The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49

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The Extractive Industries and Society

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Original article The technopolitics of Swedish iron mining in Cold War , 1950–1990 T Karl Bruno

Division of History of Science, Technology and Environment, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 74D, SE-100 44, Stockholm, Sweden

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Earlier research on Cold War resource politics has not focused significantly on the interests of smaller, non- Cold War colonial industrialized states. This paper examines the iron mining company LAMCO in Liberia, dominated Iron mining strategically and operationally by Swedish actors and interests, between the mid-1950s and the late . It LAMCO argues that the creation of LAMCO must be understood in the context of the early Cold War and its international Liberia politics, and that the enterprise’s subsequent development was characterized by a specific technopolitical dy- Technopolitics namic resulting from the encounter between the Liberian government’s development strategy and the Swedish investors’ need to mitigate political risks both in Liberia and at home. The findings help clarify the conditions under which actors from an ostensibly non-aligned and non-colonial country could gain access to minerals in Africa. They also contribute to our understanding of iron mining in Liberian political history, showing how LAMCO developed in close association with particular developmental policies in Liberia that sought to promote national development while simultaneously increasing the power of the Liberian presidency. Though it initially served this purpose successfully, its operations also generated a string of unexpected outcomes that eventually made the company a serious problem for the Liberian government.

1. Introduction clear material improvements anyway, was not sufficient to prevent tensions from building. Resource sovereignty became a key point of The Cold War and the post-war creation of the Third World as a contention in North-South relations. This was clearly expressed in the political project reconstituted the global politics of natural resources. 1962 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 that formulated “the in- The East-West divide began to replace colonial contestations and re- alienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural wealth and source extraction regimes, and the newly independent states were resources in accordance with their national interests” and in debates at shaped by the entanglement of their resource possessions with super- the first U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in power interests and needs. Resources, and the industrial systems Geneva in 1964.1 The tensions culminated in OPEC’s 1973 oil embargo needed to extract them, also became important instruments as former and the subsequent demands by a range of Third World countries for a colonizers sought to build new relationships with the formerly colo- New International Economic Order that included raw materials sover- nized. In both contexts, resource extraction became inextricably tangled eignty and a pricing mechanism more in favour of developing coun- up with ideologies of modernization, either of the American variety that tries—even if those countries eventually got little out of this seeming “reconfigured the imperial civilising mission as a non-colonial discourse “triumph of third-worldism” (Rist, 2014: ch. 9). pivoted on building independent. . . national developmental states,” or The literature detailing this history of natural resources is mostly of the Soviet variety that emphasised state-led industrialism as the path geared towards the broad historical strokes, or else is slanted towards to socialism and real independence (Romero, 2014: 695). In Western- the interactions of developing countries with superpowers or former dominated contexts it also became tangled up with the interests of colonial powers (see, e.g., Eckes, 1979; Priest, 2005; Brands, 2007; multinational corporations that designed and implemented extractive Abraham, 2011; Dietrich, 2011; Dorn, 2011; Hecht, 2012; Gendron, projects, and which often justified their involvement in terms ofde- Ingulstad et al. 2013; Ingulstad et al., 2015; Black, 2016). Scholars have velopment and national interest, both to home constituents and when paid less attention to the group of industrialized states that held no interacting with Third World governments. territorial colonies in 1945. These were also involved in global resource However, the lure of development, which often failed to bring about markets, yet we know little about their aims or choice of strategies. For

E-mail address: [email protected]. 1 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1803, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,” December 14, 1962, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_1803/ ga_1803.html [accessed 7 May 2019]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.06.008 Received 7 January 2019; Received in revised form 7 May 2019; Accepted 24 June 2019 Available online 01 August 2019 2214-790X/ © 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/). K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49

Sweden, which is in focus here, we do know that there were numerous are less interested in the companies as such, however, and do not en- efforts from business actors to secure and extract resources abroadin gage empirically with them. The second approach is grounded more in the interwar and pre–World War One periods (Avango, Högselius et al. economic and business history and primarily focuses on the companies 2018; Vikström, Högselius et al. 2017). It is also recognized that after themselves. Prominent examples include Fred van der Kraaijös (1983) World War II, Sweden had considerable political involvement in the economic and William D. Coale, Jr.ös (1978) mono- Third World through its extensive program of development aid and graph on the Bong Mining Company. Both engage in source-based study high-profiled politics of solidarity with the global poor(Bjereld and of the mining concessions and their relationship with the Liberian state. Ekengren, 2004). Recent research has demonstrated, furthermore, that However, they do not clearly contextualize the companies in relation to Swedish industrial leaders simultaneously were keen on accessing the the long-term Liberian government strategies and goals discussed by new markets opening up through decolonization (Glover, 2016, 2018). Liebenow, Sawyer, and Whyte. The same applies to a much briefer Swedish interests in foreign natural resources in the Cold War period overview of LMC by Emmanuel Urey (2015). The most significant study have, however, scarcely been considered by earlier research. In this of LAMCO itself, a dissertation by Göran Bergström (2009), also follows paper, I will examine the major realization of such interest, namely, the this pattern.3 Bergström provides a thorough overview of LAMCO’s mining company LAMCO (the Liberian American-Swedish Minerals managing company’s strategic decision-making, but his analysis is si- Company) in Liberia, dominated strategically and operationally by a milar to van der Kraaij’s and Coale’s work in that it does not emphasize group of Swedish investors. I seek to understand how and why these long-term political aspects. Other work on LAMCO focus more on the Swedish actors got access to Liberian iron, and how their engagement in Swedish and less on the Liberian context. Nikolas Glover (2019) has Liberia developed. recently analysed media representations of LAMCO and their role in A starting point for my analysis is work by historians of technology Swedish debates on corporate social responsibility, and I have myself interested in the material underpinnings of the Cold War that has em- addressed the extent and goals of Swedish government support for phasized that technology was also a means to make politics: that “[t] LAMCO in an earlier study (Bruno, 2018). I will therefore not elaborate echnological systems and expertise offered less visible—but sometimes on the latter dimension in this paper. more powerful—means of shaping or reshaping political rule, economic It follows from the above that there is an asymmetry in the earlier arrangements, social relationships, and cultural forms.” (Hecht, 2011: historical studies of mineral extraction in post-war Liberia. The studies 1) Technological systems employed to extract natural resources are that discuss the broader politics of the Liberian resource concessions do prime examples. In the paper, I understand LAMCO as an expression of not study them empirically, while the empirical studies of the conces- such technopolitics, a notion that signals how, in Liberia, the technolo- sions have narrower conceptions of their role in larger political projects. gies of mining were means to achieve political ends for the involved Neither, furthermore, consider the particular context of Cold War re- actors. These ends could converge but also diverge. In addition, the source politics. My paper fills this gap with two specific contributions. technopolitics of mining often produced outcomes that were both un- First, I argue that the creation of LAMCO must be understood in the intended and unexpected. This reflects how the making of politics context of the early Cold War and its international politics. This through the design or use of technology is never a process straightfor- nuances our understanding of the resource concessions in Liberia, while wardly in the hands of those ostensibly controlling technological sys- also adding to the literature on resources and the Cold War by clarifying tems. It is rather common that technopolitical outcomes are unin- the conditions under which actors from an ostensibly non-aligned and tended, either because some subaltern group appropriates the non-colonial country could gain access to minerals in Africa during this technology’s political potentials or because the complexity of the period. Second, I argue that the development of LAMCO was char- technical system—and the socio-ecological context into which it is in- acterized by a specific technopolitical dynamic resulting from the en- serted—makes its impact inherently unpredictable (Mitchell, 2002; counter between the Liberian government’s development strategy and Hecht, 2010). The case of LAMCO in Liberia shows how this could play the Swedish investors’ need to mitigate political risks both in Liberia out in the context of small-state resource interests and Third World and at home. This adds to the history of Liberia but also, more gen- programs of development, during the Cold War. erally, to the history of national and multinational extractive industries In post-war Liberia there were four iron mining companies: The in postcolonial Africa and their interactions with state authorities. This West German-controlled Bong Mining Company, the (American) is knowledge that arguably remains relevant today: though the geo- Republic Steel-owned Liberian Mining Company (LMC), the National political context is different, there is no shortage of similar extractive Iron Ore Company, which was closely associated with LMC and its projects managed by overseas interests across the global South. owners although the Liberian government was nominally the largest shareholder, and the Swedish-dominated LAMCO, which was the lar- gest enterprise in the group.2 Earlier historical research on these com- 2. Minerals for the free world panies tends to take one of two different analytical approaches. The first approach primarily analyses the mining companies in relation to the The technical and political relations that constituted the mineral Liberian government’s overall political aims. In their respective over- contents of the Nimba range as a valuable natural resource, and enabled views of Liberian history, J. Gus Liebenow and argue that the establishment of a Swedish-led extractive industry to exploit this 4 under President William V. S. Tubman (in power from 1944 until his resource, are inseparable from the early Cold War. At that time, Liberia death in 1971), the central government of Liberia employed foreign was (alongside Ethiopia) one of only two independent states in sub- investments in natural resources as part of a conscious strategy to in- Saharan Africa. It had existed since the mid-nineteenth century, when crease its own power and capabilities (Liebenow, 1987; Sawyer, 1992). freed American slaves who had colonised the coast declared their polity Similarly, Christine Whyte sees the resource concessions as one in- a sovereign state. Closely associated with the , Liberia had stantiation of a long-lasting attempt of the Liberian government to se- been an important staging area for Allied operations in North Africa cure economic and political control of its hinterlands, and thus inter- during World War II and was firmly within the American sphere of national legitimacy as a territorial state (Whyte, 2017). These scholars influence at war’s end. Like all of , it had also become

