GERMANY AND RUSSIA: A TALE OF TWO IDENTITIES

The Development of National Consciousness in the Napoleonic Era

Written by:

Clayton E. Marsh

Wittenberg University Class of 2019 HONR 499-1W: “Honors Thesis”

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Timothy A. Bennett Second Reader: Dr. Lila W. Zaharkov Third Reader: Dr. Christian A. Raffensperger

Submitted on: 04/09/2019 Defended on: 04/15/2019 Revised and resubmitted on: 05/02/2019 Page 2 of 50

Contents

Thesis Question and Abstract…...... 3

Introduction...... 4

I. Understanding the “We” and “They:” Cultural and National Identity …...... 5

II. A Tale of Two Identities: Germany and Russia …...... 7

III. Enlightenment, Revolution, and the Invocation of Nationalism Within the West …...... 8

IV. Fichte and the Primary Struggle for the German Language, Reformed Education, and National Religious Fervor …...... 12

V. Hegel: “Right” as Law and the Actualization of the Individual …...... 15

VI. Henrick von Sybel: The Division of North and South, and the Projection of National Unity Amid the Dueling Austrian-Prussian Hegemonies …...... 17

VII. Pestel, Karamzin, and the Ideal of Naradnost’ [народность] …...... 22

VIII. The Slavophiles, and the Idea of Eurasianism …...... 26

IX. Raeff: The Decembrists, and Vision for Westernization …...... 29

X. Kant: The Premise of National Unity as the Union of Peoples …...... 32

XI. Spring of Hope, Winter of Despair: The Ultimate Expression of the 'Nation' and Its Consequences in the Modern Age …...... 35

XII. Tolz: Theories of Nationalism and Their Application to the Russian Case …...... 37

XIII. Harold James: The Building Blocks of German National Identity …...... 38

XIV. Gauland: 'Die Goethe Zeit' and the Debate of German Identity in the Post-Modern Era ….. 40

XV. Putin: The Annexation of Crimea and the Expression of Russia's Shared Identity …...... 42

XVI. Concluding Reflections …...... 44

Bibliography …...... 45 Page 3 of 50

Thesis Question and Abstract

In understanding the causes of the concurrent development of national identity in Germany and

Russia in the early 19th century, how can we better comprehend this development and its effect on our perception of national identity, nationalism, and national self-consciousness in the post-modern era?

National political identity is a term often used to describe the codification of the cultural ethos, colloquial narrative, and collective vision of a people living within, but not exclusive to, a particular geographic sphere. Understanding this definition of national political identity and its role in the social construct of the modern “nation-state” is vital in gaining a deeper understanding of both the peoples and polities that have governed the modern age, and continue to direct its course. Moreover, compre- hending the ideological origins of such national political identities, and the historical continuum upon which they waned or thrived, are of paramount importance to any serious study of post-modern society.

One extraordinary example is the concurrent development of nationalism in both Germany and Russia within the early 19th century. While it may appear to have evolved internally and without external in- fluence, the sociopolitical discourse regarding national self-identification within both Germany and

Russia was consistently dominated by the persistent effects of Napoleon's France; likewise, the similar- ities and differences regarding religious, linguistic, and political national prerequisites between the Ger- man and Russian national consciousness provide pivotal insight into the cultural context of a national political disposition. Page 4 of 50

There will never be a fixed political state of things in this country till we have a corps of teachers instructed on established principles. So long as the people are not taught from their earliest years, whether they ought to be Republicans or Royalists, Christians or Infidels, the state cannot properly be called a nation, for it must rest on a foundation which is vague and uncertain, and it will be forever exposed to disorders and fluctuations.

– Napoleon Bonaparte, from Breed's Opinions

Introduction

Each morning, millions of school children across America stand, face their flag, place their right hand over their hearts, and recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In so doing, an interesting idea of “nation” as expressed in the concept of a Republic with principles of Liberty and Justice “for all,” is subtly conveyed by the memorization of words and phrases. This heartwarming spectacle of patriotism encourages one to question why the people of any country would engage in this sort of behavior, teaching even its youngest citizens to see themselves as members of a social order defined by philosophical ideals, engendered in language and inspired through culture. One might glean insights from the threshing floor of history as to why people, from patriarchs to plebeians, are willing to pledge their lives and fortunes to preserve, uphold, and defend their “nations,” even when geographical boundaries shift, political allegiances shuffle, and revolutionary movements shake the very foundations of civilized society which govern the rule of law.

One might ask what inspires such national consciousness among citizens, even when suppressed through revolt, or challenged by revolution. What specific elements within language and culture have motivated this national sense of “we” and “they,” creating such expanded ideological platforms for the development of national identity? Indeed, as one attempts to discern these elements, the value of historical, linguistic and cultural proficiency cannot be underestimated: this idea of national consciousness is most keenly appreciated when studied apart from one's own native tongue. As such, Page 5 of 50 the historical, linguistic, and cultural proficiency in studying a nation other than one's own is also relevant and, in my view, vital to begin any worthy analysis of this subject matter. Thus, to better understand the concurrent development of German and Russian nationalism, this progression – from

“State” to “Nation” – can be keenly observed throughout the Napoleonic era; moreover, it can be traced from and deduced to an identification of the individual “self” to that of the national “self” via the implementation of a national unifying idea. Within both Germany and Russia, this “nation- identity” can be diverse and circumstantial, and yet, oddly synergistic—appearing suddenly in the wake of war, yet also developing gradually through social progress. Many scholars have discussed the impact of nationalism, and analyzed the political policies and historical events surrounding social evolution and what exactly constitutes this identity—specifically how it is defined, are addressed.

Furthermore, with the recent debates over mass-immigration to the European Union, and the Russian annexation of the Crimea, the study of national consciousness in these nations present a particular post- modern relevance.

I. Understanding the “We” and “They:” Cultural and National Identity

The term “identity,” as etymologically defined, was first introduced as a medieval Latin term identitatem [ “sameness”] from the Latin root idem [same], that later appeared as a 14th century French term identite [sameness], and used in the 16th century to describe “...sameness, oneness, or the state of being the same.”1 Simply put in modern terms, “identity” describes the characteristics determining who or what a person or thing is; as such, it is, by origin, an idea specific to the study of Philosophy

[Metaphysics], which seeks to probe the nature of existence and being.2 The concept of “identity” gained notoriety after Rene Descartes' declaration of the autonomy of self,3 followed thereafter by John

Locke, in his memory theory of personal identity, in which he asserts that memory is a necessary and 1 According to the Etymological Dictionary, the English term idemptitie (c1560) is also derived from Medieval Latin idemptitas. https://www.etymonline.com/ 2 The branch of philosophy, formally introduced by Aristotle as “the first philosophy,” examining the fundamental nature of reality including the relationship between mind and matter, between substance and attribute, and between possibility and actuality. The science of things transcending what is physical or natural. 3 Rene Descartes. “Meditation VI” Meditations on the First Philosophy (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996), 322- 323 Page 6 of 50 sufficient condition of self and personal identity.4

The national identity of a given people is as diverse as it is circumstantial. As various events have an impact upon the host culture of a given nationality, the identity of those living with said nationality will undergo a shift—be it for, or against, a national unification. With the idea of “nation” being so vital to personal identity, and a means to further ideals that one may deem to be greater than one’s self, the tendency to view national identity as a definite, self-evident, and constant force within societies is certainly a common error in the post-modern context. The viewing of the “nation” as one’s own people, homeland, and religious ideal or economic union can often be a mere mirage to the actual source of the national identity. While it is possible for a national bond to develop organically through the inclination of the host culture, it can also be manufactured via language, literature, and education.

As the national ideal is one that is taught to the individual citizen, it can be manipulated within various communicative agents. 5 For instance, the political theorist Miroslav Hroch6 put forward the notion the a “national consciousness” was developed in a citizen's understanding as a “member” of the nation—a part of a whole.7 Similarly, as the national consciousness is a “member” identification, the relationships between the various parts of the nation express a national identity; likewise, in the expression of this collective understanding, a nationalist sentiment is formed.8 Contrasting the idea of a “spirit” awakening of the national consciousness, Hroch fostered a notion of the national-self as an identification as a member in a civil bond of cooperation with the other parts.9

Any meaningful discussion regarding the development of the post-modern “nation state” must begin by addressing the philosophical origin of what makes society possible amid such a contentious

4 Ryan A. Piccarillo, “The Lockean Memory Theory of Personal Identity: Definition, Objection, Response.” Inquiries Journal, 2010, Vol 2, No 08, 1-1. http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1683/the-lockean-memory-theory-of- personal-identity-definition-objection-response 5 By “agents,” I mean national institutions: national education, newspapers, trade unions, a national bank and the like. 6 Miroslav Hroch (b. 1932) is a Czech historian focusing on national identity and comparative national political study. Famed for his “three phase” theory, in which the phases of A, B, and C, represent the national development from nation- state foundation through initial activism, multi-cultural incorporation, and mass movement. 7 Miroslav Hroch. Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 12. 8 Ibid., 11. 9 Ibid., 13. Hroch would further assert that a “patriot” was not one who has a “national awakening,” but rather one who more easily/readily accepts his/her national membership—and identifies as a part. Page 7 of 50 history of squabbling clans and tribal factions.10 Prior to the Enlightenment, philosophers roundly agreed that certain social conditions were necessary11 to promote the formation of government,12 so as to encourage reciprocity between individual citizens13 and more clearly identify the cultural ethos14 emergent within society15 that allows for the inception of nation-states.16 Thus, when evident cultural bonds existed, this collective unity could express itself through the inception of a legal construct or code.17 Yet, the Enlightenment philosophers challenged and “refreshed” these earlier antiquated ideals, starting from the theoretical notion of nation and identity as a social “contract,” – the unseen instrument in which cultural identity is firmly rooted, and upon which national identity is legitimized.

II. A Tale of Two Identities: Germany and Russia 10 Aristotle, Politics (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996), 446. When Aristotle exclaimed, “ Man is a social animal,” he strongly suggests that authentic human interaction is possible only when others are present, and conflict [two or more positions] exist discordantly, or opposed. In translations, the terms “social” and “political” are often interchanged. 11 Ibid., 445. Likewise, in order to legitimize such social interaction, Aristotle strongly suggests that a collective understanding(conditions) must be reached wherein rules and boundaries exist, place and rights are clearly defined, and a legal system is developed to ensure this order is maintained. By asserting that “...Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good.....” he postulates that the notion that “state” is a form of regulated society. 12 Ibid., 446-447. “...the state is made up of households...” In its most primitive form, Aristotle relates this collective understanding as that of a household: therein, an authority is supplied by a patriarchal elder, and one’s place in society was determined by kinship; thus, any notion of duty to the collective was, in fact, a straightforward sense of familial obligation to provide for kin. 13 Ibid., 446. “...the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state...” As such, this “first state” was wholly defined as an extension of nuclear family. As societies grew in number, the ties of kinship were gradually disconnected through varying degrees of separation, eventually reaching the ethical dissolution of the “family- state.” 14 Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996, pp. 367) 15 Plato, The Republic (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996), 317-321. “...Then we [the state in question] must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient...” In this statement, the notion of the “state original” as a simple economic circle of kinship ties manifests in a more complex social order, as many of the inhabitants are not united by kin. Hence, societal development progresses beyond family, and into a code of social understanding—allowing the state to grow. 16 Ibid., 346. Furthermore, Plato invoked the concept of a “Basic-State” in which the essential needs of people were met as every member of a city possessed a different occupation—thereby producing different goods. In this setting, the collective understanding was no longer rooted in kinship, but rather, in an economic union to meet the needs of one’s collective people (those living within the local economic circle). As the state expands, becoming more complex, it begins to invite goods beyond the scope of fulfilling mere basic needs: as such, a primitive sense of cultural identity expresses itself through art, poetry, music, soldiery, and, above all else, writing. Hence, the state -- not the individual clan or family cabal -- births a sense of identity beyond the economic union, and is united in the maintenance, defense, and propagation of its own culture; Plato would later identify this concept as the “luxurious state” which, in its purest form, manifests in the Republic, itself. 17 Cicero, De Legibus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 322-323. “..Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists in man and God, the first common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must believe that men have Law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share Law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth...” Here, the Roman orator Cicero would distill the cultural ethos of a people into the construct of the law, viewing it as the highest form of collective understanding. Page 8 of 50 Often seen as disconnected from the rest of Europe, the Russian Empire’s position during the

Napoleonic onslaught in 1812 was rather ambiguous as a uniquely “Eurasian” power. Pulling Russia away from its former “land of the Rus’,” Alexander I firmly believed that the “…liberties of Europe and its concomitant system of order required the participation of an empire far larger than the rest.”18

Further, Alexander’s empire would serve as an example of strength, and prove vital to the balance of power set forth in the Congress of Vienna (1814).19 Long dueling amongst itself as a coalition of fragmented States, the Germans were too weak to be an effective presence in central Europe. Often being viewed as more of a “buffer” between the Eastern and Western European powers (namely, France and Russia), Germany was a vital “peacekeeper” following the expulsion of Napoleon, and the

Congress of Vienna in 1814.20 As such, with the “peace of Westphalia” instituted [1648], the Congress of Vienna set and defined the European equilibrium of power; however, with the unification of the

German Empire in 1871, Germany became the most powerful industrial nation in Europe—destroying this Westphalian equilibrium, and initiating the social turbulence that would eventually culminate in the conditions ripe for “World War.” Consequently, these fundamentally different peoples, with unique circumstances surrounding the development of their respective national ideals, the national identity in both Germany and Russia possess a different understanding, while still preserving certain common elements.

