POPULISM AND THE CHANGING VISION OF FRONT NATIONAL ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam

Author: Mai-Linh Scholten Date: January, 2018

1

1 Author unknown, ‘Front National’, http://globetribune.info/2013/10/17/marine-le-pen-predicts-collapse-of-eu/front- national/, retrieved 18 September 2017. INTRODUCTION ...... 3 DEBATE & METHODOLOGY ...... 4 1. POPULISM AND THE ROOTS OF FRONT NATIONAL ...... 6 1.1 POPULISM ...... 6 1.2 POUJADISM ...... 8 1.3 ORDRE NOUVEAU...... 9 1.3.1 Gérard Longuet...... 11 1.3.2 François Duprat ...... 12 1.4 MAURRAS AND PETAIN ...... 12 2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FRONT NATIONAL ...... 14 2.1 ANTI-REPUBLICANISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM ...... 14 2.2 COMMUNICATION, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLS ...... 15 2.3 MARINE’S FRONT NATIONAL ...... 17 3. FRONT NATIONAL AND THE IDEA OF A CULTURAL EUROPE ...... 21 3.2 JEAN-MARIE'S VISION ...... 21 3.2 MARINE’S VISION ...... 22 4. FRONT NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION ...... 24 4.1 EUROSCEPTICISM & EUROFASCISM ...... 24 4.2 FRONT NATIONAL’S VISION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BEFORE 1990 ...... 26 4.3 FRONT NATIONAL’S VISION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE 1990 ...... 27 4.3.1 The European Union and immigration ...... 28 4.3.2 The European Union, Russia and Front National ...... 31 5. THE OPPOSITION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AS DERIVATIVE OF POPULISM ...... 33 5.1 THREE ‘POPULIST PERIODS’ ...... 33 5.3 OTHER POPULIST ELEMENTS ...... 34 CONCLUSION ...... 37 REFERENCES ...... 40 Introduction

France has always been a leading country in world politics. Together with China, France is the oldest republic in the world. For centuries, French was the primary political language, and it has been the model for the rest of the civilized world for centuries. However, the French are famous for the characteristic that they are unable to let go of traditions and hold on to them for too long. France missed out on the digital revolution of which English is the primary language, and the country is losing its influence on international grounds. The European Union was once a united force between France and Germany, but nowadays it is mostly Germany that is the leading country. France is also a member of the United Nations Security Council, but in this council, France cannot compete with superpowers such as the United States, Russia, and China. Furthermore, just as other European countries, France was suffering from an economic crisis and the situation still is not stable. The unemployment rate is high with a budgetary deficit. Another critical point in France is the growing problems in the Banlieues, as a result of growing economic inequality in the country. 2

This year, it was for the first time that the French chose between two presidential candidates who were not representatives of the traditional socialist or conservative parties. Defeating Marine le Pen in the second round of the elections, Emmanuel Macron was elected president of the Republic in April 2017. If Marine le Pen had won the elections, there was a considerable chance that France would have left the European Union. For the last decades, Front National is known as a Eurosceptic party. What most people do not know is that the party was pro-European Union until the 1990s.

This thesis examines the changing position of Front National towards European integration and looks at the role populism played in this change. It argues that populism is indispensable in this context and that it is rather a strategy or an instrument to gain votes than an ideology or political style. It sees the negative view of Front National regarding European integration as a populist tool to gain votes. Before the 1990s, Jean-Marie le Pen was pro-European cooperation, and in fact he supported an ever closer union. In the 1980s, he even wrote a book, almost a myth, in which he promoted European unity on a political and cultural domain. The main research question is: ‘Is the current attitude of Front National towards the European Union explainable when looking back at the history and nature of the party and to what degree would populism be the incentive?’

The first part of this thesis will elaborate the history and the characteristics of the party in general, to subsequently look at its vision on European integration and the role that populism plays in this vision.

2 Verplancke, M., ‘Mia Doornaert: “De Fransen zijn te koppig om in te zien dat ze verkeerd bezig zijn”’, http://www.demorgen.be/interviewreportage/mia-doornaert-de-fransen-zijn-te-koppig-om-in-te-zien-dat-ze-verkeerd-bezig-zijn-bf88f19f/ retrieved 5 May 2017. This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter will look at the roots of Front National in the French political history of the far right. This chapter treats its predecessors, but also people and movements that were important to the party. The second chapter looks at the general characteristics of Front National. This chapter focusees on the ideals, goals, themes, discourses, methods, use of language and other features. The third chapter looks at the cultural idea of Europe according to Front National. It is divided into a cultural and a political vision on Europe because during the research it became apparent that a cultural Europe and political Europe mean something very different to Front National. This chapter will show that the cultural idea of European unity was, and still is, very important to Front National. The fourth chapter assesses the party's vision regarding political unity in Europe and the role of Euroscepticism. Front National was pro-European integration until the 1990s, but they became anti- European integration ever since. The fifth chapter will show that this change of heart was driven by populism and was not an inevitable outcome of the nationalist ideology like we assume today. It argues that the current position contrasts strongly with the pro-European integration position of the party before 1990 and the lasting sentiment of European cultural unity within the party.

This study aims to argue that Front National blames the European Union for the crisis in France and that this is a characteristic populist stance. To support this argument, it argues that Front National is using populist rhetoric in response to the economic and social crises in France in an attempt to increase its support amongst the population. It will show that antipathy towards the European Union is one of three essential populist instruments that the party has been using to blame someone or something for a crisis. The first instrument is that the party linked unemployment to migration and started to blame a group (migrants) for a crisis. This began in 1978 when Jean-Marie le Pen used the quote: ‘Un million de chômeurs, c'est un million d'immigrés en trop' (One million unemployed is one million immigrants too much). The second instrument, the main subject of this thesis, is the accusation of the European Union as the cause of the economic and social crisis in France that started in the 1990s. The third instrument is the moderate character of the party today that began in 2011 and continues to this day, starting with the ascension of Marine le Pen as the leader of Front National. Ever since, the party is using a more moderate and mainstream populist rhetoric to gain support from a broader audience. Debate & Methodology There are many different opinions about what populism is, but there are three possible concepts that are widely acknowledged. The first is that populism is an ideology. However, there are appearing more opinions who disagree with this and argue that populism is a ‘thin ideology’: an ideology with a ‘thin core’ that cannot exist on itself but is dependent on other ‘full ideologies’. Secondly, populism is a political style, a style of communication. The third concept is the concept that this thesis supports. It argues that populism is a strategy or tool to gain votes. Populism has been a point of discussion for over a century and lately it became one of the most popular debates in the political world. All over the world populist parties and leaders are rising and the debate is slowly overrunning the media.

4 This thesis is a study of the ideas of the political party Front National. In order to explain the changing vision of Front National on the European Union and the role of populism in this change, this thesis is divided in a principal debate and a metadebate. The principal debate in which this thesis will engage is whether populism is a (thin) ideology, a political style or a tool. The metadebate in this thesis is the relation between populism and Euroscepticism in the case of Front National. This thesis is a study of the changing political style and culture of Front National and argues that this changing style is a result of populism as a tool to gain votes.

The primary debate on populism is mostly based on secondary sources such as academic books and articles, including known academics in the field of populism: Cas Mudde, Koen Vossen and Jan Werner- Müller and known academics in the field of fascism: Ernst Nolte, Roger Griffin and Roger Eatwell. The metadebate is based on secondary sources like academic books and articles about Euroscepticism, (Euro)fascism and far right parties, in particular Front National. For both the principal debate and the metadebate, these secondary sources were compared with primary sources of Front National to find a connection between populism, Euroscepticism, (Euro)fascism and the ideas of Front National. The primary sources that were used for the greater part were the discourses on the website of Front National and on the website carnetdesperances.fr, a website of Marine le Pen where she shares ideas via blogs. Another important primary source is the book Europe discours et interventions 1984-1988 written by Jean-Marie le Pen in which he gave his vision on Europe and European cooperation in the 1980s. This book was an interesting source for this study as his ideas about Europe at the time contradict the convictions he defended after 1990.

Next to the information from discourses, blogs and books directly from the hand of Jean-Marie and Marine le Pen and the party in general, this study is based on news articles and interviews that Jean- Marie le Pen and Marine le Pen gave for both right- and leftwing journals like le Monde, le Point and le Nouvel Observateur. These sources were used to give more background information and expand the influence on society and on the political debate.

5 1. Populism and the roots of Front National

This chapter will elaborate populism and the roots of Front National. First it will start with a definition of populism. Subsequently, it will focus the two movements that were the predecessors of Front National, i.e., Poujadism and Ordre Nouveau. These two movements are known as populist movements. Although Front National is a unique party and there has not been a party or movement in this form before its existence, there are political movements that influenced the party and that are seen as movements from wich Front National originated. These movements are known for their violent and racist history and this chapter looks at the influence of the movements characters on Front National. Besides, Ordre Nouveau was in favor of European integration, just like Front National in its early years. Secondly, this chapter will look at the influence of Charles Maurras and Marshall Philippe Pétain on Jean-Marie le Pen.3 Maurras was founding father of Action française, seen as one of three forms of fascism. His ideas were of influence on Le Pen. Le Pen later defended Marshall Pétain and Vichy. As reaction on this, Marine le Pen distanced herself and the party from her father to emphasize a more moderate character of the party. This chapter argues that Front National is rather a populist party than an ideological party, not only because its predecessors already were populist, but moreover because there is no ideology that the party pursues. The party adapts its points of view, of which the view on European integration, depending on the situation prevalent at the time. This chapter furthermore argues the party's inconsistency by showing that the moderate character of the party today is not evident, looking at the violent history of political parties and movements that preceded Front National and the sympathy of Jean-Marie le Pen with Maurras and Pétain.

1.1 Populism Populism is one of the most controversial concepts in social science. There is confusion about its contributions, its manifestations and its impact on democracy; therefore there is no precise definition of populism.4 Populism is by some people seen as a political style. Others defined it as an ideology, a movement and even a ‘syndrome of democracy.' There are various interpretations of the concept of populism in different parts of the world. In Europe populism is primarily defined as an anti-immigration and xenophobic ideology, whereas in South America as a reaction to the economic situation, in particular to economic mismanagement. 5 According to Koen Vossen populism is a ‘thin ideology.’ Michael Freeden first introduced this concept. According to him thin ideologies are ‘ideologies whose core concepts are too limited to address in fully the famous who gets what, when, how-question.’ Thin ideologies are ideologies with a core that is too ‘thin’ to exist on itself. These ‘thin ideologies’ are

3 Nolte, E., Der faschismus in seiner epoche : Die action française, der italienische faschismus, der nationalsozialismus, München: Piper 1979. 4 Abts, K. & S. van Kessel, ‘Populism’, International encyclopedia of social & behavioral sciences no. 2 (2015), p. 609. 5 Mudde, C. & C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’, in: M. Freeden, M. Stears, The Oxford handbook of political ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 4. therefore dependent on other ideologies because they cannot exist alone.6 ‘Thin-centered’ means that populism, as opposed to ‘thick-centered’ or full ideologies, such as fascism, liberalism or socialism, has a restricted morphology, and attaches itself to existing ideological families. This means that populism can take different shapes and that the core concepts of populism are related to other political ideologies. Ben Stanley said: ‘there is no Populist International; no canon of key populist texts or calendars of significant moments and the icons of populism are of local rather than of universal appeal.7

There are different opinions on what populism is and populism can take different shapes, but there are a couple of particular features that appears in every form of populism. One of the most important features of populism is that it separates society into two camps; the pure people versus the corrupt elite. It argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people. The core concepts of populism are the people, the elite, and the general will.8 Another feature of populism is that populists have enemies. Groups or people who they blame for the problems they want to tackle.

