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Monthly Forecast November 2020 Monthly Forecast 1 Overview Overview 2 In Hindsight 3 Status Update since our October Forecast Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has the pres- Adoptions are also anticipated to renew the idency of the Security Council in November. mandates of MINUSCA (Central African Repub- 5 Lebanon (1701) Although the Council held several meetings in the lic) and UNISFA (Abyei). 6 Peacebuilding and Council chamber in October, COVID-19 infec- The regular meetings on Syria, Yemen and Sustaining Peace tions at the mission of a member state led to the the situation in the Middle East, including the 8 UN Peacekeeping suspension of in-person meetings in late October, Palestinian Question, are also on the November 9 Central African and it is unclear when they will resume. programme of work. On Syria, there will be an Republic St Vincent and the Grenadines has chosen open and closed meeting on the political and 10 Bosnia and to hold a high-level open debate on “contempo- humanitarian situation and a closed meeting on Herzegovina rary drivers of conflict and insecurity”, under the the use of chemical weapons. The meetings on 11 Syria Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace agenda. The developments in Yemen and on the situation in Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grena- the Middle East are planned in both open and 13 Libya dines, Ralph Gonsalves, will chair the meeting. closed format. 15 Yemen The expected briefers are Deputy Secretary-Gen- Other meetings on the Middle East include: 16 International Court of eral Amina Mohammed; Chief Executive Officer • Iraq, with briefings and consultations on Justice of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development UNAMI and UNITAD; and 17 Sudan and South Ibrahim Mayaki; Vice-Chancellor of the Univer- • Lebanon, consultations on resolution 1701. Sudan sity of the West Indies Sir Hilary Beckles; and pos- On Europe, the Council will hold its semi- 18 Somalia sibly the President of the Economic and Social annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina and 20 Group of Five for the Council, Ambassador Munir Akram (Pakistan). renew the authorisation of the EU-led multina- Sahel Joint Force There will be the biannual briefing, followed tional stabilisation force. 21 Iraq by consultations, on the Joint Force of the Group Regarding the DPRK, the chair of the 1718 of Five for the Sahel (FC-G5S), which Burkina DPRK Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Chris- 22 DPRK (North Korea) Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (G5 toph Heusgen (Germany), will brief in consul- Sahel) established in 2017 to combat terrorist and tations. The sixth annual briefing with heads of criminal groups in the region. police components of peace operations will be Several meetings on Somalia are expected. held in early November. In addition, the Secu- The Council is scheduled to adopt a resolution rity Council and the General Assembly will elect renewing several elements of the Somalia sanc- five judges to the International Court of Justice to tions regime that will expire on 15 November. commence their term on 6 February 2021. Additionally, the Council is expected to hold a The 15 current Council members and the meeting on the implementation of the mandates incoming five (India, Ireland, Kenya, Norway of UNSOM and AMISOM. and Mexico) will participate in the annual “Hit- Regarding Libya, there will be a briefing on the ting the Ground Running” workshop organised ICC by the Prosecutor and a briefing and consul- by Finland. tations on UNSMIL. 30 October 2020 This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” series at whatsinblue.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter. Security Council Report Monthly Forecast November 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Formulating the Motion to be Put to a Procedural Vote Security Council procedural votes—which presidency, decided to hold the monthly members wanted to block the participation of require nine votes in favour to be adopted briefing on the use of chemical weapons in the representative of the Federal Republic of and cannot be vetoed by a permanent mem- Syria in public, although it usually takes place Yugoslavia in a debate on the situation in the ber—remain rare, with a recent high of four in consultations. In addition to Izumi Naka- Balkans on the grounds that it was inappro- such votes in 2018. From 1946 through 1989, mitsu, the High Representative for Disarma- priate for the Council to hear from a repre- there were 153 procedural votes, and since ment Affairs, who usually briefs on the Syr- sentative of a country whose senior leadership 1990 there have been only 28. Since the end ia chemical weapons issues, the presidency was at the time under indictment by a tri- of the Cold