III. Enlightenment, Revolution, and the Invocation of Nationalism Within the West

As the Enlightenment began to have an impact on political discussion, writers such as Rousseau began to define the state as a collective/social contract between various members for mutual advantage.21 This goal of collective partnership was enforced and manifested in common law.

18 Henry Kissinger. “The European Balance-of-Power System and its End” World Order. (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 49. 19 Ibid., 61. 20 Ibid., 64. 21 Jean Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996), 391. “The sum of forces [collective will] can arise only where several persons some together; but, as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself?...This is the fundamental of which the Social Contract provides a solution.” In this statement, the social contract is an agreement whereby the individual interests of each citizen are ceded to the collective interest of Page 9 of 50 Furthered still by the French political theorist Montesquieu, the state became hyper-secularized to a point that kinship bonds, or even religion, cease to bear any relevance to the union of this collective understanding [code of civil law]; as so illustrated, the collective unity of the people is derived from a sense of the contract “us.”22 Hence, a more comprehensive understanding of the notion of “nation,”-- as the institutionalized manifestation of a collective union between members, in which the citizen is a part, -- renewed an ancient concept while demanding that it become ideologically flexible enough to tolerate the ebb-and-flow of a rapidly changing social, economic and cultural environment. While

Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau and Montesquieu challenged earlier implacable applications of

Cicero’s notion of state, they understood that human societal interaction, and the fundamental notion of self to society remain constant: national identity is one of self in relation to the collective ideal, honed as the economic, social, and cultural contract of “us,” visible through the codification of a system of law, yet inherent in the turbulence of political expression . Such defines the “nation-state.” Similar to

Hroch's understanding, the nation is identification as a “member” of the nation in a relationship between citizens one-to-another.23 Noted sociologist Herbert Fisher emphasizes the significance of this idea as it relates to the origins of nationalism within a uniquely “Napoleonic” Europe:

The working faith of the best men of the French Revolution was the legacy of the eighteenth-century philosophy, belief in scientific progress, in growing material comfort, in natural rights, in religious toleration, and in the ultimate triumph of good sense throughout the world. It was a philosophy which took little heed of the various temperaments and idiosyncrasies of men or nations, regarding humanity as something homogeneous through place and time, capable of being nourished by the same food and rescued by the same medicines. It paid scant attention to historical conditions, believing that in politics, as in physics, there was a mathematical art of discovery and scientific certainty of truth…Napoleon brought France to the world.24

With Napoleon’s invasion of Germany from 1803-1807, the collision of much more than

the State. From this idea, the notion of legal structures and governmental institutions as a definition of collective will manifest in a visible, institutional, expression of society—the State. 22 Charles Montesquieu. The Spirit of Laws (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996), 266-268. The connection of legal codes with social relations is stressed as a primary cultural identifier as it is what defines the boundaries of civic responsibility. Beginning with the Roman “Twelve Tables,” he notes that laws were commonly taught to children as a means of literacy education amid civic context. Hence, the civic identity of an individual is manifested in civil law. 23 Miroslav Hroch. Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 12-13. 24 Herbert Fisher. Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 374. Page 10 of 50 armies manifested amid the chaos of war. In addition to force of arms, the French extended their ideas, thoughts, and fashions within the realm of politics in order to impose its values upon its neighbors; furthermore, in the extension of such political shifts, the previous governing social structure of the aristocracy ceased to exist, preferring the place of State as a mediator between social and civil relations

—including divorce, marriage, and the right to take up trades.25 Initially seeing Germany as a fragmented cultural polity divided along ecclesiastical boundaries [Catholic and Protestant], Napoleon boldly asserted the notion that, “…we [the French] should have to create it [the Germanic national body] expressly for our convenience….”26 From this statement, the French viewed Germany as somewhat of a sociopolitical “fossil” during the Enlightenment, rendering the German polity weak and in need of sociopolitical reform (particularly in the introduction of a civil law code). Reducing the number of German states by half in the absorption of the ecclesiastical principalities in 1803, Napoleon had begun to put his political reformations into place in the destruction of the old societal spheres.27 In fact, of the three ecclesiastical Electors, only one survived, and even still was transplanted from Mainz to Ratisbon; likewise, of the fifty-two free towns that existed before, only six would remain post- campaign: Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Frankfurt, Augsburg, and Nuremburg.28 With the Diet of

Princes so depleted, and with the Protestant states gaining a majority representation, both the destruction of the ecclesiastical apparatus and the Austrian hegemony had been effected by Napoleon’s occupation. Moving in to engage the remnant of the Holy Roman Empire, the war against Austria began with a royal marriage of Napoleon’s stepson, Eugene, to the eldest daughter of the Elector of

Bavaria, Augusta –thus depriving Austria of her most powerful remaining ally. In so doing, the abdication of Francis II in 1805 was rendered inevitable, and the Holy Roman Empire was at an end.29

25 Ibid., 1. “...The collision between France and Germany during the revolutionary and Napoleonic age was far more than a shock of arms. It involved an attempt on the part of France to complete and extend the domination of her sentiment and her logic, of her lightest fashions and deepest thoughts, and above all of her most solid contrivances in the realm of politics. In this process the political map of Germany was transfigured, and the old ideas that ruled the small German principalities went suddenly, painfully, and shamefully bankrupt...” 26 Ibid., 30-31. Here Napoleon I is answering the First German Revolution at Rastadt in 1797, wherein, the Austria abandoned Prussia. The Prussians had done the same in 1795. 27 Ibid., 43. 28 Ibid., 43-44. 29 Ibid., 96, 122-123. Page 11 of 50 Out of the states from the former empire, the Confederation of the Rhine was established as an auxiliary state to the French, including the adoption of France’s civil law code, and the establishment of conscription.30 The south securely in his reach, Napoleon then turned his attention to Prussia (the

North German hegemon) by waging war in 1806; however, due to Prussia’s atypical sloppiness in the organizing of her forces, and the Austrian defeat at Austerlitz (1805), the Prussians were forced to negotiate, and so, Napoleon formed the Northern league under Prussian hegemony to govern at a regional level, provided that the supremacy of France was understood and respected.31 Following this event, Napoleon had Germany under his control; however, the Russians continued to be a formidable threat, as well as the possibility of an Austro-Prussian uprising should the French army leave to invade

Poland. Dividing his forces into partially German, and partially French corps, Napoleon was able to maintain a large occupation force in Germany when he launched his campaign into Poland in 1807.

With the Russian defeat at Friedland (June, 1807), the treaties of Tilsit were signed in secret on July 7th,

1807.32 This action removed Russia from the war and allowed Napoleon to refortify his position in central Europe. Hence, with Russia temporarily pacified, new political reforms could now be instituted throughout Germany. Fisher again reiterates the effects of these reforms thus:

The disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire and the formation of the new political federation excited in Germany the most lively regrets and expectations… the knights [Teutonic Knights] and the metalized nobles had lost their historic champion…the annihilation of an institution so old, so picturesque, so interwoven with the whole course of German history.33

While a constitution was being proposed for the Rhinish Confederation, Napoleon took little interest in it, as he was more forward in his military objectives; however, seeking to maintain control over the region, and to quell the Roman Catholic resistance of the Wittelbachs, 34 Napoleon gave local 30 Montgomery B. Gibbs. The Military Career of Napoleon the Great (Akron: The Werner Company, 1900), 65. 31 Herbert Fisher. Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 126-127. It should also be noted that the Prussian army (about 36,000 strong) did decide to engage the French occupying force of 200,000 men. The French army had been reinforced by the Rhinish Confederates by this point. 32 Carl von Clausewitz. The Campaign of 1812 in Russia. (Hattiesburg : Academic International, 1970), 10. Recalling the failed campaign of 1807, the Russian army was at a clear disadvantge by 1812. From the highest estimates at the time, the Russian force consisted a mere 180,000. Concervative estimates would place the French at 350,000. It should also be noted that many Rhrinish and Italian soldiers formed a key part of the French corps. 33 Herbert Fisher. Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 163. 34 Ruling Bavaria since 1180, the Wittelbach family was the dominant noble house in Bavaria. Located along the Paar river, the castle of Wittelbach was the seat of power in Bavaria until 1918. Hence, when one referred to the “Wittelbachs,” it was often in relating to the Bavarian nobility, as they were the primary authority on a local level. Page 12 of 50 autonomy to the princes. With the establishment of the constitution, and the papal concordat in 1808, and again in 1813, the influence of the Roman Catholic Church rapidly declined amid the sociopolitical pressure imposed by Napoleon’s campaign.35 Furthermore, with the Church pacified, the most powerful ideological rival to Napoleonic civil reforms was eliminated, and the constitutional law of the

“Rheinbund” was established.36 Fisher would continue in his analysis of these reforms in the civil law code with, “the legal profession [in Germany] now [1809] formed a distinct class, and the verdicts of amateur judges would fail to command confidence or respect….37” Likewise, the Enlightenment principles of Erastus [Erastianism]38 founded the ecclesiastical system of law, which was particularly characteristic of the Napoleonic era.39 However, in spite of all of these reforms, Napoleon’s regime imposed a heavy system of taxation. Before the Napoleonic occupation, taxes were relatively light, but under the French, these were increased by more than three times, and the local administrative deficit was likewise increased. Thus, when the German War for Liberation broke out in 1813, tax collectors and custom-houses were among the first and primary targets.40 These developments would eventually push the amendment of personal taxation systems to a property tax throughout the Grand-Duchy of

Frankfurt, as well as the introduction of the Civil Code.41

IV. Fichte and the Primary Struggle for the German Language, Reformed Education,

35 John Witte. Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 58-59. Here Witte reaffirms the notion that, in the adherence to the sacraments and Church Canon law, society had been centered in theological practice; however, as civil society progressed in the legal system, the Church laws declined in prominence. 36 Herbert Fisher. Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 172. 37 Ibid., 199. Likewise, when the code was translated 1809, aspects of German common law were incorporated. “The benefits of uniformity, speed, and publicity recommended these new codes.” (259). 38 Thomas Erastus (1524-1583) was a Zwinglian theologian and physician who professed the belief that the state should have all authority regarding civil punishments, thus removing the Church’s authority to withhold the sacraments. From this ideology, came “Erastianism,” wherein, religious tolerance was stressed, and the authority of the Church to punish offenders was limited. This principle would be supported by the French Civil Code with the state holding the sole right to dispense marriage licenses, as well presiding over divorce cases. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Erastus 39 Herbert Fisher. Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 211. 40 Ibid., 218-219, 291. Gradually, taxes were increased throughout the Kingdom of Westphalia to 13.75% from the previous 10%. This was too much for most Germans to pay, and complaints of the personal taxes were frequent. 41 John Witte. Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 45-46. Initially introduced on May 1st, 1810, the Civil Code was amended to accommodate common civil law in 1811. Evolving from the premise of “Roman Law” in the medieval period, the civil law codes shifted the legal profession into a system of legal reference (precedent) and juridical opinion by the late Enlightenment. Page 13 of 50 and National Religious Fervor

In Germany, works such as Reden an der Deutsche Nation (Fichte), Geist der Zeit (Arndt), or excerpts of the minutes of the Frankfurt Parliament, reveal the reactionary manifestation of German nationalism to French revolutionary ideals as a means of cultural identification through the context and use of the German language; similarly, works such as Christenheit oder Europa? (Novalis), and the formation of the Frankfurt Parliament clearly displays both the theological tension between the German

Catholic and German Protestant communities, as well as the political struggle arising from the contentious debate of Prussian and Austrian hegemony.

