Well-Being with Soul: Science in Pursuit of Human Potential
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Generative Dimension, in the Light of Aristotle's Substance
90 THE GENERATIVE DIMENSION, IN THE LIGHT OF ARISTOTLE’S SUBSTANCE (HYPOKEIMENON) THEORY Xiaoyu XU1 and Xinlei LIU1 ABSTRACT: The paper is dedicated to the analysis of Aristotle’s substance theory within the overall Organicist perception of the universe as a living organism. The suggested analytical pathway begins with the generative substance (in Stagirite’s original term – generative hypokeimenon) and leads to the primary causes, prompted by the constant movement of the “thing”. We argue that Aristotle’s analysis of “matter and form” (in his original texts: “ὕλη – hyle” and “μορφή – morphe”)2 leads to the generative function, reaffirming its dynamism and process expression. KEYWORDS: Aristotle, hypokeimenon, hyle, morphe, potential, reality, dynamism, universe, organism, process, generative function Contents Introduction 1. From the studying of Aristotle’s theory of substance (hypokeimenon) – to realizing the generative dimension 2. From Aristotle’s analysis of “hyle” and “morphe” – to examining the generative potentials that are their natural essences Conclusion 1 Northeast Petroleum University, Daqing, CHINA. 2 Following the approach of the BCnA-journal, we consider it essential to apply the genuine terms and notions, used by the Stagirite in his original works, in expressing the authentic (and our own – neo-Aristotelian) conceptual constructions. Thus, we use (adding Italics); hyle – instead of “matter”; morphe – instead of “form”; hypokeimenon – instead of “substance”, etc. Vol. 8, No. 1, BIOCOSMOLOGY – NEO-ARISTOTELISM Winter 2018 91 ГЕНЕРАТИВНОЕ ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ, В СВЕТЕ АРИСТОТЕЛЕВСКОЙ ТЕОРИИ СУБСТАНЦИИ (ГИПОКЕЙМЕНОНА) Чиаю ЗЮЕ и Шинлей ЛЬЮ АБСТРАКТ: Статья посвящена анализу теории субстанции (гипокейменона) Аристотеля в общем восприятии органической вселенной как живого организма. Предлагаемый аналитический путь начинается с порождающего вещества (в первоначальном выражении Стагирита – порождающего гипокейменона) и приводит к основным причинам, побуждающим постоянное движением «вещи». -
Aquinas and Aristotelians on Whether the Soul Is a Group of Powers
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY Volume 34, Number 2, April 2017 AQUINAS AND ARISTOTELIANS ON WHETHER THE SOUL IS A GROUP OF POWERS Nicholas Kahm n the Aristotelian tradition, there are two broad answers to the basic Iquestion “What is soul?” On the one hand, the soul can be described by what it does. From this perspective, the soul seems to be composed of various different parts or powers (potentiae) that are the principles of its various actions. On the other hand, the soul seems to be something different, namely, the actual formal principle making embodied living substances to be the kinds of things that they are. Contemporary Aris- totelians are split on how to interpret Aristotle: Anna Marmodoro (2013, 18), Thomas Johansen (2012, 81), and most others argue that the soul is nothing but a kind of cluster or group of powers. Rebekah Johnston (2011), however, strongly disagrees and argues that the soul is only the actual principle of embodied substance.1 Aquinas provides a novel and neglected solution to this problem and would argue that both sides are partly right but that either side is insufficient without the other. The first part of this paper discusses how Aquinas can simultaneously hold that the soul as form is not a group of powers while also holding that the soul as mover or potential whole is composed of powers. The second part discusses why he would disagree with Johnston’s arguments that the soul cannot be a group of powers, and the third part discusses why he would disagree with arguments that the soul is nothing but a group of powers. -
On the Relations of Soul to Body in Plato and Aristotle
On the Relations of Soul to Body in Plato and Aristotle THOMAS M. OLSHEWSKY MY CONCERN IN THIS PAVER is to give an exposition of, apology for, and to draw implications from, the following contrastive statement: On Plato's understanding, the soul is in the body; but Aristotle's account implies that the body is in the soul. On first glance, the former clause seems commonplace and quite intelligible, while the latter seems to do violence both to history and to common sense. One can perhaps understand how a soul could be in a body, on analogy to a loaf of bread in a breadbox, or to a pilot in a ship--or even to a ghost in a machine; but a reversal of the relation of body and soul seems as ludicrous as a reversal of these analogue relations of contain- ment and of agency. Yet, I hope to show that Plato's account is an unintelligible one, especially in the light of his own ontology; that while Aristotle never asserted the rela- tionship that I claim for him, his account of body and soul clearly requires it; that Aristotle's account is both consistent with his own ontology and intelligible in its own right. I. The first clause of the aphorism is prima facie unproblematic, the character- ization in the Phaedo of the body as the prison house of the soul being a commonplace. How we are to understand the soul/body distinction in Plato, together with this con- tainer model for their relationship, is not all that clear. -
