The Conflicting Theories of Ethnic

CEU eTD Collection Advisor: Professor AlexeiMiller The Conflicting Theories of Ethnic Conflict: In partialfulfillment oftherequirements forthedegree of TheCase ofNagorno-Karabakh Nationalism Studies Program Central European University Budapest, Hungary Sanan Mirzayev Sanan Master ofArts Submitted to 2007 By CEU eTD Collection Actors ...... 20 of the Conflict Complexity of Nagorno-Karabakh ...... 14 Conflict PART I...... 14 Literature Review...... 6 Introduction...... 3 Regional Actors...... 48 Military ...... 43 Actors Community Level Actors...... 40 Political ...... 38 Organization Governmental Level Actors...... 22 A Short History of Conflict over ...... 14 Nagorno-Karabakh Turkey Iran Russia MilitaryForcesSoviet andOther Azerbaijan National Army Azerbaijani IndependentMilitias National Armyof IndependentArmenia Armenian ArmedMilitaryGroups Azeri Community Armenian Community The AzerbaijaniPopular Front The KarabakhCommittee National Azerbaijani Government GovernmentNational Armenian Volskiy Committee Nagorno-Karabakh Soviet CPSU Armenian SSR Republic: Azerbaijan SovietSocialist From to1992 Perestroika coexistence untilGorbachevera Uneasy, butpeaceful Pre-Soviet Antagonism Violence: Ethnic Theories ofExtreme General Theories ...... 49 ...... 29 ...... 48 ...... 50 ...... 26 ...... 42 ...... 6 ...... 34 ...... 40 ...... 14 ...... 45 ...... 38 ...... 18 ...... 33 Table ofContents ...... 39 ...... 35 ...... 46 ...... 45 ...... 44 ...... 37 ...... 22 ...... 10 ...... 44 ...... 16 1 CEU eTD Collection EEE ILORPY...... 100 SELECED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 96 Appendixes Conclusions...... 93 ...... 58 PART II Events: Interpretations ...... 52 and Impacts Does Theory Help?...... 84 Common Fallacies of the Rational Choice Theories...... 79 Theories on Nagorno-Karabakh Case...... 65 Rationalist ...... 59 Explanations Categorization of the conflict...... 58 Media, Religious Leaders, & Personalities...... 51 pedxD...... 99 Appendix D ...... 98 Appendix C ...... 97 Appendix B ...... 96 Appendix A Symbolist Synthesis ofthe Model AncientHatredsTheory Adding Models Aspects ofRationalist the Shortcomings of Model War in Karabakh asaResultofPoliticization of Fear Limitations ofthe Model Pure UncertaintyinNagorno-Karabakh Security Dilemma Failure of The SecurityDilemmainKarabakh Shortcomings oftheCommitment problem Nagorno-Karabakh as a CommitmentProblem Politicization ofRationalFear PureFear Uncertainty of The SecurityDilemma The CommitmentProblem August CoupandDissolution ofUSSR Operation ‘Ring’ January Black Earthquake inSpitak Sumgait Pogrom ...... 55 ...... 55 ...... 53 ...... 54 ...... 61 ...... 75 ...... 63 ...... 59 ...... 78 ...... 72 ...... 84 ...... 64 ...... 86 ...... 90 ...... 71 ...... 56 ...... 74 ...... 67 ...... 66 ...... 77 2 CEU eTD Collection the shortcomings that preclude them from offering a complete explanation, I will also briefly also will I explanation, complete a offering from them preclude that shortcomings the out point and theories rationalist deconstruct to is thesis in this my task Although conflicts. the of participants and complexity the much attribution appreciate ethnic of of too to conflict rationality will turn in moreAs I conflicts. detail,ethnic violent post-Soviet to theseexplanations plausible theories providing from far are theories can offer only partial explanations, rationalist the that in myI hypothesize thesis Nonetheless, conflict. ethnic on literatures other the due to their failure to present thesis. Rationalist theorists the of embryothe constitute will conflict ethnic of approaches choice rational the on focus came to be believed in superiority of the specifically, More explanations. notorious and focus recent on only most I will theirlimitation the explanations over inregions.due tothetime conflict and space post-Soviet However, prevalence of ethnic formulating theories tounderstand nature and underlying reasonsrecentethnic violence. devoted in their andenergy various backgrounds from time Increasing numbersof scholars decade. last the throughout scholarly of attention thecenter became adversaries atrocious into states hub the turned of is violenceethnic that characterized by extreme brutality. those shortly history, As the irony of society. of Soviet the democratization initiate leader to reform reform package, last days of existence.their endwasreachedthe Beginning of thetruly when path-breaking very violence until the nasty face of ethnic escapethe managed to andYugoslavia, Soviet Union the multiethnic states, socialist the were, systems their though and oppressive Authoritarian Introduction In this thesis, I am going to look at theories offered by scholarsinto societies least seemingly, at co-existed, peacefully of swifttransformation This as an explanation to perestroika , was proposed by , wasproposed hisGorbachev subsequent to reign as last Soviet 3 CEU eTD Collection these parties will looked at. All the events and actors will be analyzed in the first part are those part in thefirst willbe analyzed andactors All events the at. looked will parties these of will beattached, andtheimpacts of eventson these interpretations parties the contending the fully, picture grasp the make readerto the To beportrayed. will theconflict of escalation the on effects significant with non-political, and political events, the part first the of sections subsequent In shown. be will other each with interactions and policies, decisions, their speculation, for media, and and leaders political religious leaving will beWithout focused. separately any room military communities, parties fronts, and external and fractions, governments, armies actors, Consequently, theories. of respective the assumptions familiar with the before becoming way, Ihope to offerreader to a chance toevaluate the case and produce him/her own explanation than customary the different part, somewhat in first the conflict the of complexity the displaying by demonstrated examinationthorough of differentlevel and theirinteractions.actors By be will conflict Nagorno-Karabakh complexity the of part the Infirstmain parts. from two due toits scale and its effect. potential partly due to spill-over Karabakh together with Abkhaz-Georgian conflict attracted most of the scholarly attention partly validity. Among the many other ethnic conflicts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) thebe assesstheir applied and to conflicts, Nagorno- for post-Soviet explanation assuming those particularly conflict is a clear Nagorno-Karabakh the that Given example secession. claimed Armenians after of Azerbaijan, integral part of post-SovietArmenians in and Azeris dominantly Nagorno-Karabakh, by legally populated Armenians, but ethnic conflict, itinto as fullyin skirmishes casestudy. blown the war 1992betweenethnic 1988 turned Early of provides a solid basis for theories, literature. of ethnicthe conflict currents other with interaction and eclecticism integrative from benefit theories would thatthose propose To be able to present my argumentation in an effective way the thesis will be comprised in thesis will way the an effective my present To beable argumentation to conflict theNagorno-Karabakh take Iwill hypothesis of the validity assess the to In order 4 CEU eTD Collection conclusions willbe derived. conclusions Lastly, aspects. of