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Government and Public Reaction in Estonia to Soviet Pressure and the Events of September–December 19391

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Government and Public Reaction in Estonia to Soviet Pressure and the Events of September–December 19391 GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC REACTION IN ESTONIA TO SOVIET PRESSURE AND THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 19391 Magnus Ilmjärv In the history of the Baltic people, the years 1939 and 1940 represent a most painful period of the twentieth century. These years signified the end of one era, the first epoch of the independent nationhood. The establish- ment of independent Baltic States was made possible by the collapse of Tsarist Russia and Imperial Germany in 1917 and 1918 respectively. Clearly, although the birth of the Baltic States had essentially been helped forward by the changes in the arena of grand politics, independence would not have been achieved without the combined will of the Baltic peoples and their victorious armed struggle for freedom. Twenty years later, changes in the field of grand political ideas and ideals, as well as the prevailing fric- tion between the European great powers affected the Baltic States, easing the way for their loss of sovereignty. Although admittedly they did not do much to protect this by their own actions. A study of how this process unfolded needs to consider the German-Soviet non-aggression pact as reflected in the Baltic diplomatic representatives’ accounts, in reports by the accredited foreign diplomatic representatives in the Baltic States, in press-communiqués of the Baltic and foreign newspapers, and in the pub- lic’s efforts to clarify the background to the events and their consequences in general terms. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact The events of 23 August 1939 are well known and do not require further explanation here. As early as the 1920s, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian diplomats reported rumours that the Soviet Union and Germany might very well reach a mutually beneficial compromise at the expense of the Baltic States. Similar suggestions can be found in press reports in the Baltic as well as throughout the world.2 When the Soviet Union and Germany 1 The research was financially supported by the Estonian Science Foundation grant nos. 2905, 3817, 5095, 9896, targeted financing projects of the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research SF1130057s07 and SF0130038s09. 2 See Helsingin Sanomat, 17 September 1926. Vaba Maa, 4 November 1931. <UN> 210 magnus ilmjärv concluded the Rapallo Treaty in April 1922, this was considered a threat to the security of the Baltic States. The fears of Estonian politicians, that Germany and the Soviet Union could one day make an agreement at the expense of the Baltic States, are recorded in the German Tallinn legation’s documents. An excerpt from a paper prepared in 1930 by the legation states that: in Estonia as well as in Finland, the distrust about Germany’s active East policies persists. Particularly it is feared that in the power struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union the Border States will be crushed or will be used as bargaining chips.3 However, the news that the Soviet Union and Germany had signed a non-aggression pact on 23 August 1939 hit the Baltic States’ public con- sciousness like a bombshell. When hearing about the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the whole world asked: what is the price of the concluded pact, and who is asked to pay for it? Reports from Estonia’s envoys in London, Paris, Rome, Kaunas and Riga, and from the Estonian military attachés in Latvia and Lithuania, confirmed the assumption that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had been made at the expense of the Baltic States. Only the Estonian legation in Moscow presented the opposite view.4 In the foreign policy operations of Nazi Germany, and also in those of the Soviet Union, so-called emissaries played a significant role. By circum- venting official channels they were able to act quickly and produce the desired results. Therefore, the activities of Carl Burckhardt, last Commissar of the League of Nations to the Free City of Danzig, cannot be ignored. On 11 August 1939 Hitler invited him to a meeting. Here the Führer suggested, as Burckhardt explained “from his own free will”, the complex circumstances of Polish-German relations to the representatives of the 3 Duckwitz’s report, 11 November 1930. US National Archives II [NA II], College Park, Maryland RG242 T120 R5769б, K663033-K663040. 4 Schmidt’s report, 26 August 1939. Estonian State Archive [ERA], Tallinn 957-14-700, p. 120; see also Telegram from the Finnish legation to Great Britain, August 26, 1939. Archive of the Finnish Foreign Ministry [UM], Helsinki Tulleet sähkeet Lontoo. Phone call from London, 1 September 1939. UM Tulleet sähkeet Lontoo; G.A. Gripenberg: Lontoo-Vatikaani- Tukholma, p. 56. Leppik’s report, 25 August 1939. ERA 957-14-722,1-3. Warma’s report, 23 August 1939. ERA 957-14-704,116; Pallo’s report, 25 August 1939. Molotovi–Ribbentropi pak- tist baaside lepinguni. Dokumente ja materjale. Tallinn, 1989, p. 96. Rebane’s report, September 12, 1939. ERA 957-14-7 04, p. 230. Mollin’s report, 11 September 1939. ERA 495-11- 42, 59. Raidna’s report, 9, 11 and 18 September 1939. ERA 495-11–41, 15–16, 18, 34. Rei’s report, 31 August 1939. Molotovi-Ribbentropi paktist baaside lepinguni, pp. 98–99. <UN> <UN>.
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