices in space.34 e concept of a Code of Conduct or rules of the road for space operations has since been supported by multiple stakeholders, including government and military ocials, commercial representatives, and nongovernmental organizations.35 e International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities proposed by the European Union, which mainly addresses issues related to harmful interference with space objects and skirts controversial issues related to the placement of weapons in outer space, continues to undergo international consultations, as described below.
2011 Development The Permanent Court of Arbitration adopts Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities. On 6 December 2011 the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) adopted the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities,36 which were the result of a process initiated in 2009. For the rst time a formal mechanism was established to resolve space-related international disputes. e perceived need for the rules arose from the increasing number of international disputes between governmental entities and nongovernmental commercial entities. Key features37 of the new rules include: • An option for the parties to submit an agreed document to the Tribunal summarizing and giving background to any scienti c or technical issues that will enable the Tribunal to fully understand the matters in dispute (Article 27);
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• Enhanced measures to protect the confidentiality of information provided by the parties in the course of arbitration; • Additional discretionary powers of the Tribunal to continue the arbitration notwithstanding the failure by one arbitrator to participate in the proceedings (Article 12[4]); • The establishment by the PCA of a list of experts in disputes relating to outer space activities or in relevant scienti c or technical matters (Articles 10[4] and 29[7]).
2011 Development International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities proposed by the EU continues to receive mixed support During 2011 the EU continued e orts to persuade other countries to sign a voluntary international code of conduct on outer space activities. According to analysts, consultations with China in July had been “very dicult.”38 China’s reluctance to support the code has been attributed to its purported view that the issue of orbital space debris should not be included in the Code, as well as an objection to the code’s insistence that states that adopt the code share information on their domestic national space policies, including security objectives and defense-related activities.39 However, China has not issued a formal statement on its position. Apprehension over the code was expressed in India at a 26 May 2011 roundtable hosted by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), a nongovernmental think-tank.40 Because the code is voluntary, concern was expressed that it would prevent the global community from moving toward a legally binding rule in the future. As well, critics assert that the code does not include e ective veri cation and monitoring mechanisms, and India and other Asian countries believe that they were not suciently consulted during its drafting.41 In early 2011 reports emerged42 that an interagency group of U.S. experts had concluded that the United States should sign the EU’s proposed Code of Conduct with minimal changes to the document. Subsequently, a letter was sent on 2 February 2011 to U.S. Secretary of State Clinton by a group of 37 Republican senators, requesting that the administration “immediately consult” with key Senate committees and interested senators because they were “deeply concerned” that the administration might pursue “a multilateral commitment with a multitude of potential [sic] highly damaging implications for sensitive military and intelligence programs (current, planned or otherwise).”43 While statements by various administration ocials during 2011 seemed to indicate that the United States might endorse the code in its current form or with minor modi cations, on 17 January 2012, Clinton instead stated that “the United States has decided to join with the European Union and other nations to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,”44 signaling that the United States was in favor of developing an international code but that some aspects of the code presented were unacceptable to it.
2011 Development Satellite industry opposes the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Space Assets Protocol to the Cape Town Convention A draft Space Assets Protocol to the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment was developed by UNIDROIT to overcome the perceived problem in obtaining secure and readily enforceable rights to space assets. 62 Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines
In 2009 the International Institute for Space Commerce conducted an independent review to assess support for the proposed new international regime created by the protocol. It found less support than UNIDROIT was claiming, particularly from the satellite industry.45 In a letter to UNIDROIT’s Deputy Secretary General dated 9 December 2011, the industry openly opposed the draft protocol, stating that its adoption should be halted because the regime would add unnecessary bureaucracy and costs to the industry and that UNIDROIT had consistently disregarded their views.46 Despite the opposition, the protocol was adopted at a UNIDROIT conference held in Berlin, Germany between 27 February 27 and 9 March 2012.
2011 Development Orbital slot and frequency allocations continue to be disputed by companies and states Twice in 2011 the Radio Regulations Board (RRB) of the ITU attempted to resolve a dispute involving an Iranian satellite system called Zohreh-2 and the partnership of French Eutelsat and Qatar, which plans to launch a new satellite in 2013.47 At issue was whether Zohreh-2 had remained in operation in past years by being temporarily hosted on U.S.- and French-registered satellites and so had the right to continue to access radio frequencies in a crowded location and in con ict with the requirements of the new satellite.48 France claimed that since Iran had “failed to operate its service for a period exceeding the two-year limit imposed by ITU rules,” it should lose its registration, thereby making possible registration of the new satellite.49 Iran claimed that Zohreh-2 had remained active through two subleases, one on the Eutelsat Eurobird-2 satellite and the other on the Intelsat PAS-5 satellite. France and the United States, on behalf of Eutelsat and Intelsat respectively, denied this claim.50 e RRB was forced to question the claim of Iran, although some argued that it had no right to do so. RRB representative American Julie Zoller argued that “a nation’s solemn word cannot be challenged by the ITU” and pointed out that, according to section 13.6 of the ITU’s Radio Regulations, a network cannot be removed from the registry unless the notifying administration—in this case, Iran—agrees.51 e RRB agreed with this charge, but then, in an unusual act, revisited the case in early November 2011.52 As of the end of 2011 the issue remained unresolved.53 e ITU called upon the parties involved to resolve the dispute amongst themselves before the 2012 World Radio Communication Conference.54 In mid-May 2011 Eutelsat leased Sinosat 3/Chinasat 5C, an in-orbit Chinese satellite from China Satcom,55 and moved it from Asia to an orbital slot over Europe “just before Eutelsat’s rights to the intended orbital slot were set to expire.”56 (See Chapter 5 for further details on this development.)
2011 Development Reports of significant harmful radiofrequency interference (RFI) and infringements of RF regulations continue In March 2011 South Korea sought help from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to address alleged North Korean jamming of navigation signals.57 In response, ICAO sent an ocial letter to Pyongyang requesting a halt to the jamming.58 On 7 December 2011 ve major international broadcasting companies—BBC, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, AEF, and Radio Netherlands Worldwide—issued a joint statement condemning deliberate satellite jamming and radiofrequency interference.59 e statement noted that instances of jamming to pressure media outlets had increased in 2011.60
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Much of this deliberate interference was occurring in Iran against foreign broadcasts in Farsi.61 e broadcasting companies called upon “the regulatory authorities to take action against those who deliberately cause interference to satellite signals on the grounds that this is contrary to international conventions for the use of satellites” and “to recognize the importance of the role they play in ensuring the free ow of information.”62 e statement requested that this concern be addressed at the upcoming meeting in Geneva of the ITU.63
Space Security Impact Di ering opinions continue to dominate international discourse on a normative framework for outer space activities. Likewise, instances of deliberate radiofrequency interference continue to underscore the governance challenges facing current regulatory mechanisms. Although several alternatives are being considered, space actors have been unable to reach consensus on the exact nature of a space security regime. While this lack of consensus has signi cantly slowed down the development of international norms, it has generated important debate and revealed a variety of perspectives and priorities that may contribute to more inclusive rules. It is also becoming apparent that emerging rules will need to acknowledge private sector actors as legitimate stakeholders in the space domain. e extent to which their concerns are addressed in policymaking processes and governance structures will be an important determinant of space security going forward.
Indicator 3.2: National space policies Most spacefaring states explicitly support the principles of peaceful and equitable use of space in their space policies, and emphasize the goals of using space to promote national socioeconomic, scienti c, and technological progress. Likewise, virtually all space actors underscore the importance of international cooperation in their space policies, and it is through such cooperation that several developing nations have been able to secure access to space. e 2010 U.S. National Space Policy “calls on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space”64 and arms that the United States “renews its pledge of cooperation in the belief that with strengthened international collaboration and reinvigorated U.S. leadership, all nations and peoples—space-faring and space- bene ting—will nd their horizons broadened, their knowledge enhanced, and their lives greatly improved.”65 Such cooperation is particularly linked to space exploration, space surveillance, and Earth observation. e United States also aims to build an understanding of, and support for, U.S. national space policies and programs and to encourage the use of U.S. space capabilities and systems by friends and allies.66 Russia has been deeply engaged in cooperative space activities, asserting that international cooperation in space exploration is more ecient than breakthroughs by individual states.67 Russia is a major partner of the ESA,68 and also cooperates with other key partners in space, including China and India.69 Russia has undertaken cooperative space ventures with Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Pakistan, and Portugal.70 Similar to those of the United States, Russian space cooperation activities have tended to support broader access and use of space. But Russian policy also aims to maintain Russia’s status as a leading space power, as indicated in the Federal Space Program for 2006–2015, which signi cantly increased the resources of the Russian Federal Space Agency, Roscosmos.71 China’s 2011 White Paper on space,72 described below, declares a commitment to the peaceful use of outer space in the interests of all mankind, linking this commitment to
64 Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines national development and security goals. While China actively promotes international exchanges and cooperation, it has also stated that such e orts must encourage independence and self-reliance in space capabilities.73 India is a growing space power that has pursued international cooperation from the inception of the Indian Space Research Organisation, although its mandate remains focused on national priorities. India has signed Memoranda of Understanding with almost 30 states and the ESA. India also provides international training on civil space applications at the Indian Institute of Remote Sensing (IIRS) and the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in the Asia Paci c Region to support broader use of space data.74 e ESA facilitates European space cooperation by providing a platform for discussion and policymaking for the European scienti c and industrial community.75 Many see this cooperation as one of the most visible achievements of European cooperation in science and technology. e ESA has established strong links of cooperation with larger space powers, such as the United States and Russia. In addition France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. all have extensive cooperative ventures with the United States, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Japan and others. Fueled in part by technological advances in military a airs, the national policies and military doctrines of a number of states also re ect a growing reliance on space-based applications to support military functions. Consequently, major space powers and several emerging spacefaring nations increasingly view their space assets as an integral element of their national security infrastructure. Space support for military operations is examined separately in Chapter 6. In addition to focusing on the security implication of outer space capabilities, countries’ policies increasingly highlight the need to develop and revitalize the industrial sector as a key partner in achieving national objectives in the space sector.
2011 Development U.S. National Security Space Strategy released On 4 February 2011 the U.S. DoD released an unclassi ed summary of the “National Security Space Strategy” (NSSS).76 e NSSS release marked the culmination of a lengthy space posture review, mandated by the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act, to analyze the relationship between military and national security space strategy and assess space acquisition programs, future space systems, and technology development. e new NSSS is the rst space strategy signed by both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, in e ect covering all space-related national security concerns. e NSSS establishes three broad objectives: to maintain and enhance the strategic advantages that the United States derives from space; to strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; and to energize the U.S. industrial base. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory Schulte said, “In addition to protecting the advantages we derive from space, we must also protect the domain itself and the industry that provides our capabilities.”77 e NSSS builds on the Obama administration’s move toward greater international space cooperation as set out in the 2010 National Space Policy, which presents a full section on “Partnering with Responsible Nations, International Organizations, and Commercial Firms.”
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Recognizing that space is becoming increasingly “congested, contested, and competitive,” the NSSS o ers a multilayered approach to deterrence.78 First is the establishment of norms of responsible behavior to help separate responsible spacefaring countries from others. Second is the establishment of international partnerships, to force an adversary to contemplate attacking the capabilities of many countries, not just one. ird is increasing resilience and capacity to operate in a degraded environment. Fourth is a readiness and capability to respond in self-defense. At a discussion on the implications of the strategy for the DoD organized by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies,79 former Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III pointed out that by retaining its right to self-defense the United States would respond to attacks on U.S. space systems as it would with any other system. e response might not be limited to a response in space. As well, according to former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta General Cartwright, a consequence of being a bad actor in space is the denial of all other services of space. Like the National Space Policy, the new document states that the administration will consider “proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, e ectively veri able, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies,” but o ers no speci c proposals. 80 In the press release announcing the release of the NSSS,81 the DoD stated that the NSSS will be implemented by updating guidance, plans, doctrine, programs, and operations to re ect the new strategic approach and that its scal 2012 budget will contain initial steps toward implementing the strategy.
2011 Development China issues five-year White Paper on space On 28 December 2011 the Information Oce of the State Council of China published the White Paper China’s Space Activities in 2011,82 describing the achievements of its space program over the past ve years and outlining its plans for the next ve. China had issued White Papers previously in 2000 and 2006. e White Paper describes progress since the 2006 white paper for the full sphere of space activities: space transportation systems, satellite developments, human space ight, deep space exploration, space launch sites, space telemetry, tracking and command, space applications, and space debris. China will continue to strengthen its capacities in those areas over the next ve years. Despite the fact that “China relies primarily on its own capabilities to develop its space industry,” it has engaged widely with other nations on a bilateral and multilateral basis. In the next ve years China expects to cooperate with international partners in a variety of scienti c and technological endeavors. e White Paper stresses China’s policy of peaceful space development: “China always adheres to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and opposes weaponization or any arms race in outer space.” It further states that “the country develops and utilizes space resources in a prudent manner and takes e ective measures to protect the space environment, ensuring that its space activities bene t the whole of mankind.” e White Paper asserts that China will continue to work on space debris monitoring and mitigation, including experimenting “with digital simulation of space debris collisions.” To that end, “China will work together with the international community to maintain a peaceful and clean outer space and endeavor to make new contributions to the lofty cause of promoting world peace and development.”
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e military aspects of China’s space program are not referenced in the White Paper. (See Chapters 1 and 2 for further details on China’s White Paper regarding cooperation on space debris monitoring and space situational awareness.)
2011 Development The EU releases communication on EU space policy On 4 April 2011 the European Commission (EC) released the Communication “Towards a space strategy for the European Union that bene ts its citizens.”83 It details priority actions for an EU Space Policy. e primary goals outlined in the communication relate to • Satellite radio navigation, • Using space for the benefit of the environment, • Securing space to achieve security and defense objectives, and • Space exploration. e Communication recognizes the need to make space infrastructure secure and to construct a European SSA system. It highlights the importance of international cooperation, which could open doors for European technology and services in the space sector. e Communication also focuses on strengthening cooperation among EU and developing relations between the ESA and the EU. e Centrum für Europäische Politik (Centre for European Policy)84 criticized the Communication because it does not address how the measures will be funded and fails to demonstrate the bene t of having an EU strategy distinct from ESA activities. But the European Space Policy Institute states that “it provides for the de nition of the EU space competence; it de nes the role of the EU in the European decision-making related to space; it advances the EU position in the way towards a coordinated European Strategy for space; it endorses a task sharing for governance and calls upon ESA and member states to move on the way toward a coordinated industrial policy and a coordinated governance scheme.”85
2011 Development Austria promulgates new domestic space law On 6 December 2011 Austria promulgated its domestic space law, “Bundesgesetz über die Genehmigung von Weltraumaktivitäten und die Einrichtung eines Weltraumregisters (Weltraumgesetz),” which roughly translates as “Federal law over the permission of space activities and the mechanism of a space register (space law).” e Act describes: • regulations to obtain permits for space activities; conditions of those activities • the creation of a domestic registry for space objects, and • penalties for violation of provisions.
Space Security Impact e ongoing focus of national space policies on the long-term sustainability of the space domain and a renewed focus on the bene ts of international cooperation generally bode well for space security. However, an overreliance on space for national security could lead to a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust that could ultimately be detrimental to the space domain. Clear rules, greater transparency, and international cooperation are positive indicators of space security, but tensions could also build as more policymakers become aware of the vulnerabilities and fragility of many space capabilities. Greater transparency and
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openness in national policies would be welcome developments toward the goal of increased cooperation.
Indicator 3.3: Multilateral forums for outer space governance An overview of the relationships among key institutions mandated with addressing issues related to outer space activities is provided in Figure 3.3. Issues of space security are often debated at the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of UNGA, the main deliberative organ of the UN. While the decisions of the Assembly are not legally binding, they are considered to carry the weight of world opinion. e UNGA has long held that the prevention of an arms race in outer space would make a signi cant contribution to international peace and security. e UNGA created COPUOS in 1958 to review the scope of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, develop relevant UN programs, encourage research and information exchanges on outer space matters, and study legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space. COPUOS and its two standing committees—the Scienti c and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee—develop recommendations based on questions and issues put before them by UNGA and Member States. ere are currently 69 Member States of COPUOS, which works by consensus. As well, a few intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations have permanent observer status in COPUOS and its subcommittees. Debate on revisiting the mandate of COPUOS to include all issues a ecting the peaceful uses of outer space—namely those pertaining to militarization—has not reached consensus. e United States, in particular, has maintained that COPUOS should exclusively address issues related to peaceful uses of outer space.86
Figure 3.3: UN-related institutions relevant to international space security
e CD is the primary multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. First established in 1962 as the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, it went through several name changes as its membership grew, receiving its present name in 1979. e CD, with 65 current Member States plus observers, works by consensus under the chair of a rotating Presidency. e CD has repeatedly attempted to address the issue of the weaponization of space, driven by perceived gaps in the OST, such as its lack of veri cation or enforcement provisions and its failure to expressly prohibit conventional weapons in outer space or ground-based ASATs. In 1982 the Mongolian People’s Republic put forward a proposal to create a committee to negotiate a treaty to address these shortcomings.87 After three years of deliberation, the CD Committee on PAROS was created and given a mandate “to examine, as a rst step…the prevention of an arms race in outer space.”88 From 1985 to 1994 the PAROS committee met, despite wide disparity among the views of key states, and in that time made several recommendations for space-related con dence-building measures.89 68 Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines
E orts to extend the PAROS committee mandate faltered in 1995 over an agenda dispute that linked PAROS with other items discussed at the CD—in particular, a Fissile Material Cut-o Treaty (FMCT). CD agenda negotiations were stalled between 1996 and 2009, a period during which the CD remained without a formal program of work. In 2000 then CD President Ambassador Amorim of Brazil unsuccessfully attempted to break the deadlock by proposing the creation of four subcommittees, two of which would deal with, respectively, PAROS and an FMCT. Similarly, in 2004 several states called for the establishment of a CD expert group to discuss the broader technical questions surrounding space weapons, but there was still no consensus on a program of work. While in 2009 the CD adopted its rst program of work in over a decade, this advance was short-lived as the CD reverted to a deadlock following objections from Pakistan over FMCT discussions. To date, there is still no consensus on negotiation of a PAROS treaty.
2011 Development United States confirms engagement with UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) for Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Space On 17 November 2011, at the USSTRATCOM Cyber and Space Symposium held in Omaha, Nebraska, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy Frank A. Rose stated that the United States “look(s) forward to working with our international colleagues to engage in a GGE that serves as a constructive mechanism to examine voluntary and pragmatic TCBMs [transparency and con dence-building measures] that enhance stability and security, and promote responsible operations in space.”90 When Russia initially proposed in 2010 the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts to assess options for TCBM, the United States would not co-sponsor the Russian resolution because of its references the proposed Sino-Russian Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, which the United States has indicated it will not support.91 Despite a U.S. abstention, UNGA resolution 65/68 was adopted with a vote of 183 states in favor and none opposed, requesting that the Secretary-General establish, on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, a group of governmental experts to conduct a study commencing in 2012, and to report to UNGA in 2013.92 Sergey Koshelev, Deputy Director of the Department of Security and Disarmament A airs at the Russian Ministry of Foreign A airs, stated that the rst task should be to de ne the GGE’s goals, agenda, and program of work, which should be based on appropriate and realistic priorities and consensus and should re ect continuity with the 1991–1993 GGE while accounting for technological changes.93 ere is much hope that the GGE will produce tangible results. According to Michael Krepon at the Stimson Center, “the GGE could become another forum for wrangling and a wasted opportunity. It could also become the springboard to engage countries not involved in the EU’s e ort to help shape a consensus diplomatic initiative on space.”94
2011 Development The CD could not agree on a Program of Work during 2011 e CD closed its thirteenth consecutive year without substantive work as it failed to agree on a Program of Work. e main point of contention continues to be Pakistan’s refusal to support a Program of Work that includes a Fissile Material Cut-o Treaty, while other CD member states would not agree to any substantive work that did not include FMCT negotiations.95 While most delegations admit that there is a problem with the CD and the 69 Space Security Index 2012
adoption of a Program of Work is urgent, views on how to break the deadlock di er. Since the CD operates on consensus, it is unlikely that this body can move forward ocially with its “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” agenda item until the impasse is resolved. Nevertheless, the CD did organize four informal meetings in June and July 2011 to discuss PAROS under the coordination of Ambassador Soares of Brazil, who subsequently provided the Conference with a report on the nature of these discussions.”
2011 Development Terms of reference for COPUOS Working Group on Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities agreed In 2009 the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space decided that the Scienti c and Technical Subcommittee should include on its agenda for 2010 “long-term sustainability of outer space activities.” On 18 February 2010 the Subcommittee established the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. In 2011 a working paper containing the proposal of the Chair for the terms of reference, method of work, and work plan for the Working Group was presented to the Subcommittee. e Working Group is to examine and propose measures to ensure the safe and sustainable use of outer space for peaceful purposes, for the bene t of all countries. It will prepare a report on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities that includes a consolidated set of current practices and operating procedures, technical standards, and policies associated with the safe conduct of space activities. On the basis of all the information collected, the Working Group will produce a set of guidelines that could be applied on a voluntary basis by international organizations, nongovernmental entities, and individual states.96 Four expert groups were established to focus on the agreed areas of work to expedite the work of the Working Group. Group A will work on sustainable space utilization supporting sustainable development on Earth; Group B on space debris, space operations, and tools to support collaborative space situational awareness; Group C on space weather; and Group D on regulatory regimes and guidance for actors in the space arena.97
Space Security Impact e continuing failure to adopt a Program of Work at the CD (the result of issues unrelated to outer space) is highly problematic; it is unclear if the deadlock will end in the near future. e fact that the deadlock at the CD has prevented substantive negotiations on one of its core agenda items, PAROS, has a negative impact on the security of outer space. While ine ective multilateral forums such as the CD stagnate, the Group of Governmental Experts established by the UN General Assembly and the COPUOS Working Group on the Long- Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities are very promising developments that may advance important and necessary con dence-building measures related to peaceful space operations, and could complement an eventual code of conduct for outer space activities.
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Civil Space Programs CHAP is chapter assesses space security indicators and developments associated with civil space programs and global space-based utilities. e civil space sector comprises those organizations engaged in the exploration of space, or in scienti c research in or related to space, for non- commercial and non-military purposes. is sector includes national space agencies such as the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Russian Federal Space Agency, and the European Space Agency, and missions such as Soyuz, Apollo, the Hubble Space Telescope, and the International Space Station. Developments related to the launch vehicles that enable space access are covered in this chapter, as well as the international collaborative e orts that facilitate space access for countries without the necessary means to independently engage in space activities. TER e chapter examines collaborative undertakings among civil space programs of di erent nations and reviews recent developments related to actors that access space, either independently or through partnerships. Also covered here are the scope and priorities of civil space programs, including the number of human and civil satellite launches made by each actor and the funding levels of national space agencies. Furthermore, this chapter describes developments related to space-based global utilities. ese applications, provided by civil, military, and commercial actors, can be freely used by anyone equipped to receive their data, either directly or indirectly. Global utilities include remote sensing satellites that monitor the Earth’s changing environment, such as weather FO UR satellites. Satellite navigation systems that provide geographic position (latitude, longitude, altitude) and velocity information to users on the ground, at sea, and in the air, such as the U.S. Global Positioning System, are perhaps the best-known global utilities.
Space Security Impact Civil space programs can have a positive impact on the security of outer space as they constitute key drivers behind the development of technical capabilities to access and use space, such as those related to the development of space launch vehicles. As the number of space actors able to access space increases, more parties have a direct stake in the need to ensure the sustainability of space activities and preserve this domain for peaceful purposes. As well, civil space programs and their technological spino s on Earth underscore the vast scienti c, commercial, and social bene ts of space exploration, thereby increasing global awareness of its importance. International cooperation remains a key aspect of both civil space programs and global utilities, a ecting space security positively by enhancing transparency of the nature and purpose of certain civil programs. Furthermore, international cooperation in civil space programs can assist in the transfer of expertise and technology for the access to, and use of, space by emerging space actors. International cooperation can also help nations undertake vast collaborative projects in space such as the ISS, the complex technical challenges and prohibitive costs of which are dicult for any one actor to take on. Conversely, civil space programs could have a negative impact on space security by diverting technological advances for peaceful space exploration to military applications, thereby facilitating the development of dual-use technologies for potential space systems negation or space-based strike capabilities. In addition, the growing number of spacefaring nations and the increasing diversity of sub-national space actors contribute to the overcrowding of space orbits and place great strain on scarce space resources, such as orbital slots and radio frequencies. Competition for access to and use of space resources in the longer term could
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generate tensions insofar as emerging spacefaring states and commercial providers of space- related services nd limited opportunities to secure access to space resources. Many civil space programs are dual-use and can support military functions. Civil-military cooperation can have a mixed impact on space security. While such cooperation helps to advance the capabilities of civil space programs to access and use space, it could encourage adversaries to target dual-use civil-military satellites during con ict. Millions of individuals rely on space applications on a daily basis for functions as diverse as weather forecasting, navigation, communications, and search-and-rescue operations. Consequently, global utilities are important for space security because they broaden the community of actors with access to space data, which have a direct interest in maintaining space for peaceful uses.
Indicator 4.1: Priorities and funding levels within civil space programs Space agencies e main U.S. agency that deals with civil space programs, NASA, is in charge of mission design, integration, launch, and space operations, while also conducting aeronautics and aerospace research. NASA’s work is carried out through four interdependent directorates:1 Aeronautics develops and tests new ight technologies; Exploration Systems creates capabilities for human and robotic explorations; Science undertakes scienti c exploration of the Earth and Solar System; and Space Operations provides critical enabling technologies as well as support for space ight. While much of the operational work is carried out by NASA itself, major commercial contractors such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin are often involved in the development of technologies for new space exploration projects. During the Cold War civil space e orts in the Soviet Union were largely decentralized and led by “design bureaus”—state-owned companies headed by top scientists. Russian launch capabilities were developed by Strategic Rocket Forces and cosmonaut training was managed by the Russian Air Force. Formal coordination of e orts came through the Ministry for General Machine Building.2 A Russian space agency (Rossiyskoe Kosmicheskoye Agentstvo) was established in 1992, and has since been reshaped into Roscosmos. While Roscosmos is more centralized, most work is still completed by design bureaus, now integrated into “Science and Production Associations” (NPOs) such as NPO Energia, NPO Energomash, and NPO Lavochkin. In 1961 France established its national space agency, the Centre national d’études spatiales (CNES), which remains the largest of the EU national-level agencies. Italy established a national space agency (ASI) in 1989, and Germany consolidated various space research institutes into the German Aerospace Center (DLR) in 1997. e European Space Research Organisation and the European Launch Development Organisation, both formed in 1962, were merged in 1975 into the European Space Agency, which is now the principal space agency for the region. As of June 2012 ESA had 18 Member States; the last to join was Romania, which rati ed the ESA Convention on 22 December 2011. Canada participates in ESA programs and activities as an associate member. Civil space activities began to grow in China when they were allocated to the China Great Wall Industry Corporation in 1986. e China Aerospace Corporation was established in 1993, followed by the development of the China National Space Administration. CNSA
72 Civil Space Programs remains the central civil space agency in China and reports through the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense to the State Council. In Japan civil space was initially coordinated by the National Space Activities Council formed in 1960. Most of the work was performed by the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of the University of Tokyo, the National Aerospace Laboratory, and, most importantly, the National Space Development Agency. In 2003 all this work was assumed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency.3 India’s civil space agency ISRO was founded in 1969. e Israel Space Agency was formed in 1982, the Canadian Space Agency in 1989, and Brazil’s Agência Espacial Brasileira in 1994.
Expenditures Although NASA’s budget has consistently been the highest among all civil space agencies, it dropped 25 percent in real terms between 1992 and 2001.4 e ESA budget dropped nine percent in the same period. is followed a long period of growth (1970-1991) for both NASA and ESA, during which the NASA budget grew 60 percent and the ESA budget 165 percent in real terms.5 NASA’s budget is now close to $18.5-billion per scal year and the ESA budget is approximately $3.6-billion per year. e nancial contributions of ESA member states to the Agency’s General Budget are based on their GDP.6 e USSR/Russia was the most active civil space actor from 1970 until the early 1990s, when sharp funding decreases led to a reduction in the number of civil missions. By 2001 the number of Russian military, civil, and commercial satellites in space had decreased from over 180 during the Soviet era to approximately 90. e budget had been reduced to $309-million—about 20 percent of the 1989 expenditure and less than the cost of a single launch of the U.S. space shuttle.7 is steady decline was reversed in 2005, however, when Russia approved a 10-year program with a budget of approximately $11-billion.8 e annual budget for Russia’s space program during 2011 was approximately $3.8-billion. Civil expenditures on space continue to increase considerably in India and China, due in large part to the growth of civil programs, including large satellites and human space ight programs. Since 2005 India’s space budget has dramatically increased and is approximately $1.2-billion for 2011-2012. e Chinese space budget is complex. Ocials have been quoted as saying that the Chinese civil space budget is as low as $500-million, while media sources place the gure closer to $2-billion. However, expenditures are not the sole indicator of capabilities, because of di erences in production cost among countries, as well as local standards of living and purchasing power.9
Human space ight On 12 April 1961 Yuri Gagarin became the rst human to travel into space onboard a Soviet Vostok 1 spacecraft. e early years of human space ight were dominated by the USSR, which succeeded in elding the rst woman in space, the rst human spacewalk, the rst multiple-person space ights, and the longest-duration space ight. Following the Vostok series rockets, the Soyuz became the workhorse of the Soviet and then Russian human space ight program and has since carried out over 100 missions, with a capacity load of three humans on each ight. e 2006-2015 Federal Space Program maintains an emphasis on human space ight, featuring ongoing development of a reusable spacecraft to replace the Soyuz vehicle, and completion of the Russian segment of the ISS.10 e rst U.S. human mission was completed on 5 May 1961 with the suborbital ight of the Mercury capsule, launched on an Atlas-Mercury rocket. e Gemini ight series
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and then the Apollo ight series followed, ultimately taking humans to the Moon. e United States went on to develop the Skylab human space laboratories in 1973 and the USSR developed the Mir space station, which operated from 1986 to 2001. In the 1970s the United States initiated the Space Shuttle, which was capable of launching as many as seven people to LEO. e rst Space Shuttle, Columbia, was launched in 1981. By the end of 2008 the program had completed 124 launches and at the end of 2010 was the only human space ight capability for the United States.11 For a time after the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, Russia was the only actor performing regular human missions and its Soyuz spacecraft provided the only lifeline to the ISS. is situation will likely recur in the foreseeable future given the Space Shuttle’s retirement. In addition, consideration is being given to future reliance on commercial providers of transport services. In 2004 the United States announced a new NASA plan that includes returning humans to the Moon by 2020 and a human mission to Mars thereafter. A new strategy for lunar exploration was announced in 2006.12 Future plans include a permanent human presence on the lunar surface.13 ese plans were examined in 2009 by the Review of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee, which found that the U.S. human space ight program is on an unsustainable trajectory, with the growing scope of the program outstripping the government’s ability to fund it. In its nal report, the Committee suggested two possible solutions: 1. Transporting astronauts to LEO could be turned over to the commercial sector. If this option is chosen, the government should create a competitive bidding process. 2. Levels of international cooperation between the U.S. and other national space programs could increase. China began developing the Shenzhou human space ight system in the late 1990s and completed a successful human mission in 2003, becoming the third state to develop an independent human space ight capability.14 A second mission was successfully completed in 2005, and the third and latest in 2008. Other civil programs are also turning to human space ight and the Moon. In 2005 JAXA released its 20-year vision statement, which includes expanding its knowledge of human space activities aboard the ISS as well as developing a human space shuttle by 2025.15 e ESA also has a long-term plan to send humans to the Moon and Mars through the Aurora program. India approved a human space ight program in 2006.16 In 2007 both Japan and China launched robotic lunar missions Kaguya and Chang’e-1, respectively.17 Germany, India, and South Korea have also considered lunar missions going forward.18
2011 Development Changing budgetary allotments for civil space programs e 2011 budget of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration was 1.3 percent less than in 2010,19 going from $18.724-billion to $18.485-billion. Funding doubled for the development of a commercial crew initiative, but was eliminated for lunar manned missions and planetary explorations.20 Approximately $600-million was cut from Space Operations, which included the International Space Station and the now retired space shuttle eet.21 NASA operations related to planetary probes, space telescopes, and environmental satellites, which are part of the agency’s Science Mission directorate, were allocated $4.945-billion for 2011, or about $448-million above the 2010 level.22 A House of Representatives attempt to cancel NASA’s
74 Civil Space Programs over-budget James Webb Space Telescope, a successor to the Hubble Space Telescope, was averted, although spending on the program was capped at $8-billion.23
Figure 4.1: NASA 2007-2011 budget (in $USB) 24
Despite concerns regarding heavy public debt and the euro crisis, the annual budget of ESA was increased by 7 percent to 2.975-billion euros ($4-billion) in January 2011.25 While France and Germany are the largest nancial contributors to ESA, 12 other member countries agreed to raise their contributions for 2011. Earth observation (21.1 percent) accounts for the largest segment of ESA’s total budget in 2011, while navigation (16.7 percent), which is mainly related to the development of the Galileo navigation system, comes second, followed by launch vehicles (15.3 percent).26 Nevertheless, the European Commission proposed to reduce funding for the GMES program by 5.7-billion euros ($7.7-billion).27 To protest the proposed GMES budget reduction, 19 ESA states issued a joint letter on 27 October.28 ey threatened to refuse to launch the rst group of GMES Sentinel satellites unless the commission agreed to fund the system’s operations beyond 2014. In the wake of the severe economic crisis engul ng Europe, ESA Director General Jean- Jacques Dordain announced at a press conference on 8 November that ESA plans to reduce its internal operating costs by 25 percent in the next ve years.29
Figure 4.2: Top contributors to ESA’s 2011 General Budget* 30
* This chart includes ESA member states that contribute 5 percent or more.
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ISRO was allocated 6600 crore (approximately $1.2-billion) in the 2011-2012 General Budget,31 which amounts to an increase of almost 35 percent over the previous year. New missions for earth observation were allocated 200 crore (approximately $35-million), while the Human Space ight program was granted 98.81 crore (approximately $20-million) in the budget – a signi cant increase from the 14.71 crore (approximately $2.6-million) of the year before.32 Space science projects, including atmospheric and climate change studies, were allocated 350 crore (approximately $62-million). Of that total, 80 crore (approximately $14-million) are destined to Chandrayaan-2, a lunar exploration mission being developed jointly with Russia.33 e budget also includes 125 crore (approximately $22-million) for the Mars Orbiter Mission, which is expected to be launched by ISRO in November 2013 on India’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle.34 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would allocate 115-billion rubles ($3.8-billion) for its space program during 2011,35 an amount that has almost tripled since 2007 and the highest annual allotment since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.36 Russia could also spend as much as 346.5-billion rubles (almost $12-billion) for the support and development of GLONASS during the period 2012-2020.37 Roscosmos chief Anatoly Perminov reported that the agency earned an annual pro t of $0.7-billion from its commercial contracts.38 e 2011-2012 budget for CSA operations stood at $424.6-million, which represents an increase of 8.7 percent or $33.9-million over the previous year.39 Four program areas are supported: $136.6-million for Space Data, Information; $152.4-million for Space Exploration; $86.1-million for Future Canadian Space Capacity; and $49.4-million for Internal Services.40 Despite the increase, in November 2011 CSA was asked to provide two budget-cut scenarios to the government: one assuming a budget reduction of 5 percent, and the other a reduction of 10 percent.41
2011 Development Various countries pursue human space exploration programs An Iranian attempt to launch a Kavoshgar-5 rocket with a capsule containing a live monkey in September 2011 was unsuccessful.42 According to Iran’s Deputy Science Minister Mohammad Mehdinejad-Nouri, the launch “was not publicized as all of its anticipated objectives were not accomplished.”43 In 2010 Iran had reportedly launched several animals into space, including a rat, a turtle, and worms, using a Kavoshar-3 rocket.44 In the same year Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had announced the country’s plans to conduct a manned mission into space by the year 2019. 45 In December 2011 ISRO signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Indian Air Force to assist with the crew selection for the rst indigenous manned mission into space.46 According to Lieutenant General H L Kakria, Director General of India’s Army Medical Corps, the Air Force is setting up facilities for the rst round of the selection process, which is expected to start by 2020.47 To this end, ISRO has also cooperated with NASA.48 During an address at Kamaraj College in India, Antony S. Jeevarajan, deputy division chief at NASA’s Johnson space center, said that the U.S. agency is helping India with its manned space objectives, although he did not provide details about the extent of the collaboration.49
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Figure 4.3: Countries with independent orbital launch capability*
*Dark grey indicates an independent orbital launch capability and dots indicate launch sites.
Figure 4.4: Countries’ first orbital launches State/actor Year of first orbital launch Launch vehicle Satellite USSR/Russia 1957 R-7 rocket Sputnik 1 United States 1958 Juniper-C Explorer 1 France* 1965 Diamant Astérix Japan 1970 Lambda Osumi China 1970 Long March Dong Fang Hong I U.K.* 1971 Black Arrow Prospero X-3 India 1980 SLV Rohini Israel 1988 Shavit Ofeq 1 Iran 2009 Safir-2 Omid * France and the U.K. no longer conduct independent launches, but France’s CNES manufactures the Ariane launcher used by Arianespace/ESA.
China is expected to launch its manned Shenzhou-9 spacecraft between June and August of 2012, and conduct a space rendezvous and docking mission with the orbiting Tiangong-1 space lab module.50 ree astronauts will blast o onboard the Shenzhou, which will manually dock with the module.51 (See Chapter 8 for information on China’s 2011 docking maneuver with Tanging-1.) On 17 August 2011 Roscosmos Chief Vladimir Popovkin stated that manned space ight was no longer the top priority of Russia’s space program52 and that the focus needed to shift to more technology-oriented projects. “Unfortunately manned space ight accounts for an unjusti ably large part of the budget: It makes up 48 percent,” he said. He pointed instead to satellite communication, navigation systems, and meteorological study. But Popovkin emphasized that Russia remains committed to its obligations related to the International Space Station. Since the retirement of the U.S. space shuttle eet, Russia is the only nation responsible for crew transportation to and from the ISS. Russia resumed manned Soyuz ights after its unmanned space freighter Progress M-12M, which was carrying cargo
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to the ISS, crashed in a remote area of Siberia on 24 August.53 On 14 November a Russian Soyuz craft carrying an American and two Russian astronauts launched successfully from Kazakhstan.54
2011 Development Scientific exploration missions continue to be developed worldwide During 2011 the failure of the Phobos-Grunt mission garnered signi cant media attention for the Russian space program. e $163-million Phobos-Grunt craft, carrying an array of 20 instruments, was Russia’s rst interplanetary mission in 15 years.55 e spacecraft, designed to retrieve soil samples from Mars’ moon Phobos,56 was launched on 8 November aboard a Zenit-2SB rocket.57 However, the probe failed to re its thrusters on a course toward Mars and was stranded in Earth orbit.58 (See Chapter 2 for further details.) On 26 November 2011 NASA successfully launched Mars rover Curiosity from Cape Canaveral atop a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket. Its mission is to investigate the possible presence of microbial life on the surface of Mars. As expected, the rover landed on Mars on 6 August 2012, with a sky crane lowering the rover to the surface after a parachute- and retrorocket-assisted descent.59 Since the 2009 announcement of a 2013 mission to Mars by then-ISRO Chief Madhavan Nair,60 a Mars Mission Study Team has developed 10 experiments to be performed on the mission.61 A report from the Planetary Sciences and Exploration conference held on 12-14 December 2011 highlights suggestions made by scientists at various ISRO centers and aliates. Among the suggested experiments to be conducted is a Probe for Infrared Spectroscopy for Mars (Prism), which will study certain aspects of the Martian atmosphere and “spatial and seasonal variations of these gases over the lifetime of the mission” and a Mars Exospheric Neutral Composition Analyzer (Menca), which will analyze the Martian upper atmosphere-exosphere region 400 km above the surface.62 ISRO has also commissioned a study to assess the feasibility of a scienti c mission to Venus in May 2015.63 In 2011 China achieved a major technical breakthrough when it successfully conducted its rst docking mission.64 e Tiangong-1 module, the base of China’s space station and an experimental space laboratory, was launched aboard the Long March 2F/G (T1) launch vehicle from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.65 e Chinese Shenzhou-8 unmanned capsule launched on 31 October successfully docked two days later with Tiangong.66 It carried a German-built Simbox containing 17 German and Chinese biological and medical experiments. is collaboration is seen as an important step in joint ventures between China and other states.67 A second successfully concluded docking mission is regarded as a precursor to the development of a large-scale manned space station by 2020.68
2011 Development States continue to pursue Moon exploration programs On 10 September twin probes from NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) mission successfully lifted o from Cape Canaveral aboard a United Launch Alliance Delta II rocket.69 e mission is to study the moon “from crust to core” by measuring the lunar gravitational eld; this study should lead to a better understanding of planetary origins. e two GRAIL probes, GRAIL-A and GRAIL-B, reached the lunar orbit as planned on 31 December 2011 and 1 January 2012, respectively.70
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In January 2012 Roscosmos Chief Popovkin indicated that the Russian space agency had consulted with NASA and ESA about the possibility of jointly manned lunar research bases.71 Popovkin claims that there are two ways to achieve this objective: “either to set up a base on the Moon or to launch a station to orbit around it.”72 Roscosmos is also planning to send two unmanned missions to the Moon: the Luna Glob and the Luna Resource.73 Although they were initially slated for launch by 2015, the head of the Russian Space Research Institute, Lev Zelyony, said that the failure of the Phobos-Grunt Mars probe would likely cause a delay in the missions: “ e dates may have to be moved, as the technical solutions that were used with NPO Lavochkin’s Phobos-Grunt were also used in the lunar projects and they clearly need to be reviewed.”74 e Phobos-Grunt failure is also expected to cause a delay in the construction of the Russian lander for India’s Chandrayan-2 mission to the Moon.75
Figure 4.5: Human spaceflight missions by country 1961–2011
Space Security Impact e fact that government spending on space activities saw some global increase during 2011 indicates that spacefaring states attach high priority to their national space programs. is positive development demonstrates that states see a strong link between space exploration and socioeconomic development. More scienti c exploratory missions and a renewed interest in manned space ight and lunar missions by national space agencies may further enhance international cooperation on space activities.
Indicator 4.2: International cooperation in civil space programs Due to the huge costs and technical challenges associated with access to and use of space, international cooperation has been a de ning feature of civil space programs throughout the space age. Scienti c satellites, in particular, have driven cooperation.76 One of the rst scienti c satellites, Ariel-1, launched in 1962, was the world’s rst international satellite, built by NASA to carry U.K. experiments. e earliest large international cooperation program was the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, which saw two Cold War rivals work collaboratively to achieve a joint docking in space of U.S./USSR human modules in July 1975. However, “collaboration has worked most smoothly when the science or technology concerned is not of direct strategic (used here to mean commercial or military) importance,” and when projects have “no practical application in at least the short to medium term.”77 If government support for space science decreases, such cooperative e orts may also decline. 79 Space Security Index 2012
e 1980s saw a plethora of international collaborative projects involving the USSR and countries including the United States, Afghanistan, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Slovenia, Syria, and the U.K. to enable astronauts to conduct experiments onboard the Mir space station.78 Many barriers to global partnership have been overcome since the end of the Cold War. Examples include the EU-Russia collaboration on launcher development and utilization, and EU-China cooperation on the Galileo navigation system. From 1995 to 1998 there were nine dockings of the U.S. Space Shuttle to the Mir space station, with various crew exchanges.79 e ESA and NASA have collaborated on many scienti c missions, including the Hubble Space Telescope, the Galileo Jupiter probe, and the Cassini-Huygens Saturn probe. e most prominent example of international civil space cooperation is the ISS, the largest, most expensive international engineering project ever undertaken. e project partners are NASA, Roscosmos, ESA, JAXA, and the Canadian Space Agency. Brazil participates through a separate agreement with NASA. e rst module was launched in 1998. As of July 2012 a total of 125 ights had carried components, equipment, and astronauts to the station,80 which remains un nished. e ISS is projected to cost approximately $129-billion over 30 years of operation.81
Figure 4.6: Flights to the International Space Station by July 2012 82
e high costs and remarkable technical challenges associated with human space ight are likely to make collaborative e orts in this area increasingly common. In 2007 the 14 largest space agencies agreed to coordinate future space missions in the document e Global Exploration Strategy: e Framework for Coordination, which highlights a shared vision of space exploration, focused on the Moon and Mars. It calls for a voluntary forum to assist coordination and collaboration for sustainable space exploration, although it does not establish a global space program.83 Signi cant bilateral cooperation on Moon and Mars missions is also taking place. For example, ESA provided technical support and knowledge- sharing for both China’s Chang’e-1 lunar orbiter and India’s Chandrayaan-1 lunar orbiter.
2011 Development Increasing number of cooperation agreements on space activities In October 2011 it was announced that, as part of the bilateral Alcantara Cyclone Space project, Ukraine plans to launch the Cyclone-4 three-stage expendable rocket84 from the Brazilian Space Launch Facility in Northwestern Brazil.85 Ukraine has also expressed interest in investing in a jointly developed booster rocket, Cyclone-5.86 80 Civil Space Programs
On 20 April 2011 ISRO launched Singapore’s rst indigenous micro-satellite, the 105-kg X-SAT, which was built by Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. 87 e micro- satellite, containing three payloads related to remote-sensing applications, was launched aboard Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle PSLV-C16 and has a mission life of three years.88 On 11 August 2011 China successfully launched Pakistan’s 30-transponder communication satellite, Paksat-1R, from its Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC).89 Paksat-1R, which was launched aboard a Chinese Lon March 3B rocket,90 will replace the aging communication satellite Paksat-1. China-Pakistan cooperation in space technology began when Pakistan launched its rst indigenously-developed satellite, Badar-1, from China in 1990.91 Both countries have agreed to further their collaboration on space technologies.92 Nigerian telecommunications satellite NigComSat-1R, carrying 28 active transponders and seven antennas, was launched from the Xichang launch base in Sichuan province in southwestern China on the Chinese Long March 3B rocket.93 It is expected to meet the needs of communications, broadcasting, and broadband multimedia services across Africa and parts of Europe and Asia. It replaced a $257-million satellite launched in 2007 that failed due to loss of power in November 2008.94 NigComSat-1R is based on China’s DFH-4 spacecraft platform.95 China has reached agreements to build DFH-4 communications satellites for several emerging space actors, including Pakistan,96 Nigeria,97 Venezuela,98 Laos,99 Bolivia,100 and Sri Lanka.101 An International Launch Services (ILS) Proton rocket successfully launched Chinese and Kazakhstan commercial telecommunications satellites AsiaSat-7102 and KazSat-2103 respectively from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Pursuant to the 2002 agreement between Russia and South Korea to build the Korea Space Launch Vehicle-1 (KSLV-1), Russia plans to ship a main-stage rocket for the vehicle in August 2012 for a scheduled launch in October. e Russian Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center manufactured the liquid-fueled rst-stage cryogenic rocket, while South Korea built the smaller solid-fuel second stage rocket as well as the scienti c satellite. is will be South Korea’s third attempt, after two failed launches in 2009 and 2010.104 Romania became the nineteenth ESA Member State by acceding to the ESA Convention on 20 January 2011.105 Israel and Malta signed Cooperation Agreements with ESA on 30 January 2011, and 20 February 2012, respectively.106 e agreed areas of research include astrophysics, satellite engineering, environmental contamination, natural disasters, telecommunications, and space biology.107 During 2011 the United States entered into two cooperative Earth Science agreements with the Brazilian space agency Agencia Espacial Brasileira. One agreement formalizes their scienti c collaboration on the Global Precipitation Measurement mission, while the other extends an agreement for the Ozone Cooperation Mission.108 An Administrative Arrangement on cooperation was concluded between ESA and the European Defence Agency to provide a structured relationship to coordinate their respective activities. It aims to explore “the added value and contribution of space assets to the development of European capabilities in the area of crisis management and the Common Security and Defence Policy.”109 It also allows the two agencies to enter into “implementing arrangements” for speci c projects, the rst of which will address unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) command and control via satellite.110
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2011 Development The United States eases export controls with India e United States is relaxing controls over exports to Indian space and defence organizations in an e ort to facilitate bilateral collaboration for space exploration.111 e removal of ISRO and Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) from the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List is expected to facilitate bilateral high-technology trade and cooperation in civil space and defense. A Federal Notice from the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security announced the removal of nine Indian space and defense-related organizations from the Entity List:112 e Federal Notice further excluded India from the U.S. Export Administration Act, which formerly listed India as a “country of concern.” India has now been added to a preferential Country Group (A:2), which consists exclusively of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) states.113 Commerce Secretary Gary Locke commented that this action “marks a signi cant milestone in reinforcing the United States-India strategic partnership and moving forward with export control reforms that will facilitate high technology trade and cooperation.”114
2011 Development U.S. bill limits NASA interaction with China Although many states have a growing interest in collaborating with China, on 15 April, the U.S. government enacted an Appropriations Act that contains clauses adding limits to NASA’s interactions with China. e prohibition, designed to prevent the use of federal funds “to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company,” also extends to preventing any NASA facility from hosting “ocial Chinese visitors.” Representative Frank Wolf, Chairman of the appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction over NASA, is reported to have pushed for limited NASA-China cooperation because China’s space program, although independent, “is run by the People’s Liberation Army.”115 e U.S. Administration, however, continues to propose the establishment of a regular dialogue with China about space. In July 2011 Gregory Schulte, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, said, “We’re ready to go in to talk about this strategy, to talk about what we think responsible use of space looks like … [and] to talk about ways to create rules for the road, and … reduce the risk of mishap or miscalculation or misunderstandings.”116 China’s White Paper also stated that the “director of the U.S. National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) visited China and the two sides will continue to make dialogue regarding the space eld.” Despite the prohibition in the Appropriations Act, the negotiations proposed by Schulte should not be a ected. White House Oce of Science and Technology Policy Director John Holdren stated that the congressional restriction on U.S.–Chinese space cooperation was not, in fact, a ban. 117 According to Holdren, the White House has concluded that the provision doesn’t extend to “prohibiting interactions that are part of the president’s constitutional authority to conduct [international] negotiations.” 118
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2011 Development Various states continue to pursue cooperation with China on space activities On 4 April 2011 the EC released the communication “Towards a space strategy for the European Union that bene ts its citizens,”119 which, among other objectives, urges cooperation and sharing of open frequencies in the eld of satellite navigation with China.120 It states that “the EU will also propose that space dialogue, the scope and objectives of which will be set out in appropriate bilateral arrangements, be established with other existing and emerging space powers, in particular the People’s Republic of China.”121 Despite an ongoing dispute with the EU, China decided to place its encrypted, government- only navigation service on a section of radio spectrum that overlaps with Europe’s planned service. While it is reported122 that neither China nor the EU is violating international regulations on broadcast interference because no broadcast interference will result, the overlap means that neither country could jam the other’s encrypted signals in a time of con ict without also jamming its own. Speaking at the conference “Space, Science and Security: e Role of Regional Expert Discussion,” India Congress Party spokesperson Manish Tewari emphasized the need for regional and international dialogue and common rules of operation. Tewari stated that India would be happy to engage China in a dialogue on space cooperation, recognizing that “China’s role is critical for … regional measures to be successful.”123 On 3 November 2011 during the First Canadian Aerospace Summit, CSA president Steve McLean said that Canada had begun talks about collaboration with China that would allow the Canadian space industry to access the Chinese market. No timetable for a signed treaty was announced.124
Space Security Impact e increased cooperation in space activities is a positive development; it builds con dence and fosters transparency among various spacefaring nations. In addition, international cooperation leads to tangible bene ts from such collaborative space activity as scienti c research. Given the sometimes prohibitively costly nature of space endeavors, international cooperation makes major missions possible through shared costs and technologies.
Indicator 4.3: Space-based global utilities e use of space-based global utilities, including navigation, weather, and search-and-rescue systems, has grown dramatically over the last decade. While key global utilities such as GPS and weather satellites were initially developed by military actors, today these systems have grown into space applications that are almost indispensable to the civil and commercial sectors as well.
Satellite navigation systems ere are currently two global satellite navigation systems: the U.S. GPS and the Russian GLONASS. Work on GPS began in 1978 and it was declared operational in 1993, with a minimum of 24 satellites that orbit in six di erent planes at an altitude of approximately 20,000 km in MEO. A GPS receiver must receive signals from four satellites to determine its location, with an accuracy of 20 m, depending on the precision of available signals. GPS operates a Standard Positioning Service for civilian use and a Precise Positioning Service that is intended for use by the U.S. DoD and its military allies.