Addressing the issue of national identity amid the onslaught of the Napoleonic Wars, Johann

Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) called for the reformation of the German states into a single nation, as a people united in a common cause with a common purpose. In this address, the German national movement was given new life at the time of publication in 1808. Beginning his first address with the theme of “national identity,” Fichte believed that the German people had to first identify as one people before a national ideal could be achieved,42 as such, the fragmented German population, beginning with the foregoing of divisions between the many fiefdoms. Once the people identified as the same people, a national idea of self-to-nation could be achieved. Following the unification of the people, a reformation of the national system of education was necessary.43 Centering on the notion of the

“original language,” Fichte claimed that the German people were distinct in their linguistic tradition because they alone preserve the German language in its “original” form, while other Germanic peoples

(such as the Swedes, English, or Danes) fused the German language to another host language—tainting the language “original.”44 Hence, according to Fichte, the German people defined in the German national ideal were those who spoke German. In this reasoning, if one spoke German as their native language, one was German; as such, the people of the proposed national identity were defined and distinguished from the other European peoples. One primary example of this language “original” is in

42 Gottlieb Fichte. Addresses to the German Nation (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), 3-4. 43 Ibid., 12-14. 44 Ibid., 55. Page 14 of 50 the term for “idea” itself, as Idee in German borrows from the Greek ιδέα; however, in German, the term Gesicht meaning “vision” also conveys this same notion.45 In such understanding, the German language possesses a unique sense of organic identity, passing this sense on to its speakers. Thus,

“...where a people have a living language, mental culture influences life, where the contrary is the case, mental culture and life go their way independently of each other…”46 In this way, German identity is defined within the parameters of the German language, and cannot exist without it. In his Fourth

Address, Fichte utilized language as the defining characteristic of the German people, as distinct from other Teutonic races; furthermore, in his Sixth Address, Fichte sought to provide a historical basis for the “uniqueness” of the German people as one rooted in the “earnestness” of the German character in the manifestation of the Protestant Reformation, 47and the rise of the German burgher class.48

To further the process of a continued national identity, Fichte argued that a system of national education should be implemented to ensure the longevity of the national cause. For example, Fichte reasoned that as, “…all education aims at producing a stable, settled, and steadfast character, which no longer is developing, but is, and cannot be other than it is…,49” one must direct the “new” national education toward producing a national character. Likewise stating that, “…you (the developed

Germans) must fashion him (the developing German), and fashion him in such a way that he simply cannot, will otherwise than you wish him to will….50” In this understanding, Fichte articulated that, in

1808, future generations would preserve this national ideal that they had united under against

Napoleon. In the identification of German with “German,” the people of Germany were able to relate to a common sense of national self, and thereby, preserve this national identity via education. From this understanding, whether it be autocracy or democracy, foreign or domestic rule, war or peace, the

45 Ibid., 59. Modern scholarship would call this claim into question as the proto-Germanic root sekh is fused with a Dutch/German sicht; likewise, the Swedish sigt is derived from the same root. Hence, while it has a proto-Germanic root, many other Germanic languages maintain it in a modern form. The prefix gi however does come from ancient Germanic. 46 Ibid., 70. 47 Ibid., 98-100. This too was also used as a means of separating the Germanic character from Latin influence. As the papacy was still a powerful foreign rival to the “new” education, any and all separation from this Latinizing influence was to be used. 48 Ibid., 105-106. 49 Ibid., 20 50 Ibid., 21. Page 15 of 50 German national ideal would survive. Hence, as “…the root of all morality is self-possession, self- control, and the subordination of the selfish instincts to the idea of the community,...,”51 the goal of a citizen’s development was the placing of self in service of society; thus, society was now defined within the eternal ideal of the nation. Similarly, as the German people had been traditionally split into many separate States, the presence of literature was rendered of greater importance due to the propagation of the German language and culture as a common unifying ethos for the nation. Thereby, to develop, maintain, and propagate this national ideal in the “new” education of the developing citizen, the national “…forefathers unite themselves with these addresses, and make a solemn appeal to you….”52 In addition to the fostering of national identity in the “new” education, the theological principles of Martin Luther would likewise prove influential in the establishment of educational institutions. Believing that children should be educated, and that the State should be given this responsibility, the German system of education truly began with Luther's theology on education.53

Further describing that nature of the “new” education in his Third Address, the topic of spirituality and the nature of God was more clearly related to the national ideal. Asserting that, “… education to true religion is, therefore, the final task of the new education…,”54 Fichte regarded religion as a means for collective identity, and breaking away from what was purely individual. As the primary goal of religion was to regulate life, and in turn, a regulated life was to produce a well-ordered society, the preservation of the national ideal could not be definitely sustained without a spiritual focus in the “new” national education; likewise, in the establishment of order in society, the economic, social, and ideological bonds of a people were strengthened.55 Therefore, Fichte concluded that, “…religion is simply knowledge…,”56 and such knowledge must be taught and directed to support the national ideal.

Likewise, as stated in his Eighth Address, “…then, too, it must be love of fatherland that governs the

51 Ibid., 171. 52 Ibid., 264. 53 John Witte. Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 270-274. 54 Gottlieb Fichte. Addresses to the German Nation (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), 38. 55 Ibid., 39. Here Fichte introduces the notion of “true morality” as the ideal goal of a well-order society. Reasoning that, if society is in its ideal state, the use for religion is merely the institutional expression of the already present moral ethos. 56 Ibid., 39. Page 16 of 50 State by placing before it a higher object than the usual one of maintaining internal peace, property, personal freedom, and the life and well-being of all….”57 Therefore, when called to force of arms, the

State must inspire a God-willed purpose, thereby believing in what is eternal. Furthering this notion,

Fichte asserted that the “new” education of the German nation must be directed to inspire such a devotion, and love for the fatherland was to be revered as something eternal. In this way, the German national bond of language, culture, history, and the union of the German people was to be considered sacred by the developing citizen. To continue the preservation of the German national ideal, the preservation of literature must be in place; by encouraging this preservation, the language, cultural ethos, and historical viewpoint of the nation’s people would be saved.58

Therefore, the German national identity, as suggested by Fichte, is a product of the “new” education of the developing citizen in the unification of self to the national ideal of the eternal “God- willed” call to form a well-ordered community as defined within its language and literature, demanding the full and eternal devotion of its people.

V. Hegel: “Right” as Law and the Actualization of the Individual

A man actualizes himself only in becoming something definite, something specifically particularized.59

Philosopher and nationalist Georg Hegel60asserted that the individual was meant to be a member of a social unit, and as such, found purpose in the collective relation of himself/herself to the social structure around him/her. Rendering each as part of a whole, he/she is likewise rendered a particular part of something more complex—a higher, more collective, understanding. Without such understanding, the individual is alone; furthermore, in this solitude, the individual is separated from a sense of purpose. Hence, the notion of the collective will is comprised of the individual wills of its 57 Ibid., 139-140. 58 Ibid., 215-216. 59 Georg Hegel. The Philosophy of Right (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996), 72. 60 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a German philosopher, nationalist, and rationalist. Furthering the ideas of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, Hegel was impacted by the principles of Christianity. Seeking to reconcile the reasoning of the Enlightenment, and principles of Christianity, and the events and shaping of his time, Hegel grappled with the “infinite” which eventually led to his problem with Kantianism. His philosophy is often referred to as “Hegelian.” Page 17 of 50 people. Furthering the notion of society to include the administration of justice, and a subsequent understanding of “right,” the civil society of the “State” is formed. As such, deriving each person's individual identity from the collective sense of “rightness,” the interpretation of law serves as the primary guide for a more complete definition of society's parameters. Stating thus:

The principle of rightness becomes the law (Gesetz) when, in its objective existence, it is posited (gesetzt)...the right becomes positive law in general.61

Centering the collective unity of society on the law, as an expression of “rightness,” the national ideal of the individual members is likewise centered in the common understanding of justice as manifest in the law; furthermore, the institutional framework by which this collective understanding is conveyed may likewise be constructed in the “State.” As notions of “right” and “wrong” are heavily dependent on the cultural persuasion of the populace, the law is similarly an expression of the culture, language, and literature of the people. Thus, the national political identity of a people is derived from a common purpose through a particularization of “rightness” as an individual member of the collective – that is the State, manifest in a civil relationship called “nation.”62

Similarly, in the maintenance of the nation, Hegel reaffirmed the notion that a national system of education for the purpose of instilling the national ideal to children must be established if said nation is to survive. Communicating the national ideal as in a household, the State apparatus becomes a kind of communicator for the collective will of the people, as a result, the national sentiment of future generations can be determined in the teachings of the national educational apparatus. Hence, whatever is taught as the national ideal, the collective will should be defined as such; likewise, in the defining of the collective will, the individual purpose of each citizen is defined in the particularization of their purpose in the support and maintenance of the collective will of the nation.63 Defining the State as the

“..actuality of the ethical idea...,” Hegel further claimed that it [the State] must be absolutely rational, as the national ideal, and, likewise, its relation to the individual citizens is a product of reason. As such, in this notion, the State is categorized in “immediate actuality,” “international relation,” and

61 Georg Hegel. The Philosophy of Right (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996), 73. 62 Ibid., 74-75. 63 Ibid., 80. Page 18 of 50 “genus [process of World History].”64 In these relational categories, the individual consciousness of each citizen would be able to relate to each other via the connection to the cultural ethic's relation to itself, others, and its origin in the world. Following from this principle, Hegel defines the scope of the nation in three distinct “powers:” 1.) the power to determine the universal [Legislature], 2.) the power to subsume cases [Executive], 3.) the power of subjectivity in ultimate decision [the Crown].65

In these definitions and clarifications, Hegel arrived at the ultimate goal of his reasoning—the defining principle of the Germanic peoples. Expressed as the pinnacle of human development and self- consciousness, the individual, when united in reason with the collective [the “divine” nature of humanity] – , is made manifest in national political identity – thereby, forming German identity.66

VI. Henrick von Sybel: the Division of North and South and the Projection of National

Unity Amid the Dueling Austrian-Prussian Hegemonies

In the very earliest times, there seems to have been among the Germans no trace of a national consciousness…they break up into their component elements or unite for the time…just as circumstances may require 67

Initially beginning from the standpoint of the Holy Roman Empire, Henrick von Sybel68 affirmed that the Carolingian cultural sphere held the German duchies together in a mutual peace during the medieval period; likewise, the Roman Church served as a vital intermediary for this cultural cooperation.69 With the division of the Holy Roman Empire in 1517 along theological lines, the rift

64 Ibid., 86. 65 Ibid., 94. 66 Ibid., 118. “...This is the absolute turning point; mind rises out of its situation and grasps the infinite positivity of this inward character...it grasps the principle of the unity of the divine nature and the human, the reconciliation of objective truth and of freedom as the truth and freedom appearing within self-consciousness and subjectivity, a reconciliation with the fulfillment of which the principle of the north, the principle of the Germanic peoples, has been entrusted...” 67 Henrick von Sybel. The Founding of the German Empire by Wilhelm I (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 3. 68 Henrick von Sybel (1817-1895) was German historian from Westphalia. Serving in the Prussian lower House from 1862-1864, and again 1874-1880, he distrusted the liberal movements of the socialists, and opposed Bismarck’s foreign policies; however, in 1875, he was appointed as the head of the Prussian archives. Using many classified sources in his series The Founding of the German Empire, he draws from many voices within Prussian affairs and serves as a vital resource for discussions of German unification. 69 Henrick von Sybel. The Founding of the German Empire by Wilhelm I (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 5-6. Similarly, John Witte in his Law and Protestantism affirmed the theological fostering of civil society throughout the German nation. Often in judicial proceedings, justifications, or legal sources, the teachings of Luther would be related to the adjudication of a civil matter—not least among them being the doctrines of sola Scriptora and the premise of natural law. John Witte. Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 172-173. Page 19 of 50 between the Northern and Southern German States was strengthened, in terms of religion, politics, and culture. As the “low” Germans of the North held to the Protestant belief, they were separated from the

Papacy and the theological influence of Rome; thus, states such as Bavaria could not properly identify with the Northern states of Prussia, “low” Saxony, Mecklenburg, or Pomerania, rather sharing a closer connection to Austria, Swabia, or even Transylvania and Hungary.70 Later, this would manifest in a division of currency with the East Bavarian Mark (eventually being adopted into the Austrian Mark) becoming a regional currency within the Austrian Empire and the Papal State. As the Germanic polity grew more disconnected, “…constant dangers, both internal and external, forced large colonial territories to hold together, and to organize a stronger central government….”71 From this understanding, a 'dueling hegemony' of Austrian and Prussian influence created a sense of centrality in the German States from their respective localities. Likewise, from the division of the North and South,

Germany had been divided effectively into different sub-polities, making up the bulwark of central

Europe.