3 Besides Bergström’s dissertation, I would like to mention a more popularly 2 Another crucial resource-exporting enterprise in Liberia was the Firestone written account of LAMCO that was published recently (in Swedish) by Eva rubber plantation. It dated to the interwar period and had a formative impact Ersson Åbom (2018). on Liberia’s economic transformation to an export-oriented economy domi- 4 On natural resources as constituted through human relations, see Bridge nated by overseas companies. (2009).

40 K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49 important as a potential source of raw materials (Ibikunle Tijani, 2008; positive reply was presumably a precondition for SEB’s engagement, as Oyebade and Falola, 2008). It was thus drawn into the new Cold War it could not afford antagonizing U.S. connections, but the correspon- context of superpower resource interests in, and political positioning dence is more interesting in its highlighting of the political context. vis-à-vis, what would become known as the developing world. As Dulles used the word “responsible” twice. This was a clear political Megan Black has shown, these met in President Truman’s Point Four signal: responsible meant aligned with American interests. Swedish program of technical assistance to developing countries. The Point Four participation would be creditable as long as it stayed within these aid functioned as a form of political cover for the acquisition of mi- limits. nerals. It could “deflect anti-imperialist ire” and help American com- The character of the limits as they applied in this situation can be panies gain access to areas not as open to explicit resource exploitation derived from a 1951 U.S. Department of State Policy Statement on the programs (Black, 2016: 88–89). Liberia would have been more acces- “long-range objectives of US policy toward Liberia.” It listed three ob- sible to American prospecting than many other places—and American jectives: stimulating needed economic and social reforms; encouraging iron ore prospecting had been carried out in the country before the natural resource development by American companies; and main- war—but the same logic still played out there.5 The “mineral objec- taining the U.S. strategic and commercial position. The policy also tives” (Black, 2016: 87) of the Point Four program manifested as a set of opened for “other foreign investment and commercial activity in the U.S.-sponsored geological surveys that, among other things, identified Liberian economy,” in order to “assure the best possible development of potentially valuable deposits of high-grade iron ore in the Putu region. Liberia’s natural resources.” The principal U.S. concern was thus not to These surveys were a precondition for the creation of LAMCO keep other states out but to make sure that “the development of the (Bergström, 2009: 51). Liberian mineral and other resources” took place in ways that could Following up on the Point Four surveys, American business pro- “ensure American consumers free and equal access to any newly-dis- moters Lee Edgar Detweiler and Alfred Wang formed a company and, in covered sources and permit acquisition of any available supplies for US 1953, reached an agreement with the Liberian government that gave Government stockpiles.” The policy also noted that “friendly foreign them concessionary rights to prospect for and mine iron in Putu. commercial activity” would be approved if it carried “no undesirable Lacking mining expertise and capital themselves, Detweiler and Wang political implications.” This primarily referred to the United Kingdom looked for partners elsewhere. The initial offer of participation to and France, the colonial powers in West Africa, who sought to increase Swedish companies seems, according to available accounts, have been a their influence in Liberia. In light of this, it seems likely that Swedish matter of a chance encounter between the two Americans and a investors—coming from a state with little apparent political interest in Swedish businessman. The latter took the offer to some of his connec- Liberia—were especially welcome, as long as they did not engage in tions and eventually interested Stockholms Enskilda Bank (SEB), an cartels and were prepared to give American buyers “free and equal industrial bank in Sweden controlled by the influential Wallenberg fa- access” to the Liberian resources they developed.8 mily (Gårdlund, 1967: 10–11, Bergström, 2009: 50–55). Its managing By 1955, the Swedish interest was taking on a more solid shape. director Marcus Wallenberg quickly took the lead. Sensitized to global Crucially, mining conglomerate Grängesbergsbolaget (Gränges) had politics through his extensive international business contacts and his gotten involved, bringing both technical expertise and an established role as an international trade negotiator for neutral Sweden during sales organization to the endeavour. Having declined to participate in a World War II (Olsson, 2001), Wallenberg’s first action was to politically Liberian venture when first approached in 1953, Gränges had recon- clear the proposed enterprise with the United States. sidered once it was becoming clear that the Swedish government would Wallenberg’s American contacts demonstrate how the Cold War make it rescind its interest in the major iron mines in northern Sweden. conditions that shaped the Liberian mineral surveys were also for- This freed up resources for new investments and triggered a “desire to mative for the subsequent Swedish involvement. In December 1953, he develop its traditional expertise” elsewhere (Meinander, 1968: 487). sounded out his acquaintance Allen Dulles, director of the CIA and the SEB, Gränges, and a group of other Swedish companies formed the brother of John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, about Swedish LAMCO Syndicate, a joint Swedish party that then entered into “whether such a Swedish small minority position [which was the only negotiations with other interested parties in Liberia, the United States, thing discussed at this stage] would fit in with the American over-all and West (to which a lot of the ore was expected to be sold) policy and particularly with the Point Four program …” Wallenberg about the project’s realization. The long and overlapping processes of acknowledged the potential sensitivity of Sweden’s geopolitical position further prospecting and financial negotiations (during which Detweiler in the context of the U.S. “over-all policy.” He noted that his country and Wang were outmanoeuvred, the American Bethlehem Steel Cor- was “of course, not a member of the NATO,” but then signalled its in- poration entered the project, and the geographical focus shifted to Mt. tegration in the Western politico-economic sphere by emphasizing that Nimba) have been detailed in earlier accounts and will not be repeated it nevertheless was a member of “the United Nations, the World Bank here (see Gårdlund, 1967: ch. 1, Bergström, 2009: ch. 3). Suffice it to and the International Monetary Fund.”6 Dulles replied that he could not say that obstacles relating to the American relationship with Liberia and speak officially on the matter, but that his impression was that“re- the Third World in general necessitated further high-level political sponsible Swedish participation” would be welcome, and that being negotiations in the United States, with the syndicate’s negotiators able to add Sweden to the list of countries participating in the devel- making direct approaches to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Robert opment of “backward areas” would “be all on the credit side.”7 This B. Anderson and the Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon in the fall of 1960 (Bergström, 2009: 71). These eventually agreed that the rea- lization of LAMCO was in the American interest. Negotiations suc- 5 “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Division of cessfully concluded at the end of 1960. Near Eastern Affairs,” Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, The outcome was a complex corporate structure called the LAMCO 1938, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East, and Africa, Volume II, Joint Venture. Bethlehem Steel owned 25% of the joint venture (and Document 673, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1938v02/ would take a corresponding 25% of the mine’s output), while the d673 [accessed 6 May 2019]. Liberian American-Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO) held the re- 6 This tension between military non-alignment and Western economic and maining 75%. Ownership of LAMCO was split between the Liberian cultural belonging was a defining feature of Sweden’s position during the Cold War: see, e.g., Bjereld and Ekengren (2004). 7 Marcus Wallenberg to Allen Dulles, 12 December 1953; Dulles to Wallenberg, 26 December 1953, Stockholms Enskilda Bank archives [hence- 8 “Department of State Policy Statement,” Foreign Relations of the United States, forth SEB], F1C: 1637, The Foundation for Economic History Research within 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V, Document 712, https://history. Banking and Enterprise. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v05/d712 [accessed 6 May 2019].

