DOCSLIB.ORG

Meeting the Challenge HUMAN Protecting Civilians Through the Convention RIGHTS on Cluster Munitions WATCH

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Meeting the Challenge HUMAN Protecting Civilians Through the Convention RIGHTS on Cluster Munitions WATCH Meeting the Challenge HUMAN Protecting Civilians through the Convention RIGHTS on Cluster Munitions WATCH Meeting the Challenge Protecting Civilians through the Convention on Cluster Munitions Copyright © 2010 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-711-6 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org November 2010 ISBN: 1-56432-711-6 Meeting the Challenge Protecting Civilians through the Convention on Cluster Munitions Table of Acronyms ............................................................................................................................. i Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Cluster Munitions and their Human Toll .......................................................................................2 The Convention on Cluster Munitions ........................................................................................... 3 Overview of the Book ................................................................................................................... 3 Part I: Recognizing the Problems I. The Technological Evolution and Early Proliferation and Use of Cluster Munitions ........................... 5 Early Development and Use ......................................................................................................... 5 Southeast Asia ........................................................................................................................... 6 Early Proliferation of Cluster Munitions: 1970s and 1980s ........................................................... 8 A Spike in Use: 1990s ................................................................................................................ 11 The Gulf War of 1991 ............................................................................................................ 11 Other Conflicts in the 1990s ................................................................................................ 13 Modern Technological Developments......................................................................................... 14 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 18 II. A Decade of Cluster Munition Use: Recent Case Studies Documented by Human Rights Watch .... 19 Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 20 The NATO Air Campaign in the former Yugoslavia ...................................................................... 20 Cluster Munition Strikes ...................................................................................................... 21 Aftereffects ......................................................................................................................... 22 Afghanistan ............................................................................................................................... 23 Cluster Munition Strikes ...................................................................................................... 24 Aftereffects ......................................................................................................................... 25 Iraq .......................................................................................................................................... 26 Cluster Munition Strikes in the Iraq Ground War .................................................................. 28 Cluster Munition Strikes in the Iraq Air War .......................................................................... 30 Aftereffects ......................................................................................................................... 31 Lebanon/Israel .......................................................................................................................... 33 Israel’s Use in Lebanon ....................................................................................................... 33 Hezbollah’s Use in Israel ..................................................................................................... 38 Georgia...................................................................................................................................... 39 Russian Use ....................................................................................................................... 40 Georgian Use ...................................................................................................................... 42 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 45 III. Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling ........................................................................................ 46 Production ................................................................................................................................ 46 Transfer .................................................................................................................................... 48 Stockpiling ................................................................................................................................ 53 Case Studies ............................................................................................................................. 57 China .................................................................................................................................. 57 Israel .................................................................................................................................. 58 Russia ................................................................................................................................ 60 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 61 United States ..................................................................................................................... 62 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 66 IV. The Need for Post-Conflict Measures: Clearance, Risk Education, and Victim Assistance ............ 67 Contamination and Casualties ................................................................................................... 67 Clearance .................................................................................................................................. 70 Professional Clearance Organizations.................................................................................. 70 Methods of Clearance ......................................................................................................... 71 Obstacles to Clearance ........................................................................................................ 73 Community Clearance ......................................................................................................... 77 Risk Education ........................................................................................................................... 79 Victim Assistance ...................................................................................................................... 81 Components and Implementation of Victim Assistance ........................................................ 81 Victim Assistance Challenges .............................................................................................. 83 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 85 Part II: Developing a Process V. Initial International Efforts to Govern Cluster Munitions .............................................................. 99 Existing International Humanitarian Law ................................................................................... 99 Early Attempts to Ban Cluster Munitions .................................................................................. 101 The Origin and Early Years of the Convention on Conventional Weapons .................................. 102 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War ................................................................................. 104 The Birth of the Cluster Munition Coalition ............................................................................... 107 Cluster Munition Discussions
