DOCSLIB.ORG

Here a Causal Relationship? Contemporary Economics, 9(1), 45–60

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Here a Causal Relationship? Contemporary Economics, 9(1), 45–60 Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C. Stephenson Harvard Law School http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/ May 2021 Aaken, A., & Voigt, S. (2011). Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? Economics of Governance, 12(4), 301–324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0100-8 Aalberts, R. J., & Jennings, M. M. (1999). The Ethics of Slotting: Is this Bribery, Facilitation Marketing or Just Plain Competition? Journal of Business Ethics, 20(3), 207–215. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006081311334 Aaronson, S. A. (2011a). Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? Available at SSRN 1922190. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922190 Aaronson, S. A. (2011b). Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Public Administration and Development, 31(1), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.588 Aaronson, S. A., & Abouharb, M. R. (2014). Corruption, Conflicts of Interest and the WTO. In J.-B. Auby, E. Breen, & T. Perroud (Eds.), Corruption and conflicts of interest: A comparative law approach (pp. 183–197). Edward Elgar PubLtd. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN_batch:ELGAR01620140507 Ab Lo, A. (2019). Actors, networks and assemblages: Local content, corruption and the politics of SME’s participation in Ghana’s oil and gas industry. International Development Planning Review, 41(2), 193–214. https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2018.33 Abada, I., & Ngwu, E. (2019). Corruption, governance, and Nigeria’s uncivil society, 1999- 2016. Análise Social, 54(231), 386–408. https://doi.org/10.31447/AS00032573.2019231.07 Abalo, E. (2019). Why does inaccessibility widely exist in healthcare in Ghana? Understanding the reasons from past to present. Journal of Public Health, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10389-019-01019-x Abbas Drebee, H., & Azam Abdul-Razak, N. (2020). The Impact of Corruption on Agriculture Sector in Iraq: Econometrics Approach. IOP Conference Series. Earth and Environmental Science, 553(1), 12019-. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/553/1/012019 Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014). Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1 111(Journal Article), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 Abbink, Klaus. (2004). Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(4), 887–906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008 Abbink, Klaus. (2005). Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption. In Kokinov & Boicho (Eds.), Advances in Cognitive Economics. Sofia: NBU Press. https://winster.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2002-05.pdf Abbink, Klaus. (2006). Laboratory Experiments on Corruption. In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International handbook on the economics of corruption (pp. 418–440). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=P60nmWlJWEoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&d q=Laboratory+Experiments+on+Corruption,%E2%80%9D+in+Susan+Rose- Ackerman+ed.+International+Handbook+on+the+Economics+of+Corruption+(Edward+ Elgar&ots=j9agtH21zb&sig=2ojEcFGAw5WeEuD5KDd_f7alhb4 Abbink, Klaus, & Ellman, M. (2010). The Donor Problem: An Experimental Analysis of Beneficiary Empowerment. Journal of Development Studies, 46(8), 1327–1344. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380903428407 Abbink, Klaus, Freidin, E., Gangadharan, L., & Moro, R. (2018). The Effect of Social Norms on Bribe Offers. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 34(3), 457–474. Abbink, Klaus, & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2006). Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. Experimental Economics, 9(2), 103–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683- 006-5385-z Abbink, Klaus, Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2002). An Experimental Bribery Game. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18(2), 428–454. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.2.428 Abbink, Klaus, Ryvkin, D., & Serra, D. (2020). Corrupt police. Games and Economic Behavior, 123, 101–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.001 Abbink, Klaus, & Serra, D. (2012). Anticorruption policies: Lessons from the lab. In New advances in experimental research on corruption (Vol. 15, pp. 77–115). https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=N48c72KXsD4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA77&d q=Abbink,+Klaus+%26+Danila+Serra.+2012.+%E2%80%9CAnticorruption+Policies:+ Lessons+from+the+Lab,%E2%80%9D+in+Danila+Serra+%26+Leonard+Wantchekon,+ eds.,+New+Advances+in+Experimental+Research+on+Corruption+&ots=uycq5h5aMR &sig=vUixS6mxw6Zc-7lPoVpnBt-ZQB8 Abbink, Klaus, & Wu, K. (2017). Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on 2 mitigating collusive bribery. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 133, 256– 272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.013 Abbott, K. W. (2001). Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the case of bribery and corruption. Journal of International Economic Law, 4(2), 275–296. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/4.2.275 Abbott, Kenneth W. (2009). Fight Against Corruption. In Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law. Abbott, Kenneth W., & Snidal, D. (2002). International action on bribery and corruption: Why the dog didn’t bark in the WTO. In D. M. Kennedy & J. D. Southwick (Eds.), The political economy of international trade law. Abbott, K. w, & Snidal, D. (2002). Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption. The Journal of Legal Studies, 31(S1), S141–S177. https://doi.org/10.1086/342006 Abdalla, H. F., Maghrabi, A. S., & Raggad, B. G. (1998). Assessing the perceptions of human resource managers toward nepotism A cross-cultural study. International Journal of Manpower, 19(8), 554–570. Abdallah, S., Sayed, R., Rahwan, I., Leveck, B. L., Cebrian, M., Rutherford, A., & Fowler, J. H. (2014). Corruption drives the emergence of civil society. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface / the Royal Society, 11(93), 20131044. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2013.1044 Abdiweli, M. A. (2003). Institutional differences as sources of growth differences. Atlantic Economic Journal, 31(4), 348–362. Abdixhiku, L., Krasniqi, B., Pugh, G., & Hashi, I. (2017). Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies. Economic Systems, 41(3), 354–366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2016.12.004 Abdixhiku, L., Pugh, G., & Hashi, I. (2018). Business tax evasion in transition economies: A cross-country panel investigation. The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 15(1), 11–36. https://doi.org/10.25428/1824-2979/201801-11-36 Abdul‐Gafaru Abdulai. (2009). Political will in combating corruption in developing and transition economies: A comparative study of Singapore, Hong Kong and Ghana. Journal of Financial Crime, 16(4), 387–417. https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790910993753 Abdullah, S., Gray, T., & Clough, E. (2018). Clientelism: Factionalism in the allocation of public resources in Iraq after 2003. Middle Eastern Studies, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1444607 Abdulrauf, L. A. (2020). Using Specialised Anti-Corruption Agencies to Combat Pervasive 3 Corruption in Nigeria: A Critical Review of the ICPC and EFCC. African Journal of Legal Studies, 12, 2020(3–4), 215–241. https://doi.org/10.1163/17087384-12340050 Abdyli, E. (2017). Some Forms of Manifestation of Official Corruption and Crimes against Official Duty in Kosovo 2011- 2012. Acta Universitatis Danubius. Juridica, 13(3). http://search.proquest.com/docview/2118379145/?pq-origsite=primo Abe, K., & Wilson, J. S. (2008). Governance, Corruption, And Trade In The Asia Pacific Region (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4731). The World Bank. http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4731 Abé Ndjié, A., Atangana Ondoa, H., & Ngoa Tabi, H. (2019). Governance and youth unemployment in Africa. Labor History, 60(6), 869–882. https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2019.1645320 Abed, G. T., & Davoodi, H. R. (2000). Corruption, Structural Reforms, and Economic Performance in the Transition Economies (IMF Working Paper No. 00/132). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879906 Abed, G. T., & Gupta, S. (2002). Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. International Monetary Fund. Abeyagoonasekera, A. (2020). Unexplained wealth and for what purpose: A Sri Lankan perspective. Journal of Financial Crime, 27(1), 24–28. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-12- 2018-0128 Abidin, I. S. Z., Jantan, M. D., Satar, N. M., & Haseeb, M. (2014). Trade Linkages between Malaysia and the OIC Member Countries: Empirical Evidence Based on Gravity Model. American Journal of Applied Sciences, 11(11), 1938–1944. Abiona, I. A., & Savage, O. (2014). Influence of Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission on Female Civil Servants in Oyo State, Nigeria. Public Policy and Administration Research, 4(12), 36–43. Abotsi, A. (2018). Tolerable Level of Corruption for Foreign Direct Investment in Europe and Asia. Contemporary Economics, 12(3), 269–284. https://doi.org/10.5709/ce.1897- 9254.277 Aboutorabi, A., Ghiasipour, M., Rezapour, A., Pourreza, A., Sarabi Asiabar, A., & Tanoomand, A. (2016). Factors affecting the informal payments in public and teaching hospitals. Medical Journal of The Islamic Republic of Iran (MJIRI), 30(1), 26–35. Abraham, J., & Giovani Pea, A. (2018). Can proneness to moral emotions detect corruption? The mediating role of ethical judgment based on unified ethics. Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2018.07.013 4 Abraham, J., Suleeman, J., & Takwin, B. (2018). The Psychology of Corruption: The Role of the Counterfeit Self, Entity Self-Theory, and Outcome-Based Ethical Mindset. Journal of Psychological and Educational Research, 26(2), 7–32. Abrams, D., Travaglino, G., Marques, J., Pinto, I., & Levine, J. (2018). Deviance Credit: Tolerance of Deviant Ingroup Leaders is Mediated by Their Accrual of Prototypicality and Conferral of Their Right to Be Supported. The Journal of Social Issues, 74(1), 36–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12255 Abrams, N. (2010). Federal criminal law and its enforcement (5th ed.). West.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Rising Sinophobia in Kyrgyzstan: the Role of Political Corruption
    RISING SINOPHOBIA IN KYRGYZSTAN: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY DOĞUKAN BAŞ IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EURASIAN STUDIES SEPTEMBER 2020 Approval of the thesis: RISING SINOPHOBIA IN KYRGYZSTAN: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION submitted by DOĞUKAN BAŞ in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Eurasian Studies, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University by, Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI Dean Graduate School of Social Sciences Assoc. Prof. Dr. Işık KUŞÇU BONNENFANT Head of Department Eurasian Studies Prof. Dr. Pınar KÖKSAL Supervisor Political Science and Public Administration Examining Committee Members: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Işık KUŞÇU BONNENFANT (Head of the Examining Committee) Middle East Technical University International Relations Prof. Dr. Pınar KÖKSAL (Supervisor) Middle East Technical University Political Science and Public Administration Assist. Prof. Dr. Yuliya BILETSKA Karabük University International Relations I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Doğukan Baş Signature : iii ABSTRACT RISING SINOPHOBIA IN KYRGYZSTAN: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION BAŞ, Doğukan M.Sc., Eurasian Studies Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Pınar KÖKSAL September 2020, 131 pages In recent years, one of the major problems that Kyrgyzstan witnesses is rising Sinophobia among the local people due to problems related with increasing Chinese economic presence in the country.