41 K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49 state (50%) and another company called Liberian Iron Ore Ltd. (LIO), deliberations and motives in this particular case, but if so, the Swedish- which the Swedish syndicate controlled.9 The Export-Import Bank and led LAMCO served American mineral interests in a way similar to what the First National City Bank in the United States and the Kreditanstalt the technical assistance of the Point Four program was intended to do. für Wiederaufbau in Germany provided further financing. Liberia’s 50% stake in LAMCO represented an unusually high degree of influence for the host government compared with similar investments at the time, 3. Mining as development? though it only translated into five of eleven representatives on the board of directors (Gårdlund, 1967: 32–34). It was, however, an ar- The Liberian government, led since 1944 by President William V. S. rangement the Liberian government generally demanded from foreign Tubman, also engaged with LAMCO from the outset, seeing in it an concessionaires. It related to the particular political context in which it opportunity to promote its own domestic and international agendas. understood them and which I will discuss below. Operatively, things Since the foundation of Liberia, the nation’s chief social issue had been were simpler. The joint venture contracted out the operation of the the relationship between the Americo-Liberian settler society and the mine, the Atlantic port in Buchanan from which the ore would be indigenous inhabitants. The former was in total economic and political shipped, and the railroad connecting Nimba to Buchanan, to Gränges. It control of the state in spite of being a small minority of the population ran the enterprise through a wholly owned subsidiary called the (Sawyer, 1992). President Tubman was, rhetorically but to some extent LAMCO Joint Venture Operating Company.10 also in his political practice, committed to reducing this ethnic and These findings show how the involved Swedish investors con- economic divide in a way that nonetheless minimized the political sciously and carefully sought to stake a claim in Liberia that was based fallout and preserved the Americo-Liberian superiority. To this end, he on American groundwork without challenging American interests. They launched a ‘unification campaign’ that was closely linked to abroad saw in Liberia a chance to make a mining profit and a way to make a program of economic development based on the extraction of natural name for themselves in growing Third World markets.11 They also resources by way of an ‘open-door policy,’ which meant inviting foreign realized, as both Wallenberg’s coordination with Dulles and the sub- concessionaires with the necessary know-how and capital. Tubman sequent cabinet-level approaches in Washington demonstrate, that in often presented the joint goals of development and unification as clo- this context, American objectives—mineral and geopolitical—were sely integrated, as for example in a speech during the 1956 Liberian both a potential means to profit and a constraint that had to beman- independence celebrations: aged. It was not, in the first instance, a constraint in terms of conflicting The Liberty to Develop must supersede and transcend all our other interests, but it meant that it was necessary to consider U.S. preferences liberties, for it must give force and effect to each and all of them. It throughout. The Swedish investors had to frame the project as one of must be based upon the Unification Policy which is welding our mutual benefice not only between themselves and Liberia but alsobe- population into a strong, virile and united people. It must be based tween themselves and the United States. upon the Open Door Policy which is bringing into the country more From the U.S. point of view, LAMCO accordingly became under- and more enterprises and concessions, teaching new skills, em- stood as part of its efforts to achieve strategic objectives in Liberia ploying more people and putting more money into circulation.13 (Dunn, 2009: ch. 2) and of the broader effort to secure resources in Africa. At the conclusion of the drawn-out financial negotiations, the Behind this straightforward modernization narrative, built on the board of directors of the Export-Import Bank sent a congratulatory premise of trading resources for development, there was a more specific letter to LAMCO, seemingly for reading out at a formal dinner in technopolitical program. The open-door policy was designed to ensure . The directors stated that they were happy to assist with a that any major investment was in line with the government’s political project that not only would promote Liberian development, but also objectives and promoted its stability as well as continued Americo- “provide the Free World with another major source of high grade iron Liberian privilege. This was most clearly manifested in the fact that ore,” and further noted with pleasure “that a great Swedish concern only white investors from Europe and the United States, who could not with an enviable reputation [i.e., Gränges] has been obtained to act as become naturalized Liberians and had no incentives to strive for any- manager of this venture.”12 The Ex-Im Bank was an agency of the thing but a political status quo, were encouraged (van der Kraaij, 1983: United States government that, from the late 1940s, had begun to play 45). It was also the reason why the Liberian government insisted on an important role in U.S. Cold War foreign policy, not least when it having a significant stake in the open-door companies. There was, came to financing the procurement of resources abroad (Becker and however, a deeper implication too. The nature of the concession McClenahan, 2003: ch. 3). When it celebrated LAMCO as part of the agreements Liberia entered into around and after World War II led to a broader effort of securing African minerals for the “Free World” and marked increase in the institutional capacities of the presidency and announced its satisfaction with a Swedish company enrolled as the central government. They provided it with major sources of revenue managing party, it reflected a political goal in line with the 1951 policy that were independent of its peripheral administrative apparatus and statement. It is also possible that Washington understood the leading did not come with the same association of accountability as taxes levied Swedish role in the enterprise as a way to dampen the negative political directly on the population. Through this, the open-door policy helped effects of American attempts to secure resources. This has to remaina establish a new political order. Whereas political influence had earlier speculative conclusion until more research can be done on American been distributed among different centres of power within the Americo- Liberian elite, the economic reconfigurations that followed the major foreign investments after World War II helped elevate the functional 9 However, one fourth of LIO’s shares were owned by other investors, in- powers of the Tubman presidency to a level that Sawyer describes as the cluding a number of individuals in Liberia and elsewhere. “emergence of autocracy” in Liberia (Sawyer, 1992: 10; a similar point 10 In the following, I will generally use LAMCO to refer to the overall en- is made in Liebenow, 1987). terprise, only distinguishing between the LAMCO JV, LAMCO, and LJVOC if the The first contribution Tubman expected from LAMCO was thusa analysis requires. new revenue stream that would contribute to reshaping political rule in 11 Gränges went on to entertain the idea that it could offer management services to other Third World mining enterprises without necessarily engaging an investor. See Erland Waldenström, “Uppdrag i samband med planerande av 13 Manuscript of speech by President , 18 July 1956, File: utländska gruvprojekt,” 29 November 1960, Gränges archives, 082 – Direktör Speeches: William V.S. Tubman, 1947–1971, Series: Subject Files, Record Erland Waldenströms handarkiv, E1: 8, Swedish National Archives. Group: Liberian Government Papers, William V.S. Tubman Papers, 1904–1992, 12 Untitled letter from the Board of Directors of the Ex-Im Bank, 31 January http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/findingaids/lcp/VAB6923 [accessed 7 May 1961, SEB, F1C: 1638. 2019].

