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'Nisi Temere Agat': Francisco Suárez on Final Causes and Final Causation

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'Nisi Temere Agat': Francisco Suárez on Final Causes and Final Causation Nisi temere agat Erik Åkerlund Nisi temere agat Francisco Suárez on Final Causes and Final Causation Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Universitetshuset, sal IV, Biskopsgatan 3, 753 10 Uppsala, Uppsala, Monday, December 19, 2011 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English. Abstract Åkerlund, E. 2011. Nisi temere agat. Francisco Suárez on Final Causes and Final Causation. Filosofiska institutionen. 158 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 978-91-506-2248-5. The main thesis of this dissertation is that final causes are beings of reason (‘entia rationis’) in the philosophy of Francisco Suárez (1547-1617). The rejection of final causes is often seen as one of the hallmarks of Early Modern phi- losophy, marking the transition from an earlier Aristotelian tradition. However, in this disser- tation it is shown that final causes had a problematic position already within the Aristotelian tradition. Although other examples of this can be found, this dissertation centers around the thinking of the philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez and his treatment of final causes in his Disputationes Metaphysicae from 1597. Suárez counts final causes as one of the four kinds of causes, in line with the Aristotelian tradition. However, what these are and how they cause is, at closer inspection, not at all clear, as Suárez shapes his notion of final causation against the background of a definition of causa- tion where efficient causation is the principal kind of causation. Due to this basic view on causes, he is faced with a host of problems when it comes to “salvaging” final causes. Though at first sight seemingly real, in a final analysis final causes are shown to belong to the class of “beings of reason,” ‘entia rationis’, which are not real beings at all. However, it is also argued that this does not in itself preclude counting final causes as causes; something can really be a cause without being real. Chapter one presents Suárez’ general view on causes and causation. Chapter two presents his view on final causation. Chapter three examines the close link between final causation and moral psychology. Chapter four relates the question of final causation to God’s concurrence with the world. Finally, chapter five argues for the thesis that final causes are beings of rea- son. Keywords: Francisco Suárez, final causes, causality, ontology, metaphysics, intentionality Erik Åkerlund, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics, Box 627, Uppsala University, SE-75126 Uppsala, Sweden. © Erik Åkerlund 2011 ISBN 978-91-506-2248-5 urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-160816 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-160816) Printed in Sweden by Edita Västra Aros, Västerås 2011. Acknowledgements No man is an island. Though only one person stands as the author of the present dissertation, and takes full responsibility for its final form, it is dependent upon many persons. First and foremost, the whole project would be inconceivable without the intellectual environment provided by the department of philosophy at Uppsa- la University for the last ten years. One cannot mention this department without also mentioning the name Rysiek Sliwinski. Formally, Rysiek is the Director of Studies at the department, but in reality he is so much more. From day one of my studies up until the present he has facilitated my work, and that of so many others, by his flexibility and constant assistance in all matters practical. More particularly, though, the research group on the history of philosophy at said department has become my home base in the academic world. The thoughts presented in this dissertation have been shaped by meticulous dis- cussions at the seminar in the history of philosophy; to this group I owe much of whatever acuity can be found herein. I feel a deep sense of gratitude to each and every member of this group, but the name most associated with it – actually, the founder of it – is Lilli Alanen. It was under her aegis that I was first introduced to the history of philosophy. She was also my first main supervisor for this dissertation. And further steps I have taken on the road of philosophy have to a large extent been supervised by her former students. In short, Lilli’s contribution cannot be overestimated. With regards to this dissertation, however, no one has helped me more than Tomas Ekenberg, my supervisor. He has put a copious amount of time and effort into helping me with this dissertation. In matters large and small, he has been an invaluable help. Pauliina Remes and Henrik Lagerlund have, as co-supervisors, supported me in different ways. Pauliina entered quite late in the process, but has en- couraged my work and has come with very productive suggestions. Henrik has been leading me on in the field of philosophy for much longer. It was Henrik who first introduced me to Suárez, and he was my supervisor for my master thesis on Suárez (“Suárez on Forms, Universals and Understanding”). Henrik also led me to the specific topic of final causes in Suárez. Furthermore, during my PhD-studies, I visited Henrik for one semester at the University of Western Ontario (UWO), London, ON, which was a very 5 important time for me. This trip was made possible by a grant from the Wal- lenberg Foundation. From the UWO, I would also like to mention Ben Hill, with whom I have had many productive discussions. I would also like to thank John Thorpe for the warmhearted way in which he invited me to ga- therings academic and social during my stay in Canada. In another context, the Jesuits of the Uppsala community have helped me on many different levels over the course of many years, also regarding the dissertation. My special thanks go to fr. Philip Geister, SJ, and to fr., Ulf Jonsson, SJ, for all their support. In the spring of 2011, I received a grant to stay a week at the Sigtuna Foundation to work on my dissertation. This turned out to be a most produc- tive stay, and I am thankful to the Sigtuna Foundation and to the staff there, who facilitated my work during this week. Life isn’t all academic, however. Besides good friends, I have the fortune of having a loving and caring family around me. In the closest vicinity, I would like to thank Ove, my father, Christina, my mother and Ola, my brother, for all your support. But in particular I would like to extend my gratitude to Thérèse, my wife; “in good times and in bad, in sickness and in health…” I dedicate this disser- tation to you. 6 Contents Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... 5 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 9 1. What is a Cause? ....................................................................................... 17 1.1 The Cause as a Principle .................................................................... 17 1.2 The Definition of a Cause .................................................................. 25 1.2.1 Ordering the Principles ............................................................... 25 1.2.2 Cause and Causation ................................................................... 27 1.2.3 The Nature of a Cause ................................................................ 28 1.3 Different Kinds of Causes .................................................................. 32 1.4 The Causes among Themselves ......................................................... 35 1.4.1 The Efficient Cause: Agent, Action, Effect ................................ 35 1.4.2 The Efficient Cause as the Principal Kind of Cause ................... 40 1.4.3 The Final Cause: some Preliminary Remarks ............................. 42 1.5 Causes and Relations .......................................................................... 43 1.6 Summary and Conclusions ................................................................. 46 2. Final Causes and Final Causation ............................................................. 49 2.1 Basic Layout: Finality as Rational Agency ........................................ 50 2.2 In what Sense is the End a Principle? ................................................. 54 2.3 Finality, Time and Intellect ................................................................ 55 2.3.1 Different Kinds of Ends .............................................................. 57 2.3.2 Different Kinds of Effects of Ends ............................................. 61 2.3.3 A Future Act Causes a Desire for Itself ...................................... 63 2.4 Finality, Form and Will ...................................................................... 64 2.5 Moving or Terminating? .................................................................... 66 2.5.1 Metaphor and Analogy ............................................................... 69 2.6 End and Chance .................................................................................. 72 2.7 What is the Effect of a Final Cause? .................................................. 73 2.8 Summary and Conclusions ................................................................. 73 3. Free Agency and Free Will ....................................................................... 75 3.1 Free – from Necessity ........................................................................ 75 3.2 Free Choice and Free Will.................................................................. 79 3.2.1 A Free Faculty ...........................................................................
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