The ‘enemies' of western populist far right parties have changed over time. Before the events of 9/11, they were mostly non-European immigrants as a whole, i.e., defined by ethnonationality. However, after 9/11 the enemy became a particular group (Muslims) who are instead ethnoreligiously defined.9 The role of a strong leader is significant to populism. Abts and Van Kessel argue that populism is a tool for leaders to gain and exercise power. They argue that a populist party is not an ordinary party characterized by different factions, but instead is a unified bloc or movement of the people, with a charismatic leader who is said to embody the will of the common people and to speak on their behalf. Communication also plays a significant role in populism. Populist parties have a particular form of communication. They use anti-theoretical and anti-intellectual rhetoric, in attempt to exploit feelings of resentment among the general population.10 Populists are framing specific criticisms to magnify some aspects. The media play a considerable role in framing, especially how they amplify certain aspects and diminish others.11

There are different opinions about when and how populism came into existence.12 Three different forms of populism have existed in various parts of the world, beginning from the start of the 20th century. The first is agrarian populism in Russia with the Narodniki and the United States with the American People’s Party around the turn of the nineteenth century; the second is socio-economist populism in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century, and the third is xenophobic populism in Europe in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The Narodniki were a small group of urban middle-class

6' Vossen, K., ‘Van marginaal naar mainstream? Populisme in de Nederlandse geschiedenis’, Low Countries Historical Review no 127 (2012), p.28. 7' Mudde, C. & C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’, in: M. Freeden, M. Stears, The Oxford handbook of political ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 7. 8 Abts, K. & S. van Kessel, ‘Populism’, International encyclopedia of social & behavioral sciences no. 2 (2015), p. 609. 9 Ibid., p. 6 10 Abts, K. & S. van Kessel, ‘Populism’, International encyclopedia of social & behavioral sciences no. 2 (2015) p. 609. 11 Ibid., p. 124. 12 Burniaux, C., ‘Populism’, Books Abroad no. 3 (1938), p. 272.

7 intellectuals who believed that the peasantry was the authentic, morally most genuine population: society should be based on an agricultural economy of rural cooperatives and small farms. 13 The American People’s Party was a rural mass movement in a rapidly changing American society that reacted to industrialization, seeing it as a threat to their norms and values. Like the Narodniki, they also saw the peasantry as the authentic people. Socioeconomic populism in Latin America was a reaction to the crisis of the 1930s, which served as a wake-up call for the excluded masses to become politically active. 14

Populism became a core value in Western European political far right parties since the 1970s and 1980s. However most populist parties did not enter European governments until the 1990s and the 2000s. Next to populism, core values of these far right parties are nationalism, nativism and authoritarianism. Their core beliefs relate to, among other things, immigration, crime, and corruption. They complain about the establishment, which are not only political parties but also cultural, economic and media elites, whom they accuse of not telling the truth. They argue that these elites deceive people by false electoral competition and by putting their own interests and those of immigrants above national interests.15

The form of populism that embraces and explains all features of populism the best is populism as a strategy or a tool to gain votes. Jan Werner-Müller describes this view on populism. He argues that populism is not an ideology or a ‘thin ideology’, but that populism is a strategy to gain votes. Werner- Müller argues that populists demonize people or groups in a society that oppose to their opinion. According to Werner-Müller populists are convinced that they are the only ones who speak on behalf of ‘the people’ and that it is only them who fight for ‘the people’. All other politicians are according to them opposing to these ‘people’ and are therefore free to be demonized. He supports his argument that populism is a strategy to gain votes by saying that populists do not substantively react on their opponents, but that they only claim that the viewpoints of the enemy is directed against ‘the people’. They do not give a detailed explanation for this view but only make unsubstantiated statements.16

1.2 Poujadism The previous section shortly looked at populism, its definition, and origin. This section assesses the two populist movements and their characteristics that preceded Front National, to argue that Front National is rather a populist than ideological party, assuming populism as strategy and not ideology.

Front National has lots of common characteristics with Poujadism. After World War II, new political movements were born including Poujadism. Poujadism was created in 1953 and was named after its founding father: Pierre Poujade. It started as a protest movement that defended middle-class shopkeepers

13 Mudde, C. & C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’, in: M. Freeden, M. Stears, The Oxford handbook of political ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 4. 14 Ibid., p. 4. 15 Ibid., p. 6. 16 Stuenkel, O., ‘What is populism?, by Werner Müller’, Democratization, no. 0 (2017), p 2.

8 against a new tax system.17 Poujadism was one of the far right movements of France; populism was one of its fundamental aspects. The movement organized demonstrations, obstructions of treasury officials, tax strikes and withdrawal of savings from state banks. Poujadisms enemies were the elite: tax officials, politicians, corporate capitalists, technocrats, intellectuals, and journalists. The movement founded several unions like the Union for the Defence of French Farmers (UDAF) and the Union for the Defence of French Workers (UDTF).18 For the Poujadist movement, it was never the goal to govern France, but it wanted to make way for a representative body that fought against the parliamentary democracy that 'exploited the people and which profited at the expense of the people.' Although Poujade was an anti- communist, the communists in France followed his movement because they had the same goal: defending shopkeepers. 19

There are other common characteristics between Front National and Poujadism. Jean-Marie le Pen and Pierre Poujade both ushered in a new way of doing politics that was never shown before. Populist elements of Poujadism, including its break with parliament and its view of a struggle between the people and the elite, would later be visible in the discourses of Front National. During his studies Jean-Marie le Pen became a member of the Poujadist movement, this was his first encounter with populism. From this membership, Le Pen gained many votes that made him become the youngest deputy of the National Assembly in France in 1955.20 The next section will look at Ordre Nouveau, the movement that is seen as the direct predecessor of Front National and that had an even bigger influence on the party.

1.3 Ordre Nouveau The movement that preceded of Front National and whose characteristics correspond even more to those of Front National is Ordre Nouveau. Ordre Nouveau, created in 1969, has been called the most important, the most dynamic and the most dangerous neo-fascist movement in post-war France.21 It was the predecessor of another violent political movement: L’Occident. Ordre Nouveau itself also had its share of hardcore militants who were dressed in combat clothes, wore a Celtic cross and armed themselves with iron bars and shields.22 It was formed by members of other revolutionary nationalist groups, such as Groupe d’Union et de Défence (GUD) and it also included figures from a different background, like journalists of far right-oriented media. The subjects they focused on were the absence of a large, organised, determined, revolutionary nationalist force and on the ‘incredible dispersion of the nationalist right into so many small sectarian groups, scattered, isolated and completely cut off from reality, consumed by sectarian quarrels where personal issues and petty resentments count for more than political action.’23 The goal of Ordre Nouveau was to unite the diverse forces of the far right into one

17 Shields, J.G., The extreme right in France: From Pétain to le Pen, London: Routledge 2007, p. 68. 18 Ibid., p. 69. 19 Ibid., p. 71. 20 Ibid., p. 71. 21 Ibid., p. 158. 22 Ibid., p. 162. 23 Ibid., p. 159.

9 united party, like the Italian Social Movement (MSI).24 The method to achieve this goal was to break with the past and to break links with old predecessors. Previous nationalist experiments were recognized, but they desired a break from old forces like Nazism and monarchism.25

Ordre Nouveau was anti-liberal, anti-capitalist and anti-Marxist. It advocated among other things French nationalism, protection of the peasantry and defense of small shopkeepers and artisans.26 The militant supporters of Ordre Nouveau called for what became one of the favorite themes in the discourses of Front National: a stronger police force to ensure the security of citizens, including in the form of self- defense groups. They also called for ‘a return of France to the French', a slogan that has repeatedly been appropriated by Jean-Marie and Marine le Pen. 27

Front National and Ordre Nouveau have certain characteristics in common. Supporters of Ordre Nouveau were mainly young people who had never voted before. Members of the movement were mostly male, under 30 years of age and almost none of them were workers or shopkeepers. Like Front National would later do, Ordre Nouveau made use of whatever issue presented itself, such as political corruption, tax morality, and mounting criminality. The theme that dominated the second national congress of Ordre Nouveau in 1972 was the need to transform itself into a political party that had a meaningful chance in the elections of 1973. This led to the creation of Front National.28 Most important for this thesis is that Ordre Nouveau advocated French nationalism, an important feature of populism, but also: European unity. Front National would also defend this European unity until the 1990s, after which the party turned against European political integration. This will be further explained in chapter four.

That the predecessors of Front National were populist movements makes it easier to understand the origin of Front National’s populism. Moreover, Ordre Nouveau made use of whatever issue presented itself and there was not one ideology or direction that the movement followed. It is therefore not likely to see Front National and its predecessors as ideological movements, but more likely as populist movements assuming populism as a strategy. As will further be explained in the next chapters, Front National’s point of view regarding European integration is an example of the populist character of the party. Just like Ordre Nouveau, Front National does not have one single standpoint about subjects, but its perspectives change, just as its suits the party. Not only the party is inconsistent regarding its standpoints, but Front National furthermore denies the influence of its predecessors on the party. Front National nowadays does not acknowledge Poujadism and Ordre Nouveau in the history of the party because of their bad reputation. It is not only the denial of the party’s violent predecessors that shows

24 Ibid., p. 159. 25 Ibid., p. 159. 26 Ibid., p. 161. 27 Ibid., p. 162. 28 Ibid., p. 163.

10 the inconsistency of a party that wants to come out as a more moderate party. The break between this ‘new moderate party’ with Jean-Marie le Pen’s standpoints regarding Maurras and Pétain will further support this as will be shown after the next section. But first, this study will further look at two people that played an important role in Ordre Nouveau and later Front National.

1.3.1 Gérard Longuet The person that played a significant role in the violent movements that preceded Front National was Gérard Longuet. Prior to the elections in 2017, the Dutch journalist Wilfred de Bruijn made a documentary series called: “Op zoek naar Frankrijk”, in which he did research at the current state of mind in the French society. He treated different aspects of the French society and dedicated one episode to far right movements in France. In this episode, he interviewed Serge Bolloch, former deputy chief editor of the French newspaper Le Monde. As a student in 1967, Bolloch was distributing leaflets against the Vietnam War at a university campus in Rouen. Members of Occident violently attacked the protesters while shouting: ‘the West will conquer’. Skulls were smashed, people were badly injured and one of the students ended up in a coma. The initiator and participant was Gérard Longuet, himself a participant in the attack, who later would be condemned for violence and assaults on forethought.29 Longuet was one of the founders of Occident. When the government banned Occident, Longuet became a member of Ordre Nouveau. Longuet later became a member in Front National.30

Not only De Bruijn mentioned Longuet in his documentary. In reaction to the growing support of Front National by French voters, the Belgium director Lucas Belvaux made the movie Chez Nous that came out in January 2017. Chez Nous is a Belgian-French production that reflects on Front National. The movie is about a French single mother who runs for mayor in a village in the North of France on behalf of Front National. One of the main characters is Philippe Bertier, based on Gérard Longuet. In Chez Nous, Bertier is a sympathetic older man, who convinces the single mother to run for Mayor. Bertier is the former leader of a violent militant extreme right group, like Occident.