By Napoleon’s invasion in 1803, Germany was experiencing a “radical individualism” rising from the constant self-interest of the various States.72 In the words of Sybel, “…nothing was more serviceable for him [Napoleon] in this career than the fact that Germany was divided into small

States….73 In this way, the French were able to occupy the territories of the Rhineland. Smashing the

Austro-Russian alliance at Austerlitz in 1805, the Rhinish Confederation was initially praised for its state reforms, social progresses, and promise of peace. “…The noblest men raved for a time over its high-sounding manifestos, over the inalienable rights of man, over Liberty and Equality, and the fraternization of all nations…”.74

Further pressing the issue of North and South, Sybel asserts that because of the Napoleonic reconstruction of the government(s) in Germany, cultural identities continued to grow apart. With the

70 Henrick von Sybel. The Founding of the German Empire by Wilhelm I (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968),121-124. 71 Ibid., 8. 72 Ibid., 13-14. 73 Ibid., 28. 74 Ibid., 28. Page 20 of 50 Southern German States maintaining their aristocratic rulers (such as the Wittelbachs in Bavaria), and the “old traditions and customs” continued to govern without much interference. Yet, in the North, things were very different. As France annexed the left bank of the Rhine, Bonaparte ruled as prince in

Westphalia and Berg; likewise, Oldenburg, Hanover, and most of the Hanse towns fell under the direct control of the French.75 Inciting hatred among their subjects, the French were laying the groundwork for the German War for Liberation in 1813, but before the Northern and Southern spheres could unite, little could be done.76 As tension began to build, clear and confident voices, like Fichte’s, further stirred a national sentiment of “Germanness” as a means of eliminating the French occupying force, resulting in a desired spirit of reunification with the idea of independence and empire.77 Another prominent nationalist, Ernst Moritz Arndt78 also expressed similar sentiments when he enthusiastically affirmed,

“Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein, so weit die deutsche Zunge klingt.” 79 Concluding that neither

Prussia nor Austria could match the French “oppressor,” the desire for a unified nation of the Germanic polity began to express itself in order to defeat Napoleon. Germany required a unification, and its scope would be expressed in those who spoke the German language.

With many young men returning from the war and entering higher education at the Universities, student societies known as the “Burschenschaften” began to rise in prominence due to their vocal indignation regarding the Diet’s division on the matter of national unification, as well as the French occupation.80 Setting themselves to the training of new generations, these students would be the heirs

75 Ibid., 29-31. “...There was much suffering in Prussia…the country was desolated, impoverished, burdened with exorbitant war-contributions…encumbered with French garrisons...” 76 Ibid., 31. “...The reestablishment of Germany depended in every way upon Austria and Prussia. Everything turned on what position these Powers would take in reference to their great task....” 77 Ibid., 28. “...The Fraternization of Nations become a pretext for a war....” 78 Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860) was a Professor of History at the University of Geifswald, a nationalist poet, and a leading figure in the “national awakening” of Germany during the Napoleonic era. Publishing his first work Geist der Zeit (Spirit of the Times) in 1808, he was an active member of the German political debate. A member of the National Assembly at Frankfurt (1848-1849), Arndt supported the offering of the crown to Wilhelm I of Prussia. A deeply religious man, most of his poetic work centered around religious themes and, while devoted to the German unification, he never lost his connection to the Lutheran Church. 79 Arndt is quoted in Henrick Sybel's The Founding of the German Empire by Wilhelm I (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 37. The translation would read “…The whole of Germany should be, so far as the German tongue [language] sounds.” 80 Ibid., 57. “…Young heroes returning from the war filled the universities with patriotic indignation…they sought to fill all the educated youth of Germany with their enthusiasm for unity, justice, and freedom…training the rising generation… Page 21 of 50 and patrons of Fichte’s “new national education.” As such, Academia became a kind of “oasis” for nationalist sentiment and gained a great deal of traction amid the chaos of the still looming war for independence.81 Likewise, following the assassination of the poet Kotzebue in 1819, the student movements were subjected to extreme investigation—often being denied permission to gather in groups at Prussian universities.82 Highly influenced by the ideals of the French Enlightenment, these students actively participated in the national debates for suffrage, representative government, education, and the rise of the economically independent middle-class.83 Returning from the Wars for

Liberation (1813-1817), most of the young men who fought against the French did not have a “cooling down” period following the war, but rather, they desired national unity and a government more in tune with the principles of the Enlightenment—such as the institution of democratically-elected officials, a constitution, and a firm code of laws.84 Similarly following from the Prussian ideology for national

German identity, the Prussian Law of 1818 established a customs system along the frontier which allowed for a financial incentive to submit to Prussian hegemony, while simultaneously balancing

Prussia’s financial deficit incurred by the tariff-union of Austria, Hanover, and Holstein.85 From these economic pressures, and due to the threat of a possible French re-incursion of military force, a common

German Confederate army was organized in 1821 from the various States.86 Thus, beginning with the nationalist protests of university students, a national economic equilibrium and a conscripted confederate army had been instituted—furthering the course toward national unification. Hence, from

Sybel’s perspective, German national identity is defined as those who speak German and manifested in the centralization of the economy via trade-unions/tariff agreements and the formation of a common

German army. With the establishment of a German Confederacy under the Prussians, Germans began to have an outlook of greater internal unity via a feudal patronage under Berlin’s centrality, but lacked

81 Ibid., 57-58. 82 Ibid., 60-61. 83 Frank Eyck. The Frankfurt Parliament 1848-1849 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968), 8-14. 84 John Witte. Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 44-45. From this understanding of discontentment, the shift from the regional judge (Schoffen) to the standardized national legal apparatus manifested as a result of civil law as fostered throughout Lutheran theology. 85 Henrick Sybel. The Founding of the German Empire by Wilhelm I (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 65. 86 Ibid., 70-71. Page 22 of 50 the national unity to be truly called one people. In the phrase “…Und dies Deutschland ware ein

Vaterland…,”87 the idea of Germany became more of a place than a national idea, and the identification of “German” was rendered as a resident of said geographical location rather than a citizen devoted to the furtherance of a national ideal. Regarding the national unity that manifested during the War for

Liberation in 1813, it was of little impact by the mid-1820’s. While Germany had made a greater inclination toward unity than ever before, it seemed as if the spirit of the war was largely forgotten.

Such was noted by Wilhelm I88, as he lamented, “...It gained by such sacrifices as the world had never seen before nor shall be repeated, but this is all forgotten now.…”89

From Sybel’s analysis of the period immediately following the war, one comes to the understanding that the unification of the German Empire did not happen in one great movement, but rather was a gradual process of national evolution. Moving beyond their loosely united, highly fractionalized polity of the Holy Roman Empire, the German States could now identify as a people in an ethno-cultural sense and had a definition as to the scope of “their” people in the German language; however, this sociopolitical, economic, and ideological unity, required to form the nation of the

German Empire, was still lacking.

With the French Third Revolution of 1830, a revived sense of national sentiment and a persisting concern of French invasion drove the German Confederacy and Southern States to debate the possibility of a National Congress; however, with the cultural, political, and theological division between the dueling German groups, this would not be a simple task. Eventually manifesting in the

Frankfurt Parliament from 1848-1849, issues regarding the formation of a monarchical hegemon manifested in the centrality of the city of Berlin; likewise, Austria, due to its gradual assimilation of other, non-Germanic, peoples (such as Italians, Hungarians, Czechs, and Slavs), the once old Austrian duchy had slowly dissolved from the German national sphere—henceforth being excluded from the

87 Ibid., 80. Translation: “…And this Germany would be a Fatherland…” 88 Wilhelm I (1797-1888), also known as Wilhelm Friedrich Ludwig, was King of Prussia from 1861 and German emperor from 1871. https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-I-emperor-of-Germany 89 Ibid., 78 Page 23 of 50 debate of national unification.90 This exclusion was an incredible step in the unification efforts as it made Prussia the undisputed hegemon for the National Assembly and severely weakened the Southern sub-polity, as only Bavaria remained as a reasonably powerful Catholic state, and an influential force.

From this gradual shift from South to North, the centrality of Berlin, the exclusion of Austria, and the national unifying efforts post-1830, the political situation looked ripe for the German unification under Wilhelm I—eventually manifesting in 1871 due to the diplomatic influence of

Bismarck. In this unification, the German people found their identity as tied to those states that were undisputedly “German,” and focused on Berlin as the main sociopolitical and cultural center. Thus, the

German national ideal of the unification of the German peoples, and the establishment of a singular institutional expression of such unity, developed into the German Empire.

VII. Pestel, Karamzin, and the Ideal of Naradnost’ [народность]

In Russia, works such as the drafted Russkaya Pravda (Pestel91), History of the Russian State

(Karamzin92) and On Censorship (Nicholas I93) clearly illustrate the complex transition from “empire” to “nation,” expressing the acute dichotomy between the pomp of constitutional monarchy (Alexander

I94) and the tradition of Orthodox Russophilia (Nicholas I); furthermore, the unique Russian ideal of narodnost' [народность] provides a crucial pivot in the Russian discourse of ethno-political identity and pan-Slavism, from the older imperial ideal of multicultural polity toward the modern national ideal of the mono-cultural state.

Expressed in works such as his Russian Truth, the political activist and liberal idealist Pavel

Pestel sought to clarify the truth of Russian national development, and its relation to the Russian people

90 Frank Eyck. The Frankfurt Parliament: 1848-1849. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 39. 91 Pavel Ivonovich Pastel (1793-1826) was a Russian military officer and leader in the Decembrist Movement. Russkaya Pravda (1824; “Russian Truth”) was his plan for the socioeconomic and political transformation of Russia which called for the execution of the imperial family, the emancipation of the serfs, the replacement of the tsarist autocracy by a republican form of government, and the allotment of land o the freed serfs. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pavel-Ivanovich-Pestel 92 Nickolay Mikhaylovich Karamzin (1766-1866) was a Russian poet, historian, and journalist, first attempted to codify the Russian language as a way to invite serious study of Russian culture and history. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nikolay-Mikhaylovich-Karamzin 93 Nicholas I [Nicholay Pavlovich] (1796-1855) was Emperor (Tsar) of Russia during the turbulent period of the Decembrist revolt. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nicholas-I-tsar-of-Russia 94 Alexander I [Alexandr Pavlovich] (1777-1825) was Emperor (Tsar) of Russia, political and legal reformer. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexander-I-emperor-of-Russia Page 24 of 50 and Russian culture. Beginning from the point of nationality (narodnost’), Pestel addressed the cultural understanding of kinship, and geographical ties to a nation’s people. As the Russian Empire was vast in territory, and multi-cultural in its population, Pestel described the Russian national question as unique: this point is significant due to the identification of self with a collective sense of “we.” In the

Russian context, this would prove unusual, as there are many cultural and geographical obstacles to this understanding— chief among them being language. As he continues to describe the situation, Pestel notes the importance of literacy in Russia for national unification, because if one cannot communicate as a national people, then a sense of national identity cannot exist.95 Similarly, as the advocate for constitutional reforms within the monarchy, Tsar Alexander I sought to establish the ministries of government with the inclusion of the non-Russian [culturally], and non-Orthodox populations within state affairs; likewise, upon the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, he relentlessly rallied the empire behind a sense of collective duty and responsibility.96 Hence, in the reformation of the government, the

Russian national identity was defined as a civil union between cultures.97 After the war, and following the death of Alexander I in 1825, Tsar Nicholas I instituted a more conservative political philosophy centering on the ideals of Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavism. As the nation is unified in a common collective understanding, the cultural unity of the Slavic peoples, and their subsequent adherence to the Orthodox faith were paramount to the discussion of national identity, and were a driving justification for the

