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The Self Excerpts THE SELF A Thematic Compilation Avi Sion, Ph. D. © AVI SION, 1990-2008, 2016. PROTECTED BY INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTIONS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY BE REPRODUCED IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER, OR STORED IN A RETRIEVAL SYSTEM OR TRANSMITTED, WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR-PUBLISHER, EXCEPT IN CASE OF BRIEF QUOTATIONS WITH DUE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. First published 2008. Expanded edition, 2017. By Avi Sion. Geneva, Switzerland. Library Cataloguing Information: Sion, Avi. The Self. A Thematic Compilation. ISBN: 978-1495972089 Abstract The Self is an inquiry into the concepts of self, soul, person, ego, consciousness, psyche and mind – ranging over phenomenology, logic, epistemology, ontology, psychology, spirituality, meditation, ethics and metaphysics. This book is a thematic compilation drawn from past works by the author. The present, expanded edition includes an essay written in 2016 on the Buddhist five skandhas doctrine. Contents 1. Chapter One ............................................................. 7 1. Consciousness is a Relation ................................. 7 2. Kinds of Consciousness ..................................... 10 3. The Mind ............................................................ 17 4. Popular Psychology ............................................ 21 2. Chapter Two ........................................................... 24 1. Self or Soul ......................................................... 24 2. Self-Knowledge.................................................. 35 3. Chapter Three ......................................................... 44 1. To Be Or Not To Be ........................................... 44 2. The Self .............................................................. 47 3. Factors of the “Self” ........................................... 56 4. Identification-With ............................................. 63 5. Fallacious Criticisms of Selfhood ...................... 68 6. What “Emptiness” Might Be .............................. 79 4. Chapter Four .......................................................... 88 1. Cultural Context and Epist. Considerations ....... 88 2. Theoretical Context ............................................ 92 3. Stages in the Process of Volition ..................... 102 4. The Scope of Freewill ...................................... 113 5. Chapter Five ......................................................... 118 1. The Ego Abhors a Vacuum .............................. 118 2. Ungluing the Mind ........................................... 125 3. Abstract vs. Concrete Self ................................ 128 4. Sundry Reflections on the Soul and God ......... 141 6. Chapter Six ........................................................... 153 1. The Individual Self in Monism ........................ 153 2. The Impression of Self ..................................... 159 7. Chapter Seven ...................................................... 167 1. Not an Essence, but an Entity .......................... 167 2. Distinguishing the Ego ..................................... 175 3. Dismissing the Ego .......................................... 179 8. Chapter Eight ....................................................... 185 1. The Self or Soul ............................................... 185 2. Descartes’ Mind-Body Dichotomy .................. 193 3. Buddhist Denial of the Soul ............................. 202 9. Chapter Nine ........................................................ 209 1. Awareness of Self ........................................... 209 2. Meditation on the Self ...................................... 212 3. Behold the Mind ............................................... 216 4. The Buddhist No-Soul Theory ......................... 225 5. Self and Enlightenment .................................... 234 10. Chapter Ten .......................................................... 238 1. My Own Phenomenological Reading .............. 239 2. A More Orthodox Psychological Reading ....... 244 3. The Metaphysical Aspects ............................... 253 4. In Conclusion ................................................... 277 Main References........................................................... 283 Diagrams 1. Material, mental and spiritual domains 68 2. Three types of continuity 73 3. Mapping the process of volition 104 4. How momentary subjects and objects give rise to abstractions 130 5. Matter, mind and spirit presented as three dimensions of existence 263 CHAPTER 1 7 1. CHAPTER ONE Drawn from Future Logic (1990), Chapter 61. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE MIND My purpose here is to propose a consistent framework and terminology for epistemology. 1. Consciousness is a Relation Consciousness is a specific, peculiar kind of relation between an entity like ourselves (called the Subject); and any ‘appearance’, ‘phenomenon’, ‘thing’ which presents itself to us (called the Object). One can figuratively view consciousness as a line stretching between subject and object. (Capital letters are sometimes used for these terms, to avoid confusion with the use of the same words in other contexts, note.) Consciousness is itself, of course, a phenomenon — one very difficult to grasp and define, because it is such a fundamentally unique and distinctive part of the world. We are here merely indicating it, without presuming to know what it is much more precisely, or just how it works. The point made here is just that it is primarily a relational phenomenon, a placid ‘seeing’; it is not itself an activity, though many activities surround it. The ‘effort’ of 8 THE SELF attention or the ‘state’ of being aware or the ‘activity’ of thought, are secondary aspects of this phenomenon, which depend on the relational definition for their understanding. The reason why consciousness is best described as ‘a relation’, is that we cannot consistently claim that consciousness is ‘subjective’, because that claim is itself an event of consciousness which has pretensions of being ‘objective’. This means that the subject and object must be related by consciousness in such a way that neither affects the other when they are so related. Consciousness, then, is a relation which is neither passive nor active. Consciousness cannot be said to consist of changes of or within the subject caused by the object, because such changes would not guarantee the existence of an object, let alone that the same object would always cause the same change or that different objects would never cause the same change. And consciousness cannot be said to consist in a creation by the subject of an object, because we would still have to explain how the object is apprehended once produced. The Subject is itself also a phenomenon — again, one very difficult to grasp and define, because it is such a fundamentally unique and distinctive part of the world. We can say that it remains unaffected by consciousness or its Object. If consciousness was passive or active (as above defined), the Subject would be unable to be conscious of itself, not even hypothetically. The Object is, note well, whatever presents itself to us, as it stands — without initial concern as to whether it is to be regarded as ‘real’ or ‘illusory’: these are later judgments about the object. The Object, likewise, remains unmoved by consciousness or by the Subject as such. CHAPTER 1 9 What matters here is that ultimately all consciousness is essentially observation, by someone, of something. The nature or type or source or status, of observer, consciousness, and observed, are other issues, which philosophy indeed has to discuss at length and try to resolve, but which need not concern us at this stage. Whether the object is faced by the subject with detachment, dispassionately, objectively — or the subject is unwilling or unable to ‘distance’ himself from the object — these are attitudinal aspects, which pertain to reaction and do not affect the essentially ‘observatory’ nature of consciousness. The existence of the object is immediately given in its appearance as a phenomenon. However we interpret what has appeared, we can be sure that something has appeared. If nothing had appeared, there would be nothing to discuss. The existences of subject and consciousness are not so obvious, a reflection of sorts is required to notice them. Objects seem to be of various substance: some seem ‘materially concrete’ (e.g. a stone), some ‘mentally concrete’ (e.g. a dream); some seem ‘abstract’ (e.g. entropy or humaneness). Subjects are believed to be of a substance other than such material or mental entities: we view them as ‘spiritual entities’ or ‘souls’. Consciousness also seems a very special component of the world. We sometimes label our awareness of subject and consciousness jointly as ‘self-consciousness’. For us humans at least, that awareness seems to peripherally accompany our every cognition of other objects, if only we make a minimal effort to activate it. This direct impression is further confirmed indirectly, by observation 10 THE SELF of other apparent people and higher animals. The extrapolation from object to consciousness and subject seems obvious to us. We know very little about what constitutes a Subject, what gives some existents the power of cognition. Judging by their behavior, humans and higher animals have it (animists believe that all things have consciousness to some degree). One cannot postulate that consciousness is bound to be distortive, without thereby putting one’s own skeptical principle in doubt.
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