War, most procedural decisions— invited José Bustani, a former director of the bunal unanimously established by the Coun- adopting the agenda for a particular meeting; Organization for the Prohibition of Chemi- cil, the International Criminal Tribunal for adding a new item to the “seizure list”, as cal Weapons (OPCW) to brief. The Europe- the Former Yugoslavia. Russia supported the the list of all formal agenda items is known; an members of the Council (Belgium, Esto- Yugoslav representative’s participation and or inviting an individual to participate in a nia, France, Germany, and the UK) and the suggested a procedural vote to collectively Council meeting—have been arrived at by US objected, arguing that Bustani, who left approve or reject all the speakers planned for consensus during consultations. the OPCW more than a decade before the that meeting; they included the Special Envoy However, the vote tally on the 28 proce- Council began considering the Syria chemi- of the Secretary-General for the Balkans and dural votes recorded since 1990 demonstrates cal weapons file, lacked the relevant expertise. the High Representative for the EU’s Com- how divided the Council was on most of Speaking on behalf of the six members, the mon Foreign and Security Policy, as well as these issues. Setting aside the ten procedural UK asked the presidency to put the issue of the participation of concerned member states, votes between March 1990 and December the proposed briefer to a procedural vote. under Rule 37 of the Council’s Provisional 1992 that were called by the US regarding the An unusual public discussion ensued— Rules of Procedure. participation of the representative of the Pal- with China, France and Germany also tak- The presidency (France) suggested that estine Liberation Organisation in meetings, ing the floor—about how the question should three separate procedural votes be held: on in which the US was the only member voting be phrased. Russia suggested that the proce- member states’ asking to participate under against, most of the remaining 18 decisions dural question should be “Who is opposed Rule 37, on the two high-level envoys’ par- were adopted or rejected by a narrow margin to Mr. José Bustani briefing today’s meeting?” ticipation, and on the participation of the of votes. Thirteen of those votes have taken The UK countered that the question should Yugoslav diplomat. Russia insisted that a place since 2014. That year and the next two be “The Russian Federation wishes to pro- single procedural vote be held on all those each featured one procedural vote. In 2017, pose this briefer. Who supports it?” France wishing to participate. The presidency thus there were three such votes, and in 2018, four. suggested re-phrasing the question as “Do asked Council members to “take a single There were two procedural votes in 2019 and you agree that Mr. Bustani should brief the decision on all the requests, considered as one so far in 2020. Council?” After several minutes’ discussion a whole”, stressing that this “would mean Procedural votes are taken during formal on whether to vote on all the questions and in that the Council would either accept all the Council meetings and, unlike other Council which order, the Permanent Representative requests or reject them all”. The president decisions, neither require nor generate a writ- of Russia, in his capacity as Council presi- also signalled that should the Russian pro- ten document. The procedural question is dent, announced that he would “not insist, posal fail to be adopted, he would “follow the presented by the president orally just before unless other delegations should, on deciding procedure that I myself have proposed” (S/ the vote. The fact that the Council held no as to which proposal shall be put to the vote PV.4164). The single decision received four formal meetings for several months during first” and would “put to the vote the question votes in favour and failed to be adopted. The the COVID-19 pandemic and developed a whether the Council agrees to invite Mr. José Council then adopted by no-objection pro- purely written voting procedure during the Bustani to brief it today”. Three members— cedure the list of member states asking to Chinese presidency in March may be a fac- China, Russia and South Africa—voted affir- participate under Rule 37 and the invitation tor in the dip in procedural votes in 2020 matively, six voted against, and six abstained. for the UN and the EU envoys to brief. A (S/2020/253). The agreement on the briefer was thus not separate vote was then held on the propos- Often, the decision to be voted on is artic- adopted because it failed to obtain the nine al to invite the representative of the Federal ulated in the room, on an ad hoc basis, just affirmative votes required on a procedural Republic of Yugoslavia to participate.
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