DOCSLIB.ORG

EMILE DE GROOT Britain. in Connexion with the Anglo-German Naval Treaty Mr Menken Is Mis- Taken in His Statement About the Ratio

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
EMILE DE GROOT Britain. in Connexion with the Anglo-German Naval Treaty Mr Menken Is Mis- Taken in His Statement About the Ratio SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS 93 Britain. In connexion with the Anglo-German Naval treaty Mr Menken is mis­ taken in his statement about the ratio of submarine tonnage between the two Powers (pp. 86--;). It should, nevertheless, be repeated that there has so far been no short history of the pre-war years to which the interested but uninformed student may be so confidently recommended. EMILE DE GROOT THE RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE August 1939-June 1941. By A. Rossi. London, Chapman & Hall, 1950. xiii-l-arS pp. Index. 81" X 51". I2S. 6d. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/28/1/93/2703860 by guest on 01 October 2021 THIS competent and most illuminating study of the ramifications of the Soviet­ German alliance of 1939 brings together the relevant facts and clues contained in a large mass of diplomatic and other documentation. It is an exciting, tersely written book, and effectively shows how little the Kremlin was moved by ideological considerations when presented by Hitler with a chance of partici­ pating in a new world share-out at the expense of weak and, or, hostile nations (e.g. Poland, the Baltic States, Roumania, Persia, Turkey). And in cynical expediency Soviet Russia was equal if not superior to the Nazi leaders in their machinations. Indeed some of the victims, like Roumania, seem to have pre­ ferred Hitler as a choice of evils. In more than one field, these revelations form a dramatic backcloth to Soviet aims and diplomacy today. The significance of the present Soviet-inspired peace movement, for example, is easier to evaluate when lined up against the Kremlin's mobilization of the Comintern for peace with Hitler in 1940 (pp. 98-1°9), and blackballing of resistance to Hitler's peace moves from 1939-41 (on the basis, of course, of his domination of Western Europe) as 'black reaction'. Mr Rossi's chapter dealing with the Soviet annexa­ tion of the 'Western Ukraine' (i.e. Eastern Polish provinces) in 1939 throws a beam of new light on this unsavoury episode. The Soviet military intervention which was-and is still-represented by Soviet propaganda as being solely aimed at protecting the Ukrainians from the German advance and 'reuniting them to their blood brothers of the Ukraine' was concocted in full agreement with the Germans, in accordance with the territorial provisions of the Soviet-Nazi pact of 23 August 1939. A French edition of this book appeared originally in 1948; the English edi­ tion is substantially the same but contains some textual revisions and enlarge­ ments corresponding to documentation subsequently published. It contains an index but unfortunately no bibliography. C.G. LES COMMUNISTES FRAN<;AIS PENDANT LA DROLE DE GUERRE. By A. Rossi. Paris, Les lIes d'Or, 1951. 365 pp. Index. II!" X 8!". No price. M. ROSSI has specialized in writing the history of the French Communists for them. They are hardly likely to be grateful to him. He begins in 1939, when the Communist Party was denouncing the policy of appeasement and l'Humanite was asking, 'La Pologne sera-t-elle trahie?' (P.9). The Party was thrown into disarray by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but the suppression of the Communist press by the French Government at this point rendered it the greatest service by providing it with the interval necessary for the reorientation of its propaganda line. After a short period of attentisme the French Communists threw themselves into the Nazi-Soviet peace campaign, and engaged in an underground struggle against the 'imperialist war'. The government of Daladier, it was proclaimed, 'trahit la France en faisant la guerre au profit de la City de Londres avec la peau des soldats francais' (p. 196). Their efforts were directed particularly towards anti-war propaganda in the factories and the army and the sabotage of war material, though the actual effect of these efforts is difficult to estimate. In all their propaganda at this time there seems to have been a strict rule never to refer to Hitler or the Nazi Party. At the time of the Armistice the French Communist Party seems to have 94 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [JAN. suffered from the illusion that it could transform military disaster into a popular rising: it should be said that others, such as Weygand, were obsessed with the same possibility. Disappointed in this hope, it attempted at least to secure some measure of toleration from the occupying Power by rather insincere efforts at collaboration, which at least were successful in so far as up to the time of the German invasion of the USSR, police measures against the Communists in France were mainly the work of Vichy and not of the Germans. The history which I have briefly outlined is given by M. Rossi in full detail and with thorough and valuable documentation, including fifty-one facsimile reproductions from Communist literature. His book is of importance both for Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/28/1/93/2703860 by guest on 01 October 2021 the historian and the student of contemporary politics, all the more because it is a story which there have been persistent attempts to re-write by the process of suppressing half of the facts and inventing another half. ALFRED COBBAN REGIERUNG DONITZ: die letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches. By Walter Ludde­ Neurath. G6ttingen, 'Musterschmidt', Wissenschaftlicher Verlag for Institut fur Volkerrecht an der Universitat G6ttingen, 1951. 