rationalist the aspects successful the with synthesized accordingly and bescrutinized will conflict ethnic of the literatures from other theories different Then, two out. be pointed will approaches of rationalistthe shortcomings common only the partial explanation casein toseewhether order they provideAssuming aplausible explanation. they that provide Nagorno-Karabakh the to beapplied briefly will they Accordingly, deeply. be will scrutinized early skirmishes of into1988 turned an warall-out by firstthe month of 1992. happened that andexisted between 1988and is early 1992. That thetime where framework the In the second part of the thesis, the rationalist explanations and their main assumptions 5 CEU eTD Collection ed. National Independence, 1816 – 1980,” 2 2000). Snyder, Democratization and Nationalist Conflict Ethnic Conflicts 1998); David Carment and Patrick James, eds. International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Charles A. Kupchan, ed. MIT Press, 1996); University Press, 1993); Michael E. Brown, ed. 1 littleunderstandforward to ethnicviolence.too success, wereput among Variousassumptions, inexplaining eruption of ethnicthough violence. with theories the emerged. Review of currentliterature on ethnic violence reveals alack of clarity and incoherence been has ethnic on conflict literature Hence a voluminous violence. ethnic and nationalism, ethnic ethnicity, of understand dynamics the to haveattempted and practitioners scholars Numerous Literature Review historical or identity-based value to territory, they are more willing to use force to secure valuable envisage indivisibility of territory from their historical legacy. donot vary parties valuing approach in territory, value.Accordingthe intrinsic to the and Union relationsA numberofinternational Yugoslavia. havefocused onterritory’s scholars or in focusing rather areasof Sovietthe Former conflicts, conflicts particular than the on all ethnic General Theories of ethnic conflict, andtheories onpost-Sovietextreme ethnicviolence –thatis ethnic war. theories macro-level groups: broad in two be categorized can theories those simplicity sakeof the can limited foronly partial why and elucidation explanation provide For violence occurs. ethnic For detailed account, see Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, “Entering International Society: Military Conflict and Conflict Military Society: International “Entering Goertz, Gary and F.Diehl seePaul account, detailed For See, for example, Michael E. Brown, Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of aProcess Model (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild, eds. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998);Jack Snyder, Mikulas Tiech and Roy eds.Portter, : Approaches falling category under this applicableassume explanations to Ethnic Conflict and International Security Comparative Political Studies (London: W.W Norton & Company, 2000); Barbara F. Walter and Jack Peace in the Midst of Wars: Preventing and Managing International International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Thomas S. Szayna, The National Question in Europe in Historical Context 23, no. 4(January 1991):497-518. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, University Princeton N.J.: (Princeton, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, Nationalism and Nationalities in the New 2 Since the actors attach some attach actors Since the 1 Theories, when taken alone, taken when Theories, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton N.J.: (Princeton, From Voting Violence:to (Cambridge, Mass.: The 6 CEU eTD Collection Anticipating Ethnic Conflict great fight over resources. For more discussion, see Ashley J. Tellis, Thomas S. Szayna, & James A. Winnefeld, 7 1987). Press, University Toronto economically backward groups. For more information, see Jean Laponce, Jean see information, more For groups. backward economically by as well as advanced by economically canbeforwarded claims separatist that argues hand, other the on 6 the Cold War L. Woodward, see Susan Yugoslavia, former in the conflicts ethnic the Coughlan, eds., 5 International Interactions Literature,” Empirical of the Assessment and War:AReview and “Geography F.Diehl, seePaul of literature, review 4 in International Politics 3 development andmodernization. this group of ethnicexplanations presumesthat violence is andconflict resultthe of uneven fashion region toseparatism. the live incontributes they where concentrated given state. relative development particularly of ethnic groups, who are livingthose in within compact, a arguments in fortheir understanding search ethnicviolence. The focus explanations on the worthless territory, but others not. seemingly clashes face areready violent over fail someethnicexplain groups to why theory to this hold to who scholars Moreover, based. materially always not and strategic, or economic is policies strategically With and samethe geographically worthless. token state arenot only strategicvalue argument. Cases exist where states engaged in conflict over a piece land,of which survival. it astate’s andlossallegedly of threatens state, of security a respective the approach. territory. Besides itsintrinsic value, strategic worth of territory is another important part of the According to several scholars modernization makes people want the same, not different, things and this results in results andthis things different, not same, the want people makes modernization scholars several to According See Donald Horowitz, Reed and Samarasinghe A. de see S.W.R conflict, ethnic in factors of economic of role discussion a general For See Peter Liberman, “The Spoils ofConquest,” Spoils “The Liberman, SeePeter See Jack Snyder, SeeJack Another group of scholars proposes political-development and economic-modernization Although the intrinsic value argument has powerful logic, the same can notbe said for the 3 Strategic worth is of particular importance given that this very territory is essential for (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995). 5 According toHorowitz the level of economic development of an ethnic group and of EconomicDimension ofEthnic Conflict Myths of Empire Ethnic Groups in EthnicConflict (Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. chapter3. 17, 1 no. (1991): 11-27. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1998); Susan Olzak, & Joane Nagel, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Robert Gilpin, 7 Parallel to these arguments, some prominent scholars argue some prominent arguments, these Parallel to International Security (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991); On economic roots of (Berkley: University of California Press, 1995); LaPonce, 18, 2 no. (Fall 1993): 125-153: For the Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After Languages and Their Territories 6 The main line of War andChange 4 (Toronto: 7 CEU eTD Collection Stanford University Press, 1992). Calif.:Sage Publications, 1979); Susan Olzak, Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 12 conflict, see Walker Connor, “Eco- or Ethno-Nationalism?” or “Eco- Connor, see Walker conflict, 11 country. of the part inrichest place high level of economic development. Similarly, the first secessionist movements and clashes in Yugoslavia took 10 Wars,” Politics 9 Reality Myth, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm, 8 1986). “Introduction,” in state. the with identification in individuals’ resulted not have development political and modernization modernize. of state andstructures economy as towardthe individualsthe state that loyalty from switch groups their ethnic should their developed and highly represented in the political in life ofcountry. highly represented political developedthe and well- areeconomically regions secessionists where violenceincountries of eruption the of violenceethnic and is provided development economic betweenequalized groups regions. Perceiving mobilizationPerceiving asa of one group tothemselves,threat remaining follow the groups the for resources. compete cancollectively they so that identity theethnic based on up groups of relative by deprivation individuals belonging tosame ethnic encourage background them form perception obvious and conditions economic Declining ethnicconflict. of outbreak the to catalyst explaining these shortcomings. disaster will follow evenif they gain independence. Approaches in are this fargroup from For thorough review of literature, see Saul Newman, “Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?” Political Ethnic Breed “Does Modernization Newman, see Saul literature, of review thorough For Benedict Anderson, See James Davies, “The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of Revolution and Rebellion,” in For deeper discussion of why economic development alone can not explain the emergence of ethnic violence and violence ofethnic emergence the explain not can alone development economic ofwhy discussion deeper For Countries as Spain and NorthernIreland still face separatist claims and violence by ethnic groups despite their 11 World Bank Conference on Civil War, Crime andViolence Moreover, individuals participating in ethnic conflict, more or less, predict economic predict less, or more conflict, in ethnic participating individuals Moreover, 43, 3 no. (April 1991): 451-478; Paul Collier& Anke Hofeffler,“Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil The main criticism on this current of ethnic violence literature was its failure to explain wasits failure to violenceThe maincriticism literature currentof ethnic on this The third group of approaches concentrates on interethnic resource competition asa competition interethnic resource on concentrates of approaches group The third (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Competitive Ethnic Relations Imagined Communities (London: Verso,1983); Ernest Gellner, The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict eds. Susan Olzak & Joane Nagel (New York: Academic Press, Academic York: (New Nagel & Joane Olzak Susan eds. 8 Consequently, the literature predictsdisappearance literature Consequently, the Ethnic and Racial Studies eds. Ted Robert Gurr & HughDavis (Beverly Hills, . Washington, DC, Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, 10 In many cases economic cases many In (February 1999). Nations andNationalism 7, no. 3 (1984): 342-359. (Stanford, Calif.: World 9 12 8 CEU eTD Collection Princeton University Press, 1997), 26. 17 ofIdeas,” Marketplace the and “Nationalism Bellentine, & Karen Snyder see Jack information, more For societies. respective their in ofnew nationalism vanguards the became leaders those community, each in ofscapegoats existence and media to access their to Thanks Union. 16 Snyder, Jack see countries, post-socialist in process democratization in manipulation Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” Comparison 15 World Politics 14 mobilization is accomplished through presentation of scapegoats that is mostly another weaker another thatismostly scapegoats of presentation through is accomplished mobilization national cases In several ethnic conflict. to people exhort easily leaders can nationalist and“construct” goal, a nationalist around people of mobilization achieve they control, privileged have they which over media, mass violence. to masses incite the to their ability andassume leaders considerable numbers of scholars adhere violenceto. tosecure their cultural and historical values. Scholars of this current despitelittle explain rationallysome why groups or start ethnic ethnic deprivation no choose to stress the role this issilentwhenit Additionally, approach relative deprivation keeps impossible. comes to of political violencepredict based on to is itmatter that concluded Forthat between withingroups. and theories, however, do not provide any principle how to measure or compare those perceptions 13 power. stay at secure their to nationalism popular to appeal people of in theeyes individuals orsociety relativegiven group of havesubjective perceptions deprivation. ethnic causes conflict. concentrated, in mostlevel,cases territorially group path and mobilize through of establishmentthe their military Competition own groups. a on Paul R. Brass, The recent version of theory is about the Communist leaders who tried to stay at office after the demise of Soviet For developed discussion of elite manipulation, see Paul Brass, seePaul manipulation, of elite discussion developed For See Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Nowhere: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” Frederick Barth, ed. Elite manipulationElite is approach in explanation literature another ethnic conflict that Critics discredit this explanation because of the impossibility of adequate testing. In any testing. In adequate impossibility of because of the explanation this Critics discredit (New SageDelhi: Publications, 1991); Valere P. Gagnon, Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International 44, no. 1,(October 1991): 7-48. Theft of anIdol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence Ethnic Groups and Boundaries International Security 17 ethnic conflict. Besides de-legitimized leaders, ethnicBesides fanatic de-legitimized conflict. 19, no. (Winter3, 1994/95): 130-166; For discussion of elite (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). International Security Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and 15 21, no. 2, (Fall 1996): 5-40. Political leaders lost legitimacy lost leaders Political From Voting Violenceto 13 (Princeton, N.J.: 16 Through the Through 14 These . 