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Failure of UN Security Council Resolution 2286 in Preventing Attacks on Healthcare in Syria
    The Failure of UN Security Council Resolution 2286 in Preventing Attacks on Healthcare in Syria January 2017 SYRIAN AMERICAN MEDICAL SOCIETY C1 Contents Acknowledgements C3 Foreword 1 Background 2 Methodology 2 Executive Summary 3 Attacks on Healthcare, June–December 2016 4 Advanced and Unconventional Weaponry 7 All Forms of Medical Facilities and Personnel Targeted 7 Conclusion 8 Appendix: Attacks on Medical Personnel, June–December 2016 9 ABOUT THE SYRIAN AMERICAN MEDICAL SOCIETY The Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) is a non-profit, non-political, professional and medical relief organization that provides humanitarian assistance to Syrians in need and represents thousands of Syrian American medical professionals in the United States. Founded in 1998 as a professional society, SAMS has evolved to meet the growing needs and challenges of the medical crisis in Syria. Today, SAMS works on the front lines of crisis relief in Syria and neighboring countries to serve the medical needs of millions of Syrians, support doctors and medical professionals, and rebuild healthcare. From establishing field hospitals and training Syrian physicians to advocating at the highest levels of government, SAMS is working to alleviate suffering and save lives. On the cover: Aftermath of an attack on a hospital in Aleppo, October 2016 Design: Sensical Design & Communication C2 The Failure of UN Security Council Resolution 2286 in Preventing Attacks on Healthcare in Syria Acknowledgements None of our work would be made possible without Syria’s doctors, nurses, medical assistants, ambulance drivers, hospital staff, and humanitarian workers. Their inspiring work amidst the most dire of circumstances con- tinues to inspire us to help amplify their voices.
    [Show full text]
  • Landmine Monitor 2014
    Landmine Monitor 2014 Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board Handicap International Human Rights Watch Mines Action Canada Norwegian People’s Aid Research team leaders ICBL-CMC staff experts I © December 2014 by International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC). All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-2-8399-1160-3 Cover photograph © Jared Bloch/ICBL-CMC, June 2014 Back cover © Werner Anderson/Norwegian People’s Aid, November 2013 Cover design by Rafael Jiménez Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email [email protected]. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental footprint of reports by pub- lishing all our research reports online. This report is available online at www.the-monitor.org. International Campaign to Ban Landmines The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Conven- tion”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities. The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including: • No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances; • Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines; • More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and • Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
    [Show full text]
  • United States / Afghanistan
    December 2002 Vol. 14, No. 7 (G) UNITED STATES / AFGHANISTAN FATALLY FLAWED: CLUSTER BOMBS AND THEIR USE BY THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN Acronyms Used In Report........................................................................................................................................ iii I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.........................................................................................................1 Methodology ..........................................................................................................................................................3 Outline of Report....................................................................................................................................................3 Recommendations ..................................................................................................................................................4 To minimize the humanitarian harm of cluster bombs during strikes ................................................................4 To minimize the aftereffects of cluster bombs ...................................................................................................4 To improve clearance .........................................................................................................................................4 To develop better cluster bomb controls for the future ......................................................................................5 II. WHAT ARE CLUSTER BOMBS?.......................................................................................................................6
    [Show full text]
  • Cluster Weapons – Military Utility and Alternatives
    FFI-rapport/2007/02345 Cluster weapons – military utility and alternatives Ove Dullum Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt/Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) 1 February 2008 FFI-rapport 2007/02345 Oppdrag 351301 ISBN 978-82-464-1318-1 Keywords Militære operasjoner / Military operations Artilleri / Artillery Flybomber / Aircraft bombs Klasevåpen / Cluster weapons Ammunisjon / Ammunition Approved by Ove Dullum Project manager Jan Ivar Botnan Director of Research Jan Ivar Botnan Director 2 FFI-rapport/2007/02345 English summary This report is made through the sponsorship of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its purpose is to get an overview of the military utility of cluster munitions, and to find to which degree their capacity can be substituted by current conventional weapons or weapons that are on the verge of becoming available. Cluster munition roughly serve three purposes; firstly to defeat soft targets, i e personnel; secondly to defeat armoured of light armoured vehicles; and thirdly to contribute to the suppressive effect, i e to avoid enemy forces to use their weapons without inflicting too much damage upon them. The report seeks to quantify the effect of such munitions and to compare this effect with that of conventional weapons and more modern weapons. The report discusses in some detail how such weapons work and which effect they have against different targets. The fragment effect is the most important one. Other effects are the armour piercing effect, the blast effect, and the incendiary effect. Quantitative descriptions of such effects are usually only found in classified literature. However, this report is exclusively based on unclassified sources. The availability of such sources has been sufficient to get an adequate picture of the effect of such weapons.