Aristotle's Theory of Actuality SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy Author : Bechler, Z
title : Aristotle's Theory of Actuality SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy author : Bechler, Z. publisher : State University of New York Press isbn10 | asin : 0791422399 print isbn13 : 9780791422397 ebook isbn13 : 9780585046068 language : English subject Aristotle, Philosophy of nature. publication date : 1995 lcc : B491.N3B43 1995eb ddc : 113 subject : Aristotle, Philosophy of nature. cover Aristotle's Theory Of Actuality cover-0 SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy Anthony Preus, Editor cover-1 Aristotle's Theory OF Actuality Zev Bechler State University of New York Press cover-2 Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 1995 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, address State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y., 12246 Production by Diane Ganeles Marketing by Fran Keneston Composition by Kelby Bowers, Compublishing, Cincinnati, Ohio Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bechler, Z. Aristotle's theory of actuality / Zev Bechler. p. cm.(SUNY series in ancient Greek philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-2239-9 (alk. paper).ISBN 0-7914-2240-2 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Aristotle. 2. Philosophy of nature. I. Title. II. Series. B491.N3B42 1995 185dc20 94-1045 CIP 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 cover-3 To Niza Dolav For her special friendship cover-4 Contents Acknowledgments xi Introduction: The Idea of Anti-Informationism 1. -
Two Kinds of Matter in Aristotle's Metaphysics
TWO KINDS OF MATTER IN ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS Christine M. Korsgaard The distinction of form and matter stands at the center of Aristotle’s metaphysics. Aristotle took it that the account we give of the substance or being of a thing ought to have explanatory value, to explain why the thing has the attributes that it does and why it does what it does. Aristotle saw himself as combining two kinds of explanation that had been given by his predecessors. Such thinkers as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus gave what Aristotle understands to be a material account of things, an explanation that is in terms of matter or more specifically the “elements” · of a thing. The Pythagoreans and Plato give what Aristotle understands to be a formal account of things: Plato in terms of the Ideas and the Pythagoreans through their theory of the numerical construction of the universe: For reasons detailed throughout his writings, Aristotle finds that neither account is satisfactory by itself. Very roughly, we can say that the trouble with the material account is its failure to deal with the plurality and manifoldness of things and particularly its failure to . account for the special phenomena of life and motion. The primary trouble with the formal account is the doctrine that the Ideas are separate from material things, which renders them gratuitous and robs them of their explanatory value. In making “love” or “reason” a force working on the elements, Empedocles and Anaxagoras had attempted a combination of the two sorts of account, but not quite successfully . What was needed was a way of making the greater explantory value of a formal account apply to material things. -
Chapter 23 – Electric Potential
Chapter 23 – Electric Potential - Electric Potential Energy - Electric Potential and its Calculation - Equipotential surfaces - Potential Gradient 0. Review b b Work: Wa→b = ∫ F ⋅ ld = ∫ F ⋅cos ϕ ⋅dl a a Potential energy - If the force is conservative: Wa→b = U a −U b = −(U b −U a ) = −∆U Work-Energy: K a +U a = K b +U b The work done raising a basketball against gravity depends only on the potential energy, how high the ball goes. It does not depend on other motions. A point charge moving in a field exhibits similar behavior. 1. Electric Potential Energy - When a charged particle moves in an electric field, the field exerts a force that can do work on the particle. The work can be expressed in terms of electric potential energy. - Electric potential energy depends only on the position of the charged particle in the electric field. Electric Potential Energy in a Uniform Field: Wa→b = F ⋅d = q0 Ed Electric field due to a static charge distribution generates a conservative force: Wa→b = −∆U → U = q0 E ⋅ y - Test charge moving from height ya to yb: Wa→b = −∆U = −(Ub −U a ) = q0 E(ya − yb ) Independently of whether the test charge is (+) or (-): - U increases if q 0 moves in direction opposite to electric force. - U decreases if q 0 moves in same direction as F = q 0 E. Electric Potential Energy of Two Point Charges: A test charge (q 0) will move directly away from a like charge q. rb rb 1 qq qq 1 1 W = F ⋅dr = 0 ⋅dr = 0 − a→b ∫ r ∫ 4πε r 2 4πε r r ra ra 0 0 a b The work done on q 0 by electric field does not depend on path taken, but only on distances ra and rb (initial and end points). -