9 CEU eTD Collection Representations 20 Press, 1996), 150-51. hatreds”, suppressed by a temporary freedby is ofcommunism,beexpressedbygroups now rule suppressed hatreds”, a temporary to According this works. “age-old to the approach its afewscholarly inmanynewspapers and place found explanation, analytical least but common most the hatreds”, “Ancient argument. hatreds” mutual hostility among competing ethnic ingroups what eventually became to labeled “ancient violence. ethnic developed theories have Many scholars multiethnic states. in formerly and erupted these conflicts ethnic violent applied their theories A number Cold-War. the of of violence ethnic following extreme epicenters became coexistence, to these specific cases to understand the extreme 19 and The Indivisibility of Territory Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence not.but do others goals, in their succeed leaders some why question to itcomes when is silent theory this Lastly, 18 masses” innocent and politicians evil “of façade a creating for criticized is explanation manipulation elite Additionally, violence, butunsuccessful in dissuading an angry population from engaging in violence. For that matter, it fails to explain why political leaders are highly successful to stir people up for of nationalism. power the underestimates was believed tobe inline interests of with elites. geography, in Hence, violence,ethnic eruption post-Soviet particularly the of the group. ethnic Pandey Gyanendra, “The Defense of Fragment: the Writing About Hindu-Muslim Riots inIndia Today,” Sudhi Kakar, For thorough discussion of literature, see Monica D. Toft, D. Monica see of literature, discussion thorough For Early attempts to explain the post-Soviet violent ethnic conflicts assumed the presence of presence the assumed conflicts ethnic violent post-Soviet toexplain the attempts Early Nonetheless, this approach assumes very small independent effect to nationalism, and effect independent very small assumes approach this Nonetheless, 37, (1992): 27-55. The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict 19 and assigning too little room littleindividualby people. and acts ordinary assigning too room to (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003). 18 Secondly, this approach over-predicts ethnic conflict. ethnic Secondly,over-predicts approach this : Yugoslavia models and FSU,formerly the of The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity,Interests, (Chicago: Chicago University 10 20 CEU eTD Collection (New York, August 30-September 2): 1-22. Commitment Problem”, Donald Rothchild, (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1998); James D. Fearon, “Ethnic War as a Conflict,” in 22 Ethnic Conflict Group Conflict states. independent newly in minorities ethnic exploit to not themselves commit to more majorities conflicts,because ableTranscaucasus haswitnessed manyviolentwere no ethnic and Europe post-Soviet Consequently,antagonisticpost-Socialist Eastern groups. the between places the betweenthem–takes agreements more assures no party situation third where conflict occurs when the choiceforwardcommitment byJames theory was put Fearon.According this violent to approach ethnic problem – that is two communities find themselves in a American Political Science Review 21 violence. ethnic of rationality assumes that explanation an into theory of Yugoslavia.incorporatesideas somefrom Thisgroup international realisttheorists relations in conflicts the following theory choice of rational from adherers comes conflicts ethnic case. wasthe opposite but the Georgian-Ossetin, rather than conflict Magyar-Romanian have expected would Most calm. remained somebut others violence, to appealed each other explain hatred againstnot with ancient. were not Secondly, some groups theory can ethnic why successful inexplaining First of ethnicmany conflicts. all,erupted that ethnicconflicts the of an enemy. againstage-old inmobilization of a group factors are important mythsenemies memories, against Historical are byhistoric enemies. threatened groups respective individual’sis of identity that theyfeel tied whentheir a specific closely to threatened group, against their life-longhatred passes generation Asthe from generation enemies. andan to For more information about the theory, see James D. Fearon, “Commitment Problem and the Spread of Ethnic For examples of this approach, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” Interethnic “Explaining Laitin, D. David and Fearon D. see James approach, of this examples For Other, perhaps more complex and well analyzed, approachesA deep to researchpost-Soviet into extreme post-Soviet conflicts, however, reveals that this theory is not The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion,and Escalation ; Brown, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Lake and Rothchild, Ethnic Conflict and International Security Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association 90,no. 4(December1996): 715-735; Russel Hardin, . 21 The International Spread of One for All: The logic of edited by David Lake and Lake by David edited The leading rational 22 Barry Posen Barry 11 CEU eTD Collection International Security Violence,” Ethnic ofExtreme Theories Testing Choice: Rational or Politics “Symbolic Kaufman, J. Stuart 26 University Press, 1999). Civil wars,Insecurity, and Intervention 25 Spread of Ethnic Conflict International Security 24 edited by Michael E. Brown, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). theories on ethnic conflicts. To assess the validity of my hypothesis I will apply those theories to theories those apply will I hypothesis my of validity the assess To conflicts. ethnic on theories and evil forces. myths are important because they allow the elite toframe the conflict as a struggle againsthostile group mythsappeal andjustifyto symbols ethnic provoke thathostility to Symbols conflict. and 23 mobilization”. are groupmyths and“symbolic of chauvinist politics conflict ethnic violent of causes real the theory politics symbolic Kaufman’s Stuart to According war. ethnic ofthe cause key asthe fearof on investcitizenry, regarded rational the predatory who the elite, In explanation. this approach alternative another Weingast presented andRui Figuerado Barry de resolution. from a peaceful reaching groups prevent contending problem that andcommitment failures information of endresult as the perceived conflict ethnic Rothchild, the Donald Lake and follows. conflict ethnic Violent group. another in insecurity necessary triggers its toensure security same groups takes the the steps group of one When security. own their for responsible themselves find state formed newly ina groups Ethnic international explodes conflicts. theory ethnic when conflict of relations post-Soviet of realist tradition concept security dilemma” “the byapplying an approach proposed alternative Stuart J. Kaufman, Rui JP de Figuerado and Barry Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict,” in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” See Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Conflict,” Ethnic and Dilemma Security “The Posen, R. SeeBarry In the second part of thesis I will turn to a detailed discussion of post-Soviet case specific The main contender of the rationalist theories is the socio-psychological approach. 25 Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 45-86. