The Relation of Akasa to Pratityasamutpada in Nagarjuna's
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The relation of akasa to pratityasamutpada in Nagarjuna’s writings Garth Mason To Juliet, my wife, whose love, acceptance and graceful realism made this thesis possible. To Sinead and Kieran who teach me everyday I would like to thank Professor Deirdre Byrne for her intellectual support and editing the thesis The relation of akasa to pratityasamutpada in Nagarjuna’s writings By Garth Mason Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY In the subject of RELIGIOUS STUDIES at the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA PROMOTER: PROF. M. CLASQUIN AUGUST 2012 i Summary of thesis: While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialist thought (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He focuses most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the importance of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance, he maintains that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his two- truths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive truth of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguistically- based, conventional status.2 I am critical of this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I argue that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality akin to understanding of ākāśa in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras which although experienced cannot be cognitively grasped. Key terms: Nāgārjuna, śūnyatā, saṃvṛti, paramārtha, Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, metaphoricity, ākāśa, pratītyasamutpāda. 1 MK 24: 14 (cited in McCagney 1997:201); VV 70 (cited in Westerhoff 2010:130). 2 Garfield (Chapter 2: 23-38) and Tillemans (Chapter 9;151-166) (in Westerhoff et al, 2011) ii Declaration I declare that “The relation of akasa to pratityasamutpada in Nagarjuna’s writings” is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references ________________________ Garth Mason iii Contents List of abbreviations and note on translations used 1 Chapter One: Introduction 2 1. The Central problem 2 2. The theoretical and conceptual approach 9 3. Contribution to existing research 18 4. Methodology 29 5. Conclusion 34 Chapter Two: Ākāśā in Nāgārjuna’s thought 35 1. Introduction 35 2. The impact of the Indian tradition of Yoga on the PPM and on Nāgārjuna’s thought 43 3. Nāgārjuna’s solution to the problem of dualism and non-dualism in yoga 51 4. The roots of the meditative experience of insubstantiality in Indian thought and its expression as ākāśa in the PPM sūtras in Nāgārjuna’s writings 62 5. The meditative experience of ākāśa in Nāgārjuna’s writings 72 Chapter Three: Implications of ākāśa in Nāgārjuna’s thought 89 1. Introduction 89 2. Early Buddhist philosophy 97 iv 2.1. The emergence on Nāgārjuna’s understanding emptiness 102 3. Realism and non-realism 106 4. The importance of indeterminacy in Nāgārjuna’s identification of śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda 110 4.1. Conze, McCagney and the PPM hypothesis 119 4.2. Is śūnyatā as openness contractictory to the two-truths formulation? 123 4.3. The role of imagination in pratītyasamutpāda 126 4.4. The akasic characteristics of indeterminacy 128 5. Indeterminacy, akasic influences and the two truths 132 Chapter Four: The role of symbolism in the two-truths formulation 141 1. Introduction 141 2. Meaning based on pratītyasamutpāda vs meaning based on common sense 144 3. Theories of truth 155 4. The validity of identity theory 163 5. Metaphoricity 169 6. Conclusion 193 Chapter Five: Conclusion 192 Bibliography 201 v List of Abbreviations VV – Vigrahavyāvartanī MK –Mūlamadyamakakārikā Rgs –Ratnaguņasaṃucayagāthā PPM –Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra Aṣṭa - Aṣṭasāhasrikā Rt –Ratnakūta SS –Śūnyatāsaptati Note on Translations used I have used primarily Nancy McCagney’s translation of the MK (1997) in Nāgārjuna and philosophy of openness and Jan Westerhoff’s translation of the VV (2010) in The dispeller of disputes: Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani. Where not otherwise stated these two translations serve as my primary texts for translations on Nāgārjuna’s writings. 