168 pp. (G6ttinger Beitrage fur Gegenwartsfragen Volkerrecht-Geschichte-International­ politik, Heft 2.) 81" X sin. DM 4.80. ADMIRAL DONITZ'S personal aide-de-camp from October 1944 recounts here his experiences up to the arrest of the Admiral and his acting government together with the German High Command on 23 May 1945. He also gives his somewhat uncompromising views. These detract from the work as a source of information on the last days of the Third Reich, though the long appendix, containing some twenty-seven documents, provides a useful and compact reference for those who may have interest in the attempts of the little band of ex-Nazi politicians, soldiers, and officials at Flensburg to provide continuity of government in German hands after the total defeat of Germany. Herr Ludde-Neurath seems to think that unconditional surrender was negotiated on behalf of the German armed forces alone and not of the German people or civil administration. He gives the impression that only Hitler was guilty of excesses; the stories of atroci­ ties in concentration camps bear marks, he thinks, of exaggeration; the allies, especially troops of the British r rth Armoured Division, were most inconsiderate of the comfort and dignity of the high officers and politicians arrested in Flens­ burg. His story confirms a great deal and reveals a certain amount about Donitz's aims before and after the capitulation. EMILE DE GROOT ERINNERUNGEN EINES SOLDATEN. By Heinz Guderian. Heidelberg, Vowinckel, 1951. 464 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. 9!"x6!". DM 18. THIS is one of the best and most informative books on the last war. The period covered is actually from 1922 to 1945, and the record of the pre-war years, though condensed by comparison with what follows, is at least as important. In that period General Guderian did more than any other man to build up the German armoured forces from nothing and in particular to frame a doctrine for their employment which brought them all the greatest successes of the war. He was above all the advocate of the independence of armoured forces and an opponent of the principle of tying them to the infantry. In general he got his way against strong opposition. In the war he commanded a Panzer Corps in Poland and in France, a Panzer Group and later a Panzer Army in Russia. He was relieved of his command at the end of 1941 after a fierce struggle with Hitler and with his immediate superior, von Kluge, when his advocacy of a limited with­ drawal for the remainder of the winter was disregarded. He returned early in 1943 to become Inspector General of Armoured Forces, with special powers, to carry out a root-and-branch reorganization, from design and construction to schools. In July 1944 he became also Chief of the Staff of the Army, which in­ volved a special responsibility for the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht dealing.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Buildup of the German War Economy: the Importance of the Nazi-Soviet Economic Agreements of 1939 and 1940 by Samantha Carl I
    The Buildup of the German War Economy: The Importance of the Nazi-Soviet Economic Agreements of 1939 and 1940 By Samantha Carl INTRODUCTION German-Soviet relations in the early half of the twentieth century have been marked by periods of rapprochement followed by increasing tensions. After World War I, where the nations fought on opposite sides, Germany and the Soviet Union focused on their respective domestic problems and tensions began to ease. During the 1920s, Germany and the Soviet Union moved toward normal relations with the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922.(1) Tensions were once again apparent after 1933, when Adolf Hitler gained power in Germany. Using propaganda and anti-Bolshevik rhetoric, Hitler depicted the Soviet Union as Germany's true enemy.(2) Despite the animosity between the two nations, the benefits of trade enabled them to maintain economic relations throughout the inter-war period. It was this very relationship that paved the way for the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and the subsequent outbreak of World War II. Nazi-Soviet relations on the eve of the war were vital to the war movement of each respective nation. In essence, the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939 allowed Germany to augment its war effort while diminishing the Soviet fear of a German invasion.(3) The betterment of relations was a carefully planned program in which Hitler sought to achieve two important goals. First, he sought to prevent a two-front war from developing upon the invasion of Poland. Second, he sought to gain valuable raw materials that were necessary for the war movement.(4) The only way to meet these goals was to pursue the completion of two pacts with the Soviet Union: an economic agreement as well as a political one.