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption Trends in the Middle East and North Africa Region (2007-2011)
    www.transparency.org www.cmi.no Corruption trends in the Middle East and North Africa Region (2007-2011) Query What do anti-corruption indexes and experts say about the levels and types of corruption in MENA countries over the last five years? What are the main areas and sources of corruption? Are there specific themes and issues that are common to a number of countries? What record do governments have in tackling corruption? Are there any examples of successful anti-corruption reforms in countries in the MENA region over the past five years? We are especially interested in country based issues - rather than regional – for Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Libya. Purpose Summary This Expert Answer is to assist with developing a new anti-corruption strategy in the MENA region. In Revolutions sweeping across the Middle East and particular, the donor is interested in approaches it can North Africa (MENA) region during 2011 have shone take to reduce corruption in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, light on widespread corruption, particularly political Tunisia and Libya. The aim is to pursue effective anti- corruption in the form of stolen assets by seemingly all corruption strategies in order to contribute to peace and the deposed leaders. There also has been widespread stability in the region. evidence of prolific patronage, nepotism, and collusion between the public and private sectors that has Content contributed to the heightened levels of civil unrest and public protests. 1. Corruption trends in the MENA region (2007 – 2011) The key anti-corruption indexes — namely Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 2. Country specific themes, issues and anti- Index, the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation corruption reforms Index, Global Integrity’s Report, Freedom House’s 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption in Tanzania
    Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer Overview of corruption and anti- corruption in Tanzania Author(s): Kaunain Rahman, [email protected] Reviewer(s): Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka, Paul Banoba and Brian Cooksey, Transparency International Date: 30 September 2019 The Tanzanian government under the presidency of John Magufuli has cracked down heavily on corruption. Despite the current anti-corruption campaigns, however, political, petty and grand corruption seem to be endemic in the country. The regime is becoming increasingly authoritarian, resulting in the suppression of dissent, banning of protests, and a crackdown on media and opposition forces. Observers state that populist anti-corruption operations have to give way to initiatives aimed at a systemic and structural overhaul to bring about lasting and meaningful change. © 2019 Transparency International. All rights reserved. This document should not be considered as representative of the Commission or Transparency International’s official position. Neither the European Commission,Transparency International nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. This Anti-Corruption Helpdesk is operated by Transparency International and funded by the European Union. Query Please provide an overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Tanzania. Contents 1. Background Main points 2. Extent of corruption 3. Nature of corruption challenges — The incumbent government is cracking 4. Sectors affected by corruption down heavily on corruption. 5. Legal framework 6. Institutional framework 7. Other stakeholders — Critics allege that President Magufuli is 8. References steering the state towards greater authoritarianism, with little tolerance of Background dissent. The United Republic of Tanzania comprises of a — Citizens perceive that corruption levels union between the Tanzanian mainland (formerly have fallen in the country, but many still Tanganyika) and the semi-autonomous fear reporting acts of corruption.
    [Show full text]
  • Governance and Corruption in Public Health Care Systems by Maureen Lewis
    Working Paper Number 78 January 2006 Governance and Corruption in Public Health Care Systems By Maureen Lewis Abstract What factors affect health care delivery in the developing world? Anecdotal evidence of lives cut tragically short and the loss of productivity due to avoidable diseases is an area of salient concern in global health and international development. This working paper looks at factual evidence to describe the main challenges facing health care delivery in developing countries, including absenteeism, corruption, informal payments, and mismanagement. The author concludes that good governance is important in ensuring effective health care delivery, and that returns to investments in health are low where governance issues are not addressed. The Center for Global Development is an independent think tank that works to reduce global poverty and inequality through rigorous research and active engagement with the policy community. This Working Paper was made possible in part by funding from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. Use and dissemination of this Working Paper is encouraged, however reproduced copies may not be used for commercial purposes. Further usage is permitted under the terms of the Creative Commons License. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the directors or funders of the Center for Global Development. www.cgdev.org 1 Governance and Corruption in Public Health Care Systems Maureen Lewis* Senior Fellow Center for Global Development January 2006 * I am grateful to William Savedoff for extensive peer review comments and suggestions, and to James Habyarimana, John Hicklin, Randi Ryterman, Julian Schweitzer, Peter Heller and Adam Wagstaff for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
    [Show full text]
  • Greece, Capitalist Interests, and the Specular Purity of the State
    Discussion Paper No. 8 Corrupt Compared to What? Greece, Capitalist Interests, and the Specular Purity of the State Peter Bratsis August 2003 The Hellenic Observatory The European Institute London School of Economics and Political Science Acknowledgements This paper was made possible by a research fellowship from the Hellenic Observatory of the European Institute. It is based on a talk given at the London School of Economics on October 22, 2002. Many of the ideas and arguments presented here were developed during discussions with Constantine Tsoukalas, without his input and encouragement this paper would not have been possible. Stanley Aronowitz, John Bowman, Andreas Karras, Lenny Markovitz, Randy Martin, Eleni Natsiopoulou, Frances Fox Piven and Yannis Stavrakakis have read earlier versions of key sections of the current paper and have provided important comments and suggestions. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Papadimitriou have been kind enough to read the paper and provide useful criticisms and suggestions. I hope that the arguments contained here are clear and provocative enough to engender discussion. Table of Contents Introduction: Political Corruption and Greece Part I: Legitimation What is Political Corruption? Why Corruption? Rules of Separation: From Leviticus to Washington D.C. The Australian Case: Fetishism Revealed Part II: Accumulation The Opacity of Transparency Instrumental Reason and the Relative Autonomy of the State The Globalization of the Capitalist State Conclusion: Future Directions for Research on Corruption and Greece Works Cited 3 Introduction: Political Corruption and Greece Political corruption is under attack. Technocrats, mainstream academics, and media pundits qua ‘experts’ have increasingly set their sights upon the blight of corruption.