42 K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49

Liberia. Dividends would be forthcoming once profitable operations helped the Swedish government see LAMCO as a possible means to were set up, and LAMCO would pay a land rent and a limited royalty as portray Sweden in a positive light in the Third World and beyond. It well (see the summaries of the 1953 and 1960 LAMCO concession consequently promoted the enterprise through diplomatic activities agreements in van der Kraaij, 1983: annex 14). At the same time, it and, primarily, through funding a technical school associated with the remained crucial to Tubman’s legitimacy that the company functioned company as an aid project (for more on the Swedish government’s as a direct vehicle of modernization. In this respect, the form of position, see Bruno (2018)). LAMCO’s mining system was very congruent with Tubman’s objectives. At the same time, internal documents make clear that the Swedes LAMCO created railroad, road, and harbor infrastructures that were also understood and sought to exploit the other side of Tubman’s crucial for its own operations but simultaneously enabled easier technopolitical program, namely, his increasing personalization of transport and communication—and more central government con- power. After his first meeting with Tubman, in 1957, Marcus trol—within the country, helping to integrate the hinterlands into the Wallenberg aptly characterized him as a “dictator” and Liberia as a state. Its and schools were necessary establishments to attract “one-man show.”16 The Swedish syndicate’s leaders made use of this expatriate staff, but also made education and healthcare more broadly centrality of Tubman to Liberian politics—a centrality their investments available in a way that the Liberian government could not have man- simultaneously strengthened—by staying in Tubman’s good graces aged on its own yet could still take credit for (Ortmark, 1977; through personal engagement with him and a steady flow of gifts (they Liebenow, 1987). In a 1959 speech in , the regional capital were helped significantly in this by Johnston Avery’s coaching onhow and the closest pre-existing settlement to LAMCO’s mining area, to best interact with the president).17 Tubman emphasized how his government had been able to “attract This simultaneous encouragement of development and dictatorship foreign investment capital to the country” and distribute this capital “in should not be understood as hypocrisy on the Swedish investors’ part. It such a manner as to bring employment simultaneously to your door- reflected a coherent political philosophy, discernible in Wallenberg’s steps.” In the speech, Tubman thus claimed that he was delivering on musing that “people in these latitudes … benefit from a dictator under his promises of material progress. The undercurrent of his claims also the emblem and banner of democracy,” which held both industrial related to the defining question of the Liberian state, namely, there- development and strong leadership as necessary for social progress.18 It lation between the coastal Americo-Liberians and the interior. Since was also a fact that appealing directly to Tubman could resolve most early in the century, the government had deployed the concept of de- issues in Liberia. A notable example is a complicated conflict and legal velopment to mediate this relation (Whyte, 2017), and the remoteness process that took place in 1965 over the boundaries of LAMCO’s con- of LAMCO meant it perfectly embodied Tubman’s take on this strategy: cession area. In private, the Liberian Secretary of the Treasury, Charles the integration of development, unification, and foreign investment. Sherman, suggested to a LAMCO executive that Marcus Wallenberg was Accordingly, Tubman declared that his open-door and unification po- the only person “who could straighten this whole thing out … in a licies had transformed Sanniquellie from “an isolated, jungle-hidden, private session with the president.” That is what eventually happened: hard-to-reach town, into one of the most promising places in the na- Wallenberg and Tubman worked it out amongst themselves, and the tion.”14 legal outcome reflected Tubman’s LAMCO-friendly decision.19 For their part, the Swedish investors spent considerable time on Another part of the open-door policy’s context was Liberia’s inter- trying to understand Liberia and the role of their project in the country. national relations. Although Tubman remained closely oriented to the They were able to draw on a valuable resource in American busi- U.S., he sought to diversify Liberia’s foreign relations and, particularly, nessman and former Point Four official Johnston Avery, who became reduce its economic and political dependence on American capital, associated with LAMCO at an early stage and who both knew much which had been almost total on his accession to the presidency in 1944. about Liberia and enjoyed a personal friendship with President So if the United States were pleased to see Swedish companies devel- Tubman. As such, they quickly identified Tubman’s technopolitical oping minerals for the “Free World” in Liberia, then the Liberian gov- aims, and in response sought to both construct and portray their mine ernment was likewise pleased to receive non-American investors. as part of Liberian national development. In a 1959 letter to Marcus LAMCO’s Swedishness and its major customers in Germany were poli- Wallenberg, Sture Linnér, general manager of LAMCO’s Liberian op- tical advantages that contributed to positive relations with the gov- erations, wrote that “[b]eside and beyond the iron ore business proper ernment (Carlsson, 1982: 75). Swedish neutrality also helped: Liberia we are … trying to fulfil, as it were, a civic and social responsibility,” under Tubman found it important to expand its international connec- and thanked the syndicate board members for their support in tions as much as possible, but could not afford to have close relations achieving this goal.15 Two years later, Gränges’ CEO Erland Walden- with countries in the socialist bloc. It therefore actively cultivated its ström declared that his company had been “trusted” with a “project of connections with nonaligned states, including, besides Sweden, Austria, major importance for the economic and social development” in Liberia, Switzerland, and India. (Liebenow, 1987: 139–143). a project that had to be aligned with “the long-term development Furthermore, intra-African relations shaped Tubman’s appreciation program drawn up by its government.” (cited in Gårdlund, 1967: of LAMCO. Well aware of his position as president of the continent’s 31–32) These private and public statements suggest that they under- stood that creating congruence between profit motives and develop- mental politics would be important to LAMCO’s success. It aligned the 16 M[arcus]. W[allenberg]., “Samtal med president Tubman den 12.12 1957 company with Tubman’s domestic priorities and helped safeguard it on board Liberias Presidential yacht. Pres. John E Royre [sic],” 2–3, undated, against the—from the investors’ perspective—unpredictable risks as- SEB, F1C: 1644. sociated with Liberian politics. It also catered to private and public 17 Silver cabinets, sporting clay shotguns, a bust of the president, and many constituencies at home, contributing to LAMCO’s representation as “a other things found their way to Tubman’s executive mansion, often along with prime example of responsible capitalism with a human—primarily gracious greetings on birthdays or other occasions, courtesy of the involved Swedish—face.” (Glover, 2019: 416–17). The framing furthermore Swedish companies. The references to these gifts are too numerous to list in full, but they can be found in SEB, F1C, volumes 1644–55. 18 M. W., “Samtal med president Tubman.” This ideology was widely spread among Swedish industrialists: see Glover (2019). 14 Manuscript of speech by President William Tubman, 5 February 1959, File: 19 Anonymous (probably Johnston Avery), “Report on visit Monrovia April 24 Speeches: William V.S. Tubman, 1947–1971, Series: Subject Files, Record – May 2, 1965,” SEB, F1C: 1623. Cf. van der Kraaij’s (1983) account of the affair Group: Liberian Government Papers, William V.S. Tubman Papers, 1904–1992, (pp. 212–16), which focuses on the formal-legal aspects of the dispute and http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/lcp/VAB6923-00638 [accessed 6 May 2019]. underemphasizes the significance of the informal negotiations that went onin 15 Sture Linnér to Wallenberg, 16 April 1959, SEB, F1C: 1637. the background.