95 Русская Правда (Russian Truth) http :// www . hrono . ru / dokum /1800 dok /1825 pravda .php 96 In his book. Russian Constitutionalism: Historical and Contemporary Development, Dr. Andrey N. Medushevsky, noted historian, political scientist and attorney, and professor of Political Science and Political Theory Analysis at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, states on pp. 85-86 that, “A Law-based state is a state which pursuant to its constitution, is obligated to exercise the law approved by way of popular will or popular representation, and be subject to control by an independent court (along the lines of separation of powers). This concept of a law-based state proceeds from an ancient idea stipulating that it is laws rather than people that must dominate; from medieval ideas of meeting laws as the main mission of the state, and finally, a holistic theory of state and law developed by European, specifically German, liberalism of modern times....” Comparing this notion of state and civil unity as manifested in theological principle, Witte would suggest that, deriving from the teachings of Luther and Melanchthon, the idea of civil law and the scope of the state as a civil unit was defined. Witte would go so far as to suggest that, through the Protestant Reformation, the old notions of regional laws and Church canon law were reformed into the Lutheran “reformation civil law.” This ideal would be furthered into the Napoleonic era and could be considered an influential factor in the successful implementation of the Civil Code. See John Witte. Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10-15. 97 Ibid., 88. As he specializes in comparative constitutional law, Medushevsky articulates this notion well : “Civil society is the model of social organization realizing the basic rights and respective obligations of citizens to the state acting as a guarantor of rights....and involves three dimensions: legal (equality under the law), political (universal suffrage) and socio-economic (i.e. healthcare). Page 25 of 50 Russo-centric administration of Nicholas I. Seeking to limit the influence of the Decembrist resistance,

Nicholas I instituted a series of censorship, eliminating any challenge of the government, government policy, Orthodoxy, and any terms that could possess a double meaning [double entendres]; likewise, in the state control of education, the future fostering of political ideas would be under the strict supervision of Nicholas’ regime.98

Amid the highly contentious division between the republican Decembrists and the authoritarian apparatus of Nicholas I, the Russian ideal of narodnost’ describes this nationality. Being most simply defined as a sense of “nation-ness,” narodnost’ is derived from the Russian term narod, meaning “my people.” Similarly, the term narod shares the common root, “rod,” with the term rodina, meaning “my homeland.” From this understanding, a relationship between “homeland” and “people” is derived, and the expression of narodnost’ is understood as an expression of “nationhood” in the context of “us” as defined by Russia the place, and Russia the people.99 Hence, the collective nationality Russia is defined in the economic, societal, and spiritual union of the Russian people, and is promoted via education in the Russian language, thereby rendering national identity in Russia as the identification of the Russian-self with the collective ideal (narodnost’) that is “Russia.” Therefore, the people-place dichotomy of Russian identity is summed via the qualifier rod of membership meaning, “to be spring from.”

Beginning with the notion that “…love of country [narod] may be physical, moral, and political…”100 Karamzin puts forward a vital distinction in the understanding of the Russian expression of narodnost’, as well as the manifestation of this ideal amid the sociopolitical turmoil following the

98 Ibid. 87. According to Medushevsky. “Pestel's Russian Truth set quite a distinctive concept of unitary state against the principle of federative state. Like Napoleon's France, it would exercise uniform – purely geometric – principles of administrative division....Pestel, unlike Muraviov, had given much more attention to national issue. The latter [Muraviov], when dealing with the federative structure of the state, in no way linked this structure with the multi- national nature of the nation. Pestel, on the contrary, took this factor into consideration, yet tried to overcome it by integrating all non-Russian peoples in the uniform Russian culture, proceeding from the necessity of cultural assimilation and Russification policy....” 99 In her Russian Romanticism: Two Essays, Professor Lauren G. Leighton discusses the elements by which narodnost’ was expressed and understood. It manifests in the “spirit of its [Russian] language, by means of expression, by the freshness of ideas, by the mores, tendencies, and customs of the people, by the equalities of the subjects which surround and act upon the imagination.” 53. 100 Marc Raeff. “Love of Country and National Pride” Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1966), 107. Page 26 of 50 Napoleonic Wars. Using physical attachment to the land and people as his first premise, “…men love the place they were born and raised…,”101 he draws a connection between the physical territory and people and the Russian sense of identity—that being “Russia” as both birthplace and kin. As the “we,” is formed, he affirms that, “…we get used to those with whom we grow up and with whom we live….”102 As these natural bonds of locality and kinship are strengthened over time by habit and familiarity, a moral sense of nationality develops to guide the social consciousness into a sense of community.103 As the community is established as an ideal, the notion of history, national place in relation to the world, and a shared cultural understanding between those living within the same conditions all converge to form a political identity.104 So, in order for a Russian sense of self to relate to a “Russian” national ideal, the Russia of “birthplace and family” must be encouraged to thrive, develop, and become “habit,” – integrated through that which is uniquely “Russian” [language, culture, shared social norms] for the inherent purpose of nurturing a “connected-ness” among people from differing, extended localities toward an widened sense of community. As a result, the notion of self connection to society, and the supremacy of the Russian people as a uniquely inspired union under the Tsar and the Orthodox faith surged; likewise, the faith and tradition of the Russian people served as a means to further the national union of Russians in a common sense of tradition and history.105

From this notion of kinship, homeland, and sociopolitical tradition, a sense of Russian national identity is the manifestation of “self” as a part of the society belonging to the “community” that is [who are] “Russia.” This extraordinary statement defines Russia (and subsequently Russian identity) as a cultural bond between those born in the place that is “Russia,” acclimated to the societal habit that 101 Ibid., 107. 102 Ibid., 107. 103 Ibid., 108-109. 104 Ibid., 109-112. 105 Marc Raeff. “An Essay on Enlightenment with Reference to Russia” Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1966), 123-124. This is in stark contrast to the notion of the Enlightenment as a form of “breaking away.” This statement reveals a national attachment to the old aristocratic order, and the medieval pseudo theocratic notion of Orthodoxy and autocracy as the primary driving force behind the national identification of “self” within society. “…with gratitude to all those, living and dead, whose intellect, knowledge, talents, and artistry have guided me [Karamzin], I throw myself upon the indulgence of my good fellow citizens [Russians]. There is only one thing we [Russian community] love or wish for: we love our native land; for it we wish well-being even more than glory; it is our wish that there may never be a change in the firm foundation of our greatness, that the precepts of a wise autocracy and the Holy Faith [Orthodoxy] may more and more strengthen the union of the parts. May Russia flourish… at least for a long, long time to come, if on earth there be nothing immortal except the human soul…” Page 27 of 50 expresses “Russia,” and living according to the traditional institutions that frame Russia. Hence, the notion of Russian identity as expressed in the “people-place” dichotomy of narodnost’ are better understood in the context of physical, moral, and political identity.

VIII. The Slavophiles and the Idea of Eurasianism

Located on the cusp of West and East, the Russian Empire was in a unique position during the

Napoleonic era. Following in the Russian Orthodox religious tradition, and maintaining a belief in the

Tsar as the universal head of State, Russian national identity culminated into an ethnic union of the

Slavic peoples, under the absolute autocracy of the Tsar, and guided and protected by the Orthodox faith. When the debate broke out between the dueling ideological beliefs of the Westernizers and the

Slavophiles in the 19th century, manifested in the war against Napoleon, a shift took place that serves to support and define the Russian sense of “self” in relation to Russia as a nation.

According to Riasanovsky,106 the national-self awareness of the Russian people was expressed gradually throughout the history of their political sphere. Stemming from Russia's Westernizing influence under Peter the Great, many Russians viewed the West as progress, enlightenment, and the future; however, as Western ideals gradually entered into Russia's borders, traditionalists grew skeptical of the Enlightenment's “Age of Reason” and formally opposed them with Fonvizin's107 indictment of the West from 1777-1787. 108These people, known as “Slavophiles,” had a powerful and wide reaching impact on this discussion of Russian national identity—advocating for the autonomy of

Russia as the only nation governed by Slavs, and as those who were the remaining guardians of the

106 Nicholas Valentine Riasanovsky (1923-2011) was a Professor of Russian History at the University of California, Berkeley. His greatest work includes the writing of textbooks for students of Russian history—these being viewed as the standard for Russian Studies textbooks in many circles. Devoted to his students' understand of the Russian nation and people in its full comprehension, his work is balanced and detailed in a way that was unique for his time. 107 Denis Ivanovich Fonvizin (1744-1792) was a Russian dramatist and playwright for the court of Catherine the Great. He was censored in 1783 for his criticisms of the Russian nobility. Despite censorship, he is still considered to be one of the foremost Russian dramatists of the 18th century. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Denis-Ivanovich-Fonvizin 108 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 1. While Fonvizin is often characterized by his Western influences in his plays, he was a cynical figure in relation to the French-speaking Imperial court under Catherine the Great. Borrowing from many of the enlightened principles from the West in the proliferation of the arts, he also professed a sense of Russian identity. As such, while Riasanovsky's claims regarding Fonvizin's “indictment” are somewhat questionable, the cultural shift resulting from the Western influences in literature, the arts, and politics during this period lay the groundwork for the Slavophile opposition. Page 28 of 50 Orthodox faith following the fall of Constantinople in 1453, they reasoned that the uniqueness of the

Russian people and nation under the Tsar as the “God-chosen” civil authority, could not be defined by, or understood through, the Enlightenment. Serving as the pinnacle of Russian national sentiment, the

French invasion of 1812 was a marked date for Russian unity; likewise, with the Russian victory, the place of the Russians in relation to the West was made definite, and the strength and importance of

Russia as a major military power was no longer purely theoretical, but an undeniable reality.109 Listed as one of the most important dates in Russian history, the Slavophiles viewed the victory as an example of the Enlightenment's error and weakness as well as a confirmation that Russia was uniquely, and divinely, protected in the Orthodox faith and the Tsar.110

Reforming the historiographical debate of the place and origins of Russia, Karamazin published his eleven volume History of the Russian State in order to provide a historical base of reference by which Russia could rival any other European power. The Slavophiles were very receptive to this interpretation of Russian history as it established a line of historical reasoning for Russia that was unique, and if Russia was unique in her historical development, then Russian identity would likewise be derived from a unique source. Therefore, in this historiographical “uniqueness,” the Russians would not view themselves, or their nation, as Western or Eastern, but rather, as a special “Eurasian” polity that enjoyed its own sense of self and that determined its own course.111 Similarly, Donald

Ostrowski112 expressed the complexity of the Russian “uniqueness” in the development of Muscovy in the Rus'ian period, particularly the Mongol occupation.113 Through the numerous governmental/administrative reforms effected by the Mongols and Tatar peoples of the Steppe, the struggle of the Rus' as well as the Muscovite hegemony that developed was both unique and central to 109 Ibid., 3. “...Russian nationalism was stimulated by the Napoleonic wars culminating in the great invasion of Russia in 1812, the crushing defeat of the French, the victorious advance of Russian armies in Western Europe, the collapse of Napoleon, and the new importance which Russia attained at the Congress of Vienna and in subsequent European politics...no longer confined to the role of theory...Russia had faced the West, and Russia had defeated the West...” 110 Ibid., 2-4. “...The Slavophiles listed it [1812] together with 862, the calling of the Varangians ; 988, the conversion of Russia to Orthodox Christianity; and 1613, the defeat of the Catholic Poles and the election of the Romanov dynasty to the throne of Russia, as one of the splendid and significant moments in the life of Russia, and an expression of her true essence...” 111 Ibid., 6-7. 112 Donald Ostrowski is an expert in Muscovite history and a lecturer in Russian history to Harvard University. 113 Donald Ostrowski. Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-3. Page 29 of 50 the development of Russian identity.114 Viewing themselves as separate from the rest of the nations, the

Slavophiles are known for their “we” and “they” constructions when approaching the outside [non-

Russian/non-Slavic] world. For example, as Riasanovsky claims, “...in the West, the Slavophiles could never relax....”115 By this statement, it is meant that, when separated from the homeland, people, and

Church of Russia, the Slavophiles could not truly relate to the society around them, and “they” (as the non-Russian social community) could not understand “them” (as the Eurasian exception).116

In a political sense, this identification of national identity with Church, ethnicity, and homeland, drove the Russian political discussion into the reign of Nicholas I (1796-1855) with the Russians being viewed as the “defenders of the Faith [Orthodox Faith].” This ideology would place the Russians in national communion with their “brother Slavs” fighting against the Ottoman Turks and the Austrians, thereby entering the conflicts of the Crimean War (1853-1856)117, the Balkan Crisis (1875-1878),118 and the Bulgarian Crisis of 1885.119 Hence, from the viewpoint of the Slavophiles, Russian national identity was the natural connection of the Russian people, as manifested in the political head of the Tsar and protected by the spiritual head of the Orthodox Church, to each other in Slavic unity—rendering their sense of identity as an ethnic bond that is institutionalized in the Tsar and Church.