Society seems to have forgotten about Gérard Longuet and his role in the far right, but Longuet was an important pillar for Front National. He later claimed that he had been one of the most important contributors to the economic programme of Front National. Accordingly, in 1973 he wrote a 31 pages long treatise entitled: Défendre les Français. The subjects Longuet treated are family, youth, leftism, hippies, drugs, conformism and apoliticism. Longuet also denounced attempts at general politicization in educational institutions and community organizations. He finally demanded total amnesty for former terrorists of the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS). This organisation, active in France and Algeria, was Europe’s biggest and most violent far right secret society after the Second World War. It fought

29 Bruijn, de, W., ‘Op zoek naar Frankrijk’, https://www.npo.nl/op-zoek-naar-frankrijk/03-04-2016/VPWON_1243840, retrieved 30 March 2017. 30 Author unknown, ‘De Jean-Marie à Marine, le retour aux sources lepénistes de Gérard Longuet’, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/election-presidentielle-2012/20120501.OBS7452/de-jean-marie-a-marine-le-retour-aux-sources- lepenistes-de-gerard-longuet.html, retrieved 5 June 2017.

11 against the independence of Algeria. Longuet was highly fascinated by this organization. He had always been interested by the defence of the French colonial empire and advocated the points of view of Poujadism. Jean-Marie le Pen also defended the old French colonies and advocated against France’s loss of Algeria.31

From the mid-1970s, Gérard Longuet made a shift to more moderate politics. First he became president of the Parti républicain, vice-president of Les Réformateurs, an organization that is linked to the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), the rightist political party which counts among its members the former presidents Chirac and Sarkozy. He later became president of the UMP in the senate, subsequently minister under the governments of Chirac, Balladur and Sarkozy. In 2012 Longuet came in opposition to Marine le Pen. According to the French magazine Nouvel Observateur, this shift was a political ploy to catch up and revitalize his political career.32

1.3.2 François Duprat Another person that was important for Front National, especially for its creation, with a history in Ordre Nouveau, was François Duprat. Duprat, together with others from Ordre Nouveau created Front National, asking Jean-Marie le Pen to be its spokesman. It was him and others who from within Ordre Nouveau created Front National and asked Jean-Marie le Pen to be its spokesman. They called Le Pen: L’homme providentiel: the right guy who was there at the right moment. There is not much written about Duprat, but he deserves mention because he was the founder of what became the most famous slogan of Front National and this might be the reason why the party became so well known. Duprat invented the sentence: Un million de chomeurs, c’est un million d’immigrés en trop: ‘One million unemployed is one million immigrants too much.’ It was the first time that migration was linked to unemployment and this became one the most important pillar of the party as will be further explained in chapter four. Some even say that Duprat created the basis of the populism of today.33 Duprat was the second man of Front National from the creation of the party until his assassination in 1978. He was a neo-fascist, but later took distance from fascism because he thought that Hitler gave it a bad connotation. He was antisemitic and greatly influenced the party.34 Just as Gérard Longuet, François Duprat deserves mention in this study, to critically assess that Front National was not always as moderate as the party wants to show now.

1.4 Maurras and Pétain The previous section looked at political movements that influenced Front National and that existed not long before its creation. Now it will ecamine the influence of two people and their movements at the

31 Ibid., retrieved 5 June 2016. 32 Ibid., retrieved 5 June 2016. 33 Lieshout, E., ‘Speeches: Jean-Marie le Pen’, https://www.vpro.nl/programmas/speeches/speeches-6-jean-marie-le-pen.html, retrieved 10 June 2017. 34 Picco, P., ‘Vingtième Siècle’, Revue D'histoire no. 116 (2012), p. 202.

12 beginning of the 20th century: Charles Maurras and Marshall Pétaien. Charles Maurras was the leader of the political movement Action française, a rightist nationalist movement during the start of the twentieth century. The movement wanted a restoration of the monarchy and was xenophobic and antisemitic. With the slogan: ‘Family, Church, State and Nation' Action française wanted a return of traditional French values. It wanted to protect the nation against all threats and dangers to the nation. During the interwar period, fascism spread throughout Europe, including France. Some argue that Maurras and Action française were not fascist, but only nationalist. According to Ernst Nolte however, there were three different types of fascism; Italian fascism of Mussolini, German fascism of Hitler and Action française of Charles Maurras. Charles Maurras was furthermore a defender of the Vichy regime, the “free part” of France that during World War II collaborated with Germany and Italy and was presided over by Marshall Philippe Pétain.35 The thoughts of Maurras were of significant influence on the ideology of Vichy. According to the philosopher Raymond Aron, Maurras was even the true ideological inspiration for Vichy, because he saw Jews, Protestants, Freemasons, and others as a threat to traditional, Catholic French values. 36

Although Jean-Marie le Pen did not want to conform himself to any ideology, he was a fan of Charles Maurras’ nationalism and adopted a lot of the convictions of Maurras. 37 He furthermore defended Marshall Pétain by saying that he did not see him as a traitor but as antisemite who as leader of Vichy, collaborated with Germany, also in the persecution of Jews. In 2015 Marine le Pen distanced herself and the party from her father after this defense and his comments that ‘gas chambers were just a detail in World War II.’ 38

As mentioned in the introduction, next to the anti-immigration policy and the opposition to European integration of Front National, the moderate appearance of the party is one of the three notable populist instruments of Front National. Just as the other two instruments, this study sees this moderation as an attempt to appeal to a large share of voters, rather than a genuine characteristic. There are two arguments in this chapter that are in favor of the argument that Front National is rather populist than ideological. The first is that the movements that preceded and influenced the party were populist and that, just as those movements, Front National is inconsistent regarding its standpoints; their perspectives change, just as it suits the party. Second, the distance the party takes towards its radical former viewpoints and the movements and people that influenced the party shows that the moderate character of the party is not obvious, but that it has changed to gain more support.

35 Nolte, E., Der Faschismus, Munchen: Verlag Kurt Desch 1968, p. 218. 36 Weyemberg, M., ‘Georges Sorel en Charles Maurras, De Conservatief-revolutionaire Marxist en de conservatieve revolutionair’, in: Antoon Braeckman ed., Onbehagen met de moderniteit, Kapellen: Pelckmans 2001, p. 34. 37 Shields, J.G., The extreme right in France: From Pétain to le Pen, London: Routledge 2007, p. 62. 38 Giessen, P., Le Pen breekt met vader na verdediging Maarschalk Pétain, http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/le-pen-breekt-met- vader-na-verdediging-maarschalk-petain~a3946724/, retrieved 22 February 2017.

13 2. General characteristics of Front National

The previous chapter examined populism and the roots of Front National to argue that the party is rather populist than ideological. This chapter will discuss the general characteristics of the party and link them with populism. The previous chapter argued that the denial of the radical past of the party's predecessors and influencers is in favor of the new moderate character of the party and that this moderation is one of the three populist instruments to gain votes that are mentioned in this thesis. This chapter will further support this argument by looking closer at the characteristics of the current ‘moderate party', whose ideas are originally not as moderate as they do occur.

2.1 Anti-republicanism and authoritarianism Front National emerged in 1972 and, as seen in the previous chapter, was created by the far right nationalist political movement Ordre Nouveau. The original name of Front National was: Front National pour l’unité française. The party was led by Jean-Marie le Pen from its start until 2010. In 2011 his daughter Marine le Pen took over the presidency of the party.39 Today’s Front National wants to radiate its moderate, progressive and modern character that strives for change and progression. Nevertheless, the party originally does not have such a modern character that embraces a republic. The party strives more for an authoritarian government with a strong central power, a feature of populism.

France has a long history of alternation between monarchy and republic, beginning with the French Revolution in 1789. The Revolution changed France from a monarchy into a republic, but in 1804 Napoleon Bonaparte came to power and made himself emperor. Ever since, there has been an interchange between the two regimes. Front National is a monarchist party. The interchange of republic and monarchy in France therefore affects this pronounced character. There are people who argue that Boulangism is the first movement that underpins Front National ideologically because of its anti- republican convictions. Founded during the Third Republic at the end of the 19th century, Boulangism was a political movement created by general Georges Boulanger. It denounced the failures of the parliamentary republic. It was an anti-parliamentary movement and had monarchist and republican followers. The movement wanted a revision of the constitution.40

This anti-republicanism that we find in Boulangism is also to find in the criticisms of Front National at the Fifth Republic of De Gaulle. Nevertheless, the party did not call the republican form of government itself into question. Although Front National is seen as a monarchist party, Jean-Marie le Pen proclaimed in 1995 his intention to start a Sixth Republic, which he called: ‘a truly democratic republic’. He wanted to reform the parliamentary system ‘to make it truly representative’ and to reduce the

39 Author unknown, ‘Front National’, http://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Front_national/120460, retrieved 30 January 2017. 40 Garrigues, J., ‘Le Boulangisme est-il anti-parlementaire?’, Revue d’histoire politique no. 3 (2013), p. 55. decentralisation of decision-making. Furthermore, he wanted to protect liberties and assure the equality of rights for all French citizens.41 In 2005, Le Pen however tempered these plans for a Sixth Republic. He wanted to improve the Fifth Republic in an attempt to protect the French constitution against European integration. Le Pen indicted president Chirac of breaching the fundamental laws of the Republic and of flouting the rule of law.42

Front National was criticized by old members. They claimed that the republican values of the party were not for the sake of the people, but for the nation. Front National embraces the principles of the republic, such as the sovereignty of the people and the values liberty, equality and fraternity; but not in a universalist way i.e.: not for all the people, but only for the French nation and citizens.43 Their notion of the republic is a particular one, not comparable to the principles of the French Revolution in which people fought for universal rights and democracy. During a congress in 1990, the majority of Front National even voted for an authoritarian government over a constitutional monarchy or republic. Authoritarianism is a form of government with a strong centralized power where liberties are restricted. It is an important feature of populism, as seen in the previous chapter. In this respect the authoritarian position of Front National is not unlike Boulangism, desiring constitutional reform instead of the single party dictatorship of fascism.44 This section looked at ideas and views that Front National originally pursued. The next section elaborates the way of politics that Front National pursues, both during Jean- Marie and Marine le Pen.

2.2 Communication, language and symbols Although Marine and her father do not agree on everything, they both are strong, charismatic leaders who argue that they speak on behalf of the common people. This strong leader is an appeal to the power of the common people to challenge the legitimacy of the current political establishment. 45 An important instrument that these leaders use is framing, a populist feature, as seen in the previous chapter. They use framing to enlarge some aspects while diminishing others. An example of this is the magnification of the discontent with the European Union.46 This chapter starts with the language and symbols used by Front National, that comprises populist characteristics.