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GPS military applications include navigation, target tracking, missile and projectile guidance, search-and-rescue, and reconnaissance. However, by 2001 military uses of the GPS accounted for only about two percent of its total market. e commercial air transportation industry, with more than two billion passengers a year, relies heavily on GPS.125 U.S. companies receive about half of GPS product revenues, but U.S. customers account for only about one-third of the revenue base. Demonstrating the growing importance of satellite navigation for civilian uses, former U.S. President George W. Bush announced in 2007 that next- generation GPS Block III satellites will not have the capability to degrade the civilian signal. e “decision re ects the United States strong commitment to users of GPS that this free global utility can be counted on to support peaceful civil activities around the world.”126 GLONASS uses principles similar to those used in GPS. It is designed to operate with a minimum of 24 satellites in three orbital planes, with eight satellites equally spaced in each plane, in a circular orbit with an altitude of 19,100 km.127 Although the rst GLONASS satellite was orbited in 1982, various satellite malfunctions kept the system below operational levels, retaining only some capability.128 In 2011 the system was declared fully operational, as described below.129 GLONASS operates a Standard Precision service available to all civilian users on a continuous, worldwide basis and a High Precision service available to all commercial users since 2007.130 Russia has extended cooperation on GLONASS to China and India,131 and continues to allocate signi cant funding for system upgrades independent of the Roscosmos budget. Two additional independent, global satellite navigation systems are being developed: the EU/ESA Galileo Navigation System and China’s Beidou Navigation System. Galileo is designed to operate 30 satellites in MEO in a constellation similar to that of the GPS, providing Europe with independent capabilities. e development of Galileo gained traction in 2002 with the allocation of $577-million by the European Council of Transport Ministers under a public-private partnership.132 After a ve-year delay, European governments agreed in 2007 to provide the necessary $5-billion to continue work on the system133 and in 2011 again revised cost estimates upwards by approximately $2.4-billion.134 As of 2012 the system’s deployment date has been delayed by six years and will go online no earlier than 2014.135 Galileo will o er open service; commercial service; safety-of-life service; search-and- rescue service; and an encrypted, jam-resistant, publicly regulated service reserved for public authorities that are responsible for civil protection, national security, and law enforcement.136 e Chinese Beidou system is experimental and thus far limited to regional uses. It works on a di erent principle from that of the GPS or GLONASS, operating four satellites in GEO.137 In 2006 China announced that it will extend Beidou into a global system called Compass or Beidou-2 for military, civilian, and commercial use.138 e planned global system will include ve satellites in GEO and 30 in MEO. While Beidou will initially provide only regional coverage, it is expected to evolve into a global navigation system by 2020.139 India has also proposed an independent, regional system—the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS)—intended to consist of a seven-satellite constellation.140 Japan is developing the Quazi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), which is to consist of a few satellites interoperable with GPS in HEO to enhance regional navigation over Japan, but operating separately from GPS, providing guaranteed service.141 e system is expected to be operational by 2013.142 e underlying drive for independent systems is based on a concern that reliance on foreign global satellite navigation systems such as GPS may be risky, since access to signals is not
84 Civil Space Programs assured, particularly during times of con ict. Nonetheless, almost all states remain dependent on GPS service and many of the proposed global and regional systems require cooperation with it. e development of competing independent satellite navigation systems, although conceivably interoperable and able to extend the reliability of this global utility, may face problems related to proper intersystem coordination and lead to disagreements over the use of signal frequencies. Another concern is orbital crowding as states seek to duplicate global services, particularly in MEO.
Remote sensing Remote sensing satellites are used extensively for a variety of Earth observation (EO) functions, including weather forecasting; surveillance of borders and coastal waters; monitoring of crops, sheries, and forests; and monitoring of natural disasters such as hurricanes, droughts, oods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, and avalanches. Access to EO data has been spreading worldwide, although not without diculties.143 To ensure truly broad access to data, agencies across the globe are working to enhance the eciency of data sharing with international partners.144 e European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) provides meteorological data for Europeans. e National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), founded in 1970, provides the United States with meteorological services.145 Satellite operators from China, Europe, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States, together with the World Meteorological Organization, make up the Co-ordination Group for Meteorological Satellites, a forum for the exchange of technical information on geostationary and polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems.146 e Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), coordinated by the Group on Earth Observation, has the goal of “establishing an international, comprehensive, coordinated and sustained Earth Observation System.”147 As of July 2012 the Group on Earth Observation has members from 88 state governments and the European Commission.148 In addition 64 intergovernmental, international, and regional organizations are recognized as Participating Organizations.149 Established in 2005 GEOSS has a 10-year implementation plan. Bene ts will include reduction of the impact of disasters, resource monitoring and management, sustainable land use and management, better development of energy resources, and adaptation to climate variability and change.150 e European Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) initiative is another example of a centralized database of Earth observation data made available to users around the world.151
Disaster Relief & Search-and-Rescue Space has also become critical for disaster relief. e International Charter Space and Major Disasters was initiated by ESA and CNES in 1999 to provide “a uni ed system of space data acquisition and delivery to those a ected by natural or man-made disasters through Authorized Users.”152 Other member organizations include the CSA, NOAA, ISRO, the Argentine Space Agency, the U.S. Geological Survey, the British National Space Centre, CNSA, and DMC International Imaging, which bring together resources from over 20 spacecraft.153 DMC International Imaging operates satellites for the Disaster Monitoring Constellation, a collaboration of Algeria, China, Nigeria, Spain, ailand, Turkey, the U.K., and Vietnam. Initiated by China, the project uses dedicated microsatellites to provide emergency Earth imaging for disaster relief, as well as daily imaging capabilities to partner states.154
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In 1979 COSPAS-SARSAT, the International Satellite System for Search and Rescue, was founded by Canada, France, the USSR, and the United States to coordinate satellite-based search-and-rescue. COSPAS-SARSAT is basically a distress alert detection and information distribution system that provides alert and location data to national search-and-rescue authorities worldwide, with no discrimination, independent of country participation in the management of the program.155 Similarly, states including Canada and Norway have begun to develop satellite systems to better collect and track Automated Identi cation System signals for collision avoidance. Satellite receivers for such signals could improve search-and- rescue e orts, as well as ship surveillance for security purposes.156 On 14 December 2006 the UNGA agreed to establish the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN- SPIDER). Its ocial mission statement is to “ensure that all countries and international and regional organizations have access to and develop the capacity to use all types of space-based information to support the full disaster management cycle.”
2011 Development Improvement in access to Earth observation data On 19 June 2011 Iran successfully received the rst images and data from its second domestically made satellite, Rasad-1 (Observation-1).157 e Earth observation satellite, weighing 15.3 km, was launched on 15 June 2011 and reportedly has a resolution of about 150 m.158 On 8 February 2012 Iran received the rst images sent by its research satellite Navid-e Elm and San’at (Promise of Science and Technology), which was sent into space aboard the Sa r rocket on 3 February.159 On 22 December 2011 China launched its rst high-resolution operational civilian remote- sensing satellite ZiYuan-1 (2C) on the Long March 4B (Chang Zeng 4B) rocket from its Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.160 is was the third CBERS-2 satellite, which follows a series of China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite launches resulting from a 1988 China-Brazil partnership. But ZiYuan-1 was built by the Chinese without any Brazilian participation following speci cations by the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources.161 e Ziyuan III satellite has also transmitted back visual data after being launched on 9 January 2012 to produce high-resolution imagery for civilian use.162 e satellite reportedly includes two panchromatic high-resolution cameras, each with a ground resolution of 2.6 m and a combined swath width of 54 km, and an infrared multispectral scanner of 5m/10m resolution and ground swath width of 60 km.163 Pléiades 1A, the rst new-generation observation satellite operated by French space agency CNES was orbited by Arianespace onboard a Soyuz launcher from French Guiana on 17 December.164 Pléiades, which will replace the Spot 5 3D imaging satellite, is scheduled to supply new-generation panchromatic and multispectral Earth imagery for dual purposes.165 e joint French-Italian Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation (ORFEO) is a dual-use network that will consist of two Pléiades satellites and four Cosmo-Skymed satellites equipped with synthetic aperture radars, being developed by Italy. On 20 April 2011 ISRO launched ResourceSat 2, India’s eighteenth remote sensing satellite, on its PSLV-C16.166 On 12 October 2011 ISRO also launched the Megha-tropiques climate research satellite along with three micro-satellites on the Indian PSLV-C18, in collaboration with CNES which provided the SAPHIR and ScaRaB payloads for the mission.167
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e U.S. National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory Project satellite was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California aboard a United Launch Alliance Delta II rocket on 28 October. is NASA Earth-observing satellite is designed to provide enhanced weather data for NOAA scientists.168 Two Nigerian Earth observation satellites, NigeriaSat-2 (2.5 m resolution) and NigeriaSat-X (7.5 m resolution), designed and built with Nigerian participation by the U.K.-based Surrey Satellite Technology Limited, were launched on 17 August 2011 from a launch pad in Yasny, Russia “to monitor weather in a region seasonally ravaged by disasters.”169
2011 Development Satellite navigation systems around the globe continue to evolve e long-delayed and signi cantly over-budget European 30-satellite Galileo navigation system, which is designed to be fully interoperable with the American GPS and the Russian GLONASS, progressed in 2011 with the rst pair of satellites launched on a Russian Soyuz vehicle from French Guiana on 21 October.170 Both satellites have successfully transmitted test signals to the ground station in Redu, Belgium.171 e next pair of In-Orbit Validation (IOV) satellites is scheduled to be launched in 2012. In February 2011 EC Vice President Antonio Tajani announced that the consortium led by OHB System AG and Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd., which is already building 14 satellites for the Galileo program, had been given the contract to build a further eight satellites under the supervision of ESA.172 e same month, Arianespace entered into an agreement with ESA to launch satellites for the Galileo satellite positioning system aboard Ariane 5 launchers. Under the terms of the agreement, Ariane 5 launchers are to be used in 2014 and 2015 to complete the deployment of the Galileo constellation.173 At the Galileo Application Congress 2012 the Czech government signed an agreement with the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Agency to host the headquarters of the Galileo system in Prague.174 For the rst time in more than 15 years, Russia’s GLONASS is fully operational, with 24 satellites providing global coverage.175 Russia could spend as much as 346.5-billion rubles (almost $12-billion) on its GLONASS system in the period 2012-2020 to have 30 satellites in orbit, including six in reserve. e country also plans to launch 13 GLONASS-M satellites and 22 GLONASS-K satellites to replace outdated spacecraft. Eight Proton-M and 11 Soyuz-2.1b carrier rockets will launch the satellites.176 In a related development, the Russian space agency launched its rst navigation augmentation satellite, Luch-5A, on 11 December 2011.177 Luch-5A is the rst in a series of new data relay satellites designed to rebuild the Soviet-era Luch Multifunctional Space Relay System and will be used to relay communications and telemetry between LEO spacecraft and Russian ground facilities.178 e second and third Luch satellites are expected to be launched in 2012 and 2014.179 After a successful launch of the Beidou-2 IGSO satellite on 10 April,180 the Beidou-2/ Compass IGSO-5 satellite was launched on 1 December from Xichang in China,181 thus completing the construction of the basic regional navigation system for service in China.182 is launch by the Long March booster rocket was the sixteenth successful orbital launch in 2011 for China, breaking the 2010 launch record of 15 successful missions.183 At a press conference in Beijing, where the system was ocially declared operational,184 a beta or test version of the Beidou-2/Compass Interface Control Document was released.185 However, completion of the Phase II development, to provide service to the Asia/Paci c region, will
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require further satellite launches in 2012. Phase III global coverage, with a 35-satellite system, is to be achieved by 2020.186 e USAF awarded Lockheed Martin a $238-million contract for production of the third and fourth satellites in the next-generation GPS III constellation, which are expected to deliver better accuracy and improved anti-jamming power while adding a new civil signal designed to be interoperable with international global navigation satellite systems.187 (See Chapter 1 for a description of interference by U.S. telecommunications company LightSquared with GPS signals.)
Space Security Impact Increasing reliance on space systems for global utilities such as disaster management, earth observation, telecommunications, weather, position, navigation, and timing may constitute a positive development for space security. Spacefaring nations are encouraged to promote safe and responsible space behavior and to focus on the long-term sustainable use of space resources. e growing use of remote sensing data to manage a range of global challenges, including disaster monitoring and response, is positive for space security insofar as it further links the security of Earth to the security of space, expands space applications to include additional users, and encourages international collaboration and cooperation on an important space capability.
88 Commercial Space
Commercial Space CHAP is chapter assesses space security indicators and developments in the commercial space sector, which includes manufacturers of space hardware such as rockets and satellite components, providers of space-based information such as telecommunications and remote sensing, and service operators for space launches. Also covered in this chapter are the developments related to the nascent space tourism industry, as well as the interactions between commercial operators and the public sector. e commercial space sector has experienced dramatic growth over the past decade, largely as a result of rapidly increasing revenues associated with satellite services provided by companies that own and operate satellites, as well as the ground support centers that control them. is
growth has been driven by, among other factors, the reality that space-based services such TER as satellite-based navigation, once the exclusive purview of governments, are now widely available for private customers. In 2011 alone, the world satellite industry had revenues in excess of $177-billion.1 Companies that manufacture satellites and ground equipment have also contributed signi cantly to the growth of the commercial space sector. is includes both direct contractors that design and build large systems and vehicles, smaller subcontractors responsible for system components, and software providers. is chapter assesses developments associated with access to space via commercial launch services. In the early 2000s overcapacity in the launch market and a reduction in commercial demand combined to depress the cost of commercial space launches. More recently, an FIVE energized satellite communication market and launch industry consolidation have resulted in stabilization and an increase in launch pricing. Revenues from 23 commercial launch events in 2011 were close to $2-billion.2 is chapter also examines the relationships between governments and the commercial space sector, including the government as partner and the government as regulator, and the growing reliance of the military on commercial services. Governments play a central role in commercial space activities by supporting research and development, subsidizing certain space industries, and adopting enabling policies and regulations. Indeed, the space launch and manufacturing sectors rely heavily on government contracts. e retirement of the space shuttle in the United States, for instance, will likely open up new opportunities for the commercial sector to provide launch services for human space ight. Conversely, because space technology is often dual-use, governments have sometimes taken actions such as the imposition of export controls, which impact the growth of the commercial market. ere is also evidence that commercial actors are engaging governments on space governance issues, in particular space trac management and space situational awareness.
Space Security Impact e role that the commercial space sector plays in the provision of launch, communications, imagery, and manufacturing services, as well as its relationship with government, civil, and military programs, make this sector an important determinant of space security. A healthy space industry can lead to decreasing costs for space access and use, and may increase the accessibility of space technology for a wider range of space actors. is has a positive impact on space security by increasing the number of actors that can access and use space or space- based applications, thereby creating a wider pool of stakeholders with a vested interest in the maintenance of space security. Increased commercial competition in the research and development of new applications can also lead to the further diversi cation of capabilities to access and use space.
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Commercial space e orts have the potential to increase the level of transnational cooperation and interdependence in the space sector, thereby enhancing transparency and con dence among international partners. Additionally, the development of the space industry could in uence, and be in uenced by, international space governance. To thrive, sustainable commercial markets must have the freedom to innovate, but they also require a framework of laws and regulations on issues of property, standards, and liabilities. Issues of ownership and property may also pose a challenge to the growth of the industry. For example, while the non-appropriation clause of the Outer Space Treaty is generally understood to prohibit ownership claims in space, this clause also raises questions about the allocation and use of space resources, which are utilized by a variety of space actors, but are technically owned by no one. Growth in space commerce has already led to greater competition for scarce space resources such as orbital slots and radio frequencies. To date, the ITU and national regulators have been able to manage inter- and intra-industry tensions. However, strong demand for additional frequency allocations and demands of emerging nations for new orbital slots will provide new governance challenges for domestic and international regulators. e growing dependence of certain segments of the commercial space industry on military clients could also have an adverse impact on space security, by making commercial space assets the potential target of military attacks.
Indicator 5.1: Growth in commercial space industry Commercial space revenues have steadily increased since the mid-1990s, when the industry rst started to grow signi cantly. e satellite industry is made up of four major segments: ground equipment, satellite services, launch industry, and satellite manufacturing. During 2011 satellite services accounted for approximately 61 percent of total worldwide space industry revenues3 and 4 percent of overall global telecommunications industry revenues.4 Between 2010 and 2011 launch industry segment remained steady with 3 percent of total revenues. Satellite manufacturing increased slightly in 2011 to 7 percent from 6 percent in the previous year; satellite services grew from 60 percent to 61 percent.5 Growth in services such as telecommunications has been largely driven by commercial rather than government demand; this trend is mirrored in other sectors. e telecommunications industry has long been a driver of commercial uses of space. e rst commercial satellite was the Telstar-1, launched by NASA in July 1962 for telecommunications giant AT&T.6 Satellite industry revenues were rst reported in 1978, when Communication Satellite Corporation claimed 1976 operating revenues of almost $154-million.7 By 1980 it is estimated that the worldwide commercial space sector already accounted for revenues of $2.1-billion.8 Individual consumers are becoming important stakeholders in space with their demand for telecommunications services, particularly Direct Broadcasting Services, but also global satellite positioning and commercial remote sensing images. Today’s space telecommunications sector emerged from what were previously government-operated bodies that were deregulated and privatized in the 1990s. For example, the International Maritime Satellite Organisation (Inmarsat) and International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) were privatized in 1999 and 2001, respectively.9 PanAmSat, New Skies, GE Americom, Loral Skynet, Eutelsat, Iridium, EchoStar, and Globalstar were some of the prominent companies to emerge during this time. Major companies today include SES Global, Intelsat, Eutelsat, Telesat, and Inmarsat. 90 Commercial Space
Although satellite manufacturers continue to experience pressure to lower prices, strong demand for broadcasting, broadband, and mobile satellite services and a strong replacement market drive an increase in orders that is projected to continue.10 Of the 133 payloads carried into orbit in 2011, 35 provide commercial services and the remaining 98 perform civil government, nonpro t, or military missions.11 e commercial launch market continues to be dominated by Russia and Europe, followed by the United States. e shape of the commercial space industry has been shifting as it becomes more global. Although it is still dominated by Europe, Russia, and the United States., countries such as India and China are starting to become involved. Developing countries are the prime focus of these e orts.12 India has been positioning itself to compete for a portion of the commercial launch service market by o ering lower-cost launches13 and it also intends to compete in the satellite manufacturing industry.14 For the rst time in 2007 China both manufactured and launched a satellite for another country, Nigeria’s Nigcomsat-1.15 Moreover, because it uses no U.S. components, China has marketed manufactured satellites as free of ITAR (International Trac in Arms Regulations) restrictions, reportedly at prices below industry standard.16
2011 Development Despite predictions of downturn, satellite industry positioned for continued growth Because of the market’s cyclical nature and the global recession, a downturn had been predicted for satellite markets, but substantial orders for commercial geostationary-orbiting telecommunications satellites kept the market lively.17 On 6 February 2012 Euroconsult, a leading consulting and analysis rm specializing in the space sector, announced that the prospects for the satellite industry are expected to remain favorable over the next decade in a variety of areas.18 In its report Satellite Communications & Broadcasting Markets Survey, Euroconsult predicts satellite bandwidth used by traditional Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) will be worth approximately $15-billion by 2020.19 However, the report also forecasts stagnating government spending, which is expected to persist through the middle of the decade.20 According to a public statement by Euroconsult CEO, Pacôme Revillon, “while we have seen slowing growth rates in leased capacity, FSS operators’ revenue growth has continued to outperform the global economy, and operating margins remain high for most operators. In the near term, the dicult economic environment could weigh on the market.”21 Revillon added that “connectivity needs and the growth of digital TV in emerging regions, combined with the launch of new generation high throughput satellite systems should continue to drive growth. e value of satellite capacity leasing should consequently grow at 7% over the next ten years.”22 Euroconsult’s report predicts that 1,145 satellites will be built for launch between 2011 and 2020—a 51 percent increase over the previous decade.23 Seventy percent of this activity can be attributed to government demand. ese launches are expected to generate revenues worth $196-billion. As well, Euroconsult predicts that 203 commercial communications satellites, with a market value of $50-billion, will be launched into Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) over the next decade.24
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Figure 5.1: Approximate commercial launch revenue by country in 2011 (in U.S.$ millions) 25
e report is consistent with ndings from early 2011 that “disproved analysts’ warnings that the cyclical industry was headed for a downturn”26 and con rmed that the telecommunications industry had managed to maintain nearly the same level of orders for commercial GEO orbiting satellites in 2010 as for 2009 (26 in 2010; 30 the year before).27 For instance, in 2011 earth imagery supplier DigitalGlobe reported growth exceeding its ability to keep up with it.28 GPS and direct-to-home (DTH) satellite television also produced strong revenues, continuing to fuel overall industry growth as they have since 2005.29 Eutelsat, Intelsat, SES, and Telesat all reported top-line growth compared with the year before, although only Eutelsat showed a double-digit increase.30
2011 Development Inmarsat develops business by securing fi nancing from U.S. Export-Import Bank for Global Xpress system, while expanding maritime operations On 12 May 2011 mobile satellite services operator Inmarsat announced a loan agreement with the U.S. Export-Import Bank that will provide up to $700-million to build and insure three large Ka-band satellites designed to provide more bandwidth to its customer base as part of its Global Xpress satellite system.31 A four-year drawdown will be followed by an 8.5-year payback in equal installments at an undisclosed xed interest rate.32 Although Inmarsat is based in the U.K., eligibility for U.S. export-credit support was based on the fact that all three satellites for the Global Xpress system are being built by Boeing Space and Intelligence Systems, which is based in El Segundo, California.33 In addition to carrying Ka-band payloads, all three Global Xpress satellites are expected to carry a complementary high-capacity overlay to allow higher bandwidth links to individual hotspots, several of which will be in the ocean.34 e Ka-band payloads will use both civil and military frequencies.35
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Figure 5.2: Worldwide commercial launch revenue. 2007-2011 (in U.S.$ millions) 36
On 1 August 2011 Inmarsat announced that Inmarsat SA, one of its subsidiaries, had signed an agreement with International Launch Services to launch its three Global Xpress satellites.37 e satellites are expected to be launched in 2013 and 2014 in separate Proton lifto s from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.38 e spacecraft will be stationed approximately 120 degrees apart in geostationary orbit 36,000 km above the equator, and will provide mobile broadband service for maritime, aeronautical, and land-based users.39 Inmarsat estimated the total cost of its investment in the Global Xpress system, including launches, at $1.2-billion.40 In addition Inmarsat purchased Ship Equip International, a provider of communications services to maritime vessels with very-small-aperture terminal (VSAT) onboard antennas via Ku-band satellite.41 Inmarsat aims to convert Ship Equip customers to its Global Express service. Concerns regarding signal attenuation for Ka-band mirror those expressed prior to the adoption of satellite broadband in the United States, which were addressed by adjusting power levels on the satellite beam and using adaptive coding modulation. Inmarsat is building upon the fact that prospective Global Express customers can continue to use their existing L-band satellite hardware, already used by most of Inmarsat’s existing customers, and add Global Express gear to that system. e reported cost of the acquisition was $159.5-million.42
2011 Development High throughput satellites (HTS) drive growth Changes in satellite manufacturing have placed high throughput satellites in the forefront of technologies helping to grow the satellite industry.43 Not simply larger and more powerful than their predecessors, HTS o er high total bandwidth throughput or capacity. Increased capacity is needed to meet bandwidth demand resulting from online, on-demand, streaming, or downloadable44 sites such as YouTube, Net ix, and Hulu. HTS combines greater spectrum availability, by using Ka-band and higher frequency bands, with the use of spot beams.45 Much like cellular networks, spot beams enable frequency re- use. While HTS is not limited to Ka-band, the increased use of this spectrum motivated the international satellite industry to lobby for its e ective management.46 Eutelsat went live with its KA-SAT HTS in May 2011.47
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2011 Development Eutelsat leases Chinese satellite to preserve orbital slot A Western satellite operator leased a Chinese-built satellite for the rst time in 2011.48 On 13 May Paris-based satellite operator Eutelsat announced that it had leased Chinese satellite Sinosat3/Chinasat 5C, which was launched in May 2007.49 Sinosat 3/Chinasat 5C, which has 24 36-megahertz Ku-band transponders, is based on China’s DFH-3 satellite frame and is designed to operate for 15 years.50 e company’s announcement came shortly before, according to ITU regulations, its rights over the orbital slot over Europe were set to expire in June 2011. e satellite, referred to by the ITU as F-Sat-Ku-E-1.6E, was moved from Asia to one of Eutelsat’s orbital slots over Europe, which it had reserved in 2004 through the French National Frequencies Agency.51 Eutelsat had decided “to operate the [Chinese] satellite at 1.6 degrees East.”52 Since other national administrations have registered satellites and frequencies near the orbital position in question, another operator could have occupied the slot if Eutelsat had missed the deadline. e satellite was renamed Eutelsat 3A. Details about the cost of the lease were provided on 29 July 2011 by Chief Financial Ocer Catherine Guillouard. Eutelsat is paying 15-million euros ($21.5 million) to lease the satellite, plus a nance charge of less than 1 million euros.53 On 28 July 2011 Eutelsat announced that it had ordered a large satellite from Astrium, which will be placed in the slot currently used by Eutelsat 3A.54 e new satellite, Eutelsat 3B, will carry a mixed C-, Ku-, and Ka-band payload and is expected to be launched in early 2014 into the 3 degrees east slot.55
2011 Development Commercial launch market continues to expand In 2011 China performed two commercial launches.56 e rst, in August, was the launch of a communications satellite developed by China for Pakistan.57 In October the second launched a French satellite built by ales Alenia Space for Eutelsat Communication. ese launches herald China’s intention to reenter the global launch industry, with a goal of ve launches for 2012, or approximately 15 percent of the 20 to 30 commercial launches historically performed worldwide in a given year.58 e rst mission for the Europeanized Soyuz-2 took place in October, launching two Galileo space navigation satellites.59 is was the rst time the Soyuz had launched from Kourou in French Guiana. In December the French Pléiades 1A high-resolution Earth observation satellite launched aboard a Soyuz rocket from the Guiana Space Centre.60
2011 Development LightSquared telecommunications plan interferes with GPS signals in the United States On 24 January 2011 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conditionally approved the U.S. telecommunications company LightSquared’s plan to deploy 40,000 high-power transmitters for providing broadband service to customers, despite awareness that they would interfere with nearby GPS signals.61 e FCC granted its approval to LightSquared on the condition that it would work with the U.S. Global Positioning System Industry Council and U.S. military, which operates GPS, “to determine the extent of interference and develop mitigation measures.”62 Tests were to
94 Commercial Space be completed by 31 May 2011, with a nal report presented to the FCC in mid-June.63 e report stated that “although the results vary among devices, transmissions in the 10 MHz band at the top of LightSquared’s downlink frequencies—the band nearest to the GPS frequencies—will adversely a ect the performance of a signi cant number of legacy GPS receivers.”64 On 14 February 2012 the FCC issued a statement saying that it would revoke LightSquared’s conditional license.65 (See Chapter 1 for further details on this development.)
Space Security Impact e pool of stakeholders with a direct interest in preserving space as a peaceful domain has increased in recent years as a result of the continued overall growth in the commercial space industry. is constitutes a positive development for space security. Moreover, cooperative e orts and the resulting cost-e ectiveness will likely encourage greater space access and socioeconomic development for both established and emerging spacefaring states. Development of new products and services lessens dependence upon one facet of commercial activity, thus helping to insulate against uctuations in speci c markets. However, as commercial space activity increases, issues of congestion, competition, and spectrum management become of greater concern.
Indicator 5.2: Commercial sector support for increased access to space products and services Space Launches Russian, European, and U.S. companies remain world leaders in the commercial launch sector, with Russia launching the most satellites annually, both commercial and in total. Generally launch revenues are attributed to the country in which the primary vehicle manufacturer is based. However, Sea Launch is designated “multinational” and so a clear division of revenues among participating countries is harder to establish. Commercial space access grew signi cantly in the 1980s. At that time NASA viewed the provision of commercial launches more as a means to o set operating expenses than as a viable commercial venture. European and Russian companies chose to pursue commercial launches via standard rocket technology, which allowed them to undercut U.S. competitors during the period when the United States was only o ering launches through its Space Shuttle. Increasing demand for launch services and the ban of commercial payloads on the Space Shuttle following the 1986 Challenger Shuttle disaster encouraged further commercial launch competition. e Ariane launcher, developed by the French in the 1980s, captured over 50 percent of the commercial launch market during the period 1988-1997.66 e Chinese Long March and the Russian Proton rocket entered the market in the early and mid-1990s. In May 1999 India’s Augmented Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle performed the country’s rst LEO commercial launch, placing German and South Korean satellites in orbit.67 Today Ariane, Proton, and Zenit rockets dominate the commercial launch market. Top commercial launch providers include Boeing Launch Services and Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services (vehicles procured through United Launch Alliance) and Orbital Sciences Corporation in the United States; Arianespace in Europe; ISC Kosmotras, Polyot (with partners), and ZAO Puskovie Uslugi in Russia; Antrix in India; China Great Wall Industry Corporation in China; and international consortia Sea Launch, International Launch Services, Eurockot Launch Services GmbH, and Starsem. Sea Launch—comprising Boeing (U.S.), Aker Kvaerner (Norway), RSC-Energiya (Russia), and SDO Yuzhnoye/PO 95 Space Security Index 2012
Yuzhmash (Ukraine)—operates from a mobile sea-based platform located on the equator in the Paci c Ocean. ILS was established as a partnership among Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center (Russia), Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services (United States), and RSC-Energiya (Russia). In 2006 Lockheed sold its share to U.S. Space Transport Inc. Eurockot is a joint venture between EADS Space Transportation and Khrunichev, while Starsem is a joint venture between the Russian Federal Space Agency, TsSKB-Progress, EADS Space Transportation, and Arianespace. Commercial launch vehicle builders such as Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) have become increasingly active in research and development and are seeking to compete by providing cheaper, reusable launch vehicle systems such as the Falcon 9. In addition to a proliferation of rocket designs, the launch sector has also seen innovations in launch techniques. For example, since the early 1990s companies such as the U.K.’s Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. have used piggyback launches, in which a small satellite is attached to a larger one. It is now also common to use small launchers such as the Cosmos rocket and India’s PSLV to deploy clusters of smaller satellites.
Commercial Earth Imagery While at one point only national governments could access remote sensing imagery; today any individual or organization with access to the Internet can use these services through Google Maps, Google Earth, and Yahoo Maps programs.68 Currently several companies in Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Russia, and the United States are providing commercial remote sensing imagery. e resolution of the imagery has become progressively more re ned and a ordable. In addition to optical photo images, synthetic aperture radar images up to one meter in resolution are coming on the market and a growing consumer base is driving up revenues. However, the potentially sensitive nature of the data has raised security concerns.
Commercial Satellite Navigation Initially intended for military use, satellite navigation has emerged as a key civilian and commercial service. e U.S. government rst promised international civilian use of its planned Global Positioning System in 1983, following the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 over Soviet territory and in 1991 pledged that it would be freely available to the international community beginning in 1993.69 While GPS civilian signals have dominated the commercial market, new competition may emerge from the EU’s Galileo system, which is speci cally designed for civilian and commercial use, and Russia’s GLONASS.70 China’s regional Beidou system will also be available for commercial use.71 (For further information on satellite navigations systems see Chapters 4 and 6.) e commercial satellite positioning industry initially focused on niche markets such as surveying and civil aviation, but has since grown to include automotive navigation, agricultural guidance, and construction.72 Sales of ground-based equipment provide core revenues for the commercial satellite positioning industry. Commercial users rst outpaced military buyers in the mid-1990s.73 e commercial GPS market continues to grow with the introduction of new receivers that integrate the GPS function into other devices, such as cell phones.74
Commercial Space Transportation An embryonic private space ight industry continues to emerge, seeking to capitalize on new concepts for advanced, reliable, reusable, and relatively a ordable technologies for launch to near-space and LEO. In December 2004 the U.S. Congress passed the “Commercial
96 Commercial Space
Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004.” Intended to “promote the development of the emerging commercial human space ight industry,” the Act established the authority of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) over suborbital space tourism in the United States, allowing it to issue permits to private spacecraft operators to send customers into space.75 In 2006 the ESA announced the “Survey of European Privately-funded Vehicles for Commercial Human Space ight” to support the emergence of a European commercial space transportation industry.76 e market for commercial space transportation remains small, but has attracted a great deal of interest. In September-October 2009 Canadian Guy Laliberté became the seventh and latest private citizen to y in space with Space Adventures, which sells seats on the Russian Soyuz.77 Prices for this opportunity are increasing, with Charles Simonyi paying $25-million for his trip in 2007 and $35-million for a second trip in March 2009.78 In June 2004 SpaceShipOne, developed by e Spaceship Company (a joint venture between Scaled Composites and the Virgin Group), became the rst private manned spacecraft, but only conducted suborbital ights.79 It was followed by SpaceShipTwo, unveiled in December 2009 and expected to carry passengers on suborbital ights. Although a speci c date for the rst private ights on SpaceShipTwo has not yet been con rmed, Virgin Galactic, a subsidiary of the Virgin Group, has already started taking bookings for suborbital ights at a cost of $200,000 per seat.80 While the industry has faced various challenges—including a lack of international legal safety standards, high launch costs, and export regulations81— important liability standards have emerged. In 2006 the FAA released a set of rules governing private human space ight requirements for crew and participants.82 Final rules were also issued for FAA launch vehicle safety approvals.83
Insurance Insurance a ects both the cost and risk of access to space. Insurance rates also in uence the ease with which startup companies and new technologies enter the market.84 Although governments play an important role in the insurance sector, insofar as they generally maintain a certain level of indemni cation for commercial launchers, the commercial sector assumes most of the insurance burden. ere are two types of coverage: launch insurance, which typically includes the rst year in orbit, and in-orbit insurance for subsequent years. Most risk is associated with launch and the rst year in orbit. When covering launches, insurance underwriters and brokers discriminate among launch vehicles and satellite design so that the most reliable designs subsidize the insurance costs of the less reliable hardware.85 Following a decade of tumultuous rates due to tight supply of insurance and a series of industry losses, many companies abandoned insurance altogether, but recently there has been a softening of the launch insurance market.86 Terms have also become more restricted. Insurers do not generally quote premiums earlier than 12 months prior to a scheduled launch and in-orbit rates are usually limited to one-year terms. It is possible that insurance costs may go higher in the future, owing to the risk caused by the signi cant increase in space debris in recent years.87 With the advent of space tourism, the space insurance industry may expand to cover human space ight. In the United States, the FAA requires commercial human spacecraft operators to purchase third-party liability insurance, although additional coverage is optional. Each of the rst two space tourists purchased policies for training, transportation, and time spent in space.88
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2011 Development Various companies continue to develop services for the commercial human spaceflight and space tourism markets Virgin Galactic continued testing Space Ship Two and carrier White Knight Two, completing a sixth hot- re test of a full-scale ight design rocket motor in March 2011, followed on 22 April 2011 with the longest test ight to date.89 e milestone test, which took place over the Mojave Air and Space Port, lasted 14 minutes and 31 seconds.90 Virgin Galactic also announced the selection of its rst commercial astronaut pilot, USAF test pilot Keith Colmer, from a eld of more than 500 applicants.91 Virgin Galactic entered into commercial contracts with Southwest Research Institute to allow scientists to conduct experiments during suborbital ights.92 Although these are the rst contracts of this kind for the company, it sees potential in o ering researchers more frequent and less costly ights into space. Southwest Research Institute has also purchased space for scientists and experiments on XCOR Aerospace’s two-seat Lynx space plane.93 Stratolaunch Systems chose Scaled Composites, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman and the developer of SpaceShip One and White Knight (forerunners to the Virgin Galactic eet), to develop an air launch system and the largest aircraft yet constructed.94 e rm hopes that this Paul G. Allen project will lower the cost of access to space while increasing safety.
2011 Development AISSata-1 improves AIS (Automatic Identification System) tracking Norway launched its experimental AISSat-1 satellite to improve safety at sea.95 e launch took place from India in September. Using a payload developed by Kongsberg Seatex AS and a Canadian satellite platform, space-based AIS such as AISSata-1 extends ship tracking beyond the current line of sight or 40 nautical miles of the shore-based AIS network.96
2011 Development Full control regained over Intelsat’s Galaxy 15 satellite In January 2011 Intelsat was able to recover and move its Galaxy 15 satellite after its batteries drained completely and it experienced a full system shutdown.97 Subsequently, ground commands directed a full reset maneuver, returning the satellite to sun-pointing status and allowing control to resume. is outcome matched Intelsat’s original prediction, although it took longer to occur than anticipated. Serious signal interference and service interruption were avoided.98 (For a detailed account of the Galaxy 15 malfunction, see Space Security 2011, Chapters 1, 2, and 5.)
2011 Development Plans advance for on-orbit servicing of satellites On 15 March 2011 Canada-based MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates Corporation (MDA) announced that it had entered into an agreement with Intelsat for the on-orbit servicing of Intelsat’s satellites via a space-based service vehicle to be developed and provided by MDA.99 Under the agreement, Intelsat would be the anchor tenant for MDA’s Space Infrastructure Servicing (SIS) vehicle, expected to be in service as early as 2015.100 Intelsat was to provide ight operations support for the life of the mission and invest approximately $280-million in the inaugural mission.101
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e SIS vehicle was envisioned to act as a service station for commercial and government satellites, providing fuel, repositioning, and performing maintenance using robotics and docking technologies already in use.102 e service vehicle, which would be fully robotic and controlled from the ground, would carry up to 2,000 kg of fuel in addition to various robotic tools to service satellites and extend their useful life by one to ve years.103 According to MDA, the SIS vehicle would be used, in addition to refueling, “to perform critical maintenance and repair tasks, such as releasing jammed deployable arrays and stabilizing or towing smaller space objects or debris.”104 On 16 January 2012, however, Intelsat and MDA announced the cancellation of the agreement.105 According to an Intelsat executive, “at the completion of the investigation stage, we determined that the project would end. We remain very interested in refueling and SIS, and will continue to explore potential solutions to refueling.”106 e main reason for the cancellation was reportedly a lack of commitment from prospective government and commercial customers to use SIS in the future.107 In a similar move, U.S. Space and ATK started ViviSat, a company developed to promote the Mission Extension Vehicle (MEV). e plan is for MEV to o er services to operators, including rendezvous and docking without interruption to operations of the client satellite, long-term station-keeping and attitude control, relocation of satellites to di erent orbital slots or to di erent orbits, de-orbiting satellites at the end of life, and rescue and re-orbiting of stranded satellites.108
Space Security Impact Increased access to space a ects space security both positively and negatively. As more entities, both governmental and private, are able to reach space, the bene ts of the resource spread, ideally in an equalizing manner. However, increased access to space also translates into a more congested environment, making more urgent e ective regulatory mechanisms for the allocation of scarce resources. e increasing number of private citizens with a vested interest in space security may yield a positive impact on space security. However, such access may challenge space security, both in terms of the sustainability of the space environment and in the applicability of international law to the largely uncharted realm of space tourism. Finally, although e ects seem positive, it is too early to assess the full impact of on-orbit satellite servicing, which aims to extend the operational life of active satellites.
Indicator 5.3: Interactions between public and private sectors on space activities Government Support Governments have played an integral role in the development of the commercial space sector. Many spacefaring states consider their space systems to be an extension of critical national infrastructure, and a growing number view their space systems as inextricably linked to national security. Full state ownership of space systems has now given way to a mixed system in which many commercial space actors receive signi cant government and military contracts and a variety of subsidies. Certain sectors, such as remote sensing or commercial launch industries, rely more heavily on government clients, while the satellite communications industry is commercially sustainable without government contracts. Due to the security concerns associated with commercial space technologies, governments still play an active role in the sector through regulation, including export controls and controls on certain applications, such as Earth imaging.
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e U.S. Space Launch Cost Reduction Act of 1998 established a low-interest loan program to support the development of reusable vehicles.109 In 2002 the USAF requested $1-billion in subsidies for development of Lockheed Martin’s Atlas-5 and Boeing’s Delta-4 vehicles, under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program.110 e 2005 Space Transportation Policy required the DoD to pay the xed costs to support both companies (since merged into the United Launch Alliance) until the end of the decade, rather than force price-driven competition.111 A 2006 report commissioned by the FAA indicated that a successful U.S. commercial launch industry is viewed as “bene cial to national interests.”112 Also in 2006 NASA announced the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, designed to coordinate the transportation of crews and cargo to the International Space Station by private companies.113 e U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy directs the U.S. government to “rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities for lling imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security, and civil users” to “advance and protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by maintaining the nation’s leadership in remote sensing space activities, and by sustaining and enhancing the U.S. remote sensing industry.”114 e European Guaranteed Access to Space Program adopted in 2003 requires that ESA underwrite the development costs of the Ariane-5, ensuring its competitiveness in the international launch market.115 e program explicitly recognizes a competitive European launch industry as a strategic asset and is intended to ensure sustained government funding for launcher design and development, infrastructure maintenance, and upkeep.116 e 2007 European Space Policy “emphasizes the vital importance for Europe to maintain an independent, reliable and cost-e ective access to space at a ordable conditions…bearing in mind that a critical mass of launcher activities is a precondition for the viability of this sector.”117 Russia’s commercial space sector maintains a close relationship with its government, receiving contracts and subsidies for the development of the Angara launcher and launch site maintenance.118 China’s space industry is indistinguishable from its government, with public and private institutions closely intertwined.119 e industries responsible for supporting China’s space program fall under the auspices of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), which is directly linked to the government. In many instances, governments are partnering with the private sector to subsidize the commercial development of systems also intended to meet national needs. For example, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s (NGA) NextView program included subsidies for commercial remote sensing to meet military needs for high-resolution images, which are then for sale commercially at a lower resolution.120 e commercial Radarsat-2 satellite was largely paid for by the Canadian Space Agency, which spent $445-million to pre-purchase data that is also sold commercially.121 is arrangement is similar to that for Germany’s TerrSar-X remote sensing satellite.122 Remote sensing is not the only instance of such partnering. e U.K.’s Skynet-5 secure military communications satellite is operated by a private company, which sells its excess capacity.123 However, partnering with the commercial sector often involves mixing national security considerations with private commercial interests. For instance, in 2008 the Canadian government intervened to block the sale of MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates, maker of the Radarsat-2 satellite, to a U.S. rm, citing national interests.124
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Export controls National security concerns continue to play an important role in the commercial space industry, particularly through export controls. Trade restrictions aim to strike a balance between commercial development and the proliferation of sensitive technologies that could pose security threats. However, achieving that balance is not easy, particularly in an industry characterized by dual-use technology. Space launchers and intercontinental ballistic missiles use almost identical technology, and many civil and commercial satellites contain advanced capabilities with potential military applications. Dual-use concerns have led states to develop national and international export control regimes aimed at preventing proliferation. e Missile Technology Control Regime, formed in 1987, is composed of 34 member states seeking to prevent the further proliferation of capabilities to deliver weapons of mass destruction by collaborating on a voluntary basis to coordinate the development and implementation of common export policy guidelines.125 However, export practices di er among members. For example, although the U.S. “Iran Nonproliferation Act” of 2000 limited the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Iran, Russia’s Federal Law on Export Control still allowed it.126 Most states control the export of space-related goods through military and weapons-of-mass-destruction export control laws, such as the Export Control List in Canada, the Council Regulations (EC) 2432/2001 in the EU, Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, and the WMD Act in India.127 From the late 1980s to the late 1990s the United States had agreements with China, Russia, and Ukraine to enable the launch from foreign sites of U.S. satellites and satellites carrying U.S. components. In 1998 a U.S. investigation into several successive Chinese launch failures led to allegations that aerospace companies Hughes Electronics and Loral Space & Communications Ltd. were transferring sensitive U.S. technology to China. Concerns sparked the transfer of jurisdiction over satellite export licensing from the Commerce Department’s Commerce Control List to the State Department’s U.S. Munitions List (USML) in 1999.128 In e ect this placed satellite sales in the same category as weapons sales, making international collaborations more heavily regulated, expensive, and time consuming. Exports of USML items are licensed under the ITAR regime, which adds several additional reporting and licensing requirements for U.S. satellite manufacturers. As a result of such stringent requirements, the case has been made that “the unintended impact of the regulation change has been that countries such as China, Pakistan, India, Russia, Canada, Australia, Brazil, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine, and Japan have grown their commercial space industries, while U.S. companies have seen dramatic losses in customers and market share.”129 Industries are maneuvering around ITAR restrictions by purchasing ITAR-free satellites and launch services. For instance, China was able to launch the Chinasat 6B telecommunications satellite, built by ales Alenia Space, on its Long March launcher because the satellite was built without U.S. components. ales Alenia Space is the only western company that has deliberately designed a product line to avoid U.S. trade restrictions on its satellite components.130 Finally, because certain commercial satellite imagery can serve military purposes, a number of states have implemented regulations on the sector. e 2003 U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy set up a two-tiered licensing regime, limiting the sale of sensitive imagery.131 In 2001 the French Ministry of Defense prohibited open sales of commercial Spot Image satellite imagery of Afghanistan.132 Indian laws require the ‘scrubbing’ of commercial satellite images of sensitive Indian sites.133 With the Remote Sensing Space Systems Act, which came
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into force on 29 March 2007, Canada adopted a regulatory regime that gives the Canadian government “shutter control” over the collection and dissemination of commercial satellite imagery and priority access in the event of future major security crises.134
Commercial space systems as critical infrastructure Space systems, including commercial systems, are increasingly considered to be critical national infrastructure and strategic assets. During the 1990s the U.S. military began employing commercial satellite systems for non-sensitive communications and imagery applications. e U.S. DoD is the single largest customer for the satellite industry, although it accounts for less than 10 percent of the revenue of most large satellite operators.135 By November 2003 it was estimated that the U.S. military was spending more than $400-million each year on commercial satellite services.136 By 2006 this gure had jumped to more than $1-billion a year for commercial broadband satellite services alone.137 For instance, three years after Operation Iraqi Freedom began, it was reported that more than 80 percent of satellite bandwidth utilized by DoD was provided by commercial broadband satellite operators.138 A 2003 U.S. General Accounting Oce report recommended that the U.S. military be more strategic in planning for and acquiring bandwidth by, inter alia, consolidating bandwidth needs among military actors to capitalize on bulk purchases.139
2011 Development Hosted payloads gain traction Hosted payloads are direct evidence of the increasing synergy between the public and private sectors. As more commercial and international satellites are able to take on a secondary payload and with the growing compatibility between commercial vehicles and DoD missions, hosted payloads are providing a cost-e ective, exible alternative for DoD capabilities deployment.140 CHIRP (commercially hosted infrared payload), demonstrated in September 2011, is a good example as it supports next-generation infrared sensor system development, reduces technology risk, and is projected to achieve major savings.141 To facilitate the continued development of hosted payloads as a segment of business, seven major space companies formed the steering committee for a new organization, Hosted Payload Alliance.142 e group is positioning itself to serve as a liaison between government and industry to discuss and resolve issues arising from hosted payloads on commercial satellites. Companies participating in the steering committee are Boeing Space and Intelligence Systems, Intelsat General Corp., Iridium Communications Inc., Lockheed Martin Space Systems, Orbital Sciences Corp., SES World Skies U.S. Government Solutions, and Space Systems/Loral. e USAF is also expanding its use of hitching experimental government payloads to commercial satellites or launch vehicles.143 e Space Test Program at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, which is responsible for setting up space launches for the experiments of a number of government agencies and has a stable budget of approximately $50-million, is considering hosted payloads as a viable option in launching its experiments.144 According to a request for information posted on the Federal Business Opportunities website, the USAF is interested in hosting multiple experiments on commercial missions planned for launch in 2012 or 2013.145 Of the 73 experiments prioritized for launch by the Pentagon’s Space Experiments Review Board, technical speci cations have been provided for 15 that could be considered for commercial launches.146
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Figure 5.3: Commercial payloads launched by country in 2011 147
2011 Development NASA awards contracts, funding to various commercial space companies In January 2011 it was announced that NASA had increased its investment in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services program, assigning cash payouts for the achievement of speci c milestones related to logistical services being developed for the ISS.148 SpaceX and Orbital Sciences, which will bene t from additional payouts for the development of cargo delivery systems, are set to split $300-million in COTS funding requested in the 2011 budget blueprint President Obama sent to lawmakers in February 2010.149 e original SpaceX and Orbital COTS agreements are valued at $278-million and $170-million, respectively.150 At the time of the announcement SpaceX had already completed four milestones, worth $5-million each, that NASA established in December 2010. e milestones were: 1) a plan to test the e ect of vibrations on pressurized cargo stowed inside the reusable spacecraft Dragon, 2) a demonstration of the test capability at the company’s Hawthorne facility, 3) deploying Dragon’s solar arrays and conducting thermal vacuum tests of some components, and 4) completing a ground simulation of the spacecraft’s light detection and ranging (LIDAR) sensor, used for rendezvous and proximity operations with the ISS.151 SpaceX wanted to combine its second and third ight demonstrations after successfully completing the rst. e third demo involves docking or berthing the Dragon capsule to the ISS for the rst time. Russia, an ISS partner, emphasized that the decision to allow SpaceX’s proposal was not NASA’s alone to make.152 Russia raised concerns related to the safety and reliability of the spacecraft. NASA countered by stating that all visiting vessels, including those owned by SpaceX and Orbital Sciences, would have to meet the same safety standards. Orbital Sciences earned $20-million under the COTS agreement for completing a mission concept review related to the development of its Taurus 2 rocket and Cygnus spacecraft. In its COTS agreement with NASA, Orbital Sciences is slated to conduct a demonstration ight of Taurus 2 and Cygnus. Initially scheduled for 2011, the ight was delayed until 2012.153 On 5 January 2011 NASA announced that three companies participating in the Google Lunar X-Prize competition were among the six selected to participate in its Innovative Lunar Demonstration Data project.154 e companies—Astrobotic Technology Inc. of Pittsburgh, Dynetics Inc. of Huntsville, Alabama, and Moon Express Inc. of Mountain View, California—will each receive $500,000 in data delivery orders for work on a commercial risk-reduction initiative for the development of robotic lander technologies.155 103 Space Security Index 2012
2011 Development Australia invests in national broadband network Australia is investing in a National Broadband Network in an e ort to increase infrastructure connectivity.156 On 6 May 2011 Gilat Satellite Networks Limited announced that it had been selected by Australian telecommunications company Optus Networks to provide a SkyEdge II VSAT network for the Australian Government’s National Broadband Network Company’s Interim Satellite Service.157 Gilat is to design, build, and operate the network for the National Broadband Network Company’s Interim Satellite Service, which is expected to provide up to 6 Mb/s download and 1 Mb/s upload broadband services to all households and businesses through ber, wireless, and satellite services. Under the terms of the contract, 11 SkyEdge II hubs and 20,000 SkyEdge II VSATs are to be deployed by Gilat over the next three years, with an option for more hubs and up to 48,000 VSATs.158 e total contract value is estimated to be up to $120-million over ve years.159
2011 Development European Space Agency continues to scrutinize Arianespace finances Despite pledges of new capital for Arianespace,160 ESA continued its scrutiny of Arianespace’s nances in 2011.161 An audit was ordered by European governments as a condition of granting what was tantamount to a program of permanent nancial aid.162 e primary goal of the audit was to determine whether savings were possible for Arianespace and its contractors in rocket construction and operations. e results were to help ESA and its member states decide whether to continue with the status quo or allow Arianespace to relax or remove its geographic-return rule.163 According to the rule, “the distribution of industrial contracts between the di erent countries by means of a programme is proportional to the nancial contributions made by the individual countries to that programme.”164 is is a fundamental principle of ESA’s industrial policy. e audit concluded that, unless this rule were lifted, only marginal savings could be accomplished. e audit also determined that Arianespace’s nancial dilemma arose from con icts of interests with companies that function as both suppliers to and shareholders of Arianespace. Other factors in Arianespace’s nancial diculties include a global marketplace in which competitors’ launchers bene t from their governments’ nancial support, the need to maintain competitive prices on the global market but which do not cover the production cost of the launchers, and the costs of production carried out in Europe and of the integration of components in French Guiana.165
Space Security Impact e increased synergy between the public and private sectors has a positive impact on space security insofar as the concept of space security broadens to re ect the needs of the commercial sector as well as the national security of spacefaring states. However, the bene ts of such partnerships could be o set by an increased reliance on commercial dual-use assets by the militaries of several countries. As this mutual dependence deepens, multiple-use spacecraft built by commercial operators could become military targets, resulting in an overall decrease in security. On the other hand, the proliferation of dual-use assets in space could make a military attack less useful and, therefore, less likely.
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Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations CHAP is chapter assesses indicators and developments related to the research, development, testing, and deployment of space systems that are used to support terrestrial military operations. is includes early warning; communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; meteorology; as well as navigation and weapons guidance applications. Although the United States accounts for the vast majority of global spending on space- based military applications, expenditures on military space programs are gradually increasing around the world. Extensive military space systems were developed by the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. Satellites o ered an ideal vantage point from which to monitor the Earth to
provide strategic warning of signs of nuclear attack, such as the launch plume of a ballistic TER missile or the light signature of a nuclear detonation. Satellites also o ered the rst credible means for arms control veri cation. e space age broke new ground in the development of reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collection capabilities through the use of satellite imagery and space-based electronic intelligence collection. In addition, satellite communications provided extraordinary new capabilities for real-time command and control of military forces deployed throughout the world. By the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia had begun to develop satellite navigation systems that provided increasingly accurate geographical positioning information. Building upon the capabilities of its GPS, the United States began to expand the role of SIX military space systems, integrating them into virtually all aspects of military operations, from providing indirect strategic support to military forces to enabling the application of military force in near-real-time tactical operations through precision weapons guidance. e development of radar satellites o ered the potential to detect opposition forces on the ground in all weather conditions at all times. e United States currently leads in deployment of dedicated space systems to support military operations, accounting for roughly half of all dedicated military satellites.1 Russia maintains the second largest number, with roughly a quarter of the total. Together, these two nations dwarf the military space capabilities of all other actors, although several countries are pursuing space-based military capabilities. e United States and USSR/Russia have launched more than 3,000 military satellites, while all other states combined have launched fewer than 100. By the end of 2011 there were over 185 dedicated military satellites worldwide.2 Given the overwhelming superiority of U.S. and Russian space-based military capabilities, this chapter identi es developments related to these countries as a distinct space security trend. Also assessed separately are developments related to the increasing role a orded to space-based military support in China and India. In addition, this chapter examines the e orts of a growing number of other states that have begun to develop national space systems to support military operations, primarily imagery intelligence and communications. Many of these systems are dual-use, so they also support civilian applications. is section does not examine military programs pertaining to space systems resiliency or negation, which are described in chapters 7 and 8, respectively.