From this notion of “pan-Slavic” unity and national identity, the idea of Russia as a polity of

Slavic peoples often stretched the “Russian-self” beyond the borders of the Russian Empire in a Slavic 114 Ibid., 9. 115 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 60. 116 Ibid., 60-62. “...whether the West could understand them [the Slavophiles] or not, the Slavophiles felt certain it would not do so...” From this source, the “we” and “they” constructions were driven by a hatred for the East and a distrust of the West. The division between the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches also fueled their discontent, as they were not only separated from their home, they were also separated from God in a way. 117 Conspiring with Britain and aided by France, the Turks declared war upon Russia in September, 1853; the battle at Balaklava inspired Tennyson's famous poem, “the Battle of the Light Brigade,” when French and British forces had advanced to the Russian fortress at Sevastopol. Having no way out, the Russian forces destroyed their own forts, and burned their own ships before evacuating the fortress. There was tremendous loss of life, – 250, 000 troops died on each side. https://www.britannica.com/event/Crimean-War 118 In July, 1875 the Christian peasants of Herzegovina rebelled against their Muslim landlords and Ottoman Turk rulers. This uprising spread to Bosnia and generated much popular sympathy in Serbia, which was, at that time, an independent principality within the Ottoman Empire. Russia eventually declared war on the Ottoman Empire, and by 1878, the war was over; Serbia and Montenegro received their independence through the Treaty of Berlin ( and 4,000 square miles) from the Turks. https://www.britannica.com/event/Serbo-Turkish-War 119 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 83. Both Serbia and Bulgaria felt that the Treaty of Berlin had “slighted” by the Turks in their land rights. Bulgaria aggressively tried to take more land, and the Serbs responded in kind. The Treaty of Bucharest (1886), ended the war by reestablishing the prewar Serbo-Bulgarian border. https://www.britannica.com/event/Serbo-Bulgarian-War Page 30 of 50 solidarity of one to another. From this principle, the identity of the Russian is uniquely placed in a crossroads between worlds, and connected to a “Eurasianist” worldview.120

In no better words can the “Eurasianist” impact on Russian identity be expressed than in the words of the Slavophile movement’s co-founder Ivan Kireevskii:121

Russia is a different story; she experienced no struggle, no conquest, no eternal war, no endless treaties; she is not a creation of circumstance, but the product of a living organic development; she has not been constructed, she grew. 122

IX. Raeff: The Decembrists, and Vision for Westernization

Columbia University Professor Marc Raeff123 accentuates the political tenor and tone of the

Decembrist Movement:

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars produced a fermentation of kinds which led to an activation of European political thought and life, manifesting itself in the formation of secret and semisecret patriotic and political societies.124

Indeed, December 14th, 1825 would mark a date long remembered throughout the annals of

Russian history. The same day that court was to swear allegiance to the new Tsar Nicholas I, a group of

3,000 soldiers and officers of the Imperial Guard lined up in combat formation on the Winter Palace square. Despite the relatively light resistance offered to Nicholas’ ascension, and the failure of the protest from the Guard, the movement of the “Decembrists” would be closely remembered by Tsar

Nicholas and further affected the notions, ideals, and parameters of Russia’s national conscience. 120 Lufti Sunar. Eurocentrism at the Margins: Encounters, Critics, and Going Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2016), xiii- xiv. Viewing the idea of “Eurasianism” as inherently unique and complex, the scholarship surrounding the manifestation of said “Eurasianist” influence in Russia is not always the same. For instance, the influence of the Mongols in Rus'ian history is often viewed in both “positive” and “negative” interpretations. Riasanovsky viewed the Mongols as an influential force, but only in a negative sense. This is to say that, in resisting the Mongols and living under their yoke, the Russians (Muscovy in particular) became a polity subject to Steppe influence. In contrast, Ostrowski views the Mongol occupation as a “positive,” claiming that the Mongols fostered the necessity for administrative reform that assisted Rus' into progressing as a polity—eventually manifesting in the Russian Empire. 121 Ivan Vasilyovich Kireevskii (1806-1856) was a Russian writer and co-founder of the Slavophile movement. Studying Metaphysics in Germany, he came to the conclusion that Russian culture was superior to the West and that the tradition of the Orthodox Church were better suited to guide Russia than the Western Enlightenment principles. He advocated for a Russian identity, and viewed Russia as an exception to many of the “Age of Reason’s” arguments in favor of social reform. From his writings, a unique sense of “Eurasianism” was formed in the Russian national psyche. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ivan-Vasilyevich-Kireyevsky 122 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 119. Here Riasanovsky quotes from Ivan Kireevskii. 123 Marc Raeff (1923-2008) was a Russian historian and Professor of Russian history at Columbia University. Specializing on the impact of Western society on Russian culture, his work on the Decembrists and other westernizing movements are seen as among the best of his time. 124 Marc Raeff. The Decembrist Movement (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966), 6. Page 31 of 50 Influenced by the Enlightenment ideals of “civil service” and the “office” of government as the primary authority in the nation, the Decembrists fundamentally influenced and changed the notion of the Tsar, from swearing to an authority in himself, to swearing loyalty to the “State” that is Russia. In this sense, “Russia” as a State, both defined and legitimized the Tsar as an office of State, rather than merely viewing the Tsar as the personage of State. Similarly, the Decembrists were the first political movement in Russia to even approach the idea of “State” as separated from the people, place, or

Church of Russia—viewing Russia as a civil union between peoples living in a civil bond of cooperation. From this notion, the Decembrist belief in authority was not diminished, nor was their loyalty to the Tsar; however, it shifted the cause of said allegiance from to the physical personage of the

Tsar, to the national idea of Russia.125

Many voices would attempt to articulate such ambitious goals. “…A liberal cast of thought took shape in me from the moment I began to think; natural reason strengthened it...[Mit'kov].”126

From these ideals, the Decembrist movement began to advocate for reforms to the judiciary, administrative and executive offices, and even called for the creation of a constitution for the monarchy. Imported from the French and Germans, these principles of equity and equality were the driving mission behind the ideological shift that established the Decembrists as a political unit.

The desire to be useful to humanity always filled me, I took as a rule to always seek truth…the general good is the highest law—on this maxim my religion and ethics are based. [Spiridov] 127

From these principles of equity and equality, as well as the inalienable rights of all people, the judicial and administrative practices that had been pervasive in Russian law for many years, were being challenged and reformed. Protesting the flogging of soldiers and the mistreatment of peasants,

Spiridov took the principles of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero to further his notion of the “highest

125 Ibid., 15-16. “…the Decembrists’ shift of allegiance from the ruler to the “state”…the Russian state as distinct and separate from the ruler, people, and specific administrative institutions…” 126 Ibid., 52. Mikhail Fotievich Mit’kov (1791-1849) was a Freemason and an influential member of the Northern Society (a Decembrist sub-sect). A supporter of the Enlightenment, he viewed the West as the progressive future of Russia. 127 Ibid., 55-56. Mikhail Matveevich Spiridov (1796-1854) was an artillery Major in the Russian army and served on campaign in Georgia. A stanch nationalist, and believer in liberal ideals, he was a key member of the Society of United Slavs. Page 32 of 50 good.”128 As the highest good springs from a sense of “State” as the collective good of a people, and as all other goods are merely subordinate goods to the general good of the State, the judicial code, administrative, practice, and even the role of the Tsar himself were likewise subordinate to the general good and welfare of Russia—including the defense and care of its people.

Striving toward the constitutional monarchy, the Northern Society drafted a Manifesto in which the equality of all rights, the dissemination of local, provincial, and regional administrations, formation of a people’s guard, jury trials, abolition of conscription and the permanent army, and “universal” suffrage (not really due to its exclusion of women and certain ethnic minorities, but in principle this was a groundbreaking theory) would be established.129 With such a government in mind, the current status of the Russian Empire would be shifted from an absolute autocracy in the personage of the Tsar, to a Federalized system wherein the Tsar would act as an administrative head of State for the local, provincial, and regional authorities; likewise, the authority of the State would be legitimized only in so far as it supported, upheld, and defended the rights of the people. Hence, the Decembrist view of the

Russian State was a civil “contract” between the people and the government in an exchange of allegiance for the security of rights.

Certainly not least among the supporters of the liberal cause was Alexander Pushkin,130 who knew many of the Decembrists both professionally and personally. Writing to commemorate their sacrifice, and to support the cause for freedom, equity, and equality, Pushkin wrote his “message” to give rise to the literary spirit that spurred their movement:

Deep in the Siberian mine, 128 Ibid., 56. 129 Ibid., 102-103. Excerpted from the Project for a Constitution by Muravyov [Murav’ev]. Nikita Mikhailovich Muravyov (1795-1843) was one of the founders of the Union of Salvation secret society, and in 1818, the Union of Prosperity. After 1821, he was a leader of the Northern Society. He was the author of a project for reconstructing Russia ("Nikita Murav'ev's Constitution") that proposed the abolition of serfdom, a federal structure for Russia, and a constitutional government (headed by the Emperor). He did not take part in the uprising (because he was on leave). After the uprising's defeat, he was arrested and sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to 20 years of hard servitude. http://www.jewhistory.ort.spb.ru/eng/main/sprav.php?id=191 130 Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin (1799-1837) was among the greatest and most famous poets in Russian history. Heavily influenced by Russian folklore, his radical style exposed him to criticism from both the Classical and Sentimentalist factions; however, his work quickly grew in prominence. A resident of St. Petersburg, Pushkin was fully immersed in the political discussion of Westernization, and supported the Decembrist cause—even becoming a member of the Union of Welfare. Exiled and recalled under Nicholas I, he continued to write some of the greatest works of Russian poetic literature ever seen. He was killed in a duel in 1837. http://www.hesperuspress.com/alexander-pushkin.html Page 33 of 50 Keep your patience proud; The bitter toil shall not be lost, The rebel thought unbowed.

The sister of misfortune, Hope, In the under-darkness dumb, Speaks joyfully courage to your heart: The day desired will come.

And love and friendship pour to you Across the darkened doors, Even as round your galley-beds My free music pours.

The heavy clanging chains will fall, The walls will crumble as a word; And Freedom greet you in the light, And brothers give you back the sword.131

Speaking of “hope” dwelling with the “unbowed rebel,” Pushkin had the faith to assert that despite the

“galley beds” of the Siberian mines, the genuine hope persisted, – of progress, enlightenment, and a better world; likewise, as the “desired day will come,” the memory of their principles would forever be enshrined in history as a turning point in Russian life and thought.132 In the Decembrists, Russia would truly be reborn. Perhaps this is what invoked the words of Odovskii133 in his reply:

Beating our shackles into swords, Liberty’s torch we will re-light, And she will overwhelm the Tsars, While nations waken in the night.134

From the “awakening” of such national conscience, the Russian nation had matured to a point wherein, the enlightenment principle of “State” as a civil representation of the civil cooperative union between peoples manifested in the resurgence of a patriotic pride in “Russia” as an ideal, and would 131 Max Eastman, Poems of Five Decades (New York: Harper, 1955), as quoted in Raeff, Decembrists, 178. In this translation of Pushkin’s poem Message from Siberia [ (1827), the recurring themes of freedom and imprisonment can be observed throughout. 132 Another translation of the same poem by Rachel Douglas of the the Schiller Institute illustrates both the depth of thought and challenges in translation. https://archive.schillerinstitute.com/fidelio_archive/1999/fidv08n02-1999Su/fidv08n02- 1999Su_066-alexander_pushkin_three_poems_on.pdf 133 Vladimir Fedorovich Odoevskii (1803-1869) was a Russian writer who was strongly impacted by the German rationalists. A supporter of the liberal movements, he was both fervent and conflicted about his beliefs. Also influenced by the Slavophiles and the notion of Russian exceptionalism, he at times, fused the two together to form an “enlightened” view of Russian exceptionalism. A founder of Russian musicology, he devoted much of his life to the study of Russian folk songs and their relation to cultural expression. Http://www.hesperuspress.com/vladimir- odoevsky.html 134 Marc Raeff. The Decembrist Movement (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966), 179. Translated by Valentine Snow from Odovskii’s poem Reply to Pushkin’s Message (1827). Page 34 of 50 eternally imprint the a national conscience upon the Russian people. Guided by the Decembrist vanguard of the intelligentsia, the Russian nation had been born in the fermentation of the Eurasianist notion of exceptionalism united with the ideal of the Russian “State” as the institutional representative of the Church, Tsar, culture, place, and people who are “Russia.”