The language and symbols that Front National is using have the characteristics of populism. Framing, the use of language and symbology are aspects that play a considerable role in how to deliver messages and how to reach and convince the electorate. Front National has a distinctly populist style of communication. They exalt and call on the common people, flattering them. They are anti-elite; they separate society into a division between the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’ by criticizing the

41 Shields, J.G., The extreme right in France: From Pétain to le Pen, London: Routledge 2007, p. 311. 42 Ibid., p. 311. 43 Ibid., p. 311. 44 Ibid., p. 312. 45 Abts, K., S. van Kessel, ‘Populism’, International encyclopedia of social & behavioral sciences no. 2 (2015), p. 609. 46 Fieschi, C., Fascism, Populism and the French Fifth Republic, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2004, p. 124.

15 establishment. Their politics are presented as an expression of the general will of people. They use anti- intellectual rhetoric to exploit feelings of resentment.47 Both Jean-Marie and Marine le Pen repeatedly talk to ‘the people.' They use this word in almost all their discourses. Other words that frequently return are ‘the elite’ and democracy. They use these words in different contexts, but with the same goal: to free the people from the ruling elite. Front National is against these powerful elites, ‘who aren't democratic and only think of themselves and not of the ordinary people.' Not only are they opposed to the elite in French politics, but also against the elite in the European Union. They portray themselves as a victim of these elites. An example is this quote of Jean-Marie le Pen: ‘we are victims of the ostracism of the media and the political class. There is a general tolerance except for our party.’48 As shortly noticed in chapter one, populists complain about the establishment, not only about political parties but also about cultural, economic and media elites. They accuse them of not telling the truth, and they argue that those elites deceive people by false electoral competition and by putting their interests, and those of immigrants, above national interests.49 The way Jean-Marie and Marine speak in their speeches and their way of writing is very accessible, containing little nuance with a straightforward writing style.

Not only language but also symbols play a significant role in the discourses of Front National. The words and values that return in the discourses carry a symbolic value, but they also use other kinds of symbols. They repeatedly refer to liberté, egalité, fraternité and the principle of laïcité. Front National claims that the welcoming of migrations in France would be a threat to the principle of laïcité.50 Laïcité, for which the most relevant English translation is secularism, is one of the most important values in France. It is the separation of state and religion. By referring to important values for the French and by presenting these values as under threat, anti-theoretical or anti-intellectual rhetoric to exploit feelings of resentment can be recognized. 51

The symbols used by Front National include not only words but also images. The website: Carnetsdesperances.fr with blogs of Marine le Pen portrays a lot of pictures of her. These photos, showing Marine working at a farm or watching television, aim to present her as an ordinary person, not unlike her voting base. She uses symbols that stand for the French authenticity. There is an increased focus on farming and farmers because they are seen as the authentic French, having their roots in the French soil, les racines des ancêtres français. This is a tradition of nationalism at the end of the 1800s and start of 1900s, among other things to be found in Charles Maurras’ discourses. Farmers were always

47 Mudde, C. & C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’, in: Freeden, M. and M. Stears, The Oxford handbook of political ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 7. 48 Fressoz, F., ‘Europeennes : La campagne du Front national - Jean-Marie Le Pen se voudrait le seul defenseur de la nation francaise’, https://www.lesechos.fr/03/06/1994/LesEchos/16658-014-ECH_jean-marie-le-pen-se-voudrait-le-seul-defenseur- de-la-nation-francaise.htm, retrieved 10 February 2017. 49 Mudde, C. & C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’, in: Freeden, M. and M. Stears, The Oxford handbook of political ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 6. 50 Author unknown, ‘Ma commune sans migrants’, http://www.frontnational.com/ma-commune-sans-migrants/, retrieved 11 November 2016. 51 Mudde, C. & C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’, in: Freeden, M. and M. Stears, The Oxford handbook of political ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 7.

16 the biggest group of voters of Front National.52 Here again, there is a connection to populism. There is a distinction between three forms of political populism. The third form, xenophobic populism that emerged in Europe in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, responds to a nationalistic feeling in which nativism and authoritarianism play a significant role. In this form of populism, the authentic people with their roots in the French, or even European, soil, is highly valued and honored. The Nazis used the term Volksgeist that refers to the origins of the people and Mussolini used the term Risorgimento that indicates that state- and myth-making would create Italians. This reference to authentication and ethnicity exploits a feeling of ‘us against them,' anti-immigration sentiment and racism that will be explained in the next section.53

2.3 Marine’s Front National The previous chapter already looked at the denial of Marine le Pen’s Front National of the history and predecessors of the party. This section will look at the characteristic change of the party since Marine le Pen's leadership. In particular it will regard racist and antisemitic features and the electorate because these features have evolved over time. Before, Front National was known as a racist, antisemitic party, whose electorate were mostly farmers. Now, Marine le Pen’s Front National gave the party a new fresh image, that resulted in a more diverse electorate and that wants to get rid of its racist and antisemitic character.

As seen in the previous section, the discourses of Front National are a call to “the authentic French people” with biological roots in France. This group has always been their biggest group of voters. However, recently the popularity of Front National has increased. Since Marine le Pen became the leader of the party, the support of the party has grown. In 2007 under Jean-Marie, the party gained 10.4% of the votes for the presidential elections, while in 2012, led by Marine, the party gained 17.9% of the votes in the presidential elections.54 During the presidential elections in 2017, Marine gained 21,3% of the votes in the first round and even made it to the second round in which she gained 33,90% of the votes.55 Marine softened the image of the party from a hard to a softer one with a de-demonization strategy. She broadened the message of the party to diversify its electorate, moving away from exclusively talking about immigration. She changed this to broader subjects to expand the electoral audience. The first change in her electoral audience was that voters during Jean-Marie le Pen were mainly male. Since Marine’s leadership, the number of female voters has increased. The biggest reason people vote for Front National of Marine le Pen is the anti-European Union sentiment. Europe is seen

52 Wieder, T., ‘Aux racines de l’identité nationale’, http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/11/06/aux-racines-de-l-identite- nationale_1263699_823448.html, retrieved 22 September 2016. 53 Mudde, C. & C. R. Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’, in: Freeden, M. and M. Stears, The Oxford handbook of political ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 5. 54 Mayer, N., ‘From jean- marie to marine le pen: Electoral change on the far right’, Parliamentary Affairs no. 66 (2013), p. 160. 55 Author unknown, ‘Les résultats en graphes du second tour de l’élection présidentielle 2017’, http://www.lemonde.fr/les- decodeurs/article/2017/05/07/les-resultats-du-second-tour-de-l-election-presidentielle-2017_5123789_4355770.html, retrieved 7 June 2017.

17 as the primary cause of an open door to the dangerous outside world, of economic, political and cultural insecurity. The reasons to vote for Front National in 2012 were the same as before, a key difference being that the anti-European Union sentiment gained much more importance.56 Drobrescu and Durach see this sentiment as a result of the current crisis in Europe and as a product of the radical right, i.e., to protect the national sovereignty. 57

Front National is known as a racist and antisemitic party. Jean-Marie le Pen has made several racially charged statements about races and denied the Holocaust.58 There are different definitions of racism. One of them is: an absence of color-blindness or the insensitivity to discrimination against groups, categorized racially.59 According to the Princeton encyclopaedia of Islamic political thought, racism is the belief that race is a primary determinant of human abilities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race over others.60 According to Gracia racism is commonly seen as a view or set of beliefs about the inequality of races, in which some are considered as inferior.61 The role nationalism plays to Front National, the language and symbols it uses, and its position regarding migration and migrants: all is based on race and nationality. The superiority of the French and xenophobia appears prominently. Blaming ‘others’ for your problems nourishes the fear of ‘the other.’62

Although there are several elements of racism in the discourses of Front National, there is also another side. Right after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015, the Dutch television programme Speeches made a documentary about Jean-Marie le Pen. In this documentary the makers interview Soraya Djebbour, daughter of Ahmed Djebbour, member of the Assemblée Nationale and friend of Jean-Marie le Pen. Ahmed Djebbour is originally from Algeria. After an attack on his life he lived with the grandparents of Jean-Marie le Pen, who took care of him. Soraya Djebbour later became an active member of Front National and Jean-Marie le Pen was as a father to her. It is remarkable that ‘a racist’ can be such good friends with someone of ‘a different race’. Jean-Marie le Pen and his Front National are denominated as racist and there are enough arguments for this, but it is good to look at the other side as well, because it is easy to label someone or something.63

Did the Front National of Marine le Pen lose its racist reputation? As noted in this chapter, originally mainly male native French rightist, nationalists and farmers voted for Front National. With Marine as

56 Mayer, N., ‘From Jean- Marie to Marine le Pen: Electoral change on the far right', Parliamentary Affairs no. 66 (2013), p. 168. 57 Dobrescu, P. & F. Dubrach, ‘Euroscepticism – a sign of Europe in distress’, Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations no. 16 (2014), p. 25. 58 Author unknown, ‘Le Pen geen spijt uitspraak jodenvervolging’, http://nos.nl/video/669202-le-pen-geen-spijt-uitspraak- jodenvervolging.html, retrieved 30 January 2016. 59 Frederickson, G. M., Racism : A short history, Princeton : Princeton University Press 2015. 60 Tezcan, B., ‘Racism’, The Princeton encyclopedia of Islamic political thought no. 50 (2013), p. 457. 61 Gracia, J. J. E., ‘Racism: Negative and positive?’, The Monist no. 93 (2010), p. 209. 62 Ibid., p. 209. 63 Lieshout, E., ‘Speeches: Jean-Marie le Pen’, https://www.vpro.nl/programmas/speeches/speeches-6-jean-marie-le- pen.html, retrieved 10 June 2017.

18 the leader, the female voter share increased and remarkably, nowadays there are Muslims that vote for the party as well. In 2015 Marine’s Front National started to win votes from the Muslim population through targeted campaigning. With those campaigns, they wanted to embrace moderate Muslims and condemn fundamentalists.64 In 2012 the number of Muslim voters was around 4%, but this number has increased in the following years.65 This increase sounds like a contradiction because one of the most important pillars of Front National has always been the anti-immigration, antisemitic and anti-Muslim position. Marine’s Front National started not only to sympathize with the Muslim population but also with the Jewish community. However, her father has in the past been accused of being antisemitic. The antisemitic feeling among Front National voters is still stronger than in France in general. 66 Nevertheless, Front National started a collective to support Jewish voters as a reaction on the more and more prevalent antisemitism by Muslims in French suburbs. Front National wants to appear as being the only political party that sees and cares about these issues. In this way, Marine le Pen also intends to break with the racism and antisemitism of her father and wants to attract Muslim and Jewish voters.67

There is thus a remarkable turnaround between the politics of Jean-Marie and Marine regarding Muslims and Jews. Can we say that Front National under Marine le Pen is losing its racist, antisemitic, and anti- Islamic reputation? With her politics of de-denomination Marine softened the image. Anti-immigration is not the main subject of discourse anymore, and she is courting the Muslim and Jewish populations in

France. However, anti-immigration rhetoric, racism, and nationalism are still central themes in the party's program. The next question is why Marine wants to attract Muslim and Jewish voters. Marine wants to get more support from Muslims, and she wants to protect Jews against Muslims. This can be seen as a sincere act i.e.; to create more integration in France and to decrease the tensions between ethnic groups in France. However, it rather can be seen as a populist instrument to gain more votes.