Space Security Impact e military space sector is an important driver behind the advancement of capabilities to access and use space. It has played a key role in bringing down the cost of space access; many of today’s common space applications, such as satellite-based navigation, were rst developed
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for military use. e increased use of space has also led to greater competition for scarce space resources such as orbital slots and, in particular, radio frequency spectrum allocations. While disputes over these scarce resources also a ect the civil and commercial space sectors, they become more acute in the military sector, where they are associated with national security. Space assets play an important strategic role in the terrestrial military operations of certain states. In most cases, space systems have augmented the military capabilities of several states by enhancing battle eld awareness, including precise navigation and targeting support, early warning of missile launch, and real-time communications. Furthermore, remote sensing satellites have served as a national technical means of veri cation of international nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament regimes. ese uses have resulted in an increasing dependence on space, particularly by the major spacefaring states. Space capabilities and space-derived information are integrated into the day-to-day military planning of major spacefaring states. is can have a positive e ect on space security by increasing the collective vested interest in space security, as a result of heightened mutual vulnerabilities. Conversely, the use of space to support terrestrial military operations can be detrimental to space security if adversaries, viewing space as a new source of military threat or as critical military infrastructure, develop space system negation capabilities to neutralize the advantages of those systems, potentially triggering an arms race in outer space. Because the space systems that support military operations are seen as vulnerable, actors have a greater incentive to protect them by developing space system protection and negation capabilities, which could potentially lead to an escalation of arms. Moreover, many of the space systems used for military purposes today are integrated with civilian and commercial uses, thus raising the potential of extensive collateral damage if they are targeted during warfare. Concern has been expressed that extensive use of space in support of terrestrial military operations blurs the notion of “peaceful purposes” as enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty, but state practice over the past 40 years has generally accepted these applications as peaceful insofar as they are not aggressive in space. Space has been militarized since the rst satellite, Sputnik, was placed into orbit. Of concern here is not whether militaries should use space, but rather how the use of space by militaries improves or degrades the security of space.
Indicator 6.1: U.S. military space systems e United States has dominated the military space arena since the end of the Cold War, and continues to give priority to its military and intelligence programs. e United States currently outspends all other states combined on military space applications. U.S. military and intelligence space-based capabilities continue to outpace those of the rest of the world and, by all indications, the United States is the nation most dependent on its space systems. While the United States is currently upgrading almost all of its major military space systems, they remain robust3 and technically advanced.
Satellite Communications Satellite communications have been described by one expert as “the single most important military space capability.”4 e Military Satellite Communications System (Milstar) is currently one of the most important of these systems, providing protected communications for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force through ve satellites in GEO. Replacement of Milstar satellites with Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites is under way in cooperation with Canada, the U.K., and the Netherlands. 106 Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations
Development of the next-generation Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT), which would provide protected, high-speed, Internet-like information availability to the military, was cancelled in 2009. e program, with a projected cost of between $14-billion and $25-billion by 2016,5 was disrupted by repeated delays; the rst launch had been postponed several times.6
Figure 6.1: U.S. dedicated military satellites launched in 2011 7 Satellite Operator Function Orbit Launch Date TacSat 4 Naval Research Laboratory Technology Development Elliptical 9/27/2011 USA 231 USAF/DoD Reconnaissance LEO 6/30/2011 USA 230 USAF Early Warning GEO 5/7/2011 USA 229 NRO/U.S. Navy Electronic Surveillance/Ocean LEO 4/15/2011 USA 226 USAF Technology Development LEO 3/5/2011 USA 227 NRO/USAF Communications GEO 3/2/2011 USA 225 NRO Technology Development LEO 2/6/2011 USA 224 NRO Reconnaissance LEO 1/20/2011
e Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)—the workhorse of the U.S. military’s super-high frequency communications—is a hardened and jam-resistant constellation that transmits high-priority command-and-control messages to battle eld commanders using nine satellites in GEO. e planned follow-on to this system, the Wideband Global Satellite System or Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS), is expected to signi cantly increase available bandwidth. In addition to dedicated systems, space-based military communications use commercial operators such as Globalstar, Iridium, Intelsat, Inmarsat, and Telstar. e U.S. DoD will likely continue to use some commercial services in the future, even with the deployment of new systems.
Early Warning Space-based early warning systems provide the United States with critical missile warning and tracking capabilities. e U.S. Missile Defense Alarm System was rst deployed in a polar orbit in 1960. U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning satellites were rst launched in the early 1970s, with the nal one in 2007, providing enhanced coverage of Russia while reducing the number of necessary satellites to four.8 e United States plans to replace the DSP system with the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to provide advanced surveillance capabilities for missile warning and missile defense. However, completion of SBIRS is more than eight years behind schedule and signi cantly over budget, with an estimated nal cost of more than $10-billion.9 e current status of SBIRS is discussed below. e Alternative Infrared Space System, intended to act as insurance in case of further diculties with the SBIRS program, was redesigned in 2007 as follow-on program 3GIRS ( ird Generation Infrared Surveillance).10 e U.S. Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), discussed below, will work with SBIRS to support missile defense responses.
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Figure 6.2: U.S. dedicated military spacecraft launched by application: 1957-2011 11
Intelligence e rst U.S. optical Corona satellites for imagery intelligence were launched as early as 1959, with the Soviets following suit by 1962. ese early remote sensing satellites, equipped with lm cameras, had lifetimes of only days. At the end of their operational lifetimes, capsules with the exposed lm were ejected from the satellite and collected, usually from the ocean. Gradually, resolution of these cameras improved from about 10 m to less than one meter. As early as 1976 the United States began to t its remote sensing satellites with charge-coupled devices that took digital images, which could be transmitted back to Earth via radio signal, providing near-real-time satellite imagery.12 Open source information suggests that the United States currently operates between eight and 10 imagery intelligence satellites through two optical systems known as Crystal and Misty, and one synthetic aperture radar system known as Lacrosse. While the exact resolution of recent remote sensing satellites remains classi ed, the Improved Crystal satellites are believed to have a resolution of up to 6 inches.13 e United States operates between 18 and 27 signals intelligence satellites in four separate systems—the Naval Ocean Surveillance System, Trumpet, Mentor, and Vortex.14 e U.S. military also uses commercial imagery services from DigitalGlobe and GeoEye. e Future Imagery Architecture, intended to provide next-generation reconnaissance capabilities through electro-optical and radar remote sensing, was cancelled in 2005 at a loss of at least $4-billion, in what has been called “the most spectacular and expensive failure in the 50-year history of American spy satellite projects.”15 e Misty Stealth Reconnaissance Imaging program was also cancelled due to costs, schedule delays, and poor performance.16 An additional setback occurred when USA-193 failed in orbit in 2006.
Navigation In 1964 the rst navigation system was deployed for military applications by the U.S. Navy. Its position resolution was accurate to 100 m. is system and others that followed were ultimately replaced by GPS, which was declared operational in 1993 and uses a minimum constellation of 24 satellites orbiting at an altitude of approximately 20,000 km. On the battle eld GPS is used for a variety of functions, from navigation of terrestrial equipment and individual soldiers to target identi cation and precision weapons guidance. GPS also has important civil and commercial uses (for further information, see Chapters 4 and 5).
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Although commercially available, the GPS system provides greater accuracy for its military users. Recent updates to the GPS system are discussed below.
Launch In 2007 the U.S. DoD Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Oce was opened at the Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico to coordinate the development of hardware and doctrine in support of ORS across the various agencies.17 New launch capabilities such as SpaceX Falcon launch vehicles form the cornerstone of this program. ORS allows deployments of space systems designed to meet the needs of speci c military operations. For instance, the U.S. TacSat microsatellite series falls under ORS jurisdiction and combines existing military and commercial technologies such as remote sensing and communications with new commercial launch systems to provide “more rapid and less expensive access to space.”18 e satellites are controlled directly by deployed U.S. commanders.19 e latest TacSat satellite, TacSat-4, was successfully launched on 27 September 2011.20 e EELV program is a $31.8-billion USAF e ort that began in 1994, with the objective to reduce launch costs by at least 25 percent by partnering with industry to develop capabilities that could be used for both commercial and government purposes.21 To meet future government requirements, both Lockheed Martin and Boeing are pursuing a Heavy Lift launch capability in a joint venture, the United Launch Alliance, which markets both the Delta-4 and the Atlas-5 launch vehicles.
2011 Development The United States continues to update existing space capabilities
Doctrine and Strategy In January 2011 the United States released its National Security Space Strategy, which includes this strategic objective: “to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantage a orded to the United States by space.”22 Despite planned cuts triggered by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the Administration’s new military strategy released in January 2012, which will rely on reduced forces, the Department of Defense will continue investing in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. According to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, “As we reduce the overall defense budget, we will protect and in some cases increase our investments in special operations forces, in new technologies like [ISR] and unmanned systems in space.”23 On 8 February 2011 Admiral M.G. Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta , released the U.S. National Military Strategy. It notes that “our ability to operate e ectively in space and cyberspace, in particular, is increasingly essential to defeating aggression.”24 e strategy describes e orts to enhance deterrence by establishing and promoting norms, enhancing space situational awareness, fostering transparency and cooperation, improving resiliency of systems, and training for operations in space-degraded environments.25 To address new challenges relating to anti-access and area denial by adversaries, the USAF and the Department of the Navy have developed the Air-Sea Battle Concept. It focuses on coordinated command and control of air and naval forces for the “networked, integrated, attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat” anti-access and area denial weapons, exploiting U.S. capabilities in every domain, including space.26 As part of this e ort an Air- Sea Battle oce was established on 12 August 2011.27 Some sources quote a senior Obama
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Administration ocial as saying that the concept is aimed at countering Chinese military e orts, but military ocials have said that it is not directed at any speci c country.28
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance e rst U.S. launch in 2011 placed in orbit an NRO satellite—NROL-49—on 20 January aboard a Delta IV Heavy rocket.29 According to the NRO the satellite was completed ahead of schedule and for $2-billion less than originally estimated, narrowing a projected nine- month gap in a key capability to just 33 days.30 e aggressive launch campaign, begun in 2010, saw three more launches in 2011: NROL-66 of the Rapid Path nder Program aboard a Minotaur 1 rocket on 5 February,31 NROL-27 on a Delta IV rocket on 11 March,32 and NROL-34 on an Atlas V rocket on 14 April.33 According to former NRO Director Bruce Carlson, recent changes in management practices have allowed NRO’s satellite programs to meet performance objectives while proceeding on time and within budget.34 In addition to GPS and advanced communications satellites ISR capabilities were used in the raid on Osama bin Laden in May 2011.35 ISR satellites gathered imagery of the bin Laden compound in Pakistan for months, supporting other forms of intelligence and helping the assault team develop a detailed view of the compound.36 A June 2011 GAO report stated that the success of ISR systems in “collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence information has fueled demand for ISR support and … DoD has signi cantly increased its investments in ISR capabilities since combat operations began in 2001.”37 Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael G. Vickers noted that the terrestrial and satellite bandwidth to support ISR data ow over Afghanistan has increased by 1,000 percent. However, according to the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force General C. Robert Kehler, while the government’s ability to process, exploit and disseminate data has increased about 30 percent, the in ux of data is 1,500 percent heavier than it was ve years ago. He believes that new approaches to task and coordinate image analysis are needed.38 In August 2010 the NGA’s Enhanced View Program awarded contracts worth up to $7.3-billion over 10 years to DigitalGlobe and GeoEye.39 Two high-resolution satellites are currently being developed: GeoEye’s GeoEye-3 and DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-3.40 But it has been widely speculated that this program was a likely target for cuts in the FY2013 budget. In response to these rumors, a group of lawmakers sent a letter urging Defense Secretary Panetta and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to fully fund the program. ey argued that not doing so could undermine the DoD’s credibility in negotiating future contracts for commercial space services.41 In December 2011 the White House ordered a study to determine how much can or should be cut from this initiative.42
Weather Originally intended to consolidate the military and civil polar-orbiting weather satellite systems, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System was canceled in 2010, after excessive cost overruns and delays. e Obama Administration proposed splitting the venture into two programs: a civil Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and a military Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS). While the USAF requested $445-million for DWSS in 2012, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 provided $43-million to terminate the program—for which Northrop Grumman had already been contracted—and $125-million for an unspeci ed follow-on weather satellite program.43 e Pentagon is expected to propose that the program be cancelled in its FY2013 funding request. 44 110 Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations
Satellite Communications With tight budgets limiting the DoD’s ability to procure expensive spacecraft, the armed forces have been looking for creative ways to meet growing satellite communications (SATCOM) demand. Increasingly, they are relying on commercial capabilities in addition to government systems. In certain regions, the U.S. government leases about 80 percent of its satellite communications capacity from commercial sources. Early in 2011 the USAF awarded six companies more than $4.5-million to study commercial solutions for the military’s Ka-band and X-band mobile communications needs. Agreements were signed with Space Systems/Loral, Boeing Satellite Systems Inc., Orbital Sciences Corp., Intelsat, Hughes Network Systems Inc., and U.S. Space. According to Richard Pino, deputy director of communications and networks programs at the Pentagon, industry can provide better non-critical communications than the government can today.45 A new Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) initiative to reduce satellite communication costs faced a number of challenges in 2011. The $440-million Assured SATCOM Services in Single eater (ASSIST) program plans to lease a single communications satellite, operating in both Ka- and Ku-bands for 15 years, and save an estimated $800-million46 by not continuing to lease capacity on multiple satellites on an annual basis. Currently, Central Command, the military’s largest consumer of satellite bandwidth, uses capacity on more than 20 commercial satellites.47 In September 2011 the USAF Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) was brought in to oversee the program.48 Challenges began when the House Defense Authorization bill recommended cutting $416-million of the $500.9-million requested for the program.49 e bill also prohibited DISA and the USAF from allocating more than 20 percent of their funding to commercial satellite services in 2012, “until the Secretary of Defense provides an independent assessment of the acquisition strategy.” 50 Although the initiative has not been ruled out, the Senate Appropriations bill approved in September zeroed out funding for the program.51 In October 2011 after 14 months of maneuvers, the AEHF-1 communications satellite launched in August 2010 reached its operational orbit. ese complicated orbit-raising maneuvers were necessitated by an anomaly in the satellite’s launch system that left it stranded in LEO.52 In a quality-problems report on several space and missile defense programs released in July, the GAO found that a piece of cloth left inside the craft caused the problem.53 Lockheed Martin will o set up to $25 million of the cost of the investigation and recovery.54 According to USAF ocials, AEHF-1’s maneuvers did not a ect the satellite’s 14 years of required mission life.55 e AEHF constellation is replacing the legacy Milstar satellites with greatly augmented capability. e system, which will provide secure satellite communications for nuclear command and control, is hardened for nuclear event survival and features security measures that proved e ective with its predecessor, including cross-links and an anti-jamming antenna system.56 In other attempts to reduce costs, the USAF requested $552.8-million for advanced appropriations of AEHF satellites in 2011. Congress authorized funding for only a year, but was not in opposition to the block buy idea.57 Although signi cantly increasing costs in the short term, buying multiple satellites can end the “boom-and-bust cycle for the facility making them, which is economically inecient,” said Ashton Carter, then Pentagon acquisition chief.58 e third and fourth AEHF satellites are ight-ready and the launch of
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AEHF 2 was scheduled for 27 April 2012.59 Program costs for the rst three AEFH satellites and parts for the fourth amounted to $6.5-billion.60 e USAF moved forward with several contracts for the WGS system in 2011 and early 2012. is unique, international cooperative program of X- and Ka-band communications satellites is expected to include 10 satellites, up from the six originally planned. e WGS has 10 times the capacity of the Defense Satellite Communications system, which it will replace. On 1 September 2011 the USAF signed a $1-billion contract with Boeing for production of the seventh WGS satellite and procurement of long-lead components for the eighth satellite.61 In December the USAF awarded Boeing a $354-million contract for the eighth WGS military communications satellite and a $9.4-million contract to study a hardware upgrade for the upcoming spacecraft in the series.62 On 18 January 2012 Air Force ocials exercised options for WGS-8 and WGS-9 in a deal worth $673-million.63 e agreement for the ninth satellite also involves Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Funding for a tenth spacecraft—$326-million—was included in the DoD’s FY2012 funding bill, with funds taken out of ASSIST.64 Plans are to maintain a eet of eight active satellites, but if all options in the contract awarded in 2010 are exercised, the eet could grow to 12.65 On 19 January 2012 the WGS-4 was launched on a Delta IV, joining three others launched in 2007 and 2009.66 e $464-million satellite will enable faster transmission of communications, including high-resolution imagery and video of unmanned aerial vehicles. e fth satellite is slated for a January 2013 launch, the sixth in June 2013,67 and the seventh in 2015.68
Missile Warning and Defense In March 2011 the U.S. MDA demonstrator STSS satellites performed the rst “birth-to- death” tracking of a ballistic missile launch from space, detecting and tracking the missile through all phases of ight.69 After a series of successful tests in 2010 and 2011, the satellites are scheduled to take part in live- re exercises with the sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System in late 2012 or 2013.70 e MDA announced in 2011 that it would integrate ground- and sea-based interceptor tests with the $1.7-billion STSS mission to provide earlier warning of an enemy missile and permit earlier launch of interceptors. e Advanced Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University had the lead role in the preliminary design review of the STSS follow-on program, an operational constellation of between nine and 12 missile tracking satellites called the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). On the lab’s recommendation, the MDA will not include a target-acquisition sensor in the PTSS satellites, making them simpler and more cost-e ective than STSS satellites, which have both target acquisition and tracking sensors. Instead, PTSS will drive MDA toward improved sensor command-and-control and networking capabilities.71 e Advanced Physics Laboratory will develop a prototype system for launch in 2015. e MDA is planning to select a prime contractor in 2014, with launching to begin in 2018.72 e long-struggling Space Based Infrared System, meant to replace the legacy Defense Support Program, saw the successful launch of its rst satellite, the $1.2-billion SBIRS-1 (GEO 1) on an Atlas V on 7 May.73 New technologies on the satellite, which is designed for a 12-year mission life,74 enable quicker detection of faint objects. General Roger Teague, director of the USAF Infrared Space Systems Directorate, said that, “from a sensitivity perspective, SBIRS sees dimmer targets, dimmer events of interest much sooner. With that information it allows us to take and decimate events of interest much, much faster and
112 Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations tightens our OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act).”75 In addition to missile defense, SBIRS-1 will support missions such as space situational awareness to troops on the ground and technical intelligence.76 SBIRS-1 will collect data about foreign rocket launches, becoming the rst U.S. military satellite certi ed for that role by the NGA.77 Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for SBIRS; the complete system includes four dedicated SBIRS satellites that will operate in GEO, and four infrared payloads hosted on classi ed satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO), two of which have already been launched.78 In August 2011 Lockheed Martin announced that SBIRS-2 had cleared acoustic testing and was on track for a spring 2012 launch.79 Northrop Grumman is the payload integrator and USAF Space Command operates the system.80 In April 2011 the USAF made a contract modi cation valued at $460.3-million for a more exible ground infrastructure.81 e Block 10 ground infrastructure will be built on a smart architecture that allows for better segregation of SBIRS mission areas and ensures data is available to a large community of users.82 On 21 September the USAF Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP) was launched on the SES 2 communications satellite by an Ariane V rocket.83 A key milestone for future government-industry collaborations, CHIRP was developed as a technology maturation and risk reduction program by Science Applications International Corporation for $216-million. CHIRP’s less complex design features improved performance on the SBIRS global scanning payload with a wide eld-of-view infrared staring sensor that covers one-quarter of the globe from an orbit of 22,300 miles above the equator.84 It will detect missile launches and support other military missions.
Launch Although not a launch program, the Operationally Responsive Space initiative seeks to enable quicker development and deployment of space capabilities in response to emerging military needs. e rst ORS satellite was launched 29 June on a Minotaur I rocket.85 ORS-1 will bene t U.S. military forces in the Middle East by relaying images of the battle eld directly to troops. e satellite carries an imaging sensor, built by Goodrich Corporation, that is derived from the SYERS 2 camera on the USAF U-2 spy plane.86 e satellite was transferred to the Air Force Space Command’s 14th Air Force on 15 September and started its one-year operational mission in October.87 e satellite cost $226-million; its spacecraft bus was manufactured by ATK Space Systems in less than 1.5 years; and 30 months were needed to deliver the fully integrated satellite for launch.88 Also part of the ORS initiative, the Navy’s Tactical Satellite-IV (TacSat 4) was launched aboard a Minotaur IV rocket on 27 September 2011.89 e 460-kg experimental communications satellite will operate from a gravitationally stable orbit ranging between 640 km and 11,750 km, ying three times closer to Earth than traditional military communication satellites to provide nine times the signal strength of legacy systems in higher orbits. e Navy-led mission was built and launched for $118-million.90 A week after its launch, the satellite was relaying messages and its $2-million antenna had been deployed. It is designed for a one-year test campaign to show the utility of added UHF communications capacity, but it could be transitioned to an operational role.91 Striving to provide stability to the rocket manufacturing industrial base while recognizing the need for future entrants, the USAF, NRO, and NASA signed a memorandum of understanding on evolved expendable launch vehicles on 10 March 2011.92 e agencies are now responsible for coordinating their launch requirements. On 12 October they signed a
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coordinated certi cation strategy for commercial new entrant launch vehicles.93 By providing a method for each agency to certify launch vehicles based on a common risk evaluation approach, the strategy aims to enable new entrants to compete on a level playing eld for contracts to launch U.S. government missions, once they demonstrate reliable launch capabilities.94 Under the proposed EELV block buy proposal, DoD and NRO would buy eight common booster rocket cores a year for ve years, spending $15-billion between 2013 and 2017. Some critics were concerned that this proposal would sti e competition, especially after a GAO report on 17 October determined that “this approach may be based on incomplete information” and recommended that DoD address a series of unknowns before committing to it.95 DoD replied that it partially concurred with the recommendations and would consider a number of scenarios before moving ahead with the block buy.96 e USAF revised its approach slightly and asked the United Launch Alliance, which provides the Delta IV and Atlas V EELVs, to make its best bid for di erent block-procurement scenarios ranging from six to 10 booster cores per year over a period of three to ve years.97 is “cost matrix” would be part of a strategy to reduce cost of near-term buys from the United Launch Alliance, while establishing conditions for competition to further lower prices.98 Meanwhile, an amendment to the DoD Authorization Act of 2012 changed the EELV’s status from ongoing sustainment program to “major acquisition program,” with more stringent reporting requirements.99 Another amendment directs the USAF to document and submit plans to implement the recommendations of the GAO report by March 2012.
Navigation/GPS e second of the most advanced series of GPS satellites, the Boeing-built GPS IIF-2, launched on 16 July 2011 aboard a Delta IV rocket100 and entered service in August. Boeing will build an additional 10 GPS IIF satellites.101 Meanwhile, in August the USAF reactivated a decommissioned satellite, GPS 2A-22, to replace ailing GPS 2A-27.102 Potential interference with GPS raised concerns about a proposal for a multibillion-dollar satellite-terrestrial wireless broadband network by the company LightSquared. LightSquared planned to use a portion of the L-band spectrum near the frequencies used by GPS. Concerns intensi ed after a series of reports released in June 2011, including one by an FCC-mandated Technical Working Group,103 concluded that interference with many GPS- enabled operations would occur if the network were deployed.104 The Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration concluded that “there is no practical way to mitigate potential interference.” On 14 February 2012 the FCC issued a statement saying that it would revoke LightSquared’s conditional license.105 (See Chapters 1 and 5 for further information on LightSquared’s interference with GPS.)
Space Security Impact e use of space systems in U.S.-led military operations—a key example of the critical role of space systems in defense—has mixed impacts on the security of outer space. Signi cant reliance on space systems encourages the United States to reduce con ict in space. However, that same reliance enhances the strategic value for adversaries to target U.S. military space systems in the event of terrestrial con ict. Nevertheless, U.S. e orts at international cooperation, along with repeated statements and practices that advocate for the responsible 114 Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations use of space and deterring aggression in space through resiliency and transparency, have a markedly positive e ect on long-term space security. Interdependence and cooperation increase, while uncertainty among other space actors is reduced.
Indicator 6.2: Russian military space systems Russia maintains the second largest eet of military satellites. Its early warning, imaging intelligence, communications, and navigation systems were developed during the Cold War and by 2003 between 70 and 80 percent of these spacecraft had exceeded their designed lifespan.106 Forced to prioritize upgrades, Russia focused rst on its early warning systems and continues to move to complete the GLONASS navigation system, which was declared fully operational in 2011.107 Since 2004 Russia has focused on “maintaining and protecting” its eet of satellites and developing satellites with post-Soviet technology.108 In 2006 the rst year of a 10-year federal space program, Russia increased its military space budget by as much as one-third, following a decade of severe budget cutbacks.109 Despite the recent growth in Russia’s spending, capabilities will only gradually increase, because signi cant investments are required to upgrade virtually all parts of its military space systems.
Satellite Communications Russia maintains several communications systems, most of which are dual-use. Between 1975 and 1994 Russia conducted an average of 16 communications missions each year; more than 600 spacecraft were placed in orbit during this period.110 e Raduga constellation, described as a general purpose system, is reported to have secure military communications channels. e latest satellite of this constellation was successfully launched on 28 January 2010.111 e Geizer system was designed to deploy four GEO satellites as a communications relay system for Russian remote sensing and communications satellites in LEO.112 Satellites in the civilian Gonets LEO system reportedly relay information to the Russian military in addition to other government agencies and private organizations.113 e Molniya-1 and -3 communications satellites in HEO serve as data relay satellites for both military and civilian use and are to be replaced by the Meridian series of communications satellites.114 Meridian-4, the latest satellite in the constellation at the end of 2011, was launched on 4 May 2011.115
Figure 6.3: Russian dedicated military satellites launched in 2011 116 Satellite Operator Function Orbit Launch Date Cosmos 2473 Ministry of Defense Communications GEO 9/20/2011 Meridian-4 Military Space Forces Communications Elliptical 5/4/2011
Early Warning e USSR launched its rst early warning Oko satellite in 1972 and by 1982 had deployed a full system of four satellites in HEO to warn of the launch of U.S. land-based ballistic missiles. Over 80 Oko satellite launches allowed the USSR/Russia to maintain this capability until the mid-1990s. By the end of 1999 the Oko system was operating with four HEO satellites—the minimum number needed to maintain a continuous capability to detect the launch of U.S. land-based ballistic missiles. e Oko system provides coverage of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile elds about 18 hours a day, but with reduced reliability; it is capable of detecting massive attacks, but not individual missile launches.117 e Oko system is complemented by an additional early-warning satellite in GEO, which is believed
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to be a next-generation US-KMO or Prognoz satellite, capable of detecting missiles against the background of the Earth.118 e importance of adequate early warning capabilities was highlighted in 1995 when Russian early warning radars mistakenly warned of a potential incoming Trident nuclear missile. Russian President Boris Yeltsin made a decision not to retaliate with a nuclear launch, averting disaster.119
Intelligence e USSR began using lm-based optical imagery satellites in 1962 and by the 1980s could electronically transmit images while still maintaining a lm-based system.120 Russia’s optical imaging capabilities have declined since the Cold War. e three Russian lm-based and opto-electronic reconnaissance systems used today are the Kobalt, Arkon, and Orlets/ Don systems, which in 2008, 2002, and 2006, respectively, received new satellites, but with lifespans of only 60-120 days. In 2005 Russia announced plans for a constellation of high-resolution space radars, using Arkon-2 and Kondor-E satellites. e Arkon-2 satellite can provide photos with a resolution of up to one meter, while the Kondor-E satellite has multirole radar that provides high-resolution images along two 500-km sectors to the left and right of its orbit.121 Russia maintains two signals intelligence satellite systems, neither of which is fully operational; US-PU/EORSAT is dedicated to detecting electronic signals from surface ships, while Tselina is used for more general signals intelligence purposes.
Figure 6.4: Russian/Soviet dedicated military spacecraft launched by application: 1957-2011 122
Navigation e rst Soviet navigational system, Tsyklon, was deployed in 1968 and was followed by the Parus military navigation system in 1974.123 Currently this constellation provides more services to the civilian than the military sector. In 1982 the USSR began development of its second major navigation system, GLONASS, which became fully operational in 2011. Unlike Tsyklon and Parus, GLONASS can provide altitude as well as longitude and latitude information by using a minimum constellation of 24 satellites at a 19,100-km orbit.124 Details on GLONASS during 2011 are discussed below.
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2011 Development Amid continuing launch failures, Russia updates some satellite constellations, declares GLONASS fully operational.
Navigation/GLONASS A new generation of GLONASS satellites, GLONASS-K, was launched by a Soyuz 2.1 rocket from Plesetsk, Russia on 26 February 2011.125 Later in the year, on 3 October 2011 a GLONASS-M satellite was launched from Plesetsk on a Soyuz 2.1 rocket.126 Upon the latter’s addition to the constellation, Russia declared the GLONASS system fully operational.127 e forty-sixth and forty-seventh launches to deploy GLONASS satellites took place in November 2011: a Proton-M rocket launch from Baikonur deployed three Uragan-M satellites on 4 November, and a Soyuz-2.1 launch from Plesetsk deployed a GLONASS-M satellite on 28 November.128 e 31-satellite constellation includes 23 operational spacecraft, four spacecraft in the process of activation, two spacecraft temporarily out of service, one in reserve, and one in ight-testing mode.129 e GLONASS constellation spans three orbital planes, each containing eight satellites, to allow global coverage.130 GLONASS will be used for civil and military applications. On 16 December 2011 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh released a statement on their mutual interest in cooperating on GLONASS projects, including joint production of satellite navigation equipment and services to civilians in both countries.131 In January 2012 Russian Space Systems Deputy General Director Grigory Stupak stated that “the Latin American and Indian markets will be a priority for GLONASS.”132
Communications and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance On 4 May 2011 a Soyuz 2-1 rocket launched a Meridian communications satellite from Plesetsk.133 According to Russian media, the satellite was designed to provide communication between ships and aircraft operating in the Arctic Ocean and ground-based stations in Siberia and the Russian Far East.134 e satellite replaces the Molniya-1, Molniya-3, and Parus communications spacecraft.135 On 27 June 2011 Russia launched a secret military payload on a Soyuz-U rocket from Pletesk.136 e deployed satellite was reportedly a Kobalt-M imaging intelligence satellite.137 A Garpun satellite, designed to relay imaging data from reconnaissance satellites in LEO to Russian ground stations, was launched on 21 September aboard a Proton rocket from Baikonur.138 On 10 December Russia launched a Luch-5A communications satellite from Baikonur on a Proton rocket.139 is system is designed to transmit data from the ISS and unmanned military satellites.140 Despite these successes, Russia failed to deploy several satellites designed to support terrestrial military operations in 2011. In February the GEO-IK2 satellite, a geodetic measurement satellite for civil and military agencies, failed to reach orbit after a failure of its two-stage Rockot launch vehicle.141 On 18 August a Proton-M rocket’s booster did not separate from the Express-AM4 communications satellite.142 e Express-AM4 satellite was designed to provide digital television and secure government communications for Siberia and the far east.143 e fth Meridian satellite, launched on 23 December, failed to reach orbit when its Soyuz launch vehicle exploded seven minutes after launch.144
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Launch On 21 October 2011 Russia successfully launched two European Galileo satellites from Kourou, French Guiana.145 is launch marked the beginning of Arianespace’s operation of Soyuz rockets from their complex in South America.146 Kourou’s proximity to the equator allows for 15 percent lower payload launch costs than those at Cape Canaveral, and 40 percent lower than those at Baikonur Cosmodrome.147 While still under development, Russian Space Forces’ representative Alexei Zolotukhin stated that test launches of Russia’s new Angara booster system will begin no later than 2013.148 On 23 May 2011 the RD-191 engines required for the rocket system were declared operational by a Russian interagency commission.149
Space Security Impact Russia’s progress in updating its military space systems has been hindered by widespread launch failures that impact both civil and military activities. While Russian critics have focused on the cost of setbacks and failures, they have also praised the value of successes such as a fully operational GLONASS. e latter, coupled with Russian international collaborative e orts in launch and navigation capabilities, may provide incentives for further cooperation with international partners and bode well for the security of outer space.
Indicator 6.3: Chinese military and dual-use space systems China’s government space program does not maintain a strong separation between civil and military applications. Ocially, its space program is dedicated to science and exploration,150 but like the programs of many other actors, it is assumed to provide data to the military. Most of China’s satellites are civilian or commercial, but many have capabilities that could also be used for military purposes. Although China has never published a military space doctrine, its national defense strategy is based on “active defense” that “aims at winning local wars in conditions of informationization” that include maintaining “space and electromagnetic space security.”151 China has advanced remote sensing capabilities that could support imagery intelligence. It began working on space imagery in the mid-1960s, launching its rst satellite in 1975.152 It successfully launched 15 recoverable lm-based satellites, the last of which was reportedly decommissioned in 1996.153 Today China maintains two ZY-2 series transmitting-type optical imagery satellites in LEO that could support tactical reconnaissance and surveillance.154 In 2005 China launched the Beijing-1 (Tsingshua-1) microsatellite, a civil Earth observation spacecraft that combines a multispectral camera with a high-resolution panchromatic imager and could also support the military.155 More recently, by 2006 China had launched a series of six Yaogan satellites for “scienti c experiment, survey of land resources, appraisal of crops and disaster prevention and alleviation.”156 Two of these satellites are believed to use synthetic aperture radar, which would provide the Chinese government with all-weather/ night-day imagery that would be advantageous for military use.157 Western experts believe that Chinese military satellite communications are provided by a DFH-series satellite, ChinaSat-22. Ocially a civilian communications satellite, ChinaSat-22 is thought to enable “theater commanders to communicate with and share data with all forces under joint command” through C-band and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) systems.158 China also operates the Beidou regional navigation system, four satellites in GEO designed to augment the data received from the U.S. GPS system and enable China to maintain
118 Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations navigational capability if the United States were to deny GPS services in times of con ict.159 Beidou may also improve the accuracy of China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and cruise missiles.160 China launched the rst Compass-M1 test satellite into MEO in 2007.161 e country has been working to upgrade Beidou to a global satellite navigation system—the Beidou-2 or Compass system—expanding on the initial system to include ve satellites in GEO and 30 in MEO, with the 35-satellite system expected to provide global coverage by 2020.162 During 2011 China launched three Beidou-2 series satellites, as described below. While Compass falls under China’s defense ministry, it is intended to provide both an Open Service with position accuracy of 20 m and an Authorized Service that will be “highly reliable even in complex situations.”163 In recent years the country has continued to advance the system, with ve satellites successfully launched in 2010, out of 10 planned for the 2010–2012 period.164 China experimented with electronic intelligence satellites, called “technical experimental satellites,” in the mid-1970s, but these programs were discontinued. It relies on modern air, sea, and land platforms, not satellites, to perform signals intelligence missions. However, in 2006 China launched two Shi Jian experimental satellites (SJ-6/2A and SJ-6/2B), which some Western experts believe were intended to provide signals intelligence, although their ocial purpose is to measure the space environment.165
2011 Development China continues deploying space-based military capabilities With 18 successful launches in 2011 China’s Long March rocket family surpassed the U.S. annual ight rate, admittedly much reduced from its peak in the 1960s. is record also exceeds China’s 2010 achievement of 15 launches. e defense ministry stated that China will launch more than 20 satellites in 2012 to further promote the development of the aerospace industry, national scienti c and technological progress, and economic development.166
Navigation In late December China activated the rst phase of its Beidou/Compass satellite navigation system.167 Chen Gucang, senior engineer at the China Satellite Navigation Oce, said that the government considers the program a “strategic industrial priority” as part of China’s focus on information technologies.168 ree Beidou-2 series launches took place in 2011, the rst on 9 April,169 followed by launches on 27 July170 and 1 December.171 is constellation now has 10 satellites, but it is not clear how many satellites are providing initial service.172 China is set to launch another six navigation satellites in 2012.173 By October 2012 China plans to complete the second step in the three-step program to carry out Beidou/Compass commissioning services.174 Using 14 satellites, this process will expand the service area to cover most parts of the Asia-Paci c region.175 China envisions a 35-satellite constellation for global coverage by 2020.176 In late December 2011 China released an ambitious ve-year plan for space exploration.177 In this White Paper, China states that it is engaged in international discussions to coordinate satellite navigation radio frequencies, although it does not mention ongoing talks with the European Union on overlap of the encrypted military security signals planned for the Galileo and Beidou/Compass systems.178 In April the European Commission said that it will “seek constructive solutions to issues of cooperation and sharing open frequencies in the eld of satellite navigation.”179 China
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and the EU are not violating international regulations that limit broadcast interference, but the overlap means that neither country could jam the other’s encrypted signals in a time of con ict without also jamming its own.180 (See Chapters 2 and 3 for further information on China’s White Paper.)
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance According to a report of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China is increasingly using space for force enhancement, particularly through the integration of space-based sensors and guided weapons.181 A notable example of this is China’s development of the Dong Feng-21D, the world’s rst anti-ship ballistic missile, which relies on reconnaissance satellites for targeting and tracking.182 According to U.S. Navy Commander Leslie Hull-Ride, satellites “could provide some targeting data on large surface ships in the region, and this expanding infrastructure is augmented by non-space- based sensors and surveillance assets.”183 e system has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.184 According to Chen Bingde, chief of the PLA General Sta , the DF-21 missile is a “defensive weapon.”185 Meanwhile, China continued updating its space-based ISR and communications capabilities. Two satellites from the Yaogan remote sensing series were launched: Yaogan 12 on a Long March 4B on 9 November,186 and Yaogan 13 on a Long March 2c on 1 December.187 Chinese sources state that the satellites will be used to conduct scienti c experiments, carry out surveys on land resources, estimate crop yield, and help with natural disaster reduction and prevention. According to some sources, the Yaogan-series of remote sensing satellites could also collect intelligence for the Chinese military.188 A communications satellite, Chinasat 1A, was launched on a Long March 3B/E on 18 September to provide high quality voice communication, broadcast, and data transmission services for users across China.189 Western analysts believe Chinasat 1A will serve the Chinese military.190 In 2011 China also attempted to launch three satellites of its Shi Jian experimental series, with two successes: Shi Jian 11-03 was launched by a Long March 2C rocket on 6 July191 and Shi Jian 11-02 was launched by a Long March 2C rocket on 27 July.192 Although the speci c mission of this satellite series has not been divulged, some Western analysts speculate that the satellites may be part of an early warning constellation for the Chinese military.193
Space Security Impact China conducted more launches in 2011 than in any previous year, demonstrating a commitment to growing space capabilities, including its military space constellation. Continued limited transparency of China’s space capabilities and intentions is a concern for space security. For example, China continues to classify satellites believed to be of dedicated military or dual use as “scienti c,” increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation and mistrust and negatively impacting space security. is trend further highlights the value of transparency and information sharing among actors to reduce the possibility of con ict in space.
Indicator 6.4: Indian multiuse space systems India has one of the oldest and largest space programs in the world, with a range of indigenous dual-use capabilities. Space launch has been the driving force behind ISRO. It successfully launched its Satellite Launch Vehicle to LEO in 1980, followed by the Augmented Satellite
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Launch Vehicle in 1994, the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle in 1994, and the Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle in 2004. By the end of 2011 India maintained eight remote sensing- and one dedicated military surveillance satellites.194 e Cartosat-series remote sensing satellites—the latest of which (Cartosat-2B) was launched in 2010—are generally considered to be dual-use in nature, although organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists have classi ed the primary users of Cartosat-2A as military.195 Referring to Cartosat-2, Secretary of the Department of Space and Chairman of ISRO G. Madhavan Nair has explained that “we don’t put a restriction on anybody using it,”196 con rming beliefs that India’s civil space program is available for military use. ISRO has also developed a Radar Imaging Satellite using synthetic aperture radar that is designed to take 3-m resolution images in all-terrain, all-weather, day/night conditions—a signi cant dual-use capability.197 Built with Israeli assistance and equipped with all-weather vision capabilities, the satellite was successfully launched in April 2009.198 e Indian National Satellite System199 is one of the most extensive domestic satellite communications networks in Asia. India uses its Metsat-1 satellite for meteorology. To enhance its use of U.S. GPS, the country is developing GAGAN, the Indian Satellite-Based Augmentation System. is will be followed by the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), which is expected to be made up of seven navigation satellites200 and is to provide an independent satellite navigation capability. In 2007 India signed an agreement with Russia to jointly use its GLONASS navigation system.201 Although these are civilian- developed and -controlled technologies, they are used by the Indian military for dual-purpose applications.202 In 2008 the United States-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was approved. By ending longstanding sanctions it could allow for greater cooperation between ISRO and the military.203
2011 Development India continues growing its remote sensing constellation On 20 April India launched a remote sensing satellite, Resourcesat-2, aboard a Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle.204 Resourcesat-2 will help scientists measure soil contamination, track water resources, and monitor land use trends. India’s national security agencies have con rmed that they will also use Resourcesat-2 data.205 e satellite has three cameras with high, medium, and coarse resolutions.206 Risat-1, India’s second radar imaging reconnaissance satellite with all-weather monitoring capability, will be the country’s rst launch in 2012.207 While India continues to launch systems with both civilian and military applications, plans to launch its rst dedicated military space satellite have been delayed until at least the end of 2012.208 e 2,330-kg naval communications and surveillance “Rohini” satellite will contribute to maritime domain awareness. Development of this system is part of the Defence Space Vision-2020, which identi ed ISR, communications, and navigation as the thrust areas in Phase-I, which continues until 2012.209
Space Security Impact Future dedicated military satellites are part of India’s plan to continue growing its space capabilities. Growing reliance on space systems could have a bene cial impact on long-term space security. e deciding factor may be India’s willingness to maintain transparency about its space activities and intentions; a lack of openness could increase misinterpretation and mistrust, spurring competition and con ict. 121 Space Security Index 2012
Indicator 6.5: Development of military and multiuse space capabilities by other countries During the Cold War, states allied with either the United States or the USSR bene ted from their capabilities. Today declining costs for space access and the proliferation of space technology enable more states to develop and deploy military satellites. Until 1988 when Israel launched its rst, only the U.K., NATO, and China had joined the United States and USSR in launching dedicated military satellites. In 1995 France and Chile both launched dedicated military satellites.210 Historically, military satellites not owned by the United States or Russia were almost exclusively intended for communications and imagery intelligence. Recently, however, states such as China, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Spain have been developing satellites with a wider range of functions. According to a recent report, security has become a key driver of established government space programs, pushing spending higher and encouraging dual-use applications.211 Indeed, in the absence of dedicated military satellites, many actors use their civilian satellites for military purposes or purchase data and services from satellite operators.212 Such activities contribute to the blurring of the divide between military, civilian, and commercial space assets and applications.
Figure 6.5: Minimum resolutions for remote sensing target identification (in meters) 213 Target on the Ground Detection General Precise Technical Analysis Identification Identification Vehicles 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.045
Aircraft 4.5 1.5 1.0 0.045
Nuclear weapons 2.5 1.5 0.3 0.015 components Rockets and artillery 1.0 0.6 0.15 0.045
Command and control 3.0 1.5 1.0 0.09 headquarters
Europe European states have developed a range of space systems to support military operations, with France having the most advanced and diversi ed independent military space capabilities. While individual nations have pursued independent space capabilities for military support, many of these capabilities, particularly communications and imagery, are shared among several EU states. Greater harmonization of the EU through the Lisbon Treaty, development of the European Security and Defence Policy, and budget restrictions in member states are driving this cooperation. e Besoin Opérationnel Commun (BOC) provides the framework for space systems cooperation among the ministries of defense of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Greece.214 France’s Helios-1 observation satellite in LEO was included under this agreement215 and was subsequently replaced by the Helios-2B second-generation defense and security observation system, which was launched in 2004 by France in conjunction with Belgium and Spain.216 Germany’s rst dedicated military satellite system, Sar-Lupe, which uses synthetic aperture radar for high-resolution remote sensing, and Italy’s COSMO- SkyMed radar satellites are expected to be integrated with France’s Pléiades dual-use optical remote sensing satellites.217 Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden cooperate on the dual-use ORFEO satellite network.218 France has also been working on the optical and
122 Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations radar MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging System) project with Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Poland;219 the new optical component of MUSIS was expected to replace the French Helios-2 optical satellite by 2015.220 However, recent developments suggest that MUSIS has been stalled by disagreements among the partners and the project could collapse.221 Europe has several dedicated and dual-use satellite communications systems. In 2006 France completed the Syracuse-3 next-generation communications system, described as “the cornerstone in a European military Satcom system.”222 France also maintains the dual-use Telecomm-2 communications satellite and the military Syracuse-2 system.223 e U.K. operates a constellation of dual-use Skynet-4 UHF and Super High Frequency (SHF) communications satellites,224 as well as a next-generation Skynet-5 system, intended to provide British military forces with a secure, high-bandwidth capability though 2022.225 e latest Skynet-5 satellite was launched in June 2008 and another launch is expected in 2013, making the £3.6-billion (approximately $5.6-billion) project the single biggest U.K. space project.226 In 2006 Spain launched the dedicated military communications satellite Spainsat to provide X-band and Ka-band services to the Ministry of Defense. Spain also owns the dual-use communications satellite XTAR-EUR and the dual-use Hispasat system, which provides X-band communications to the Spanish military. In 2006 Germany signed a procurement contract with MilSat Services GmbH to provide the German armed forces with a secure information network to assist its units on deployed missions.227 Italy’s Sicral military satellite provides secure UHF, SHF, and Extremely High Frequency (EHF) communications.228 Other military space capabilities in Europe include France’s Essaim constellation of four signals intelligence satellites, launched in 2004. France launched two Spirale early warning satellites in early 2009 for a probative research and technology demonstration229 and, at a cost of $142.3-million each, commissioned from EADS Astrium four Elisa microsatellites, which will gather signals intelligence data and identify civil and military radars for the French intelligence community.230 e EU has called for a more coherent approach to the development of space systems capable of supporting military operations and has begun to actively develop dual-use systems. e 2007 European Space Policy makes speci c reference to defense and security applications, indicating a shifting focus on increasing synergies between military and civil space programs.231 e joint EU/ESA GMES project will collate and disseminate data from satellite systems and is anticipated to be fully operational by 2014. It will support activities given priority in the European Security and Defense Policy, such as natural disaster early warning, rapid damage assessment, and surveillance and support to combat forces.232 Similarly, the Galileo satellite navigation program, initiated in 1999 and jointly funded by the EU and ESA, will provide location, navigation, and timing capabilities for both civilian and military users.233 ESA, which has traditionally been restricted to working on projects designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, has begun to invest in dual-use, security-related research, such as Galileo. e current status of Galileo is described below.
East Asia e commercial Superbird satellite system provides military communications for Japan, which also has four “information gathering” remote sensing satellites—two optical and two radar—that were launched in 2003 and 2007 following growing concerns over North Korean missile launches.234 Ocially called the Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) series and under the control of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Oce, IGS 3A and 3B provide
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images of up to 1-m resolution to the Japanese military.235 Japan is primarily interested in monitoring the Korean Peninsula, but the IGS system provides a scan of the entire planet at least once a day.236 In December 2003 South Korea announced its intentions to increasingly use space for military purposes.237 South Korea operates the civilian Kompsat-1 satellite with 6.6-m resolution, which is “sucient for [military] mapping although not for military intelligence collection.”238 It also bought 10 Hawker 800-series satellites from the United States and has operated them for signals intelligence since 1999.239 On 22 August 2006 Sea Launch launched South Korea’s dual military/commercial Koreasat-5 (Mugunghwa 5) communications satellite to replace Koreasat-2 by providing Ku-band, C-band, and military SHF-band communications. Jointly owned by the French Agency for Defense Development (DGA) and South Korea’s KT Corp., it will provide secure communications for South Korea’s defense forces.240 South Korea also launched the Kompsat-2 high-resolution Remote Sensing Satellite for Earth mapping in 2006.241 Although a civilian spacecraft, its 1-m resolution could allow it to serve as a reconnaissance asset.242 In July 2004 ailand signed a deal with EADS Astrium to provide its rst remote sensing satellite, to be used for intelligence and defense.243 e THEOS Earth Observation Satellite, which orbits in LEO, was launched on 1 October 2008 for the ai government.244 Taiwan, which has its own space program, operates the civilian Formosa-2 optical imaging satellite, which has a resolution of 1.8 m and is also used by its military forces.245
Middle East Israel operates the dedicated military Ofeq optical imaging system, which provides both panchromatic and color imagery for intelligence purposes.246 e latest satellite in the system, Ofeq-9, launched in June 2010, is in a constellation with Ofeq-5 and Ofeq-7 and reportedly can identify objects as small as approximately 0.5-m.247 Ofeq’s capabilities are augmented by the dual-use Eros-A and -B imagery satellites, the latter able to capture black-and-white images at 70-cm resolution.248 In January 2008 Israel launched the TecSAR reconnaissance satellite on an Indian launch vehicle rocket. Considered one of the world’s most advanced space reconnaissance systems249 with a resolution of up to 10 cm,250 the TecSAR is reportedly used to spy on Iran.251 Iran’s rst satellite, the Sina-1, was launched in 2005 with the support of a Russian launcher, and has a resolution precision of approximately 50 m.252 Although the satellite is intended to collect data on ground and water resources and meteorological conditions, the head of Iran’s space program said that it is capable of spying on Israel.253 But poor resolution means that it is not very useful for military purposes. Iran also has a space launch vehicle program, which some speculate is linked to its development of ICBMs and the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 missiles.254 Egypt’s civilian Egyptsat-1 remote sensing microsatellite was launched in 2007. Weighing just 100 kg, it has an infrared imaging sensor and a high-resolution multispectral imager to transmit black-and-white, color, and infrared images intended to support construction and cultivation and ght deserti cation.255 Egypt has not released public details about the resolution or clarity of the images it provides, but an Israeli source has made an uncon rmed claim that it can detect objects as small as 4 m.256
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Canada Canada’s military has used commercial satellite communications and imaging services for several years.257 In June 2005 the Department of National Defence announced the creation of Project Polar Epsilon, a joint space-based wide area surveillance and support capability, which will provide all-weather, day/night observation of Canada’s Arctic region and ocean approaches.258 Radarsat-2, a commercial satellite developed with the Canadian Space Agency, was launched in 2007 on a Russian Soyuz rocket and orbits the Earth at approximately 800 km.259 It uses synthetic aperture radar to produce images with a resolution of up to 3 m260 and has an experimental Ground Moving Target Indicator capability to detect and track the movement of vehicles and ships.261 Canada is on track to deliver the next evolution of the Radarsat program, the Radarsat Constellation, which will upgrade current systems features and improve reliability over the next decade.262 e purpose of the system is not to replace Radarsat-2, but to meet its core demands at a lower cost and enable future applications. Satellite launches to enable maritime surveillance, disaster management, and ecosystem monitoring are planned for 2016 and 2017.263
2011 Development Canada joins Wideband Global SATCOM Project Canada joined the U.S.-led international WGS Project in January 2012.264 Canada has agreed to contribute $337.3-million to build the ninth satellite of the system, which will be in operation by 2017.265 Its share in the $620-million deal to build the spacecraft makes Canada the biggest investor in the satellite.266 As part of the agreement, Boeing, which is in charge of building the satellites, will return $240 million to Canada in “industrial regional bene ts.”267 Furthermore, Canadian ocials argued that this “one-time, xed payment” would provide Canadian defense forces with cost-e ective, secure satellite bandwidth for the long term.268 Canada was motivated to join WGS, at least in part, by a conservative estimate that by 2022 Canadian forces would be spending $CAD100- million annually on satellite bandwidth. Lieutenant-Colonel Abde Bellahnid, director of space requirements for satellite operations for DND said that “the status quo was not acceptable.”269 In March 2011 DND signed an $11.7-million ve-year deal with MDA for the operation and maintenance of the Sapphire Satellite System.270 As part of Canada’s Space Surveillance System, Sapphire will provide space situational awareness and join the U.S. Space Surveillance Network. e launch of Sapphire, reportedly Canada’s rst military satellite, is slated for 2012 aboard an Indian PSLV.271
2011 Development Chile’s first military intelligence satellite launched On 16 December 2011 a Soyuz rocket launched from Europe’s Guiana Space Center placed in orbit Sistema Satelital de Observación Terrestre, Chile’s rst military intelligence satellite.272 According to Astrium, which built, integrated, and tested the spacecraft, this satellite will give Chile extremely high quality images that will be used for a variety of applications.273 Under a deal signed in 2008, the $70-million, 130-kg satellite, also known as the FASat-Charlie, was developed by Astrium and CNES for the Chilean defense ministry. While its main mission will be to support national defense, particularly anti-drug tracking operations, it will also contribute to civil applications such as agriculture, reforestation, weather monitoring, urban planning, and disaster monitoring.274 At a panchromatic 125 Space Security Index 2012
resolution of 1.45 m and 5.8 m in multispectral, it is the most powerful remote sensing satellite in South America.275 In a ceremony on 12 January 2012 the Commander of the Chilean Air Force gave the Defense Minister the rst four images captured by the satellite,276 which was slated to become operational by April 2012 after a period of calibration and testing.277
2011 Development Europe raises cost estimate to fund Galileo; launches delayed In-Orbit Validation (IOV) satellites
Navigation/Galileo In January 2011 the EC announced that, due to higher development and launch costs, the European Galileo global navigation satellite system (GNSS) would cost €1.9-billion more than originally estimated, or €5.4-billion. Scheduled to go online with 18 satellites in 2014, six years later than originally planned, the program needs new money to launch a further 12 satellites by 2020 to ensure full service from the constellation.278 e EC also stated that operating costs for Galileo and its sister European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) system will amount to €800-million a year.279 On 21 October the long-delayed rst two IOV satellites of the system were launched on the maiden ight of the Soyuz rocket from the European Guiana Space Center in Kourou.280 By January 2012 the rst IOV satellite was functioning as expected, transmitting test signals across the whole of its assigned radio spectrum.281 e two remaining IOV satellites were expected to launch from Kourou during the rst half of 2012.282
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance On 17 December 2011 the Pléiades-1A high resolution civil-military optical remote sensing satellite was launched aboard the second Soyuz ight from Europe’s Guiana Space Center.283 Although the satellite’s sensor has a resolution of 70 cm, image processing will recover detail to 50 cm.284 e 970-kg satellite was the result of nearly a decade of work by Austria, Belgium, Spain, and Sweden, which partly funded the project to gain access to its images.285 e €314-million satellite was developed by EADS-Astrium; the optical system developer was ales Alenia space.286 A second satellite is slated for a 2013 launch from Kourou. Also onboard the Soyuz launched in December were four Elisa electronic-intelligence demonstration satellites, and Chile’s remote sensing satellite.287 e French military constellation Elisa is designed to support the development of an operational system that will track ground radars from space.288 According to military ocials, the €115-million Elisa, built by Astrium Satellites and ales Airborne Systems, will be the last of four electronic- intelligence demonstrator projects. e operational system will be launched by the end of the decade, with or without European partners. e three- or four-satellite Ceres electronic intelligence system is scheduled to launch by 2019.289
Weather Funding for the agship GMES program was a topic of intense debate in 2011. e initiative is a partnership between the EC, the European Environment Agency, and ESA, which is in charge of satellite delivery. On 15 June 2011 the EC signed an agreement con rming the transfer of €104-million to ESA for the initial operations of the Sentinel satellites, the rst component of the system, on which the EC and ESA have invested €2.3-billion to date.290
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e transferred funds were meant to bridge the gap until the next Multi-annual Financial Framework in 2014.291 In a surprising move, in July the EC proposed that the program be removed from the seven-year budget in 2014, being funded instead by voluntary contributions from individual governments.292 ESA, which expected the EC to take over the operational and maintenance phase at an estimated annual cost of €834-million, immediately criticized the proposal and said that it is unlikely that ESA will be able to fund GMES operations by itself.293 In a letter dated 9 September 2011 to Commission President José Manuel Barroso, 44 members of the European Parliament urged the EC to reinstate the GMES into the multiyear funding plan to avoid collapse of the program.294 Meanwhile, development of the rst two Sentinel satellites was at least six months behind schedule, forcing ESA to extend operations of the Envisat satellite, which was launched in 2002 on a ve-year mission. ESA Earth Observations Director Volker Liebig said that the Sentinel 1A and Sentinel 2A satellites will not launch until late 2013 and early 2014, respectively. According to prime contractor ales Alenia Space, the delay was caused by the destruction by earthquake of a satellite manufacturing facility in L’Aquila, Italy in April 2009. 295 On 25 February 2011 Eumetsat announced that it had secured backing of all 26 member governments for the six-satellite Meteosat ird Generation system. Built by a consortium led by ales Alenia Space and OHB Technology at a cost of more than €2.37-billion, the system will consist of four imaging satellites and two sounder satellites; the latter will carry ultraviolet sounders as part of GMES.296
Cooperation Cooperation in military space activities remains limited. In April the head of France’s space command said that the French military hesitates to commit military resources to cooperative military programs in Europe because of concerns over these programs’ security and the diculty of coordinating the desires of individual governments. Until problems relating to Galileo’s governance and implementation schedule were resolved, French defense procurement ocials were unwilling to consider the purchase of Public Regulated Service receivers that would use Galileo’s encrypted signal.297 Referencing France’s decision in 2010 to contract for two satellites for the CSO (Optical Space Component) Constellation, one Belgian Defense Ministry ocial said that MUSIS, which aims to develop common ground for next-generation space-based reconnaissance systems, “is nearly dead.”298 As a follow-up to a space policy resolution signed in November 2010, the European Defence Agency and ESA signed an administrative agreement on 20 June to improve cooperation.299 “Reinforcing the cooperation between EDA and ESA will allow us to further develop the security dimension of the European Space Policy in coordination with other EU stakeholders,” said the ESA Director General.300 e agreement aims to provide a structured relationship for identifying opportunities to pool and share resources. Possible common activities include crisis management, ISR, and Earth observations.301
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2011 Development Iran launches second indigenous remote sensing satellite Rasad; plans for bigger, more complex satellites In February 2011 Iran unveiled a new launcher, Kavoshgar 4 (Explorer 4), and four domestically built satellites, including Rasad, which were to be launched in the near future. One satellite, Fajr (Dawn), is a remote sensing satellite manufactured by the defense ministry.302 Iran launched Rasad 1 (Observation 1) into orbit aboard the indigenous Sa r rocket on 15 June.303 Rasad 1 is a remote sensing intelligence satellite.304 Functions include providing imagery to identify sea borders and meteorology. Two ground stations and a mobile station will be used to process images with an accuracy of one meter. 305
2011 Development Japan launches reconnaissance satellites, approves national global navigation satellite system (GNSS) capability In 2011 Japan launched two reconnaissance satellites: Optical-4 on a Japanese H-2A rocket on 23 September,306 and Radar-3 on an H-2A rocket on 12 December.307 Both satellites are part of the IGS system308 established in response to North Korea’s 1998 test ring of a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile, which ew over Japanese territory.309 e satellites will work with the remaining functional reconnaissance satellite already in orbit.310 e IGS system is designed to function as a constellation of four low Earth orbiting satellites consisting of two satellites with optical sensors and two with radar to monitor North Korea and East Asia.311 Another radar satellite launch is planned for 2012.312 After the launch of its rst GPS augmentation satellite in 2010313 Japan decided to develop an indigenous GNSS.314 e Quasi-Zenith Satellite System will cover mainly the Japanese archipelago and surrounding areas.315 JAXA selected Spirent Communications’ testing solutions to verify performance of QZSS.316 At a January 2012 meeting in Washington, DC, JAXA ocials said that Japanese leadership considers the QZSS constellation “the most important space-related national project.” e Japanese Cabinet Oce, in charge of developing, launching, and operating the system, will create a new organization for its operation. e constellation is expected to be launched by 2020.317
Space Security Impact Increased access to space by more actors reduces the advantage of those countries that already rely on space assets and increases the community of actors with a stake in protecting this resource through long-term space security. An ongoing positive impact will depend on continuous cooperative e orts by both established and emerging actors to enhance space situational awareness, avoid interference between systems, and promote transparency and information sharing.