X. Kant: The Premise of National Unity as the Union of Peoples

For the State is not property, as may be the ground on which its people are settled. It is a society of human beings over whom no one but itself has the right to rule and to dispose.135

Supporting the ideal of the nation as an intermediary between people living in society,

Immanuel Kant furthers the notion that the State becomes a representative expression of a common understanding between those being ruled within the national unit. As such, the people's mutual bond, expressed as an ideal, serves to maintain peace between the various members of the society—rendering the State, and subsequently the nation, as a peacekeeper between peoples. Separating the national ideal from the territory of a particular location, or even the kinship ties of a given ethnicity, the national ideal is as large as the number of people willing to support and uphold the peace of the national understanding; likewise, the strength of the nation is derived from the devotion of the people to the national connection of mutual support. Therefore, the nation is not simply a bond between peoples, but an ideal that people could unite around in mutual support. Hence, the people are united via the nation.

In light of this Kantian principle, the term “national identity,” simply defined, describes that state of self as it relates to the collective economic, social, and cultural constructs of “we” and “they;” however, it is often misunderstood, shrouded in vague layers of myth, legend and, sometimes, historical events twinged with religious fervor. The initial inklings of a cultural sense of “we” and

“they” spring from the recognition of at least three distinct variables: ethnicity, language, and customs.

The natural, physical geographical connection between peoples encouraged this early sense of culture, and allowed for the development of distinct customs and traditions. Likewise, the presence of shifting

135 Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972), 109. Page 35 of 50 social environments often created conditions promoting a curious sense of self-consciousness and self- awareness among such peoples, often leading to larger questions of their own unique human significance as pertinent to a particular place, space, and time. As a consequence, the desire for meaningful answers to questions of intention and purpose within the scope of human interaction initiated the development of cultural mythologies and folklore as a means to not only describe such difference, but also to enshrine it in the vestige of religious tradition, and thereby, initiate an institutional notion of cultural identity, survival needs and dwelling habits.

Plato's argument, so passionately espoused by Thrasymachus in the Gorgias, still echoes across the historical continuum of “survival of the strongest,” whereby cultural superiority is ascribed by the chaotic exertion of brute force and conquest of one upon another, leading to a random and bizarre integration of tribes by geography and opportunity. While the memory of past events, chronicled, embellished, and retold to each new generation reaffirmed the cultural invocation to sameness, oneness, and unity, the ever-shifting scope of land acquisition, subjugation of tribes, kingdom building and conquest, created a seemingly endless series of struggles toward maintaining singular ethnic bonds and cultural homogeneity, making cultural identity somewhat difficult to discern. As a consequence of the increased need for maintaining social order, political leaders initiated the formation of new, collective identity, – a national one in which emphasized the communal bonds formed through the adoption of shared values and ideals, expressed in the notion of citizenship through the codification of a system of laws governing civil order.136

Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastical, high flown nation of right, but a compliment of the unwritten code of law—constitutional as well as international—necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realization of perpetual peace.137

Derived from the teachings of equity and equality throughout the Enlightenment, the promise and mission of the State as the maintainer of perpetual peace in the civil bond between the people is shown to manifest in the nation; likewise, as all peoples do not live within the same civil sphere, the

136 Ibid., 131-137. 137 Ibid., 142. Page 36 of 50 plurality of nations becomes as an individual when brought into the scope of international relations.

Protected and guided within a “divine Providence,” the form of all things determines the cause-and- effect relationship between the substance causing the peace (the institutional State) and those effected by it (the people). From this Kantian understanding, the world is an interlocking conglomerate of civil relations—from individual to family, from family to State, from State to nation, and from nation to world.138 In the civil bonds that are created and maintained in the law, and in the upholding of the people's rights, the goal of “perpetual peace” can be achieved. From Kant's reasoning, the national identity of a people is defined by the national ideal of peace via a union of civic duty, within the scope of those willing to accept its ideals. Hence, the nation becomes and understanding of peace. As Kant asserted:

This union of individual wills...may be at the same time the cause of bringing about the result intended and practically realizing the idea of right.139

XI. Spring of Hope, Winter of Despair: The Ultimate Expression of the 'Nation' and Its

Consequences in the Modern Age

Alexis de Tocqueville140 keenly noted that:

The French are at once most brilliant and most dangerous of all European nations, and best qualified to become, in the eyes of other peoples, an object of admiration, of hatred, of compassion, of alarm—never of indifference.141

As nationalism rose amid the war, death, and destruction, of the revolutionary period, the formation of the modern “nation-state” was a manifestation of the principles of the Enlightenment and a restructuring of allegiance and power to support the rights of the individual in a collective union rooted in a national ideal. Bringing a message of “hope” for the future, and being seen as the progress of the age, the development of national political identity during the Napoleonic era marked the turning

138 Ibid., 143-154. This is a summery of Kant's First Supplement to the question of perpetual peace's longevity. 139 Ibid., 178. 140 Seymour Drescher. “Alexis de Tocqueville, French Historian and Political Writer.” Britannica, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexis-de-Tocqueville As the great-grandson of the liberal aristocrat, Christien de Malesherbes, de Tocqueville (1805-1859) provides a poignant and personal view of the French Revolution and its consequences. 141 Alexis de Tocqueville. The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1955), 211. Page 37 of 50 of worlds—from aristocracy to republicanism, from allegiance [to one person] to a “State,” from local common law to national civil law. All of these concurrent strides in the history of Western Civilization pushed the individual citizen to think in a collective mindset with a collective purpose. In this ideological and political unity, a people find strength, and with such strength, a people will concurrently build anew and destroy the old. Just as the French invoked the Enlightenment and the inalienable dignity of the individual person, so also did they destroy the old world of the king and aristocracy —a world that had existed for centuries, and would never exist again.

In Germany, this concept was made manifest during the events leading up to, and proceeding, the War for Liberation in 1813. From the common ideal of union between the German-speaking peoples expressed in the institutional structure of the “new” education, the citizenry shared a sense of self in relation to the “idea” that was Germany—this union of ideas being the base definition of

“German.” Furthering these principles, the individual members of society required a civil law code, and an education equal to the comprehension of the nation. Thus, to be in the nation, one had to relate to the “idea” of Germany that was the unification of the German people in a civil contract of support.

As such, the educational system becomes a nationalist factory for the collective will—as an institutionalized expression of the union of individuals. In so reasoning, Germany entered into a new era of justice, equality, and prosperity, but also at the expense of the world that existed beforehand. In the gaining of these “enlightened” principles, the individual self lost its purpose when removed from the maintenance of the collective. This lack of individual identity would indirectly result in the tragedies of the 20th century.

In Russia, the national self was placed in a relation of one to another long before the formation of their nation-state, rather, the development of the Russian nation was an organic process by which the people began to identify with an already existent ethnocentric bond as embodied within the “State” of

Russia. Marking the formation of this ideal on December 14th, 1825, the Russians discovered an identity that manifested in “Russia” the ideal, rather than “Russia” the collective expression of the Tsar

(as the personage of State). In placing the “State” ideal before the Tsar's person, the Russians united in Page 38 of 50 a collective ideal that was “Russia” the nation. Hence, while the union of the Russian people as one-to- another remains vital in understanding the nature and origin of the nation, the defining principle of

Russia rests in the impersonal “idea” of the nation.

From the concurrent development of German and Russian nationalism in the 18th century, the nation is deduced to a set of ideas and principles that form a civil union between the various members of the State structure in question. While these developments differ greatly in their manifestation, the common principles of law, order, language, and culture seem to have a base impact on the formation of the “nation-state.” Derived from a common understanding of “Right,” Kant furthered this ideal in stating:

Natural right in the state of a civil constitution means the forms of right which may be deduced from principles...such as a constitution.142

In this deduction of principle, the people are in relation with each other via the common understanding manifested in the national idea. While this idea could be anything that might bind the nation together, the common expressions of culture through language and literature are paramount to comprehending this collective understanding, and a proper definition of the nation itself.

XII. Tolz: Theories of Nationalism and Their Application to the Russian Case

Dividing the nature and scope of nationalism into primordial, modernist, and post-modernist categories, Vera Tolz143 attempts to distill a sense of national progression into the development of natural dissolution, political power, and national sovereignty.144 Viewing the Time of Troubles (1598-

1613)145 as a pivot point from the discussion of medieval Rus' to that of “Russia,” Tolz asserts that 142 Immanuel Kant. The Science of Right (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1996), 408-409. 143 Vera Tolz (1959-Present) is a Professor of Russian Studies at the University of Manchester. Writing about various periods of Russian history, her work is highly respected for its depth in understanding Russian society. Her work Russia: Inventing the Nation (2001) was written to answer the question, “What is Russia?” during the aftermath of the Chechen War (1994-1996). Fascinated by the diversity of Russia's many nationalities, the question of how this national came to be was of paramount importance. 144 Vera Tolz. Russia: Inventing the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3. 145 Chester S. L. Dunning. Russia's First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 1-2. In addition to Tolz, Dunning also provides insight into the Time of Troubles. When Boris Gudanov overcame his political aristocrat rivals to become Tsar, his legitimacy was soon questioned, because of the rumor that he had orchestrated the murder of Ivan the Terrible's youngest son, Dmitrii, in 1591. During Gudanov's reign, Russia suffered a terrible famine which wiped out almost 1/3 of the Page 39 of 50 Russian culture and ideology changed greatly in society's centering political control around Moscow.146

As power was concentrated in the Tsar and the Orthodox Church, the political “nation” that was Russia was likewise rooted in this belief; furthermore, despite the influence of Peter the Great, Russia was very strongly impacted by the beliefs of the Slavophiles and the Westerners. In this ideological dichotomy, one can see a sense of Russian identity in the harmony between Western progressiveness and Slavophilic tradition.

Impacted by the French Revolution, the word “nation” did not even come into the Russian political psyche until Napoleon in 1807.147 The Slavophiles, viewing the peasantry as the remaining cultural narod, continued to advocate for the autonomy of the Russian culture and nation, reasoning that the Russians possessed a special “Roman” connection after the fall of Constantinople [1453].

Similarly, as people “close to the land,” the Russian peasantry preserved a Russian nationality that would ultimately drive the debate of Russian exceptionalism for many years.148

While Tolz does address the Westerner side of the debate, she does so under the context of

“Russian Socialism.”149 This is not inaccurate as there were many such activists whose primary concern was the emancipation of the Serfs (such as Chincherin); however, she does not address the Decembrist movement in the slightest. The impact of Westernization caused much more than emancipation, law codes, or even socioeconomic reform: it was a vital overhaul of Russian identity from one that was loyal to the Tsar as the personage of State, to one wherein the Tsar of head of State. While this may seem a small difference, the viewing of national self via the medium of the national “idea” that is the

State of Russia cannot be overlooked. Without properly categorizing this shift from a union between members directly, to a union in a common civil bond to the State, the very essence of national political identity is lost. Therefore, despite the wonderful work Tolz has done in helping to clarify Russian

population, for which he was blamed. In 1604, he was deposed by another military usurper, whom the people named “False Dmitrii.” After the aristocracy, through political maneuverings, got rid of False Dmitrii, a civil war created chaos within the region, to which yet another usurper, Vasilii Shuiskii, came to brief power. However, he re-establishment of the Romanov dynasty eventually brought the Time of Troubles to a rocky conclusion, but not without ramifications to the national consciousness. In the Soviet era, the Time of Troubles was known as the “First Peasant War.” 146 Vera Tolz. Russia: Inventing the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)., 4-5. 147 Ibid., 85. 148 Ibid., 88-89. 149 Ibid., 93-94. Page 40 of 50 identity from the perspective of Russian exceptionalism, the impact of the Decembrists must be recognized for this transformation of the Russian national conscience.