    [Show full text]
  • Ukraine in World War II
    Ukraine in World War II. — Kyiv, Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, 2015. — 28 p., ill. Ukrainians in the World War II. Facts, figures, persons. A complex pattern of world confrontation in our land and Ukrainians on the all fronts of the global conflict. Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance Address: 16, Lypska str., Kyiv, 01021, Ukraine. Phone: +38 (044) 253-15-63 Fax: +38 (044) 254-05-85 Е-mail: [email protected] www.memory.gov.ua Printed by ПП «Друк щоденно» 251 Zelena str. Lviv Order N30-04-2015/2в 30.04.2015 © UINR, texts and design, 2015. UKRAINIAN INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL REMEMBRANCE www.memory.gov.ua UKRAINE IN WORLD WAR II Reference book The 70th anniversary of victory over Nazism in World War II Kyiv, 2015 Victims and heroes VICTIMS AND HEROES Ukrainians – the Heroes of Second World War During the Second World War, Ukraine lost more people than the combined losses Ivan Kozhedub Peter Dmytruk Nicholas Oresko of Great Britain, Canada, Poland, the USA and France. The total Ukrainian losses during the war is an estimated 8-10 million lives. The number of Ukrainian victims Soviet fighter pilot. The most Canadian military pilot. Master Sergeant U.S. Army. effective Allied ace. Had 64 air He was shot down and For a daring attack on the can be compared to the modern population of Austria. victories. Awarded the Hero joined the French enemy’s fortified position of the Soviet Union three Resistance. Saved civilians in Germany, he was awarded times. from German repression. the highest American The Ukrainians in the Transcarpathia were the first during the interwar period, who Awarded the Cross of War.
    [Show full text]
  • The Byline of Europe: an Examination of Foreign Correspondents' Reporting from 1930 to 1941
    Illinois State University ISU ReD: Research and eData Theses and Dissertations 3-8-2017 The Byline of Europe: An Examination of Foreign Correspondents' Reporting from 1930 to 1941 Kerry J. Garvey Illinois State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd Part of the European History Commons, Journalism Studies Commons, and the Mass Communication Commons Recommended Citation Garvey, Kerry J., "The Byline of Europe: An Examination of Foreign Correspondents' Reporting from 1930 to 1941" (2017). Theses and Dissertations. 671. https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/671 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ISU ReD: Research and eData. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ISU ReD: Research and eData. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE BYLINE OF EUROPE: AN EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS’ REPORTING FROM 1930 TO 1941 Kerry J. Garvey 133 Pages This thesis focuses on two of the largest foreign correspondents’ networks the one of the Chicago Tribune and New York Times- in prewar Europe and especially in Germany, thus providing a wider perspective on the foreign correspondents’ role in news reporting and, more importantly, how their reporting appeared in the published newspaper. It provides a new, broader perspective on how foreign news reporting portrayed European events to the American public. It describes the correspondents’ role in publishing articles over three time periods- 1930 to 1933, 1933-1939, and 1939 to 1941. Reporting and consequently the published paper depended on the correspondents’ ingenuity in the relationship with the foreign government(s); their cultural knowledge; and their gender.
