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By Means of the Gun: African States After Assassination by Allison

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By Means of the Gun: African States After Assassination by Allison By Means of the Gun: African States after Assassination by Allison Solomon B.A. in Political Science, May 2008, Mercer University A Thesis submitted to The Faculty of Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts January 31, 2011 Thesis directed by Paul Williams Associate Professor of International Affairs © Copyright 2011 by Allison Solomon All rights reserved ii Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank Dr. Paul Williams and Dr. Gina Lambright for their guidance and support in completing this thesis. The author would also like to thank Aaron McKay and Ginny Solomon for listening and advising throughout the creative process. iii Abstract of Thesis By Means of the Gun: African States after Assassination Head of state assassinations have been rife across an independent Africa, yet a comprehensive analysis of the political impacts of these events has been lacking. This thesis seeks not only to assess the impacts of the 27 cases of assassination, but also to identify the factors most likely to influence the results. Gaining insight into these issues will provide a new perspective on the African state, and may even offer practical guidance for policymakers dealing with post-assassination states. In order to approach the problem, a comparative historical case study analysis was employed using nine cases to illustrate a range of impacts. The cases were also distinct in terms of governance system, historical decade, economic environment, and geography. The impacts of the cases were then scored using ten political indicators (political violence, ethnic strain, civil war, etc.) to determine impact. The results from the case studies and the additional assassinations were then used to develop trends regarding potential explanatory factors for the impacts. The outcomes revealed that the majority of impacts have been low or moderate, suggesting that while the frequency of assassinations may be troubling, the impacts are generally minor. In terms of the African state, these findings indicate that individual leadership is not as important as the continuity of the structures of the state, for those states with sound political structures proved to be the most stable after assassinations. Accordingly, states with structural dynamism, meaning those with a history of coups d‘etat, regime transition, military interference, and nascent democratization, were the ones to most likely experience a higher degree of post-assassination impact. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ iii Abstract of Thesis .............................................................................................................. iv List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... vi List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................. viii Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Assassinations .................................................................................................. 7 Chapter 2: Low Impact Case Studies ........................................................................... 17 Chapter 3: Moderate Impact Case Studies .................................................................. 42 Chapter 4: High Impact Case Studies .......................................................................... 67 Chapter 5: Conclusion……………………………………………………….99 References ....................................................................................................................... 106 Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 114 v List of Tables Table 1-South Africa…..……………………………………………………………….39 Table 2-Egypt.………………………………………………………………………….39 Table 3-DRC..………………………………………………………………………….40 Table 4-Rep. Congo…………………………………………………………………….64 Table 5-Burkina Faso..………………………………………………………………….64 Table 6-Niger.…….…………………………………………………………………….65 Table 7-Congo (Lumumba).…………………………………………………………….95 Table 8-Algeria………………………………………………………………………….96 Table 9-Burundi..……………………………………………………………………….97 Table 10-Guinea Bissau………………………………………………………………..108 Table 11-Nigeria (Mohammed).………………………………………………………..108 Table 12-Comoros (Abdallah)...………………………………………………………..109 Table 13-Comoros (Soilih)……………………………………………………………..109 Table 14-Togo...………………………………………………………………………...110 Table 15-Ethiopia (Andom)..…………………………………………………………...110 Table 16-Burundi (Ngendandumwe)…………………………………………………...111 Table 17-Chad...………………………………………………………………………...111 Table 18-Ghana.………………………………………………………………………...112 Table 19-Madagascar…………………………………………………………………...113 Table 20-Somalia...……………………………………………………………………...113 vi Table 21-Nigeria (Ironsi)...……………………………………………………………114 Table 22-Nigeria (Balewa)……………………………………………………………115 Table 23-Liberia (Doe)..………………………………………………………………116 Table 24-Liberia (Tolbert).……………………………………………………………117 Table 25-Rwanda..……………………………………………………………………117 Table 26-Burundi (Ntaryamira).………………………………………………………118 Table 27-Ethiopia (Banti)..……………………………………………………………119 vii List of Acronyms ABAKO Alliance des Ba-Kongo ADF Allied Democratic Forces AFDL Alliance des Forces Democratiques Pour la Liberation du Congo ANC African National Congress APC Assemblees Populaires Communales APW Assemblees Populaires Wilayas AU African Union CDR Comites de Defense de la Revolution CMP Conseil Militaire du Parti CNE National Electoral Commission CNN Conseil Consultatif National CNR Conseil National de la Revolution CONAKAT Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga CPLP Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries CPP Comites de Pouvoir Populaire CR Comites Revolutionnaires CSC Confederation Syndicale Congolaise DEC Delegations Executives Communales DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States viii EP European Parliament EU European Union FAR Forces Armees Rwandaises FAZ Forces Armees Zairoises FDD Forces for the Defense of Democracy FIS Front Islamique du Salut FLN Front de Liberation Nationale FP Front Populaire FRDD Front Pour la Restoration et la Defense de la Democratie FRODEBU Front des Democrates du Burundi GIA Armed Islamic Group HCE State High Council IMF International Monetary Fund INEC Independent National Electoral Commission JRR Jeunesse Revolutionnaire Rwagasore MAOL Movement of Free Officers MIA Islamic Armed Movement MIOB International Observer Mission to Burundi MLC Mouvement Pour la Liberation du Congo MNC Mouvement National Congolais MNSD National Movement for the Development of Society NP National Party ix OAU Organization of African Unity PALIPE Parti Pour la Liberation de Peuple Hutu -HUTU PCT Congolese Labor Party PL Parti Liberal PNP Parti National du Progres PP Parti du Peuple RCD Rassemblement Congolais Pour la Democratie RPB Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais RPN Rassemblement Patriotique National SADC Southern African Development Community UCB Union des Communistes Burkinabe ULCR Union des Luttes Communistes UN United Nations UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UPRONA Union Pour le Progres National x ―These people attacked my residence with a single objective: to physically liquidate me. No one has the right to massacre the people of Guinea-Bissau in order to steal power by means of the gun.‖ President Joao Bernardo Vieira 24 November 2008 Introduction Shortly after midnight on 23 November 2008, armed soldiers attacked the private residence of Guinea-Bissau‘s president, Joao Bernardo Vieira, in an attempt to assassinate the political leader.1 Vieira ultimately survived the assault and, in a press conference delivered the same afternoon, reassured citizens that the ―situation is under control.‖2 It was one of the last times Vieira would deliver a major address as only four months later he would be killed in yet another attack by mutinous troops.3 His death marked the first assassination of a head of state on the African continent since that of the Democratic Republic of Congo‘s autocratic leader, Laurent Kabila, in 2001. Just as in the aftermath of Kabila‘s murder, the issues of succession, authority, and political power loomed large in Guinea-Bissau. Fearing statewide upheaval, organizations like the International Crisis Group warned that ―without outside help to end military involvement in politics and impunity, it may be impossible to halt a slide into further violence.‖4 As other 1 Amnesty International reports that no elected head of state has completed the five-year term in Guinea-Bissau either as a result of coups or assassinations; see Document-Guinea-Bissau: Briefing for International Election Observers, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR30/005/2009/en/6de6d38d-5f96-4031-904e- 28b3fe2c0b3b/afr300052009en.html (June 2009). 2 Associated Press, “Guinea-Bissau Repels Attack on President,” New York Times, (23 November 2008). 3 The attack was considered retaliation for Vieira’s alleged—and still unfounded—involvement in the death of Guinea-Bissau’s army chief of staff just one day prior. 4 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun,” Africa Briefing 61 (2009): 1. 1 assassinations followed with the murders of a presidential candidate,
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