XIII. Harold James: The Building Blocks of German National Identity

In the absence of institutions…Germans had to manufacture their own concept of nationality…they need self-consciously to formulate an imagined past and an idealized future.150

Holding to the institutionalized nature of a German political identity, James151 centered his discussion of German identity on the premise of education’s manufacturing a national past and future— rendering a national purpose to the individual members of the State. Further still, the institutional manifestation of national self-consciousness came to Germany because of the French exportation of ideas following the Napoleonic wars.152 Holding to the notion that German national identity developed as a direct result of Napoleon’s invasion, and the establishment of civitas throughout the continent,

James suggests that German identity was the product of the enlightenment via the formation of a civil union.153 Placing the beginning of this civitas at the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1805, the

German State initially rallied around enlightenment ideals; however, as the national sentiment of the

Germans grew, so also did the discontentment with the French, and so, they liberated themselves.154

Using the economic unification of the German region as a cause for civil cooperation, the institutional product of anti-French xenophobia and economic cooperation resulted in the formation of the German national identity.155

While James has provided a compelling and well-researched argument regarding the impact of institutions and the gradual centralization of economic capital, he falls short when discussing the cultural impact of language. As Fichte argued for the German nation, he also reasoned that the German 150 Harold James. A German Identity: 1770-1990 (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc., 1989), 11. 151 Harold James (1956-Present) is a Professor of European Studies at Princeton University. As an economic historian, he specializes in the economic centrality of the European nations—specifically Germany. In his work, A German Identity: 1770-1990 (1990), he sought to question the nature of the German nation in its national, socioeconomic, development. 152 Ibid., 11-14. 153 Ibid., 34-35. 154 Ibid., 38-39. 155 Ibid., 55-61. Page 41 of 50 people must identify as one people. How was this accomplished? – In the propagation of the German language as expressed in literature. When Arndt defined the parameters of the German polity, the definition of the German “we” was in the German language. In short, the foundation of German national identity, as the identification of the German people one-to-another, can be described as those people who speak German. More simply put, if one spoke German, then one was German. By failing to address the cultural impact of the language, James overlooked the very cause for the War for

Liberation and its scope. While economic centralization and the establishment of civitas were unquestionably vital to the actuality of the German nation, the initial identity of the German people was almost solely contingent on the German language.

Despite his omission regarding the concept of language, James was correct in his analysis of the

German nation as a product of institutional development. Without an institutional means of maintaining social and economic centrality, the national bonds of the German people undoubtedly would have dissolved. As Sybel foreshadowed, by the mid-1820’s, the Germans had already lost the initial rallying cry of for liberation from 1813. From this assertion, the notion that the German people were fundamentally divided was realized in the consistent tendency to dissolve civic bonds. Therefore, one must conclude that, in the absence of an institutional communicator, the German nation would have been forever confined to the realm of political theory.

XIV. Gauland: “Die Goethe Zeit” and the Debate of German Identity in the Post-modern

Era

Rather contentiously debating the issue of immigration into Germany, the Alternativ fur

Deutschland (AfD)156 has presented themselves as a right-leaning faction advocating the preservation of “German identity.” One of their party leaders, Dr. Alexander Gauland of Thuringen,157 instigated a

156 Melissa Eddy. “Alternative for Germany: Who Are They and What Do They Want?” New York Times, 25 Sept 2017. Alternative for Germany [Alternativ fur Deutschland] or AfD was formed in April 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/world/europe/germany-election-afd.html 157 Dr. Alexander Gauland, noted professor of history, political science and law, is the current party leader for the AfD. He was born in Chemnitz in 1941and fled to the Federal Republic in 1959. After 40 years as an active member of the CDU, Mr. Gauland switched political parties in 2014. https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/biografien/G/519654-519654 Page 42 of 50 firestorm of criticism following a speech given at the Kyffhauser-Treffen158 in 2017. In this speech, he discussed the impact of the German political consciousness during the German unification in 1871; however, he also recalled the “Goethe Zeit,” wherein he reminded the audience of the influence of the

German language and culture in the development of the Natural Sciences and the Humanities (literature in particular).159 Recalling the fact that many of most celebrated works of literature, journals, and articles were published in the German language, Gauland rallied the crowd, invoking a sense of cultural pride in the achievements and advancements made by the German people since the Enlightment. He furthered this argument with the melancholic suggestion that in the Germany of today [2017], such cultural influence had waned as a consequence of a border-less immigration system; as such, he encouraged his audience to “rediscover” their sense of pride in national identity, – as if they had somehow lost it.160 Indeed, Gauland unabashedly implored his audience to preserve their “German- ness” amid the “integration” of the non-Germanic migrants. Recalling figures such as Bach,161

Kleist,162 Heine,163 Goethe,164 and Schelling,165 he implies a heavy sentiment that the AfD was somehow seeking to protect that legacy —even continuing his claims into the First World War166; however, as is quite typical, when addressing the years 1933-1945, Gauland asserted that this had

“nothing more to do with our identity,”167 boldly suggesting that no nation on earth had done more to

158 Named after the Kyffauser hills on the border between Thruringen and Sachsen, the Kyffhauser-Treffen is an annual AfD conference meeting to discuss and promote the party's platform as described in their Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany. https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/04/2017- 04-12_afd-grundsatzprogramm-englisch_web.pdf 159 “Alexander Gauland Controversial Speech at the 2017 Kyffhauser-Treffan, AfD, English Subtitles.” 2 Sept 2017. Translated by Cassius. 9 Feb 2019. Video. 17:52. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpOv9aD6LJM 160 For more information on the controversy surrounding the place of national identity in the European Union, please see Patrick J. Geary's Myth of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 161 Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750) was a German Lutheran composer of the Baroque period. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Johann-Sebastian-Bach 162 Bernd Heinrich Wilhelm von Kleist (1777-1811) was a German poet, dramatist, novelist, and journalist. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Heinrich-von-Kleist 163 Christian Johann Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) was a German Jewish poet, journalist, essayist and literary critic. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Heinrich-Heine-German-author 164 Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832) was a German poet, writer, and statesman. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Johann-Wolfgang-von-Goethe 165 Friedrich Willhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) was a German philosopher who wrote treatises on German idealism. Fichte was an early mentor of Schelling and Hegel was his university roommate. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Friedrich-Wilhelm-Joseph-von-Schelling 166 “Alexander Gauland Controversial Speech at the 2017 Kyffhauser-Treffan, AfD, English Subtitles.” 2 Sept 2017. Translated by Cassius. 9 Feb 2019. Video. 02:00-04:00. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpOv9aD6LJM 167 Ibid., 14:25-14:31. Page 43 of 50 make amends for their mistakes than Germany.168

While this speech was certainly a rallying point for the German political right, it also reiterated a somewhat misguided belief about the establishment, nature, and purpose of German national identity as well as deeply sentimental, but somewhat flawed, historical analysis. While Goethe, Schiller, and

Bach are vital cultural figures for the Germans, they were not “nationalists” per se, and they were not the primary activists during the time of the German War for Liberation. While Kleist and Heine were eloquent advocates for the unification effort, they also attempted to build this identity in the rallying of the German people, through the defined context of the German language and the invocation to this identity via institutions of learning (as presented by Fichte). In fact, to my amazement, throughout this entire speech, Gauland did not even once mention Fichte or Arndt; furthermore, he failed to address the evolution of the German identity in 1848-1849, or the actual unification in 1871. Why? – Because, perhaps, if one were to address these specific historical periods and voices, then he or she would be obliged to remember that German national identity appears to be more of a product of circumstance rather than a consciously-driven effort by the “German culture.” Similarly, Gauland glosses over the issue of German identity during the 1933-1945. Why? – Because this period in German history is problematic to his position: logically speaking, how can Germans hold to an ideological perception that includes the early 19th century, but excludes events that are less than a century old? The only way such an argument can be construed is to assert that the National Socialist [Nazi] regime fundamentally and purposely misunderstood the 19th century unification effort—defining it across racial boundaries, rather than linguistic and cultural ones, viewing Germany as something visually definite and self- evident rather than something that is fostered and created. In reciting or singing the phrase

“Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles”169 one recognizes a song celebrating the inception of what would, hopefully, become the German nation, and not something already realized by race, ethnicity, or

168 Ibid., 13:46-14:18. 169 The German National Anthem (1922-1991). As a point of reference, during the Nazi era (1933-1945) only the first verse was sung, followed by a Nazi party propaganda song. In 1952, verses 1 and 2 were no long sung. In 1991, the official national anthem of the Federal Republic of Germany became verse 3 only (eliminating verses 1 and 2 entirely). https://lyricstranslate.com/en/deutschlandlied-song-germany-german-national-anthem.html Page 44 of 50 geographic borders; such a process speaks of a becoming Germany, not a fixed ethno-state. Thus, Dr.

Gauland has a legitimate point in defending the German identity by claiming that “integration” implies that those seeking integration have both a discernible standard and culture in which to integrate; however, he fails to address that German identity, itself, is largely something fostered by each generation in an endless “becoming” of Germany, and not a definite, self-generating identity.

XV. Putin: The Annexation of Crimea and the Expression of Russia's Shared Identity

Following the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation from February-March 2014, the debate surrounding the nature of Russian national identity, and the subsequent expression of nationalism thereof were expressed in Vladimir Putin's March 8, 2014 address.170 Beginning his remarks by invoking the shared cultural history of Russia and the Crimea, he recalled Volodemir “the

Christianizer”171 and appealed to the shared struggle during the Second World War at Sevastopol.172

Uniting in solidarity with their fellow Russians in the Ukraine and Belarus, he defined those who were

“Russian” as those who spoke Russian. Similarly, he defined the scope of the Russian people as those living within this shared tradition of Rus'ian history. As such, despite sanctions and criticisms from the

West, Putin held to the legitimacy of Russia's claim on the region—in their shared history, blood, faith, and language, the Crimea was, indeed, a part of Russia:

Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea.173

From this understanding if Russian identity, the principles of faith, history, and Slavic ethno- 170 Bob Dreyfuss.“Full Text and Analysis of Putin's Crimea Speech.” The Nation, 19 March 2014. https://www.thenation.com/article/full-text-and-analysis-putins-crimea-speech/ 171 Volodemir Svietoslavich “the Christianizer” (956-1015) was the Grand Prince of Kiev during the Christianization of Rus' in 988. Choosing Christianity over Judaism and Islam, Volodemir I is seen as the primary forefather of the Kievan Rus' period. His decedents would rule Rus' until the fall of the Rurikid dynasty in 1610. He is still revered as one of the most important people in the history of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladimir-I 172 C. Peter Chen and Robert Forczyk. “The Battle of Sevastopol.” World War II Database Online. Jan 2008. The battle of Sevastopol was fought from Oct. 30th, 1941 to Jul. 4th, 1942 and claimed the lived of approx. 18,000 Soviet soldiers. https://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=214 173 Bob Dreyfuss.“Full Text and Analysis of Putin's Crimea Speech.” The Nation, 19 March 2014. https://www.thenation.com/article/full-text-and-analysis-putins-crimea-speech/ Page 45 of 50 cultural identity remain paramount to understanding the nature of the Russian national consciousness; however, as in Germany, this identity can be deceiving. For example, while the shared faith tradition of the Orthodox people is certainly a strong cultural symbol for the Slavic peoples, it is not always visible in today's Russian society. The Soviet period saw an decrease in the number of practicing believers and only maintained one seminary to train new priests yet the Russian national consciousness still remained; likewise, during the integration of non-Slavic peoples in the USSR, the common ethnic bond of the Slavic world was still present—without the Russian nation, or a Russian national-self. In fact, the only consistent commonality in the Russian identification with their culture and nation was the

Russian language. Hence Putin states:

We hoped that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and civilized state that would protect their rights in line with the norms of international law. However, this is not how the situation developed. Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced assimilation.174

From this understanding, the nature of Russian culture, history, and pan-Slavic identity, is concentrated in the Orthodox faith and in the propagation of the Russian language. From this principle, if one is connected to the Russian history, and if one speaks the Russian language, then – by this standard – such an individual would be Russian.

Concluding Reflections

Having discussed the concurrent development of nationalism, national political identity, and national self-consciousness in Germany and Russia during the Napoleonic era, a more objective and sound understanding as to the actuality of what national identity is has been addressed. While the circumstantial nature of this national development remains constant amid the gradual process of social evolution, a deeper understanding as to the nature of such national development has been shown.

Although many past and present scholars have attempted to discern the existence of national political identity within the vacuous ideological expanse of philosophy, or the hypersensitive indecision of 174 Ibid. Page 46 of 50 political science, or even the odd militant optimism of modern economics, its inherent movement is both irritatingly random, yet oddly synergistic. Within 19th century Germany and Russia, these national premises were not only unintentional, they were accidental, as evidenced within their religious, linguistic, and political focus; however, despite the events which initially caused the national unification, the national movement of the Napoleonic era provided a gateway to understanding the sociopolitical reality of the modern age.

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