43 K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49 oldest republic, Tubman often sought to play the role of elder statesman not last past the late 1960s. Even as the triumphant newsletter article and moderating influence on more radical leaders in African diplomatic quoted above was published in 1969, Tubman had begun to adopt a contexts. His vision of Africa’s future built on pragmatism: rather than more hesitant attitude. Several factors contributed, one of which was the political transformation based on African unity envisaged by for LAMCO’s increasingly recognized technopolitical unpredictability. example Ghanaian president , Tubman advocated a The government had attempted to make sure that the concessions legalist-statist political order with continued ties to the West. This promoted political status quo and that it would derive credit from their foreign policy meshed with his politics of national development. He investments in infrastructure, education, and healthcare, while explicitly advanced Liberia’s “spirit of unification” as a model for LAMCO’s foreign investors and managers were content with upholding Africa, a move that sought to reduce the political liability of Liberia’s good relations with the Tubman government. In the mid-1960s, it sharp political and socio-economic divide between colonizers and in- nevertheless became clear that the presence and importance of LAMCO digenous Africans in a context where national liberation and self-de- could not but affect Liberian political dynamics, particularly in relation termination was strongly emphasized (Dunn, 2012). The unification to the unification policy. The most dramatic expression of this took policy’s connection to the open-door policy—which in itself reflected place in late 1967 when two of LAMCO’s Liberian managers were ar- Tubman’s view on the maintenance of pragmatic relations to the Wes- rested and the ensuing ruckus led to the resignation of Richard Lowe, t—also brought natural resources into the discourse. In line with his the chief executive of the LAMCO Joint Venture Operating Company. overall vision, Nkrumah was a harsh critic of foreign exploitation of Behind the conflict lay multifaceted tensions. On the one hand, there African natural resources, which he saw as a crucial part of the con- was friction in the mining community between Americo- tinued Northern interference that he labeled “neo-colonialism” Liberian managers in LAMCO and indigenous Liberians that Tubman, in (Nkrumah, 1965). In this context, the seeming success of LAMCO’s line with the unification policy, had appointed to government positions fusing of profitable mining with social responsibility and national in . On the other hand, there was also a conflict between unification became an important part of a counter-narrative thatde- the government and a faction of the Americo-Liberian elite that re- fended the Liberian model and the open-door policy that was integrated sented Tubman’s policies and his increasing monopoly on power. The with Tubman’s personal power and prestige. It found, for example, very incident itself involved the refusal of an Americo-Liberian LAMCO clear expression in a special issue of LAMCO’s newsletter published for manager to obey a minor request from a county official and, allegedly, the Tubman administration’s Silver Jubilee in 1969. Describing the some defamatory claims about the government and the president. Using open-door and unification policies as “The Tubman Formula,” anun- this as pretext, Tubman sought to make an example out of two of his signed article called LAMCO the “classic expression” of this formula and opponents by having them arrested. Lowe then intervened to protect his went on to note that the “substantial” foreign investments had not only employees and his company’s interests, but he approached Tubman at created “one of the world’s technically most advanced mining opera- an inopportune moment and had already provoked him by earlier cri- tions” but also constituted “a major and permanent investment in Li- ticizing the collection of political funds from the pay of LAMCO workers beria’s continued growth and development.” In a pointed conclusion, it by government agents. To Tubman, this represented two counts of in- then argued that LAMCO demonstrated “what can be accomplished in tolerable interference in what he considered internal Liberian affairs. any developing country when investors and the whole society work to- He made a public statement to that effect, after which Lowe resigned gether on a partnership basis.”20 his position.22 Relations between LAMCO and the government were subsequently restored, but the affair—both the actions of the two ar- rested managers and Lowe’s interventions—demonstrated to Tubman 4. Technopolitical complications that the political outcomes of technopolitical modernization were not always controllable or predictable. In particular, concessions like The relationship between President Tubman and the international LAMCO could seemingly generate new forms of political capital at odds concessions that dominated economic life in post-war Liberia shares with the government’s aims. characteristics of what economists and business historians call “crony A similar demonstration of technopolitical unpredictability related capitalism,” a mode of economic operation that can arise when in- to LAMCO’s and other mining companies organization of large in- stitutions are weak and patronage networks carry decisive influence, dustrial workforces in a country hitherto dominated by a subsistence and in which personal access to politicians become a determining factor economy, and with the conditions of subordination inherent in the 21 of corporate profits. This dimension should perhaps not be overstated technological system of mining that they had taken to Liberia. The for the case of LAMCO, which did not draw on long-developed personal implications were not lost on the government, which tried to channel relations that preceded the investors’ entry into Liberia, did not extend the growing labor movement into politically acceptable forms. From beyond the particulars of the extractive project, and did not build on 1963, the government granted freedom of unionization to workers in fundamentally shared economic or political goals between Tubman and the mining and commercial sectors, but all unions had to be affiliated the Swedish syndicate. It does highlight, however, both the possibility with one of two confederations: the Congress of Industrial and importance of good relations with Tubman for any major foreign Organizations of Liberia (CIO) or the United Workers Congress (Dunn, enterprise in 1950s and 1960s Liberia. In this narrower sense, cronyism Beyan et al., 2001). Both were vehicles of the government and were not helped LAMCO develop into an operational success and firmly establish intended to effectively safeguard labor interests. This is clear from the itself in Liberian economic life. It grew to become a crucial part of the fact that in the early 1960s, the larger CIO was led by William Tubman, national economy, making up 15% of the GNP and directly employing Jr., the president’s son, who simultaneously held a managerial position 5% of the total labor force. Annual sales increased most years through in LAMCO with responsibilities for labor and public relations the 1960s and though the bottom line result varied with international (Liebenow, 1987: 74). Even so, the confederations were unable to prices, LAMCO consistently showed a profit during the decade prevent repeated strikes both at the mine and at the Buchanan por- (Ortmark, 1977; Bergström, 2009). However, the favorable climate did t—important ones took place in 1965, 1966, 1971, and, most promi- nently, in 1977—and the government often resorted to repression. The

20 reasons for these labor actions varied and the workers did not always “LAMCO and the Open Door Policy,” LAMCO News 12/68, 6, SEB, F1C: 1651. My emphases. 21 The concept has mostly been applied to South East Asia, where it has been evoked as an explanation for the financial crisis of the late 1990s. For ahis- 22 See Johnston Avery, “Report,” 7 December 1967; “Report no. 5,” 7 January torical exploration, see White (2004); for an African example, Akinyoade and 1968; and other reports and documents in the same archival file: SEB, F1C: Uche (2018). 1651.