    [Show full text]
  • End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939 Author(S): Michael Jabara Carley Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol
    End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939 Author(s): Michael Jabara Carley Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1993), pp. 303-341 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/152863 Accessed: 12/09/2009 06:36 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Europe-Asia Studies. http://www.jstor.org EUROPE-ASIASTUDIES, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Escape to Shanghai: 1938-1940
    Flight to Shanghai, 1938-1940: The Larger Setting Avraham Altman and Irene Eber Between November 1938 and August 1939, approximately 20,000 Central European refugees, most of them Jews, landed in Shanghai. They had sailed on German, Italian, and Japanese ships and, in the short span of eight months, constituted a massive exodus. What, however, is the background to this phenomenon, and, moreover, why did it rapidly diminish after August 1939?1 In order to answer these questions, we must look at the larger setting within which this process took place—something that, until now, has not been investigated. The Background In 1933, when Hitler came to power, there were around 500,000 Jews in Germany and 185,000 in Austria.2 In contrast to the gradual pressure over several years that had been exerted on the Jews in Germany to leave the country, when Austria came under German rule in March 1938, the Jews were immediately and ruthlessly persecuted. By launching an organized terror campaign against them—confiscating their property, depriving them of all means of livelihood, and incarcerating Jewish men in concentration camps—the Nazis forced the Austrian Jews to 1This paper is part of a larger project on the Jewish communities in modern China under Japanese occupation. The authors wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and its Truman Research Institute for their partial support of this research. Irene Eber thanks the J.K. Fairbank Research Center, Harvard University, where additional research was carried out in 1996-1997, and the Andover Newton Theological School where she was Visiting Judson Professor.
    [Show full text]
  • France Between the Wars: Some Important Dates 11
    FRANCE BETWEEN THE WARS: SOME IMPORTANT DATES 11 November 1918. Armistice 28 June 1919. Treaty of Versailles signed. 14 July 1919 France celebrates Victory 19 March 1920. U.S Senate rejects Treaty of Versailles and Anglo-American guarantee to France 10-11 November 1920. Unknown Soldier brought from Verdun to Paris 10 April 1922. Treaty of Rapallo. Germany and Soviet Union establish diplomatic relations 11 January 1923. France and Belgium occupy Ruhr to enforce reparations payments 18 April 1924. France accepts Dawes Plan for revision of reparation payments by Germany 2 October 1924. Geneva Protocol for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 29 October 1924. France recognizes Soviet Union 10 March 1925. Britain rejects Geneva Protocol. 27 August 1925. Last French troops leave Ruhr. 16 October 1925. France, Germany, Britain, Italy agree on Treaty of Locarno : mutual aid in case of Aggression 24 April 1926. Germany and Soviet Union Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact 27 August 1928. Kellogg-Briand Pact Outlaws War. 5 September 1929. Briand proposes United States of Europe 30 June 1930. French troops evacuate last Rhineland Zone provided in Treaty of Versailles. 16 June 1932. Lausanne Conference suspends reparations 30 January 1933. Adolph Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany 14 October 1933. Germany leaves League of Nations 6 February 1934. Stavisky riots in Paris; Chamber of Deputies attacked 12 February 1934. General strike and left-wing demonstrations 16 March 1935. Germany reintroduces conscription and begins build Luftwaffe 3 October 1935. Italy invades Ethiopia. 6-7 March 1936. Germany remilitarizes Rhineland in violation of Versailles Treaty. 26 April-3 May 1936.