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 41-75; See also David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, Donald and Lake A. David also See 41-75; 1996): 2 (Fall no. 21, . edited by Barbara F. Water andJack Snyder, (New York: Columbia 23 In third rationalist approach, proposed by David Inthirdrationalist proposed approach, Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Ithaca, Cornell University Press,2001); 26 The treacherous leaders Thetreacherous The International 12 24 CEU eTD Collection 92: the period of escalation to full scale war. full to scale ofescalation period 92: the focus onyears1988- with particular conflict thecomplexity Nagorno-Karabakh of demonstrate first of thepurpose thesis Iwill for However, interaction. from benefit how can they and argue the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Accordingly, I will point out the shortcomings of each theory 13 CEU eTD Collection by Donald V. Scwartz and Razmik Panossian, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). Press, Toronto of University (Toronto: Panossian, Razmik and Scwartz V. by Donald Nationalism andHistory –ThePolitics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia Forefathers: National Identity and the Historiography and Politics of Armenian and Azerbaijani Ethnogeneses,” in 27 historiographies exclusive mutually on mainly Nagorno-Karabakh to claims and justifications their Pre-Soviet Antagonism Nagorno-Karabakh over of Conflict History A Short willconflict be presented. backgroundbrief ethnic inof of historical Nagorno-Karabakh conflict course the the 1988-1992 study and of beforeof vital the actors proceedingto escalation.events the impacts on However, and parties ofthe immediate interpretations of with analysis betogether will conflict examined conflict. In the followingmilitary,governmental, party level playedand community actors key in role escalation of the sections the events believed relations. criteria andbetween actor After thepaperwill the defining group focus on to be decisive in the theorists,the through identification of different actors, theirdevelopmentinteractions with one another, within of the In this part I will portray the complexity of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in general overlooked by Complexity of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict PART I arrival arrival newof of group in Armenians particularly Armenia,inTranscaucasus, today’s Baku,and issue convergeon the of the historiographies of owners all region.disagreement the Despite For elaborated historiographies of Armenians and Azeris, see Stpehen H. Astourian, “In Search of Their “In Search H. Astourian, see Stpehen Azeris, and ofArmenians historiographies elaborated For 27 in which both were respectivelyboth groups settlers inwhich exposedasearly true and : Armenia and Azerbaijan, immediate parties to the conflict, establish conflict, the to parties immediate Azerbaijan, and Armenia : edited 14 CEU eTD Collection see Kamuran Gurun, Kamuran see Armenian Genocide in Perspective ed., Hovannisian see Richard account, Armenian an For year. of that happenings known the to reference parts and assumes it is not the objective of this paper to provide any insights. Hereafter 1915 fromevents EasternAnatolia, which will resulted bein death ofused many as due to a harsh conditions. The present paper avoids taking against Armenians. The official Turkish argument discredits the genocide claims and calls it expulsionof Armenians 33 Russian Rule 1985). 32 Progress: War inNagorno-Karabakh (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991); Also, see Caroline Cox and John Eibner, 31 Muslim Community 1986);Press, Tadeusz Swietochowski, Muslim City,” in 30 them as exploiters. dominate business life. Specifically, forthat matter tensions with native population increases, since nativeslive perceive in isolationfrom natives. Linguistically, religiously, andethnically different than the local populations, theygroups are hard-working and intelligent communities with cohesionhigh mutual and support, and usually choose to According to the same author the role of Armenians in Baku can be compared to theKarabakh”. Jews in Eastern Europe. Both (Richmond: Cruzon Press, 1999). Especially chapter on “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict overNagorno- aforementioned migration only contributed to the increasing numbers of Armenians. numbers increasing the to 29 contributed only migration aforementioned 28 Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh into migration Armenian wave of century. Karabakh,following Russia’s Tsarist Ottomans the wars against and Persiansin the nineteenth with their ethnicity. their with Nakhchevan, and Yerevan Russian moreauthorities onArmenians in distribution of higher managerial positions respective social classes, erupted in Baku erupted social classes, respective their for other each classified sides wherein clashes, inter-communal first The Azeris. Muslim roots of early between animosities andurbanized Armeniansaffluent Christian and peasant The official Armenian view portrays the 1915 events as an organized genocide carried out by Ottoman Turks out by Ottoman carried genocide organized asan events 1915 the view portrays Armenian official The For the spread of clashes to regions, see Audrey Altstadt, For thorough account of 1905 clashes, see Christopher J.Walker, For detailed overview of conflict in Baku and its spread to regions, see Audrey Altstadt, “Baku: Transformation of Transformation “Baku: Altstadt, Audrey see regions, to spread its and Baku in conflict of overview detailed For See, Svante E.Cornell, Svante See, The group. ethnic separate as present already were Armenians regions these all in that note to important is It Until Until bloody the of events 1915 with itsall causesandconsequences of reliance the century in twentieth early itsthe height at boom was oil Baku When 28 (Stanford: HooverInstitution Press, 1992). The City in Late Imperial Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed Small Nations andGreat Powers: AStudyof Ethnopolitical Conflict inthe Caucasus 32 , where ethnic groups , whereethnic groups livedin andidentified oneanother compact (New Brunnswick, N. J.: Transaction Publishers, 1988);For a Turkish account, (London: Institute for Religious Minorities in the Islamic World, 1993). Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: TheShaping of NationalIdentity ina 30 edited by Michael F. Hamm, (Bloomington: Indiana University as early as 1905 The Azerbaijani Turks: Power andIdentity under Armenia and Karabakh: The Struggle for Unity 31 , and eventually spread to Karabakh, (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 34 relations between the between relations Ethnic Cleansing in 33 that started new started that The 29 set the 15 CEU eTD Collection Walker, 39 Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 38 (1990). Blank, “The Transcaucasian Federation and the Origins of the Soviet Union, 1921-22”, Union, Soviet of the Origins the and Federation Transcaucasian “The Blank, 37 36 First Year, 1918-1919 Independence Struggle forTranscaucasia incorporation Uneasy, but peaceful coexistence until Gorbachev era Army. Red rebellions against awaiting Azerbaijan the actual collapse of republicthe invasion the after of the 35 Michigan Slavic Publication, 1983). authorities. Azerbaijani by confirm However, bya transferAzerbaijan decision was denied decision statement. the to the placed andNakhchevan Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenian administration and pressuredSoviet committee revolutionary the meeting first their In debate. a political to confrontation military a radical heavily byArmenians.dominated relationship of relationship of UnionSoviet Kemalist ally and closestthe then Turkey, Union, Soviet the of authorities, and put both territories under the jurisdiction of Soviet Azerbaijan. Many believed the Indeppendece,”in 34 Ottoman support thankslatter, independenceWar Armenia in declaredtheir the to Azerbaijan and 1918, when region.over the outof Revolution Amidtherisingchaos Bolshevik the and turmoil Worldthe of communities remained somewhat calm when the Russian empire re-established its firm control On account of complicated developments of 1920, see & John Eibner, & John see of 1920, developments of complicated