THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE DEATH PENALTY? EVIDENCE FROM BRITISH COMMUTATIONS DURING WORLD WAR I Daniel L. Chen∗ Abstract During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers to death, but only executed 12% of them; the others received commuted sentences, unbeknownst to soldiers at the time. I verify that variation in commutations and executions is consistent with a random process. Using this result, I identify the effect of executions on subsequent desertions. There is limited evidence that executing deserters deterred absences, while executing Irish soldiers, regardless of the crime, spurred absences, particularly Irish absences. I present a model where perceived legitimacy of authority affects why people obey the law. Keywords: Compliance, Legitimacy, Deterrence JEL codes: N44, K14, K42, P48 ∗Daniel L. Chen,
[email protected], Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France;
[email protected], LWP, Har- vard Law School. First draft: April 2008. Current draft: February 2017. Latest version at: http://nber.org/∼dlchen/papers/The_Deterrent_Effect_of_the_Death_Penalty.pdf. I would like to thank assis- tance and comments from Julian Putkowski, British National Archives, Gerard Oram, Sonya Hymer, Markus Loecher, and many colleagues. Work on this project was conducted while I received financial support from the European Research Council (Grant No. 614708), Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Institute for Humane Studies, Agence Nationale de la Recherche, John M. Olin Foundation, Petrie-Flom Center, Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 100018-152678 and 106014-150820), and Templeton Foundation (Grant No. 22420). “There are hooks on the post .. He is hooked on like dead meat in a butcher’s shop.