    [Show full text]
  • Outbreak of War Week 6
    The Nazi Soviet Pact Stalin, the leader of the communist Soviet Union, had been very worried about the German threat to the Soviet Union ever since Hitler came to power in 1933. Hitler had openly stated his interest in conquering Russian land. He had denounced Communism and imprisoned and killed Communists in Germany. Even so, Stalin could not reach any kind of lasting agreement with Britain and France in the 1930s. From Stalin’s point of view, it was not for want of trying. Politicians in Britain and France had not resisted German rearmament in the 1930s. Indeed, some in Britain seemed even to welcome a stronger Germany as a force to fight Communism, which they saw as a bigger threat to British interests than Hitler. Stalin’s fears and suspicions grew in the mid-1930s. He signed a treaty with France in 1935 that said that France would help the USSR if Germany invaded the Soviet Union. But Stalin was not sure he could trust the French to stick to it, particularly when they failed even to stop Hitler moving into the Rhineland, which was right on their own border. The Munich Agreement in 1938 increased Stalin’s concerns. He was not consulted about it. Stalin concluded from the agreement that France and Britain were powerless to stop Hitler or, even worse, that they were happy for Hitler to take over eastern Europe and then the USSR. Despite his misgivings, Stalin was still prepared to talk with Britain and France about an alliance against Hitler. The three countries met in March 1939, but Chamberlain was relucta nt to commit Britain.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Did World War II Break out in 1939? World War II (WWII)
    Why did World War II break out in 1939? World War II (WWII) is the deadliest conflict in human history, leading to the deaths of over 70 million people. It lasted from 1939 to 1945 and involved nearly every country in the world. This worksheet will help you understand why WWII broke out in 1939 and what the causes of the war were. The Invasion of Poland Instructions: Read the two paragraphs and answer the questions about them in your books. Since Adolf Hitler had come to power in 1933, Germany had been building up its military strength. Germany had also joined with Austria and occupied Czechoslovakia. As you will know from the Appeasement work-sheet, the UK and France (the Allies) did little to stop Germany. This encouraged Hitler to move onto his next target: Poland. He wanted to conquer Poland because some German-speaking people lived there and because he wanted mored Lebensraum (‘living space’) for Germany. Realising Hitler needed to be stopped, on 31 March 1939 the UK and France guaranteed Polish independence - this meant they would declare war on Germany if they invaded Poland. Hitler did not take this promise seriously, and thought the UK and France would do nothing. # On 1 September 1939 German soldiers invaded Poland, starting WWII. Two days later the UK, France, Australia, New Zealand and India declared war on Germany. They were unable to help Poland. Germany sent 1.5 million soldiers into Poland. Poland had an army of 1 million and their soldiers fought bravely, but they were caught by surprise and the Germans advanced rapidly.
    [Show full text]
  • 32, Air Power, Armies, and the War in the West, 1940., R.J. Overy, 1989
    'The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, Department of Defense or the US Government.'" USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #32 Air Power, Armies, and the War in the West, 1940 R.J. Overy, 1989 It is now almost fifty years since German armies routed British and French forces on the northern plains of France. It was a victory almost unique in twentieth-century warfare in its speed and decisiveness. So rapid and well planned was the German advance that it was not difficult to argue that this was just the campaign for which Hitler had long been preparing. German victory strengthened the view that the Western Allies stood before him weakened by years of military neglect and political feebleness. Since the war, this view has become embedded in popular wisdom. There is a strong consensus that the Western powers were militarily unprepared, much weaker than the enemy they faced, and that German success rested on exploitation of the new air and tank weapons. This new technology was integrated in the Blitzkrieg formula, which cruelly exposed the poor planning, strategic bankruptcy, and low morale of Germany’s enemies. The core of German success, so the argument goes, was the overwhelming air power that Germany brought to bear on the conflict. At least one historian of the campaign has concluded that it was “the Luftwaffe’s supremacy in the air which constituted a decisive factor.”1 Though there would be little point in denying that the air force did constitute an important element in Germany’s success in May and June 1940, there remain nonetheless a great many questions that historians can still ask about the role of air power in the campaign.
    [Show full text]
  • Hitler on Peace
    1 Hitler on peace From Adolf Hitler, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939. London: Oxford University Press, 1942. 2 February 1933: Any one like myself who knows what war is is aware of what a squandering of effort, or rather consumption of strength, is involved. (p. 1003) 23 March 1933: The German nation wishes to live in peace with the rest of the world. (pp. 1016-17) 17 May 1933: It is, however, in the interests of all that present-day problems should be solved in a reasonable and final manner. No new European war could improve the unsatisfactory conditions of the present day. On the contrary, the application of violence of any kind in Europe could have no favourable effect upon the political or economic position which exists to-day. Even the ultimate effect would be to increase the disturbance of European equilibrium and thus, in one manner or another, to sow the seed of further conflicts and complications. The result would be fresh wars, fresh uncertainty, and fresh economic distress. The outbreak of such infinite madness, however, would necessarily cause the collapse of the present social and political order. A Europe sinking into Communistic chaos would bring about a crisis, the extent and duration of which could not be foreseen. It is the earnest desire of the National Government of the German Reich to prevent such a disturbing development by means of its honest and active co-operation. (p. 1046) 17 May 1933: We therefore have no use for the idea of Germanization. The mentality of the past century which made people believe that they could make Germans out of Poles and Frenchmen is completely foreign to us; (p.
