SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS 93 Britain. In connexion with the Anglo-German Naval treaty Mr Menken is mis­ taken in his statement about the ratio of submarine tonnage between the two Powers (pp. 86--;). It should, nevertheless, be repeated that there has so far been no short history of the pre-war years to which the interested but uninformed student may be so confidently recommended. EMILE DE GROOT THE RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE August 1939-. By A. Rossi. London,

Chapman & Hall, 1950. xiii-l-arS pp. Index. 81" X 51". I2S. 6d. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/28/1/93/2703860 by guest on 01 October 2021 THIS competent and most illuminating study of the ramifications of the Soviet­ German alliance of 1939 brings together the relevant facts and clues contained in a large mass of diplomatic and other documentation. It is an exciting, tersely written book, and effectively shows how little the Kremlin was moved by ideological considerations when presented by Hitler with a chance of partici­ pating in a new world share-out at the expense of weak and, or, hostile nations (e.g. Poland, the Baltic States, Roumania, Persia, Turkey). And in cynical expediency Soviet Russia was equal if not superior to the Nazi leaders in their machinations. Indeed some of the victims, like Roumania, seem to have pre­ ferred Hitler as a choice of evils. In more than one field, these revelations form a dramatic backcloth to Soviet aims and diplomacy today. The significance of the present Soviet-inspired peace movement, for example, is easier to evaluate when lined up against the Kremlin's mobilization of the Comintern for peace with Hitler in 1940 (pp. 98-1°9), and blackballing of resistance to Hitler's peace moves from 1939-41 (on the basis, of course, of his domination of Western Europe) as 'black reaction'. Mr Rossi's chapter dealing with the Soviet annexa­ tion of the 'Western Ukraine' (i.e. Eastern Polish provinces) in 1939 throws a beam of new light on this unsavoury episode. The Soviet military intervention which was-and is still-represented by Soviet propaganda as being solely aimed at protecting the Ukrainians from the German advance and 'reuniting them to their blood brothers of the Ukraine' was concocted in full agreement with the Germans, in accordance with the territorial provisions of the Soviet-Nazi pact of 23 August 1939. A French edition of this book appeared originally in 1948; the English edi­ tion is substantially the same but contains some textual revisions and enlarge­ ments corresponding to documentation subsequently published. It contains an index but unfortunately no bibliography. C.G. LES COMMUNISTES FRAN<;AIS PENDANT LA DROLE DE GUERRE. By A. Rossi. Paris, Les lIes d'Or, 1951. 365 pp. Index. II!" X 8!". No price. M. ROSSI has specialized in writing the history of the French Communists for them. They are hardly likely to be grateful to him. He begins in 1939, when the Communist Party was denouncing the policy of appeasement and l'Humanite was asking, 'La Pologne sera-t-elle trahie?' (P.9). The Party was thrown into disarray by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but the suppression of the Communist press by the French Government at this point rendered it the greatest service by providing it with the interval necessary for the reorientation of its propaganda line. After a short period of attentisme the French Communists threw themselves into the Nazi-Soviet peace campaign, and engaged in an underground struggle against the 'imperialist war'. The government of Daladier, it was proclaimed, 'trahit la France en faisant la guerre au profit de la City de Londres avec la peau des soldats francais' (p. 196). Their efforts were directed particularly towards anti-war propaganda in the factories and the army and the sabotage of war material, though the actual effect of these efforts is difficult to estimate. In all their propaganda at this time there seems to have been a strict rule never to refer to Hitler or the Nazi Party. At the time of the Armistice the French Communist Party seems to have 94 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [JAN. suffered from the illusion that it could transform military disaster into a popular rising: it should be said that others, such as Weygand, were obsessed with the same possibility. Disappointed in this hope, it attempted at least to secure some measure of toleration from the occupying Power by rather insincere efforts at collaboration, which at least were successful in so far as up to the time of the German invasion of the USSR, police measures against the Communists in France were mainly the work of Vichy and not of the Germans. The history which I have briefly outlined is given by M. Rossi in full detail and with thorough and valuable documentation, including fifty-one facsimile reproductions from Communist literature. His book is of importance both for Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/28/1/93/2703860 by guest on 01 October 2021 the historian and the student of contemporary politics, all the more because it is a story which there have been persistent attempts to re-write by the process of suppressing half of the facts and inventing another half. ALFRED COBBAN REGIERUNG DONITZ: die letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches. By Walter Ludde­ Neurath. G6ttingen, 'Musterschmidt', Wissenschaftlicher Verlag for Institut fur Volkerrecht an der Universitat G6ttingen, 1951. 168 pp. (G6ttinger Beitrage fur Gegenwartsfragen Volkerrecht-Geschichte-International­ politik, Heft 2.) 81" X sin. DM 4.80. ADMIRAL DONITZ'S personal aide-de-camp from recounts here his experiences up to the arrest of the Admiral and his acting government together with the German High Command on 23 May 1945. He also gives his somewhat uncompromising views. These detract from the work as a source of information on the last days of the Third Reich, though the long appendix, containing some twenty-seven documents, provides a useful and compact reference for those who may have interest in the attempts of the little band of ex-Nazi politicians, soldiers, and officials at Flensburg to provide continuity of government in German hands after the total defeat of Germany. Herr Ludde-Neurath seems to think that unconditional surrender was negotiated on behalf of the German armed forces alone and not of the German people or civil administration. He gives the impression that only Hitler was guilty of excesses; the stories of atroci­ ties in concentration camps bear marks, he thinks, of exaggeration; the allies, especially troops of the British r rth Armoured Division, were most inconsiderate of the comfort and dignity of the high officers and politicians arrested in Flens­ burg. His story confirms a great deal and reveals a certain amount about Donitz's aims before and after the capitulation. EMILE DE GROOT ERINNERUNGEN EINES SOLDATEN. By Heinz Guderian. Heidelberg, Vowinckel, 1951. 464 pp. Illus. Maps. Index. 9!"x6!". DM 18. THIS is one of the best and most informative books on the last war. The period covered is actually from 1922 to 1945, and the record of the pre-war years, though condensed by comparison with what follows, is at least as important. In that period General Guderian did more than any other man to build up the German armoured forces from nothing and in particular to frame a doctrine for their employment which brought them all the greatest successes of the war. He was above all the advocate of the independence of armoured forces and an opponent of the principle of tying them to the infantry. In general he got his way against strong opposition. In the war he commanded a Panzer Corps in Poland and in France, a Panzer Group and later a Panzer Army in Russia. He was relieved of his command at the end of 1941 after a fierce struggle with Hitler and with his immediate superior, von Kluge, when his advocacy of a limited with­ drawal for the remainder of the winter was disregarded. He returned early in 1943 to become Inspector General of Armoured Forces, with special powers, to carry out a root-and-branch reorganization, from design and construction to schools. In July 1944 he became also Chief of the Staff of the Army, which in­ volved a special responsibility for the Eastern Front, the dealing