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Space Systems Resiliency CHAP is chapter is focused on the research, development, testing, and deployment of physical and technical capabilities to better protect space systems from potential negation e orts. is includes protection capabilities designed to mitigate the vulnerabilities of the ground- based components of space systems, launch systems, and communications links to and from satellites, to ensure sustainable access to and use of outer space. E orts to protect against environmental hazards such as space debris are examined in Chapter 1. In addition, the ability of space systems to deny an adversary the bene ts of an attack is a key concern for advanced spacefaring nations. For example, the U.S. National Security Space Strategy states that “resilience can be achieved in a variety of ways, to include cost-e ective
space system protection, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on a mix of platforms in TER various orbits, drawing on distributed international and commercial partner capabilities, and developing and maturing responsive space capabilities.”1 While countermeasures to the space negation capabilities of others are considered protection measures by some, they are addressed separately in the chapter on space systems negation. Physical and technical capabilities can provide a certain degree of protection to spacecraft from potential negation e orts, but they cannot make space systems fully invulnerable. Consequently, di erent initiatives to provide non-physical protection of space assets by attempting to regulate the conduct of spacefaring nations and by de ning permissible behavior in outer space are being considered at various multilateral forums, as discussed in SEVEN Chapter 3. Measures to protect space systems can be broadly categorized as one of the following: capabilities to detect space negation attacks; physical and electronic means to withstand attacks on ground stations, communications links, and satellites; and reconstitution and repair mechanisms to recover from space negation attacks.2 e ability to detect, identify, and locate the source of space negation attacks through early warning and surveillance capabilities is critical to space protection e orts. It is important to accurately determine whether the failure of a space system is being caused by technical or environmental factors, or by the deliberate and potentially hostile actions of another space actor. Detection is often a precondition for such e ective protection measures as electronic countermeasures or maneuvering a satellite out of possible harm. Due to the diculty in distinguishing between satellite failures caused by environmental factors and deliberate attacks, greater space situational awareness can help reduce uncertainty when pinpointing the immediate cause behind the malfunction of a space asset.3 Since SSA can also be used for tracking and targeting foreign satellites, the possession of advanced SSA capabilities constitutes a strategic advantage for spacefaring nations. Protecting satellites, ground stations, and communications links depends on the nature of the space negation threat that such systems face, but, in general terms, threats can include cyber-attacks against space system computers, electronic attacks on satellite communications links, conventional or nuclear attacks on the ground- or space-based elements of a space system, and directed energy attacks such as dazzling or blinding satellite sensors with lasers. An advanced space systems protection capability involves the ability to recover from a space negation attack in a timely manner by reconstituting damaged or destroyed components of the space system. While capabilities to repair or replace ground stations and reestablish satellite communications links are generally available, capabilities to quickly rebuild systems in space are more dicult to develop and implement. 129 Space Security Index 2012
Space Security Impact Most space systems remain unprotected from a range of threats, including 1) electronic warfare such as jamming communications links, 2) physical attacks on satellite ground stations, 3) dazzling or blinding of satellite sensors, 4) hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons, 5) pellet cloud attacks on low-orbit satellites, 6) attacks in space by microsatellites, and 7) high altitude nuclear detonations (HANDs).4 Other potential threats include radio frequency weapons, high-powered microwaves, and “heat-to-kill” ground-based lasers. Growing awareness of the vulnerabilities of space systems has led actors to develop space system protection capabilities to better detect, withstand, and/or recover from an attack. Nonetheless, there are no e ective physical protections against the most direct and destructive types of negation such as the use of kinetic or high-powered energy forces against satellites. e development of e ective protection capabilities can have a positive impact on space security by increasing the ability of a space system to survive negation e orts, thus helping to ensure secure access to and use of space, and potentially deter negation attempts. Space actors may refrain from interfering with well protected space systems if such attacks seem both futile and costly. Moreover, the use of protective measures to address system vulnerabilities could o er a viable alternative to o ensive means to defend space assets. e security dynamics of protection and negation are closely related and, under some conditions, protection systems can have a negative impact on space security. Like many defensive systems, they can stimulate an arms escalation dynamic by motivating adversaries to develop weapons to overcome them. Conceivably, robust protection capabilities could also reduce the fear of retaliation in a space actor that possesses said capabilities, thus lowering the threshold for attempting the negation of spacecraft. As well e ective protective measures can have signi cant cost implications and so reduce the number of actors with secure use of space.
Indicator 7.1: Vulnerability of satellite communications, broadcast links, and ground stations Protection of satellite ground stations Satellite ground stations and communications links are likely targets for space negation e orts since they are vulnerable to a range of widely available conventional and electronic weapons. While military satellite ground stations and communications links are generally well protected, civil and commercial assets tend to have fewer protection features. A 2004 study published by the U.S. President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee emphasized that the key threats to the commercial satellite eet are those faced by ground facilities from computer hacking or possibly, but less likely, jamming.5 Still, satellite communications can usually be restored and ground stations rebuilt for a fraction of what it costs to replace a satellite. e vulnerability of civil and commercial space systems raises concerns since a number of military space actors are becoming increasingly dependent on commercial space assets for a variety of applications. Many commercial space systems have a single operations center and ground station,6 leaving them potentially vulnerable to some of the most basic attacks. Responding to such concerns, the U.S. GAO recommended that “commercial satellites be identi ed as critical infrastructure.”7 In the event of an attack the use of standardized protocols and communications equipment could allow alternative commercial ground stations to be brought online. To be sure, most if not all space actors are capable of providing
130 Space Systems Resiliency e ective physical protection for their satellite ground stations within the general boundaries of their relative military capabilities.
Electronic protection Satellite communications links require speci c electronic protection measures to safeguard their utility. Although unclassi ed information on these capabilities is dicult to obtain, one can assume that most space actors, by virtue of their technological capabilities to develop and operate space systems, are also able to take advantage of simple but reasonably robust electronic protection measures. ese basic protection capabilities include 1) data encryption; 2) error protection coding to increase the amount of interference that can be tolerated before communications are disrupted; 3) directional antennas that reduce interception or jamming vulnerabilities, or antennas that utilize natural or manmade barriers as protection from line- of-sight electronic attacks; 4) shielding and radio emission control measures that reduce the radio energy that can be intercepted for surveillance or jamming purposes; and 5) robust encryption onboard satellites.8 Sophisticated electronic protection measures were traditionally unique to the military communications systems of technologically advanced states, but they are slowly being expanded to commercial satellites. Advanced protection capabilities include 1) narrow band excision techniques that mitigate jamming by using smaller bandwidth; 2) burst transmissions and frequency-hopping (spread-spectrum modulation) methods that communicate data in a short series of signals or across a range of radio frequencies to keep adversaries from “locking-on” to signals to jam or intercept them; 3) antenna side-lobe reduction designs that mitigate jamming or interception vulnerabilities by providing more focused main communication beams and reducing interference from jamming in the side-lobe regions; and 4) nulling antenna systems (adaptive interference cancellation), which monitor interference and combine antenna elements designed to nullify or cancel the interference.9 During the Cold War the United States and USSR led in the development of systems to protect satellite communications links. e United States currently appears to be leading in the development of more advanced capabilities. For example, United States/NATO Milstar communications satellites use multiple anti-jamming technologies, employing both spread- spectrum modulation and antenna side-lobe reduction. Adaptive interference cancellation is being developed for next-generation satellites.10 rough its Global Positioning Experiments project, the United States has also demonstrated the ability of GPS airborne pseudo-satellites to relay and amplify GPS signals to counter signal jamming.11 e United States and other countries, including Germany and France, have reportedly been developing laser-based communications systems, which could provide a degree of immunity from conventional jamming techniques in addition to more rapid communications; however, these developments involve signi cant technological challenges.12 e United States has also recently established a Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to be responsible for the military’s Internet and other computer networks, which reached Full Operational Capability in 2010.13 In response to several jamming incidents attributed to the Falun Gong, in 2005 China launched its rst anti-jamming satellite, the Apstar-4 communications satellite.14 China also reportedly upgraded its Xi’an Satellite Monitoring Center to diagnose satellite malfunctions, address issues of harmful interference, and prevent purposeful damage to satellite communications links.15
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2011 Development Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS) Block 10 nears initial operational capability In 2011 RAIDRS, a U.S. ground-based defensive system designed to detect potential attacks against military space assets, completed its sixth year of operational capability. Initially deployed in July 2005 as the Satellite Interference Response System for a 120-day proof of concept, RAIDRS was re-designated RAIDRS Deployable Ground Segment Zero and assigned to Operation Silent Sentry,16 which was deployed to provide support for U.S. military activities in the Middle East. RAIDRS Block-10, the latest iteration, consists of a central operating location and ve suites of transportable antennas deployed around the world. It serves “to detect, characterize, geolocate and report sources of radio frequency interference on U.S. military and commercial satellites in direct support of combatant commanders.”17 RB-10 is expected to achieve initial operational capability in September 2012 and full operational capability a year later.18 In April 2011 the USAF awarded Integral Systems, Inc., the prime contractor for RAIDRS Block-10, a $6.99-million contract for the construction of the rst two deployment sites, and the design of a third deployment site.19 On 17 January 2012 it was announced that this contract had been modi ed to include an additional $9.9-million to complete development and elding.20 On 28 July 2011 USAF Space Command held a groundbreaking ceremony for a RAIDRS site at Radio Transmitter Facility Lualualei in Waianae, Hawaii. Others sites planned for Florida, Germany, Japan, and U.S. Central Command have scheduled completion dates within the next two years. By January 2012 ground had been broken at three locations.21
2011 Development Programs under way to mitigate risk of cyberattack After reaching full operational capability the previous year, USCYBERCOM focused in 2011 on developing policies and programs related to the prevention of cyberattacks. During the year, the vulnerability of this domain was revealed by such occurrences as the Pentagon’s largest instances of cybertheft22 and the discovery by a NASA Inspector General of security aws in a number of data-sensitive NASA computers, which made critical systems open to cyberattack.23 On 16 May 2011 the United States launched the International Strategy for Cyberspace, which provides a framework to expand international partnerships in order to more e ectively address cyberthreats. e strategy “establishes how network security relates to other crucial areas of partnerships.”24 Over the previous year the United States had worked with Australia, Canada, the U.K., and NATO to strengthen cyber partnerships. Under this new initiative, the DoD was looking to increase such international collaboration.25 On 14 July 2011 DoD released its rst strategy for operating in cyberspace.26 In addition to an overall focus on denying or limiting attacks, the strategy is organized around ve “strategic initiatives”: 1. Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential 2. Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems
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3. Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy 4. Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity 5. Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.27 During 2011 additional policy developments took place to address security concerns that had not been fully worked out when USCYBERCOM was established in 2010. Notably, the Joint Sta began reviewing doctrines that would establish rules of engagement against cyberattacks, including determining what constitutes a war in cyberspace.28 In December 2011 the U.S. Congress authorized o ensive military action in cyberspace through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. According to the act, such action must be in compliance with the law of armed con ict and the War Powers Resolution.29
2011 Development High-integrity GPS (HIGPS) demonstrates full functionality e Navy’s HIGPS program was demonstrated in February 2011 at NAVFEST, a program of USAF 746th Test Squadron designed to provide low-cost, realistic GPS-jamming scenarios to test GPS-based navigation systems and train personnel in GPS-denied environments.30 HIGPS is a Technology Concept Demonstration designed to augment existing GPS capabilities using the Iridium constellation of 66 satellites in LEO, which provides global coverage. HIGPS participation at NAVFEST demonstrated end-to-end functionality of the HIGPS system, including improvement of reception of GPS signals in a jammed environment using existing modi ed GPS receivers and the ability to provide continuous time synchronization in a GPS-denied environment.31 e HIGPS Technology Concept Demonstration contract awarded to Boeing ran from July 2008 until January 2011.32 On 21 December 2011 the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) announced that it would award Boeing an additional contract to optimize HIGPS for use in an operational environment.33
Space Security Impact E orts to identify and report sources of interference and to continue operations despite degradation to critical systems are leading to increased resiliency. Space actors may refrain from interfering with well protected space systems if such attacks seem both futile and costly. Moreover, the consolidation of cybersecurity e orts internationally and across agencies and programs will mitigate the damage posed to space security infrastructures by potential cyberattacks. Policies that allow o ensive action against cyberthreats have potential implications for space security.
Indicator 7.2: Capacity to rebuild spacecraft and integrate distributed architectures into space operations e capability to rapidly rebuild space systems in the wake of a space negation attack could reduce vulnerabilities in space. It is also assumed that space actors have the capability to rebuild satellite ground stations. e capabilities to re t space systems by launching new satellites into orbit in a timely manner to replace satellites damaged or destroyed by a potential attack are critical resilience measures.
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During the Cold War the USSR and the United States led in the development of economical launch vehicles capable of launching new satellites to repair space systems following an attack. e USSR/Russia has launched less expensive, less sophisticated, and shorter-lived satellites than those of the United States, but has also launched them more often. Soviet-era pressure vessel spacecraft designs, still in use today, have an advantage over Western vented satellite designs that require a period of outgassing before the satellite can enter service.34 In principle Russia has the capacity to deploy redundancy in its space systems at a lower cost and allow quicker space access to facilitate the reconstitution of its systems. For instance, in 2004 Russia conducted a large military exercise that included plans for the rapid launch of military satellites to replace space assets lost in action.35 A signi cant number of Russia’s current launches, however, are of other nations’ satellites and Russia continues to struggle to maintain existing military systems in operational condition. us little redundancy is actually leveraged through this launch capability.36 e United States has undertaken signi cant e orts to develop responsive space capabilities. In 2007 the DoD Operationally Responsive Space Oce opened to coordinate the development of hardware and doctrine in support of ORS across the various agencies.37 ORS has three main objectives: 1) Rapid Design, Build, Test with a launch-ready spacecraft within 15 months from authority to proceed; 2) Responsive Launch, Checkout, Operations to include launch within one week of a call-up from a stored state; and 3) Militarily Signi cant Capability to include obtaining images with tactically signi cant resolution provided directly to the theater. New launch capabilities form the cornerstone of this program. Indeed the USAF Space Command has noted: “An operationally responsive spacelift capability is critical to place timely missions on orbit assuring our access to space.”38 Initial steps included a Small Launch Vehicle (SLV) subprogram for a rocket capable of placing 100 to 1,000 kg into LEO on 24-hours notice; however, such a program may ultimately be linked to a long- term prompt global strike capability.39 Under this program AirLaunch LLC was asked to develop the QuickReach air-launch rocket and SpaceX to develop the Falcon-1 reusable launch vehicle to ful ll the SLV requirements.40 In September 2008 Falcon-1 reached orbit on its fourth attempt.41 e USAF TacSat microsatellite series is also intended for ORS demonstration, combining existing military and commercial technologies such as imaging and communications with new commercial launch systems to provide “more rapid and less expensive access to space.”42 A full ORS capability could allow the United States to replace satellites on short notice,43 enabling rapid recovery from space negation attacks and reducing general space systems vulnerabilities. e concept for a U.S. Space Maneuver Vehicle or military space plane rst emerged in the 1990s as a small, powered, reusable space vehicle operating as an upper stage of a reusable launch vehicle.44 e rst technology demonstrators built were the X-40 (USAF) and the X-37A (NASA/DARPA).45 A successor to the X-37A, the X-37B unmanned, reusable spacecraft was launched for the rst time in April 2010 under signi cant secrecy. India is reportedly working on a Reusable Launch Vehicle, which is not anticipated before 2015.46 e commercial space industry is contributing to responsive launch technology development through advancements with small launch vehicles, such as the Falcon-1 by SpaceX and its successor, the Falcon-9, which had its maiden test ight in June 2010. Interest is increasing in the development of air-launched microsatellites, which could reduce costs and allow rapid launches, as they do not require dedicated launch facilities. e Russian MiG-launched kinetic energy anti-satellite weapon program was suspended in the early 1990s, but commercial applications of similar launch methods continue to be explored. As early as 1997 the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau was carrying out research using
134 Space Systems Resiliency a MiG-31 to launch small commercial satellites into LEO.47 e Mikron rocket of the Moscow Aviation Institute’s Astra Centre introduced in 2002 was designed for launch from a MiG-31 and is capable of placing payloads of up to 150 kg into LEO.48 e United States has used the Pegasus launcher, rst developed by Orbital Sciences Corporation in 1990, to launch military small payloads up to 450 kg from a B-52 aircraft.49 Other e orts include the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s plan to launch small payloads from a modi ed H-6 bomber.50
2011 Development The United States launches and deploys two Operationally Responsive Space satellites On 29 June 2011 a Minotaur 1 rocket launched from Wallops Island, Virginia placed the ORS-1 satellite into a 400-km circular orbit. is electro-optic, earth observation satellite was built in response to a Joint Urgent Operational Need submitted in 2008 by the U.S. Central Command via USSSTRATCOM. ORS-1 was developed on an aggressive 24-month schedule, unprecedented for an operational, remote sensing DoD platform. Technical diculties added on six months. e satellite’s payload is a modi ed version of the Syers-2 imager originally developed for the U-2 high altitude surveillance aircraft.51 On 27 September tactical satellite IV (TacSat-4) was launched from the Alaskan Aerospace Corporation’s Kodiak Launch Complex aboard a Minotaur IV+ launch vehicle. e Oce of Naval Research sponsored the development of the payload while the Oce of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering funded the standardized spacecraft bus. e ORS Oce funded the launch that was performed by the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center. Built by the NRL and Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory, TacSat-4 allows troops using existing radios to communicate on-the-move from obscure regions without the need for dangerous antenna positioning and pointing. e spacecraft, having an apogee of 12,050 km in the high latitudes to deliver 10 UHF channels near deployed forces and provide favorable geometries for access in mountainous regions that have previously proved problematic.52 e NRL Blossom Point Ground Station provides command and control for TacSat-4, while the Virtual Mission Operations Center tasking system enables dynamic reallocation of channels to di erent theaters worldwide and rapid SATCOM augmentation when unexpected operations or natural events occur. TacSat-4 serves as a proof of concept satellite that serves as a potential augmentation capability to the future eet of military UHF geosynchronous satellites, the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). e satellite is undergoing a 12-month experimentation phase to determine military utility and e ectiveness.
2011 Development U.S. Combatant Command utilizing Cubesats for missions In December 2010 the United States launched four mini-satellites known as Cubesats into LEO aboard a SpaceX rocket to clandestinely track high-value targets using tagging, tracking, and locating (TTL) data.53 U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is evaluating CubeSat capabilities and considering the satellites for future missions.54
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ese relatively inexpensive satellites, so small that they can t in the palm of a hand, have been used in scienti c missions for a number of years. e TTL mission is only one of several potential applications for Cubesats. Covert tags using technology such as radio frequency identi cation devices and more elaborate technologies are also being tested. Cubesats can simplify command and control challenges for the military. Because they are inexpensive, satellites can be dedicated to local commanders.
2011 Development DARPA System F6 program selects prime contractor In July 2011 Emergent Space Technologies was awarded a contract by the NASA Ames Research Center for the provision of cluster ight guidance, navigation, and control algorithms and software for System F6. e contract is worth as much as $6.7-million over 2.5 years.55 e System F6 program, under the jurisdiction of DARPA, seeks to develop and demonstrate a new architecture for space systems comprised of wirelessly interconnected modules that form a virtual satellite. Four companies won Phase 1 contracts for System F6 in 2008, and Orbital Sciences led the team that won the Phase 2 contract in 2009.56 DARPA held a virtual Proposers’ Day in November 2011 to provide information on System F6 progress and to introduce the System F6 Tech Package Broad Agency Announcement also released in November.57 e current design for System F6 includes a cluster of four fractionated modules. An on-orbit demonstration is planned for 2015.58
2011 Development Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload mission begins e CHIRP mission was launched as a payload on the SES-2 satellite on 21 September 2011 aboard an Ariane 5 launch vehicle from Kourou, French Guiana. CHIRP will collect real- world wide eld-of-view infrared data while examining spacecraft-sensor interactions, other sensor behavior, and related operational issues.59 Because this is the rst commercially hosted payload for the USAF, an important part of CHIRP’s mission is evaluating the long-term suitability of commercially hosted payloads.60 CHIRP is also essential in reducing technology risk for future missions and is expected to achieve signi cant cost savings over a mission as a dedicated free yer.61 As of November 2011 CHIRP had completed initial on-orbit testing and was moving to calibration and execution of experiments.62
Space Security Impact Multiple programs show the prioritization of, and progress in, new technologies that can be integrated quickly into space operations. Smaller, less expensive spacecraft that may be fractionated or distributed on hosts can improve continuity of capability and enhance security through redundancy and rapid replacement of assets. While these characteristics may make attack against these assets less attractive, they may decrease trust and transparency if assets are more dicult to track.
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Space Systems Negation CHAP is chapter assesses indicators and developments related to the research, development, testing, and deployment of capabilities to negate the use of space systems, which includes Earth-to-space and space-to-space interference, as well as electromagnetic and cyber attacks. e focus here is on technical capabilities and not the intent of actors to use them. While this chapter touches on the development of space surveillance capabilities, which is a key enabling technology for space systems negation, Space Situational Awareness is covered as a separate space security indicator in Chapter 2. Space systems negation e orts can involve taking action from the ground or from space against the ground-based components of space systems, the communications links to and
from satellites, space launchers, or satellites themselves. Negation can be achieved through TER the application of cybernetic or electronic interference, conventional weapons, directed energy (lasers), or nuclear capabilities used to carry out what are often referred to in the United States as the ve Ds: deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction.1 Many space negation capabilities are derived from widely available military equipment, technology, and practices. ese include conventional attacks on ground stations, hacking into computer systems, jamming satellite communications links, using false radio transmissions (spoo ng), or simple camou age techniques to conceal the location of military space assets.
Space negation capabilities that involve attacks on satellites themselves are more sophisticated. EIG HT With the exception of ground-based laser dazzling or blinding, a basic launch capability is required to directly attack a satellite. Space surveillance capabilities are also required to e ectively target satellites in orbit. Some space-based negation techniques require highly specialized capabilities, such as precision maneuverability or autonomous tracking. Degradation and destruction can be provided by conventional, directed energy, or nuclear ASAT weapons.2 Conventional anti-satellite weapons include precision-guided kinetic- intercept vehicles, conventional explosives, and specialized systems designed to spread lethal clouds of metal pellets in the orbital path of a targeted satellite. A space launch vehicle with a nuclear weapon would be capable of producing a High Altitude Nuclear Detonation, causing widespread and immediate electronic damage to satellites, combined with the long- term e ects of false radiation belts, which would have an adverse impact on many satellites in LEO.3
Space Security Impact Space systems negation capabilities are directly related to space security since they enable an actor to restrict the secure access to and use of space by other actors. e dynamics of space systems negation and space systems resiliency are closely related. For example, robust space negation e orts will more likely succeed in the face of weak resiliency measures. Like other o ense/defense relationships in military a airs, this space negation/resiliency dynamic raises concerns about an arms race and overall instability as actors compete for the strategic advantages that space negation capabilities appear to o er. Di erent negation activities are likely to stimulate di erent responses.4 While interruption of communications links would probably not be viewed as very provocative, physical destruction of satellites could trigger an arms race. Soviet and U.S. concerns that early warning satellites be protected from direct attack as a measure to enhance crisis management were enshrined in bilateral treaties such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaties. Space war games have 137 Space Security Index 2012
also underscored the challenges generated by space negation e orts focused on “blinding” the strategic communications and attack warning capabilities of an adversary.5 Security concerns arising from the development of negation capabilities are compounded by the fact that many key space capabilities are dual-use. For example, space launchers are required for many anti-satellite systems; microsatellites o er great advantages as space- based kinetic-intercept vehicles; and space surveillance capabilities can support both space debris collision avoidance strategies and targeting for weapons. e application of some destructive space negation capabilities, such as kinetic-intercept vehicles, would also generate space debris that could potentially in ict widespread damage on other space systems and undermine the sustainability of outer space, as discussed in Chapter 1.
Indicator 8.1: Capabilities to attack space communications links The most vulnerable components of space systems are the ground stations and communications links, which are susceptible to attack from commonly accessible weapons and technologies. An attack on the ground segments of space systems with conventional military force is one of the most likely space negation scenarios. Only modest military means would be required for system sabotage; physical attack on the ground facility by armed invaders, vehicles, or missiles; and interference with power sources. e United States leads in developing advanced technologies to temporarily negate space systems by disrupting or denying access to satellite communications. In 2004 the mobile, ground-based CounterCom system, designed to provide temporary and reversible disruption of a targeted satellite’s communications signals, was declared operational.6 In 2007 this system was upgraded to fully equip two squadrons with seven jamming systems, up from the original two.7 Next-generation jammers will likely have “enhanced capabilities for SATCOM denial,” using largely commercially available components.8 Moreover the 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy states that the United States will retain the “capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail.”9 e U.S. Space Control Technology program sought to “continue development and demonstration of advanced counter-communications technologies and techniques…leading to future generation counter-communications systems and advanced target characteristics.”10 e mission description for this program noted that, “consistent with DoD policy, the negation e orts of this program focus only on negation technologies which have temporary, localized, and reversible e ects.”11 e 2004 Presidential Directive on Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Systems called for development of capabilities to selectively deny, as necessary, GPS and other navigation services.12 Although the United States has the most advanced space capabilities, the technical means for electronic and information warfare, including hacking into computer networks and electronic jamming of satellite communications links, are widely available. For instance the jamming by Libyan nationals of the uraya Satellite Telecommunications mobile satellite in an e ort to disrupt the activities of smugglers of contraband into Libya lasted more than six months.13 Reports emerged in November 2007 that China had deployed advanced GPS jamming systems on vans throughout the country.14 Incidents of jamming the relatively weak signals of GPS are not new. Iraq’s acquisition of GPS-jamming equipment during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 suggests that jamming capabilities could proliferate through commercial means. e equipment was reportedly acquired from Russian company Aviaconversiya Limited.15 138 Space Systems Negation
Reported incidents of electronically jammed media broadcasts include interruptions to broadcasts to Iran, Kurdish news broadcasts,16 and Chinese television.17 Computer networks linked to communications systems have also been targeted.18 Commercial proliferation of these capabilities means that non-state actors are increasingly able to launch attacks on communications links. It is often dicult to determine if satellite interference conducted by individual attackers is state-sponsored. Various countries have been accused of jamming satellite transmissions of media outlets, as discussed below.
2011 Development Jamming incidents and capabilities continue to proliferate On 17 July 2011 broadcaster LuaLua TV was jammed only four hours after it was launched.19 e station is a London-based Bahraini current a airs network founded by 15 members of the Bahraini opposition. While LuaLua TV was able to circumvent the jamming by partnering with a live streaming service, the website was soon blocked within Bahrain.20 According to Ethiopian Satellite Television an Amsterdam-based satellite service, the Ethiopian government, with the assistance of the Chinese government, was responsible for repeatedly jamming its programming in 2011.21 In a statement released on 15 June 2011 ESAT accused the government of the People’s Republic of China of complicity in the jamming of its satellite transmissions, and urged it “to desist from providing technology, training and technical assistance to the regime in Ethiopia to enable it to jam shortwave radio and satellite transmissions to Ethiopia.”22 e jamming, which has also a ected other broadcasters such as Voice of America and Deutsche Welle Amharic Services,23 has been condemned by the U.S. state department and the international press. e Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association has given credence to allegations regarding the involvement of the Chinese government, stating that “after investigating the matter, EFJA has con rmed the veracity of the allegations from many credible sources inside and outside of Ethiopia.”24 In January 2012, nearly six months after the ESAT jamming was denounced, reports surfaced that the Ethiopian government had been accused by the Eritrean Ministry of Information of blocking transmissions from Eritrea’s state-run satellite television.25 e Eritrean government, which said that Addis Ababa had been warned by the Arab Satellite Communications Organization to stop the illegal interference with the Eritrean transmissions, announced that it was considering legal action to stop the jamming.26
Space Security Impact Jamming is clearly widespread, a ecting both wealthy and poor nations. e ubiquity of the problem should encourage international cooperation, although e ective enforcement of anti-jamming regulations will likely remain challenging for the foreseeable future. Countermeasures will likely be developed to protect against military jamming, thus ensuring continued satellite communications and producing a positive e ect on space security.
Indicator 8.2: Earth-based capabilities to attack satellites A series of U.S. and Soviet/Russian programs during the Cold War and into the 1990s sought to develop ground-based weapons that employed conventional, nuclear, or directed energy capabilities against satellites. As well, recent incidents involving the use of ASATs underscore the detrimental e ect they have for space security, in particular should these weapons be used for hostile purposes against an adversary.
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Conventional (kinetic intercept) weapons Launching a payload to coincide with the passage of a satellite in orbit is the fundamental requirement for a conventional anti-satellite capability. To date nine nations have con rmed autonomous orbital launch capabilities, as discussed in Chapter 4. Tracking capabilities would allow a payload of metal pellets or gravel to be launched into the path of a satellite by rockets or missiles (such as a SCUD missile).27 Kinetic hit-to-kill technology requires more advanced sensors to reach the target. Targeting satellites from the ground using any of these methods would likely be more cost-e ective and reliable than space-based options.28 USAF Counterspace Operations Document 2-2.1 outlines a set of “counterspace operations” designed to “preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage…using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means.”29 Among the tools for o ensive counterspace operations, the document lists direct ascent and co-orbital ASATs, directed energy weapons, and electronic warfare weapons. e U.S. Army invested in ground-based kinetic energy ASAT technology in the late 1980s and early 1990s. e small, longstanding Kinetic Energy ASAT program was terminated in 1993 but was later granted funding by Congress from FY1996 through FY2005.30 For FY2005 Congress appropriated $14-million for the KE-ASAT program through the MDA Ballistic Missile Defense Products budget.31 e KE-ASAT program was part of the Army Counterspace Technology testbed at Redstone Arsenal.32 e United States has also deployed a limited number of ground-based exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) interceptors, including the Aegis (Sea-Based Midcourse) and Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Systems, for ballistic missile defense purposes.33 EKVs use infrared sensors to detect ballistic missiles in midcourse and maneuver into the trajectory of the missile to ensure a hit to kill.34 With limited modi cation, the EKV could be used against satellites in LEO.35 Japan is an important international partner of the United States on ballistic missile defense and has its own Aegis system. In 2007 a Japanese destroyer successfully performed a sea-based midcourse intercept against an exoatmospheric ballistic missile target.36 Notably, in 2008 the United States recon gured an anti-missile system to destroy failing satellite USA-193 as it deorbited. Modi cations were made to enable a Raytheon SM-3 missile to destroy the satellite before it reentered Earth’s atmosphere. While this event demonstrated the ability to recon gure a missile to be used against a satellite, the United States has stressed that it was a “one-time event,”37 not part of an ASAT development and testing program. Russia developed an anti-satellite system called the Co-Orbital ASAT system, designed to launch conventional explosives into orbit near a target satellite via a missile, which maneuvers toward the satellite, then dives at it and explodes.38 Russia has continued to observe a voluntary moratorium on anti-satellite tests since its last test in 1982. e precise status of its system is not known, but it is most likely no longer operational.39 Russia also developed a long-range (350-km) exoatmospheric missile, the Gorgon, for its A-135 anti- ballistic missile system.40 China has developed an advanced kinetic anti-satellite capability, demonstrated by its intentional destruction of a Chinese weather satellite in 2007 using what is believed to be a vehicle based on a medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuelled ballistic missile, possibly the DF- 21.41 However, China called the event an experiment, not an anti-satellite test.42 e U.K., Israel, and India have also explored techniques for exoatmospheric interceptors.43
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Nuclear weapons A nuclear weapon detonated in space generates an electromagnetic pulse that is highly destructive to unprotected satellites, as demonstrated by the U.S. 1962 Star sh Prime test.44 Given the current global dependence on satellites, such an attack could have a devastating and wide-ranging impact on society. Both the United States and USSR explored nuclear- tipped missiles as missile defense interceptors and ASAT weapons. e Russian Galosh ballistic missile defense system surrounding Moscow employed nuclear-tipped interceptors from the early 1960s through the 1990s.45 China, the member states of the European Space Agency, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Russia, and the United States possess space launch vehicles capable of placing a nuclear warhead in orbit, although the placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space is speci cally prohibited by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (see Chapter 3). North Korea and Pakistan are among the states that possess medium-range ballistic missiles that could launch a mass equivalent to a nuclear warhead into LEO without achieving orbit. Eight states are known to possess nuclear weapons: China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United States, and the U.K. North Korea has an ongoing nuclear program and attempted to detonate a nuclear device in 2006.46 Iran reportedly ended its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but the International Atomic Energy Agency continues to investigate potentially illegal uranium enrichment activities.47
Directed energy weapons Low-powered lasers that could be used to “dazzle” satellites in LEO have been used to degrade unhardened sensors on satellites in LEO.48 In 1997 a 30-watt laser used for alignment and tracking of a target satellite for the megawatt U.S. Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) was directed at a satellite in a 420-km orbit, damaging the satellite’s sensors.49 is suggests that even a commercially available low-watt laser functioning from the ground could be used to “dazzle” or temporarily disrupt a satellite.50 In addition ground-based lasers, adaptive optics, and tracking systems would allow laser energy to be accurately directed at a passing satellite. Low-power beams are useful for ranging and tracking satellites, while high-energy beams are known to cause equipment damage. Adaptive optics, which enables telescopes to rapidly adjust their optical components to compensate for distortions, could be used to produce detailed images of satellites. Ground- and aircraft-based lasers could also use the same technologies to maintain the cohesion of a laser beam as it travels through the atmosphere, enabling more energy to be delivered on target at a greater distance. Adaptive optics research and development have been conducted by countries such as Canada, China, Japan, the United States, Russia, and India.51 Nations that are developing laser satellite communications systems, such as France, Germany, and Japan, could also develop the ability to track and direct a laser beam at a satellite. Several states have demonstrated the technical ability to generate relatively high-powered laser beams. Both Israel and the United States have developed prototypes of laser systems that are capable of destroying artillery shells and rockets at short ranges. e potential use of high-energy lasers against satellites has been explored by the United States, the USSR/ Russia, and China. e MIRACL system was developed by the U.S. Navy to dazzle and blind sensors in GEO and heat to kill electronics on satellites in LEO—a signi cant ASAT capability. Similarly the USAF Star re Optical Range at Kirtland Air Force Base has undertaken laser experiments under the Advanced Weapons Technology program that
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have been characterized as “experiments for applications including anti-satellite weapons”; a demonstration of “fully compensated beam propagation to Low-Earth orbit satellites” was called for in the FY2007 budget request.52 Funding was only authorized after the USAF denied any intent to test Star re against a satellite.53 e Boeing YAL-1 Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) system—formerly known as Airborne Laser—of the USAF is central to plans for Boost Phase Ballistic Missile Defense.54 is technology is believed by some experts to have potential ASAT capabilities, despite the signi cant technical and cost challenges it has faced.55 e program was initiated in 1996 and took 12 years to reach rst light, at a cost of $5-billion.56 e rst ballistic missile interception was planned for late 200957 and nally occurred in February 2010 when the ALTB system successfully shot down a test ballistic missile.58 China operated a high-power laser program as early as 1986 and is believed to have since acquired multiple hundred-megawatt lasers.59 e Chinese government has also devoted resources to high-power solid state laser research.60 Researchers are studying adaptive optics to maintain beam quality over long distances and the use of solid state lasers in space; both technologies could be used against satellites.61 In 2006 China reportedly used a ground-based laser to illuminate a U.S. reconnaissance satellite ying over Chinese territory.62 However, with only public sources available, it is dicult to verify the nature of the laser beam, the physical e ects on the spacecraft, or the intent behind the illumination.63 South Korea is also interested in developing laser systems for use against North Korean missiles and artillery shells, and expressed hopes of deploying such a system in 2010.64 Indian defense scientists have also reportedly experimented with “high-power laser weapons.”65 A summary of the technologies that are required to support the development of ground- based capabilities to attack satellites is provided in Figure 8.1.
2011 Development India continues to signal interest in the development of ASAT capabilities e 6 March 2011 ABM interceptor test conducted by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation demonstrated “India’s capability to e ectively neutralize satellites belonging to an adversary,” according to DRDO Director-General V.K. Saraswat.66 e target, a modi ed Prithvi missile that mimicked the trajectory of a 600-km-range ballistic missile, was launched from Launch Complex III of the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, Orissa.67 Radar at di erent locations tracked the target and passed the information in real time to the mission control center, allowing an interceptor with a directional warhead to engage the target.68
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Figure 8.1: Technologies required for the development of ground-based capabilities to attack satellites Capabilities Conventional Directed energy Nuclear Pellet Kinetic- Explosive Laser Laser Laser heat- HAND cloud ASAT kill ASAT ASAT dazzling blinding to-kill Suborbital launch ◾ ◾ ◾ ◾ Orbital launch ◾ ◾ ◾ ◾ Precision position/ ◾ maneuverability Precision pointing ◾ ◾ ◾ Precision ◾ ◾ ◾ ◾ space tracking (uncooperative) Approximate ◾ ◾ ◾ space tracking (uncooperative) Nuclear weapons ◾ Lasers > 1 W ◾ Lasers > 1 KW ◾ Lasers > 100 KW ◾ Autonomous ◾ tracking/homing Key: ◾ = enabling capability
In October Saraswat, who is also Scienti c Advisor to India’s Minister of Defence, indicated that India could develop an ASAT capability using the country’s existing technology.69 e claim, made during the conference DRDO, the challenges ahead at the University of Pune, is based on the prospect of integrating a satellite kill vehicle with an Agni III ballistic missile.70 According to Saraswat, “developing such a missile is feasible if Agni III and BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) kill vehicle are integrated. e e ective range, which is about 1400-1500 km, is sucient to engage a satellite.”71
2011 Development U.S. Airborne Laser Test Bed comes to an end, but directed energy weapons continue to be developed In December 2011 the U.S. ALTB was discontinued, despite some testing successes during the year.72 e ALTB, consisting of two solid-state lasers and a megawatt class Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL) mounted on a modi ed Boeing 747, was a joint project of Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman. Boeing supplied the jet platform, Lockheed Martin built the beam/ re control system, and Northrop Grumman was responsible for the high-energy laser.73 In 2010 the ALTB completed its rst destruction of a missile in boost phase, hitting a target traveling 6,400 km/h with a basketball-sized beam. Several failures late in the year were caused by diculties in software used to regulate safety conditions. In 2011 the ALTB completed its rst laser tracking of an ICBM, a Minuteman III, and set records for distance tracking at a range of 500 km.74 However, the DoD decided to terminate the program after 16 years of development, and a $5-billion investment.75 Of primary concern for the
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Pentagon was the limited range of the ALTB and the use of perishable chemicals to fuel the COIL, making the system of limited operational feasibility.76 New technologies could potentially circumvent some of the problems su ered by the ALTB. e High Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense System (HELLADS) being developed by DARPA also reached key laboratory testing milestones in 2011, demonstrating “the ability to achieve high power and beam quality from a signi cantly lighter and smaller laser.”77 HELLADS is intended to be a tactical-level laser, mounted on aircraft and usable against surface-to-air threats. e program aims to deliver a 150-kw laser by the end of 2012.78 According to Richard Bagnell, HELLAD’s program manager, “Advances in diodes, cooling, lightweight electronics, pumps, optics, and metal structures have made shrinking the size and weight possible without losing laser e ectiveness.”79
Figure 8.2: History of ground-based anti-satellite demonstrations System Actor Dates Known Number Description of program of Orbital Engagements Bold Orion air-launched ballistic U.S. 1959, single test 0 Air-launched ballistic missile passed within 32 km missile of U.S. Explorer VI satellite SAtellite INTerceptor (SAINT) U.S. 1960-1962 0 Designed as co-orbital surveillance system, the (USAF) Idea abandoned satellite could be armed with warhead or ‘blind’ in the late 1960s enemy satellite with paint Program 505 U.S. 1962-1964 1? Nike-Zeus nuclear-tipped anti-ballistic missile (Army) system employed as ASAT against orbital vehicles Program 437 U.S. 1963-1975 1? Nuclear-armed Thor ballistic missile launched (USAF) directly into path of target Co-orbital (IS) ASAT USSR 1963-1972, 12? Conventional explosives launched into orbit near 1976-1982 target, detonated when within range of one km Polaris submarine launched ASAT U.S. 1964-late 1960s ? Submarine-launched ballistic missile fitted with (Navy) tracking sensors and launched into orbit as satellite passed overhead to detonate warhead filled with steel pellets Laser ASAT USSR 1975-1989 0 Sary Shagan and Dushanbe laser sites reported to have ASAT programs Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle U.S. 1982-1987 1 Missile launched from high-altitufe F-15 aircraft (USAF) to destroy satellite with high-speed collision MiG-31 Air-launched ASAT USSR 1980-1985 ? Exploration of kinetic-kill ASAT to be launched from MiG-31 aircraft MIRACL Laser U.S. (USAF) 1989-1990 Tested 1 Megawatt-class chemical laser fired at satellite in 1997 though to disable electronic sensors not acknowledged as ASAT test Ground-Based Kinetic Energy U.S. 1990-2004 0 Kinetic-kill vehicle launched from ground to ASAT (Army) intercept and destroy satellite * Medium-range ballistic missile- China 2007 1 Destroyed Feng Yun 1C weather satellite on 11 based kinetic energy ASAT (PLA) January 2007 †Modified Standard Missile-3 U.S. 2008 1 Single engagement of the failed, de-orbiting launched from the Aegis Ballistic (Navy) US-193 satellite that resulted in kinetic intercept Missile Defense System (not a and consequent destruction of satellite on 20 dedicated anti-satellite program) February 2008 * The Chinese government states that the intercept of the Feng Yun 1C satellite was a scientific experiment and not an anti-satellite test or demonstration. † The U.S. government states that the engagement of the US-193 satellite was done to protect populations on Earth, and that the modification of the system was a one-time occurrence that has been reversed.
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Space Security Impact e continued development of capabilities that can enable a spacefaring actor to intentionally compromise the physical and operational integrity of space assets has a negative e ect on space security as it can directly restrict the secure access to space by others. While possession of such capabilities does not necessarily entail their imminent use, their very development may heighten tensions and have a negative e ect on regional and international stability. Clearly, the interest in ASAT capabilities expressed by India and the recent use of ASAT weapons by the United States and China do not bode well for the security of outer space. Despite continued research on directed energy weapons, the ALTB program has been terminated and there are no indications that such capabilities will materialize in the near future.
Indicator 8.3: Space-based negation enabling capabilities Deploying space-based ASATs—using kinetic-kill, directed energy, or conventional explosive techniques—would require enabling technologies somewhat more advanced than the fundamental requirements for orbital launch. While microsatellites, maneuverability, and other autonomous proximity operations are essential building blocks for a space-based negation system, they are also advantageous for a variety of civil, commercial, and non- negation military programs. Space-based weapons targeting satellites with conventional explosives, referred to as “space mines,” could employ microsatellites to maneuver near a satellite and explode within close range. Microsatellites are relatively inexpensive to develop and launch, and have a long lifespan; their intended purpose is dicult to determine until detonation. Moreover, due to its small size, a space-mine microsatellite can be hard to detect. Microsatellite technology has become widespread, involving an array of civil, military, commercial, and academic actors. In 2000 the partnership between China and Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. of the U.K. saw the launch of the Tsinghua-1 microsatellite and companion Surrey Nanosatellite Application Platform to test on-orbit rendezvous capabilities.80 A variety of U.S. programs have developed advanced technologies that would be foundational for a space-based conventional anti-satellite program, including maneuverability, docking, and onboard optics. e USAF Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS) employed microsatellites to test proximity operations, including autonomous rendezvous, maneuvering, and close-up inspection of a target. XSS-11 was launched in 2005 and ew successful repeat rendezvous maneuvers. e fact that the program was linked to the Advanced Weapons Technology element of the budget suggests that it could potentially evolve into an ASAT program.81 e MDA Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), designed to provide support to ballistic missile defense, at one point was intended to employ a kill vehicle to encounter a ballistic missile at close range, with a sensor to record the ndings. In 2005 the MDA cancelled the experiment after Congress expressed concerns about its applicability to ASAT development,82 prompting the kill vehicle to be replaced with a laser communications payload. In 2006 the United States launched a pair of Micro-satellite Technology Experiment (MiTEx) satellites into an unknown geostationary transfer orbit. e MiTEx satellites are technology demonstrators for the Microsatellite Demonstration Science and Technology Experiment Program (MiDSTEP) sponsored by DARPA, the USAF, and the U.S. Navy. A major goal
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of the MiTEx demonstrations is to assess the potential of small satellites in GEO for defense applications.83 In January 2009 the Pentagon con rmed that the two MiTEx microsatellites had maneuvered in close proximity to a failing satellite in GEO.84 is incident raised concerns that the ability to get in such close proximity to another satellite could potentially be used for hostile actions.85 An autonomous rendezvous capacity was also the objective of NASA’s Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) spacecraft, which relied on the Advanced Video Guidance Sensor and GPS to locate its target.86 e ASAT capability of maneuverable microsatellites was demonstrated in 2005 when the DART craft unexpectedly collided with the target satellite and bumped it into a higher orbit.87 Other U.S. programs developing a range of space-based, dual-use maneuvering, autonomous approach, and docking capabilities include the DARPA/NASA Orbital Express program. In 2007 it demonstrated the feasibility of conducting automated satellite refueling and repair, which could also be used to maneuver a space-based anti-satellite weapon.88 DARPA and the Naval Research Laboratory are also developing a space tug capable of physically maneuvering another satellite in orbit under a program called Front-end Robotics Enabling Near-Term Demonstration (FREND). It was “designed to allow interaction with GEO-based military and commercial spacecraft, extending their service lives and permitting satellite repositioning or retirement.”89 e NRL has developed and ground-tested guidance and control algorithms to enable a spacecraft-mounted robotic arm to autonomously grapple another satellite not designed for docking.90 As well DARPA’s TICS (Tiny, Independent, Coordinating Spacecraft) program was intended to develop 10-lb satellites that could be quickly air launched by ghter jets to form protective formations around larger satellites to shield them from direct attacks. Using advanced robotic technologies, these satellites could have potentially been used against non- cooperative satellites, but the program was cancelled in the FY2009 budget.91 On-orbit servicing is also a key research priority for several civil space programs and supporting commercial companies. Germany is developing the Deutsche Orbitale Servicing Mission, which “will focus on Guidance and Navigation, capturing of non-cooperative as well as cooperative client satellites, performing orbital maneuvers with the coupled system and the controlled de-orbiting of the two coupled satellites.”92 Sweden has developed the automated rendezvous and proximity operation PRISMA satellites, which were successfully launched in June 2010 from Yasni, Russia.93 e PRISMA satellite project demonstrates technologies for autonomous formation ying, approach, rendezvous, and proximity operations.94 While there is no evidence to suggest that these programs are intended to support space systems negation and Sweden has been quite transparent about the nature of this project, such technologies could conceivably be modi ed for such an application.