    [Show full text]
  • Youth Activism in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan As Case Studies
    Structure of Mobilization and Democratization: Youth Activism in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan as Case Studies by Mohammad Yaghi A Thesis presented to The University of Guelph In partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Guelph, Ontario, Canada © Mohammad Yaghi, April, 2015 ABSTRACT STRUCTURE OF MOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION: YOUTH ACTIVISM IN TUNISIA, EGYPT, AND JORDAN AS CASE STUDIES Mohammad Yaghi Advisors: Professor Janine A. Clark University of Guelph, 2015 Professor Jordi Diez Professor Francesco Cavatorta This dissertation argues for a correlation between the dynamics of the protests at their climax and the processes of democratization in case these protests succeed. Using youth activism in Tunisia and Egypt where the protests succeeded, and in Jordan where they failed as a contrasting case study, this research shows that youth activism leads to democratization if three conditions are met at the protests’ apex: domination of autonomous youth movements, an inclusive master frame (MF), and a decentralized leadership. In doing so, the research provides an atypical narrative about the role of activists during the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. The primary sources that informed this research are not only based on the activists themselves, but also on the analysis of the protests videos, slogans, and documents of the youth movements. Furthermore, the research contributes to the literature on social movements in four domains. First, it reveals that the state’s use of repression and the way it uses it is a necessary condition, but is insufficient to turn a reform protest cycle into a revolution; the other necessary condition is that an autonomous opposition also must be dominant when the state uses repression.
    [Show full text]
  • Cambodia's Anti- Corruption Regime 2008-2018: a Critical Political
    U4 Issue 2019:1 Cambodia’s anti- corruption regime 2008-2018: A critical political economy approach By Jacqui Baker and Sarah Milne Series editors: Aled Williams and Jessica Schultz Disclaimer All views in this text are the author(s)’, and may differ from the U4 partner agencies’ policies. Partner agencies Australian Government – Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade – DFAT German Corporation for International Cooperation – GIZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – BMZ Global Affairs Canada Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark / Danish International Development Assistance – Danida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation – SDC The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norad UK Aid – Department for International Development About U4 U4 is a team of anti-corruption advisers working to share research and evidence to help international development actors get sustainable results. The work involves dialogue, publications, online training, workshops, helpdesk, and innovation. U4 is a permanent centre at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Norway. CMI is a non- profit, multi-disciplinary research institute with social scientists specialising in development studies. www.U4.no [email protected] Cover photo damien_farrell (CC by) https://flic.kr/p/gL5zFE Keywords anti-corruption reforms - Cambodia - China - decentralisation - public financial management - public expenditure tracking Publication type U4 Issue Notes This U4 Issue was updated on 3 May 2018 to address inaccuracies in section 2.3 Public finance management: FMIS and PETS Education. Creative commons This work is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Cambodia’s anti-corruption reforms have been critical to consolidating power in the hands of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.