    [Show full text]
  • C.275.M.192.1939. Geneva, October 2Nd,1939. NUMERICAL LIST OF
    LEAGUE OF NATIONS (Communicated to the Members of the League.) C.275.M.192.1939. Geneva, October 2nd,1939. NUMERICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE No.9 (September 1959) Official number SUBJECT Ca67.M.98.à939,V ( P 0.167(a) .M.98(a) .1939.V( Maemdum No*2 Election of Members of the Permanent Court of international Justice for the period January 1st, 1940 to December 31st, 1948.-- Letter from M. Algot Bagge. C.170.M*100.1939»VI, Index. Permanent Mandates Commission (36th Session) (June 1939).- Index to the minutes and report of the session. C.231.M.153.1939.XII International Committee on Intellectual Co-ope- ration (21st Session, July 1939).- Report. C.250.M.169.1939 Numerical list of documents distributed to the Members of the League No,8 (August 1939). C.251.M.170.1939.V & Annex (C.P.J.I.,Series E,No,15) Permanent Court of International Justice.- 15th Annual report (June 15th,1938-June 25 th, 1939), and note by the Secretary-General. C,252.M,171.1939.VII State of war between France, The United Kingdom and Poland, on the one part,' and Germany, on the other.- Communication from France. C.253.M.172.1939.VII Communication from Afghanistan, C.255.M.173.1939.VII Communication from Argentine. C.256.M.174.1939.VII Communication from Mexico. C *257*M*175.2)939 ■> VII State of war between France, the United Klngdcnt and Polaad, on the one part, and Germany, on tte other,- Communication from the United Kingdom.
    [Show full text]
  • French Creek Recreational Demonstration Project Records
    Department of the Interior, National Park Service French Creek Recreational Demonstration Project Records 1928 1. Deed Plattings of Properties in Cumru Twp., Berks Co., Pa., Platted from old Drafts & Deeds, June 1928, Robert H. Seidel, Engineer & Surveyor 1935 1. Typical Cabin Design-A, 28 June 1935 2. Typical Cabin Design-B, 27 June 1935 3. Spring Houses, 29 May 1935, No 10A, project 144 4. Tent Platform, 31 May 1935, No. 10-B 5. Tent Platform, 31 May 1935, No. 10-B 6. Property Map, 24 May 1935, No. 14 7. Organized Camp Latrine, 29 June 1935, No. 23A, project 113 (blueprint) 8. Organized Camp Latrine, 29 June 1935, No. 23A, project 113 (diazo) 9. Double Latrine, 22 July 1935, No. 24, project 113 (blueprint) 10. Double Latrine, 22 July 1935, No. 24, project 113 (blueprint) 11. Double Latrine, 22 July 1935, No. 24, project 113 (diazo) 12. Pit and Pool for Double Latrine, 22 July 1935, No. 25, project 113 (diazo) 13. Pit and Pool for Double Latrine, 22 July 1935, No. 25, project 113 (blueprint) 14. Public Camp Ground Development, 12 August 1935, No. 11-A-1, project 711 15. Open Shelter and Concession, 19 August 1935, No. 27, project 119 1936 1. Gate Entrance Hopewell Tower, 7 January 1936, Project 78-11, File16-A, F & W 78-11-3 2. Layout of Camp Buildings – S.P. 17, 21 April 1936, F & W 78-4-20 3. Garage, S.P. 17, 27 October 1936, FC-9010-1-1 4. Septic Tank and Distribution Box Organized Camp # 1, 20 October 1936, RD8- FC-9153-2-4, F & W – 78-1-35 5.
    [Show full text]