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See It Through with Nguyen Van Thieu

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See It Through with Nguyen Van Thieu See It Through with Nguyen Van Thieu SEE IT THROUGH WITH NGUYEN VAN THIEU THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION EMBRACES A DICTATOR, 1969-1974 By JOSHUA K. LOVELL, BA, MA A Dissertation Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy McMaster University © Copyright by Joshua K. Lovell, June 2013 McMaster University DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (2013), Hamilton, Ontario (History) TITLE: See It Through with Nguyen Van Thieu: The Nixon Administration Embraces a Dictator, 1969-1974 AUTHOR: Joshua K. Lovell, BA (University of Waterloo), MA (University of Waterloo) SUPERVISOR: Professor Stephen M. Streeter NUMBER OF PAGES: ix, 304 ii ABSTRACT Antiwar activists and Congressional doves condemned the Nixon administration for supporting South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, whom they accused of corruption, cruelty, authoritarianism, and inefficacy. To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of Nixon’s decision to prop up a client dictator with seemingly so few virtues. Joshua Lovell’s dissertation addresses this gap in the literature, and argues that racism lay at the root of this policy. While American policymakers were generally contemptuous of the Vietnamese, they believed that Thieu partially transcended the alleged limitations of his race. The White House was relieved to find Thieu, who ushered South Vietnam into an era of comparative stability after a long cycle of coups. To US officials, Thieu appeared to be the only leader capable of planning and implementing crucial political, social, and economic policies, while opposition groups in Saigon’s National Assembly squabbled to promote their own narrow self-interests. Thieu also promoted American-inspired initiatives, such as Nixon’s controversial Vietnamization program, even though many of them weakened his government. Thieu’s performance as a national leader and administrator was dubious, at best, but the Nixon administration trumpeted his minor achievements and excused his gravest flaws. Senior policymakers doubted they would find a better leader than Thieu, and they ridiculed the rest of the South Vietnamese as fractious, venal, and uncivilized. While the alliance ultimately chilled over disagreements regarding the Paris peace negotiations, Washington’s perception of Thieu as a South Vietnamese superman facilitated a cordial relationship for most of Nixon’s first term in office. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I owe debts of gratitude to a wide variety of people, without whom I could not have completed this dissertation. Professor Stephen M. Streeter provided much needed guidance as I planned and organized this project, and offered critical feedback on chapter drafts. Drs. Jaeyoon Song and Richard Stubbs similarly offered exceptional advice along the way. I am indebted to my colleagues in the graduate program at McMaster University, who provided encouragement at various junctures. I would similarly like to thank Dr. Andrew Hunt, from the University of Waterloo, for inspiring my interest in the Vietnam War in the first place. I could not have conducted my research without the generous assistance of the staff and archivists at the LBJ Presidential Library, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, and National Archives and Records Administration. They helped me organize my investigation, and directed me to source material that I would not have otherwise found. I also owe special thanks also to “B” and Gloria Newell, who helped me navigate unfamiliar cities during prolonged visits to those archives. I depended very heavily on my family over the course of this doctoral program. My parents, Kevin and Robbin Lovell, and brothers, Lucas and Matthew, urged me to pursue my dream and provided much needed assistance along the way. My grandparents—Burt and Eileen Lovell and Ross and Doreen Auliffe—never failed to provide much appreciated support. My partner and fiancé, Sarah Bornstein, galvanized my determination to complete this project and patiently suffered through the neuroses of a busy graduate student. Finally, I would like to thank Dylan Auliffe for serving as a iv tremendous source of inspiration. Dylan’s life was unjustly brief, but I will always remember him as a model of courage, strength, and determination. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii Acknowledgments...............................................................................................................iv List Of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... vii Introduction..........................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: The Rise of Nguyen Van Thieu, 1964–1968 ...................................................21 Chapter 2: Rapprochement, 1969 ......................................................................................78 Chapter 3: Dissent, Descent, and Decency, 1970 ............................................................136 Chapter 4: The Damndest Mess We’ve Seen, 1971 ........................................................187 Chapter 5: When the Tail Can’t Wag the Dog, 1972–Jan 1973 ......................................237 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................283 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................294 vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS APC: Accelerated Pacification Campaign ARVN: Army of the Republic of Vietnam BNDD: Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs CAP: Code for Outgoing Telegram from the White House CDST: Camp David Study Table Chron: Chronological File CIA: Central Intelligence Agency CIP: Commercial Import Program CNR: Committee of National Reconciliation CORDS: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support COSVN: Central Office for South Vietnam CR: Congressional Record Deptel: Telegram from the Department of State Embtel: Embassy Telegram FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States (series) FWWR: Files of Walt W. Rostow GVN: Government of Vietnam (used in some source material titles) HAK Telecons: Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversations IAC: Irregular Affairs Committee IMF: International Monetary Fund JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff JUSPAO: Joint US Public Affairs Office LBJLM: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum LTTP: Land-to-the-Tiller Program MACV: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam MP: Memoranda for the President MPC: Military Payment Certificate MR: Military Region MTP: Memos to the President NARA: National Archives and Records Administration NCNRC: National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord NLF: National Liberation Front NSC: National Security Council NSCF: National Security Council Files NSCIF: National Security Council Institutional (“H”) Files NSCMM: NSC Meeting Minutes NSDF: National Social Democratic Front NSF: National Security Files OO: Oval Office PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam PC: Presidential Correspondence vii PF: Popular Forces POF: President’s Office Files POW: Prisoner of War PRG: People’s Revolutionary Government PSDF: People’s Self Defense Force RG: Record Group RVNAF: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces SMOF: Staff Member and Office Files TJN: Tom Johnson’s Notes TOHAK: Telegram to Henry A. Kissinger US: United States USAID: United States Agency for International Development USIA: United States Information Agency VC: Viet Cong, derogatory term for NLF VCF: Vietnam Country File VSF: Vietnam Subject Files WHSF: White House Special Files WHT: White House Tapes WR: Walt Rostow viii DECLARATION OF ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT Joshua Lovell is the sole author of this dissertation. ix PhD Thesis – J. Lovell; McMaster University – History INTRODUCTION He was lying in the back of an armored personnel carrier. Once the most powerful man in the country, Ngo Dinh Diem looked quite humble on this late-fall morning. He had entered the vehicle willingly, despite his disappointment that the generals had not arrived in a limousine. Desperate times required him to sacrifice some of the conveniences of his office. The personnel carrier did not offer the safety it promised, though. Once inside, a disgruntled junior officer shot Diem in the head and stabbed his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, repeatedly. Blood splattered across Diem’s face as his body fell awkwardly, his back bent forward with his hands tied behind him. He was later granted an ignoble burial in a prison cemetery. His cause of death was listed as “suicide,” though the government added the adjective “accidental” after pictures of the corpse became public. His death certificate listed him as a province chief, but he had long since moved beyond this office. Until 2 November 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem had been the president of the Republic of (South) Vietnam.1 Before his death, the White House had shaped its foreign policy in Vietnam around the slogan of “sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem.”2 In late 1963, however, President John F. Kennedy and his advisers grew weary of Saigon’s incurable instability 1 Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 1; Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-1963 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 6; Stanley
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