To conclude this chapter, it will link the politics of Marine le Pen to gain votes from groups outside of Front National’s traditional voting base to the argument that populism is a tool to gain votes. This task to obtain sympathy of a broader group of voters, even of former enemies of Front National can be considered as a populist objective to increase the size of the party. Not only Marine le Pen has employed this strategy, but also the populist politician Geert Wilders in The Netherlands has used de- demonization. Wilders was initially the member of a right-wing conservative party. The political positions of his own political party are closer to the leftist socialist party than to any other party. This way Wilders increases his share of voters by meeting this group of people and win its support. This is

64 Vinocur, N., ‘Marine le Pen targets Muslim voters’, http://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-muslim-voters-front-national- campaign/, retrieved 13 January 2017. 65 Larquier, de, S., ‘Ses Musulmans séduits par le FN’, http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/ces-musulmans-seduits-par-le-fn-07-10-2015- 1971307_20.php, retrieved 12 January 2017. 66 Author unknown, ‘Front National plagued by Anti-Semitism’, https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections- 2014/news/french-national-front-plagued-by-anti-semitism/, retrieved 9 January 2017. 67 Author unknown, ‘Le Front National lance un collectif des juifs’, http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/le-front-national-lance-un- collectif-des-juifs-26-04-2016-2035139_20.php, retrieved 9 January 2017.

19 one of the reasons see this study argues that populism is not an ideology, but a tool that leaders use to broaden the appeal of parties at the edge of the political specter. The previous and current chapter looked at the history and characteristics of Front National and argued that Front National is a populist party that uses populist instruments to gain votes. It argued that the change to a moderate character of the party is one of these instruments. The next chapter will have a closer look at the party’s view of Europe that has been changed since 1990 and will argue that this is another populist instrument to broaden the electorate of the party. It divided Europe as cultural integration and Europe as political integration and will start with cultural Europe.

20 3. Front National and the idea of a cultural Europe

This chapter will look at Front National’s notion of cultural Europe. Controversially, Europe as cultural unity is fundamental to Front National, in contrast to Europe as political unity. First it will regard the meaning of Europe to Front National. A discovery during this research was that Europe as a continent or Europe as a political union has a different meaning to the party. Until the end of the 1980s, Jean- Marie le Pen was a defender of an even closer Union with stronger European integration.68 In 1988 the slogan of one of the conferences of Front National was: Europe, Le Pen, liberté (freedom). This slogan is in high contrast with the slogan nowadays: France, Marine, liberté.69 Nevertheless, Europe as cultural unity is still fundamental to the party.

3.2 Jean-Marie's Vision The following sections will show different ways in which Jean-Marie and Marine le Pen defend the importance of European cultural unity. In 1988 Jean-Marie le Pen published the book: Europe discours et interventions 1984-1989, a compilation of discourses of Jean-Marie le Pen between 1984 and 1988 in which he pleads for European unity, culturally and politically, including Eastern Europe. The book mainly talks about European cultural unity, which is why it is used for this chapter. In this book, Le Pen warns about a bureaucratic political system in which not politicians take the lead, but technocrats. Le Pen also argues that the opening of borders is a controversial idea. Nevertheless, he pleads to Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission: ‘when we speak about internal borders in Europe, we obviously all agree that we should lower them since we have the desire to create a community that goes up to the political dimension, even to the national dimension.70 The book is a call to the youth of Europe, rather than just French youth. Le Pen argues that the European youth has to fight for Europe as a union for their future, their freedom and their lives.71 He addresses his work to the youth of 29 European countries, which he mentions individually, including Greece, Cyprus, and the Eastern European countries.72

Jean-Marie le Pen feared a threat to the European culture. This fear can be seen as a form of nationalism, although a better term for this would be Europeanism. Europeanism is a form of nationalism, but on a European level, that emphasizes a unified Europe. Europeanism can be seen as the defense of European political unity, which Front National defended until the 1990s. Since the 1990s this fight for political unity switched to an anti-European political unity position, which goes against the political form of

68 Albertini, D., ‘Quand le Front National était pro-Européen’, http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/06/25/quand-le-front-national- etait-pro-europeen_1461803, retrieved 2 October 2016. 69 Ibid., retrieved 2 October 2016. 70' Pen, le, J. M., Europe discours et interventions 1984-1989, Paris: GDE 1988, p. 143. 71 Ibid., p. 10. 72 Ibid., p. 108.

21 Europeanism. However, there is still a form of Europeanism within Front National from the 1990s, i.e., cultural Europeanism.73 The Europe of Front National in the 1990s was a Europe of nations, the belief in a French France and a European Europe. A Europe based on geopolitics and culture was more important to Front National than economic interests, and the party was invested in the concept of a collective European identity.74

Decadence, a subject that also appeared in discourses at the beginning of the twentieth century, among other things in those of Charles Maurras, is also a theme in Le Pen’s book. At the beginning of the twentieth century there was a general feeling in France that the French society was in decline, economically, politically and socially. Decadence is the feeling that one’s world is in decline. It is the condition of society in which values, customs, and certainties are in decline, not because of economic collapse, but because of moral and spiritual exhaustion. It appears often during an economic or social crisis. At the time, there was a fear for decadence of the French society, therefore national unity and the roots of the ancestors played a considerable role. 75 In his book, Le Pen highlights several times that he is a European, born in Brittany and that the youth of Europe should unite and fight for their continent. He refers several times to old European myths, battles in which Europeans defended Europe as Marathon, Salamis, and Lepanto.76 The book itself reads like a myth in which he glorifies Europe and its shared history. Le Pen mentions the importance of Greece and Athens in European civilization, and he talks about ancestors who fought with courage and honor, ‘European blood' that flowed for the Gods.77 He mentions European beliefs and the nations, referring among other things to the two world wars.78 With this book, Le Pen created a myth that has to convince readers and maybe himself of the rich shared history that Europe knows, in which European cooperation was an important pillar and should not be forgotten. He strongly supported a closer collaboration between the different European countries.

3.2 Marine’s vision Although there has been a shift in the position of Jean-Marie le Pen regarding Europe, since the 1990s European cultural unity was still fundamental to Front National of Jean-Marie le Pen. As seen in the previous chapter, the anti-European Union sentiment is the biggest reason people vote for the current Front National of Marine. Nevertheless, European cultural unity is also important to the party. In a speech in Milan, held by Marine le Pen on the 19th of January 2016, she emphasized the importance of Rome and the Roman Empire to Europe. She mentioned that civilization was born during the Roman

73 Author unknown, ‘Plus libres, plus forts, une autre Europe est possible’, http://www.frontnational.com/videos/plus-libres-plus- forts-une-autre-europe-est-possible/, retrieved 24 October 2016. 74 Davies, P., The Front National in France, ideology, discourse and power, London: Routledge 1999, p. 96. 75 Davies, P., The Front National in France, ideology, discourse and power, London: Routledge 1999, p. 96. 76 Pen, le, J. M., Europe discours et interventions 1984-1989, Paris: GDE 1988, p. 10. 77 Ibid., p. 149. 78 Ibid., p. 107.

22 Empire and that this is still the fundament of Europe.79 Moreover, in 2013 she wrote a 'Call to the people of Europe.' In this call, she pleaded for a Europe without the European Union and argued that the European Union destroyed everything that the European population built up. She ends her call with the following: ‘If I don't want this European Union, it is just because I want nations; I want Italy, Spain, Germany, Swiss, Portugal, Poland, I want all nations, I want France, and I want a future for every citizen.' ‘In the coming months, I will multiply the initiatives to support the hope for a change in the European countries and to meet the players who are likely to participate in the reconstruction of a European future.'80 In this call, Marine le Pen pleaded for a Europe of nations, and she was talking about a ‘European future.' In her discourses, Marine le Pen also treats Europe as a whole, instead of just France.

Furthermore, in June 2015, in cooperation with Geert Wilders, Marine le Pen created the party: Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) in the European Parliament. On their website, Marine le Pen argues that their project is based on the construction of a Europe that respects the inalienable right of the European people and in which countries can cooperate freely. Their objective is to free Europe from chains of technocratic servitude and to build a continent of peace and prosperity. Pour une France forte dans une Europe des nations. 81 ENF fights for the European nations and not only France, but ENF is against European political cooperation via the European Union; it supports the freedom of choice of the countries to cooperate or not.

This chapter argued that Europe as a unity politically and culturally was critical to Jean-Marie le Pen and Front National. That the view on Europe as political unity radically changed after 1990, did not affect the importance of Europe as a cultural unity that we should preserve according to both the Front National of Jean-Marie and Marine le Pen. In the next chapter, however, we will see that the standpoint about Europe as political unity radically changed and opposes the attitude about Europe as cultural unity. Is it possible to actively attach to European cultural unity, while it politically falls apart? The strong value of European cultural unity, that before 1990 was not considered separately from European political unity, shows that the shift to oppose to European political integration was not evident. Moreover, one could question whether it is possible to see Europe's united culture apart from Europe's federal politics. The next chapter will critically assess Front National’s view on European political integration.

79 Author unknown, ‘Plus libres, plus forts, une autre Europe est possible’, http://www.frontnational.com/videos/plus-libres-plus- forts-une-autre-europe-est-possible/, retrieved 24 October 2016. 80 Pen, le, M., ‘Appel de Marine le Pen aux peuples d’Europe’, http://www.frontnational.com/2013/04/appel-de-marine-le-pen-aux- peuples-deurope/, retrieved 2 October 2016. ‘Si je ne veux plus de cette Union européenne, c’est justement parce que je veux les nations : je veux l’Italie, je veux l’Espagne, je veux l’Allemagne, je veux la Suède, je veux le Portugal, je veux la Pologne, je veux toutes les nations, je veux la France, et je veux un avenir pour chaque peuple !’‘Je multiplierai dans les mois qui viennent les initiatives afin de porter dans les différents pays européens cet espoir de changement et rencontrer les acteurs susceptibles de participer à la reconstruction nécessaire d'un avenir européen.' 81 Pen, M., ‘l’Europe que nous voulons: celle des Nations et Libertés’, http://www.enfgroup-ep.eu/, retrieved 28 October 2016.

23 4. Front National and European political integration

As noted in the previous chapter, there is a difference between the cultural and political vision of Front National regarding Europe. The party was pro-European unity, but since the 1990s the party is against political integration. Its position regarding European political integration has undergone a radical change. Before 1990, the party promoted political cooperation via the European Community. When we think of Front National today, it is most recognized for its Eurosceptic position towards the European Union. This chapter will start with the concept of Euroscepticism and Eurofascism and subsequently argue that the shift to become anti-European integration is not evident.

