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Saigon May Release Thieu Foe to Vietcong Sider His Request' - - by CHARLES MOHR Effective Pacification Program Mit Mr

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Saigon May Release Thieu Foe to Vietcong Sider His Request' - - by CHARLES MOHR Effective Pacification Program Mit Mr NYTimes CIA 12 Mar 73 See this :file 6 Mar 70 et seq. NYTimes MAR 1 2 1913 THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 12,1971 Saigon May Release Thieu Foe to Vietcong sider his request' By CHARLES MOHR - - An informed source said effective pacification program Mit Mr. Chau's arrest. Special to The New York Times that, technically, if. Mr. Chau adopted for the first time. Mr. Chau wentintwhiciing at SAIGON, South Vietnam, remained in South Vietnam, he The plan, a synthesis of many Mr. Vann's quarters in the city March 11—The case of Trail, would have to serve out the minds, reflected in large part of Can Tho. Mr. Vann devel- Ngoc Chau, whose imprison- seven remaining years of his ideas first developed or refined• joped an elaborate plan to fly ment by the Saigon Government sentence. But then he indicated by Mr. Chau, including an him to safety in Cambodia by in 1970 caught world attention, that President Thieu might emphasis on identifying and helicopter, a step that would now turns on the question of• favorably consider setting Mr. meeting grieyances of the surely have meant Mr. Vann's whether he will be turned over Chau free. peasants. dismissal. Finally, Mr. Chau- to the Vietcong or set free. "We are very open about Mr. Chau became the national after great soul-searching—per- Mr. Chau, 48 years old, a ma- this," the source said. director of the pacification mitted himself to be arrested. jor architect of the anti-Com- Although Mr. Chau was con- cadre and head of the training Bunker Supported n munist pacification program victed of illegal contacts with school. Along with the Pacifica- and a valued friend of American' Communists, bitter political tion Minister, Lieut. Gen. Vann wanted thethe United United advisers during the war, had' feuds were at the root of his Nguyen Duc Thang, he was the -States mission to use all its fought against the Vietcong for troubles. His case marked the most influental Vietnamese in influence to save Mr. Chau. But two decades before his im- beginning of a severe erosion of the struggle to win control of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, prisonment. • civil liberties, constitutional rural Vietnam. deeply committed to President In 1970, he was sentenced to procedure and democratic gov- Thieu, forbade any intervention. 10 years. in prison for having ernment. The case was also a Right Kind of Vietnamese • A sense of shame Tan deeply made "treasonable" contacts considerable drama. To the American "snake-eat- through a part of the American with his- brother, who was a Served With Vietminh ing night fighters," he was the community here. spy for North Vietnam. right kind of Vietnamese- • A military court convicted The South Vietnamese au- Born in Hue, Mr. Chau , dedicated, effective, flexible Mr. • Chau of illegal contacts thorities recently expressed an fought for a time with the and honest. with his brother and sentenced intention to "release" Mr. Chau Vietminh against French rule ' Mr. Chau ran for the lower him to 10 years in prison. but left them in 1949, charging house of parliament in 1967 and . Angry scenes, approaching to his old adversaries as part being dominated of the exchange of prisoners of that they were won by one of the largest mar- riots, took place in the Assem- war now under way. But late and misdirected by the Commu- gins of any candidate. And he bly, which had begun to decline last week, an official spokes- nists. ran in the province that he in power relative to the Presi- man indicated that this plan He entered the South Viet- had ruled as province chief, dent. The Supreme Court ruled might be reconsidered. namese Army, rising to the something many of the nation's that Mr. Chau's conviction was rank of lieutenant colonel. administrators would have unconstitutional, and later an- Amnesty Considered President Ngo Dinh Diem made found a futile, possibly humili- nulled his sentence. An informed South Vietnam- him chief of Kien Hoa Province, ating, project. ese source said it was even which, with more than half a Although he was .,originally possible that Mr. Chau, a for million people, is the largest not unfriendly to President mer soldier, official and mem- province in the Mekong Delta. Thieu, Mr. Chau gradually be- ber of the National Assembly, After serving briefly as gan to arouse deep anger and might be given amnesty and set Mayor of Da Nang, Mr. Chau appreension in the Presiden- free. again assumed control of ad- tial Palace. But whatever his ultimate ministration in Kieri Hoa after For one thing, Mr. Chau ac- ite, the Chau case has resulted President Diem was assassi- cused one of President Thieu's in one of .the most tumultuous, nated in November, 1963. closest supporters of paying bitter and divisive political According to Americans who large Tribes to subvert the As- controversies of the administra- devoted themselves to the sembly. After the Tet offensive tion of President Nguyen Van same difficult subject, Mr. of 1968 he recommended diplo- Thieu. Chau was an innovative and matic contacts with North Viet- nam aimed at a settlement of The case has also caused imaginative thinker 'on revolu- emotional argument between tionary, or political, warfare the war. However, he specifi- American officials who had and counterinsurgency. This ' cally opposed a coalition gov- tried to help Mr. Chau and made him unusual because few ernment with the Vietcong. those who supported President South Vietnamese officials dis- Meanwhile, Mr. Chau's older Thieu's efforts to jail him. played much real interest or brother, Tran Ngoc Hien, had come from North Vietnam to The affair seemed to be talent for the basics of guer- heading toward a tragic climax rilla war. work as an underground intel- in recent days, when the South Vann Was Close Friend ligence agent. When the broth- er was finally arested in Vietnamese Government an- Mr. Chau was a' close friend nounced that Mr. Chau's name 1969, the Government learned The New York Times of the late John Paul Vann, the that he and Mr. Chau had been Tran Ngoc Chau was on a list of more than respected American civilian ad- 5,000 civilian prisoners to be in contact. viser. Another good friend was Mr. Chau admitted that he "exchanged" with the Vietcong Edward G. Lansdale, another in line with the Vietnam cease- had met his brother eight times legendary Asia hand, who with ut said he had kept the United fire agreement. a team of old associates and "It's grotesque," said one of new recruits such as aDniel States mission informed of these Mr. Chau's American friends. eetings and had been encour- Ellsberg, came to South Viet- aged to continue them. Mr. "He's not a Communist and the nam in 1965 to help get an final straw would be to turn Vann confirmed this. him over to the other side." President Thieu attempted to The Government's official strip Mr. Chau of his parliamen- spokesman, Pham Duong Hien, tary immunity by obtaining a however, said in answer to a three-fourths vote of the As- question Fridayi, that if Mr. sembly's members, as stipulated Chau asked not to be sent to in the Constitution. Failing this, the Vietcong, "we would con- the Government used other parliamentary methods. to per- .
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