2011 Development Pursuit of greater abilities for small spacecraft to rendezvous with satellites In October 2011 DARPA announced that it is seeking technical expert information for its Phoenix program for servicing geosynchronous satellites that have been decommissioned into GEO for disposal.95 Once DARPA is able to develop technologies capable of reaching and harvesting retired satellites, the Phoenix program aims to salvage valuable components and repair and attempt to reuse them.96
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According to DARPA Program Manager David Barnhart, to repurpose valuable components from retired satellites, “new remote imaging and robotics technology and special tools to grip, cut, and modify complex systems”97 are required. An important caveat in the program objectives is that “the willing knowledge and sanction of the satellite’s owner” is a prerequisite for any attempts to salvage satellite components. Under the Phoenix program, approximately $36-million will be awarded to contractors to construct a eet of “satlets” or nanosatellites, “which can be sent more economically to the GEO region through existing ride-along services with commercial satellite launches and then robotically attached to the antenna of a nonfunctional cooperating satellite to essentially create a new space system,” as well as a larger craft that will be capable of doing more sophisticated maintenance on the satellites.98. While the NRL has already developed spacecraft capable of reaching out to satellites and manipulating them, DARPA plans to launch a eet of these spacecraft soon, with an anticipated demonstration of Phoenix in 2015-16.99 (See Chapter 5 for information on the Space Infrastructure Servicing vehicle proposed by the MDA for satellite on-orbit servicing.)
2011 Development China successfully conducts docking maneuver On 2 November 2011 the China National Space Administration successfully completed docking maneuvers between an unmanned Shenzhou 8 spacecraft and the robotic Tiangong 1 space laboratory module.100 e event constituted a milestone for China’s space program as it was the rst time that a space docking was performed by a Chinese vehicle. Shenzhou 8’s mission started on 31 October 2011 when it was launched on a Long March 2F rocket from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in Inner Mongolia.101 Although the spacecraft was unmanned, it was reportedly identical to the ones used in China’s manned space missions.102 With a total mass of 8,082 kg, Shenzhou 8’s design consisted of a front orbital module, a reentry capsule, and an aft service module; inside the reentry module, it carried two dummies and a biological experiment payload supplied by Germany and ESA.103 ree days after launch, it successfully docked with Tiangong-1. is success demonstrated that China is able to ax spacecraft to one another in orbit and perform docking functions necessary for assembling their space station, due to be completed in 2020. 104 Chinese news agency Xinhuanet highlighted the essential role of CSNA’s cooperation with other countries, in particular Russia (the only country currently ying humans to the ISS).105 According to Xinhuanet, in addition to engaging Russia, the CSNA has recently cooperated with Germany and hopes such international alliances will allow Chinese spacecraft to dock with the ISS. e publicity surrounding these docking procedures can be contrasted with the secrecy surrounding the robotic rendezvous maneuvers that took place between the Chinese SJ-12 and SJ-06F satellites in 2010.106 ese maneuvers, which could have been a test of space station procedures, illustrated the ability to approach and potentially interfere with other satellites.107
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2011 Development X-37B 2 space plane successfully launched On 5 March 2011 the second USAF reusable space plane, X-37B 2, was launched on an Atlas rocket to begin a 270-day mission.108 Nine months after the launch, the ight was extended to take advantage of “additional experimentation opportunities,” according to the X-37B systems program director.109 As of January 2012 the vehicle had not landed,110 signi cantly outlasting its predecessor, which was launched in April 2010 and landed in December.111 Although program cost and mission details remain classi ed, ocial statements emphasize its reusable launch and retrieval capabilities.112 “We want to be able to put an object up into space, materials, technology and so forth, test them out, bring them back and examine them,” said Richard McKinney, deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for space programs. Speculation on whether the mission of the X-37B was to spy on the Tiangong spacecraft was dashed by experts, who stated that the orbits of the two spacecraft were not properly aligned for such purposes.113 Ongoing discussions on the future use of the X-37B focus on the economic sense of using the space plane for such missions as rapid small satellite delivery.114 Research is being done in Russia on a space plane similar to the USAF X-37.115 e Buran, the Soviet version of the NASA Space Shuttle, which ew to outer space and successfully returned unmanned, has been retired since its only ight in 1988.116. e head of Russian military space operations refused to state whether the new space plane will be used for any future operations. 117
Space Security Impact While space-based systems negation remains largely theoretical and no space assets have been deployed with a dedicated negation mission, many extant capabilities could potentially be used for this purpose. e further development of technologies that potentially enable space- based ASAT capabilities may force spacefaring nations to incorporate greater protection measures into their spacecraft and invest more in e ective space situational awareness. Rendezvous and proximity operations, for example, could be perceived as having hostile applications, unless they are conducted transparently.
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Space Security Working Group Meeting A
Best Western Ville-Marie Hotel NNEX 1: Expert P Montreal, Quebec, Canada 13-14 April 2012
Participants Timiebi Aganaba Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University
Kate Becker Space Policy Institute, George Washington University
Eva Bernhardsdotter Swedish Defense Research Agency
Joyeeta Chatterjee Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University
Jean-Marc Chouinard Canadian Space Agency
Ti any Chow articipation Secure World Foundation
Richard DalBello Intelsat General Corporation
Laura Delgado Institute for Global Environmental Strategies
Karl Doetsch Doetsch International Space Consultants
Joanne Gabrynowicz e University of Mississippi School of Law
Graham Gibbs Canadian Space Agency (Ret)
Mark Gubrud University of North Carolina
Peter Hays Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
Diane Howard Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University
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Ram Jakhu Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University
Cesar Jaramillo Project Ploughshares
Gaurav Kampani Cornell University
David McArthur Space Policy Institute, George Washington University
Philip Meek United States Air Force, Ret.
Paul Meyer e Simons Foundation
Ashlyn Milligan National Defence Canada
Audrey Scha er Oce of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.)
John Siebert Project Ploughshares
Michael Simpson Secure World Foundation
Isabelle Sourbès-Verger Centre national de la recherche scienti que (France)
Lucy Stojak HEC Montréal
Richard Tremayne-Smith Consultant (U.K.); formerly with the British National Space Centre
Ray Williamson Secure World Foundation
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Types of Earth Orbits* A NNEX 2: Types of Earth Orbits
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is commonly accepted as below 2,000 kilometers above the Earth’s surface. Spacecraft in LEO make one complete revolution of the Earth in about 90 minutes. Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) is the region of space around the Earth above LEO (2,000 kilometers) and below geosynchronous orbit (36,000 kilometers). e orbital period (time for one orbit) of MEO satellites ranges from about two to 12 hours. e most common use for satellites in this region is for navigation, such as the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS). Geostationary Orbit (GEO) is a region in which the satellite orbits at approximately 36,000 kilometers above the Earth’s equator. At this altitude, geostationary orbit has a period equal to the period of rotation of the Earth. By orbiting at the same rate, in the same direction as Earth, the satellite appears stationary relative to the surface of the Earth. is is very useful for communications satellites. In addition, geostationary satellites provide a ‘big picture’ view of Earth, enabling coverage of weather events. is is especially useful for monitoring large, severe storms and tropical cyclones. Polar Orbit refers to spacecraft at near-polar inclination and an altitude of 700-to-800 kilometers. e satellite passes over the equator and each latitude on the Earth’s surface at the same local time each day, meaning that the satellite is overhead at essentially the same time throughout all seasons of the year. is feature enables collection of data at regular intervals and consistent times, which is especially useful for making long-term comparisons. Highly Elliptical Orbits (HEO), are characterized by a relatively low altitude perigee and an extremely high-altitude apogee. ese extremely elongated orbits have the advantage of long dwell times at a point in the sky; visibility near apogee can exceed 12 hours. ese elliptical orbits are useful for communications satellites. GEO transfer orbit (GTO) is an elliptical orbit of the Earth, with the perigee in LEO and the apogee in GEO. is orbit is generally a transfer path after launch to LEO by launch vehicles carrying a payload to GEO. Apogee and Perigee refer to the distance from the Earth to the satellite. Apogee is the furthest distance to the Earth, and perigee is the closest distance to the Earth.
* From the Space Foundation, e Space Report 2008 (Colorado Springs: Space Foundation 2008), at 52.
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A Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
NNEX 3: Outer Space Treaty States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
e States Parties to this Treaty, Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the bene t of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scienti c development, Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scienti c as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,” which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963, Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 1963, Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space, Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Have agreed on the following:
Article I e exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the bene t and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scienti c development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. ere shall be freedom of scienti c investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.
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Article II Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.
Article III States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.
Article IV States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. e moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. e establishment of military bases, installations and forti cations, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. e use of military personnel for scienti c research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. e use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Article V States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle. In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties. States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.
Article VI States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. e activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.
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Article VII Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Article VIII A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not a ected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.
Article IX In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.
Article X In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be a orded an opportunity to observe the ight of space objects launched by those States. e nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be a orded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned.
Article XI In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the moon 154 Annex 3 and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scienti c community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and e ectively.
Article XII All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.
Article XIII e provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international intergovernmental organizations. Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international intergovernmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international organization or with one or more States members of that international organization, which are Parties to this Treaty.
Article XIV 1. is Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. is Treaty shall be subject to rati cation by signatory States. Instruments of rati cation and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. is Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of rati cation by ve Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty. 4. For States whose instruments of rati cation or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of rati cation or accession. 5. e Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of rati cation of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices. 6. is Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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Article XV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.
Article XVI Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written noti cation to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take e ect one year from the date of receipt of this noti cation.
Article XVII is Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certi ed copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the twenty-seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven.
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Spacecraft Launched in 2011* A
COSPAR Launch Satellite Actor Type Primary Function Owner Launch Orbit NNEX 4:Spacecraft Launched in 2011 Number Date Name Vehicle 2011- 1/20/2011 Electro-L1 Government Meteorological Russia Zenit GEO 001A 2011- 1/20/2011 USA 224 Military Reconnaissance USA Delta 4 LEO 002A Heavy 2011- 2/6/2011 USA 225 Military Technology USA Minotaur 4 LEO 006A Development 2011- 2/26/2011 Cosmos 2471 Military/ Navigation/ Russia Soyuz 2 MEO 009A Commercial Global Positioning 2011- 3/2/2011 USA 227 Military Communications USA Delta 4 GEO 011A 2011- 3/5/2011 USA 226 Military Technology USA Atlas 5 LEO 010A Development 2011- 4/9/2011 Compass G-8 Military Navigation/ China (PR) Long March GEO 013A Global 3A Positioning 2011- 4/15/2011 USA 229 Military Electronic USA Atlas 5 LEO 014A Surveillance/ Ocean 2011- 4/15/2011 USA 229 Military Electronic USA Atlas 5 LEO 014B Surveillance/ Ocean 2011- 4/20/2011 Resourcesat 2 Government Earth India PSLV C16 LEO 015A Observation 2011- 4/20/2011 X-Sat Government Earth Singapore PSLV C16 LEO 015C Observation 2011- 4/20/2011 Youthsat Government Scientific India PSLV C16 LEO 015B Research 2011- 4/22/2011 Intelsat New Commercial Communications USA Ariane 5 GEO 016A Dawn 2011- 4/22/2011 Yahsat-1A Military/ Communications United Arab Ariane 5 GEO 016B Commercial Emirates 2011- 5/4/2011 Meridian-4 Military Communications Russia Soyuz 2-1a Elliptical 018A 2011- 5/7/2011 USA 230 Military Early Warning USA Atlas 5 GEO 019A 2011- 5/20/2011 GSAT-8 Government Communications/ India Ariane 5 GEO 022A Navigation 2011- 5/20/2011 ST-2 Commercial Communications Singapore/ Ariane 5 GEO 022B Taiwan 2011- 5/20/2011 Telstar 14R Commercial Communications Canada Proton GEO 021A 2011- 6/10/2011 Satellite for Government Earth Argentina/ Delta 2 LEO 024A Scientific Observation USA Applications (SAC-D)
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COSPAR Launch Satellite Actor Type Primary Function Owner Launch Orbit Number Date Name Vehicle 2011- 6/20/2011 Zhongxing 10 Government Communications China (PR) Long March GEO 026A 3B 2011- 6/30/2011 USA 231 Military Reconnaissance USA Minotaur LEO 029A 2011- 7/6/2011 Shijian 11 03 Government Technology China (PR) Long March LEO 030A Development 2C 2011- 7/11/2011 TianLian 2 Government Communications China (PR) Long March GEO 032A 3C 2011- 7/13/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a LEO 033E M081 2011- 7/13/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a LEO 033A M083 2011- 7/13/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a LEO 033D M085 2011- 7/13/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a LEO 033B M088 2011- 7/13/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a LEO 033F M089 2011- 7/13/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a LEO 033C M091 2011- 7/15/2011 GSAT-12 Government Communications India PSLV C17 GEO 034A 2011- 7/15/2011 KazSat-2 Commercial Communications Kazakhstan Proton-M GEO 035B 2011- 7/15/2011 SES-3 Commercial Communications USA Proton M GEO 035A 2011- 7/16/2011 USA 232 Military/ Navigation/ USA Delta 4 MEO 036A Commercial Global Positioning 2011- 7/18/2011 Spektr-R/ Government Astrophysics Multinational Zenit 3SLBF/ Elliptical 037A RadioAstron Fregat SB 2011- 7/26/2011 Compass G-9 Military Navigation/ China (PR) Long March GEO 038A Global 3A Positioning 2011- 7/29/2011 Shijian 11 02 Government Technology China (PR) Long March LEO 039A Development 2C 2011- 8/6/2011 Astra 1N Commercial Communications Luxembourg Ariane 5 ECA GEO 041A 2011- 8/6/2011 BSAT-3C/ Commercial Communications Japan Ariane 5 ECA GEO 041B JCSat 110-R 2011- 8/11/2011 Paksat-1R Government/ Communications Pakistan Long March GEO 042A Commercial 3B 2011- 8/15/2011 Haiyang 2A Government Meteorology China (PR) Long March LEO 043A 4B 2011- 8/17/2011 AprizeSat 5 Commercial Communications USA/ Dnepr 1 LEO 044E Argentina
158 Annex 4
COSPAR Launch Satellite Actor Type Primary Function Owner Launch Orbit Number Date Name Vehicle 2011- 8/17/2011 AprizeSat 6 Commercial Communications USA/ Dnepr 1 LEO 044F Argentina 2011- 8/17/2011 EduSAT Civil Technology Italy Dnepr 1 LEO 044A Development 2011- 8/17/2011 NigeriaSat-2 Government Earth Nigeria Dnepr 1 LEO 044B Observation 2011- 8/17/2011 NigeriaSat-X Government Earth Nigeria Dnepr 1 LEO 044C Observation/ Technology Development 2011- 8/17/2011 RASAT Government Earth Turkey Dnepr 1 LEO 044D Observation 2011- 8/17/2011 Sich 2 Government Earth Ukraine Dnepr 1 LEO 044G Observation 2011- 9/18/2011 Zhongxing 1A Military Communications China (PR) Long March GEO 047A 3B 2011- 9/20/2011 Cosmos 2473 Military Communications Russia Proton M GEO 048A 2011- 9/21/2011 Arabsat 5C Government Communications Multinational Ariane 5 ECA GEO 049B 2011- 9/21/2011 SES-2 Commercial Communications USA Ariane 5 ECA GEO 049A 2011- 9/23/2011 IGS-6A Government Reconnaissance Japan H2A LEO 050A 2011- 9/24/2011 Atlantic Bird 7 Commercial Communications Multinational Zenit 3SL GEO 051A 2011- 9/27/2011 TacSat 4 Military Technology USA Minotaur 4 Elliptical 052A Development 2011- 9/29/2011 QueztSat-1 Commercial Communications USA Proton M GEO 054A 2011- 9/29/2011 Tiangong-1 Government Technology China (PR) Long March LEO 053A Development 2F 2011- 10/2/2011 Cosmos 2474 Military/ Navigation/ Russia Soyuz 2 MEO 055A Commercial Global Positioning 2011- 10/5/2011 Intelsat 18 Commercial Communications USA Zenit GEO 056A 2011- 10/7/2011 Eutelsat W-C3 Commercial Communications Multinational Long March GEO 057A 3B 2011- 10/12/2011 Jugnu Civil Earth India PSLV LEO 058B Observation 2011- 10/12/2011 Megha- Government Earth Science India/France PSLV LEO 058A Tropiques 2011- 10/12/2011 SRMSat Civil Technology India PSLV LEO 058D Development 2011- 10/12/2011 Vesselsat-1 Commercial Communications USA PSLV LEO 058C
159 Space Security Index 2012
COSPAR Launch Satellite Actor Type Primary Function Owner Launch Orbit Number Date Name Vehicle 2011- 10/19/2011 ViaSat-1 Commercial Communications USA Proton M GEO 059A 2011- 10/21/2011 Galileo IOV-1 Commercial Navigation/ ESA Soyuz- MEO 060B FM2 Global Fregat Positioning 2011- 10/21/2011 Galileo IOV-1 Commercial Navigation/ ESA Soyuz- MEO 060A PFM Global Fregat Positioning 2011- 10/28/2011 NPP Government Meteorology USA Delta 2 LEO 061A 2011- 11/4/2011 Cosmos 2476 Military/ Navigation/ Russia Proton M MEO 064A Commercial Global Positioning 2011- 11/4/2011 Cosmos 2477 Military/ Navigation/ Russia Proton M MEO 064B Commercial Global Positioning 2011- 11/4/2011 Cosmos 2475 Military/ Navigation/ Russia Proton M MEO 064C Commercial Global Positioning 2011- 11/9/2011 Tian Xun-1 Civil Technology China (PR) Long March LEO 066A Development 4B 2011- 11/9/2011 Yaogan 12 Military Remote Sensing China (PR) Long March LEO 066B 4B 2011- 11/20/2011 Chuangxin 3 Government Earth China (PR) Long March LEO 068A Observation 2D 2011- 11/20/2011 Shiyan 4 Government Remote Sensing/ China (PR) Long March LEO 068B Research 2D 2011- 11/25/2011 AsiaSat 7 Commercial Communications China (PR) Proton M GEO 069A 2011- 11/27/2011 Cosmos 2478 Military/ Navigation/ Russia Soyuz 2 MEO 071A Commercial Global Positioning 2011- 11/29/2011 Yaogan 13 Military Remote Sensing China (PR) Long March LEO 072A 2C 2011- 12/1/2011 Compass G-10 Military Navigation/ China (PR) Long March GEO 073A Global 3A Positioning 2011- 12/11/2011 Amos 5 Military/ Communications Israel Proton M GEO 074A Commercial 2011- 12/11/2011 Luch 5A Government Communications Russia Proton M GEO 074B 2011- 12/12/2011 IGS-7A Government Reconnaissance Japan H2A LEO 075A 2011- 12/17/2011 ELISA-E12 Military Electronic France Soyuz 2/ LEO 076B Intelligence/ Fregat Technology Development
160 Annex 4
COSPAR Launch Satellite Actor Type Primary Function Owner Launch Orbit Number Date Name Vehicle 2011- 12/17/2011 ELISA-E24 Military Electronic France Soyuz 2/ LEO 076C Intelligence/ Fregat Technology Development 2011- 12/17/2011 ELISA-W11 Military Electronic France Soyuz 2/ LEO 076D Intelligence/ Fregat Technology Development 2011- 12/17/2011 ELISA-W23 Military Electronic France Soyuz 2/ LEO 076A Intelligence/ Fregat Technology Development 2011- 12/17/2011 NigComSat-1R Commercial Communications Nigeria Long March GEO 077A 3B 2011- 12/17/2011 Pléiades HR1 Government Earth France/Italy Soyuz 2/ LEO 076F Observation Fregat 2011- 12/17/2011 SSOT Government/ Earth Chile Soyuz 2/ LEO 076E Military Observation Fregat 2011- 12/28/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a/ LEO 080B M080 Fregat 2011- 12/28/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a/ LEO 080C M082 Fregat 2011- 12/28/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a/ LEO 080A M084 Fregat 2011- 12/28/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a/ LEO 080F M086 Fregat 2011- 12/28/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a/ LEO 080E M090 Fregat 2011- 12/28/2011 Globalstar Commercial Communications USA Soyuz 2.1a/ LEO 080D M092 Fregat
* Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database,” 2012, online: www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_ security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html.
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Endnotes Chapter One Endnotes 1 D. Wright, “Space Debris,” Physics Today, October 2007, at 36. 2 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog, Space Track, online: www.space-track.org. 3 J. James, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, House Committee on Science and Technology, 28 April 2009, at 2, online: http://gop.science.house.gov/Media/hearings/ space09/april28/james.pdf. 4 William J. Broad, “Orbiting Junk, Once a Nuisance, Is Now a reat,” e New York Times, 6 February 2007, online: www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/science/space/06orbi.html?ei=5070&en= 52e4fd924f69b8b9&ex=1179374400. 5 J. Singer, “Space-Based Missile Interceptors Could Pose Debris reat,” Space News, 13 September 2004. 6 Ibid., at 8. 7 NASA, “Orbital Debris,” Photo Gallery, NASA Orbital Debris Program Oce, 27 October 2009, online: http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/photogallery/photogallery.html. 8 D. Wright, “Colliding Satellites: Consequences and Implications,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 26 February 2009, online: www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/SatelliteCollision-2-12-09.pdf. 9 Nicholas Johnson, “USA Space Debris Environment, Operations, and Policy Updates,” Presentation given to UNCOPUOS Scienti c and Technical Committee meeting in Vienna, Austria, 6-17 February 2012, online: http://unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2012/tech-26E.pdf. 10 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, “Only a Few Minor Satellite Breakups in 2011,” January 2012, at 1. 11 Ibid. 12 Data compiled from NASA’s Orbital Debris Quarterly News for January 2012, online: www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/newsletter.html. 13 Ibid. 14 Data compiled from the Space Track public satellite catalog maintained by the U.S. military, online: http://space-track.org. 15 Space Security 2011, ed. Cesar Jaramillo, Spacesecurity.org, online www.spacesecurity.org/space. security.2011.revised.pdf at 11. 16 Data compiled from the Space Track public satellite catalog maintained by the U.S. military, online: http://space-track.org. 17 Ibid.; Johnson. 18 Johnson. 19 Wang Ting, “Deployed Satellite,” online: http://wangting.org/Database/DeployedSate.php. 20 Johnson. 21 Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database,” 31 December 2011, online: www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ ucs-satellite-database.html. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Johnson. 25 Peter B. de Selding, “FCC Enter Orbital Debris Debate,” Space News, 28 June 2004; Federal Register, “Mitigation of Orbital Debris,” #70, 12 October 2005. 26 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, “Publication of the Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris,” NASA Orbital Debris Program Oce, October 2008, at 3-4, online:: http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/ newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv12i4.pdf. 27 ESA, ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook, Noordwijk, NE, 19 February 1999; R. Walker et al., Update of the ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook, ESA, QinetiQ, July 2002, online: www.esrin. esa.it/gsp/completed/execsum00_N06.pdf.
162 Endnotes
28 European Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standard, Issue 1, Revision 0, 27 September 2000; F. Alby F, D. Alwes, L. Anselmo, H. Baccini, C. Bonnal, R. Crowther, W. Flury, J. Rudiger, H. Klinkrad, C. Portelli, R. Tremayne Smith, “A European Standard for Space Debris,” in Europe and Space Debris, Toulouse, France, 27-28 November 2002, Proceedings, vol. CD, at 1-6, ANAE, 2003. 29 Council of the European Union, document 14455/10, 11 October 2010, online: www.consilium. europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st14455.en10.pdf. 30 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, “Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,” 5 October 2004, at 3, 13, online: www.iadconline.org/docs_pub/ IADC.SD.AI20.3.10.2004.pdf. 31 Ibid. 32 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines at the UN,” NASA Orbital Debris Program Oce, July 2005, at 1, online: http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ ODQNv9i3.pdf. 33 “Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixty Second Session,” at 17. 34 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, “Reentry of NASA Satellite,” October 2011, at 1; NASA, “NASA's UARS Re-Enters Earth's Atmosphere,” Press Release 11-350, 24 September 2011, online: www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2011/sep/HQ_11-350_UARS_Re-entry.html. 35 Ibid. 36 Brad Sylvester, “NASA: 1 in 3,200 Chance of Satellite Debris Hitting Someone,” Yahoo!, 9 September 2011, online: http://news.yahoo.com/nasa-uars-satellite-debris-poses-1-3-200- 192200264.html. 37 Gina Sunseri, “Space Satellite UARS Might Hit Earth Friday,” ABC News, 20 September 2011, online: http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/space-satellite-uars-hit-earth-friday/story?id= 14562819#.TxKBDVY052k. 38 Kenneth Chang, “It’s Safe to Go Outside: NASA Says Its Falling Satellite Will Miss the U.S.,” New York Times, 23 September 2011, online: www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/science/ space/24satellite.html?_r=1. 39 Tariq Malik, “6.5 Ton Defunct Satellite Falling to Earth Faster than Expected, NASA Says,” Fox News, 18 September 2011, online: www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/09/18/65-ton-defunct- satellite-falling-to-earth-faster-than-expected-nasa-says. 40 Malik; Chang. 41 Sylvester. 42 Peter B. de Selding, “German Rosat Satellite Re-enters Atmosphere,” Space News, 25 October 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/111025-rosat-reenters-atmosphere.html. 43 Ibid. 44 Ned Potter, “Falling From the Sky? German ROSAT Satellite Descends,” ABC News, 20 October 2011, online: http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/german-rosat-satellite-enter-atmosphere-orbit- debris-hit/story?id=14764298#.TxKEI1Y052k. 45 Richard Gray, “German space telescope to crash back to Earth,” e Telegraph, 22 October 2011, online: www.telegraph.co.uk/science/space/8843426/German-space-telescope-to-crash-back-to- Earth.html. 46 Natalie Wolchover, “What Are the Odds You’ll Get Struck by the Falling ROSAT Satellite?,” Fox News, 20 October 2011, online: www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/10/20/what-are-odds-youll- get-struck-by-falling-rosat-satellite. 47 Ted ornhill, “ANOTHER satellite to crash land soon, and the odds of it hitting someone are even higher,” Daily Mail, 30 September 2011, online: www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2043846/ ROSAT-ANOTHER-satellite-crash-land-weeks-time.html. 48 ornhill; Wolchover. 49 Mike Wall, “ e Most Memorable Space ight Stories of 2011,” MSNBC, 21 December 2011, online: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45753503/#.TxKA1VY052k; Dan Vergano, “Underfunding doomed Russian Mars probe, lawyer says,” USA Today, 8 January 2012, online: www.usatoday.com/ tech/science/space/story/2012-01-08/russian-mars-probe/52457434/1.
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50 Data compiled by Nicholas Johnson from the Space Track public satellite catalog maintained by the U.S. military, online: http://space-track.org. 51 Mike Wall, “Nearly 15 tons of failed Russian Mars probe could slam into Earth Jan. 15,” Christian Science Monitor, 6 January 2012, online: www.csmonitor.com/Science/2012/0106/Nearly-15-tons- of-failed-Russian-Mars-probe-could-slam-into-Earth-Jan.-15. 52 Johnson. 53 Tariq Malik, “Space Junk reat Forces Space Station Crew to Take Shelter,” SPACE.com, 5 April 2011, online: www.space.com/11300-space-junk-station-astronauts-shelter.html. 54 Ibid. 55 Matt Peckham, “Astronauts Safe from Space Debris reat to International Space Station,” Time, 5 April 2011, online: http://techland.time.com/2011/04/05/crew-seeks-cover-as-space- debris-threatens-international-space-station. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Johnson. 59 Margaret Munro, “Orbital junk threatens future of space travel according to NASA,” National Post, 1 January 2012, online: http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/01/orbital-junk-threatens-future-of- space-travel-acording-to-nasa. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Peter Rakobowchuk, “Canadian satellites facing increased threats from space debris,” Winnipeg Free Press, 21 January 2012, online: www.winnipegfreepress.com/arts-and-life/life/sci_tech/canadian- satellites-facing-increased-threats-from-space-debris-137814088.html. 63 Johnson. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, “ERS-2 Maneuvered into Shorter-lived Disposal Orbit,” October 2011, at 2. 67 ESA, “ESA – ESA Spacecraft Operations – ERS-2 Operations,” 8 September 2011, online: www.esa.int/esaMI/Operations/SEMM1Z8L6VE_0.html. 68 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, October 2011. 69 “Report of the Scienti c and Technical Subcommittee on its forty-fourth session,” at 43-45. 70 China’s Space Activities in 2011, Xinhua, 29 December 2011, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/china/2011-12/29/c_131333479.htm, at 4. 71 Ibid., at 6. 72 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, “TDRS and GOES Spacecraft Sent to Graveyard Orbits,” January 2012, at 3. 73 Ibid. 74 Stephen Clark, “Tracking satellite retired after 22 years of service,” Space ight Now, 25 December 2011, online: http://space ightnow.com/news/n1112/25tdrs4. 75 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, January 2012. 76 NOAA News, “NOAA activates GOES-15 satellite; deactivates GOES-11 after nearly 12 years in orbit,” 6 December 2011, online: www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20111206_goessatellite. html. 77 Johnson. 78 Ibid. 79 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, January 2012, at 4. 80 Ibid.
164 Endnotes
81 Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA’s Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs, 2011, at vii. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid., at 1. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid., at 98. 88 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, “14th NASA/DoD Orbital Debris Working Group Meeting,” April 2011, at 2. 89 Orbital Debris Quarterly News, “DoD-NASA Orbital Debris Removal Workshop,” October 2011, at 3. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 China’s Space Activities in 2011. 94 Ibid. 95 Towards Long-term Sustainability of Space Activities: Overcoming the Challenges of Space Debris, Report of the May 8-9, 2009 and Apr. 29-30, 2010 International Interdisciplinary Congress on Space Debris, McGill Institute of Air and Space Law, Montreal, Canada and Cologne, Germany, the McGill Institute of Air and Space Law and the Cologne University Institute of Air and Space Law, 2011. 96 Ibid., at 7. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., at 38. 99 Ibid., at 38-40. 100 Marc Boucher, “MDA Signs Intelsat as Anchor Tenant for On-Orbit Servicing,” SpaceRef Canada, 15 March 2011, online: http://spaceref.ca/commercial-space/mda/mda-signs-anchor- tenant-for-on-orbit-servicing-service.html; Peter de Selding, “Intelsat Signs Up for MDA’s Satellite Refueling Service,” Space News, 18 March 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_ telecom/110318intelsat-signs-for-mdas-satellite-refueling-service.html. 101 Joel Spark, “MDA, Intelsat cancel on-orbit servicing deal,” Space Safety Magazine, 20 January 2012, online: www.spacesafetymagazine.com/2012/01/20/mda-intelsat-cancel-on-orbit-servicing-deal. 102 DARPA, “Phoenix,” online: www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/Programs/Phoenix.aspx. 103 SPACE.com, “DARPA Wants to Recycle Space Junk Into New Satellites,” 20 October 2011, online: www.space.com/13339-darpa-space-junk-recycling-phoenix-satellites.html. 104 Tim Bonds et al., Employing Commercial Satellite Communications: Wideband Investment Options for DoD, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000, at 17. 105 Michael Calabrese and J.H. Snider, “Up in the Air,” Atlantic Monthly, September 2003, at 46-47; Albert “Buzz” Merill and Marsha Weiskopf, “Critical Issues in Spectrum Management for Defense Space Systems,” Crosslink, Winter 2002, at 14-19, online: www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/ winter2002/02.html. 106 Merill and Weiskopf, at 18. 107 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union: Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, International Telecommunication Union, Marrakesh, 2002. For an excellent description of the role of ITU, see Francis Lyall, “Communications Regulations: e Role of the International Telecommunication Union,” 3 Journal of Law and Technology, 1997, online: www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1997_3/lyall. 108 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Art. 45, para. 197.
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109 M.Y.S. Prasad, “Space-Based Telecommunications including Tele-Education & Telemedicine– Implications to the Area of Space Law,” in Proceedings of the Space Law Conference 2005: Bringing Space Bene ts to the Asian Region, Bangalore, India, 26-29 June 2005. 110 eresa Hitchens, Future Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Course, Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, September 2004, at 49. 111 U.S. DoD, “DoD Moves Forward with Next Steps for Spectrum Relocation,” 16 July 2007, online: www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11131. 112 Union of Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Quick Facts,” 1 April 2012, online: www.ucsusa.org/ nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html. 113 Joel D. Scheraga, “Establishing Property Rights in Outer Space,” 6 Cato Journal, 1987, at 891. 114 Ibid. 115 Col. John E. Hyten, USAF, “A Sea of Peace or a eater of War? Dealing with the Inevitable Con ict in Space,” 16 Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2002, at 90, note 11. Current U.S. FCC policies require U.S. direct broadcast satellites to be spaced nine degrees apart, placing greater constraints on the availability of orbital slots in GEO; see FCC, “DBS Spacing,” online: www.fcc. gov/ib/sd/dbs_spacing. 116 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Art. 33, para. 2. 117 Ram Jakhu, “Legal Issues of Satellite Telecommunications, the Geostationary Orbit, and Space Debris,” 5(2) Astropolitics, 2007, at 182. 118 ITU, Implementation of cost recovery for satellite network lings, Document C08/103-E, 21 November 2008, Annex, at 7-8, online: www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/space/Documents/Decision%20 482(C2008)-E.pdf. 119 Jakhu, at 182-183. 120 Graham Warwick, “Amid Jamming Worries, Tests for GPS Receivers,” Aviation Week, 15 April 2011, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/ awst/2011/04/11/AW_04_11_2011_p26-307552.xml. 121 Andrew M. Seybold, “Seybold’s Take: Why LightSquared’s proposed system will interfere with GPS,” Fierce Wireless, 14 June 2011, online: www. ercewireless.com/story/seybolds-take-why- lightsquareds-proposed-system-will-interfere-gps/2011-06-14. 122 Ibid. 123 Turner Brinton, “Reports: LightSquared Plan Poses Unacceptable Risk to GPS Service,” Space News, 10 June 2011. 124 Warwick. 125 Ibid. 126 “Recommendation of LightSquared Subsidiary LLC,” Testimony, 8 September 2011. 127 Ibid. 128 Coalition to Save our GPS, “House Committee Acts to Halt Any FCC Expenditures Related to LightSquared Proposal Until Harmful GPS Interference Issues Resolved,” Press Release, 23 June 2011, online: www. ercegovernmentit.com/press-releases/house-committee-acts-halt-any-fcc- expenditures-related-lightsquared-proposa. 129 Matthew Lasar, “LightSquared to FCC: it’s our spectrum, interference is GPS industry’s problem,” Ars Technica, 21 December 2011, online: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/12/ lightsquared-to-fcc-its-our-spectrum-interference-is-gps-industrys-problem.ars. 130 “Comments of LightSquared Subsidiary LLC,” Before the Federal Communications Commission in the matter of LightSquared Technical Working Group Report and LightSquared Subsidiary LLC Request for Modi cation of its Authority for an Ancillary Terrestrial Component, 1 August 2011. 131 Debra Werner, “New LightSquared Plan Fails to Ease GPS Interference Worries,” Space News, 9 September 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110909-lightsquared-interference- worries.html. 132 Warren Ferster, “Revised LightSquared Plan Still Interferes with GPS,” Space News, 13 January 2012, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/120113-lightsquared-plan-interferes.html.
166 Endnotes
133 Warren Ferster, “FCC To Pull LightSquared License,” Space News, 15 February 2012, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/120215-fcc-pull-lightsquared-license.html. 134 NASA, “What is a PHA,” NASA Near Earth Object Program, online: http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/ groups.html. 135 NASA, “Near-Earth Asteroid Discovery Statistics,” NASA Near Earth Object Program, online: http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/stats. 136 Russell Schweickart, “ e Asteroid Impact reat: Decisions Upcoming,” presentation to the 37th COSPAR Scienti c Assembly, Montreal, Quebec, July 2008. 137 Planetary Defense Conference: Protecting Earth from Asteroids, European Space Agency, 20 December 2011, online: www.pdc2011.org. 138 “Key Points and Recommendations from the 2011 IAA Planetary Defense Conference,” Report from 2nd annual IAA Planetary Defense Conference held in Bucharest, Romania, 9-12 May 2011, online: www.congrex.nl/11C03/pages/standaard/PDC_2011_White_Paper.pdf. 139 Ibid, 1-4. 140 Ibid, 4-5. 141 A.W. Harris et al, A Global Approach to Near-Earth Object Impact reat Mitigation, 2011, online: http://elib.dlr.de/70019/1/NEOShield_paper_pdc11.pdf. 142 Ibid. 143 CSA, “CSA – NEOSSat,” 31 December 2011, online: www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/neossat. 144 Microsat Systems Canada Inc., “MSCI – Flight Heritage – NEOSSat (Near-Earth Object Surveillance Satellite),” 2012, online: www.mscinc.ca/heritage/neossat.html. 145 Ibid. 146 CSA. 147 Microsat Systems Canada Inc. 148 CSA. 149 Ibid. 150 NASA, “NASA Space Telescope Finds Fewer Asteroids Near Earth,” Press Release, 29 September 2011, online: www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/WISE/news/wise20110929.html. 151 Je rey Kluger, “Duck! e Asteroids Are Coming – ough Fewer than We Feared,” Time, 3 October 2011, online: www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2095882,00.html?iid= pf-main-mostpop1. 152 NASA, “NEO Discovery Statistics,” NASA Near Earth Object Program, online: http://neo.jpl.nasa. gov/stats. 153 Ibid. 154 NASA, 29 September 2011. 155 Ibid. 156 Kluger. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 “Key Points and Recommendations from the 2011 IAA Planetary Defense Conference,” at 4. 160 Secure World Foundation, “Exchange of Views Statement,” Presented to the Scienti c and Technical Subcommittee, UNCOPUOS, Vienna, Austria, February 2012, online: http://swfound.org/ media/58990/STSC_2012_Statement.pdf.
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Chapter Two Endnotes 1 Improving Our Vision: Approaches for Shared Space Situational Awareness, Report of the Sept. 15-16, 2006 Conference, e Antlers Hotel, Colorado Springs, CO, e World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information and e US Air Force Academy’s Center for Defense and Space Studies, 2007, at 9. 2 Ibid. 3 Federation of American Scientists, “Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC),” online: www.fas.org/ nuke/control/jdec/index.html. 4 Launched in 1996, the MSX satellite has reached its intended lifespan. For system details see Grant H. Stokes et al., “ e Space-Based Visible Program,” 11 Lincoln Laboratory Journal, 1998, online: www.ll.mit.edu/ST/sbv/sbv.pdf. 5 US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, November 2003, at D-10, online: www.af.mil/library/ posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf. 6 Aviation Week and Space Technology, “USAF boosts space situational awareness,” 3 July 2009, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/AWARE070309.xml&headline= USAF+Boosts+Space+Situational+Awareness&channel=defense. 7 Amy Butler, “USAF Expects SBSS Launch by Early 2009,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9 April 2008, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel. jsp?channel=defense&id=news/SBSS040908.xml. 8 Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3 July 2009. 9 Peterson Air Force Base, “Fact Sheet,” 20th Space Control Squadron, Detachment 1, online: www.peterson.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4729. 10 John Matson, “U.S. Taking Initial Steps to Grapple with Space Debris Problem,” Scienti c American, 31 August 2011, online: www.scienti camerican.com/article.cfm?id=orbital-debris- space-fence. 11 Ibid. 12 Adapted from Secure World Foundation, “Space Situational Awareness Fact Sheet,” 17 June 2009, online: www.secureworldfoundation.org/siteadmin/images/ les/ le_359.pdf. 13 Space-trace.org, 2012, online: www.space-track.org. 14 Aviation Week and Space Technology, “Bureaucracy reatens Sat Protection Project,” 4 April 2008. 15 Maloney, Lt Col Dave, “Public Law 108-136, Section 913, 10 U.S.C. §2274 (i) –Data Support,” Space Surveillance Support to Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) Pilot Program, 20 October 2004, online: http://celestrak.com/NORAD/elements/notices/Space_Surveillance_Support_to_ CFE_Pilot_Program_V07.pdf. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 U.S. DoD, “Contracts,” Press Release, 26 January 2011, online: www.defense.gov/contracts/ contract.aspx?contractid=4457. 19 Linda Haines and Phillip Phu, “Space Fence PDR Concept Development Phase,” Presentation given at Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies Conference, Maui, HI, 13-16 September 2011, online: www.amostech.com/TechnicalPapers/2011/SSA/PHU.pdf. 20 John Matson, “U.S. Taking Initial Steps to Grapple with Space Debris Problem,” Scienti c American, 31 August 2011, online: www.scienti camerican.com/article.cfm?id=orbital-debris- space-fence. 21 Ibid. 22 Haines and Phu. 23 Matson. 24 Ibid. 25 Northrup Grumman, “Space Tracking and Surveillance System Demonstration Satellites, Built by Northrup Grumman, Complete Mission Objectives Ahead of Schedule,” News Release, 9 November 2011, online: www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=237741. 26 Ibid.
168 Endnotes
27 Ibid. 28 MDA, “Missile Defense Agency Space Tracking and Surveillance System Advanced Technology Risk Reduction Satellite transfers to Air Force Space Command,” News Release, 8 November 2010, online: www.mda.mil/news/10news0017.html. 29 DARPA, “Space Surveillance Telescope (SST),” online: www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/ Programs/Space_Surveillance_Telescope_%28SST%29.aspx. 30 Ibid. 31 Gwyneth Dickey Zakaib, “Telescope will track space junk,” Nature, 22 April 2011, online: www.nature.com/news/2011/110422/full/news.2011.254.html?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20110426. 32 Ibid.; Amar Toor, “DARPA’s new Space Surveillance telescope will keep our satellites safe from interstellar debris,” engadget, 26 April 2011, online: www.engadget.com/2011/04/26/darpas- new-space-surveillance-telescope-will-keep-our-satellite. 33 Zakaib. 34 Jane’s Space Directory, “ e SSS Space Surveillance System,” 23 December 2003; Improving Our Vision: Approaches for Shared Space Situational Awareness, report on conference held 15-16 September 2006, Center for Defense Information, at 10, online: www.cdi.org/PDFs/ SSAConference_screen.pdf. 35 Federation of American Scientists, Sourcebook on the Okno, Krona and Krona-N Space Surveillance Sites, Version of 28 September 2006, online: www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/okno.pdf. 36 Russianforces.org, “Space surveillance,” online: http://russianforces.org/sprn. 37 Jane’s Space Directory, 23 December 2003. 38 Ibid. 39 Pavel Podvig, “Strategic Defense,” Russian Strategic Forces, May 2006, online: http://russianforces.org/eng/defense. 40 Pavel Podvig, “Early warning–Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Russianforces.org, 9 February 2009, online: www.russianforces.org/sprn. 41 France-Israel Teamwork in Science, “Imminent Delivery of the French Surveillance System,” 75 France ST Special Reports, 24 August 2005, online: www. tscience.org/media/upload/ FranceST_075.pdf; Onera, “Graves Le système français de surveillance de l’espace,” 4 May 2006, online: www.onera.fr/dprs/graves/index.php; Federation of American Scientists, A GRAVES Sourcebook, 29 October 2006, online: www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/graves.pdf. 42 Jacques Bouchard as quoted in France-Israel Teamwork in Science, 24 August 2005. 43 Global Security, “German Space Agencies,” 27 April 2005, online: www.globalsecurity.org/space/ world/germany/agency.htm#ref21; W. Flury, “Agenda Item 8: Space Debris, European Space Agency,” Presentation to the 41st session of UN Scienti c and Technical Subcommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), 16-27 February 2004 at 7, online: www.oosa. unvienna.org/COPUOS/stsc/2004/presentations/ ury2.ppt. 44 Peter B. de Selding, “Europe Keeping Increasingly Capable Eye on Space Debris,” Space News, 21 April 2010, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/100421-europe-eye-orbital-debris.html. 45 Ibid. 46 European Space Agency, “Space debris: analysis and prediction,” 20 February 2009, online: www.esa.int/esaMI/Space_Debris/SEMXP0WPXPF_0.html. 47 W. Flury, A. Massart, T. Schildknecht, U. Hugentobler, J. Kuusela, and Z. Sodnik, Searching for Small Debris in the Geostationary Ring – Discoveries with the Zeiss 1-metre Telescope, 104 ESA Bulletin, November 2000, online: www.esa.int/esapub/bulletin/bullet104/ ury104.pdf. 48 European Space Agency, “Space debris: scanning and observing,” 19 February 2009, online: www.esa.int/SPECIALS/Space_Debris/SEMD31WPXPF_0.html. 49 Heiner Klinkrad, “Monitoring Space–E orts Made by European Countries,” presented at the International Colloquium on Europe and Space Debris, sponsored by the Académie National de l’Air et de l’Espace, Toulouse, France, 27-28 November 2002, online: www.fas.org/spp/military/ program/track/klinkrad.pdf. 50 Xinhua, “China Reports Progress in Space Debris Research,” 14 August 2003, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-08/14/content_1113433.htm.
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51 China Daily, “Alarm System Warns of Space Debris,” 11 August 2003. 52 People’s Daily, “China First Space Debris Monitoring Center Settles PMO,” 11 March 2005; People’s Daily, “CAS Sets up the First Space Debris Monitoring Center in China,” 16 March 2005. 53 Global Security, “Chinese Space Facilities,” 19 October 2005, online: www.globalsecurity.org/ space/world/china/facility.htm. 54 Japan Times, “Space Debris Radar Station Operational,” 9 April 2004. 55 IADC Observation Campaigns, Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee presentation to 43rd Session of COPUOS Science and Technology Sub-Committee, February 2006, online: www.iadc-online.org/docs_pub/UN_Presentation_2006_ nal.pdf. 56 Marc Boucher, “MDA to Provide Operations and Maintenance Support for DND Sapphire Satellite System,” Spaceref Canada, 29 March 2011, online: http://spaceref.ca/commercial-space/ mda/mda-to-provide-operations-and-maintenance-support-for-dnd-sapphire-satellite-system.html. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 ESA, “European Space Surveillance Conference,” Congrex, 19 July 2011, online: www.congrex.nl/11c01proceedings. 60 Ibid. 61 ESA, “Scanning the skies for debris hazards,” 6 June 2011, online: www.esa.int/esaMI/ SSA/SEM61NJ4LOG_0.html. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 ESA, “Warsaw conference to spotlight Space Situational Awareness,” 8 September 2011, online: www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/SEMB3CJ37SG_0.html. 66 Ibid. 67 Patrice Brudieu, “Current French Policy and Perspectives for Space Sustainability,” Space Sustainability Conference, ISU, Strasbourg, France, 21-23 February 2012. 68 ESA, “Space debris measurements,” 19 February 2009, online: www.esa.int/esaMI/Space_Debris/ SEMD31WPXPF_2.html. 69 ESA, “ESA bulletin: space for Europe,” August 2011, at 32, online: http://esamultimedia.esa.int/ multimedia/publications/ESA-Bulletin-147/page ip.html. 70 Ibid., at 32-33. 71 Ibid., at 34. 72 Ibid., at 36. 73 China’s Space Activities in 2011, Xinhua, 29 December 2011, at 6, online: http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/china/2011-12/29/c_131333479.htm. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 SDA, “Space Data Center Attains Full Operational Capability Status,” Press Release, 20 September 2011, online: www.space-data.org/sda/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/04/041311- SpaceDataCenter-FullOperationalCapability.pdf. 77 Ibid. 78 SDA, “Eutelsat Joins Space Data Association as Executive Member,” Press Release, 29 June 2011, online: www.space-data.org/sda/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/06/eutelsat-1.pdf. 79 Ibid. 80 Je rey Hill, “Eutelsat Joins Space Data Association,” Satellite TODAY, 30 June 2011, online: www.satellitetoday.com/st/headlines/Eutelsat-Joins-Space-Data-Association_37037.html. 81 SDA, 29 June 2011. 82 Michael Williams, “Conjunction Warnings and Space Weather at EUMETSAT,” Presentation given at SSA Seminar in Warsaw, Poland, 29 September 2011, online: http://ssawarsaw.pl/ les/pdf/ SSAwarsaw_session3_EUMETSAT.pdf.
170 Endnotes
83 Je rey Hill, “MDA to Operate, Maintain Canadian Military Space Surveillance System,” Satellite TODAY, 30 March 2011, online: www.satellitetoday.com/military/headlines/MDA-to-Operate- Maintain-Canadian-Military-Space-Surveillance-System_36466.html. 84 MDA, “MDA to provide operations and maintenance support to DND’s Canadian Space Surveillance System,” Press Release, 28 March 2011, online: www.mdafederal.com/press/mda-to- provide-operations-and-maintenance-support-to-dnds-canadian-space-surveillance-system. 85 Ibid. 86 Canadian Press, “Canada used space launch to punish Russia for Georgia invasion, cable suggests,” iPolitics, 16 October 2011, online: www.ipolitics.ca/2011/10/16/canada-tried-to-punish-russia-for- georgia-invasion-cable-suggests. 87 Microsat Systems Canada Inc., “MSCI – Flight Heritage – NEOSSat (Near-Earth Object Surveillance Satellite),” 2012, online: www.mscinc.ca/heritage/neossat.html. 88 Ibid. 89 CSA. 90 Tenerife Magazine “Councils should Ignore the Law & an Earth Bound Asteroid in Tenerife News of the Week,” 18 October 2011, online: www.tenerifemagazine.com/featured/councils-ignore-law- earth-bound-asteroid-tenerife-news-week.htm. 91 ESA, “Amateur skywatchers help space hazards team,” 12 October 2011, online: http://www.esa.int/esaMI/SSA/SEMURW6UXSG_0.html. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Ted Molczan, “X-37B OTV 2-1 found by Greg Roberts,” SeeSat-L, 9 March 2011, online: http://satobs.org/seesat/Mar-2011/0187.html. 95 U.S. Strategic Command, “Commercial & Foreign Entities Pilot Program Transitions to U.S. Strategic Command,” 4 January 2010, online: www.stratcom.mil/news/2010/137/Commercial_ Foreign_Entities_Pilot_Program_Transitions_to_US_Strategic_Command. 96 Amy Butler, “New technologies under development to improve satellite-crash predictions,” Aviation Week Science and Technology, 6 July 2009, at 18. 97 R. Kehler, Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 21 April 2010, online: http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/SF042110/Kehler_Testimony042110. pdf. 98 Duane Bird, Major, USAF, “Sharing space situational awareness data,” online: www.dtic.mil/ cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA531775. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Patrice Brudieu, “Current French Policy and Perspectives for Space Sustainability,” Space Sustainability Conference, ISU, Strasbourg, France, 21-23 February 2012. 102 C. Aranaga, “U.S., Russia to Share Warning Data on Missile, Space Launches,” Embassy of the U.S., Brussels, Belgium,, 22 September 2009, online: www.uspolicy.be/headline/us-russia-share- warning-data-missile-space-launches. 103 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Fifty-third Session, 9-18 June 2010, online: www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/gadocs/A_65_20E.pdf. 104 Peter B. de Selding, “Satellite Operators Solicit Bids to Create Orbital Database,” Space News, 18 November 2009, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/091118-satellite- rms-moving- ahead-orbital-database.html. 105 Space Data Association, “SDA Overview,” 2012, online: www.space-data.org/sda/about/ sda-overview. 106 Olga Zakutnyaya, “Phobos mission – the story must go on,” e Voice of Russia, 16 January 2012, online: http://english.ruvr.ru/2012/01/16/63950672.html. 107 Ibid. 108 Dan Vergano, “Russia’s Phobos-Grunt probe heads for ery nale,” USA Today, 8 January 2012, online: www.usatoday.com/tech/science/columnist/vergano/story/2012-01-07/russian-mars- probe/52419376/1. 171 Space Security Index 2012
109 Peter B. de Selding and Dan Leone, “ESA Abandons E ort to Contact Russia’s Stranded Mars Probe,” Space News, 2 December 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/111202-esa- abandons-mars-probe.html. 110 Zakutnyaya. 111 Agence-France Presse, “US, France agree to share space data,” 8 February 2011, online: www.spacedaily.com/reports/US_France_agree_to_share_space_data_999.html. 112 Agence-France Presse, “US, France to sign accord on tracking space debris,” 7 February 2011, online: www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i1kZsPIpzSF0KIcer_ZZ26XtAu7g?docId =CNG.421844de3e38acde175203b0eacf6239.501. 113 Agence France Press, 8 February 2011. 114 Ibid. 115 “Space Situational Awareness Partnership: Statement of Principles,” Agreement between Canadian Department of National Defence /Canadian Forces – United States Department of Defense, 10 March 2011. 116 Ibid. 117 Agence-France Press, 7 February 2011. 118 Ti any Chow, “Space Situational Awareness Sharing Program: An SWF Issue Brief,” 22 September 2011, online: http://swfound.org/media/6009/swf%20issue%20brief%20-%20ssa%20sharing%20 program%20with%20execsum%20web%20lctclc.pdf. 119 Courtland B. McLeod, “Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Sharing,” Presentation given to UNCOPUOS Scienti c and Technical Committee meeting in Vienna, Austria, 6-17 February 2012, online: http://unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2012/tech-40E.pdf. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Warren Ferster, “Stratcom Could Negotiate Data Sharing Agreements,” Space News, 19 July 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/110719-stratcom-interntional-data-sharing.html; McLeod. 123 McLeod. 124 Ibid. 125 Peter de Selding, “China Outlines Space Priorities: Debris Mitigation, New Rockets, Space News, 29 December 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/111229-china-outlines-priorities.html. 126 Ibid.
Chapter Three Endnotes 1 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, 59 Stat. 1031, 145 U.K.T.S. 805, 24 U.S.T. 2225, T.I.A.S. No. 7739. 2 United Nations General Assembly, Historical Summary on the Consideration of the Question on the De nition and Delimitation of Outer Space, Report of the Secretariat, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/AC.105/769, 18 January 2002. 3 Frans von der Dunk, “ e Sky is the Limit–But Where Does It End?” Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 2006 at 84-94. 4 Ivan A. Vlasic, “ e Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” in Bupendra Jasani, ed., Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of De nition for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (London: Taylor and Francis, 1991). 5 e U.S. interpretation of “peaceful” as synonymous with “non-aggressive” was a logical extension of the U.S. e ort to gain international recognition of the permissibility of reconnaissance satellites, while simultaneously discouraging military space activities that threatened these assets—two major goals of U.S. policy during the period predating the Outer Space Treaty (1957-1967). See Paul B. Stares, e Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-84 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), at 59-71. 6 Elizabeth Waldrop, “Weaponization of Outer Space: U.S. National Policy,” High Frontier, Winter 2005, at 37, online: www.law.umich.edu/curriculum/workshops/governance/WkshpPaper2006_ Waldrop.pdf.