Lecture 6.2: Change, Potentiality and Causes Rorty UCSC Substances
Lecture 6.2: Change, Potentiality and Causes Rorty UCSC Substances: We talked Tuesday about Aristotle’s basic constituents of reality: substances. To be a substance, in A’s terminology, is to be an individual—a ‘this such’, capable of being designated in some way; and independent—a thing whose being is not dependent upon something else being modified in some way or another, a non-parasitical thing. The first and plainest examples of substances are animals and plants; and as we saw in Zeta, artifacts, things made. [Aristotle in some of the texts we are not reading seems to consider not only artifacts, but perhaps the heavenly bodies (sun, moon and stars) as substances.] As Barnes puts it, “perceptible things--middle-sized material objects—are the furniture of Aristotle’s world.” Matter and form: Tuesday I attempted (with what success only you know) to give you one tool of analysis by which to understand the nature of a substance: the analytic correlative tools of “matter” and “form.” They go together: something is ‘matter’ or indeterminate with respect to the ‘form’ which determines what kind of thing it is. The brass is the matter out of which a vase is made. The yarn is the matter out of which Aunt Leslie forms a scarf. The matter is called so relatively to the form which gives it further determination. [What I mean to say by calling them ‘analytic tools’ is that you can perform the same operation with them on, for instance, the brass itself, or the yarn: brass is a combination of copper and iron in a certain proportion. -
Potential Energy 1 Potential Energy
Potential energy 1 Potential energy Potential energy In the case of a bow and arrow, the energy is converted from the potential energy in the archer's arm to the potential energy in the bent limbs of the bow when the string is drawn back. When the string is released, the potential energy in the bow limbs is transferred back through the string to become kinetic energy in the arrow as it takes flight. Common symbol(s): PE or U SI unit: joule (J) Derivations from other quantities: U = m · g · h (gravitational) U = ½ · k · x2 (elastic) U = C · V2 / 2 (electric) U = -m · B (magnetic) In physics, potential energy is the energy of an object or a system due to the position of the body or the arrangement of the particles of the system.[1] The SI unit for measuring work and energy is the Joule (symbol J). The term "potential energy" was coined by the 19th century Scottish engineer and physicist William Rankine,[2][3] although it has links to Greek philosopher Aristotle's concept of potentiality. Potential energy is associated with a set of forces that act on a body in a way that depends only on the body's position in space. This allows the set of forces to be considered as having a specified vector at every point in space forming what is known as a vector field of forces, or a force field. If the work of forces of this type acting on a body that moves from a start to an end position is defined only by these two positions and does not depend on the trajectory of the body between the two, then there is a function known as a potential that can be evaluated at the two positions to determine this work. -
Potentiality, Actuality and Non-Separability in Quantum and Classical Physics: Res Potentiae in the Macroscopic World
Potentiality, Actuality and Non-Separability in Quantum and Classical Physics: Res Potentiae in the Macroscopic World Robert R. Bishop1 Joseph E. Brenner2 Abstract To help resolve stubborn aporias in quantum mechanics, Kastner, Kauffman and Epperson have recently proposed a new interpretation of Heisenberg’s ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia. In related work, Khrennikov and Aerts and their respective associates have explored the intermediate domain of mesoscopic phenomena in which quantum-like behavior can be observed and formalized. We generalize this work to define a third domain, one of macroscopic, interactive processes to which quantum concepts, but not quantum formalism apply. We show that they follow the non-standard logic proposed in the last century by the Franco-Romanian thinker Stéphane Lupasco. This logical system, grounded in the ontological dualities in nature, describes the evolution of complex processes and emergence at macroscopic levels of reality as chains of interacting actualities and potentialities. Without going outside the laws of physics, some new approaches to the problems of life, cognition and information can be made. The most appropriate formalism for describing this logic is under current scrutiny. 1. Introduction. The Hard Problems of Physics The concepts of actuality and potentiality, and of the movement from the latter to the former, have been discussed since Aristotle, but now can be seen as common to both quantum and macroscopic levels of reality, that is, those of non-thermodynamic and thermodynamic change respectively. Areas of on-going debate in physics are on the one hand non-locality, wave function collapse, entanglement, etc. and on the other the possibility of extension of the relevant quantum mechanical formalism to selected complex macroscopic phenomena. -
