Peripheries at the Center of a Shadow Nation: the Pivotal Role of Borderland Violence in Central American History
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Peripheries at the Center of a Shadow Nation: The Pivotal Role of Borderland Violence in Central American History Robert H. Holden History Department Old Dominion University Norfolk VA 23529-0091 [email protected] For the panel “American Identities” at The Historical Society’s 2008 Conference “Migration, Diaspora, Ethnicity, & Nationalism in History” Baltimore June 7, 2008 In 1808, at the outset of their prolonged and violent divorce from the monarchy of Spain, the peoples of Hispanic America had much in common. Having shared the experience of rule by the same overlord for three centuries, the reigning beliefs, language, legal systems and political customs were practically indistinguishable, from New Spain in the north to Chile in the south. Yet the engagement of separation from Spain also entailed a second engagement of separation: that of prying themselves apart into separate national communities. In most places, that process of national dissolution simply meant turning primary or secondary-level ex-Spanish juridisdictional boundaries into national ones. Chile and Peru, for example, had been separate jurisdictions of the overarching viceroyality of Peru; Mexico was most of the viceroyalty of New Spain. But nowhere was the process of national dissolution as divisive as in the Kingdom of Guatemala, which had been a secondary jurisdiction within the viceroyalty of New Spain. That Kingdom, like other Hispanic lands, was organized into intendencias (roughly, provinces). After separating from Spain in 1821, and then from Mexico in 1823, the ex-Kingdom survived as a nominal nation ─ the República Federal de Centro América ─ for two decades. Then, about 1840, after years of almost constant civil war, the federal republic finally collapsed into five separate countries whose international borders followed the boundaries of the states (estados) into which the República had been divided. The state boundaries, in turn, had largely duplicated the intendencia boundaries of the old Kingdom. Political disintegration had not proceeded this deeply and widely anywhere else in Hispanic America. It would have been difficult to create a distinctive national identity for the kingdom-turned-republic of 1821-c. 1840. But the challenge supplied by the breakup of 1840 seemed even greater. For on what grounds was, say, Honduras to be understood as a distinct political community with its own identity, bursting to be free from the national communities of Nicaragua or Guatemala? Elsewhere I have suggested that it was just the legacy of the failed República Federal de Centro América, and the centuries-old networks of cross-national kinship, entrepreneurial, and political ties, that created the conditions for weak nationalisms and a pattern of cross-border intervention, both armed and otherwise, that have persisted to this day.1 The “shadow nation” of this paper’s title is the old República, and the “peripheries” of the title are the ex-República’s state boundaries, transformed into international boundaries after 1840. The “shadow nation” has lived on, not only in mistrust and violence, but also in ever-evolving expressions of an eternally frustrated aspiration to reunite. Between 1842 and 1961, "formal and official steps" were undertaken to reconstitute the federation at least 25 times, though not one of them survived more than a few months, and all five countries did not always join them (El Salvador and Honduras joined almost every one; Guatemala and Nicaragua were only a little less active, and Costa Rica participated in no more than a third).2 Writing in the early 1980s, during the worst period of disunity and violence in the region’s history, the distinguished historian of Central America, Hector Pérez Brignoli, observed that ever since 1821, “la utopía de la Unión se ha visto incansablemente reiterada,” and he was right to predict that the theme of unity would reemerge even after the bitterly destructive horrors of the 1980s.3 Indeed, the banner of the “utopía de la Unión” is carried today by two institutions ─ the politically-oriented Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA) and (in the economic realm) the Secretariá de Integración Económica Centroamericana (SIECA), each with its own cross- 1 Robert H. Holden, Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821- 1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 42-43. 2 Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union: Central America 1824-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 243, 248. 3 Héctor Pérez Brignoli, Breve Historia De Centroamérica (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985), 154. 1 regional governing bodies and bureaucracies. Morever, the very constitutions of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras still today commit their countries to restoring the old federation. These multiple expressions of a desire to reunify in turn help to preserve an ambience of ambiguity about national identity. That ambiguity, it is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate, finds expression in the opportunities for mutual subversion, resistance and innovation that are most hospitably accommodated in the borderlands that separate the five countries. Rare is the Central American borderland violence that is unambiguously nationalistic. For borders to magnify and enhance a sense of national identity, there must be a plausible premise of alterity separating the two sides. But as Pérez Brignoli insightfully observed, the persistence of the unity question means, “en cierto modo, que la identidad nacional de los países centroamericanos no está todavía plenamente constituida,”4 a problem whose bearing on the institutional character of the borderlands (and the violence associated with them) cannot be overlooked. If the agents of isthmian borderland violence typically represent no consistently distinct national identity, national-level discourses about borderland violence cannot therefore readily seize on that violence in order to rally “the nation” against “the other.” The most effective and credible myths of alterity in Central America have been those constituted by the menacing presence of some non-isthmian power ─ above all, the United States, and secondly, the Soviet Union.5 As Jorge Castañeda said of the Latin American left in general from the beginning of the twentieth century onward, “there was virtually no one else [but the United States] to be nationalistic against.”6 In 1953 and 1954, the Guatemalan enemies of the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz took refuge in the neighboring states of Nicaragua and Honduras. Installing themselves in the borderland, they pushed back into Guatemala, fortified with weapons and military training covertly arranged by the United States with the quiet cooperation of the governments of Nicaragua and Honduras. The Guatemalans, Hondurans and Nicaraguans all accused one another of being the stooges of either U.S. or Soviet imperialism. Nor did the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan borderland violence of the 1950s thrive on nationalistic principles, for it was provoked repeatedly by the borderland-based, Nicaraguan-protected, Costa Rican enemies of the Costa Rican governments. In the borderlands conflicts of the bloody 1970s and ‘80s, national identities would fade even further. Nicaraguans, Hondurans and Costa Ricans did not fight each other then as Nicaraguans, Hondurans or Costa Ricans but as sandinistas or anti-sandinistas. Only the weakest of nationalistic discourses can be found in borderland fighting because nationalities were not fundamentally in conflict. Individuals of all three nationalities (and others besides) could be found on different sides of the fighting, and on different sides of the borders. Morales’s characterization of the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican borderland as “binacional” may well apply to others in the region. Owing mainly to Nicaraguan migration, kinship ties and local loyalties have given that borderland "un principio de identidad muy homogéneo e históricamente más volcado hacia Nicaragua," a tendency reinforced by the fact that the borderland itself communicates more easily with Nicaraguan than with Costa Rican centers of decisionmaking. As a result, settlements on the Costa Rican side were more often the result of Nicaraguan rather than 4 Pérez Brignoli, Breve Historia de Centroamérica, 154. 5 For the violence-enhancing risks of such myths, see Peter Lambert, "Myth, Manipulation, and Violence: Relationships Between National Identity and Political Violence," in Political Violence and the Construction of National Identity in Latin America, ed. Will Fowler and Peter Lambert, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 29-30. 6 Jorge G. Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: the Latin American Left After the Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 290-291. 2 Costa Rican colonization efforts. "Aparte, entonces, de las relaciones de parentesco y vecindad entre poblaciones fronterizas de ambos países, se conformó un tejido de rutas y redes comerciales que constituyen los principales lazos de una economía transfronteriza en procesos de expansión permanente." At the same time, this borderland has long been a scene of conflict, with fighting men passing from one side to the other, so that border life has been dominated by war and the fear of war on both sides of the line. Even trade revolved around war materiel.7 Civil war, rather than international war, may thus be the best way to understand these cross-border occasions of violence, a view that would also fit Jack Child’s interpretation of isthmian conflict as fundamentally ideological.8 In the “shadow