4.1 Euroscepticism & Eurofascism There is no single definition for Euroscepticism; disagreement even exists over when it first appeared. Some define Euroscepticism as the general doubt about or disbelief in Europe or European integration. Others define it as encompassing a range of critical positions on European integration, as well as outright opposition.82 According to Harmsen and Spiering, Euroscepticism started as an English phenomenon in the sense of ‘awkwardness’ or ‘otherness’ concerning the continental European project of political and economic integration.83 During the beginnings of European integration, Euroscepticism was seen as being critical of market integration. After the Maastricht Treaty, however, it was more seen as defending the national community and to express doubt or opposition towards the political form assumed by European integration.84

The most important theme of Euroscepticism is the reason why it emerges: distrust. Euroscepticism appears when people are dissatisfied with the political situation, for example during an economic crisis.85 Accordingly, Euroscepticism is mostly found at the extremes of the political spectrum, both on the left and the right. This is because there is a bigger chance that people at the edges of the political spectrum do not feel represented by the current political order.86 There are two distinctions that will be illustrated here: first between Euroscepticism on the left and the right; secondly, between hard and soft Euroscepticism. On the right, it is expressed in the criticism that the European Union undermines national identity and independence. Right-wing Euroscepticism rejects European integration as a whole. On the left, it is expressed as concerns about the effect of the European Union on social protections and the European social model, but it does not oppose European integration per se.87 The common theme in

82 Hooghe, L. & G. Marks, ‘Sources of Eurofascism’, Acta Politica no. 42 (2007), p. 120. 83 Harmsen, R. & M. Spiering, Eurofascism: Party politics, national identity and European integration, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2004, p. 13-15. 84 Ibid., p. 18. 85 Dobrescu, P. & F. Dubrach, ‘Euroscepticism – a sign of Europe in distress’, Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations no. 16 (2014), p. 25. 86 Elzas, van, E. J., A. Hakhverdian, ed., ‘United against a common foe? The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens’, West European Politics no. 6 (2016), p. 1182. 87 Ibid., p. 1182.

24 the positions of the left and the right is that the European Union is a threat to the status quo.88 The second distinction is the difference between hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is ‘a situation where there is a principled opposition to the European Union and European integration,’ and soft Euroscepticism is ‘a situation where there is not a principled objection to membership, but in which concerns or criticisms are expressed about European Union policies which amount to a "qualified opposition".'89

In line with Euroscepticism, the term Eurofascism will be elaborated. Chapter one looked at whether Jean-Marie le Pen enhanced fascism during the Interbellum after the remarkable statement that gas chambers were just a detail in World War II. 90 This section will look at a different form of fascism, namely: Eurofascism, something that appears in both Jean-Marie and Marine le Pen’s way of thinking. Roger Griffin argues that the term emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War as a reaction on periodicals with titles such as ‘The European’, ‘Europa Nazione’, ‘Nation Europa’, etc. Furthermore by the publication of works calling for a European Federation or empire of fascist nations and the creation of pan-European fascist organizations.91 Øyvind Strømmen argues that the term Eurofascism has been used to refer to different meanings. Some are using the term to refer to Hitler, Mussolini and the contrast with non-European countries. Others see it as anti-European Union; others still such as libertarians and conservatives use it to describe social democratic policies.92 Strømmen uses the term Eurofascism to refer to the European myth, or to a specific ideological trend in post-WWII European fascism. He refers to modern-day European parties with the following characteristics: historical and current ties to pre- WWII fascist parties, neo-nazi groups, openly neo-fascist movements, Holocaust deniers and similar groups. Secondly, xenophobia or extreme opposition to immigration, often including the notion that one’s own group is being victimised; thirdly, a strong focus on the nation, on ethnicity and in some cases also on race; fourthly, an understanding of a certain European cultural union, mostly expressed by the division between Europeans and non-Europeans, or Westerners and non-Westerners.93 Here we see that, not surprisingly, Eurofascism has a lot in common with fascism; the difference is that Eurofascism is specifically directed towards Europe or the European Union.94 According to Strømmen a Eurofascist ‘calls himself a nationalist, a national democrat or a patriot and usually scorns intellectuals, academics, the media and artists. It is hostile to the left; it longs for the better days of the past, the latter reminds of

88 Harmsen, R. & M. Spiering, Eurofascism: Party politics, national identity and European integration, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2004, p. 125. 89 Ibid., p. 18-19. 90 Giessen, P., Le Pen breekt met vader na verdediging Maarschalk Pétain, http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/le-pen-breekt-met- vader-na-verdediging-maarschalk-petain~a3946724/, retrieved 22 February 2017. 91 Griffin, R., ‘Interregnum or endgame? The radical right in the ‘post-fascist’ era’, Journal of political ideologies, 2010, p. 166. 92 Strømmen, Ø., Eurofascism, Øyvind Strømmen 2007, p. 58. 93 Ibid., p. 15. 94 Griffin, R., ‘Interregnum or endgame? The radical right in the ‘post-fascist’ era’, Journal of political ideologies, 2010, p. 166.

25 Trumps famous quote: ‘Making America great again’. ‘They are obsessed with the idea that Europe is being threatened, facing a crisis’.95

The opposition to the European Union of Front National is a good example of Euroscepticism and also of Eurofascism on the right. The European Union is one of the main subjects in the party program of Front National. In almost every discourse of Marine le Pen, there is a reference to Brussels and the European Union. Brussels is, according to her, the opposite of democracy and the cause of ‘the chaos in France of today.' According to her, the French government is too afraid to leave the Union.96 Her language is harsh and clear: ‘blackmail, threat, intimidation’97 and she speaks about ‘the liars of the EU.' In a blog entitled Frexit, she reacts to Brexit and says that she is not surprised that so many people were supporting a Brexit. She also mentions being proud to be the leader of a movement that fights for a Frexit: ‘Call me Miss Frexit.’98 About members of the European Union, she says: ‘This European elite has been radicalized by repeating dogmas of an EU falling apart' and: ‘we want our sovereignty and our national identities, and thus national borders.99

4.2 Front National’s vision on European integration before 1990 As already mentioned before, this opposition to the European Union is not a matter of course in the history of Front National. Although people today assume that Front National has always been against European integration, this position was the opposite for the majority of the party’s life. In the 1980s Jean-Marie le Pen had very different plans regarding Europe and the European Union. At the time, he was not thinking about leaving the Union at all, but he even had plans for closer cooperation. The prime viewpoints were: - Political unity and the construction of Europe; - Action for the release of ‘the brothers’ in Eastern-European countries; - The establishment of a European defense community; - To fight against international terrorism; - An opening of borders of the Southern European countries, first in the Mediterranean; - The construction of a large internal market, making Europe one of the leading economic powers of the world; - To improve the social and economic situation to reverse the migration trend to Third World countries; - The implementation of a genuine European family policy to stop the destructive process of demographic collapse.100

95 Strømmen, Ø., Eurofascism, Øyvind Strømmen 2007, p. 23. 96 Pen, le, M., ‘La France exasperée’, http://carnetsdesperances.fr/2016/05/25/la-france-exasperee/, retrieved 23 September 2016. 97 Pen, le, M., ‘Liberté’, http://carnetsdesperances.fr/2016/02/22/liberte/, retrieved 23 September 2016. 98 Pen, le, M., ‘Frexit’, http://carnetsdesperances.fr/2016/03/13/frexit/, retrieved 23 September 2016. 99' Ibid., retrieved 23 September 2016. 100 Hooghe, L. & G. Marks, ‘Sources of Eurofascism’, Acta Politica no. 42 (2007), p. 148.

26

4.3 Front National’s vision on European integration since 1990 While he first argued that there should be more cooperation, his point of view completely changed in the 1990s; the party became anti-European integration as a consequence.101 The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and Schengen, that established the opening of borders of European Union member states, played a significant role in this change of heart. In reaction to the Maastricht Treaty Jean-Marie started a nationwide campaign in 1994, in which he exclaimed that he wanted Front National to ascend to power in the European Parliament. ‘We are, in the European Parliament, the last grain of sand capable of blocking the myth of world government!’102 As mentioned in the previous chapter the Europe of Front National in the 1990s was a Europe of nations, in which geopolitics and culture were more important than economic interests. There was a belief in a French France and a European Europe; Front National invested in the concept of a common European cultural identity.103

Today, a Europe of nations is still the focus of Front National, but economic interests play a considerable role as well. On their website, Front National argues that the European Union, whose purpose was the economic and political development as well as the cooperation between civilized countries, is betraying its original goals. They mention some of the leading consequences of this deceptive union such as the opening of borders, unemployment, market rule, poverty, mass immigration and the wish to make Turkey a Member State as well.104 They also argue that European integration from the beginning has been suffering from a democratic deficit. According to them, instead of acting in a common European interest, the European Commission, an unelected body, has given considerable powers to technocrats and the monopoly of legislative initiative. At least 80% of the laws and national regulations of importance are nothing more than the transportation of their norms and directives. They conclude this by saying that the same ‘enlightened despotism’ has been given to the European Central Bank (ECB) that became one-legged concerning economic policy.105

According to Front National, the European Community for Coal and Steel, the European Union’s predecessor, damaged the European steel industry and the agricultural policy marginalized the European agriculture. They argue that the European Union has the biggest and the fastest growing unemployment rate of the world. Additionally, Germany is the only member of the European Union whose export rate grew after the introduction of the Euro, and France's export rate is now in deficit. Front National,

101 Ibid., p. 148. 102 Fressoz, F., ‘Europeennes : La campagne du Front national - Jean-Marie Le Pen se voudrait le seul defenseur de la nation francaise’, https://www.lesechos.fr/03/06/1994/LesEchos/16658-014-ECH_jean-marie-le-pen-se-voudrait-le-seul-defenseur- de-la-nation-francaise.htm, retrieved 10 February 2017. 103 Davies, P., The Front National in France, ideology, discourse and power, London: Routledge 1999, p. 96. 104 Author unknown, ‘Europe - Une Europe au service des peuples libres’, http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine- le-pen/politique-etrangere/europe/, retrieved 5 September 2016. 105 Ibid., retrieved 5 September 2016.

27 therefore, argues that France should be prepared for a return of the Franc, the former national currency. European laws regarding free movement of persons are according to them something that France cannot handle and that it is threatening the national social model.106 They mention a couple of goals for France, namely that:

- France gets back the control of its borders, by preference within a free association of European states sharing the same vision and the same interests; - France restores the primacy of national law over EU law; - France takes their old currency, the Franc, back; - There will be a period of innovation of major European projects in favor of the people, like the period in which France innovated the Airbus;

- The French contribution to the European budget is zero, to aid French agriculture.

They argue that France and Europe should be in service of the people. The title of the part on their website that talks about Europe is: ‘Une Europe au service des peuples libres': ‘A Europe in favor of the free people.107

4.3.1 The European Union and immigration An important subject in the discourses of Front National is immigration. As already mentioned before, just as the opposition to the European Union, this study identifies the link between unemployment and immigration as one of the three top populist pillars of Front Nation to gain votes. Immigration, though, also plays a role in the opposition to the European Union of Front National itself. The website of Front National shows pop-ups such as: ‘Unfortunately Julie is not a migrant.' When clicking on this pop-up, stories on three different French people appear, ‘who are less fortunate than migrants in France.’ The first story is about the student Julie, ‘who has been waiting for two years for housing in Lille, while 80 immigrants just got housing on the student campus in Lille.' The next story is about Sandra, ‘who has been sleeping in her car with her son for three months while social housing in France is being saturated by uncontrolled migration.’ The third story is about Pierre, a retired farmer ‘who has a pension of 284 euros per month, while an immigrant in France receives monthly benefits 330 euros.’108 There is a petition on the same website, called: ‘My municipality without migrants.' The petition argues that migrants are a threat to French society. In summary, the primary arguments are that immigrants are a financial and social cost to society. ‘We cannot ask from people who are already the victim of the economic crisis to lose more money on immigrants.109 The institution of immigration camps in town centers provokes tension with the citizens of these communities, and it is easier for terrorists to enter

106 Ibid., retrieved 5 September 2016. 107' Ibid., retrieved 5 September 2016. 108 Author unknown, ‘Migration, décrouvrez la nouvelle campagne des jeunes avec Marine,' http://www.frontnational.com/2016/11/migrants-decouvrez-la-nouvelle-campagne-des-jeunes-avec-marine/, retrieved 11 November 2016. 109' Author unknown, ‘Ma commune sans migrants,’ http://www.frontnational.com/ma-commune-sans-migrants/, retrieved 5 November 2016.