172 Endnotes
7 Ram Jakhu, “Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public Interest in Outer Space,” 32 Journal of Space Law, 2006, at 41. 8 SpaceWar.com, “China Says Anti Satellite Test Did Not Break Rules,” 12 February 2007, online: www.spacewar.com/reports/China_Says_Anti_Satellite_Test_Did_Not_Break_Rules_999.html. 9 U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Succeeds in Intercepting Non-Functioning Satellite,” 20 February 2008, online: www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11704. 10 Lucy Stojak, “Key Concepts in Space Arms Control,” Report to Foreign A airs Canada, February 2005, at 11. 11 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Article II; convention opened for signature 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972. 12 Peter Haanappel, “Enforcing the Liability Convention: Ensuring the Binding Force of the Award of Claims Commission,” in Marietta Benko and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, eds., Space Law: Current problems and perspectives for future regulation (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2005), at 115. 13 United Nations Oce for Outer Space A airs, Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1975, online: www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SORegister/index.html. 14 United Nations Oce for Outer Space A airs, “Treaty Signatures,” 2006, online: www.unoosa.org/ oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do. 15 Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Niklas Hedman, “ e results of the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee Working Group on ‘Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects’ 2005–2007,” International Astronautical Congress, 2007, at 3. 16 United Nations Oce for Outer Space A airs, “Treaty Signatures,” online: http://www.oosa. unvienna.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do 17 COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, Practice of States and international organizations in registering space objects: Working paper submitted by the Chairman of the Working Group on the Practice of States and International Organizations in Registering Space Objects, 46th Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.266, 2007; COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, Report of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on its Forty-Sixth Session held in Vienna from 26th March to 5th April 2007, 46th Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.105/891, 2007, at 20; United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 62nd Sess., Supp. No. 20, UN Doc. A/62/20. 2007 at 30-31; United Nations General Assembly, Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects, A/RES/62/101, 62nd Sess., 2007. 18 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 5 December 1979, 1363 UNTS 3, 18 ILM 1434 (hereafter Moon Agreement) (entered into force 11 July 1984), Article 3(4). 19 Ibid. 20 Given the usefulness of some space technologies in the development of missiles, MTCR export controls are perceived by some countries, notably those outside the regime, as a restrictive cartel impeding access to space. 21 See Missile Technology Control Regime Website, 2010, online: www.mtcr.info/english/index.html. 22 Missile Technology Control Regime, “Objectives of the MTCR,” 2010, online: www.mtcr.info/ english/objectives.html. 23 Came into e ect 25 November 2002. 24 Michel Bourbonnière, “LOAC and the Neutralization of Satellites or IUS in Bello Satellites,” International Security Research and Outreach Programme Report, Department of Foreign A airs and International Trade Canada, May 2003, at 17-23. 25 Ambassador omas Graham Jr., “ e Law and the Military Uses of Outer Space,” Speech delivered at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1 May 2003, online: www.eisenhowerinstitute. org/programs/globalpartnerships/fos/newfrontier/grahambrie ng.htm. 26 Dr. Peter Van Fenema, interview by author, McGill University, Montreal, 25 February 2005. 27 United Nations General Assembly, “Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the ird United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,”
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A/59/174, 23 July 2004; United Nations, “Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development Adopted by UNISPACE III, as it Concludes Two-Week Session,” UNISPACE III Conference, 30 July 1999, online: www.un.org/events/unispace3. 28 Detlev Wolter, Common Security in Outer Space and International Law (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2005). 29 Ibid. 30 Conference on Disarmament, “Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space,” CD/1645, 6 June 2001. 31 United Nations General Assembly, “Transparency and con dence-building measures in outer space activities,” A/Res/60/66, 6 January 2006, online: http://disarmament.un.org/vote.nsf/ 5063335733dce716852570c200516189/479505242538e0d5852570a1004a6bd8/ $FILE/60-66.pdf. 32 Union of Concerned Scientists, “A Treaty Limiting Anti-Satellite Weapons,” May 1983, online: www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/page.cfm?pageID=1153. 33 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security, Conference Report, Geneva, 30-31 March 2006. 34 Henry L. Stimson Center. Model Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Incidents and Dangerous Military Practices in Outer Space, 2004, online: www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/codeofconduct.pdf. 35 Henry L. Stimson Center, “Endorsements,” online: www.stimson.org/space/?SN=WS200701191170. e concept of a Code of Conduct has been endorsed by representatives from U.S. Strategic Command, the EU, Canada, France, Intelsat, the U.S. Congress, as well as by publications including e Economist, Space News, and Aviation Week and Space Technology. 36 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities,” 6 December 2011, online: www.pca-cpa.org/upload/ les/Outer%20Space%20 Rules.pdf. 37 Hogan Lovells, “New Rules Launched to Aid the Resolution of Outer Space Disputes,” 13 December 2011,online: http://m.hoganlovells.com/new-rules-launched-to-aid-the-resolution- of-outer-space-disputes-12-13-2011. 38 Julian Hale, “EU Urges Nations to Join Space Code of Conduct,” Defense News, 13 September 2011, online: www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7666771&c=EUR. 39 Michael Listner, “ EU Code of Conduct: Commentary on Indian Concerns and their E ects,” Space Review, 28 November 2011, online: www.thespacereview.com/article/1977/1. 40 Observer Research Foundation, “Code of Conduct in Space: India Should Lead the Way,” 31 May 2011, online: www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/report/ReportDetail.html?cmaid =23591&mmacmaid=23592. 41 Ibid. 42 Eli Lake, “Republicans Wary of EU Code for Space Activity,” Washington Times, 3 February 2011, online: www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/republicans-wary-of-eu-code-for-space- activity. 43 Je Abramson and Nik Gebben, “US Moves Forward on Space Policy,” Arms Control Association, March 2011, online: www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_03/space. 44 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” Press Statement by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, 17 January 2012, online: www.state.gov/ secretary/rm/2012/01/180969.htm. 45 International Institute of Space Commerce, Assessing the Support for the Space Assets Protocol to the UNIDROIT Cape Town Convention, Study Report, 16 December 2009, online: www.iisc.im/ documents/IISC_-_09_-_P.12.1%5B2%5D_1.pdf. 46 Letter to Martin Stanford, Deputy Secretary General, UNIDROIT, Spacepolicyonline, 9 December 2011, online: www.spacepolicyonline.com/pages/images/stories/Satellite_Industry_Letter_to_ Unidroit,_9_Dec_2011_%28rev%29.pdf. 47 Peter B. de Selding, “Talks, Mediation Fail to Settle Iran-France Frequency Dispute,” Space News, 15 July 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110715-talks-fail-settle-iran-france- dispute.html. 174 Endnotes
48 Peter B. de Selding, “Iran’s Claims about Satellite Service Try International Regulatory Regime,” Space News, 8 April 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110408-iran-claims-sat- regulatory-regime.html. 49 Ibid. 50 Peter B. de Selding, “ITU Board Fails to Resolve Dispute over Iranian Service,” Space News 4 November 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/111104-itu-fails-dispute-iranian- service.html. 51 Ibid. 52 Je rey Hill, “Bizarre Zohreh-2 Dispute Headed to ITU Board of Telecom Authorities,” Satellite TODAY, 8 November 2011, online: www.satellitetoday.com/twitter/37815.html. 53 De Selding, 4 November 2011. 54 Ibid. 55 Chris Forrester, “Eutelsat acts to protect new orbital slot,” Advanced Television, 16 May 2011, online: http://advanced-television.com/index.php/2011/05/16/eutelsat-acts-to-protect-new-orbital- slot. 56 Peter B. de Selding, “Eutelsat Leases Chinese Satellite at 11th Hour to Protect Orbital Slot,” Space News, 13 May 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110513-eutelsat-leases-sat- protect-slot.html. 57 David Kaminski-Morrow, “ICAO to co-operate to stop North Korean GPS jamming,” Flightglobal, 1 April 2011, online: www. ightglobal.com/news/articles/icao-to-co-operate-to-stop-north-korean- gps-jamming-355039. 58 Shin Hae-in, “ICAO help sought over N.K. jamming,” e Korea Herald, 31 March 2011, online: www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20110331000912. 59 Broadcasting Board of Governors, “International Broadcasters Call For Action Over Jamming,” Press Release, London, UK, 7 December 2011. 60 Robert Briel, “International broadcasters call for action over jamming,” Broadband TV News, 9 December 2011, online: www.broadbandtvnews.com/2011/12/09/international-broadcasters- call-for-action-over-jamming. 61 Ibid. 62 Broadcasting Board of Governors. 63 Peter B. de Selding, “Broadcasters Call for ITU Action on Satellite Jamming,” Space News 8 December 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/111209-broadcasters-itu-sat- jamming.html. 64 National Space Policy of the United States of America, 28 June 2010, online: www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/default/ les/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf . 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Itar-Tass, “Russia May Cooperate with US in Space Programs,” 21 January 2004. 68 ESA Permanent Mission in Russia, “Cooperation with Russia,” 2009, online: www.esa.int/ SPECIALS/ESA_Permanent_Mission_in_Russia/index.html . 69 Space.com, “Russia, China Discuss Joint Space Projects,” 9 November 2006, online: www.space. com/news/061109_russia_china_missions.html; Vinay Shukla, “Putin Clears Space Pact with India,” Redi India Abroad, 6 November 2006, online: www.redi .com/news/2006/nov/ 06russia.htm. 70 Susan Eisenhower, omas Graham Jr. & Robert J. Lawson, Space Security 2003 (Toronto: Northview Press, 2004), at 37. 71 RIA Novosti, “Russia to remain Leading Space Power – Head of Roscosmos,” 19 August 2005. 72 China Daily, “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” 30 December 2011, online: www.chinadaily.com. cn/cndy/2011-12/30/content_14354558.htm.
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73 People’s Daily Online, “China’s Space Activities,” 2000, online: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ features/spacepaper/spacepaper.html. 74 Indian Space Research Organisation, “International Cooperation,” 2008, online: www.isro.org/ scripts/internationalcooperations.aspx. 75 David Long, “ e Evolution and Shape of European Space Policy,” Report to Foreign A airs Canada, May 2004, at 18. 76 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Announces the National Security Space Strategy,” News release, 4 February 2011, online: www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14245. 77 Gregory Schulte, “A new strategy for new challenges in space” Remarks to the National Space Symposium by Ambassador Gregory Schulte, 13 April 2011, www.defense.gov/home/ features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/Ambassador%20Gregory%20Schulte%20Speech%20at%20the %2027th%20National%20Space%20Symposium.pdf. 78 Gregory Schulte, “China and the New International Security Space Strategy,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission, 11 May 2011, online: www.defense.gov/ home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/Schulte_USCC_Final.pdf. 79 Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “ e National Security Space Strategy: Implications for the Department of Defense,” Transcript of the Feb. 16, 2011 discussion, 2011, at 15, online: http://csis.org/ les/attachments/110216_spacestrategy_transcript.pdf. 80 Je Abramson and Nik Gebben, “US Moves Forward on Space Policy,” Arms Control Association, March 2011, online: www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_03/space. 81 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Announces the National Security Space Strategy,” News Release, 4 February 2011, online: www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14245. 82 China Daily, “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” 30 December 2011, online: www.chinadaily.com. cn/cndy/2011-12/30/content_14354558.htm. 83 “Towards a Space Strategy for the European Union that Bene ts its Citizens,” COM(2011) 152 nal Communication from the Commission to the Council, e European Parliament, e European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 4.April 2011. 84 Centrum für Europäische Politik, “EU Communication EU Space Strategy,” CEP Policy Brief, 18 July 2011, online: www.cep.eu/ leadmin/user_upload/Kurzanalysen/Weltraumstrategie/PB_ EU_Space_Strategy.pdf. 85 Matxalen Sanchez Aranzamendi, “‘Towards a space strategy for the European Union that bene ts its citizens’ –Towards a Lisbon Generation Competence?” European Commission Communication, ESPI Perspectives No. 46, May 2011, online: www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/ Perspectives/ESPI_Perspectives_46.pdf. 86 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/60/20, 2005. 87 See Working Paper on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, submitted by the Mongolian People’s Republic to the Committee on Disarmament, CD/272, 5 April 1982. 88 United Nations General Assembly, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, A/RES/40/87, 12 December 1985. See also Mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, CD/1059, 14 February 1991 and previous documents under the same title. 89 ese recommendations included improved registration and noti cation of information, the elaboration of a code of conduct or of rules of the road as a way to reduce the threat of possible incidents in space, the establishment of “keep-out zones” around spacecraft, the elaboration of an agreement dealing with the international transfer of missile technology and other sensitive technology, and widening the protection o ered to certain satellite systems under U.S.-USSR/Russia arms control agreements. 90 Space Ref, “State Department: Leading with Diplomacy to Strengthen Stability in Space,” 17 November 2011, online: www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.rss.html?pid=39090.
176 Endnotes
91 Statement by Ambassador Laura E. Kennedy to the 65th Session of the General Assembly – Delivered in the Debate on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects), New York, 22 October 2010, online: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com10/statements/25Oct_US. 92 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65/68, “Transparency and Con dence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities,” 13 January 2011, online: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ political/1com/1com10/gares/A%20RES%2065%2068.pdf. 93 UNIDIR, “Space Security 2011: Building on the Past, Stepping Towards the Future,” Conference Report, 4-5 April 2011, online: www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-011-I-en.pdf. 94 Michael Krepon, “Space Code of Conduct Advances,” Arms Control Wonk, 17 January 2012, online: http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3329/space-code-of-conduct-advances. 95 Beatrice Fihn and Gabriella Irsten, “CD Closes Another Failed Session,” Reaching Critical Will, 15 September 2011, online: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/2011/reports.html. 96 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Terms of Reference and Methods of Work of the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Scienti c and Technical Subcommittee, Working Paper Submitted by the Chair of the Working Group, A/ AC.105/C.1/L.307/Rev.1, 28 February 2011, online: www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c1/ AC105_C1_L307Rev01E.pdf. 97 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities – Nominations of Members of Expert Groups and List of Points of Contact Communicated to the Secretariat as of 9 June 2011,” A/AC.105/2011/CRP15E, 9 June 2011, online: www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/limited/l/AC105_2011_CRP15E.pdf.
Chapter Four Endnotes 1 National Aeronautics and Aerospace Administration, “About NASA,” 2010, online: www.nasa.gov/ about/highlights/what_does_nasa_do.html. 2 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger, Raymond Ghirardi and Xavier Pasco, Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 73-77. 3 Ibid., at 96-97. 4 Ibid., at 81. 5 Ibid., at 68-69. 6 European Space Agency, “New member states,” 2010, online: www.esa.int/SPECIALS/ About_ESA/SEMP936LARE_0.html. 7 e Sunday Morning Herald, “Top Ocial Deplores Decline of Russian Space Program,” 12 December 2002, online: www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/12/11/1039379887168.html; Olga Zhdanovich, discussion with author, Montreal, 26 February 2005. 8 Aviation Week and Space Technology, “ e Government has Approved,” 7 November 2005, at 28. 9 N. Peter, “Space Policy, Issues and Trends in 2006/2007,” European Space Policy Institute, 6 September 2007, at 14, online: www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/studies/6th%20 espi%20report.pdf. 10 CNN News, “Russia Approves Space Funding,” 26 October 2005. 11 NASA, “Space Shuttle,” Mission Archives, 24 May 2009, online: www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/ shuttle/shuttlemissions/list_main.html. 12 CNN, “Bush Unveils Vision for Moon and Beyond,” 15 January 2004, online: www.cnn. com/2004/TECH/space/01/14/bush.space; NASA, “NASA Set to Launch Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter in 2008,” Release 06-224, 18 May 2006, online: www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/may/ HQ_06224_LRO_update.html. 13 NASA, “NASA Unveils Global Exploration Strategy and Lunar Architecture,” Release 06-361, 4 December 2006, online: www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/dec/HQ_06361_ESMD_Lunar_ Architecture.html. 14 Verger et al, at 68-69.
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15 Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Return Vision: Japan’s Space Agency Counts ISS at Centre of 20-year Road Map,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 2005, at 32. 16 K. S. Jayaraman, “India’s Space Agency Seeks Government Approval of Human Space ight Program,” Space News, 10 November 2006. 17 Moon Daily, “Japan’s Lunar Explorer Enters Observation Orbit,” 22 October 2007, online: www.Moondaily.com/reports/Japan_Lunar_Explorer_Enters_Observation_Orbit_999.html; Science Daily, “China and ESA Launch Moon Mission–Chang’e-1,” 25 October 2007, online: www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071024115241.htm. 18 Deputy Economy Minister P. Hintze, “Germans Shoot the Moon: Space Craft to Enter Lunar Orbit,” Deutsche Welle, 7 November 2007, online: www.dw-world.de/dw/ article/0,2144,2880216,00.html; European Space Agency, “Chandraayan-1 Overview,” 2008, online: www.esa.int/esaSC/SEM7YH2MDAF_index_0_m.html; S. Ramachandran, “India Sets Its Sights on Mars,” Asia Times, 19 April 2007, online: www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ ID19Df02.html; Reuters, “South Korea Eyes Moon Orbiter in 2020, Lander in 2025,” 20 November 2007, online: www.reuters.com/article/scienceNews/idUSSEO24596320071120. 19 Brian Berger, “Budget Compromise Includes $18.5 Billion for NASA,” Space News, 12 April 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110412-budget-compromise-includes-185-billion-for-nasa.html. 20 Brian Berger, “U.S. Budget Compromise Includes $18.5 Billion for NASA,” Space, 13 April 2011, online: www.space.com/11374-nasa-budget-2011-congress-compromise.html. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Irene Klotz, “NASA budget plan saves telescope, cuts space taxis,” Reuters, 16 November 2011, online: www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-usa-space-budget-idUSTRE7AF06320111116. 24 Budget of the United States Government scal year 2011, NASA, online: www.gpoaccess.gov/ usbudget/fy11/pdf/budget/space.pdf. 25 Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Budget Rises to $4B as 14 Nations Boost Contributions,” Space News, 21 January 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110121-esa-budget-rises.html. 26 Franco Ongaro, “ e European Space Agency,” Presentation at the Future European Space Policy – EU Space Policy after Lisbon – what demands, which objectives and what strategy? to EPP Group in the European Parliament, Brussels, 7 September 2011, online: www.eppgroup.eu/press/peve11/ docs/110907ongaro-presentation.pdf. 27 EU Business, “EU states angry over cuts of nuclear, satellite projects,” 16 November 2011, online: www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/budget-economy.djc. 28 Peter B. Selding, “European GMES Program at Risk as Battle Over Funding Escalates,” Space News, 10 November 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/111110-budget-battle-threatens-gmes.html. 29 Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Budget-cutting Plan Targets Operating Costs,” Space News, 9 November 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/policy/111109-esa-cost-cutting-initiative.html. 30 ESA, “ESA budget for 2011,” 2011, online: http://download.esa.int/docs/DG/ESA_2011_ Budget_040111_rev2.ppt. 31 K.S. Jayaraman, “Indian Space Budget Boost Supports Existing Programs,” Space News, 1 March 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110301-indian-space-budget-boost.html. 32 Press Trust of India, “Budget 2011: Over 35% Hike for Department of Space,” Outlook, 28 February 2011, online: http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=713417. 33 Ibid. 34 K. S. Jayaraman, “India expects to increase space spending in year ahead,” Space News, 21 March 2012, online: http://www.spacenews.com/civil/120321-india-increase-space-spending.html. 35 Roscosmos, “Russia Allocates $3.8 bln for Space Programs in 2011,” 12 January 2011, online: www.federalspace.ru/main.php?id=2&nid=11156&hl=2011+budget; RIA Novosti, “Russia Allocates $3.8 bln for Space Programs in 2011,” 12 January 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/ russia/20110111/162102586.html. 36 Roscosmos, “Russia Speeds Up Moon, Mars Plans as U.S. May Cut Spending,” 7 April 2011, online: www.federalspace.ru/main.php?id=2&nid=11621&lang=en.
178 Endnotes
37 RIA Novosti, “Russia May Spend Almost $12 bln on Glonass in 2012-2020,” 8 February 2012, online: http://en.rian.ru/science/20120208/171207057.html. 38 Interfax News, “Roscosmos’ 2011 budget $3 Bln, annual commercial revenue $0.7 Bln,” 13 April 2011, online: www.interfax.co.uk/russia-cis-military-news-bulletins-in-english/roscosmos-2011- budget-3-bln-annual-commercial-revenue-0-7-bln-2. 39 Marc Boucher, “No change for space as federal government releases budget,” Spaceref Canada, 6 June 2011, online: http://spaceref.ca/government-of-canada/budget-2011/no-change-for- space-as-federal-government-releases-budget.html. 40 Ibid. 41 Marc Boucher, “ e Canadian Space Agency Prepares for Possible Budget Cuts,” Spaceref Canada, 7 November 2011, online: http://spaceref.ca/missions-and-programs/canadian-space-agency/ the-canadian-space-agency-prepares-for-possible-budget-cuts.html. 42 Space, “Report: Iran Attempt to Launch Monkey Into Space Fails,” 12 October 2011, online: www.space.com/13270-iran-space-monkey-launch-failure.html; e Telegraph, “Iran fails with space monkey launch,” 12 October 2011, online: www.telegraph.co.uk/science/space/8822745/Iran-fails- with-space-monkey-launch.html. 43 Ibid. 44 Barry Neild, “Iran claims launch of turtles, rodent into space,” CNN World, 3 February 2010, online: http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-03/world/iran.space.satellites_1_uranium-enrichment- launch-iran-s-announcement?_s=PM:WORLD; Borzou Daragahi, “Iran launches rat and turtles into space,” Space Daily, 3 February 2010, online: www.spacedaily.com/reports/Iran_satellite_ launch_puts_rat_turtles_in_space_999.html. 45 BBC News, “Iran aims to send man into space by 2019,” 23 July 2010, online: www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-10747390; Press TV, “Iran manned space program on course,” 7 December 2011, online: http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/154279.html. 46 e Economic Times, “IAF to select crew for India’s 1st manned mission to space,” 30 December 2011, online: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-12-30/news/30572931_1_ moon-mission-manned-mission-isro. 47 Ibid. 48 e Deccan Chronicle, “Nasa helping India in manned space mission, says scientist,” 24 December 2011, online: www.deccanchronicle.com/channels/sci-tech/space/nasa-helping-india-manned-space- mission-says-scientist-062. 49 Ibid. 50 Xinhua, “Launch of China’s manned spacecraft Shenzhou-9 scheduled,” 17 February 2012, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2012-02/17/c_131416581.htm. 51 Morris Jones, “Shenzhou 9 To Carry 3 Astronauts To Tiangong-1 Space Station,” Space Daily, 18 February 2012, online: www.spacedaily.com/reports/Testing_Time_For_Shenzhou_9_999.html; Stephen Clark, “China sets summer launch for next human space ight,” Space ight Now, 17 February 2012, online: http://space ightnow.com/china/shenzhou9/120217schedule. 52 Alissa De Carbonnel, “Manned space ights no longer priority for Russia,” Reuters, 17 August 2011, online: www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/17/us-russia-space-idUSTRE77G5GQ20110817. 53 RIA Novosti, “Russian space freighter fails to reach designated orbit,” 24 August 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/science/20110824/166120459.html; William Harwood, “Russian cargo rocket lost in rare launch mishap,” CNET, 24 August 2011, online: http://news.cnet.com/8301-19514_ 3-20096757-239/russian-cargo-rocket-lost-in-rare-launch-mishap. 54 BBC News, “Russia resumes manned Soyuz ights after crash,” 14 November 2011, online: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15715260. 55 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia’s Failed Mars Probe Crashes Into Paci c,” New York Times, 15 January 2012, online: www.nytimes.com/2012/01/16/science/space/russias-phobos-grunt-mars-probe- crashes-into-paci c.html. 56 RIA Novosti, “Russian Martian moon mission to help clarify Red Planet’s mysteries,” 8 November 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/science/20111108/168505414.html.
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57 RIA Novosti, “Russia launches probe to Mars moon,” 9 November 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/ science/20111109/168527324.html; Mike Wall, “Russia Launching Probe to Sample Mars’ Moon Phobos Today,” Space, 8 November 2011, online: www.space.com/13540-russia-mars-phobos- grunt-mission-launch-preview.html. 58 RIA Novosti, “Russian probe fails to set course to Mars – Roscosmos,” 9 November 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/science/20111109/168533850.html; Peter B. de Selding, “Russian Mars Probe Stuck in Earth Orbit,” Space News, 11 November 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/111114- russian-mars-probe-stuck.html. 59 Robert Z. Pearlman, “NASA’s Curiosity Rover Flying to Mars with Obama & Others’ Autographs Aboard,” Space, October 2011, online: www.space.com/13742-curiosity-mars-rover-signatures- plaque.html; Todd Halvorson, “NASA’s Curiosity rover hurtling toward Mars,” USA Today, 28 November 2011, online: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/story/2011-11-28/nasa-mars- rover-curiosity/51436684/1; “‘Enormous step forward’ as NASA lands rover on Mars,” Mars Daily, 6 August 2012, online: http://www.marsdaily.com/reports/Enormous_step_forward_as_NASA_ lands_rover_on_Mars_999.html 60 Indian Express, “ISRO to launch Mars mission by 2013,” 31 August 2009, online: http://www. indianexpress.com/news/isro-to-launch-mars-mission-by-2013/509448; Times of India, “Mars mission by 2013-2015, says ISRO,” 31 August 2009, online: http://articles.timeso ndia.indiatimes. com/2009-08-31/india/28164136_1_chandrayaan-1-indian-deep-space-network- rst-moon- mission. 61 Srinivas Laxman, “Indian Scientists Propose 10 Experiments for 2012 Mission to Mars,” Asian Scientist, 9 January 2012, online: www.asianscientist.com/topnews/isro-indian-mission-to-mars- red-planet-2013. 62 Ibid. 63 Srinivas Laxman, “India planning Venus mission,” e Times of India, 17 February 2012, online: http://articles.timeso ndia.indiatimes.com/2012-02-17/hyderabad/31070866_1_venus-mission- chandrayaan-1-isro. 64 Xinhua, “Space docking success tops China’s scienti c achievements of 2011,” 17 January 2012, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-01/17/c_131365457.htm. 65 Xinhua, “Chinese leaders applaud successful launch of Tiangong-1,” 29 September 2011, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/29/c_131168314.htm; Jonathan Amos, “Rocket launches Chinese space lab,” BBC News, 29 September 2011, online: www.bbc.co.uk/ news/science-environment-15112760. 66 Mike Wall, “China Launches First Space Docking Mission,” Space, 31 October 2011, online: www.space.com/13458-china-shenzhou8-launch-space-station.html; Jonathan Amos, “Chinese spacecraft dock in orbit,” BBC News, 2 November 2011, online: www.bbc.co.uk/news/science- environment-15562928. 67 Peter B. de Selding, “German Experiments Onboard Chinese Shenzhou-8 Capsule,” Space News, 1 November 2011, online: http://spacenews.com/civil/111101-german-experiments-board-chinese- shenzhou-8-capsule.html. 68 Clara Moskowitz, “China Makes Second Successful Space Docking,” Space, 14 November 2011, online: www.space.com/13608-china-space-docking-shenzhou-8.html. 69 NASA, “NASA GRAIL Mission to the Moon Underway,” 10 September 2011, online: www.jpl. nasa.gov/news/news.cfm?release=2011-284. 70 CBC News, “NASA’s Grail probes nearing moon,” 28 December 2011, online: www.cbc.ca/news/ technology/story/2011/12/28/nasa-grail-moon-probes.html; Discovery News, “Twin NASA Probes Enter Moon Orbit,” 1 January 2012, online: http://news.discovery.com/space/nasa-grail-probes- moon-orbit-120101.html. 71 Mike Wall, “Russia Eyes Possible Moon Base with NASA: Reports,” Space, 19 January 2012, online: www.space.com/14290-russia-manned-moon-base-nasa-europe.html. 72 Ibid. 73 Vladimir Radyuhin, “Chandrayan-2 faces delay after Russian Mars probe failure,” e Hindu, 2 February 2012, online: www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2854134.ece.
180 Endnotes
74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Roy Gibson, “ e history of international space programs,” 23 Space Policy, 2007, at 155. 77 John Krige, “ e politics of European collaboration in space,” 36 Space Times: Magazine of the American Astronautical Society, September–October 1997, at 6. 78 Videocosmos, “Mir Station,” 2007, online: www.videocosmos.com/mir.shtm. 79 NASA, “History of Shuttle-Mir,” online: http://space ight.nasa.gov/history/shuttle-mir/images/ timeline.pdf. 80 NASA, “International Space Station,” Facts and Figures, online: www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/ station/main/onthestation/facts_and_ gures.html. 81 European Space Agency, “How much does it cost?” 9 August 2005, online: www.esa.int/export/ esaHS/ESAQHA0VMOC_iss_0.html. 82 NASA, “International Space Station.” 83 Satnews Daily, “NASA, 13 Space Agencies Join in Historic Space Cooperation Agreement,” 5 June 2007, online: www.satnews.com/stories2007/4550. 84 State Space Agency of Ukraine, “Cyclone – 4,” online: www.nkau.gov.ua/nsau/catalogNEW. nsf/proectR/2D357C5C6B8786B2C3256BF8004C1C4D?OpenDocument&Lang=E. 85 PR Newswire, “Ukraine to Launch a Rocket from the Brazilian Space Launch Facility,” 25 October 2011, online: www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ukraine-to-launch-a-rocket-from-the-brazilian- space-launch-facility-132564068.html. 86 RIA Novosti, “Ukraine ready to invest in joint space project with Brazil,” 27 September 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/world/20110927/167181420.html. 87 P.S. Suryanarayana, “Singapore delighted at ISRO’s launch of X-Sat,” e Hindu, 20 April 2011, online: www.thehindu.com/news/international/article1712789.ece. 88 Ibid. 89 Rizwan Khatik, “China to launch satellite for Pakistan,” Times of Ummah, 11 August 2011, online: www.timesofummah.com/2011/08/11/china-to-launch-satellite-for-pakistan. 90 Ajey Lele, “China launches a communications satellite for Pakistan,” IDSA, 24 August 2011, online: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinalaunchesacommunicationssatelliteforPakistan_ alele_240811. 91 Ghulam Ali, “China-Pakistan space technology cooperation,” East Asia Forum, 9 September 2011, online: www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/09/china-pakistan-space-technology-cooperation. 92 Azhar Masood, “Pakistan, China to boost cooperation in space technology,” Arab News, 29 October 2010, online: http://arabnews.com/world/article175289.ece. 93 PhysOrg, “Nigeria launches satellite to replace earlier failed attempt,” 19 December 2011, online: http://phys.org/news/2011-12-nigeria-satellite-earlier.html. 94 China View, “Nigeria, China sign pact to replace faulty satellite by 2011,” 25 March 2009, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/25/content_11073057.htm. 95 Stephen Clark, “Chinese Rocket Launches Powerful Nigerian Satellite Into Orbit,” Space, 19 December 2011, online: www.space.com/13975-china-rocket-launching-huge-nigeria-satellite.html. 96 China View, “Pakistan, China agree to develop new satellite,” 18 September 2009, online: http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/18/content_12076413.htm; Stephen Clark, “Chinese Rocket Launches New Satellite for Pakistan,” Space, 12 August 2011, online: www.space.com/12622-china- rocket-launch-pakistan-satellite.html. 97 China View, “Nigerian satellite for launch from Xichang,” 15 April 2005, online: http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/15/content_2832127.htm; China View, “Bank o ers $200 mln in loan for satellite project,” 13 January 2006, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-01/13/ content_4049579.htm. 98 Xinhua, “Venezuela’s second Chinese-built satellite to be launched,” 11 February 2012, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2012-02/11/c_131404796.htm.
181 Space Security Index 2012
99 China View, “China to launch communication satellite for Laos,” 26 September 2009, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/26/content_12113434.htm. 100 Xinhua, “Bolivia, China sign satellite launching agreement,” 2 March 2010, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-04/02/c_13234949.htm. 101 Xinhua, “Sri Lanka plans to launch its rst satellite in 2015,” 24 May 2012, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2012-05/24/c_131609112.htm. 102 International Launch Services, “ILS Proton Successfully Launches e AsiaSat 7 Satellite For AsiaSat,” 26 November 2011, online: www.ilslaunch.com/newsroom/news-releases/ils-proton- successfully-launches-asiasat-7-satellite-asiasat; Peter B. de Selding, “ILS Proton Lofts AsiaSat 7 into Transfer Orbit,” Space News, 28 November 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_ telecom/112811-ils-proton-lofts-asiasat-into-transfer-orbit.html. 103 Peter B. de Selding, “Proton Successfully Launches Two Geostationary Satellites,” Space News, 18 July 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/launch/110718-proton-launches-sats.html; Stephen Clark, “Russian Proton Rocket Orbits Two New Broadcasting Satellites” Space, 16 July 2011, online: www.space.com/12316-russian-proton-rocket-launch-satellites.html. 104 Yonhap News Agency, “Russia to ship main stage Naro-1 rocket to S. Korea by end-August,” 2 June 2012, online: http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2012/06/02/39/0502000000AEN2012060 2000300320F.HTML. 105 ESA, “Romania accedes to ESA Convention,” 20 January 2011, online: www.esa.int/esaMI/About_ ESA/SEMF0P6SXIG_0.html. 106 ESA, “Israel signs Cooperation Agreement,” 31 January 2011, online: www.esa.int/esaCP/ SEMKE3Y1LJG_index_0.html; ESA, “Malta signs Co-operation Agreement,” 23 February 2012, online: www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMH012YRYG_index_0.html. 107 SpaceMart, “Israel to work on European space projects,” 30 January 2011, online: www.spacemart. com/reports/Israel_to_work_on_European_space_projects_999.html. 108 e White House, Oce of the Press Secretary, “ e United States and Brazil: Education, Science, Technology, Innovation, Space and Education Cooperation,” Fact Sheet, 19 March 2011, online: www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ les/uploads/Brazil_Science_Technology_Innovation_Space_ Education_Cooperation.pdf; Consulate General of the United States, São Paulo, Brazil, “NASA Launches New Era of Cooperation with Brazil,” n.d., online: http://saopaulo.usconsulate.gov/ events/nasa-launches-new-era-of-cooperation-with-brazil.html. For the text of the Framework Agreement, see online: www.brasil.gov.br/news/history/2011/03/19/framework-agreement-between- brazil-and-usa-on-cooperation-in-the-peaceful-uses-of-outer-space. 109 ESA, “Signing of EDA–ESA Administrative Arrangement,” 20 June 2011, online: www.esa.int/ esaCP/SEM762E1XOG_index_0.html; European Defence Agency News, “Signing of EDA–ESA Administrative Arrangement,” 20 June 2011, online: http://212.190.205.2/news/11-06-20/ Signing_of_EDA_-_ESA_Administrative_Arrangement. 110 Amy Svitak, “ESA, EDA sign cooperative framework accord,” Aviation Week, 20 June 2011, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awx/2011/06/20/ awx_06_20_2011_p0-338249.xml&headline=ESA,%20EDA%20sign%20cooperative%20 framework%20accord. 111 Joan Johnson-Freese, “ e U.S.-India Space Partnership: Who Gets What?” World Politics Review, 17 May 2011, online: www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8839/the-u-s-india-space-partnership- who-gets-what. 112 e White House, “Fact-sheet: U.S.-India Partnership on Export Controls and Non-Proliferation,” n.d., online: www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ les/india-factsheets/India-US_Agreement_on_ Export_Controls.pdf. 113 Embassy of the United States New Delhi, “U.S. Government removes Indian organizations from ‘Entity List,’” Press Release, 25 January 2011, online: http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr012511. html. 114 United States Department of Commerce, “Department of Commerce Takes Steps to Implement Export Control Initiatives to Facilitate High-Tech Trade with India,” 24 January 2011, online: www.commerce.gov/blog/2011/01/24/department-commerce-takes-steps-implement-export- control-initiatives-facilitate-high.
182 Endnotes
115 Je rey Mervis, “Spending Bill Prohibits U.S.- China Collaborations,” Science Insider, 21 April 2011, online: http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/04/spending-bill-prohibits-us- china.html. 116 Tabassum Zakaria, “US wants to Talk Outer Space with China,” Reuters, 19 July 2011, online: www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/19/us-usa-china-space-idUSTRE76I6F320110719. 117 Dean Cheng, “Lost in Space: e Administration’s Rush for Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation,” e Foundry, 9 May 2011, online: http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/09/lost-in-space-the- administration%E2%80%99s-rush-for-sino%E2%80%93u-s-space-cooperation. 118 Ibid. 119 European Commissiion, Towards a Space Strategy for European Union that Bene ts its Citizens, 2011, online: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/ les/policy/comm_native_com_2011_ 0152_6_communication_en.pdf. 120 Valentine Pop, “EU wants more co-operation with China in space,” EU Observer.com, 5 April 2011, online: http://euobserver.com/884/32122; ChinaDaily Europe, “EU wants better space cooperation with China,” 5 April 2011, online: http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/ europe/2011-04/05/content_12274536.htm; Peter B. de Selding, “European Commission Urges China Dialogue,” Space News, 5 April 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110405-space- policy-document-calls-for-dialogue-with-china.html. 121 Ibid. 122 Peter B. de Selding, “European Commission Urges China Dialogue,” Space News, 5 April 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110405-space-policy-document-calls-for-dialogue-with-china. html. 123 Daily India, “India Keen on Bringing China into Space Negotiations,” 21 January 2011, online: www.dailyindia.com/show/420256.php. 124 Marc Boucher, “Opportunity and Risk Ahead for China’s Space Industry,” Spaceref, 4 November 2011, online: http://spaceref.ca/space-policy/opportunity-and-risk-ahead-for-canadas-space- industry.html?utm_campaign=&utm_medium=srs.gs-copypaste&utm_source=direct-srs.gs&utm_ content=awesm-publisher. 125 e Economist, “ e Sky’s the Limit,” 8 March 2001; Giovanni Bisignani, “State of the Air Transport Industry,” International Air Transport Association 64th General Meeting, 2 June 2008, online: www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/2008-06-02-01.htm. 126 White House press secretary quoted in Inside GNSS, “Selective Availability: Completely Dead,” 19 September 2007, online: www.insidegnss.com/node/200. 127 Russian Ministry of Defense, “Coordinational Scienti c Information Center,” online: www. GLONASS-center.ru/frame_e.html. 128 Pavel Podvig, “Russia and Military Uses of Space,” from e American Academy of Arts and Sciences Project “Reconsidering the Rules of Space,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, June 2004, online: http://russianforces.org/podvig/eng/publications/space/20040700aaas.shtml. 129 Richard B. Langley, “GLONASS Fully Operational, First Time in 15 Years,” GPS World, 8 December 2011, online: www.gpsworld.com/gnss-system/news/glonass-fully-operational- rst- time-15-years-12379. 130 European Union, “Satellite Navigation,” 6 April 2006, online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/ russia/sector/satellite_navigation_en.html; GPS Daily, “Russia to Lift GLONASS Restrictions for Accurate Civilian Use,” 14 November 2006, online: www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Russia_To_Lift_ GLONASS_Restrictions_For_Accurate_Civilian_Use_999.html. 131 RIA Novosti, “GLONASS Navigation System Available to India–Russia,” 21 January 2007, online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070122/59520011.html. 132 European Commission, “GALILEO: YES, at Last!” Europa, 26 March 2002, online: http://europa. eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/478. 133 T. Barnes and V. Samson, “Galileo Funding Approved,” 11 CDI Space Security update, 5 December 2007, online: www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4152#10. 134 GPS Daily, “Europe defends ‘stupid’ Galileo satellite,” 18 January 2011, online: www.gpsdaily.com/ reports/Europe_defends_stupid_Galileo_satellite_999.html. 183 Space Security Index 2012
135 Ibid. 136 European Union, “Galileo Services,” 1 March 2006, online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_ transport/galileo/programme/services_en.htm. 137 e Beidou System, Presentation to the Union of Concerned Scientists, Summer Symposium, Beijing, August 2004. 138 GPS Daily, “China Starts to Build Own Satellite Navigation System,” 3 November 2006, online: www.gpsdaily.com/reports/China_Starts_To_Build_Own_Satellite_Navigation_ System_999.html. 139 Mike Wall, “China Activates Homegrown GPS System,” Space.com, 28 December 2011, online: www.space.com/14063-china-gps-system-beidou-operational.html. 140 K. S. Jayaraman, “India to Develop Regional Navigation System,” Space News, 22 May 2006. 141 Interagency GPS Executive Board, “Joint Announcement, Second Japan-US GPS Plenary Meeting, 2002,” 16 October 2002. 142 Asian Surveying and Mapping, “QZSS-1 in 2010,” 8 May 2009, online: www.asmmag.com/news/ qzss-1-in-2010. 143 Peter B. de Selding, “Disaster Response Imagery, but Distribution Still Tough,” Space News, 9 June 2008, at 14. 144 Jeremy Singer, “NOAA Chief Seeks International Sources for Hurricane Data,” Space News, 3 March 2008, at 13. 145 Jonathan’s Space Report, “Satellite Catalogue and Launch Catalogue,” 2010, online: http:// planet4589.org/space/log/satcat.txt. 146 WMO Space Programme, “Current Polar-Orbiting Satellites Coordinated within CGMS,” 25 November 2005. 147 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Basic Information,” Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) and the Group on Earth Observations (GEO), 5 May 2009, online: www.epa.gov/geoss/basic.html. 148 Group on Earth Observations, “GEO members,” 2012, online: www.earthobservations.org/ ag_members.shtml. 149 Group on Earth Observations, “Participating Organizations,” 2012, online: www.earthobservations. org/ag_partorg.shtml. 150 Group on Earth Observations, “Declaration of the Earth Observation Summit,” 31 July 2003; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Basic Information,” Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). 151 Donald MacPhail, “Increasing the use of Earth observations in developing countries,” 25 Space Policy, 2009, at 6-8. 152 International Charter: Space and Major Disasters, “About the Charter,” 18 March 2009, online: www.disasterscharter.org. 153 International Charter: Space and Major Disasters, “Charter Members and Space Resources,” 17 April 2008, online: www.disasterscharter.org/participants_e.html. 154 DMC International Imaging (2009), online: www.dmcii.com/index.html. 155 Cospas-Sarsat Information Bulletin, February 2010, online: www.cospas-sarsat.org/images/stories/ SystemDocs/Current/bul22_feb2010_ nal_smallsize.pdf. 156 Space.com, “Satellite Technology Helps Canada Patrol Waterways,” 4 May 2009, online: www.space.com/businesstechnology/090504-busmon-radarsat-ships.html; Christer Aasen, “Norway builds AIS satellite,” Norwegian Space Center, News Archives, 9 October 2008, online: www.spacecentre.no/?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=51125. 157 Iran Independent News Service, “Iran receives 1st images from home-made satellite,” 19 June 2011, online: www.iranwpd.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1773:iran-receives-1st- images-from-home-made-satellite&Itemid=64. 158 Yaakov Katz, “Iran successfully launches satellite into orbit,” e Jerusalem Post, 15 June 2011, online: www.jpost.com/Iranian reat/News/Article.aspx?id=225154.
184 Endnotes
159 Tehran Times, “Iran receives rst image sent by Navid satellite,” 11 February 2011, online: www.tehrantimes.com/politics/95336-iran-receives- rst-image-sent-by-navid-satellite. 160 Xinhuanet, “China launches high-resolution remote-sensing satellite,” 22 December 2011, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/22/c_131321922.htm. 161 SinoDefence, “China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite / Ziyuan 1,” 3 April 2012, online: www.sinodefence.com/satellites/cbers-ziyuan.asp. 162 Xinhuanet, “China’s Ziyuan III satellite sends back hi-res images,” 12 January 2011, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-01/12/c_131356831.htm. 163 Ziuan-1: China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS), online: http://www.dragoninspace.com/ earth-observation/ziyuan1-cbers.aspx. 164 4 Traders, “THALES: Pleiades 1A in orbit!,” 17 December 2011, online: www.4-traders.com/ THALES-4715/news/THALES-Pleiades-1A-in-orbit-13938709. 165 CNES, “Pléiades and ELISA satellites successfully launched,” 17 December 2011, online: www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/9872-gp-pleiades-and-elisa-satellites-successfully-launched.php; Amy Svitak, “Pleiades May Boost French Competitiveness,” Aviation Week, 21 December 2011, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/awst/2011/12/19/ AW_12_19_2011_p28-406519.xml. 166 ISRO, “PSLV-C16 Flight Successful: RESOURCESAT-2, YOUTHSAT and X-SAT Satellites Functioning Satisfactorily,” Press Release, 25 April 2011, online: www.isro.org/pressrelease/scripts/ pressreleasein.aspx?Apr25_2011. 167 ISRO, “Successful launch of PSLV-C18 / MEGHA-TROPIQUES Mission,” Press Release, 14 October 2011, online: www.isro.org/pressrelease/scripts/pressreleasein.aspx?Oct14_2011. 168 NOAA, “Nation’s newest environmental satellite successfully launched,” 28 October 2011, online: www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20111028_npp.html. 169 Fox News, “UK Builds, Russia Launches Pair of Nigerian Satellites,” 17 August 2011, online: www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/08/17/russia-launches-2-nigerian-satellites. 170 ESA Soyuz-Galileo IOV News, “One Soyuz launcher, two Galileo satellites, three successes for Europe,” 21 October 2011, online: www.esa.int/SPECIALS/Galileo_IOV/ SEM167GURTG_0.html. 171 ESA Soyuz-Galileo IOV News, “First Galileo satellite producing full spectrum of signals,” 22 December 2011, online: www.esa.int/SPECIALS/Galileo_IOV/SEM60KBX9WG_0.html. 172 GPS World, “SSTL-OHB System Consortium to Build Eight More Galileo FOC Satellites,” 3 February 2012, online: www.gpsworld.com/gnss-system/galileo/news/sstl-ohb-system- consortium-build-eight-more-galileo-foc-satellites-12581. 173 GPS World, “Ariane 5 to Launch Galileo Constellation,” 6 February 2012, online: www.gpsworld.com/GNSS%20System/Galileo/news/ariane-5-launch-galileo-constellation-12592. 174 GPS World, “Czechs Sign Agreement to Host Galileo Headquarters,” 31 January 2012, online: www.gpsworld.com/GNSS%20System/Galileo/news/czechs-sign-agreement-host-galileo- headquarters-12561. 175 Richard B. Langley, “GLONASS Fully Operational, First Time in 15 Years,” GPS World, 8 December 2011, online: www.gpsworld.com/gnss-system/news/glonass-fully-operational- rst- time-15-years-12379. 176 GPS World, “Russia Expected to Spend $12B on GLONASS Development,” 13 February 2012, online: www.gpsworld.com/gnss-system/glonass/news/russia-expected-spend-12b-glonass- development-12619. 177 Richard B. Langley, “Russia Launches First Navigation Augmentation Satellite,” GPS World, 12 December 2012, online: www.gpsworld.com/gnss-system/glonass/news/russia-launches- rst- navigation-augmentation-satellite-12396. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 “ ird Beidou-2 IGSO Satellite Launched,” GPS World, 11 April 2011, online: www.gpsworld. com/gnss-system/compass/news/third-beidou-2-igso-satellite-launched-11494.
185 Space Security Index 2012
181 e Economic Times, “China launches navigation satellite Beidou,” 2 December 2011, online: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-12-02/news/30467982_1_navigation-satellite- beidou-xichang-satellite-launch-centre. 182 GPS World, “Beidou Launch Completes Regional Nav System,” 6 December 2011, online: www.gpsworld.com/gnss-system/news/beidou-launch-completes-regional-nav-system-12375. 183 Rui C. Barbosa, “China breaks record with Long March 3A launch of another BeiDou-2 satellite,” NASA Space ight, 1 December 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/12/china-breaks- record-long-march-3a-launch-beidou-2-satellite. 184 Mike Wall, “China Activates Homegrown GPS System,” Space, 28 December 2011, online: www.space.com/14063-china-gps-system-beidou-operational.html. 185 Richard B. Langley, “Beidou/Compass Declared Operational, Test ICD Released,” GPS World, 27 December 2011, online: www.gpsworld.com/GNSS%20System/Compass/news/beidoucompass- declared-operational-test-icd-released-12458. 186 Mike Wall, “China Activates Homegrown GPS System,” Space, 28 December 2011, online: www.space.com/14063-china-gps-system-beidou-operational.html. 187 GPS World, “U.S. Air Force Awards Lockheed Martin Contract for ird and Fourth GPS III Satellites,” 12 January 2012, online: www.gpsworld.com/GNSS%20System/GPS%20 Modernization/news/us-air-force-awards-lockheed-martin-contract-third-and-fourth-gps.
Chapter Five Endnotes 1 Futron Corporation, “State of the Satellite Industry Report,” May 2012, online: www.sia.org/ wp-content/uploads/2012/05/FINAL-2012-State-of-Satellite-Industry-Report-20120522.pdf. 2 Information collected from U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, “Year in Review 2011,” online: www.faa.gov/about/oce_org/headquarters_oces/ast/media/2012_YearinReview.pdf. 3 Futron Corporation, 2012. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, “ e Economic Impact of Commercial Space Transportation on the U.S. Economy: 2002 Results and Outlook for 2010,” March 2004, at 3, online: http://ast.faa.gov/ les/pdf/2004Economic_Impact.pdf. 7 Communications Satellite Corporation, or COMSAT, is a private communications satellite company organized and started by the U.S. Congress. See Comsat International, “History,” c. 2005, online: www.comsat.net.ar/noticias.php?lang_id=1&coun_id=1&n=544§ion_id=6; President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, “Satellite Task Force Report, Factsheet,” March 2004, at 6. 8 John Higginbotham, “Private Possibilities in Space,” in Edward L. Hudgins, ed., Space: e Free Market Frontier (New York: Cato Institute, 2002), at 146. 9 President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, at 6. 10 Michael A. Taverna and Robert Wall, “Pick and Choose: Buoyant demand and improving outlook seen for telecom satellite manufacturers,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 September 2007, at 28. 11 FAA, “Year in Review 2011,” online: www.faa.gov/about/oce_org/headquarters_oces/ast/ media/2012_YearinReview.pdf. 12 Jim Yardley, “Snubbed by U.S., China Finds New Space Partners,” e New York Times, 24 May 2007, online: www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/world/asia/24satellite.html. 13 AFP, “India launches Israeli satellite in boost to space business,” Canada.com, 21 January 2008, online: www.canada.com/topics/technology/science/story.html?id=68e69c99-33d2-4106-b739- a891169539c2&k=11055; BBC News, “India commercial rocket takes o ,” 23 April 2007, online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6582773.stm. For launch price comparisons see FAA, “2007 Year in Review,” FAA Commercial Space Transportation 2008, at 17-19. 14 K. Raghu, “India to build a constellation of 7 navigation satellites by 2012,” e Wall Street Journal, 5 September 2007, online: www.livemint.com/2007/09/05002237/India-to-build-a-constellation.html. 186 Endnotes
15 Edward Cody, “China builds and launches a satellite for Nigeria,” e Washington Post, 14 May 2007, online: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/13/ AR2007051301264.html. 16 AFP, “Arianespace warns US over Chinese space ‘dumping,” 30 November 2007, online: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gRSPI2HxWsPwjfICbGanIw4VN0SQ. 17 Peter B. de Selding, “Telecom Industry Staves O Predicted 2010 Downturn,” Space News, 10 January 2011, at 11. 18 Digital Ship, “Satellite industry to grow for a decade – report,” 10 February 2012, online: www.thedigitalship.com/conferences/2006/displaynews.asp?NewsID=2023. 19 Ibid. 20 Je rey Hill, “Euroconsult’s Long-Term Satellite Forecast Bullish on Commercial, Bearish on Government,” Satellite Today, online: www.satellitetoday.com/twitter/38285.html. 21 Euroconsult, “Satellite Industry Growth To Continue Despite Challenging Environment,” Press Release, 6 February 2012, online: www.euroconsult-ec.com/news/press-release-33-1/53.html. 22 Ibid. 23 Space Daily, “Satellite Industry Growth To Continue Despite Challenging Environment,” 8 February 2012, online: www.spacedaily.com/reports/Satellite_Industry_Growth_To_Continue_ Despite_Challenging_Environment_999.html. 24 Ibid. 25 FAA, Commercial Space Transportation: 2011 Year in Review, January 2012, online: www.faa.gov/ about/oce_org/headquarters_oces/ast/media/2012_YearinReview.pdf. 26 De Selding, 10 January 2011. 27 Ibid. 28 Peter B. de Selding “DigitalGlobe Chief Says Firm Poised for Double-digit Growth,” Space News, 16 December 2010, online: http://spacenews.com/earth_observation/101216-digitalglobe-double- digit-growth.html. 29 Xinhua, “Overall global space economy on rise: report,” 7 April 2011, online: http://news. xinhuanet.com/english2010/sci/2011-04/07/c_13816188.htm. 30 Peter B. de Selding, “Eutelsat Leases Chinese Satellite at 11th Hour to Protect Orbital Slot,” Space News, 16 May 2011, at 1. 31 Peter B. de Selding, “Inmarsat Secures Ex-Im Financing for Global Xpress,” Space News, 12 May 2011, online: http://www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110512-exim-backing-globalxpress.html 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Peter B. de Selding, “Inmarsat Secures Ex-Im Financing for Global Xpress Satellites,” Space News, 22 December 2010, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/101222-ex-im- nancing-global- xpress.html. 35 Peter B. de Selding, “Inmarsat Secures Ex-Im Financing for Global Xpress,” Space News, 12 May 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110512-exim-backing-globalxpress.html. 36 FAA, January 2012. 37 Inmarsat, “Inmarsat selects ILS Proton for Inmarsat-5,” Press Release, 1 August 2011, online: www.inmarsat.com/About/Investors/Press_releases/00038285.aspx?language=&textonly=False. 38 Ibid. 39 Peter B. de Selding, “ILS To Launch Inmarsat’s Global Xpress Satellites,” Space News, 1 August 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110801-ils-launch-global-xpress-sats.html. 40 Inmarsat, 1 August 2011. 41 Inmarsat, “Inmarsat completes acquisition of Ship Equip International AS,” Press Release, 28 April 2011, online: www.inmarsat.com/About/Newsroom/Press/00037441.aspx. 42 Ibid.