1 Chapter One Introduction 1. The central problem While much of Nāgārjuna’s writings are aimed at deconstructing fixed views and views that hold to some form of substantialism or svabhāva (where certain qualities are held to be inherent in phenomena), he does not make many assertive propositions regarding his philosophical position. He devotes most of his writing to applying the prasaṅga method of argumentation to prove the necessity of recognizing that all phenomena are śūnya by deconstructing views of phenomena based on substance. Nāgārjuna does, however, assert that all phenomena are empty and that phenomena are meaningful because śūnyatā makes logical sense.1 Based on his deconstruction of prevailing views of substance (see parenthesis above explaining substantialism), he asserts that holding to any view of substance is absurd, that phenomena can only make sense if viewed from the standpoint of śūnyatā. This thesis grapples with the problem that Nāgārjuna does not provide adequate supporting arguments to prove that phenomena are meaningful due to their śūnyatā. It is clear that if saṃvṛti (conceptual or conventional 1 MK 24: 14 (cited in McCagney 1997: 201); VV 70; (cited in Westerhoff 2010: 130). 2 knowledge) is indiscernible due to its emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya (conceptual or contextual truth) cannot be corroborated on its own terms due to its insubstantiality. But how does viewing phenomena as empty make them meaningful? Scholars who base their understanding of how meaning is established in Nāgārjuna’s thought based on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of his two-truths formulation, which grants both paramārtha and saṃvṛti truths their distinctive truth-values, tend to prove the distinctive veracity of saṃvṛti in terms of its linguistically-based, conventional status.2 I disagree with this approach and argue, instead, that an explanation of how phenomena are meaningful due to their emptiness is found in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra’s (PPM)’s use of metaphoricity. Rather than seeing the two truths as distinctive, I maintain that saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya both make sense based on their metaphorical relationship in that they are both śūnyatā and that phenomena point to, or are metaphors for, the all-inclusive śūnyatā of reality. The two clearest statements of Nāgārjuna’s assertion that phenomena make sense due to their emptiness are: All things prevail for him whom prevails this voidness. Nothing prevails for him for whom voidness does not prevail.3 sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate/ sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate// and For whom there is emptiness, there is [the clarity of] all things. For whom there is no emptiness there is nothing what soever. If śūnyata does not work, then everything does not work ….4 2 Garfield (Chapter 2: 23-38) and Tillemans (Chapter 9;151-166) in Westerhoff et al, 2011 3 VV 70 in Westerhoff (2010: 41). 3 prabhavati ca śūnyatéyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvāthāh/ prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya// The use of yujyate in MK 24:14 and prabhavati in VV70 suggest that phenomena are experienced as immediate (yujyate) and engagingly (prabhavati) related and when śūnyatā is fully understood. Both these terms allude to meaningful encounters with phenomena due to their emptiness. Nāgārjuna’s understanding of śūnyatā, therefore, does not imply that his philosophy is nihilistic. My thesis will demonstrate why this is so. In particular, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, (VV) Nāgārjuna was at pains to defend his argument against criticisms of nihilism. But in both Mūlamadyamakakārikā (MK) 24:14 and VV 70, śūnyatā is presented, not as a critique of phenomena, but, rather, as an integral part of their presentation. Śūnyatā in these verses is not an experience of unmitigated voidness, but rather of causal flux. But, in making his defence of śūnyatā against the charges of nihilism from his opponents, Nāgārjuna introduces meaning in order to bolster his argument. He suggests that without a correct understanding of śūnyatā nothing makes sense. Unfortunately he does not offer an argument as proof for this claim. Instead, he relies on the experience of śūnyatā in bhāvāna.5 In Chapter 2 I argue, following Nancy McCagney’s assertion, that śūnyatā, as Nāgārjuna uses the term, conceptually corresponds to ākāśa; the yogic experience of śūnyatā is mediated by a yogic experience of space as described in the in the PPM.6 4 MK 24: 14 in McCagney (1997: 201). 5 MK25: 24 (in McCagney 1997: 210). 6 McCagney (1997: 22). 4 In grappling with the problem of making sense of Nāgārjuna’s claims regarding meaning I will focus specifically on MK 24:14 and VV 70.