28 French soil and to commit a terrorist attack. Finally, immigration would feed communitarianism that is contradictory to the French principle of laïcité, one of the most important values to the French, as mentioned in chapter one.110

Immigration, in particular, plays an important role in the economic standpoint of the party, because immigration is not only seen as a threat to the French and European identity but also to the French economy.111 The main argument Front National uses against immigration is asking why a population that cannot even provide itself provides for other people who are not from the same soil and never contributed to the French society. The principle of ‘own population first’ also appears in the arguments of other populists like Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Donald Trump in the United States whose famous quote during the elections was: ‘America first.'

On their website, Front National dedicates a page to immigration and the changes in rules and policy they want to implement. They argue that France should stop mass immigration and reduce legal immigration because it harms French society and its economy. Here they mention three arguments. The first argument is that immigration is used by big money to depress wages and erode the rights of French employees. The second reason is that immigration is costly for the French nation, to the order of 70 billion euros a year. The third reason is that uncontrolled immigration is a source of tension in a republic that is unable any longer to assimilate the ‘new Frenchmen.' This results in more problems within ghettos, it provokes inter-ethnic conflicts, it harms the national identity and results in Islamization. According to them, these problems are a direct consequence of mass immigration.112

They argue that the only solution for this will be a balance between people who enter and leave the country and there are a few measures that they want to take. They want to limit the number of legal immigrants that enter the country to 10.000 a year and stop labor immigration, with the exception of some particular skills that are not widely available in France. For illegal immigrants, they want automatic departure and expulsion. They also want to stop family reunification.113 Furthermore, they want that foreigners who do not have a job within a year should leave the country and that it should be harder to get a residence permit. Besides, French nationals should get priority in job applications, and housing and family allowances should be reserved for families who at least have one parent with the French nationality.114

Moreover, they want to reinstate border controls as well as challenge Schengen and the free movement of persons within the European Union. Acquiring the French nationality should no longer be rather an

110 Ibid., retrieved 5 November 2016. 111 Davies, P., The Front National in France, ideology, discourse and power, London: Routledge 1999, p. 96. 112 Author unknown, ‘Ma commune sans migrants,’ http://www.frontnational.com/ma-commune-sans-migrants/, retrieved 17 December 2016. 113 Ibid., retrieved 17 December 2016. 114 Ibid., retrieved 17 December 2016.

29 administrative matter, but should be an honor. One needs to have been on French territory for a longer period; needs not to have a criminal record; needs to speak the French language and needs to be assimilated. A double nationality will be prohibited, except for when the second nationality is of a European Union member state.115 Anti-French racism must be punished harder, and foreigners convicted of a crime should go to prison in their country of origin.116 To regulate all these measures, they want to install a Ministry of Interior, Immigration, and Secularism as well as a ban on communautarism, the conviction that every individual depends on a community. In the Constitution, they want to add: ‘the Republic will not recognize any form of community.'117

The measures Front National intends to take against immigration are all aimed at the European Union regulations. Front National not only sees these laws as a threat and does not want to comply with them, but the measures they want to take are also in violation of the European notion of citizenship and articles 18 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Article 18 states that any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. The measures on immigration are almost all rooted in nationality.118 Article 21 states that EU citizens have the right to freely move between member states and within a member state without restrictions of any kind. With the reinstatement of border control and a revision of Schengen, free movement of persons between member states is no longer possible.119 These articles are indispensable and fundamental to European citizenship and to European Union values. Remarkably, citizenship is one of the most precious values of the French state since the French revolution.

Another important feature of the European Union that Front National opposes is the Pan-European idea of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. His Pan-European project was a progressive idea of the future of the world in which Coudenhove-Kalergi encouraged a deep integration of European countries to create a strong European federal state, even in cooperation with non-European countries. The main values of a Pan-Europe were among other things Christianity and Europeanism, but it also welcomed Jewish and Muslim influences. Coudenhove-Kalergi was in favor of colonialism, to create a stronger federal state to stand up against the United States of America. As well as Coudenhove-Kalergi, Jean-Marie le Pen was in favor of colonization. Le Pen was strongly against the European project of decolonization, especially in the case of Algeria. When Le Pen still promoted European unity, Coudenhove-Kalergi and him both agreed on the existence of colonies and the creation of an ever stronger united Europe. However, Coudenhove-Kalergi saw the future of Europe in mixed races, something that Le Pen would

115 Ibid., retrieved 17 December 2016. 116 Ibid., retrieved 17 December 2016. 117 Ibid., retrieved 17 December 2016. 118 Author unknown, ‘Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,' http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT, retrieved 20 December 2016. 119 Author unknown, ‘Burgerschap van de Unie’, https://eumovement.wordpress.com/directive-200438ec/, retrieved 20 December 2016.

30 not promote seen his vision on immigration and especially not after the shift from being pro-European integration to the opposite side.

After De Gaulle denied letting go of France’s colonies, the French eventually had to let go of its colonies in favor of closer European integration. Algeria was one of France's colonies and even became part of the French mainland i.e., it was divided in departments. When the European communities started decolonization and France lost Algeria, the so-called pieds noirs: French people who were installed in Algeria but who originated from France, came back to France. These pieds noirs were French nationalists, but they were discriminated because there was a fear that those people who were mostly wealthy, would claim too much from the French government. They felt mostly discriminated by the left spectre of politics and they found their support on the right side. Therefore they supported De Gaulle, of who they had a still wish that he would restore the old colony of Algeria. Later these pieds noirs, who were disadvantaged as a result of the European project, became an important group of voters to Front National.120

4.3.2 The European Union, Russia and Front National To conclude, this chapter looks at one more subject that is remarkable in the anti-European Union position of Front National: its vision on the Soviet Union during the Cold War and on current the Russian Federation. In the 1980s, Jean-Marie le Pen saw the Soviet Union as the enemy no. 1 of Europe.121 Marine le Pen is not a fan of the old Soviet Union either and she compared the European Union with the Soviet Union. In a press release in 2012 entitled: ‘Is the European Union in the same stage as the Soviet Union?’ Marine le Pen reacted to new plans made by the European Union. She argued that only Germany benefits, but that other countries suffer from the European Union. Only Front National pleads for ‘the nation instead of a federal Europe of Germany, the sovereignty of people instead of absolute power of technocrats and banks, the protection of borders instead of ultra-Liberalism.’ She furthermore argued that the European Union has become the prison of the people. She added the following: ‘The future of the European Union starts to look more and more at that of the Soviet Union, which died of its own contradictions.’122 In the transformation from Jean-Marie to Marine le Pen, there has been a remarkable change: although Marine le Pen declared that she is not a fan of the Soviet Union, she now supports the Russian Federation and Putin. Front National was the only party to congratulate Russia with the conquest of Crimea and believes that Europe should form one front with Russia to create

120 Veugelers, J., G. Menard, P. Permingeat, ‘Colonial past, voluntary association and far-right voting in France’, Ethnic and Racial studies no. 38 (2015), p. 775. 121 Pen, M. le, ‘Union Européenne vers le stade ultime de l’union Sovietique Européenne’, http://www.frontnational.com/2012/06/union-europeenne-vers-le-stade-ultime-de-lunion-sovietique-europeenne/, retrieved 5 October 2016. 122 Ibid., retrieved 5 October 2016.

31 a strong Europe, not like the European Union. Not only Front National supports Russia, but there are rumors that Putin supports far right parties in Europe financially, under which Front National.123

As seen in this chapter, the opposition to the European Union is not an obvious course in the party’s history. The party’s Eurosceptic position started as a reaction on the Maastricht Treaty at the beginning of the 1990s. Before the 1990s Front National advocated cultural and political European cooperation and as appears in the book of Jean-Marie le Pen, a cultural and political side still not yet divided European unity. The opposition of European cooperation on political level is mostly used to blame the European Union for crises in France, of which the economical is the most important. Here, immigration and the opening of borders play an important role. That Front National used the European Union to blame for a crisis, and that this is a derivative of populism, will be further explained in the next chapter.

123 Motet, L., ‘Le Front National et la Russie, un idylle qui dure’, http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/11/18/le-front- national-et-la-russie-une-idylle-qui-dure_5033857_4355770.html, retrieved 13 January 2017.

32 5. The opposition to the European Union as derivative of populism

This chapter will show that Front National’s position against European integration is a derivative of populism. It will argue this by showing that Front National uses populism to respond to an economic or social crisis and that they use populism to gain votes. Front National points the finger at the European Union to blame for the crisis in France. This chapter elaborates that this is a distinctly populist strategy. Some call populism a (thin) ideology; this study argues that populism is a strategy to gain votes, rather than an ideology. To support this argument, the history of Front National is divided into three parts. In the first years of its existence, the party had a unique selling point: the party made the connection between immigration and unemployment. At the beginning of the 1990s, the party began to blame the European Union for the problems and the crisis in France. Today, the leadership of the party by Marine le Pen is much more moderate than it had originally been. In this thesis these three moments are seen as derivative of populism.

5.1 Three ‘populist periods’ As seen in the first chapter populism divides two groups: the corrupt elite and the normal people that represent ‘true' democracy. Populist leaders point the finger at these corrupt elites, blaming them for the economic crises in the country. To gain the support of the people, populist parties incite fear of foreign people, but also of these elites. This study sees populism as a tool to increase popularity. It is a straightforward and easy way to blame something or someone for a problem. A considerable moment when Front National used the tool of populism was in 1978. In that year Jean-Marie le Pen held a speech in which he connected unemployment to migration with the sentence: Un million de chômeurs c'est un million d’immigrés en trop: ‘One million unemployed is one million immigrants too much.' He was asking the question: how can we give our own population work if we welcome foreigners to a country with existing unemployment? This was the moment when Jean-Marie le Pen started to use rhetoric the party would be famous for, i.e., anti-immigration. France was in a crisis; there was a high unemployment rate. To blame someone for this crisis, Front National chose migration, in particular, the migration from France’s old colony of Algeria.