account On Pipes, see Richard Republics, Transcaucasian of RedArmy ofthe Oninvasion For invasion of Transcaucasian Republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – by Bolsheviks, see Stephen –by Bolsheviks, Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia, – Republics ofTranscaucasian invasion For See Tadeusz Swietochowski, SeeTadeusz For advanced account of complex developments in the region during and after WWI, see Firuz Kazemzadeh, Firuz see WWI, after and during the region in developments ofcomplex account advanced For Richard Hovannisian, “Caucasian Armenia between Imperial and Soviet Rule: The Interlude of National Interlude The Rule: Soviet and Imperial between Armenia “Caucasian Hovannisian, Richard Armenia and Karabakh Dashnaktsutiun 37 (Berkley:University of California Press, 1967); Richard Hovannisian, 38 of of in from Republics overNagorno-Karabakh Caucasus thestruggle South shifted Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change 35 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1971). , achieved to ascertain the control of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was by now was which Nagorno-Karabakh, of ascertain control the to , achieved (New York: Philosophical Library,Richard 1951); Hovannisian, organization, Armenians conducted continuous guerilla warfare and guerilla continuous warfare Armenians conducted organization, 39 A year later the decision was completely reversed by central the reversed was completely decision later the Ayear Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920 , 107-108. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). 36 With the material support of the Armenianmaterial supportof With Republic the and the . edited by Ronald G. Suny 261-262, (Ann Arbor: Ethnic Cleansing in Progress The Formation of Soviet Union: The Republic of Armenia: The Armenia: of Republic The : Subsequent to Soviet : Subsequent to Central AsianSurvey Armenia on the Road to Road the on Armenia , 30-31; no. 4, no. The 16 CEU eTD Collection Lang, Wimbush, 42 ZoryanInstitute, 1988), 42-46. Karabakh File: Documents and Facts on the Question of Mountainous Karabakh, 1918-1988 41 1990), 656. Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute,” the republic to which they are subordinated”, Niall M Fraser, Keith W. Hipel, Johnpolitical cloutJaworsky, and prestige. and InRalph reality, Zuljan, both autonomous “A oblasts and autonomous republics are highly dependentway onof life, while an autonomous republic, which isstructured as semisovereign state, is supposed to have havegreater considerable cultural and administrative autonomy and is distinguished by a particular national composition and 40 much success. without Moscow to petitions of thousands addressed Armenians onregardtoNagorno-Karabakh byArmenians.protests werestaged 1970s Inthe question variousjurisdiction. reasons Dueto alleviated tensions were till 1960s,whennewthe wavesof Armenian to Nagorno-Karabakh of transfer achieve the to wereundertaken attempts political disappointmentArmenians. on As Armenian remained partof the highseveral discontent Army, inclusion the itinof Azerbaijan SocialistSoviet Republic (ASSR)caused massive Karabakh Given invasionby was promised that toArmenians beforethe of Bolsheviks Red the Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). and called Nagorno- thereafter status, autonomy region received in1923 the Subsequently, finalized the two the between signed playedin and the decision.that The “Treaty akeyrolemakingof Brotherhood Friendship” of Nagorno-Karabakh question. Nagorno-Karabakh Sovietrevisit to ofStalinthe throughout history callsfrom the successors Armenians, refused the relation the Armenianto less population:from in1939 to in 90% than 80% 1970. reason important behind petitions was those thechanging demographics of Nagorno-Karabakh in For demography For of Nagorno-Karabakh throughout twentieth century,see Alexandre Bennigsen and Enders Ondevelopments onNagorno-Karabakh question during 1960s and 1970s, see Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., In their articles Fraseret al., describes autonomous oblast as “An autonomous oblast (province) is supposed to The Armenians: A People inExile APeople Armenians: The Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). de jure 40 (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1986); David M. The Journal of Conflict Resolution control of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. over Azerbaijan of control 34. no. 4 (December 34. no. (Cambridge: The 42 Despite all 41 Equally The 17 CEU eTD Collection 48 Armenian Review started. Claire Mouradian,Azeris “The against Mountainousprotests Karabakh violent of wave new Question:Yerevan in Inter-Ethnicarrived clash Conflict or inter-communal of Decolonization news the When followed. Crisis?” 47 Lapidus, “Gorbachev’s Nationalities Problem,” 46 (Summer-Autumn3, 1990):35-49. Karabakh to Armenia is not in the interest of the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples. Azerbaijani and Armenian the of interest in the not is Armenia to Karabakh Nagorno- of transfer the that stated and demand the refused resolution Committee CPSU Central days22 February on A)Armenian later be (See Appendix Two transferredto SSR. USSRto the and Azerbaijan Armenia, of soviets supreme from demanded officially Oblast Nagorno-Karabakh populations. theircries constituent of incidents between governments topaymore communitiesthe the graduallyurged attention to 45 Russia, 1917-1991 44 Press, 1993), 275-276. news Afterby Armenians. receiving youths Azeri murderof the two whereAzeri radio reported Nagorno-Karabakh, to werespread part. Demonstrations took million people more than one February protest the decision Armeniansto held strikes in inand demonstrations Yerevan, which further.matters animosity thataroused scale incidents and complicated emergedafter opportunities in increased Azerbaijan protests Glasnost Gorbachev’s policy to of activities wasattributed intensification The of protest Moscow. the besides petitioning the Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in 43 and Armenia intensified,masswith Nagorno-Karabakh were and protests rallies From Perestroika to1992 See, Libaridian, See, one In of these incidents Armenians refused candidacy the of an Azeri village administrator in1987. Clashes For the reawakening of nationalities question as an unintended outcome of Gorbachev reforms, see Gail W. see Gail reforms, Gorbachev of outcome unintended an as question of nationalities reawakening the For See Tadeusz Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan: Between Ethnic Conflict and Irredentism,” and Conflict Ethnic Between “Azerbaijan: Swietochowski, Tadeusz See of implications and provisions On See, Ronald G. Suny, On February 20 1988 under influence the of Armenianthe population Sovietthe of 44 that lessened the risk of expressing complaints and demands. The number of counter of number The demands. and complaints expressing of risk the lessened that 43, no. 2-3, 43,no. (Summer-Autumn 1990):1-34. (New York: Free Press, 1994),409-424. The KarabakhFile LookingToward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History Glasnost : In secondthe half of 1980s Armenian calls for unification the of Glasnost , 98. 45 in similar fashion, when Azeris began to utilize the utilize to began Azeris when fashion, in similar . 