    [Show full text]
  • Desert Storm"
    VECTORS AND WAR - "DESERT STORM" By Joseph Conlon [email protected] The awesome technological marvels of laser-guided munitions and rocketry riveted everyone's attention during the recent Persian Gulf War. Yet, an aspect of the war that received comparatively little media attention was the constant battle waged against potential disease vectors by preventive medicine personnel from the coalition forces. The extraordinarily small number of casualties suffered in combat was no less remarkable than the low numbers of casualties due to vector-borne disease. Both statistics reflect an appreciation of thorough planning and the proper allocation of massive resources in accomplishing a mission against a well-equipped foe. A great many personnel were involved in the vector control effort from all of the uniformed services. This paper will address some of the unique vector control issues experienced before, during, and after the hostilities by the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF), a contingent of 45,000 Marines headquartered at Al Jubail, a Saudi port 140 miles south of Kuwait. Elements of the 1st MEF arrived on Saudi soil in mid-August, 1991. The 1st MEF was given the initial task of guarding the coastal road system in the Eastern Province, to prevent hostile forces from capturing the major Saudi ports and airfields located there. Combat units of the 1st Marine Division were involved in the Battle of Khafji, prior to the main campaign. In addition, 1st MEF comprised the primary force breaching the Iraqi defenses in southern Kuwait, culminating in the tank battle at the International Airport. THE VECTOR-BORNE DISEASE THREAT The vector control problems encountered during the five months preceding the war were far worse than those during the actual fighting.
    [Show full text]
  • Pax Christi Colombia Best Practice Study
    THE CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION 2003-2009 Georg Frerks IKV PAX CHRISTI BEST PRACTICE STUDY NO. 4 November 2009 2 INDEX INDEX ........................................................................................................................................ 3 ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................... 5 NOTE ......................................................................................................................................... 5 ABOUT THE AUTHOR ........................................................................................................... 6 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 7 Goals of best practice studies ................................................................................................ 7 Lobby and advocacy campaigns by IKV Pax Christi ............................................................. 7 The selection of CMC as the object of a best practice study and research questions ......... 8 Definitions of advocacy and lobby ......................................................................................... 8 Evaluating advocacy and lobby ............................................................................................. 9 Lessons learned from the ICBL ........................................................................................... 10 Evaluative framework ..........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 2018 DG Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity
    CI-18/COUNCIL-31/6/REV 2 2018 DG Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity INTRODUCTION This report is submitted to the Intergovernmental Council of the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) in line with the Decision on the Safety of Journalists and the issue of Impunity adopted by the Council at its 26th session on 27 March 2008, and renewed at subsequent sessions in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. In its latest Decision, adopted in November 2016, the IPDC Council urged Member States to “continue to inform the Director-General of UNESCO, on a voluntary basis, on the status of the judicial inquiries conducted on each of the killings condemned by the Director-General”. The present report provides an analysis of the cases of killings of journalists and associated media personnel that were condemned by the Director-General in 2016 and 2017. It also takes stock of the status of judicial enquiries conducted on each of the killings recorded by UNESCO between 2006 and 2017, based on information provided by Member States. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Executive Summary 2 2. Background and Context 2 3. Journalists’ killings in 2016 and 2017: key findings 7 3.1 Most dangerous regions 8 3.2 Rise in number of women journalists among fatalities 9 3.3 Highest number of killings among TV journalists 11 3.4 Majority of victims are local journalists 11 3.5 Freelance and staff journalists 12 3.6 More killings occurring in countries with no armed conflict 12 4. Member States’ responses: status of the judicial enquiries on cases of journalists killed from 2006 to end 2017 13 4.1 Decrease in Member State response rate to Director-General’s request 18 4.2 Slight reduction in impunity rate, but 89% of cases remain unresolved 19 4.3 Member States reporting on measures to promote safety of journalists and to combat impunity 22 5.