Another considerable moment when the party blamed someone for the problems in France was at the beginning of the 1990s when the party shifted from being pro-European integration to being Eurosceptic and anti-European integration as described in the previous chapter. Euroscepticism plays an important role in the current wave of populist leaders. The third moment that populism was used as a tool to gain votes started in 2011, when Marine le Pen became the leader of Front National. She chose to be more moderate than her father and distanced herself from certain controversial opinions of her father, as

33 described in previous chapters. Stockemer & Barizione researched the changing political discourse of Front National since the change in leadership. They concluded that the party is using more moderate rhetoric, but that the party has not become more mainstream. Its main propositions have stayed the same; it is the way the party packages these plans that has changed.124 The party has started to use a style that resonates with potential Front National voters. In the mid-2010s, a period of economic, political and identity crises, populist parties began to use a strategy that included anti-European, anti-elitist and anti- neoliberal positions, as well as the emphasis on nationalism and the rejection of immigration. This approach appeals to lower and middle classes and is likely to be supported by a large part of the population. Through this changing rhetoric, they have reached a more diversified public.125

5.3 Other populist elements The previous section showed three periods in the history of the party and argued that these periods were populist tools, used to increase the support of the party. There are also other populist elements that reflect in Front National. This study argues that populism goes together with a perception of decadence. Populists use decadence to blame ‘the elite’ for the decreasing quality of life in a country. Front National blames the establishment in France for the crisis in France and in line with this the decreasing quality of life in France. As previously seen, the perception of decadence was very strong in France at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century; today the same features appear in France. Front National is exploiting this perception of decadence in their discourses. Unlike her father, Marine le Pen does not use the word decadence; she describes it in other words. She uses, for example, the expressions: inversion des valeurs and désordre national.126 According to Dimitri Almeida, decadence cannot be seen separately from indifferentiation. He sees decadence as the fear of seeing the disappearance of differences considered as fundamental for the preservation of national order. 127 He argues that ‘decadence is conceived as a process of vanishing differences and represents the central ideological axiom from which the Front National’s core values and beliefs are derived’.128

Another point to support the argument that populism is a tool rather than an ideology, and that reflects in Front National, is the comparison of populism with the Maoist mass line. Mao created the idea of the mass line during the Yenan period from 1935-1946. The idea was as follows: ‘take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas), concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace

124 Stockemer, D. & M. Barizione, ‘The ‘new’ discourse of the Front National under Marine Le Pen: A slight change with a significant impact,' European Journal of Communication, no. 2 (2017), p.111. 125 Ibid., p. 111. 126 Almeida, D., ‘Decadence and indifferentiation in the ideology of the Front National’, French Cultural Studies, no. 25, (2014), p. 229. 127 Ibid., p. 221. 128 Ibid., p. 222.

34 them as their own, hold fast to them, translate them into action and test the correctness of these ideas in such action.’129

This idea of the mass line suits with the theory of cultural hegemony of Antonio Gramsci, the first leader of the communist party of Italy. He distinguished three levels of consciousness. The first was the economic corporative that is aware of the particular interests of a group. The second was the solidarity or class-consciousness. This solidarity extends to a whole social class but stays at an economic level. The third was the hegemonic level that brings the interests of the leading class in harmony with those of lower classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms.130 Populism incorporates the elements of the Maoist mass line and cultural hegemony of Gramsci.

The last argument to support the statement that populism is a tool to gain votes and that reflects in Front National was made by Jan-Werner Müller who argues that populists are demonizing a part of society: everyone who disagrees with the populists is a traitor and should be ejected from society.131 He argues that all populists are different because they come from different parts of the world, born in different circumstances. However, populists have one thing in common: they are convinced that it is only them who are speaking on behalf of the people. As a logical consequence, any opponents, ideological or otherwise, are not speaking on behalf of the people and are therefore free to be demonized. This tendency makes populism anti-pluralistic as it actively attempts to suppress other viewpoints. Müller warns about populism, seeing it as a threat to democracy.132 He fears the idea that populists talk about ‘one people’. Werner-Müller refers to Jurgen Habermas who said that ‘the people’ can only appear in plural. There is not one single, homogenous and authentic people. He warns that populists not only use polarization and cause conflicts, but that populists call their political enemies ‘enemies of the people’ and exclude them.133 An example of the tendency of populists to see themselves as the only authentic voice of the people is Donald Trump who during the elections of 2016 said that he represented the real people and that 'the other people’ do not matter.134 Müller even argues that populism is more than a strategy to gain votes. He argues that mainstream politicians also do this, but that populists do not substantively react to what the opposition is saying, instead of making a general claim that the opposition is the enemy of the people.135

In conclusion, this chapter argues that the opposition to the European Union of Front National can be explained by means of exclusion of other possible explanations of the crisis in Europe. Front National chose to highlight a few particular points of view and to hide others. There are three periods in the

129 Barlow, J. A., ‘Mass line leadership and thought reform in China’, American Psychologist no. 36 (1985), p. 300. 130 Martin, J., Antonio Gramsci critical assessments of leading political philosophers, London: Routledge 2002, p. 364. 131 Stuenkel, O., ‘What is populism?, by Werner Müller’, Democratization, no. 0 (2017), p 2. 132 Ibid., p 2. 133 Werner-Müller, J., What is populism?, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2017, p. 4. 134' Gruyter, de C., ‘Populisten denken dat alleen zij het volk zijn’, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/11/11/populisten-denken-dat- alleen-zij-het-volk-zijn-5245418-a1531488, retrieved 18 June 2017. 135 Stuenkel, O., ‘What is populism?, by Werner Müller’, Democratization, ahead-of-print, p 2.

35 existence of Front National that are populist tools to increase the support of the party. This chapter argues that populism cannot be called an ideology because it does not have a set of values or a doctrine, according to which the party or its leader should behave. Populism can be seen as a ‘thin ideology’ because populist party's value the same elements and oppose ‘the people' versus ‘the elite.' Nevertheless, this thesis argues that it is rather a strategy in which they express things that are widely perceived as being true, but for which barely any proof exists. This anti-intellectual foundation is what makes it dangerous. Populists do not substantively express themselves on a subject; instead, they reject pluralism, claiming that they are representatives of ‘the people' who naturally know what ‘the people' want.136 Front National therefore used the European Union as a populist instrument to increase votes.

136 Ibid., p. 2.

36 Conclusion

This thesis set out the changing position of Front National towards European integration, giving special consideration to the role played by populism. The primary debate is whether populism is a (thin) ideology, a political style or a tool. The metadebate is the relation between populism and Euroscepticism. The main research question is: ‘Is the current attitude of Front National towards the European Union explainable when looking back at the history and nature of the party and to what degree would populism be the incentive?’ Conclusively, it appears that this attitude is not a matter of course when looking at the history and nature of the party and that this attitude is a derivative of populism as a tool in order to gain votes.

Before 1990 Front National was in favor of European integration, but this viewpoint has changed significantly. From the beginning of the 1990s until today the party opposes to European political cooperation and is strongly Eurosceptic. This opposition to the European Union is nowadays one of the most important pillars of the party's program. This study explained the change in position towards the European Union and looked at the history and characteristics of the party in order to conclude whether this change was an obvious one or not.

During the study of the history of the party, it became apparent that the party originally was in favor of European political cooperation and that the change to oppose to this cooperation was not evident. Jean- Marie le Pen used to defend an even closer Union with stronger European integration, which reflects the real conviction of Jean-Marie le Pen and Front National. This study subsequently elaborated the general characteristics of the party to further investigate the shift. First, the language and symbology used by Front National were compared to known populist rhetoric to discover that their language has many populist characteristics. Secondly, this study examined the characteristic changes in the party since Marine le Pen's leadership and discovered that the party's positions regarding radical themes, in particular, racism and antisemitism, became much more nuanced.

The predecessors of Front National were radical and violent movements, led by controversial people. Front National now attempts to obscure this history; the Front National of Marine le Pen has a much more moderate character than the Front National of her father and even more so than the movements that came before it. Marine le Pen has even started to approach Muslims and Jews in an attempt to grow the party. This thesis critically assessed whether the viewpoints of Marine's party have in fact become more moderate, or whether this is a smart way to get more electoral support. The study discovered that a more moderate way of communication does not necessarily mean that the party actually has become more moderate. This discovery was a step towards the argument that the party is using populism; in this case, a way of populist communication, to reach a broader audience than it has historically been able to.

37 During the research, it became apparent that the viewpoint of Front National regarding European political unity differs from the view on European cultural unity. Unless its strong opposition to European political cooperation since the 1990s, the idea of European cultural unity is still fundamental to the party. In this view, it became evident that the party does not only have a strong nationalistic character but that the ‘Europeanic' character is strong as well. European unity that once was both cultural and political is now divided in two, and Front National still strongly values the cultural side. This led to the question whether cultural unity can exist if the political side falls apart and even more generally: if it is possible to divide these two sides. A European Union would be incomplete without a political union. Front National never considered the consequences of a European Union falling apart.

Subsequently, this study elaborated the view of Front National on European political cooperation and learned that before 1990 Jean-Marie le Pen even promoted European integration. The Eurosceptic character of Front National since 1990 is expressed in the criticism that the European Union undermines national identity and independence. This study examined the different arguments Front National is using against the European Union and argues that a European Union would be incomplete without a political union. It argues that Front National attempts to frame the discussion and does not tell the entire truth, only choosing those facts that support their argument. An important subject they enlarge is immigration.

In the last chapter, this conviction even became stronger after populism was studied more carefully. It showed that Front National’s opposition to European integration is a derivative of populist thought and that the party uses populist tools to provide an answer to a crisis to gain electoral support. Front National blames the European Union for the crisis in France. This is not the only populist technique they use. This argument was supported by dividing the timeline of Front National into three distinct moments where the party used populist instruments. The first moment was in 1978 when the party started to blame immigration for the unemployment problems that France knew at the time. The second moment was when the party began to blame the European Union for the crisis in France. The third moment was when Marine le Pen became the leader of the party and ‘rebranded the party' by giving it a more nuanced character. This resulted in enough support for Front National and led Marine le Pen to the last round of the presidential elections of 2017; Front National has never garnered as much support as it did then.

In conclusion, this study argues that populism is a tool, rather than an ideology or political style. Populism does not have a set of values or a doctrine according to which the party or its leader should behave, something ideologies do have. That populism is a ‘thin ideology' can be defended by the argument that there are more populist parties in the world that share ‘thin values' of which the most important is: ‘the elite' versus ‘the people.' Jan-Werner Müller argues that populism is more than a strategy to gain votes. He claims that populists do not substantively react to what the opposition is saying; instead, they make a general claim that any opposition is an enemy of the people. The viewpoints of populists are therefore not supported by arguments; they rather use statements without argumentation

38 and they never substantively express themselves on a subject. Instead, they reject pluralism, claiming that they are representatives of ‘the people' who naturally know what ‘the people' want. This is why this study sees the opposition of Front National towards European integration as a populist technique to broaden the party’s electorate. It is easy to blame something or someone for a problem by not substantively expressing yourself, and without supporting this accusation with arguments.

Further research is needed to define populism more accurate. This study argues that the shift of Front National’s attitude towards the European Union is a populist tool to gain votes. Nevertheless, this study also showed that populism exists for over a century and all over the world in different shapes and forms. It can therefore not be excluded that populism has different forms and shapes and that every form has a different definition. This study does not exclude either that a combination of two or more definitions of populism is possible. Further research should elaborate whether there is only one definition of populism or whether there are more possible definitions for the concept.

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