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43 Giovanni Verlini, “Next Generation of Satellite: High Capacity, High Potential,” Via Satellite, 1 April 2011, online: www.satellitetoday.com/via/features/Next-Generation-of-Satellite-High- Capacity-High-Potential_36421.html. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 CSI, “Global Ka-Band Spectrum Campaign,” Press Release, 17 November 2011, online: www.csimagazine.com/csi/Satellite-industry-launches-Ka-band-spectrum-campaign.php. 47 Tooway, “EUTELSAT’s KA-SAT High roughput Satellite Goes Live,” 31 May 2011, Press Release, online: www.tooway.com/Press/EUTELSAT-s-KA-SAT-HIGH-THROUGHPUT- SATELLITE-GOES-LIVE. 48 Peter B. de Selding, “Eutelsat Leases Chinese Satellite at 11th Hour to Protect Orbital Slot,” Space News, 16 May 2011, at 1. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Peter B. de Selding, “Leased Chinese Satellite Holds Slot for Planned Eutelsat 3B,” Space News, 28 July 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110728-eutelsat-order-sat-astrium.html. 54 Peter B. de Selding, 28 July 2011. 55 Ibid. 56 FAA, 2012, at 3. 57 Xin Dingding, “Relaunch for aerospace industry,” China Daily, 21 December 2011, online: www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-12/21/content_14297322.htm. 58 Yin Liming, president of China Great Wall Industry Corporation, a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, stated, “With this momentum, we are con dent of achieving the goal we set for the 2011-2015 period, which is to take a 15-percent share of the commercial launch market and a 10-percent share of the satellite export market by 2015.” Ibid. 59 Ken Kremer, “Historic 1st Launch of Legendary Soyuz from South America,” Universe Today, 21 October 2011, online: www.universetoday.com/90124/historic-1st-launch-of-legendary-soyuz- from-south-america. 60 Peter B. de Selding, “Initial Silence Prompts Tense Moments for Successful Pleiades 1A Launch,” Space News, 19 December 2011. 61 Graham Warwick, “Amid Jamming Worries, Tests for GPS Receivers,” Aviation Week, 15 April 2011, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/ awst/2011/04/11/AW_04_11_2011_p26-307552.xml. 62 Warwick. 63 Ibid. 64 “Recommendation of LightSquared Subsidiary LLC,” Testimony, 8 September 2011. 65 Warren Ferster, “FCC To Pull LightSquared License,” Space News, 15 February 2012, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/120215-fcc-pull-lightsquared-license.html. 66 U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, Testimony of Jerry Rising, Lockheed Martin Corporation, 23 September 1998, online: www.senate.gov/~commerce/ hearings/0923ris.pdf. 67 FAA, Commercial Space Transportation: 1999 Year in Review, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, January 2000, at 7, online: www.faa.gov/about/oce_org/ headquarters_oces/ast/media/1999yir.pdf. 68 Missy Frederick, “Internet Mapping Portal Competition Bene ts Satellite Imagery Businesses,” Space News, 24 April 2006. 69 Scott Pace et al., “Appendix B: GPS History, Chronology, and Budgets,” in e Global Positioning System: Assessing National Policies (RAND 1995), at 248.
188 Endnotes
70 GPS Daily, “Russia to Lift GLONASS Restrictions for Accurate Civilian Use,” 14 November 2006, online: www.gpsdaily.com/reports/Russia_To_Lift_Glonass_Restrictions_For_Accurate_Civilian_ Use_999.html. 71 Xinhua, “China to Launch 2 Satellites for Compass Navigation System,” 13 November 2006, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/13/content_5322002.htm. 72 Scott Pace et al., at 248-249. 73 Daniel J. Marcus, “Commerce Predicts Big ’92 Growth for US Space Business,” Space News, 6 January 1992. 74 Kim omas, “Mobile Telephones O er A New Sense of Direction,” Financial Times (London), 17 November 2006, at 7. 75 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, H.R. 3752, 108th Congress, 8 March 2004; Erica Werner, “Congress Passes Bill Allowing Space Tours,” redOrbit, 9 December 2004, online: www.redorbit.com/news/space/109773/congress_passes_bill_allowing_space_tours; Space News, “No Waiting on Commercial Space Launch Bill,” 25 October 2004, online: http://search.space. com/spacenews/archive04/editarch_102504.html. 76 European Space Agency, “ESA to Help Europe Prepare for Space Tourism,” 20 July 2006, online: www.esa.int/SPECIALS/GSP/SEM2YABUQPE_0.html. As part of the initiative European private companies with plans for space tourism activities may submit proposals to ESA, which will select a maximum of three that will receive further study. Each company that submits a proposal selected by ESA will receive €150,000 to assist in development. 77 Space Adventures, “Orbital Space ight,” 2010, online: www.spaceadventures.com/index. cfm?fuseaction=orbital.welcome. 78 Rita Del ner, “Mogul has blast again,” New York Post, 27 March 2009, online: www.nypost.com/ seven/03272009/news/nationalnews/mogul_has_blast_again_161555.htm. 79 Scaled Composites, “SpaceShipOne Makes History: First Private Manned Mission to Space,” 21 June 2004, online: www.scaled.com/projects/tierone/062104-2.htm. 80 Virgin Galactic booking, online: www.virgingalactic.com/booking. 81 U.S. Government Accountability Oce, “Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism Industry,” 20 October 2006, online: www.gao.gov/new.items/d0716.pdf. 82 FAA, “New Regulations Govern Private Human Space ight Requirements for Crew and Space ight Participants,” FAA Commercial Space Transportation, 15 December 2006), online: www.faa.gov/ about/oce_org/headquarters_oces/ast/human_space_ ight_reqs. See also Human Space ight Requirements for Crew and Space ight Participants, Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 75616, 2006. 83 Safety Approvals; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 46847, 2006. 84 Andy Pasztor, “Satellite Insurers See Flat Rates Ahead,” Wall Street Journal, 15 January 2008. 85 Space News, “Capacity, not track record, drives launch, satellite insurance rates,” 22 September 2008. 86 Lisa Daniel, “Satellite Insurance: Operators Returning to Outside Providers,” Satellite Today, 1 November 2007, online: www.viasatellite.com/via/features/Satellite-Insurance-Operators- Returning-To-Outside-Providers_19461.html. 87 Vidya Ram, “Space: Insurance’s new frontier,” Forbes.com, 13 February 2009, online: www.forbes. com/2009/02/13/space-insurance-collision-face-markets-0212_space_22.html. 88 FAA, “Quarterly Launch Report: 2nd Quarter 2006,” FAA Commercial Space Transportation, 2006, at SR-8. 89 Leonard David, “Virgin Galactic’s Tourist Spaceship Makes Longest Test Flight,” Space News, 2 May 2011, at 14. 90 Ibid. 91 Space Travel, “Virgin Galactic Selects First Commercial Astronaut Pilot From Competition,” 28 October 2011, online: www.space-travel.com/reports/Virgin_Galactic_Selects_First_ Commercial_Astronaut_Pilot_From_Competition_999.html.
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92 Space Travel, “Virgin Galactic to Fly Scientists to Space,” 2 March 2011, online: www.space-travel. com/reports/Virgin_Galactic_To_Fly_Scientists_To_Space_999.html. 93 Denise Chow, “Scientists Itching for Commercial Suborbital Space Flights,” Space News, 2 May 2011, at 14. 94 Northrop Grumman Extends Its Commercial Space Portfolio,” 29 December 2011, online: www. spacemart.com/reports/Northrop_Grumman_Extends_Its_Commercial_Space_Portfolio_999.html. 95 Norway News, “Norway’s AIS satellite enhances marine safety,” 29 September 2011, online: www.norwaynews.com/en/~view.php?72W4954zQ94839x285Loi844RK2887WM76FEh253IcX8. 96 Norwegian Space Centre, “ e rst Norwegian satellite?” online: www.spacecentre.no/?module= Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=50645; John Konrad, “Ship AIS Tracking Satellite,” gCaptain, 11 August 2009, online: www.gcaptain.com/ais-satellites-for-global-ship-tracking/?377. 97 Peter B. de Selding, “Intelsat Moving Recovered Galaxy 15 to Test Location,” Space News, 10 January 2011, at 4. 98 Michael A. Taverna, “End of an Odyssey,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 January 2011, at 26. 99 SpaceRef, “Intelsat Picks MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. For Satellite Servicing,” 15 March 2011, online: www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=33014. e dilemma Intelsat confronted with its rogue satellite provides one very real scenario in which on-orbit servicing could be useful. See Brian Weeden, “Intel … Zombiesats and On-Orbit Servicing,” MilSat Magazine, September 2010, online: www.milsatmagazine.com/cgi-bin/display_article.cgi?number=152118614. 100 Ibid. 101 Joel Spark, “MDA, Intelsat cancel on-orbit servicing deal,” Space Safety Magazine, 20 January 2012, online: www.spacesafetymagazine.com/2012/01/20/mda-intelsat-cancel-on-orbit-servicing-deal. 102 Canada.com, “MDA eyes new frontier in satellite repair with space lling station,” 14 May 2011, online: http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/business/story.html?id= dec75d-306c-4 4- b1db-e423d7cb0080&k=31433&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign= Feed%3A+canwest%2FF261+(Vancouver+Sun+-+BusinessBC). 103 SpaceRef, 15 March 2011. 104 MDA, “Intelsat Picks MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. for Satellite Servicing,” 15 March 2011, online: www.mdacorporation.com/corporate/news/pr/pr2011031501.cfm, 105 Joel Spark, 20 January 2012. 106 Ibid. 107 Peter B. de Selding, “MDA, Intelsat Scrap In-orbit Servicing Deal,” Space News, 17 January 2012, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/120117-mda-intelsat-scrap-deal.html. 108 Space News, “News Briefs: Venture Aims to Prolong Life of Geo Satellites,” 17 January 2011, at 3; Mark Holmes, “Servicing Satellites: coming to an Orbital Location Near You,” Satellite Today, 1 October 2011, online: www.satellitetoday.com/via/features/37531.html. 109 D. Dowd Muska, “Houston, We have no Purpose,” Nevada Journal, November 1998, online: http://nj.npri.org/nj98/11/cover_story.htm. 110 Mark Wade, “USAF to subsidize EELVs,” Encyclopedia Astronautica, online: www.astronautix.com/ lvs/atlasv.htm. 111 U.S. Space Transportation, Policy Fact Sheet, 6 January 2005; Brian Berger, “SpaceX Fighting for USAF Launches,” Space News, 31 October 2005. 112 J. A. Vedda, Study of the Liability Risk-Sharing Regime in the United States for Commercial Space Transportation, Aerospace Report No. ATR-2006(5266)-1, e Aerospace Corporation, 1 August 2006, online: www.faa.gov/about/oce_org/headquarters_oces/ast/reports_studies/media/Risk_ Study ( nal).pdf. 113 SpaceRef, “NASA seeks proposals for crew and cargo transportation to orbit,” 18 January 2006, online: www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=18791. 114 e White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy,” Oce of the Press Secretary, 13 May 2003, online: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030513-8.html.
190 Endnotes
115 Je Foust, “A Year-end Reality Check,” Space Review, 29 December 2003, online: www.thespacereview.com/article/78/1. 116 European Commission, “Space: A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union: An Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy,” White Paper, Directorate-General for Research, 2004. 117 European Space Agency Director General, Resolution on the European Space Policy, June 2007, at 11, online: www.esa.int/esapub/br/br269/br269.pdf. 118 Anatoly Zak, “Rockets: Angara Family,” Russian Space Web, 2010, online: www.russianspaceweb. com/angara.html; Government of the Russian Federation, “On Measures to Ful ll the Russian Federal Space Program and International Space Agreements, Decree No. 42, Selected Examples of National Laws Governing Space Activities: Russian Federation,” 12 April 1996. 119 Futron Corporation, China and the Second Space Age, 15 October 2003, online: www.futron.com/ pdf/resource_center/white_papers/China_White_paper.pdf. 120 Craig Covault, “Resolution Revolution,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 September 2007, at 30. 121 MDA Ltd., “RadarSat2,” online: www.radarsat2.info/about/mediakit/backgrounder_R2.pdf; Canadian Department of National Defence, “Polar Epsilon to assert Canada’s Arctic sovereignty,” 10 January 2008, online: www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2547. 122 German Aerospace Center, “TerraSAR-X goes into operation,” 9 January 2008, online: www.dlr. de/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-4219/6774_read-11191; Aviation Week & Space Technology, “News Breaks: Russia,” 16 April 2007, at 24; J. Herrmann, N. Faller, M. Weber, and A. Kern, “Infoterra GmbH Initiates Commercial Exploitation of TerraSar-X,” Inforterra GmbH, c. 2005, online: www. gisdevelopment.net/technology/sar/me05_062pf.htm. 123 Andrew Chuter, “New UK Milsat Follows Pattern of Private Ownership Defense Services,” Defense News, 21 May 2007, at 16. 124 CBC News, “Federal government blocks sale of MDA space division,” 10 April 2008, online: www.cbc.ca/money/story/2008/04/10/mdablock.html. 125 Missile Technology Control Regime (2011), online: www.mtcr.info/english. 126 Steven Pifer, “ e U.S. and Russia: Space Cooperation and Export Controls,” Testimony before the House Science Committee, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, 11 June 2003, online: www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/21487.htm. 127 O cial Journal of the European Communities, “Council Regulation (EC) No 2432/2001 of 20 November 2001 amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology,” 20 December 2001; Foreign A airs and International Trade Canada, “De nitions for Terms in Groups 1 and 2,” 21 July 2010, online: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/military/gr1-2-en.asp?#spac; Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 2002, online: http://cns.miis.edu/research/china/chiexp/misreg. htm; Seema Galut and Anupam Srivastava, “Nonproliferation Export Controls in India,” Center for International Trade and Security, June 2005, online: www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/EXEC%20 SUMMARY%2020050616.pdf. 128 United States House of Representatives, “Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,” 25 May 1999, online: www.house.gov/coxreport. 129 Satellite Today, “ITAR Dilemma: nding the balance between regulation and pro t,” 1 July 2008, online: www.satellitetoday.com/via/features/23649.html. 130 Peter B. de Selding, “China Launches Communications Satellite,” Space.com, 6 July 2007, online: www.space.com/missionlaunches/070706_chinasat6b_lnch.html. 131 e White House, “U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy,” Fact Sheet, 13 May 2003, online: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030513-8.html; Space News, “Business Report,” 27 May 2003. 132 Peter B. de Selding, “France Reviews Spot Imagery Policy,” Space News, 19 October 2001.
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133 K.S. Jayaraman, “Russia Wants Access to Indian Satellite Imagery Market,” Space News, 27 January 2003. 134 John C. Baker, Ray A. Williamson, and Kevin M. O’Connell, Commercial Observation Satellites– At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), at 431; Parliament of Canada, “Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign A airs, Issue 21 – Evidence – November 22 meeting,” 22 November 2005, online: www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/ commbus/senate/Com-e/fore-e/21eva-e.htm?Languag. Bill C-25 ful lls Canada’s international and bilateral obligations to regulate the remote sensing space activities of its nationals, as required pursuant to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 2000 Canada-U.S. Intergovernmental Agreement concerning the operation of commercial remote sensing satellite systems. 135 Richard DalBello, interview with author, June 2009. 136 Patrick Chisholm, “Buying Time: Disconnects in Satcom Procurement,” Military Information Technology, 29 November 2003, online: www.military-information-technology.com/article. cfm?DocID=285. 137 Bob Brewin, “Satellite Development Delays Cost DOD $1B,” FCW.com, 26 January 2007, online: www.fcw.com/article97492-01-26-07-Web. 138 David Cavossa, Satellite Industries Association Executive, cited in Jerome Bernard, “U.S. Using Space Supremacy to Wage Combat in Iraq, Afghanistan,” Defense News, 23 June 2006, online: www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1890797&C=airwar. 139 U.S. General Accounting Oce, Satellite Communications – Strategic Approach Needed for DOD’s Procurement of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth, GAO-04-206, December 2003; David Helfgott, “Satellite Communications Poised for Rebound,” SIGNAL, April 2004, online: www.afcea.org/ signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=90&print=yes. 140 Ellen Pawlikowski, et. al. “Space: Disruptive Challenges, New Opportunities, and New Strategies,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2012), at 42. 141 Hosted Payloads, “CHIRP – Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload,” online: www.hostedpayload. com/video/chirp-commercially-hosted-infrared-payload. 142 Don oma, “Public-private Partnerships: e Pathway into Space,” Space News, 2 May 2011, at 19. 143 Turner Brinton, “Pentagon Considering Commercial Launches for Space Experiments,” Space News, 25 February 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/110225-pentagon-commercial- launches.html. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 FAA, 2012. 148 Amy Svitak, “NASA Has Boosted COTS Funding by Additional $40 Million Since October,” Space News, 10 January 2011, at 6. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Amy Svitak, “NASA: Safety Standards Will Not Be Relaxed for Commercial Vehicles,” Space News, 2 May 2011, at 7. 153 Space ight Now, “Worldwide Launch Schedule,” online: http://space ightnow.com/tracking. 154 Space News, “News Briefs: NASA Buys Data from Google Moon Hopefuls,” 10 January 2011, at 3; Frank Morring, Jr., “In Orbit: Moon Data,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 January 2011, at 15. 155 Ibid. 156 Doug Mohney, “Gilat wins Australia NBN Satellite Contract,” 9 May 2011, online: http://satellite. tmcnet.com/topics/satellite/articles/172725-gilat-wins-australia-nbn-satellite-contract.htm. 157 Ibid. 192 Endnotes
158 Satellite Spotlight, “Gilat selected by Optus to provide turnkey VSAT network and operations in Australia,” 6 May 2011, online: http://satellite.tmcnet.com/news/2011/05/06/5492787.htm. 159 Doug Mohney, 2011. 160 Michael A. Taverna, “Money Troubles: Pledges of fresh capital buoy Arianespace, but shareholding picture still unclear,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 January 2011, at 37. 161 Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Putting Arianespace Finances Under the Microscope,” Space News, 17 January 2011, at 6. 162 Arianespace asked for 120 million euros in 2011 and the same amount in 2012. 163 Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Industrial Policy Limits Ariane 5 Cost-savings Potential” Space News, 21 June 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/launch/110621-esa-policy-limits-ariane-savings.html. 164 Anna Veclani, et. al., e Challenges for European Policy on Access to Space, Instituto A ari Internazionali, 22 July 2011, at 13, online: www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1122.pdf. 165 Ibid.
Chapter Six Endnotes 1 Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database,” 2012, online: www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_ weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html. 2 Ibid. 3 Peter L. Hays, “National Security Space Actors and Issues,” in Eligar Sadeh, ed., e Politics of Space: A Survey (Routledge, 2009). 4 Ibid. 5 Defense Industry Daily, “Special Report: e USA’s Transformational Communications Satellite System (TSAT),” 30 October 2008, online: www.defenseindustrydaily.com/special-report-the- usas-transformational-communications-satellite-system-tsat-0866. 6 Tony Capaccio, “Air Force Satellite Contract Is Delayed, Young Says,” Bloomberg.com, 22 September 2008, online: www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJ8ISm.IdxvA. 7 Union of Concerned Scientists. 8 Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbès-Verger and Raymond Ghirardi, e Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 344. 9 Turner Brinton, “House and Senate at Odds over SBIRS Follow-On System,” Spacenews.com, 2 October 2009, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/house-and-senate-odds-over-sbirs-follow-on- system.html. 10 To date the SBIRS program has triggered four reports to Congress under the Nunn-McCurdy Act; the program breached its cost estimates by 25 percent in 2001, by 15 percent in 2004, and by 25 percent twice during 2005. Sam Black, “Fact Sheet on Space Based Infrared System,” Center for Defense Information, 16 October 2007, online: www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion. cfm?documentID=4122; Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scienti c Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, May 2003), at 6; U.S. Government Accountability Oce, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, Report to Congressional Committees, March 2008, at 101-2; Tonya Racasner, “ ird Generation Infrared Program Team Wins AF Space Command’s Agile Acquisition Transformation Leadership Award,” Los Angeles Air Force Base, 14 March 2008, online: www. losangeles.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123090312. 11 Union of Concerned Scientists. 12 All information from Verger et al, at 336-338. 13 e International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2008 (London: Routledge, 2008), at 29. 14 Union of Concerned Scientists. ere are at least two NRO launch classi ed satellites that are believed to be used for either radar imagery intelligence or signals intelligence. 15 Philip Taubman, “In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids,” e New York Times, 11 November 2007. 193 Space Security Index 2012
16 Mark Mazzetti, “Spy Director Ends Program on Satellites,” e New York Times, 22 June 2007. 17 Ben Iannotta, “$408 Million ORS Budget to Have Broad-Based Focus,” Space News, 17 August 2007. 18 Robert K. Ackerman, “Small Satellite O ers Glimpse of the Future,” Signal Magazine, January 2004; Gunter Dirk Krebs, “TacSat 1,” Gunter’s Space Page, 1 January 2005, online: http://space. skyrocket.de/index_frame.htm?http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/tacsat-1.htm. 19 M. Hurley, “Tactical Microsatellite Experiment (TacSat 1),” Navy Research Laboratory, 2004, online: www.nrl.navy.mil/content.php?P=04REVIEW207. 20 Union of Concerned Scientists. 21 Air Force Space Command, “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle,” online: www.afspc.af.mil/ library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3643; Anthony Young, “Heavy Lifting for the New Millennium,” e Space Review, 26 April 2004. 22 U.S. Department of Defense and Oce of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy: Unclassi ed Summary, Washington, DC, January 2011, at 4. 23 Space News, “Space a Priority in Leaner U.S. Military,” 9 January 2012, at 3. 24 M.G. Mullen, e National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Rede ning America’s Military Leadership, Joint Chiefs of Sta , 8 February 2011, online: www.jcs.mil/content/ les/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf, 9. 25 Ibid. 26 U.S. Marine Headquarters, “ e Air-Sea Battle concept summary,” 10 November 2011, online: www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/Pages/ eAir-SeaBattleconceptsummary.aspx#.T5xFm9WaKSo. 27 Christopher P. Cavas, “Air-Sea Battle Oce a Nexus of Networking,” Defense News, 9 November 2011, online: www.defensenews.com/article/20111109/DEFSECT01/111090301/Air-Sea-Battle- Oce-Nexus-Networking. 28 Bill Gertz, “Pentagon battle concept has Cold War posture on China,” Washington Times, 9 November 2011, online: www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/9/pentagon-battle- concept-signals-cold-war-posture-o/?page=all. 29 William Graham, “Delta IV Heavy launches on debut West Coast launch with NRO L-49,” NASA Space ight.com, 20 January 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/01/live-delta-iv-heavy- launch-nro-l-49. 30 Turner Brinton, “NRO Satellite Launched in January Closed Capability Gap,” Space News, 15 April 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/launch/110415-nro-sat-closed-gap.html. 31 Stephen Clark, “Classi ed satellite climbs to space on Minotaur rocket,” Space ight Now, 6 February 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/minotaur/nrol66/index.html. 32 Space ight Now, “Delta 4 rocket soars on NROL-27,” 12 March 2011, online: http:// space ightnow.com/delta/d353/remotes. 33 William Graham, “ULA Atlas V launches with NROL-34 payload,” NASA Space ight.com, 14 April 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/04/ula-atlas-v-launch-with-nrol-34. 34 Tony Capaccio, “U.S. Spy Satellite Chief Says Programs Now on Schedule, Cost,” Bloomberg, 15 September 2011, online: www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-09-15/u-s-spy-satellite-chief- says-programs-now-on-schedule-cost-1-.html. 35 Todd Havolrson, “Satellites played big role in getting bin Laden,” Air Force Times, 3 May 2011, online: www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/05/ap-spacecraft-played-role-in-bin-laden-raid-050311. 36 David Axe, “With Drones and Satellites, U.S. Zeroed in on bin Laden,” Wired, 3 May 2011, online: www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/05/with-drones-and-satellites-u-s-zeroed-in-on-bin-laden. 37 GAO, Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and E ciencies of DOD’s ISR Enterprise Washington, DC, GAO-11-465, 3 June 2011. 38 Peter B. de Selding, “Pentagon Struggles with Avalanche of Data,” Space News, 19 October 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/111019-pentagon-struggles-surveillance-data.html. 39 Warren Ferster, “NGA Awards Big Satellite Imagery Contracts,” Space News, 6 August 2010, online: www.spacenews.com/earth_observation/100806-NGA-awards-imagery-contracts.html.
194 Endnotes
40 Peter B. de Selding, “NGA Bracing for New Congressional Scruitiny of EnhancedView Funding,” Space News, 30 September 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/110930-nga-scrutiny- enhancedview.html. 41 Rachel Bernstein, “Lawmakers Rally Behind EnhancedView Program,” Space News, 29 November 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/policy/111129-lawmakers-rally-behind-enhancedview.html. 42 Colin Clark, “White House Orders Commercial Spy Study as Deep Cuts Rumored,” AOL Defense, 8 December 2011, online: http://defense.aol.com/2011/12/08/white-house-orders-commercial-spy- sat-study-as-deep-cuts-rumored. 43 Warren Ferster, “U.S. Air Force Draws Final Curtain on DWSS,” Space News, 24 January 2011, online: http://spacenews.com/military/air-force-draws- nal-curtain-dwss.html. 44 Tony Capaccio, “Pentagon Said to Propose ending $6.8 Billion Missile, Satellite,” Business Week, 25 January 2012, online: www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-25/pentagon-said-to-propose- ending-6-8-billion-missile-satellite.html. 45 Stephen Clark, “U.S. military turns to private sector for SATCOM capacity,” Space ight Now, 17 February 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1102/17milsatcom. 46 Greg Slabodkin, “DISA puts nishing touches on GSM, FCSA contracts,” Defense Systems, 6 December 2011, online: http://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/12/13/cover-story-sidebar- disa-contracts.aspx. 47 Debra Werner, “U.S. Air Force Assumes Role in DISA Satellite-lease Initiative,” Space News, 5 September 2011, at 1. 48 Ibid. 49 Turner Brinton, “House Panel Slashes Funding for ASSIST,” Space News, 13 May 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/110513-house-slashes-funding-assist.html. 50 Marcia S. Smith, “Senate Approps Says DOD Should Allow Competition in Space,” SpacePolicyOnline.com, 17 September 2011, online: www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/senate- approps-says-dod-should-allow-competition-in-space-launch-no-to-assist. 51 Ibid. 52 Air Force-Magazine.com, “AEHF-1 Reaches Operational Perch,” 26 October 2011, online: www.airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2011/October%202011/October%2026%202011/ AEHF-1ReachesOperationalPerch.aspx. 53 GAO, Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs, Washington, DC, GAO-11-404, 21 July 2011. 54 Stephen Clark, “Air Force recoups costs to save stranded AEHF satellite,” Space ight Now, 14 June 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1106/14aehf. 55 Air Force-Magazine.com, 2011. 56 Amy Butler, “USAF Plans First AEHF Launch Early Next Year,” Aviation Week, c. 2008, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp_includes/articlePrint.jsp?storyID=news/AEHF04048. xml&headLine=USAF%20Plans%20First%20AEHF%20Launch%20Early%20Next%20Year; Lockheed Martin, Advanced EHF: Assured, Protected, Survivable, 8 November 2011, online: http://space ightnow.com/atlas/av031/factsheet.pdf. 57 Turner Brinton, “Senate Authorizers: AEHF Block Buy Must Save 20 Percent,” Space News, 24 June 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/110624-senate-authorizers-aehf-block-buy- must-save-percent.html. 58 Andy Pasztor and Nathan Hodge, “Space Projects of Pentagon To Get Boost,” e Wall Street Journal, 11 February 2011, online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870462900457 6136653772961410.html. 59 Justin Ray, “Air Force satellite’s epic ascent should nish soon,” Space ight Now, 9 October 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/atlas/av019/111009.html. 60 Stephen Clark, “Air Force recoups costs to save stranded AEHF satellite,” Space ight Now, 14 June 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1106/14aehf. 61 Stephen Clark, “Air Force procures another WGS communications craft,” Space ight Now, 6 September 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1109/06wgs.
195 Space Security Index 2012
62 Space News, “U.S. Air Force orders Eighth WGS Satellite,” 9 January 2012, at 3. 63 Fox News, “Air Force launches new military communications satellite,” 20 January 2012, online: www.foxnews.com/scitech/2012/01/20/air-force-launches-new-military-communications- satellite/#ixzz1kDmoUy5n. 64 Debra Werner, “U.S. Air Force Expects to Order Another Wideband Global Satellite with Allies’ Help,” Space News, 11 January 2012, online: www.spacenews.com/military/air-force-now-expects- order-10th-wideband-global-satellite.html. 65 Stephen Clark, 6 September 2011. 66 Justin Ray, “Next Delta 4 rocket to boost military communications,” Space ight Now, 11 October 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/delta/d358/rollout.html. 67 Debra Werner, “U.S. Air Force Expects to Order Another Wideband Global Satellite with Allies’ Help,” Space News, 11 January 2012, online: www. oridatoday.com/article/20120118/ NEWS02/301180009/1st-lifto -2012-will-aid-military?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|Space%20News. 68 Stephen Clark, “Air Force procures another WGS communications craft,” Space ight Now, 6 September 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1109/06wgs. 69 Turner Brinton, “STSS Satellites Demonstrate ‘Holy Grail’ of Missile Tracking,” Space News, 23 March 2011, online: http://spacenews.com/military/110323-stss-demo-birth-death-missile- tracking.html. 70 Stephen Clark, “STSS demo satellites ready for missile defense testing,” Space ight Now, 7 February 2011, online: http://space ightnow.com/news/n1102/07stss. 71 Amy Butler, “MDA Drops Target-Acquisition From Next Sats,” Aviation Week, 14 April 2011, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/ asd/2011/04/14/01.xml. 72 Turner Brinton, 23 March 2011. 73 Turner Brinton, “Air Force’s 1st Dedicated SBIRS Satellite Makes Orbit,” Space News, 9 May 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/launch/110509-af- rst-sbirs-carried-orbit.html. 74 Justin Ray, “Beginning a new generation of missile early-warning,” Space ight Now, 7 May 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/atlas/av022. 75 Ibid. 76 Space War, “Lockheed Martin Competes Final Installations On Missile Warning Spacecraft,” 17 February 2011, online: www.spacewar.com/reports/Lockheed_Martin_Completes_Final_ Installations_On_Missile_Warning_Spacecraft_999.html. 77 Defense News, “SBIRS Can Gather Intelligence,” 12 April 2011, online: www.defensenews.com/ story.php?i=6221350&c=AIR&s=TOP. 78 Turner Brinton, 9 May 2011. 79 Space News, “SBIRS GEO-2 Satellite Clears Acoustic Testing,” 29 August 2011, at 8. 80 Space War, 17 February 2011. 81 UPI, “U.S. military modi es infrared contract,” 5 April 2011, online: www.upi.com/ Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/04/05/US-military-modi es-infrared-contract/UPI- 10941302026182. 82 Air-Force Magazine.com, “SBIRS Gains Flexibility,” 4 April 2011, online: www.airforce-magazine. com/DRArchive/Pages/2011/April%202011/April%2007%202011/SBIRSGainsFlexibility.aspx. 83 Space War, “USAF Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload Launched from Kourou,” 23 September 2011, online: www.spacedaily.com/reports/USAF_Commercially_Hosted_Infrared_Payload_ Launched_from_Kourou_999.html. 84 Stephen Clark, “Money-saving missile detection sensor powered on,” Space ight Now, 4 November 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1111/04chirp. 85 NASA, “ORS-1 Launch Information,” 30 June 2011, online: www.nasa.gov/centers/wallops/ missions/orsinfo.html. 86 Stephen Clark, “Tactical spy satellite streaks into space on Minotaur rocket,” Space ight Now, 30 June 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/minotaur/ors1/index.html. 196 Endnotes
87 Space News, “ORS-1 Hando Marks Start Of Its Operational Mission,” 24 October 2011, at 8. 88 Stephen Clark, 30 June 2011. 89 U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, “NRL TacSat-4 Launches to Augment Communication Needs,” 9 September 2011, online: www.nrl.navy.mil/media/news-releases/2011/nrl-tacsat4-launches-to- augment-communications-needs. 90 Stephen Clark, “New military communications satellite could ‘save lives,’” Space ight Now, 28 October 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/minotaur/tacsat4/110928tacsat4. 91 Stephen Clark, “Low-cost UHF antenna deployed on Navy satellite,” Space ight Now, 8 October 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/minotaur/tacsat4/111008update. 92 Memorandum of Understanding Among the United States Air Force, the National Reconnaissance O ce, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles, 10 March 2011. 93 Coordinated Strategy Among the United States Air Force, the National Reconnaissance O ce, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for New Entrant Launch Vehicle Certi cation; USAF, “New entrant certi cation strategy announced,” 14 October 2011, online: www.af.mil/news/story. asp?id=123275888. 94 Ibid. 95 GAO, DOD Needs to Ensure New Acquisition Strategy is Based on Su cient Information, Washington, DC, GAO-11-641, 17 October 2011. 96 Rachel Bernstein, “Report Urges Pentagon to Reassess EELV Block Procurement Plan,” Space News, 24 October 2011, at 10. 97 Rachel Bernstein, “U.S. Air Force To Seek Bids on EELV,” Space News, 25 October 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/air-force-seek-bids-eelv.html. 98 Amy Butler, “U.S. Air Force Pushes to Reduce EELV Costs,” Aviation Week, 2 November 2011, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/ asd/2011/11/01/07.xml. 99 Warren Ferster, “Amendments Call for Tighter Scrutiny of EELV Program,” Space News, 25 November 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/111125-amendments-scrutiny-eelv- program.html; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Pub. L. 112-81. 125 Stat. 1509-1510. 31 December 2011. 100 Justin Ray, “GPS navigation satellite takes nighttime ride to orbit,” Space ight Now, 16 July 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/delta/d355. 101 Space News, “Boeing Hands O GPS 2F to Air Force After Checkout,” 29 August 2011, at 8. 102 Justin Ray, “18-year-old GPS satellite returns to navigation duty,” Space ight Now, 17 August 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1108/17gps. 103 Technical Working Group Final Report into LightSquared Interference with GPS, June 2011, online: http://licensing.fcc.gov/myibfs/download.do?attachment_key=900848. 104 Peter B. de Selding “LightSquared Su ers Setbacks on Two Fronts,” Space News, 17 June 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110617-lightsquared-setbacks-two-fronts.html; Turner Brinton, “Reports: LightSquared Plan Poses Unacceptable Risk to GPS Service,” Space News 10 June 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110610-lightsquared-risk-gps.html. 105 Warren Ferster, “FCC To Pull LightSquared License,” Space News, 15 February 2012, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/120215-fcc-pull-lightsquared-license.html. 106 NATO, Weapons in Space and Global Security, Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Sub-Committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology, 156 STCMT 03 E, 2003, at 5. 107 Anatoly Zak, “GLONASS Network,” Russian Space Web, 2012, online: www.russianspaceweb. com/uragan.html#46. 108 Interfax, “No More Reductions of Russian Satellite Fleet Planned,” 14 July 2004. 109 RIA Novosti, “Russia’s Space Defenses Stage a Revival,” 4 October 2006, online: http://en.rian.ru/ analysis/20061004/54509604-print.html.
197 Space Security Index 2012
110 Federation of American Scientists, “Russia and Communications Satellite Systems,” c. 1997, online: www.fas.org/spp/guide/russia/comm/index.html. 111 Union of Concerned Scientists. 112 Information from Pavel Podvig, “Russia and the Military Use of Space,” in Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008). 113 Stephen Clark, “Russia launches relay craft, commemorative satellites,” Space ight Now, 23 May 2008, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n0805/23rockot. 114 BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, “Russian Space Conference Looks at Problems and Challenges,” redOrbit.com, 25 November 2005, online: www.redorbit.com/news/space/302983/ russian_space_conference_looks_at_problems_challenges/index.html. 115 Union of Concerned Scientists. 116 Ibid. 117 Pavel Podvig, “History and the Current Status of the Russian Early Warning System,” 10 Science and Global Security, 2002, at 21-60; Pavel Podvig, “Early Warning,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 9 February 2009, online: http://russianforces.org/sprn. 118 Pavel Podvig, “Reducing the risk of an accidental launch,” 14 Science and Global Security, 2006, at 35. 119 Geo rey Forden, Pavel Podvig and eodor A. Postol, “False alarm, nuclear danger,” IEEE Spectrum, March 2000, online: www.armscontrol.ru/Start/publications/spectrum-ews.htm. 120 Verger et al, at 341. 121 e Lavochkin Science and Production Association agreed to build the Arkon-2 multirole radar satellite for the Federal Space Agency. It is designed to take high-resolution and medium-resolution photos for federal clients, and to use the information for national defense programs. Yuri Zatitsev, “Russia Developing New Space Radars,” RIA Novosti, 3 March 2005. 122 Union of Concerned Scientists. 123 Pavel Podvig, 2008. 124 Verger et al, at 319-323. 125 Anatoly Zak, “Russia Orbits a New-Generation GPS Bird,” Russian Space Web, 25 February 2011, online: www.russianspaceweb.com/uragan_k.html. 126 Stephen Clark, “Proton Rocket Replenishes Russian Navigation System,” Space ight Now, 3 November 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1111/03proton. 127 Anatoly Zak, “GLONASS Network,” Russian Space Web, 2012, online: www.russianspaceweb. com/uragan.html#46. 128 Stephen Clark, “Proton Rocket Replenishes Russian Navigation System,” Space ight Now, 3 November 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1111/03proton; Chris Bergin, “Soyuz 2-1B Successfully Launches New GLONASS-M Satellite into Orbit,” NASASpace ight.com, 28 November 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/11/soyuz-2-1b-launches-new-glonass- m-satellite-orbit. 129 Anatoly Zak, “GLONASS Network,” 2012. 130 Stephen Clark, “GLONASS Navigation System Beefed Up with Soyuz Launch,” Space ight Now, 28 November 2011, online: http://space ightnow.com/news/n1111/28soyuz; Federal Space Agency, Information-Analytical Center, 2012, online: www.glonass-center.ru/en. 131 Ria Novosti, “Russia, India to Cooperate in Production of Satellite Navigation Equipment,” 16 December 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111216/170302267.html. 132 Ria Novosti, “Russia’s GLONASS SatNav System Targets Latin America, India.” 13 December 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/world/20111213/170218174.html. 133 Anatoly Zak, “ e Meridian Satellite,” Russian Space Web, 2012, online: www.russianspaceweb. com/meridian.html#4.
198 Endnotes
134 William Graham, “Soyuz 2-1A Launches with Russian Meridian 4 Military Satellite,” NASASpace ight.com, 4 May 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/05/soyuz-2- 1a-russian-meridian-4-military-satellite. 135 Anatoly Zak, “ e Meridian Satellite,” 2012. 136 Anatoly Zak, “Kobalt-M satellite,” Russian Space Web, 2012, online: www.russianspaceweb.com/ kobalt_m.html#2472. 137 Ibid.; Stephen Clark, “Soyuz Rocket Lifts O with Russian Spy Satellite,” Space ight Now, 27 June 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1106/27soyuz. 138 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Garpun,” Gunter’s Space Page, 2012, online: http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_ sdat/garpun.htm. 139 Anatoly Zak, “Luch Satellite,” Russian Space Web, 2012, online: www.russianspaceweb.com/ luch5a.html. 140 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Luch-5A,” Gunter’s Space Page, 2012, online: http://space.skyrocket.de/ doc_sdat/luch-5a.htm. 141 Stephen Clark, “Russian Satellite Feared Stranded by Rocket Mishap,” Space ight Now, 1 February 2011, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n1102/01rockot. 142 Ria Novosti, “Missing Satellite Found o Designated Orbit,” 19 August 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110819/165934513.html. 143 Ria Novosti, “Russia Launches Proton-M Carrier Rocket from Baikonur Space Center,” 21 September 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110921/166992802.html. 144 Anatoly Zak, “ e Meridian Satellite,” 2012. 145 Konstantin Bogdanov, “Russian Rocket Launches European Satellites from Guiana Space Center,” Ria Novosti, 24 October 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20111024/168073801.html. 146 Arianespace, “Soyuz – Overview,” 2012, online: www.arianespace.com/launch-services-soyuz/ soyuz-introduction.asp. 147 Konstantin Bogdanov, 24 October 2011. 148 Anatoly Zak, “Russia’s New Angara Rockets to be Test Launched Before 2014- Space Forces,” Ria Novosti, 24 March 2011, online: http://en.rian.ru/science/20110324/163172746.html. 149 Russian Space Web, “Angara Launch Vehicle,” 2012, online: www.russianspaceweb.com/angara. html. 150 GlobalSecurity.org, “China Military Space Projects,” 25 June 2010, online: www.globalsecurity.org/ space/world/china/military.htm. 151 China State Council Information Oce, China’s National Defense in 2008, White Paper, 20 January 2009, online: www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-01/20/content_7413294.htm; Trefor Moss, “Space Race,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 October 2008, at 28. 152 GlobalSecurity.org, “China and Imagery Intelligence,” 20 October 2005, online: www. globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/imint.htm. 153 Jane’s Space Directory, “Government and Non-Government Space Programs: China,” 14 October 2004. 154 e International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003-2004 (London: Routledge, 2004), at 230, 304; Union of Concerned Scientists. 155 Surrey Satellite Technologies Ltd., “Disaster Monitoring and High-Resolution Imaging,” 2005, online: www.sstl.co.uk/index.php?loc=121. It has been reported that “Government departments will also use the satellite during emergencies to aid decision-making of the central government” (People’s Daily Online, “Beijing-1 Satellite Starts Remote Sensing Service,” 8 June 2006, online: http://english.people.com.cn/200606/08/eng20060608_272262.html). 156 Xinhua, “Remote Sensing Satellite Successfully Launched,” 27 April 2006, online: http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/27/content_4480989.htm. 157 Jonathan Weng, “China satellite launch indicates rapid progress,” Jane’s Defence Review, 13 June 2007, at 25; Jonathan McDowell, “NROL,” Jonathan’s Space Report No. 581, 23 June 2007,
199 Space Security Index 2012
online: www.planet4589.org/space/jsr/back/news.581. e last two satellites were launched in 2008 after the publication of these articles. ey are most likely optical imaging satellites. 158 John Pike, “ e Military Uses of Outer Space,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 635-6; Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “China Pro le,” 2010, online: www.nti.org/e_research/pro les/China/index.html. 159 John Pike, at 635-6. 160 Geo rey Forden, “Strategic Uses for China’s Beidou Satellite System,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 16 September 2003; Geo rey Forden, “ e Military Capabilities and Implications of China’s Indigenous Satellite-Based Navigation System,” 12 Science and Global Security, 2004, at 232. 161 Xinhua, “China puts new navigation satellite into orbit,” 3 February 2007, online: http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/2007-02/03/content_5689019.htm; Xinhua, “China launches ‘Compass’ navigation satellites,” 14 April 2007, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-04/14/ content_5974414.htm. 162 Mike Wall, “China Activates Homegrown GPS System,” Space.com, 28 December 2011, online: www.space.com/14063-china-gps-system-beidou-operational.html. 163 Dr. Jing Guifei, National Remote Sensing Center of China and the Ministry of Science and Technology, quoted in GPS World, “China Discusses Beidou with the GNSS Community,” 21 February 2008, online: http://sidt.gpsworld.com/gpssidt/content/printContentPopup. jsp?id=493496; Glen Gibbons, “China’s Compass/Beidou: Back-Track or Dual Track?” Inside GNSS, March/April 2008. According to the following article, the military signal could provide accuracy up to 10 m: GPS Daily, “China Starts to Build Own Satellite Navigation System,” 3 November 2006, online: www.gpsdaily.com/reports/China_Starts_To_Build_Own_Satellite_ Navigation_System_999.html. 164 Inside GNSS, “China Launches 5th Compass (Beidou-2) Navigation Satellite – First IGSO,” 1 August 2010, online: www.insidegnss.com/node/2211. 165 Astronautix, “CZ 4B Chronology,” 2007, online: www.astronautix.com/lvs/cz4b.htm; James Lewis, “China as a Military Space Competitor,” in Perspectives on Space Security, ed. John Logsdon and Audrey Scha er (Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 2005), at 101, online: www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/PERSPECTIVES_ON_SPACE_SECURITY.pdf. 166 Stephen Clark, “China Lofts New Satellite, Breaks US Rocket Launch Record,” Space.com, 26 December 2011, online: www.space.com/14048-china-satellite-launch-breaks-rocket-record.html. 167 Spacetoday.net “China Activates Satellite Navigation System,” 28 December 2011, online: http://spacetoday.net/getsummary.php?id=5483. 168 Peter B. de Selding, “China, Europe Still at Odds over Navigation Spectrum,” Space News, 4 March 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/110304-china-europe-odds-nav- spectrum.html. 169 Rui C. Barbosa, “China Kicks O eir Big 2011 Push With BeiDou-2 Launch,” NASA Space ight.com, 9 April 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/04/china-big-2011- push-beidou-2-launch. 170 Stephen Clark, “Chinese Navigation Satellite Launched into Orbit,” Space.com, 28 July 2011, online: www.space.com/12462-china-rocket-launch-navigation-satellite.html. 171 Rui C. Barbosa, “China Breaks Record with Long March 3A Launch of Another BeiDou-2 Satellite,” NASA Space ight.com, 1 December 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/12/ china-breaks-record-long-march-3a-launch-beidou-2-satellite. 172 Richard B. Langley, “Beidou/Compass Declared Operational, Test ICD Released,” GPS World. com, 27 December 2011, online: www.gpsworld.com/GNSS%20System/Compass/news/ beidoucompass-declared-operational-test-icd-released-12458. 173 Ben Blanchard, “China Begins Using New Global Positioning Satellite,” Reuters.com, 27 December 2011, online: http://ca.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idCATRE7BQ07520111227. 174 Richard B. Langley, 27 December 2011. 175 Ibid. 176 Mike Wall, “China Activates Homegrown GPS System,” Space.com, 28 December 2011, online: www.space.com/14063-china-gps-system-beidou-operational.html. 200 Endnotes
177 Edward Wong and Kenneth Chang, “Space Plan from China Broadens Challenge to U.S.,” New York Times, 29 December 2011, online: www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/asia/china-unveils- ambitious-plan-to-explore-space.html?pagewanted=all. 178 Peter B. de Selding, “China Unveils Space Mission Plans rough 2016,” Space.com, 29 December 2011, online: www.space.com/14076-china-unveils-space-mission-plans-2016.html. 179 Peter B. de Selding, “European Commission Urges China Dialogue,” Space News, 5 April 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110405-space-policy-document-calls-for-dialogue-with-china. html. 180 Ibid. 181 2011 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, November 2011. 182 Harry Kazianis, “China’s Anti-Access Missile,” e Diplomat, 18 November 2011, online: http://the-diplomat.com/ ashpoints-blog/2011/11/18/chinaa-anti-access-missile. 183 Tony Capaccio, “China Has ‘Workable’ Anti-Ship Missile Design, Pentagon Says,” Bloomberg, 25 August 2011, online: www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-25/china-has-workable-anti-ship- missile-design-pentagon-says.html. 184 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, Oce of the Secretary of Defense, 2011. 185 Peter Foster, “China increasing military use of space with new satellites,” Telegraph, 13 July 2011, online: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8632219/China-increasing-military-use- of-space-with-new-satellites.html. 186 Rui C. Barbosa, “Long March 4B launches YaoGan Weixing -12 for China,” NASA Space ight. com, 9 November 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/11/long-march-4b-launches- yaogan-weixing-12. 187 Space Daily, “China launches remote-sensing satellite Yaogan XIII,” 1 December 2011, online: www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_launches_remote_sensing_satellite_Yaogan_XIII_999.html. 188 Stephen Clark, “China Launches Military Reconnaissance Satellite into Orbit,” Space.com, 10 November 2011, online: www.space.com/13571-china-launches-military-satellite-orbit.html. 189 Stephen Clark, “China Launches Military Satellite 1 Month After Rocket Failure,” Space.com, 19 September 2011, online: www.space.com/13001-china-launches-military-communications- satellite.html. 190 National Space Science Data Center, “Chinasat 1A,” 2012, online: http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/ spacecraftDisplay.do?id=2011-047A. 191 Xinhua, “China launches experimental satellite,” 6 July 2011, online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english2010/china/2011-07/06/c_13969022.htm. 192 Rui C. Barbosa, “China make it two in a week via successful Shi Jian 11-02 launch,” NASA Space ight.com, 29 July 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/07/china-make-it-two-in-a- week-shi-jian-11-launch. 193 Stephen Clark, “Chinese rocket fails to orbit experimental satellite,” Space ight Now, 18 August 2011, online: http://space ightnow.com/news/n1108/18longmarch; Rui C. Barbosa, 29 July 2011. 194 Union of Concerned Scientists. 195 Ibid. 196 G. Madhavan Nair, Secretary in the Department of Space and Chairman of ISRO, quoted in Fresh News, “India ready for launch of satellite with military applications,” 21 September 2007, online: www.freshnews.in/india-ready-for-launch-of-satellite-with-military-applications-15639. 197 SpaceMart, “ISRO’s New Satellite Could See through Even Cloudy Sky,” 7 November 2008, online: www.spacemart.com/reports/ISRO_New_Satellite_Could_See_ rough_Even_Cloudy_ Sky_999.html; Richard Cochrane, “New Indian Satellite Can See through Clouds,” Hypocrisy.com, 7 November 2008, online: http://richardcochrane.hypocrisy.com/2008/11/07/new-indians-satellite- can-see-through-clouds. 198 CNN, “India launches radar imaging satellite,” 20 April 2009, online: http://edition.cnn.com/ 2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/20/india.satellite/index.html.
201 Space Security Index 2012
199 Government of India, “Indian National Satellite System,” 10 June 2010, online: http://india.gov.in/ sectors/science/indian_national.php. 200 livemint.com, “India to build a constellation of 7 navigation satellites by 2012,” 5 September 2007, online: www.livemint.com/2007/09/05002237/India-to-build-a-constellation.html. 201 RIA Novosti, “GLONASS Navigation System Available to India–Russia,” 21 January 2007, online: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070122/59520011.html. 202 Dr. Kasturirangan, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Keynote Address at the International Space Security Conference: Scope and Prospects for Global Cooperation, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, New Delhi, 13-14 November 2007). 203 Rear Admiral Raja Menon, “Space and National Strategies,” Presentation at the International Space Security Conference: Scope and Prospects for Global Cooperation, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, New Delhi, 13-14 November 2007; Esther Pan, Backgrounder, “ e U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2 October 2008, online: www.cfr.org/publication/9663. 204 ISRO, “Earth Observation Satellites,” 2012, online: www.isro.org/satellites/resourcesat-2.aspx. 205 Stephen Clark, “Indian Rocket Reaches Space with Observation Satellite,” Space.com, 20 April 2011, online: www.space.com/11441-indian-rocket-launch-singapore-satellite.html. 206 K.S. Jayaraman, “PSLV Lofts ree Satellites, Including Resourcesat-2,” Space News, 20 April 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/launch/110420pslv-lofts-three-satellites-including-resourcesat-2.html. 207 Hemanth CS, “Launch of Risat-1 to boost country’s recce capabilities,” DNA India, 22 November 2011, online: www.dnaindia.com/india/report_launch-of-risat-1-to-boost-countrys-recce- capabilities_1615748. 208 Debajit Sarkar, “Vision-2020 – e Next Step for India’s Military Space Programs,” Defense Update, 20 December 2011, online: http://defense-update.com/20111220_vision-2020-the-next-step-for- indias-military-space-programs.html. 209 Manmohan Singh, “Military satellite delayed again by a year,” Times of India, 13 October 2011, online: http://articles.timeso ndia.indiatimes.com/2011-10-13/india/30274617_1_gsat-7-satellite- indian-space-research-organization. 210 Verger et al, at 70-72. 211 Euroconsult, “Government Space Program Expenditures Worldwide Hit a Record $62 billion,” 18 December 2008. 212 Verger et al, at 72. 213 Yahya A. Dehqanzada & Ann M. Florini, Secrets for Sale: How Commercial Satellite Imagery will Change the World (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), cited in Je rey T. Richelson, “ e Whole World is Watching,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/ February 2006, at 33. 214 Defense News, “Europe begins debate on next-generation spy satellites,” 6 February 2006. 215 Federation of American Scientists, “ e First European Military Observation Satellite,” 1999, online: www.fas.org/spp/guide/france/military/imint/helios1a.htm. 216 PhysOrg.com, “France launches spy satellite,” 19 December 2004, online: www.physorg.com/ news2438.html. 217 Space ight Now, “German Radar Spy Satellite Launches into Space,” 19 December 2006, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n0612/19sarlupe; Tom Kington, “Crunch Time for Europe,” Defense News, 6 February 2006 at 11; Aleniaspazio, “COSMO-SkyMed,” online: www.aleniaspazio. it/earth_observation_page.aspx?IdProg=23; SpaceMart, “ ales Alenia Space To Deliver Very-High- Resolution Optical Imaging Instrument To Astrium,” 11 July 2008, online: www.spacemart.com/ reports/ ales_Alenia_Space_To_Deliver_Very_High_Resolution_Optical_Imaging_Instrument_ To_Astrium_999.html. 218 Centre national d’études spatiales, “Organization of the ORFEO Program,” 19 May 2009, online: http://smsc.cnes.fr/PLEIADES/GP_organisation.htm.