    [Show full text]
  • Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff
    Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review Volume 20 Number 2 Article 5 1-1-1998 Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff Toral Patel Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Toral Patel, Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff, 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 389 (1998). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol20/iss2/5 This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CORRUPT PRACTICES IN INDIA: No PAYOFF I. INTRODUCTION Foreign investors constantly seek new business locations to increase profits and decrease expenses. With one of the fastest growing economies in the world, India is a popular site for foreign investment. 1 India, however, suffers from a major problem which threatens U.S. investment-corruption. A Gallup survey conducted throughout India reported that corruption is one of the most serious problems plaguing the country. 2 India's current anti- corruption laws are ineffective; hence, U.S. corporations find it increasingly difficult to follow the requirements of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) while doing business in '3 India, "one of the most corrupt countries in the world." This comment analyzes the FCPA and its relationship to foreign investment in India.
    [Show full text]
  • Here a Causal Relationship? Contemporary Economics, 9(1), 45–60
    Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C. Stephenson Harvard Law School http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/ March 2021 Aaken, A., & Voigt, S. (2011). Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? Economics of Governance, 12(4), 301–324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0100-8 Aaronson, S. A. (2011a). Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? Available at SSRN 1922190. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922190 Aaronson, S. A. (2011b). Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Public Administration and Development, 31(1), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.588 Aaronson, S. A., & Abouharb, M. R. (2014). Corruption, Conflicts of Interest and the WTO. In J.-B. Auby, E. Breen, & T. Perroud (Eds.), Corruption and conflicts of interest: A comparative law approach (pp. 183–197). Edward Elgar PubLtd. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN_batch:ELGAR01620140507 Abbas Drebee, H., & Azam Abdul-Razak, N. (2020). The Impact of Corruption on Agriculture Sector in Iraq: Econometrics Approach. IOP Conference Series. Earth and Environmental Science, 553(1), 12019-. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/553/1/012019 Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014). Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 111(Journal Article), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 Abbink, Klaus. (2004). Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(4), 887–906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008 Abbink, Klaus.
    [Show full text]
  • Deterring Corruption and Improving Governance in the URBAN Water Supply & Sanitation Sector
    46829 WaterWater Working WorkingNotes Notes Public Disclosure Authorized Note No. 18, December 2008 Public Disclosure Authorized DETERRING CORRUPTION AND IMPROVING GOVERNANCE IN THE URBAN WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION SECTOR A SOURCEBOOK Jonathan Halpern, Charles Kenny, Eric Dickson, David Ehrhardt, and Chloe Oliver Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Water Working Notes are published by the Water Sector Board of the Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank Group. Working Notes are available on-line: www.worldbank.org/ water. Working Notes are lightly edited documents intended to elicit discussion on topical issues in the water sector. They disseminate results of conceptual work by World Bank staff to peer professionals in the sector at an early stage, i.e. “works in progress”. Comments should be emailed to the authors. Acknowledgements This Sourcebook was prepared as part of a broader program of work addressing governance and corruption in infrastructure of the Energy, Transport, and Water Department and Finance, Econom- ics and Urban Department of the World Bank. The sourcebook and a companion dissemination note were prepared by a Bank team comprised of Jonathan Halpern, Charles Kenny and Eric Dickson, sup- ported by Castalia (David Ehrhardt, Alex Sundakov, Seini O’Connor, and Chloë Oliver) with guidance provided by an advisory group comprised of sector and governance specialists across the regional and central units of the World Bank. A number of Bank staff provided valuable contributions at vari- ous stages including Anders Hjorth Agerskov, Alexander Bakalian, Ivor Beazley, Philippe Benoit, Steven Charles Burgess, Ed Campos, Robert Chase, Fook Chuan Eng, Marianne Fay, Meike van Ginneken, Mohinder Gulati, Erica Jorgensen, Brian Levy, Alain Locussol, and Jon Walters.