    [Show full text]
  • TIR/GE6871/SDG CIRCULAR LETTER No 02 - Geneva, 22 January 2020
    TIR/GE6871/SDG CIRCULAR LETTER No 02 - Geneva, 22 January 2020 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: The Saudi Automobile and Touring Association (SATA/098), as the issuing and guaranteeing association for TIR carnets in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, will begin its TIR issuing and guaranteeing activities from 23 January 2020 Addressees: TIR Carnet issuing and guaranteeing Associations We are pleased to inform you that the “Saudi Automobile & Touring Association” (SATA/098) that has been designated by the competent authorities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the issuing and guaranteeing association for TIR carnets on its territory in conformity with article 6 and Annex 9, part I of the TIR Convention, will start its issuing and guaranteeing activities on 23 January 2020. Following the approval of the IRU competent body, SATA became an associate member of IRU and underwent a thorough TIR admission process, which was accomplished with success. The International Insurers have confirmed that the guarantee will be provided for both TIR carnets issued by SATA and TIR carnets issued by other TIR issuing associations affiliated to IRU and used on the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the terms of Article 8.3 of the TIR Convention, the maximum sum per TIR carnet in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been set at EUR 100,000. Thus, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be considered a country in which TIR transports can be arranged as of 23 January 2020. The activation of the TIR system in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia brings the number of TIR operational countries to 63.
    [Show full text]
  • 736Th PLENARY MEETING of the COUNCIL
    PC.JOUR/736 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 23 October 2008 Permanent Council Original: ENGLISH Chairmanship: Finland 736th PLENARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL 1. Date: Thursday, 23 October 2008 Opened: 10.05 a.m. Closed: 12.20 p.m. 2. Chairperson: Mr. A. Turunen Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson informed the Permanent Council that the Chairman-in-Office, in a letter issued on 22 October 2008 (see annex 1 to this journal), had announced the adoption, through a silence procedure, of the Ministerial Council decision on the periods of service of the OSCE Secretary General (see MC.DEC/3/08, the text of which is appended to this journal). The Russian Federation welcomed the adoption of the decision (PC.DEL/882/08 OSCE+). 3. Subjects discussed — Statements — Decisions/documents adopted: Agenda item 1: OSCE MISSION TO MOLDOVA Chairperson, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova (PC.FR/22/08 OSCE+), France-European Union (with the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, in alignment) (PC.DEL/864/08), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/878/08 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/871/08), Ukraine (PC.DEL/877/08 OSCE+), Moldova (PC.DEL/870/08/Rev.1) Agenda item 2: REVIEW OF CURRENT ISSUES (a) Presidential
    [Show full text]
  • Saudi Arabia
    UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS BRANCH/SOILS UNIT IL REGIONAL OFFICE FOR WEST ASIA IRAQ A RAPID ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT ON TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS PART HI SAUDI ARABIA SEPTEMBER1991 ( LU Ci UNiTED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME 0 , w TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS BRANCH)SOILS UNiT REGIONAL OFFiCE FOR WEST ASIA A. RAPID ASSESSMENT \C 410FP Oi ANO OF THE IMPACTS OF THE IE.AQ-IcrJWAIT CONFLICT ON TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS PART THREE i A Report prepared for the United Nations Environment Programme by CAAFAR KARRAR KAMAL H. BATANOUNY MUHAMMAD A. MIAN Revised and Edited by p September 1991 Page Executive Summary vi-xi tntroducticn 2 Chapter I The Assianment and Execution ... 5 1.1 Background ... 5 1.2 The work assignment of the mission ... 6 1.3 Execution of the assignment ... 6 Chapter II The State of the Eiironment Before the the IracLKuwait Conflict ... 8 2.1 General ... 8 2.2 Physical Factors ... 8 2.2.1 Location . S 2.2.2 Topography and physiographic Regions ... B 2.2.3 Climate ... ii. 2.2.4 Soils ... 17 2.3 Biota ... 18 2.3.1 Fauna ... 18 2.3.2 Flora ... 20 2.3.3 Vegetation ... 21 2.4 Socto-Economic Indicators ... 22 2.5 Land Use ... 23 2.6 Institutional Set-up ... 23 2.6.1 Policy Relating to the Environment ... 23 2.6.2 Implementing Institution ... 24 Chapter III Imoact Identification and Evaluation. ... 25 3.1 War Activities ... 22 3.2 Environmental Components and kinds of Impacts ... 29 3.3 Qualitative judgement on nature, level and duration of impact results ..