202 Endnotes
219 Rodoula Zissi, “Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS): European space cooperation for security and defence,” European Security and Defence Assembly: Fifty-Fifth Session, 6 November 2008, online: www.assembly- weu.org/en/Reports%20Dec%202008/2025.pdf?PHPSESSID= 46e63a1504db501f256c1a193010123d. 220 Pierre Tran, “France Readies Satellite Launches,” Defence News, 6 November 2008, online: www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3807629. 221 Space News, “MUSIS ground system deal teeters on edge of collapse,” 25 April 2010, online: www.spacenews.com/military/100425-musis-deal-teeters.html. 222 Space News, “European Rocket Sends French Military Satellite Aloft,” 28 November 2005. 223 For a discussion see Federation of American Scientists, “Helios,” World Space Guide, 10 December 1999, online: www.fas.org/spp/guide/france/military/imint. 224 IISS 2004, at 230. 225 BBC News, “UK Skynet military satellite system extended,” 9 March 2010, online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8556585.stm. 226 Ibid. 227 Space War, “German Forces Will Receive Secure Network with Two Satellites,” 9 July 2006, online: www.spacewar.com/reports/German_Armed_Forces_Will_Receive_Secure_Network_ With_Two_Satellites_999.html. 228 IISS 2004, at 230. 229 Keith Stein, “France Launches First Missile Tracking Satellites,” Associated Content, 23 February 2009, online: www.associatedcontent.com/article/1485778/france_launches_ rst_missile_tracking. html?cat=15. 230 Pierre Tran, “France Readies Satellite Launches,” Defence News, 6 November 2008, online: www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3807629. 231 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Space Policy, 2007, 212 nal, 26 April 2007 at para. 3.4, online: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/space/doc_pdf/esp_comm7_0212_en.pdf. 232 David Long et al., e Evolution and Shape of European Space Policy: Preliminary Report for DFAIT, Foreign A airs and International Trade Canada, 2004, at 25. 233 Andrew B. Godefroy, Europe in a Changing Global Context: Space Policy, Security, and Non- Weaponization, Foreign A airs and International Trade Canada, 2004, at 14. 234 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “IGS-Optical 1, 2,” Gunter’s Space Page, 4 January 2005, online: www.skyrocket.de/space/doc_sdat/igs-optical-1.htm. 235 Mark Wade, “IGS,” Astronautix, 2008, online: www.astronautix.com/craft/igs.htm. 236 Space Flight, “Japanese Spy Satellite Rockets into Orbit,” 11 September 2006, online: www.space ightnow.com/news/n0609/11h2aigs. 237 Kim Yong-ho, “Air Force Begins Establishment of the Space Command Center in Full-Scale,” Seoul Kukpang Journal, 1 December 2003. 238 John Pike, at 641. 239 e order was placed in 1996. IISS 2004, at 306. 240 Asia Satellite News, “Koreasat 5 Launched,” 29 August 2006, online: www.telecomseurope.net/ article.php?id_article=2979. 241 RIA Novosti, “Russian Rocket Launches South Korea’s Kompsat 2,” 28 July 2006, online: www.gisdevelopment.net/news/print.asp?id=GIS:N_sawjfmqrvz&cat=New+Products&subc= Satellite+Imagery. 242 Spot Image, “Kompsat 2: e Alternative Metric Solution,” 2010, online: www.spotimage.fr/ html/_167_171_1155_.php. 243 Agence France-Presse, “ ailand Signs Deal with French Company for Spy Satellite,” 19 July 2004. 244 Union of Concerned Scientists.
203 Space Security Index 2012
245 Agence France-Presse, “Taiwan Planning Spy Satellite: Report,” 10 October 2005; Mail and Guardian, “Taiwan Plans Launch of Spy Satellite,” 10 October 2005. In 2006 Taiwan’s military released reconnaissance photos that it claimed depicted China’s military buildup; Yahoo! Asia News, “Taiwanese Military Shows Satellite Images of China’s Military Build-up,” 20 January 2006, online: http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060119/kyodo/d8f7mj280.html. 246 Defense Update, “Israel Launches New Satellite,” updated 9 July 2002, online: www.defense- update.com/news/ofeq5.htm; IISS 2004, at 230. e launch of Ofek-4 in 1999 failed (p. 281). 247 Defense News, “Israel launches Ofeq-9 Satellite,” 22 June 2010, online: www.defensenews.com/ story.php?i=4681651&c=MID&s=AIR. 248 Space News, “Israel’s Eros B imaging satellite reaches orbit,” 1 May 2006. 249 Foreign Policy in Focus, “India and Israel Eye Iran,” 12 February 2008, online: www.fpif.org/ articles/india_and_israel_eye_iran. 250 e Guardian, “Israel launches new satellite to spy on Iran,” 21 January 2008, online: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/21/iran.marktran. 251 Ibid. 252 Je rey T. Richelson, “ e Whole World is Watching,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/ February 2006, at 35. 253 Yitaf S. Shapir, “ e Spirit is Willing: Iran’s E ort to Conquer Space,” 152 Tel Aviv Notes, 6 November 2005; Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran Now Says Satellite Can Spy on Israel,” e Washington Post, 16 November 2005, online: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/ AR2005111601595.html. 254 Robin Hughes, “Long Range Ambitions,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 September 2006, at 26. 255 GIS Development, “Egyptsat-1 placed into orbit,” 18 April 2007, online: www.gisdevelopment.net/ news/viewn.asp?id=GIS:N_hkzlwgbfpr. 256 Jerusalem Post, “Egypt to launch rst spy satellite,” 15 January 2007, online: www.jpost.com/servlet/ Satellite?cid=1167467733037&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 257 David Pugliese, “Canada Nears Access to Dedicated Milsats,” Defense News, 25 September 2006, at 16. 258 Canada Department of National Defence, “Project Polar Epsilon Will Enhance Canada’s Surveillance and Security Capability,” DND/CF News Release, 2 June 2005, online: www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1674. 259 CBC News, “Soyuz rocket lifts Canadian radar satellite into space,” 14 December 2010, online: www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/12/14/tech-radarsat-lifto .html. 260 MDA Ltd., “Features and Bene ts,” RADARSAT-2 Information, 13 May 2009, online: www.radarsat2.info/about/features_bene ts.asp. 261 David Pugliese, “Canada to Launch Design Work on Radarsat,” Defence News, 29 September 2008, at 10. 262 Canadian Space Agency, “RADARSAT Constellation–Overview,” 28 January 2009, online: www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/radarsat/overview.asp. 263 “RADARSAT Constellation,” Canadian Space Agency, online: www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/ radarsat. 264 Peter B. de Selding, “Canada Ocially Joins U.S. WGS Satellite Program,” Space News, 17 January 2012, online: www.spacenews.com/military/011712-canada-ocially-joins-wgs-satellite-program. html. 265 Laura Payton, “Joint military satellite agreement signed by Canada,” CBC News, 17 January 2012, online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/01/17/pol-military-satellites-agreement.html. 266 Peter B. de Selding, “Allied Investment in WGS Could Pinch Demand for Commercial Bandwidth,” Space News, 23 January 2012, online: www.spacenews.com/military/120120- investment-wgs-pinch-commercial.html. 267 Laura Payton, 17 January 2012. 268 Peter B. de Selding, 23 January 2012.
204 Endnotes
269 Peter B. de Selding, “Canada’s WGS Investment Awaits Multination Commitment,” Space News, 30 November 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/military/111130-canada-wgs-commitment.html. 270 Marc Boucher, “MDA to Provide Operations and Maintenance Support for DND Sapphire Satellite System,” Space Ref, 29 March 2011, online: http://spaceref.ca/commercial-space/mda/ mda-to-provide-operations-and-maintenance-support-for-dnd-sapphire-satellite-system.html. 271 Marc Boucher, “India’s Successful Launch of PSLV-C16 is Good for Canada,” Space Ref, 25 April 2011, online: http://spaceref.ca/isro/indias-successful-launch-of-pslv-c16-is-good- news-for-canada.html . 272 Directons Maazine, “Pleiades 1 satellite launched. EADS-Astrium consortium will be another submeter resolution images supplier,” 20 December 2011, online: www.directionsmag.com/ pressreleases/pleiades-1-satellite-launched.-eads-astrium-consortium-will-be-another-subm/221355. 273 Astrium, “SSOT:High-resolution Earth observation for Chile,” 2012, online: www.astrium.eads. net/en/programme/ssto-high-resolution-earth-observation-for-chile.html.. 274 Fuerza Aérea de Chile, “Fuerza Aérea de Chile Pone a Disposición del País las Primeras Imágenes Obtenidas por Satélite FASat-Charlie,” 17 April 2011, online: www.fach.cl/noti_abril12.htm; Felipe Campos, “Lanzamiento del satélite chileno FASat-Charlie,” Seti.cl, 17 December 2011, online: www.seti.cl/lanzamiento-del-satelite-chileno-fasat-charlie. 275 Ibid. 276 Fuerza Aérea de Chile, 17 April 2011. 277 Fuerza Aérea de Chile, “Satélite Chileno Efectuó su Primer Contacto con el País,” 17 April 2011, online: www.fach.cl/noti_abril12.htm. 278 GPS Daily, “Europe defends ‘stupid’ Galileo satellite,” 18 January 2011, online: www.gpsdaily.com/ reports/Europe_defends_stupid_Galileo_satellite_999.html. 279 EU Business, “Price tag of Europe’s Galileo satellite rises again,” 21 January 2011, online: www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/space-aerospace.861. 280 Peter B. de Selding, “Soyuz Lofts Two Galileo Satellites in Debut from European Spaceport,” Space News, 24 October 2012, at 1. 281 GPS World, “First Galileo IOV Satellite Producing Full Spectrum of Signals,” 3 January 2012, online: www.gpsworld.com/GNSS%20System/Galileo/news/ rst-galileo-iov-satellite-producing- full-spectrum-signals-12463. 282 Peter B. de Selding, “Initial Silence Prompts Tense Moments for Successful Pleiades 1A Launch,” Space News, 9 January 2012, at 3. 283 Ibid. 284 Jonathan Amos, “Soyuz launched sharp-eyed Pleiades satellite,” BBC, 16 December 2011, online: www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-16223533. 285 Ibid. 286 Directions Magazine, “Pleiades 1 satellite launched. EADS-Astrium consortium will be another submeter resolution images supplier,” 20 December 2011, online: www.directionsmag.com/ pressreleases/pleiades-1-satellite-launched.-eads-astrium-consortium-will-be-another-subm/221355. 287 Peter B. de Selding 9 January 2012. 288 CNES, “Pléiades and ELISA satellites successfully launched,” 17 December 2011, online: www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/9872-gp-pleiades-and-elisa-satellites-successfully-launched.php. 289 Peter B. de Selding, “Operational French Elint System Slated for End of Decade Start,” Space News, 16 December 2011, online: http://spacenews.com/military/111216--french-elint-end-decade-start. html. 290 Peter B. de Selding, “Individual Nations Would be Asked to Contribute Voluntarily,” Space News, 19 July 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110719-ec-wants-nations-fund-gmes.html; European Space Agency News, “GMES operations another step closer,” ESA News, 15 June 2011, online: www.esa.int/esaCP/SEM0WOXSROG_index_0.html. 291 Ibid. 292 Peter B. de Selding, 19 July 2011.
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293 Peter B. de Selding, “ESA Protests Earth Observation Program’s Removal from Multiyear Budget Proposal,” Space News, 22 July 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110722-esa-protests-gmes- removal-budget.html 294 Peter B. de Selding, “European Commission Urged to Put GMES back in Budget,” Space News, 9 September 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/earth_observation/110909-ec-petitioned- reinstate.html. 295 Peter B. de Selding, “Delay in 1st GMES Satellite Presses Envisat into Longer Service,” Space News, 1 April 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/earth_observation/110411-delay-gmes-sats-presses- envisat.html. 296 Peter B. de Selding, “Eumetsat Secures Full Approval for New Weather Satellite System,” Space News, 25 February 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/civil/110225-eumetsat-secures-approval-mtg. html. 297 Peter B. de Selding, “France Reluctant Yet Hopeful on Cooperative Military Space Programs,” Space News, 5 April 2011, online: http://spacenews.com/military/110405-questions-euro-coop- milspace.html. 298 Ibid. 299 Space Mart, “Signing of EDA-ESA Administrative Arrangement,” 21 June 2011, online: www.spacemart.com/reports/Signing_of_EDA_ESA_Administrative_Arrangement_999.html. 300 Ibid. 301 Julian Hale, “EDA, ESA to Sign Cooperation Pact,” Defense News, 16 June 2011, online: www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6837178&c=POL&s=TOP. 302 Ibid. 303 Mike Wall, “Iran Launches Observation Satellite,” Space.com, 15 June 2011, online: www.space.com/11982-iran-launches-observation-satellite-rasad.html. 304 Ibid. 305 Space Mart, “Iran Unveils Homemade Satellites and Carrier,” 8 February 2011, online: www.spacemart.com/reports/Iran_Unveils_Homemade_Satellites_And_Carrier_999.html. 306 Chris Bergin, “Japanese H-2A Launches with New IGS Military Satellite,” NASA Space ight. com, 22 September 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/09/japanese-h-2a-launches-new- igs-military-satellite; Julian Ryall, “Japan Launches Spy Satellite to Monitor North Korea,” e Telegraph, 26 September 2011, online: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/8789078/ Japan-launches-spy-satellite-to-monitor-North-Korea.html. 307 Chris Bergin, “Japanese H-2A Lofts IGS (Radar-3) Satellite into Orbit,” NASA Space ight.com, 11 December 2011, online: www.nasaspace ight.com/2011/12/japanese-h-2a-lofts-igs-radar-3- satellite-into-orbit; Stephen Clark, “Japan Launches Radar Reconnaissance Satellite,” Space.com, 12 December 2011, online: www.space.com/13900-japan-reconnaissance-satellite-launch.html. 308 Chris Bergin, 22 September 2011; Chris Bergin, 11 December 2011. 309 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Launches IGS Radar Reconnaissance Satellite,” Space News, 13 December 2011, online: http://spacenews.com/launch/121311-japan-launches-latest-radar- reconnaissance-satellite.html. 310 Julian Ryall, “Japan Launches Spy Satellite to Monitor North Korea,” e Telegraph, 26 September 2011, online: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/8789078/Japan-launches- spy-satellite-to-monitor-North-Korea.html; Agence France-Presse, “Japan Launches New Spy Satellite,” Defense News, 23 September 2011, online: www.defensenews.com/article/20110923/ DEFSECT01/109230308/Japan-Launches-New-Spy-Satellite. 311 Paul Kallender-Umezu, 13 December 2011. 312 Eric Talmadge, “Japan Launches Second Spy Satellite is Year,” Boston.com, 12 December 2011, online: www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2011/12/12/japan_launches_its_2nd_spy_satellite_ this_year. 313 JAXA, “First Quasi-Zenith Satellite MICHIBIKI Injection into the Quasi-Zenith Orbit,” 27 September 2010, online: www.jaxa.jp/press/2010/09/20100927_michibiki_e.html.
206 Endnotes
314 Geospatialworld.net, “Japan Soon to Develop Native GNSS,” 26 September 2011, online: http://geospatialworld.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=23127%3Ajapan- soon-to-develop-native-gnss&catid=43%3Aproduct-gps&Itemid=1. 315 Ibid. 316 GPSworld.com, “Japanese Aerospace Agency Selects Spirent for Multi-GNSS Testing,” 1 February 2011, online: www.gpsworld.com/gnss-system/augmentation-assistance/news/japanese-aerospace- agency-selects-spirent-multi-gnss-testin. 317 Shin Okuno, Presentation sponsored by the Japanese Space Agency Washington Oce, 26 January 2012.
Chapter Seven Endnotes 1 U.S. Department of Defense, “National Security Space Strategy–Unclassi ed Summary,” January 2011, online: www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/ NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassi edSummary_Jan2011.pdf. 2 For a comprehensive overview of non-o ensive defenses in space, see Phillip J. Baines, “Prospects for ‘Non-O ensive’ Defenses in Space,” in Clay Moltz, ed., New Challenges in Missile Defense, Missile Proliferation, and Space Security, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 12, August 2003, at 31-48. 3 Bruce deBlois, Richard Garwin, Scott Kemp, and Jeremy Marwell, “Space Weapons Crossing the U.S. Rubicon,” 29 International Security, Fall 2004, at 50-84. 4 Ibid. 5 President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, “Satellite Taskforce Report, Fact Sheet,” National Communications Systems, February 2004, online: www.ncs.gov/ nstac/reports/2004/Satellite%20Task%20Force%20Fact%20Sheet%20(March%202004).pdf; eresa Hitchens, e-mail communication, 17 March 2005. 6 EADS-Astrium UK, e-mail communication, December 2004. 7 U.S. General Accounting Oce, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully Addressed, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental A airs, U.S. Senate, GAO-02-781, August 2002, online: www.gao.gov/new.items/d02781.pdf. 8 M. R. Frater and M. Ryan, Electronic Warfare for the Digitized Battle eld (Boston: Artech House, 2001). e discussion of electronic warfare in this chapter was largely drawn from the approach provided in this book. See also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST Protection for Facilities, Engineering and Design,” Pamphlet EP 1110-3-2, December 1990; W. E. Burrows, Deep Black Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Random House, 1986), at 182; Roohi Banu, Tanya Vladimirova, and Martin Sweeting, “On-Board Encryption in Satellites,” paper presented at 2005 Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) International Conference, Washington, DC, 7-9 September 2005, abstract online: http://klabs.org/mapld05/abstracts/184_banu_a.html; Eric Swankoski and Vijaykrishnan Narayanan, “Dynamic High-Performance Multi-Mode Architectures for AES Encryption,” paper presented at 2005 MAPLD International Conference, Washington, DC, 7-9 September 2005, abstract online: http://klabs.org/mapld05/abstracts/103_swankoski_a.html. 9 Frater and Ryan, 2001. 10 Don J. Hinshilwood and Robert B. Dybdal, “Adaptive Nulling Antennas for Military Communications,” Crosslink, Winter 2001/2002, online: www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/ winter2002/05.html; Mark Wade, “Milstar,” Encyclopedia Astronautica, c. 2007, online: www.astronautix.com/craft/milstar.htm. 11 U.S. DoD, Fiscal Year 2006/2007 Budget Estimates. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Descriptive Summaries, Volume I: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, February 2005, at 423, online: www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2006/DARPA/0603768E.pdf; Maj. Earl Odom, “Future Missions for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Exploring Outside the Box,” Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2002; Lt. Col. Gregory Vansuch, “Navigation & Guidance,” DARPA Special Projects Oce, Presentation at DARPATECH 2002; David C. Hardesty, “Space-based
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Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2005, at 8. 12 e United States is developing the TSAT program described in the section on Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations. See Michael Fabey, “Air Force Approach Raises Questions about TSAT Capability and Cost,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, 18 December 2006, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=aerospacedaily&id=news/ TSAT12186.xml. e German company Tesat Spacecom has a laser communications terminal that is being tested on the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s NFIRE satellite. See Aviation Week and Space Technology, “NFIRE testing laser comms,” 5 November 2007. France’s Astrium Satellites and its subsidiary Tesat Spacecom in Germany launched a civil-military laser communications program in 2007. See Peter B. de Selding, “European Firms Launched Dual-Use Sat Laser Project,” Defense News, 8 October 2007. 13 U.S. DoD, “Cyber Command achieves full operational capability,” 3 November 2010, online: www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14030. 14 China Daily, “China to Launch its First Anti-Jamming Satellite Next Year,” 4 March 2004. 15 Xinhua, “China Enhances Spacecraft Monitoring Network,” 12 December 2006, online: http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-12/12/content_5473204.htm; Zhour Honghsun and Liu Wubing, “Status Quo and Assumption of China’s Space Satellite Monitoring,” China Communications, June 2006, at 123. 16 Peterson Air Force Base, “16th Space control squadron,” 25 April 2011, online: www.peterson.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=8403. 17 KRDO.com, “16th SPCS Breaks Ground For New Weapons System,” 13 January 2012, online: www.krdo.com/news/30208062/detail.html. 18 Ibid. 19 Satnews Daily, “Integral Systems… RAIDRS Ramp Up (MILSATCOM),” 14 April 2011, online: www.integ.com/Press/2011/4-14-2011IntegralSystemsRAIDRSRampUpMILSATCOM.pdf. 20 ExecutiveBiz.com, “Kratos Subsidiary to Complete Event Detection System for Air Force,” 17 January 2012, online: http://blog.executivebiz.com/2012/01/kratos-subsidiary-to-complete-event- detection-system-development-for-air-force. 21 Satnews Daily, “Kratos’ Integral Systems… Winning RAIDRS (SATCOM),” 17 January 2012, online: www.integ.com/Press/2012/1-17-2012WinningRAIDRSSATCOM.pdf. 22 Jennifer Martinez, “DOD could use force in cyber war,” Politico, 15 July 2011, online: www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/59035.html. 23 SpaceRef, “NASA OIG: Inadequate Security Practices Expose Key NASA Network to Cyber Attack,” 28 March 2011, online: www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=33113. 24 Cheryl Pellerin, “White House Launches U.S. International Cyber Strategy,” DoD, 17 May 2011, online: www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63966. 25 Cheryle Pellerin, “DOD Releases First Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,” DoD, 14 July 2011, online: www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64686 . 26 Ibid. 27 DoD, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011, online: www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf. 28 Donna Miles, “Doctrine to Establish Rules of Engagement against Cyber Attacks,” DoD, 20 October 2011, online: www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65739. 29 “Conference Report on H.R. 1540, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,” 12 December 2011, online: www.fas.org/irp/congress/2011_cr/cyberwar.html. 30 R. Vasta et al, “NAVFEST: A Cost E ective Solution to GPS NAVWAR Testing,” abstract, ION, online: www.ion.org/meetings/abstract.cfm?meetingID=34&pid=416&t=D&s=3. 31 J. Oaks et al, “System-Level Testing of iGPS PNT at 2011 NAVFEST,” online: www.coherentnavigation.com/press/2011.06.28_igps_testing.pdf. 32 Defense Industry Daily, “High Integrity GPS/iGPS: Boeing’s Iridium Ace Card,” 13 July 2009, online: www.coherentnavigation.com/press/2009.07.13_defense_industry_daily.pdf.
208 Endnotes
33 “Optimizing Technology for Operational Use under the Navy High Integrity GPS (HIGPS) Program,” FedBizOpps.gov, 21 December 2011, online: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity &mode=form&id=361fc0cfa9bde78324406c58354c342d&tab=core&_cview=0. 34 Tamar A. Mehuron, “2004 Space Almanac,” Air Force Magazine, August 2003, online: www.afa.org/magazine/Aug2003/0803spacealmanac.pdf. 35 Moscow Times, “Military Planning Nuclear Exercises,” 2 February 2004. 36 Pavel Podvig, Russia and Military Uses of Space, Working Paper, e American Academy of Arts and Sciences Project “Reconsidering the Rules of Space,” June 2004, online: http://russianforces.org/ podvig/2004/07/russia_and_military_uses_of_sp.shtml. 37 Ben Iannotta, “$408 Million ORS Budget to Have Broad-Based Focus,” Space News, 17 August 2007. 38 Air Force Space Command, Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond, c. 2005, at 5. 39 DARPA, “FALCON Broad Agency Announcement, Phase I Proposer Information Pamphlet,” 29 July 2003; Frank Colucci, “FALCON Aims at Global Striking Power,” 6 (1) Military Aerospace Technology, February 2007. 40 Brian Berger and Jeremy Singer, “Field Narrows for DARPA’s Falcon Program; Decision Expected Soon,” Space News, 29 August 2005; Je erson Morris, “Falcon SLV Program Nearing Next Phase,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, 8 December 2006, online: www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/ channel_space_story.jsp?id=news/FALC12086.xml. 41 e New York Times, “Private company launches rocket into orbit,” 28 September 2008, online: www.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/science/space/29launch.html?_r=1&ref=us&oref=slogin. 42 Robert K. Ackerman, “Small Satellite O ers Glimpse of the Future,” Signal Magazine, January 2004; Gunter Dirk Krebs, “TacSat 1,” Gunter’s Space Page, 1 January 2005, online: http://space.skyrocket.de/index_frame.htm?http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/tacsat-1.htm. 43 James Canan, “Renaissance for Military Space,” Aerospace America, June 2003, online: www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=364&ArchiveIssueID=39. 44 Air Force Research Laboratories, “Space Maneuver Vehicle,” Fact Sheet, September 2002. 45 Andreas Parsch, “X-37/X-40,” Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, 2006, online: www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/x-37.html. 46 V. Brinda et al., “Mission Analysis of a Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Demonstrator,” American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 13th International Space Planes and Hypersonics Systems and Technologies, 2005. 47 Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Clearing Skies,” 29 April 1998. 48 Alexander Zhelezniakov, “New Space Carrier Rocket ‘Mikron,’” Russian Pereplet, 15 February 2002, online: www.pereplet.ru/cgi/science.cgi?id=61. 49 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, e Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2005 at 83, online: www.amacad.org/publications/ rulesSpace.aspx. 50 Robert Hewson, “China Plans New Space Launchers,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 November 2006. 51 Turner Brinton, “Pentagon’s ORS-1 Imaging Satellite Carried to Orbit,” Space News, 30 June 2011, online: www.spacenews.com/launch/110630-ors1-sat-orbit.html. 52 Klotz, I, “Mini spy satellites to track terrorists,” Discovery News, 7 June 2011, online: http://news.discovery.com/space/cubesat-spy-satellites-terrorists-110607.html. 53 NRL, “NRL TacSat-4 Launches to Augment Communications Needs,” 27 September 2011, online: www.nrl.navy.mil/media/news-releases/2011/nrl-tacsat4-launches-to-augment-communications- needs. 54 S. Weinberger, “U.S. Special Ops Building Satellites to Track Terrorists Everywhere,” Popular Mechanics, 18 May 2011. 55 SpaceRef, “Emergent Space Technologies Selected as Prime Contractor on DARPA System F6 Program,” 12 July 2011, online: www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=34083.
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56 MilitaryPhotos.net, “Modular Space: DARPA Awards Phase 2 Systems F6 Contract,” 20 December 2009, online: www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?171098-Modular-Space-DARPA- Awards-Phase-2-Systems-F6-Contract. 57 FedBizOpps.gov, “System F6 Tech Package (F6TP) Proposers’ Day Announcement,” 20 November 2011, online: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=e4e25a6b0ac8a919fec0e 9bc7f8cad0a&tab=core&_cview=0. 58 FedBizOpps.gov, “System F6 Demonstration Satellite Bus – Request for Information (RFI),” 18 November 2011, online: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id= d8bda35fb3a13f199188 adac9adc55&tab=core&_cview=1. 59 Barron Beneski, “Orbital-Built SES-2 Communications Satellite with CHIRP Hosted Payload Successfully Launched,” 22 September 2011, online: www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/release. asp?prid=789. 60 Ibid. 61 Hosted Payloads, “CHIRP—Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload,” online: www.hostedpayload. com/video/chirp-commercially-hosted-infrared-payload. 62 Air Force Space Command, “Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload Completes Initial Ob-orbit Testing, 3 November 2011, online: www.afspc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123278572.
Chapter Eight Endnotes 1 United States Air Force, Counterspace Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Defense Technical Information Center, 2 August 2004, online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ afdd2_2_1.pdf. 2 Ibid. at 3. Negation of space systems is called “o ensive counterspace” in current USAF terminology and includes the ‘Five Ds’ mission. Counterspace Operations represents the views of the USAF and not necessarily those of the U.S. Government. 3 e Van Allen belts are two rings of highly energetic protons trapped by the Earth’s magnetic eld. e lower belt is situated between 1,000 and 5,000 km above the equator. e second is situated between 15,000 and 25,000 km above the equator. David Stern, “Radiation Belts,” NASA, 25 November 2001, online: www-istp.gsfc.nasa.gov/Education/Iradbelt.html. See also Alan Isaacs, ed., “Van Allen Belts” in A Dictionary of Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 4 Robert Butterworth, “Assuring Space Support Despite ASATs,” George C. Marshall Institute Policy Outlook, January 2008, at 1. 5 Bruce DeBlois et al., “Space Weapons: Crossing the US Rubicon,” 20 International Security, Fall 2004, at 66. 6 Capt. Angie Blair, Air Force Spokesperson quoted in Jim Wolf, “U.S. Deploys Satellite Jamming System,” Reuters, 29 October 2004, online: www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20041029- 1531-arms-satellite-usa.html. 7 Jeremy Singer, “U.S. Air Force to Upgrade Satcom Jamming System,” Space News, 22 February 2007. 8 Center for Defense Information, “Air Force Deploying Two Satellite Jamming Squadrons,” Space Security Updates, 2 April 2007, online: www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID= 3909&IssueID=140&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated& ProgramID=68&issueID=140#2; Singer, 2007. 9 U.S. Department of Defense, “National Security Space Strategy–Unclassi ed Summary,” January 2011, online: www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/ NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassi edSummary_Jan2011.pdf. 10 “Space Control Technology,” Unclassi ed RDT&E Budget Item Justi cation, Exhibit R-2, Project Element 0603438F, Defense Technical Information Center, February 2004, at 3, online: www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2005/AirForce/0603438F.pdf. 11 Ibid., at 1. 12 U.S. Oce of Science and Technology Policy, “U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy,” 15 December 2004, online: www.ostp.gov/html/FactSheetSPACE- BASEDPOSITIONINGNAVIGATIONTIMING.pdf. 210 Endnotes
13 Peter B. de Selding, “Libya Pinpointed as Source of Months-Long Satellite Jamming in 2006,” Space News, 9 April 2007, online: www.space.com/spacenews/businessmonday_070409.html. 14 Alan Cameron, “Perspectives–June 2008,” GPS World, 24 June 2008, online: http://sidt.gpsworld. com/gpssidt/Latest+News/National-Space-Symposium-Day-3-OCX-and-GPS-III/ArticleStandard/ Article/detail/525875. 15 Frank Vizard, “Safeguarding GPS,” Scienti c American, 14 April 2003. 16 Broadcasting from the U.K. and Belgium Med-TV was a satellite network operated by Kurdish exiles. Beginning in 1995 it experienced several interruptions in service, blamed on a jamming signal originating in Turkey, before its closure in 1999; see BBC News, “World: Middle East Kurds Retaliate in Turkish Jam War,” 16 October 1998, online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ middle_east/193529.stm. 17 e Falun Gong was accused of jamming SINOSAT signals to block broadcasts and overriding transmission with pirate broadcasts in several incidents in 2002 and 2003; see China Daily, “Jamming Harms World Trade,” 30 September 2002. 18 Michael Evans, “China ‘tops list’ of cyber-hackers seeking UK government secrets,” e Times (London), 6 September 2007, online: www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2393979. ece; France24.com, “France government falls prey to cyber-attacks ‘involving China,’” 9 September 2007, online: www.france24.com/france24Public/en/news/france/20070909-Internet-piracy-france- secuirty-china-hacker.html; Demetri Sevastopulo, “Chinese hacked into Pentagon,” e Financial Times, 3 September 2007, online: www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9dba9ba2-5a3b-11dc-9bcd-0000779fd2ac. html?nclick_check=1; Reuters (U.K.), “China says su ers ‘massive’ Internet spy damage,” 12 September 2007, online: http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKPEK7050420070912. 19 Article 19, “World Television Day: satellite jamming and freedom of expression,” 21 November 2011, online: www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2858/en/world-television-day:-satellite- jamming-and-freedom-of-expression. 20 Ibid. 21 ESAT, “ESAT accuses China of complicity in jamming signals,” News Release, 15 June 2011, online: www.ethsat.com/2011/10/08/esat-accuses-china-of-complicity-in-jamming-signals. 22 Ibid. 23 Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association, “EFJA urges China to stop complicity in jamming Ethiopian satellite TV transmissions,” 16 June 2011, online: www.ifex.org/ethiopia/2011/06/22/ esat_china_jamming. 24 Ibid. 25 Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Eritrea: Ethiopia Accused of Jamming Broadcast Signals,” Sudan Tribune, 13 January 2012, online: http://allafrica.com/stories/201201140007.html. 26 Ibid. 27 DeBlois and colleagues estimate that the North Korean Nodong missile or a GPS-guided bomb could achieve the altitude and accuracy for this kind of attack. Bruce DeBlois, Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy C. Marwell, “Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon,” 20 International Security, Fall 2004, at 61, online: www.fas.org/rlg/041100-rubicon.pdf. 28 Steven Kosiak, “Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-E ectiveness of Space-Based Weapons,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 31 October 2007, online: www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20071031. Arming_the_Heavens/R.20071031.Arming_the_Heavens.pdf. 29 USAF, 2004, at 3. 30 Funding appropriated by Congress for the system included $30-million in FY1996, $50-million in FY1997, $37.5-million in FY1998, $7.5-million in FY2000, $3-million in FY2001, and $7.5-million in FY2004. Marcia Smith, “U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 21 October 2004, online: www.fas.org/spp/civil/crs/ IB92011.pdf. Funding in FY2005 was $14.0-million. eresa Hitchens, Michael Katz-Hymen, and Je rey Lewis, “U.S. Space Weapons: Big Intentions, Little Focus,” 13(1) Nonproliferation Review, March 2006, at 43, Table 4. 31 Hitchens et al, at 43, Table 4.
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32 David C. Isby, “U.S. Army continues with KE-ASAT,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, March 2005; Keith J. Costa, “ASAT Technology Test Bed in the Works at Redstone Arsenal,” Inside Missile Defense, 22 December 2004; Sandra I. Erwin, “U.S. Space Command Chief Warns About Technological Complacency,” National Defense, May 2001, online: www.nationaldefensemagazine. org/issues/2001/May/US_Space.htm; U.S. Department of Defense, “Contracts: Army,” Press Release No. 503-04, 25 May 2004, online: www.defenselink.mil/contracts/2004/ct20040525.html. 33 Space Daily, “Raytheon Delivers Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle Payloads for Fort Greely,” 18 August 2004, online: www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-04y.html; Raytheon, “EKV/GMD: Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle/Ground-Based Midcourse Defense,” July 2009, online: www.raytheon. com/capabilities/rtnwcm/groups/rms/documents/content/rtn_rms_ps_ekv_datasheet.pdf; Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Agency Accomplishments in 2007,” 14 January 2008, online: www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/08news0002.pdf. 34 Raytheon, “EKV/GMD: Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle/Ground-Based Midcourse Defense,” July 2009, online: www.raytheon.com/capabilities/rtnwcm/groups/rms/documents/content/ rtn_rms_ps_ekv_datasheet.pdf. 35 David Wright and Laura Grego, “ASAT Capabilities of Planned U.S. Missile Defense System,” 68 Disarmament Diplomacy, December 2002-January 2003, at 7-10. 36 MDA, “Japan/U.S. Missile Defense Flight Test Successful,” New release 07-NEWS-0053, 17 December 2007, online: www.mda.mil/mdaLink/pdf/07news0053.pdf. 37 Jon Rosamond, “U.S. admiral says satellite kill was ‘one-time event,’” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 March 2008, at 8. 38 Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, Union of Concerned Scientists, 2003. 39 Pavel Podvig, “Russian Military Space Capabilities,” in Phillip E. Coyle, ed., Ensuring America’s Space Security (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, September 2004), at 127. 40 Missile reat, “Gorgon (SH-11/ABM-4),” c. 2004, online: www.missilethreat.com/ missiledefensesystems/id.25/system_detail.asp. 41 GlobalSecurity.org, “Chinese Anti-Satellite [ASAT] Capabilities,” 18 January 2007, online: www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm; Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Knew of China’s Missile Test, But Kept Silent,” e New York Times, 23 April 2007, at 1. 42 Space War, “China Says Anti-Satellite Test Did Not Break Rules,” 12 February 2007, online: www.spacewar.com/reports/China_Says_Anti_Satellite_Test_Did_Not_Break_Rules_999.html. 43 Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel, U.S., Test Compatibility of Arrow-Patriot Interceptors,” Space News, 14 March 2005; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Plans 2nd ABM Test in June,” Defense News, 29 January 2007. 44 Approximately 80 percent of all the energy from a nuclear weapon detonated in outer space appears in the form of X-rays. In addition there are small amounts of gamma radiation and neutrons, small fractions in residual radio activity, and in the kinetic energy of bomb debris. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is also generated by a HAND when X-rays and gamma rays create an electron ux in the upper atmosphere of the Earth that re-radiates its energy in the radio frequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. When this radio frequency hits space systems it induces currents and voltages that may damage or destroy electronic systems not hardened against these e ects. Satellites in GEO would experience an EMP of smaller magnitude than would either LEO satellites or ground facilities located within line of sight of the HAND. Long after the initial detonation of a nuclear device, electrons liberated by the device would join the naturally occurring radiation in the Van Allen belts. Satellites not speci cally designed for operations after detonation of a nuclear weapon may fail quickly in this enhanced radiation environment due to a rapid accumulation of total ionizing doses on the critical electronic parts of a satellite. Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz, eds., Space Mission Design and Analysis, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), at 215-228. 45 Union of Concerned Scientists, “History of Russia’s ABM System,” 27 October 2002, online: www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile_defense/page.cfm?pageID=609. 46 e International Atomic Energy Agency has never been able to fully verify the status of the North Korea nuclear safeguards agreement and reports that North Korea is non-compliant with its obligations. Although claims have been made that North Korea reprocessed nuclear fuel for weapons, they remain unsubstantiated as inspectors have been denied access to nuclear facilities 212 Endnotes
since 2002. See International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” GC (48)/17, International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, 16 August 2004, online: www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/ Documents/gc48-17.pdf; BBC News, “Outcry at N Korea ‘Nuclear Test,’” 9 October 2006, online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-paci c/6033457.stm. 47 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Document GOV/2010/10, 3 March 2010, online: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Board/2010/gov2010-10.pdf. 48 S. Karamow, “Army Scores a Hit on Satellite in Test of Laser,” USA Today, 21 October 1997, at A6. 49 Grego, 2003. 50 “ at a commercially available laser and a 1.5 m mirror could be an e ective ASAT highlighted a U.S. vulnerability that had not been fully appreciated” (Ibid.). e 30-watt laser used in the test was capable of temporarily blinding the target satellite. 51 Adaptiveoptics.org, “Adaptive Optics Establishments,” 2010, online: www.adaptiveoptics.org/ Establishments.html. 52 eresa Hitchens, “U.S. Air Force Plans a Laser Test against a Satellite in FY 07,” Center for Defense Information, 3 May 2006, online: www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID= 3411&StartRow=11&ListRows=10&&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&typeID= (8)&from_page=relateditems.cfm. 53 Ibid. 54 MDA, “ e Airborne Laser,” May 2006, online: www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/laser.pdf. 55 Missile reat, “Airborne Laser fact sheet,” c. 2004 online: www.missilethreat.com/ missiledefensesystems/id.8/system_detail.asp; Jeremy Singer, “MDA Ocials Lay Out Milestones for Airborne Laser,” Space News, 13 March 2006. 56 William Matthews, “Weapon of the Future,” Defense News, 15 September 2008, at 11, 22, 26. 57 Boeing, “Boeing’s ABL Team Begins Laser Activation Tests,” 28 May 2008, online: www.asd- network.com/press_detail/16396/Boeing%27s_ABL_Team_Begins_Laser_Activation_Tests.htm. 58 Reuters, “U.S. successfully tests airborne laser on missile,” 12 February 2010, online: www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1111660620100212?type=marketsNews. 59 China has developed signi cant capacity in gas, chemical, dye, solid-state, semi-conductor, and free electron lasers, both for pulse and continuous wave functions. Subtypes developed by China include krypton- uoride, helium-argon-xenon, neodymium-doped yttrium aluminum garnet (Nd:YAG), oxygen-iodine, carbon-dioxide, neodymium glass (Nd:Glass), titanium-sapphire, quantum cascade, xenon- uoride, and both infrared and X-ray free electron lasers. See the Chinese journals Chinese Journal of Lasers, Infrared and Laser Engineering, High Powered Laser and Particle Beams, Chinese Optics Letters, and Laser and Infrared. See also Sun Chengwei, Zhang Ning, and Du Xiangwan, “Recent developments of Chinese activities in lasers and laser beam interactions with materials,” AIAA-1995-1920, 26th Plasmadynamics and Lasers Conference, San Diego, CA, 19-22 June 1995, online: www.aiaa.org/content.cfm?pageid=406&gTable=mtgpaper&gID=82509; Huang He, “A Dust-Laden Secret: Review and Prospects for China’s Optical Instruments and Laser Weapons,” Defense International, 1 April 1998 at 100-115; “LD-Pumped Nd: YAG Microchip Laser with 62.5MW CW Output Power,” Chinese Journal of Lasers, 3 May 1994); “Ti-Sapphire Laser Attains CW Output Power of 650MW,” Chinese Journal of Lasers, December 1994; Hui Zhongxi, “Sg-1 FEL Ampli er Output Reaches 140MW,” High Power Laser and Particle Beams, December 1994;
“A GW Power Level High Power CO2 Laser System,” Chinese Journal of Lasers, June 1990; IAEA, “World Survey of Activities in Controlled Fusion Research, Special Supplement,” 2001, online: http://epub.iaea.org/fusion/public/ws01/ws_toc.html; Howard DeVore, “Directed Energy Weapons and Sensors,” China’s Aerospace and Defence Industry (Jane’s Information Group, 2000); Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 1999, online: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdles/PUB74.pdf.
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60 Zhu Jianqiang, “Solid-State Laser Development Activities in China,” Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics, 2007, online: http://ultralaser.iphy.ac.cn/cleo/data/papers/C E6.pdf. 61 Yang Wen-shi, Wang Wei-li, Sun Wei-na, Bi Guo-jiang, Zhu Chen, and Wang Xiao-han, “Beam Quality of the High Power DPL,” 5 Infrared and Laser Engineering, 2005, at 511-516; Shi Xiang- chun, Chen Wei-biao, and Hou Xia, “Application of All Solid State Laser in Space,” 2 Infrared and Laser Engineering, 2005, at 127-131. 62 USA Today, “China Jamming Test Sparks U.S. Satellite Concerns,” 5 October 2006, online: www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-05-satellite-laser_x.htm?POE=TECISVA. 63 During a test in 1997 a 30-W ground-based tracking laser reportedly dazzled an imaging satellite at 500-km altitude, although few details are available. See John Donnelly, “Laser of 30 Watts Blinded Satellite 300 Miles High,” Defense Week, 8 December 1997, at 1, cited in David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, e Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), at 128. Gen. James Cartwright, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, denied that there is clear evidence of Chinese intentions to interfere with U.S. space assets and no ocial Chinese statements have been released. See Elaine M. Grossman, “Is China Disrupting U.S. Satellites?” InsideDefense.com, 13 October 2006, online: www.military. com/features/0,15240,116694,00.html. 64 Space War, “SKorea develops laser weapons: report,” 10 November 2007, online: www.spacewar. com/reports/SKorea_develops_laser_weapons_report_999.html. 65 Rajat Pandit, “Space Command must to check China,” e Times of India, 17 June 2008, online: http://timeso ndia.indiatimes.com/India/Space_command_must_to_check_China/ articleshow/3135817.cms. 66 Michael Listner, “India’s ABM test: a validated ASAT capability or a paper tiger?” e Space Review, 28 March 2011, online: www.thespacereview.com/article/1807/1. 67 Asian Defence News, “India’s ABM Test a Validated ASAT Capability or a Paper Tiger,” Asian Defense, 29 March 2011, online: www.asian-defence.net/2011/03/indias-abm-test- validated-asat.html. 68 Ibid. 69 Pranav Kulkarni, “Agni-III could be modi ed for use as anti-satellite weapon, says DRDO chief,” e Indian Express, 23 October 2011, online: www.indianexpress.com/news/agniiii-could-be- modi ed-for-use-as-antisatellite-weapon-says-drdo-chief/864205/0. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Amy Butler, “Lights out for the Airborne Laser”, 22 December 2011, Aviation Week, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news%2Fasd%2F2011 %2F12%2F21%2F02.xml&headline=Lights+Out+For+ e+Airborne+Laser. 73 Ibid. 74 MDA, “Supporting E orts: Airborne Laser Test Bed,” 2012, online: www.mda.mil/system/ altb.html. 75 Amy Butler, “Boeing Grip on Misdef Wanes with ABL Demise,” 6 January 2012, Aviation Week, online: www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/ awst/2012/01/02/AW_01_02_2012_p29-409861.xml&headline=Boeing%20Grip%20On%20 Misdef%20Wanes%20With%20ABL%20Demise&prev=10. 76 Ibid. 77 DARPA, “Compact High Power Laser Program Completes Key Milestone,” 30 June 2011, online: www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2011/2011/06/30_COMPACT_HIGH-POWER_LASER_ PROGRAM_COMPLETES_KEY_MILESTONE.aspx. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 e Surrey Space Centre’s partnership with China to develop microsatellite technology has caused much speculation about Chinese ASAT intentions, although there is no evidence of an ocial Chinese ASAT program. Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd.’s CEO posted a statement on its website
214 Endnotes
that “there have been a number of reports in the press that have portrayed SSTL’s commercial satellite business with PR China in a very misleading light.… SSTL has carried out two micro- satellite projects for PR China. Both projects are entirely civil in nature and both have been executed strictly within export controls speci cally approved for each project by the U.K. government.… No propulsion technologies or know-how has been provided by SSTL to China and therefore the satellites supplied by SSTL are not able to be used either as ‘ASAT’ anti-satellite devices nor as a basis to develop such devices as claimed by some press reports.” See Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd., “News,” 23 March 2005, online: www.sstl.co.uk/index.php?loc=6. For an analysis of China’s interest in ASAT weapons, including the Chinese academic debate about this subject, see Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggi, and Angela Deters, “China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 22 July 2003, online: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm. A full description of the Tsinghua-1/SNAP mission is online: Surrey Space Centre, www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/SSC. 81 eresa Hitchens, Victoria Sampson, and Sam Black, “Space Weapons Spending in the FY 2008 Defense Budget,” Center for Defense Information, 21 February 2008, online: www.cdi.org/PDFs/ Space%20Weapons%20Spending%20in%20the%20FY%202008%20Defense%20Budget.pdf. 82 Je rey Lewis, “NFIRE Kill Vehicle Finally Dead. Really,” Armscontrolwonk–Blog, 23 August 2005, online: www.armscontrolwonk.com/741/n re-kill-vehicle- nally-dead-really. 83 Justin Ray, “Delta 2 Rocket Puts Military Experiment into Space,” Space ight Now, 21 June 2006, online: http://space ightnow.com/delta/d316. 84 B. Weeden, “ e ongoing saga of DSP Flight 23,” e Space Review, 19 January 2009, online: www.thespacereview.com/article/1290/1. 85 New Scientist, “Spy satellites turn their gaze onto each other,” 24 January 2009, online: www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126925.800-spy-satellites-turn-their-gaze-onto-each-other.html. 86 e Advanced Video Guidance Sensor was rst demonstrated in the 1990s with the space shuttle in NASA’s Automated Rendezvous and Capture project. See NASA, “DART Demonstrator to Test Future Autonomous Rendezvous Technologies in Orbit,” September 2004. 87 Michael Braukus and Kim Newton, “On Orbit Anomaly Ends DART Mission Early,” NASA, 16 April 2005, online: www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/dart/media/05-051.html. 88 Lt. Col. James Shoemaker, “Orbital Express Space Operations Architecture,” DARPA, 19 October 2004. 89 U.S. Tactical Technology Oce, “Front-End Robotic Enabling Near-Term Demonstrations,” 18 February 2008, online: www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/frend/index.html. 90 Naval Research Laboratory, “NRL Developing Space ‘Tow Truck’ Technology for Satellite Operations,” NRL Press Release 47-07r, 27 August 2007, online: www.nrl.navy.mil/pressRelease. php?Y=2007&R=47-07r. 91 Michael Sirak, “DARPA Eyes Mini Satellites for Rapid Launch to Protect Other Spacecraft,” Defense Daily, 10 August 2007; Sam Black and Timothy Barnes, “Fiscal Year 2008 Budget: Programs of Interest,” Center for Defense Information, 19 December 2007, online: www.cdi.org/ program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4130&ProgramID=6&StartRow=1&ListRows= 10&from_page=../whatsnew/index.cfm. 92 German Aerospace Center, “Ongoing Space Robotics Missions,” Institute of Robotics and Mechanics, 2010, online: www.dlr.de/rm/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-3825/5963_read-8759. See also German Aerospace Center, “German Federal Minister of Economics Michael Glos and Bavarian Prime Minister Günther Beckstein visit DLR in Oberpfa enhofen,” 17 July 2008, online: www.dlr.de/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-3192/7568_read-13067. 93 Swedish Space Agency, “Successful launch of the Swedish PRISMA satellites,” 15 June 2010, online: www.ssc.se/?id=5104&cid=16912. 94 Sta an Persson, Björn Jakobsson, and Eberhard Gill, “PRISMA—Demonstration Mission for Advanced Rendezvous and Formation Flying Technologies and Sensors,” Paper IAC-05- B5.6.B072005 at the International Astronautical Congress, 2005, online: www.nordicspace.net/ PDF/NSA142.pdf. 95 DARPA, “Innovators sought for DARPA satellite servicing technology program,” 20 October 2011, online: www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2011/10/20.aspx.
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96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Michael Cooney, “DARPA wants to give dead, in-orbit satellites new life,” Network World, 3 January 2012, online: www.networkworld.com/community/node/79482. 99 Ibid. 100 Clara Moskowitz, “China Makes Second Successful Space Docking,” SPACE.com, 14 November 2011, online: www.space.com/13657-china-docking-test-landing-shenzhou-8.html. 101 Ibid. 102 Sinodefense.com, “Shenzhou 8,” 2012, online: www.sinodefence.com/shenzhou/shenzhou8.asp. 103 Ibid. 104 Clara Moskowitz, 14 November 2011. 105 Xinhua, “China space success, blessing to globe,” 14 November 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english2010/indepth/2011-11/14/c_131246478.htm. 106 Katie Drummond, “China’s Secret Satellite Rendezvous ‘Suggestive of a Military Program,’” Wired, 31 August 2010, online: www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/chinas-secret-satellite-rendezvous- suggestive-of-a-military-program. 107 Rachel Courtland, “Two Chinese satellites rendezvous in orbit,” New Scientist, 31 August 2010, online: www.newscientist.com/article/dn19379-two-chinese-satellites-rendezvous-in-orbit.html. 108 Master Sgt. Amaani Lyle, “Air Force technicians launch second unmanned spacecraft,” USAF, 5 March 2011, online: www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123245374. 109 W.J. Hennigan, “Air Force says it’s extending mission of mysterious X-37B,” LA Times 19 November 2011, online: http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/11/x37b-space- plane-air-force.html. 110 Mike Wall, “Mystery Surrounds Air Force’s Secretive X-37B Space Plane Landing Plan,” Space.com, 20 January 2012, online: www.space.com/14305-secret-x37b-space-plane-landing- mystery.html. 111 Associated Press, “Unmanned US spacecraft returns after 7-month trip,” 3 December 2010, online: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101203/ap_on_re_us/us_mystery_spacecraft. 112 Master Sgt. Amaani Lyle, 5 March 2011. 113 Mike Wall, “‘No Chance‘ Secret X-37B Space Plane Spying on China Module: Expert,“ SPACE. com, 6 January 2012, www.space.com/14163-secret-x37b-space-plane-spying-china.html. 114 Philip Ewing, “ e X-37’s uncertain fate,” DoD Buzz, 20 September 2011, online: www.dodbuzz.com/2011/09/20/the-x-37s-uncertain-fate. 115 Alexander Nebylov and Vladimir Nebylov, “Control Strategies of Spaceplane Docking and Undocking with Other Winged Vehicle,” 18th IFAC World Congress Milano (Italy), 28 August 28 – 2 September 2011, online: www.nt.ntnu.no/users/skoge/prost/proceedings/ifac11-proceedings/ data/html/papers/2582.pdf. 116 Bart Hendrickx and Bert Vis, Energiya-Buran: e Soviet Space Shuttle, Praxis Publishing, Ltd. Chichester, 2007. 117 Alexander Zudin, “Russians at work on military spaceplane,”, Flightglobal, 2 February 2011, online: www. ightglobal.com/news/articles/russians-at-work-on-military-spaceplane-352606.
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X SPACE SECURITY I ND E
“The space environment is a valuable asset for human development, and it is of critical importance to sustain its 2012 capacity to serve in this role. Each year, the Space Security Index catalogs and assesses the impact on the space environment of its use by some 80 nations for civil, military, and commercial purposes. The Index has developed a solid reputation as a significant data reference on the utilization and management of space assets and on the threats posed by human activity to the space environment.” Karl Doetsch 2012 President, Doetsch International Space Full report at www.spacesecurity.org Consultants (Former President, International Space University)
“The Space Security Index continues to represent the most thoughtful, informed, and nonpartisan summary of annual space activities and policy developments relevant to the safe access to and use of space. In its broad view of space security, covering issues ranging from space weapons to orbital debris and space traffic management, the Index has contributed to defining the field.” Jonathan McDowell Astrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
“I recommend the annual monograph by Space Security Index to my students, experienced aerospace professionals, policymakers, diplomats, and security officials. It is a really independent source of information and reflection on the evolution of space affairs. There you can find the most accurate data and the best policy analysis.” Bertrand de Montluc Associate Professor, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris; Senior member, Association Aéronautique et Astronautique de France