    [Show full text]
  • Emerging Faces: Lawyers in Myanmar (2014)
    ________________________________________________________________ ILAC / CEELI Institute Report: ________________________________________________________________ Emerging Faces: Lawyers in Myanmar As they emerge from decades of repression in Myanmar, lawyers are moving into the spotlight in the evolving new system. Today’s lawyers will be expected to be the guardians of personal liberty, land tenure, human rights, and freedom of expression in their country for the next several decades. ________________________________________________________________ ILAC / CEELI Institute Report: ________________________________________________________________ Emerging Faces: Report after report on the situation in Myanmar calls for the in- creased enforcement of human rights, protection of minorities, Lawyers in Myanmar cessation of “land grabs,” and safeguards for free speech. Typi- cally, such observers assume that if sufficient political changes As they emerge from decades of repression in Myanmar, lawyers are moving into the spotlight in the evolving are enacted, Burmese lawyers – like their counterparts in otherCHINA countries – will act as skilled advocates promoting and protect- new system. Today’s lawyers will be expected to be the ing the rights of the citizenry. guardians of personal liberty, land tenure, human rights, and freedom of expression in their country for the next But who are these lawyers? Are current Burmese lawyers ready several decades. MANDALAY to operate in a modern legal system based on the rule of law?KENGTUNG BAGAN TAUNGGYI MHAUKU HEHO Beginning in August 2013, the CEELI Institute and the Burma Center Prague, working in cooperation with the International TAUNGO Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC)PYAY provided skills-based train- ing for roughly 200 Burmese lawyers through the Upper and Lower Myanmar Lawyers Networks.YANGON These trainingsBAGO focused on (RANGOON) “street lawyers” involved in the day-to-day represen-THA tation TON of ordinary Burmese citizens.
    [Show full text]
  • FCPA & Anti-Bribery
    alertFall 2019 FCPA & Anti-Bribery Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP A New York Limited Liability Partnership • One Battery Park Plaza New York, New York 10004-1482 • +1 (212) 837-6000 Attorney advertising. Readers are advised that prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. © 2019 Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP CORRUPTION PERCEPTION SCORE No Data 100 Very Clean 50 0 Very Corrupt Data from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. SCORE COUNTRY/TERRITORY RANK 67 Chile 27 52 Grenada 53 41 India 78 35 Armenia 105 29 Honduras 132 23 Uzbekistan 158 88 Denmark 1 66 Seychelles 28 52 Italy 53 41 Kuwait 78 35 Brazil 105 29 Kyrgyzstan 132 22 Zimbabwe 160 87 New Zealand 2 65 Bahamas 29 52 Oman 53 41 Lesotho 78 35 Côte d’Ivoire 105 29 Laos 132 20 Cambodia 161 85 Finland 3 64 Portugal 30 51 Mauritius 56 41 Trinidad 78 35 Egypt 105 29 Myanmar 132 20 Democratic 161 85 Singapore 3 63 Brunei 31 50 Slovakia 57 and Tobago 35 El Salvador 105 29 Paraguay 132 Republic of the Congo 85 Sweden 3 Darussalam 49 Jordan 58 41 Turkey 78 35 Peru 105 28 Guinea 138 20 Haiti 161 85 Switzerland 3 63 Taiwan 31 49 Saudi Arabia 58 40 Argentina 85 35 Timor-Leste 105 28 Iran 138 20 Turkmenistan 161 84 Norway 7 62 Qatar 33 48 Croatia 60 40 Benin 85 35 Zambia 105 28 Lebanon 138 19 Angola 165 82 Netherlands 8 61 Botswana 34 47 Cuba 61 39 China 87 34 Ecuador 114 28 Mexico 138 19 Chad 165 81 Canada 9 61 Israel 34 47 Malaysia 61 39 Serbia 87 34 Ethiopia 114 28 Papua 138 19 Congo 165
    [Show full text]