46 , see Martin Malia, see Martin , Foreign Affairs From then on, both sides intermittently engaged in small engaged intermittently sides both on, then From 68, no.4, (Fall 1989): 92-108. The Soviet Tragedy: A Historyof Socialism in (Bloomington: Indiana University Armenian Review 47 Increasing minor Increasing 43 wereorganized 43, no. 2- 43,no. 48 On 26 18 CEU eTD Collection 56 1, no. 49,(December 1990). 55 Azerbaijani Politics,” 54 53 52 51 Ethnic Conflict inTranscaucasia,” Conflict Ethnic 50 541-563. to incorporate the regionfor ajointArmeniaandNagorno-Karabakh. budgetandto incorporate created Azerbaijan. to returned was Nagorno-Karabakh and off called was government interim the Consequently, hand. at problem the to solutions permanent finding in effective not was government interim the since rose, communities between 49 decision. with the content Azeris were nor Armenians Moscow. to responsible directly of Nagorno-Karabakh administration for the interim government assignedanew 12 January on 1989, Gorbachev Later, NKAO. inof declaredthe “state emergency” a inMoscow when authorities until increased September, continually thesepeoples between Tensions Azerbaijan SSR. to of Nagorno-Karabakh attachment thedecision. annulled Soviet Deputies declared its secession from Azerbaijan, but on the same day the Azerbaijani Supreme that it is against the Constitution of the USSR. Similarly on 13 July NKAO the Soviet and declared decision the ofrejected Soviet Supreme Azerbaijani Peoplesin the the fashion, same however, daysSovietlater,in with decided Nagorno-Karabakh. unanimously Two favorunification Sumgait. in Armeniansto attack refugees from started Yerevan, whowere those Azeris, particularly Sumgait, refugee groups crossed border between between crossed Armenia border Sumgait, refugee groups See Audrey L. Altstadt, See Elizabeth Fuller, “Moscow Attempts New Solution to Nagorno-Karabakh Impasse,” Nagorno-Karabakh to Solution New Attempts “Moscow Fuller, Elizabeth See On account of discontent in the part of communities, see Mark Saroyan, “The ‘Karabakh Syndrome’ and Syndrome’ ‘Karabakh “The Saroyan, see Mark of communities, part the in of discontent Onaccount See Mouradian, “The Mountainous Karabakh Question,” 24. Fordevelopments of 1988, see Walker, On flee of Azeris from Armenia, see Altstadt, For exodus of Armenians from Azerbaijani cities, see Ronald G. Suny, “The Revenge of the Past: Socialism and See IgorNolyain, “Moscow’s Initiation of the Azeri-ArmenianConflict,” In light of In lightof these andincreasing developments chaos on 15 June Armenianthe Supreme 49 To escape possible inter-communal Toescape violence possible events of inter-communal the after in27-28 February Problems of Communism The Azerbaijani Turks New Left Review 52 On 18 July USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium reaffirmed the Armeniaand Karabakh no. 39 (September-October1990): 14-29. The Azerbaijani Turks , p 212. no. 184 no. (November-December1990): 5-34. 55 In response the Armenian decided Inresponsethe Armenian government , 127. 54 Meanwhile, the skirmishes and clashes 50 , 197. and Azerbaijan Central Asian Survey 53 As we shall see, neither 51 Report ontheUSSR in both directions. 13, (1994): no.4, 56 Vol. 19 CEU eTD Collection settled in Nagorno-Karabakh, whose statusfinal will be determined through a referendum. a on Nagorno-Karabakh schedule surround that made by Armenian regions militaryoccupied forces. seven of Infive following from periods, to withdraw be decidedwill yet, forces Azeri communityArmenian plan will be re- peace to According plan. of peace principles agreed the declared time first the for onNagorno-Karabakh talks peace rose the hopes forpeaceful settlement. On2007 in 25April 2007, Azeri FM and Co-chairs of developments Minsk group, Recent war. responsible for another can undertake parties ofthe none that argue experts most armies, their last thirteen years parties held more than 100 talks to reach a peacefulagreement.In the Although bothforces. sides developing military Armenian control under came claim side had Armenian the which to other seven and Karabakh 58 (Bromma, Sweden: Triton Publishers, 1997). 57 in are notunitary forcesbodies aremostly fighting Military comprised their violence. part the and during people on will their impose not can and forces military over control no have governments in many cases that conflicts, inpost-Soviet particularly shows, fully. Practice picture grasp the approach to ethnic conflict significantly overlooks the complexity of the conflicts and prevents to asanditsare accepted obedient will cooperative. who imposes andpeople, on isin body as most forces,a single regarded theories, which military with a clearcommandover sits atthe of hierarchy top Accordingly, unified samecause. government the unitary around actor As a general rule great majority of theories of ethnic conflict readily assume conflicting sides as a Actors of the Conflict war. full-scale into clashes communal inter- from escalation of point the was that Exactly own. their on left were parties and finalized, on2September. unilaterally independence declared Soviet Nagorno-Karabakh after of region the status autonomous the abolished Azerbaijani 26NovemberJanuary”, 1991,the Sumgaitthe andpogrom. Finally,Soviet on see, duringplace took several period this suchas“Operation developments crucial Ring”, “Black and paramilitary formations 1989-90, sporadically engagedinAsthroughout violence. shall we Thewar,which left more than 30,000 dead and overa million refugees, with ended aceasefire in 1994.Nagorno- See Svante E. Cornell, The present paper argues and will turn in detail in the second part that this of this kind that inthesecond part in detail turn will argues and The presentpaper established both parties believesolution sides to inmilitary As the started two Conflict Theory and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Guidelines for aPolitical Solution 58 57 Within a month the official dissolution of USSR 20 CEU eTD Collection 59 most the case.Obviously, the to theories the applied who researchers most entrapped fallacy that the causeofindependence, supported andallAzeri were for thesuppression of claimswas these a respective communities makesit obvious argument thatthe that all Armenians uniformly the communities who seemingly struggle for the same cause. The research into the interests of the of demands and interests the between not differentiate do theories of the Most escalation. process in participated elsewhere, the Azerbaijan Armenian Diaspora and Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, in communities Azerbaijani and Armenian them amongst actors, level community governments interests, demands and concerns other, each with interactions and Their identified. decisions be can actors level governmental were crucial inputs to the in different full 1992,seven scalewar of the actualbeginning the to complexity haveoccurred, skirmishes of the situation.first and claims early the when 1988, February From conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh the of Besidesevolution follows: AtthatpointbeactorI willdefinition Fraser and defining decidingon actors. the adopt that of should the actors before analyzing step first The by theories. is the neglected that mainly conflicts situation. of the further complication