Aristotelian Infinity
ARISTOTELIAN INFINITY JOHN BOWIN begins his treatment of the infinite in book 3 of the Physics in an overtly systematic fashion. The Physics,hesays,isa study of nature, and nature has been defined as a principle of change and rest. Change, in turn, is thought to be something continuous, and what is continuous is thought to be infinitely divisible. So the topic of the infinite falls neatly out of the topic of nature. It follows, then, that the student of nature must first investigate whether the infinite exists or not, and then, if it exists, enquire how it exists. It is clear that the infinite must exist in some sense, because if it did not, ‘many impossible consequences’ would result, such as abeginningandanendoftime,andtheexistenceofindivisible lines. It remains, then, to determine in what sense the infinite does exist, and in what sense it does not. Aristotle reminds us, at the beginning of his positive account of infinity in chapter 6, that to exist means either to exist actually or to exist potentially, so if the infinite exists, it must exist in one of these senses. The previous two chapters have established that the infinite cannot exist actually, so, by disjunctive syllogism, the infinite must exist potentially. In Aristotle’s words, ‘The alternative then remains that the infinite has a potential existence’ (Phys. 3. 6, 206A18–19). Jonathan Lear is right to point out that what is at stake, for Aristotle, in the rejection of the actual infinite is ‘the possibility of philosophy—of man’s ability to comprehend the world—[which] depends on the fact that the world is a finite place containing ob- jects that are themselves finite’. -
'Nisi Temere Agat': Francisco Suárez on Final Causes and Final Causation
Nisi temere agat Erik Åkerlund Nisi temere agat Francisco Suárez on Final Causes and Final Causation Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Universitetshuset, sal IV, Biskopsgatan 3, 753 10 Uppsala, Uppsala, Monday, December 19, 2011 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English. Abstract Åkerlund, E. 2011. Nisi temere agat. Francisco Suárez on Final Causes and Final Causation. Filosofiska institutionen. 158 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 978-91-506-2248-5. The main thesis of this dissertation is that final causes are beings of reason (‘entia rationis’) in the philosophy of Francisco Suárez (1547-1617). The rejection of final causes is often seen as one of the hallmarks of Early Modern phi- losophy, marking the transition from an earlier Aristotelian tradition. However, in this disser- tation it is shown that final causes had a problematic position already within the Aristotelian tradition. Although other examples of this can be found, this dissertation centers around the thinking of the philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez and his treatment of final causes in his Disputationes Metaphysicae from 1597. Suárez counts final causes as one of the four kinds of causes, in line with the Aristotelian tradition. However, what these are and how they cause is, at closer inspection, not at all clear, as Suárez shapes his notion of final causation against the background of a definition of causa- tion where efficient causation is the principal kind of causation. Due to this basic view on causes, he is faced with a host of problems when it comes to “salvaging” final causes. -
1 Potentiality in Aristotle's Metaphysics Anna Marmodoro University Of
Potentiality in Aristotle’s metaphysics1 Anna Marmodoro University of Oxford *** This paper was accepted for publication in April 2013 and is forthcoming in K. Engelhard and M. Quante (eds.) The Handbook of Potentiality, Springer *** In this paper I will argue that Aristotle built his ontology solely on powers.2 On my reading, Aristotelian powers are pure powers. That is, all there is to a power is its powerfulness; nothing inert, or impotent is needed in the power’s nature to anchor the power to reality.3 But from this – namely that all there is to a pure power is its powerfulness – it doesn’t follow that all there is to a pure power is potentiality. This latter position, which one encounters in contemporary accounts of powers, has the unwelcome consequence that a world of pure powers only is a world of potentialities only. I will argue that in Aristotle’s system pure powers are actualised, not by a transition to different potentialities, but by a transition to a different status of the powers themselves. Ontologies of pure powers are invariably construed as relational ontologies – powers in potentiality are taken to be essentially related to further powers in potentiality, namely, to their manifestations.4 Aristotle’s power ontology, by contrast, is not relational. On the one hand, a power in potentiality is the same power as its manifestation – so being manifested does not relate a power to a further power in potentiality. On the other, although Aristotle’s powers are dependent on other powers in order to be activated, they are not related to these other powers through polyadic relations, such as ‘x being the father of y’.