    [Show full text]
  • The Reverberating Effects of Explosive Weapon Use in Syria Contents
    THE REVERBERATING EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPON USE IN SYRIA CONTENTS Introduction 4 1.1 Timeline 6 1.2 Worst locations 8 1.3 Weapon types 11 1.4 Actors 12 Health 14 Economy 19 Environment 24 Society and Culture 30 Conclusion 36 Recommendations 37 Report by Jennifer Dathan Notes 38 Additional research by Silvia Ffiore, Leo San Laureano, Juliana Suess and George Yaolong Editor Iain Overton Copyright © Action on Armed Violence (January 2019) Cover illustration Syrian children play outside their home in Gaziantep, Turkey by Jennifer Dathan Design and printing Tutaev Design Clarifications or corrections from interested parties are welcome Research and publication funded by the Government of Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4 | ACTION ON ARMED VIOLENCE REVERBERATING EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN SYRIA | 5 INTRODUCTION The use of explosive weapons, particularly in populated noticed the following year that, whilst total civilian families from both returning to their homes and using areas, causes wide-spread and long-term harm to casualties (deaths and injuries) were just below that their land. Such impact has devastating and lingering civilians. Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) has been of the previous year, civilian deaths had increased by consequences for communities and cultures. monitoring casualties from the use of explosive 50% (from 5,639 in 2016 to 8,463 in 2017). As the war weapons around the globe since 2010. So extreme continued, injuries were increasingly less likely to be In this report, AOAV seeks to better understand the has such harm been in Syria in recent years that, recorded - particularly in incidents where there were reverberating harms from the explosive violence in by the end of 2017, Syria had overtaken Iraq as the high levels of civilian deaths.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Distr
    UNITED NATIONS S Security Council Distr. GENERAL S/AC.26/2002/7 13 March 2002 Original: ENGLISH UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION GOVERNING COUNCIL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE PANEL OF COMMISSIONERS CONCERNING THE THIRD INSTALMENT OF “F2” CLAIMS S/AC.26/2002/7 Page 2 CONTENTS Paragraphs Page Introduction .........................................................................................................1 - 2 7 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..............................................................................3 - 12 11 II. COMMON CONSIDERATIONS....................................................................13 - 38 12 A. Military operations, military costs and the threat of military action..........17 - 20 13 B. Payment or relief to others ....................................................................... 21 14 C. Salary and labour-related benefits..........................................................22 - 28 14 D. Verification and valuation........................................................................ 29 15 E. Other issues..........................................................................................30 - 38 15 III. THE CLAIMS ............................................................................................. 39 - 669 17 A. Saudi Ports Authority ...........................................................................39 - 93 17 1. Business transaction or course of dealing (SAR 270,397,424) .........41 - 49 17 2. Real property (SAR 9,753,500) .....................................................50
    [Show full text]