44 K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49 voice opinions on national policy, but in the early 1970s, the Swedish embassy in Monrovia reported that the unrest was nevertheless often interpreted in terms of political opposition and could be mobilized for political purposes by oppositional intellectuals and political operators in Monrovia.23 If the ultimate goal of the open-door policy was a form of development congruent with prevailing conditions and with pro- moting the centralization of power, then labor actions with political connotations salient enough to be noticed by foreign diplomats was clearly another unintended, and—from the government’s point of view—undesirable technopolitical consequence. The reevaluation of the government’s position was also embedded in an increasing hesitation over whether companies like LAMCO really were “permanent investments” in Liberia’s development. Many had begun to argue that they rather were embodiments of what later economists have called the “resource curse,” a term highlighting ne- Fig. 1. LAMCO Joint Venture production between 1968 and 1981. For re- ference, LAMCO’s output in 1977 (8.7 million tonnes) represented about 1% of gative consequences of extractive economies that derive from, among the global iron ore production (Bergström, 2009: 28). Source: LIO Annual Re- other things, the dominance of foreign investors and the absence of ports, SEB, F1C: 1620. socioeconomic structures that encourage the productive reinvestment of profits (Auty, 1993; for an earlier critique, see also Girvan, 1976; for an overview of the intellectual history of mining and development, direction in Liberia, the Swedish companies involved in LAMCO were 26 Graulau, 2008). In 1966, a team of economists from Northwestern nevertheless concerned. Their concerns mounted as the relationship University in the United States had published a study of Liberia’s with the government came under great stress when the global steel economy titled Growth without Development, which argued that though crisis of the late 1970s wrecked LAMCO’s markets. After making record the international concessions contributed to impressive economic profits in 1975 and 1976, its profitability dropped sharply towards the growth, this did not translate into broader socio-economic development end of the decade as demand and prices for iron decreased (Fig. 2). This (Clower and Armstrong, 1966). The report’s criticism of the govern- led to explicit disagreements about how to operate the company. A ment reduced its traction with Tubman, and though he began to signal number of controversies arose in the second half of the 1970s, of which the need for a new relationship with the concessions in the late 1960s,24 the most contentious issue related to LAMCO’s capital structure. The he was ultimately too personally associated with the ‘Tubman Formula’ government argued that the project management needlessly withheld to initiate serious reform. After Tubman passed away in 1971, however, dividends and had created a financial setup that cheated Liberia outof 27 his vice-president assumed the presidency. Tolbert was its rightful share of the gains derived from the export of its resources. more open to advice from foreign-trained experts and ministers who At the core of the government’s concern with respect to the latter advocated a new stance on the concessions (van der Kraaij, 1983). controversy lay the great fiscal importance of LAMCO to Liberia. When setting out his agenda in a speech soon after taking power, he Lingering behind it was also the international discourse of the 1970s thus outlined a plan to revise the concession agreements in order to and its increasing concern with the structural unfairness of the global clarify their “ambiguous provisions” so that they would “conform to economy, as manifested in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New present-day internationally acceptable standards and trends of fair International Economic Order (NIEO) that, at the behest of the Third 28 thinking.”25 The year after Tolbert spoke more bluntly in stating that World countries, the UN General Assembly adopted in 1974. The key Liberia’s “natural resources are being steadily depleted” and that the objective of the NIEO was to reconfigure the global economy to make it “environment is being polluted,” while “our people receive compara- less disadvantageous to developing countries. Few tangible benefits tively insufficient … compensation.” (cited in Coale Jr., 1978: 153) came out of it, but it formed part of the framework in which the Li- (Fig. 1). berian government had begun to understand its concessions in the mid- Re-negotiations of the concession agreement still proceeded rela- 1970s. For example, the NIEO included support for producer’s asso- tively smoothly, and LAMCO signed a new agreement with Liberia in ciations, and Liberia had joined such a cartel of iron ore producers: the 1974. Nevertheless, company-government tensions intensified through Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries (Association des pays ex- the 1970s. This related, at least partly, to the ways in which the Tolbert portateurs de minerai de fer, APEF). It used its membership to seek presidency differed from the Tubman presidency. Tolbert largely re- advice on how to deal with its concessionaries, albeit to unclear ef- 29 jected Tubman’s highly personal style of governance and attempted to fect. This contrasted markedly with Tubman’s attempts at upholding replace his predecessor’s paternalism with a form of bureaucratic ra- the open-door policy as a positive example for Africa. Rather than tionality that relied less on networks of patronage (Sawyer, 1992). emphasizing what could be achieved by North and South working to- Accordingly, the Swedish syndicate’s relations with the president be- gether, the new framework was confrontational and focused on judg- came more formal, and the previous common ground between the ments about fair and unfair returned values. parties eroded. The global context was also different. At least since the late 1960s’ expropriation of American-owned copper mines in Chile, the prospect of nationalization loomed large over all international mining 26 Swedish LAMCO Syndicate Board meeting minutes, 7 May 1974, SEB, F1C: investors in the Third World. While there were no explicit moves in this 1629; Tryggve Angel, “Betr: Nationaliseringen av järnmalmsgruvor, Chile och Venezuela,” 7 March 1975, SEB, F1C: 1630. 27 This and other controversies can be followed in the minutes of various LAMCO meetings: Participants’ Meetings, Board of Directors Meetings, and 23 Hans Sköld, “Lamcostrejken – oron på arbetsmarknaden,” 3 November Swedish LAMCO Syndicate Board Meetings. Materials are available in SEB, F1C: 1971, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives [henceforth UD], 03.2, H96: volumes 1625 to 1635 contain materials from the 1970s. 45, Swedish National Archives. 28 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3201, “Declaration on the 24 S[ven]E[rsman], T[ryggve]A[ngel] and J[an]E[kman], “Re: LAMCO – Visit Establishment of a New International Economic Order,” May 1, 1974, http:// to Liberia and December 10 – 18, 1968,” 3–4, 20 December 1968, SEB, www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm [accessed 7 May 2019]. F1C: 1651. 29 Somewhat incongruously, Sweden—because it too was a major iron ex- 25 Tolbert is cited in Hans Sköld, “Förändringens vind i Liberia?,” 6 October porter—was one of the countries APEF approached on Liberia’s behalf in 1977. 1971, UD, 03.2, HP1: 1296. B. K. Sanyal to Stig Brattström, 10 October 1977, UD, 03.3, H40: 61.

45 K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49

from the Swedish state, as new political winds at home disfavored both LAMCO and Liberia. The earlier aid project had ceased in 1972 and the Swedish embassy in Monrovia was run by a skeleton crew, both factors that might have further aggravated the Liberian government (Bruno, 2018). More significantly, however, the U.S. cable also stated that the “philosophic underpinning” for the workers’ demands came from one of Liberia’s leading dissidents, Togba-Nah Tipoteh. This implied that the labor conflict, and by extension LAMCO’s role in the Liberian economy, was now central to political struggles in Monrovia. Tipoteh was an American-educated economist who led the oppositional Movement for Justice in Africa, or MOJA. MOJA and its sister organization, the Susukuu corporation, were highly critical of the close relationship be- tween the government and the concessionary enterprises, arguing that Fig. 2. LAMCO (proper) net profit in millions of USD between 1968 and 1981. they jointly oppressed the workers of Liberia (Liebenow, 1987: ch. 12, Source: LIO Annual Reports, SEB, F1C: 1620. Tipoteh, 1982).32 In this context, President Tolbert’s position was problematic and There was presumably something of what economists call an ‘ob- very sensitive. The state remained LAMCO’s largest owner and Tolbert’s solescing bargain’ at play in these changes, with Liberia being able to government was fiscally dependent on its continued operation. Yethe take a harder line once it had gained more experience of interacting almost certainly did believe that LAMCO’s foreign owners had taken with its investors and once LAMCO and other mining concessions were advantage of Liberia, and with the mounting political challenges had up and running so that investors could not as easily withdraw.30 Other good reasons to be concerned about the possible fallout of taking the factors were at play as well, however, notably that Tolbert was not as company’s side in the labor dispute. In conversation with the American interested in the technopolitics of self-empowerment as Tubman had ambassador, Tolbert noted that while “no one wants to kill the goose been. This reflected differences between the two presidents in termsof that lays the golden egg,” LAMCO had failed to act as a fair partner of 33 temperament and leadership style, but I would also propose that Tol- the government and had to reconsider its labor policies. Simulta- bert was more sensitive to the often-ambivalent outcomes of techno- neously, the Swedish investors consistently made the case—at one point political schemes, not in the least because his position was weaker. And writing directly to Tolbert—that meeting the workers’ demands, even in it would become even more apparent in the closing years of the decade the toned-down version that a governmental commission eventually 34 that technopolitics through mining could lead to unpredictable and suggested as a compromise, would mean the end of LAMCO. By Oc- undesirable political outcomes that potentially threatened not only the tober 1978, the situation seemed unresolvable as well as unpredictable: government’s policy objectives but were even threats to the form of the reporting to Washington, the American ambassador offered only that “it 35 Liberian state itself. remains to be seen” whether “Liberia will indeed kill the goose.” However, when push came to shove, the goose lived. In December 1978, Tolbert announced his decision in the labor dispute, noting that 5. The goose that lays the golden egg the unfavorable conditions in world markets could not be ignored and that the present state of Liberia’s finances called for “extreme caution in By the end of the 1970s, the fiercest labor dispute yet struck LAMCO making decisions which may adversely affect the economy.”36 He did and put the government in a very difficult position with respect tothe mandate a new housing renovation program as well as wage increases, company. It started with the merger of the two existing labor con- but these were relatively minor expenses for the company in compar- federations into the Liberian Federation of Labor Unions (LFLU). Many ison with the worker’s original demands. This was the first instance of a LAMCO workers refused to recognize LFLU, which they perceived to be pattern that would repeat over LAMCO’s final decade: the government catering to the government’s rather than the workers’ interests (Dunn, would engage in pieces of brinksmanship, but when faced with the real Beyan et al. 2001). Instead, they formed the independent LAMCO Mine prospect of an end to mining operations would back down with a face- Workers Union and took a militant stand in negotiations with the saving maneuver. As politically risky as it was to appear to be siding company, demanding massive wage increases and housing improve- with foreign capital, an uncontrolled shutdown of Liberia’s biggest ments. This played out against the background of North-South eco- employer and cornerstone of the national budget was riskier by far. nomic tensions. A report from the U.S. embassy in Monrovia suggested The Swedish investors, for their part, were increasingly disillu- that the workers, though “their economic sophistication [was] low,” sioned about Liberia. They were frustrated by the interpersonal distrust knew about the G77 (a coalition of developing countries that had pu- shed for the adoption of the NIEO) “contention that the Third World, and Liberia in particular, had been shafted …,” and had some con- 32 The other major opposition movement, the Progressive Alliance of fidence that the government would intervene on their behalf against Liberians, also advocated more just redistribution within the cash economy. See LAMCO. The report further noted that President Tolbert had made Liebenow (1987). public statements in support of the workers, while the internal docu- 33 U.S. Embassy to U.S. Secretary of State, 27 October 1978. ments of the Swedish investors show that they were increasingly con- 34 Arne Dahlström to Gerald Padmore, 30 September 1978, SEB, F1C: 1659; cerned, characterizing their relations with both the president and the Hans Åstrand to Gerald Padmore, 30 September 1978, SEB, F1C: 1659; U.S. government in general as bad.31 At this point, they had no real backup Embassy to U.S. Secretary of State, 6 December 1978, https://wikileaks.org/ plusd/cables/1978MONROV09110_d.html [accessed 7 May 2019]; Hans Werthén to President William Tolbert, SEB, F1C: 1643. The latter is an undated 30 In his work on the Bong Mining Company, Coale (1978) suggests that a draft, but other material shows that it was sent: see E[rik]. L[eijonhufvud]., model like this is the “most useful” to explain the development of relations “LIOs styrelsesammanträde,” 6 November 1978, SEB, F1C: 1659. between the government and Bong. 35 U.S. Embassy to U.S. Secretary of State, 27 October 1978. 31 U.S. Embassy in Monrovia to U.S. Secretary of State, 27 October 1978, 36 “Statement by the , Dr. William R. Tolbert, Jr., made at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978MONROV08117_d.html [accessed 7 the meeting with the Presidential Commission, LAMCO Management, and May 2019]; John Leinmark and Jan Ewetz, “Reserapport Liberia 25/11 – 3/12 Worker Representatives on the Settlement of Outstanding Differences between 1978,” SEB, F1C: 1659. Management and the Worker’s Union, December 8, 1978,” 1, SEB, F1C: 1659.

