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Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World’S Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning

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Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World’S Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning No. 101 JUNE 2014 Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World’s Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning Joseph A. Royo Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World’s Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning by Joseph A. Royo The Institute of Land Warfare ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER NO. 101, June 2014 Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World’s Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning by Joseph A. Royo Major Joseph A. Royo is the commander of C Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He has been in the Special Operations community since 2005. His other military experiences include tours of duty with the 82d Airborne Division and as an Observer/ Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Since 2002, he has been actively involved in combat and training operations throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of re- sponsibility. He recently returned from his fourth deployment to Afghanistan, where he served as the Chief of the Joint Operations Center for the Combined–Joint Special Operations Task Force. He has also deployed to Iraq and conducted training exchanges with other CENTCOM partner forces. Major Royo was commissioned through ROTC at Texas A&M University. He is a recent gradu- ate of the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. He also holds a master’s degree in Global International Studies from Kansas University and a master’s degree in Diplomacy from Norwich University. He is the current editor of the international relations blog “Diplomatic Discourse.” Previous publications include: “Afghanistan Part II: The Reoccurrence of International Terrorism in Somalia,” Small Wars Journal, 30 August 2010; “British Military Decline 1919–1939,” Small Wars Journal, 11 July 2012; “Agency and International Relations: An Alternative Lens,” e-International Relations, 28 August 2012; “Finding Operational Art: The Normandy Breakout,” Small Wars Journal, 6 February 2013; and a review essay of “Eichmann in Jerusalem” for e-Inter- national Relations, 14 November 2013. This paper represents the opinions of the author and should not be taken to represent the views of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the United States government, the Institute of Land Warfare or the Association of the United States Army or its members. © Copyright 2014 by The Association of the United States Army All rights reserved. Inquiries regarding this and future Land Warfare Papers should be directed to: Director, AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington VA 22201, e-mail [email protected] or telephone (direct dial) 703-907-2627 or (toll free) 1-800-336- 4570, ext. 2627. ii Contents Foreword ................................................................................................................................. v Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 1 Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 2 Unlit Space Typologies ........................................................................................................... 4 Unlit spaces ......................................................................................................................... 5 Fragile states........................................................................................................................ 6 Failing states........................................................................................................................ 6 Failed states ......................................................................................................................... 7 Ungoverned spaces .............................................................................................................. 7 Undergoverned spaces ......................................................................................................... 8 Other spaces ........................................................................................................................ 8 SOF Capabilities and Limitations ........................................................................................... 9 Access ................................................................................................................................... 11 Case Studies .......................................................................................................................... 13 Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 16 Background ................................................................................................................... 16 Afghanistan 1989–2001 ................................................................................................. 18 Afghanistan after 2002 .................................................................................................. 19 Somalia .............................................................................................................................. 20 Background ................................................................................................................... 20 Somalia 1991–2011 ....................................................................................................... 21 Somalia after 2011 ......................................................................................................... 22 Findings ................................................................................................................................. 23 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 24 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 25 Endnotes ................................................................................................................................ 27 iii iv Foreword Relatively little literature exists discussing unlit spaces. This paper attempts to clarify the concept of unlit spaces as an umbrella term for a multitude of potential political areas of inter- est using the context of categories of unlit spaces. The question of an unlit space is a question of what characteristics make a space fall under this categorization. Factors highlighting the governing structure in relation to the darkness of an area are particularly important for SOF operational planning because the sensitivity of SOF operations is proportional to the extent with which the United States decides to take intrusive actions into a region. This is especially true with regard to SOF missions that take place within the human domain. It is the human domain that makes an unlit space unique and distinct, and it is the human domain that creates accessibility risks to SOF. The author looks at case examples of Afghanistan and Somalia and how their unique settings during different time periods factor into planning considerations for conducting unconventional warfare in such unlit spaces. Gordon R. Sullivan General, U.S. Army Retired President, Association of the United States Army 20 June 2014 v vi Special Operations Forces in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World’s Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning Introduction In 2011, Admiral Eric T. Olson, then commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), highlighted a strategic focus for Special Operations Forces (SOF). He discussed placing greater emphasis on the “unlit spaces” around the globe to “deal with the emerging threats from the places where the lights aren’t.”1 Admiral Olson was referring to an illuminated image of Earth viewed from space at night which depicts concentrations of city lights and zones of darkness.2 While this is a partially useful description of potential problem areas, it lacks comprehensiveness and overgeneralizes strategic shaping of SOF potential. USSOCOM should further define what comprises those “unlit spaces” before committing resources to them. This monograph attempts to define more clearly what the unlit spaces are and what their implication are for the use of SOF. It will also offer a more comprehensive framework with which to analyze SOF options. When looking at unlit space,
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