46 K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49 with Tolbert and others in the government and felt that their con- member Euroc, Sten Lindh, argued for a continued engagement in Li- tributions to Liberian society, and the risks that they had taken, were beria on account of the syndicate’s “moral responsibility.” Even if other not appreciated. When making his case to the American ambassador in partners were less concerned about their responsibility as such, they late 1978, the head of Gränges’ international division, Tryggve Angel, knew that cutting losses by ruining Liberia would likely trigger a con- vented his frustrations about the Liberian government and its “mis- siderable PR and perhaps political backlash at home.41 Instead, the conceptions.” Angel argued that, far from exploiting the country, syndicate began exploring possibilities of divesting part or all of their Gränges had invested about a hundred million dollars there and had stake in LAMCO, but given the troubling market conditions, this did not “much more at stake than Liberia.”37 In its attempt to enroll American look viable.42 They remained in Liberia, even as perceived themselves support and increase the pressure on the Liberian government, Angel’s to be stuck between an increasingly militant workforce and a govern- statement downplayed the very real dilemma that LAMCO posed to ment partner placing irrational demands on the company management. Tolbert. It reflected a self-pitying sentiment that had been growing within the Swedish syndicate throughout the decade: they had willingly participated in Tubman’s autocratic version of a civilizing mission and 6. Epilogue invested considerable sums in Liberia, but did not get adequate credit for it in the political environment of the 1970s. This was not without its Tolbert’s already-weak government was weakened further by severe ironies. At a later meeting at the American embassy, Angel complained rioting, triggered by a proposal to decrease rice subsidies, in the spring “that the normal legal channels for labor problems … have been by- of 1979. He was ultimately deposed in a coup d’état a year later, and a passed … with decisions being taken directly to the president.”38 young non-commissioned officer, Samuel K. Doe, became head ofthe LAMCO was now on the losing side of a method it had itself employed new military government. Although Doe’s rule started with a bloody to good effect with Tubman. purge that saw the murder of Tolbert and a number of his government That LAMCO nevertheless continued to operate through the 1970s officials, it made no major breaks with the earlier economic policy.Doe despite the economic downturn and the growing divergence of interests assured investors that the open-door policy would remain in force around the company resulted from a technopolitical path dependency. (Sawyer, 1992). Yet the relationship between LAMCO and the govern- This was the most lasting effect of the enterprise’s early success in ment played out along very similar lines as during the last years of the latching on to Tubman’s political goals in a manner that shielded it Tolbert administration. By August 1983, embroiled in a conflict over a from a reformulation of its relationship to the government through the royalty payment of $3 million that the government claimed it was owed 1960s. By the time real reform was attempted, LAMCO was so firmly by LAMCO, Doe’s Minister of Finance Alvin Jones threatened to em- established as a crucial part of the national economy that there were no bargo LAMCO’s ore shipments. However, the government eventually politically acceptable ways in which the Liberian government could backed down and agreed to a compromise, a stance that reflected its either extricate itself from the joint venture or successfully modulate its utter dependence on export earnings to fill holes in the national cof- conditions. An attempt at nationalizing LAMCO would undermine all of fers.43 the government’s stated commitments to the open-door policy and Even so, by the second half of the 1980s, it was increasingly ap- alienate its main benefactor, the United States. Demands for increased parent that LAMCO was nearing its end. The company had shifted back social contributions from the company, on the other hand, were to producing at half capacity with little prospects of increasing pro- countered by the foreign management’s argument that it would trigger duction again. The ore in the Main Orebody of Mount Nimba was an immediate financial crisis for the company. That was a risk Tolbert predicted to run out in the near future, and no major expansions to could not take. It threatened to ruin the state and put thousands of other areas had been realized (several were envisioned at various points workers on the street, at a time when many already perceived the but only a relatively small one, to the Tokadeh deposit, came to frui- government as weak. Its handling of the major labor conflict of the late tion). After Bethlehem first left the joint venture and then ceased 1970s thus illustrates the limits of the Liberian state’s agency with re- buying its share of the mined ore, the company’s situation became spect to LAMCO: it had been able to construct a technopolitical path, acute. In 1987, it entered into a liquidity crisis that nearly resulted in but was led down it with little opportunity to influence the direction. bankruptcy, only avoided through the availability of some funds earlier Yet it was not necessarily led by the Swedish investors. They, too, set aside by Bethlehem and by the Liberian government (still unable to felt themselves stuck on a path that they would prefer to be off. Angel’s handle the political consequences of an immediate shutdown) finding point to the American ambassador about LAMCO’s stake in Liberia is some means to contribute. Arrangements were made for a winding- borne out by the Swedish LAMCO syndicate’s minutes: its members down period of reduced activity until 1990, when all operations would were exposed to considerable financial risk in Liberia through loans and cease.44 LAMCO thus ended with a whimper rather than a bang. All guarantees tied to the firm, and so could not easily disengage uni- LAMCO property was turned over to the Liberian state according to an laterally from its operations.39 The situation was probably particularly agreement reached with the Swedish owners, but by then, the Liberian grave for Gränges, which was going through a financial crisis of its own Civil War had already begun to ravage the country. at home.40 It was also further complicated by the considerable publicity and moral claims that had been made by LAMCO’s backers from the outset. Intended to generate sympathy and mitigate political risks both in Liberia and at home, they now constrained the Swedish syndicate’s 41 Immediately after the Liberian coup d’état, in the spring of 1980, major options. At a board meeting in January 1978, the CEO of syndicate Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter remarked that if LAMCO shut down, what was supposed to be a “model of what Swedish capitalism could achieve in a de- veloping country” would instead be “proof the capital arrived, extracted its 37 U.S. Embassy to U.S. Secretary of State, 6 December 1978. share, and moved on.” Mats Hallgren, “Lamco-projektet på väg att spåra ur…”, 38 U.S. Embassy in Monrovia to U.S. Secretary of State, 24 August 1979, Dagens Nyheter, 20 May 1980. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979MONROV06664_e.html [accessed 6 42 Swedish LAMCO Syndicate Board meeting minutes, 9 January 1978, 6–7. May 2019]. 43 See the series of telegrams exchanged between the Swedish Embassy in 39 Swedish LAMCO Syndicate Board meeting minutes, 9 January 1978 Monrovia and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1983, in UD, (minutes dated February 27), SEB, F1C: 1633, 5–6; attachment 1; Swedish 03.3, H40: 61. LAMCO Syndicate Board meeting minutes, 18 December 1978 (minutes dated 44 Ove Svensson, “Avveckling av LAMCO:s verksamhet i Liberia,” 16 April 14 February 1979), SEB, F1C: 1634. 1987; Erik Cornell,” LAMCO inför avveckling eller överlevnad,” 30 June 1987; 40 See, e.g., “Statement by Mr. Bo Abrahamsson, Group President, at Gränges’ Per-Åke Kjellshög, “Sveriges kommersiella förbindelser med Liberia och Annual General Meeting on June 1, 1979,” SEB, F1C, 1634. Västafrika,” 8 July 1987. All in UD, 03.3, H40: 61.

47 K. Bruno The Extractive Industries and Society 7 (2020) 39–49

7. Conclusions under President Tolbert then latched on to the G77’s structuralist un- derstanding of the global economy and the position of Third World The circumstances and conditions of the Swedish engagement in countries like Liberia in it. Tolbert also had both reason and opportu- LAMCO formed part of a new global politics of natural resources that nity to observe that technopolitics through mining could result in came into being after World War II. Motives specific to the post-war outcomes that were unforeseeable and potentially threatened govern- political context converged with industrial profit and expansionist mental stability, and was presumably less enthusiastic for that reason as motives to create the enterprise and secure its financial framework. This well. Political discourse on LAMCO in Liberia consequently became means that the Swedish investments in Liberia was not only a matter of quite harsh. However, by this time, the options were limited both for Sweden and Liberia, but were part of what Odd Arne Westad has the government and the foreign investors. The Tubman model, and the termed the “global Cold War” (2005). Swedish participation in Liberian way in which the Swedish investors had latched on to it, had produced mining hinged on demonstrating behaviour that was in line with overall a technopolitical path dependency. Though both sides were unhappy, American Cold War objectives. This was, however, not only a con- neither was able to significantly reconfigure the relation between state straint. Once the Swedish investors had demonstrated that they were and company. Ironically, not even the 1980 coup d’état that otherwise acting “responsible,” the United States welcomed and supported their destroyed most of the Americo-Liberian political system that had ori- endeavour in Liberia. If this finding is generalizable, it suggests that ginally shaped LAMCO was able to do that. Only the expiration of the early Cold War U.S. mineral policies were potential means to profit for iron ore and the cataclysm of the civil war put a stop to LAMCO’s extractive industries from smaller countries if they had the requisite technopolitical impact on Liberia. diplomatic and strategic capacity to manage their engagement with the A final important finding is that the dynamics of the corporate-po- American objectives. It thus highlights the need to move beyond only litical relationship in the LAMCO case tended to generate outcomes that discussing home and host country contexts if analysing foreign invest- proved either unforeseen or uncontrollable. LAMCO not only increased ments in developing countries where another foreign power held a Tubman’s personal power and access to clients. It also helped empower dominating influence (i.e., most cases where the investors came from groups that he sought to marginalize and gave voice to social actors smaller, non-colonial states). With high abilities to negotiate and draw until then unknown in Liberia, who began to influence political dis- on international networks, the LAMCO syndicate was able to leverage course and could be mobilized for oppositional purposes. The some- its ‘third country’ position. Whether or not this pattern repeated else- what-unpredictable generation and blockading of political capital and where, and whether the United States similarly were ready to work with agency that took place around the company urge caution against extractive industry from minor powers as a way to secure resources in seeking to understand the role and impact of Western extractive in- other settings, remain questions for further research. dustries in postcolonial settings in too narrow terms. It suggests the Once established in the country, LAMCO’s subsequent trajectory necessity of closely examining the historic and present-day dynamics of and socio-economic impact is best understood, I argue, as resulting business as practiced, the formal and informal networks of people that from a congruence of objectives between the Liberian government and carried these dynamics, the complex interactions that constituted them, the Swedish investors. For President Tubman, LAMCO was the flagship the various forms of appropriation of symbolic and material benefits project of his open-door policy. It was the largest foreign investment in associated with an extractive enterprise in a given setting, and the Liberia in its time, and it enrolled non-U.S. partners in a leading role. It broader range of its impacts. This is a research strategy pioneered by promised to open up the hinterlands and propel Liberia towards mod- historians of development,45 but it would be equally relevant to ex- ernity in a manner that the government could take credit for, both at amine commercially motivated projects, particularly those that shared home and abroad. At the same time, LAMCO also formed part of a characteristics and discourses with development efforts. It could sig- policy intended to strengthen the central government and promote the nificantly add to our knowledge of the conditions of foreign investment influence and power of the president. From Tubman’s perspective, it in the Third World and to the co-production of business and politics. was thus a technopolitical project in the classic sense of the word: an attempt at achieving multifaceted political ends by way of a massive Funding engineering scheme. The Swedish investors, for their part, entered into the joint venture with open eyes in this respect. Their view of Tubman’s This work was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, grant policies were similar to their view of the American policies, seeing [P15-0465:1]. them, too, as both a constraint and a means to profit. They attempted to align their mining project with Tubman’s objectives, promoting his Declaration of Competing Interest fusion of civilizing mission and self-empowerment in exchange for re- lative security and stability for their operations. In the end, LAMCO None. thus came to embody a specific developmental technopolitics that promoted Tubman’s vision of Liberian nation building. This included Acknowledgements both himself as an undisputed autocrat in Monrovia and his role as elder statesman in pan-African diplomatic contexts, but also the re- I would like to thank Roger Eardley-Pryor, Per Högselius, Dag presentation of LAMCO as a ‘permanent investment’ in Liberia that was Avango, Nikolas Glover and my two anonymous reviewers for com- in the interests of the ‘whole society.’ Not coincidentally, the integra- ments on earlier drafts on this paper. tion with Tubman’s policies helped the Swedish investors to frame the enterprise as a development-oriented investment that built on a References Swedish style of ‘responsible capitalism,’ promoting positive re- presentations and political support at home. Abraham, I., 2011. Rare earths: the Cold War in the annals of Travancore. In: Hecht, G. In practice, the congruence of interests meant that LAMCO could (Ed.), Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War. 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