the impact on have aserious by parties attached interpretations with diverse natural disasters, uncontrollable nonpolitical and of unprofessional militias or paramilitary forces. In addition to actors events, political and Fraser et al., A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute”, 653. Various actors ranging from actorsVarious ranging level toindividualgovernmental from during the played apart situation. of an action which are under its control to initiate in order to alter the conflict the power ofthe decision maker isexpressed in terms ofoptions or courses maker in a conflictmodel; decision itmust a have as some power toinfluence included be To the conflict; organization. an by represented people of group An actor, hereafter referred as a decision maker, may be an individual or a of thecomplexity demonstrate basis to asound provides Nagorno-Karabakh The caseof 59 21 CEU eTD Collection was integral was integral war, part of of from process all-out non-violentpolitical the struggleescalation to Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic: each conflict shouldlevel of governmental these beexaminedactors separately. the of understand complexity the To participated escalation. inthe level actors governmental over andmilitary populations the Asforces.from mentioned, already 1992seven 1988 to control lost governments where fewexceptions, casewith Nagorno-Karabakh to same applies the instances most In in theory. least at disposal, their at budgets and units enforcement hold imposealleviate the worsening situation. To theirwill and taken enforce governments decisions ethnic decisions Through conflicts. possess andpolicies governments apowertotrigger or of escalation the and evolution in the players prime are level actors governmental theory In Governmental Level Actors conflict. the for thestudy of special attention role than the governmentssituation. in evolution the of deterioration the to From contributed countries both in groups certainof opposition nationalistic the and conflict.points of Therefore,view theydisarming one anotherorstagingmilitary againstcoups national Lastly,governments. popular the were those playing parties, more frontsfrom important fractions foughtenemy,army only both sides not against the in butsometimes engaged deserveSeveral fights. and early of period the in mostlyespecially fighting, armies unified the about talk to hard is negative it in sections, the caseof As from infollowing Nagorno-Karabakh be established will side. each becomes part of explanation of the conflicts. Again the theories assume one central army fighting up Heretheissueby to take their of andachieveself-enforcement. thearmies demands arms is game their ability playersthe of separate makesfactor thesecommunities andforemost striking From the start, the government of Soviet Azerbaijan 22 CEU eTD Collection 63 62 1988): 3. Conundrum”, Constitutional A “Nagorno-Karabakh: Field, Francis USSR”. the by confirmation to subkect concerned, republics unon ofthe agreement by mutual altered be may republics between 61 impossibility of impossibility in of pursuing theirAlthough it goals a peaceful and constitutional way. was a sidethe Armenian to the whichexplicitly SovietAzerbaijani government, demonstrated decision. secession unilateral the annulled andimmediately same course followed the government Azerbaijani the byNagorno-Karabakh, bids of peaceful last Inthe relations. inter-republican 60 Stepanakert several times changed its political course depending on the development of events. had government socialistthe conflict the evolution of the Throughout decisions. controversial its occasionally through conflict of the stages early inthe role imperative an andplayed USSR constitution Article 78 the backedof bythe rejection, resounding second The Azerbaijani government’s in andStepanakert. Armenian Yerevan from population the responses hadtaken andgovernment Azerbaijaninotstop the couldof radicalized chain thatgovernment events measures both the February, From condemnationthen on, starting 1988. with andresolution, rejection of Nagorno-Karabakh passed a resolution of People’s Deputies of Soviet the camewhen seriousmeasures take to government Azerbaijani for the transfer the on pressed of that the events of course in the oblast moment A defining to republic. the of the integrity Armenianterritorial SSR on 20the threatened messages separatist with meetings heated these that grounds the on Moscow to Michael P. Croissant, Michael Marcus Gee & Anthony Wilson-Smith, “Enraged Republics,” “Enraged Wilson-Smith, &Anthony Gee Marcus boundaries The consent. its without be altered not may republic union a of territory “The read: was article The Ronald G. Suny, G. Ronald Quite expected and objective to even nonchalant observers though were the moves of moves the were though observers nonchalant even to objective and expected Quite Initially the response of the Azeri government to crowded Armeniancrowded rallies in to government Initially Azeri the response of the 63 60 , the Armeniandominantly capital populated complainingNKAO,of waslimited to Looking Toward Ararat 61 The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications , of the Armenian SSR request Armenian SSR , ofthe , 197-198. 62 for the unification notably exacerbated the notably exacerbated unification the for Maclean’s 101, 27 no. (27 June 1988): 28. Radio Liberty Research (London: PRAEGER, 1998), 30. . (15 July 23 CEU eTD Collection Azerbaijan a right provided to law withdraw the however, freely importantly, More form the USSR. referendum. a national to contingent became changes territorial 68 67 66 65 64 of republic”. the anger masses from Armenia were channeled toNagorno-Karabakh, which theArmenianaugmented moderatebe material people.mobilizesides aAzeri used Firstly, fleeing to the ready more to of conflict. steady tothe escalation contributed masses, anddirectly andAzeri Armenian both the radicalized government measures takenby instancesandthe controversial other vehement the in act, to borders its over sovereignty claiming government a traditional for way conventional rushed to fill the administration and security organs of Nagorno-Karabakh, reinstated under reinstated Nagorno-Karabakh, of organs andsecurity administration fill the to rushed inNagorno-Karabakh special administration Moscow’s demanding cessation blockadeof the for andfrom the withdrawal APFpushing of support was 32. where official toll death was particularly dramatic Nagorno-Karabakh and Baku. Thespreadof toSumgait,clashes be will turnedin due course, in clashes inter-communal in the resulted not or intentionally whether policies governments cases refugees,in Baku that soon turned intouncontrollable violent mobs ready collide.to In both these frustrated them of some masses, mobilized Moscow by serious taken andpoints better heard voice tomakeininhappening itsWhile order Nagorno-Karabakh, government wasthe this all with the rail blockades with rail the (APF), responded to Moscow’s installment of “special administration” in Nagorno-Karabakh The law confirmed Azerbaijani sovereignty over all parts of the country, including Nagorno-Karabakh, and any and Nagorno-Karabakh, including country, of the parts all over sovereignty Azerbaijani confirmed law The Altstadt, Elizabeth Fuller, “Nagorno-Karabakh and the Rail Blockade”, Rail the and “Nagorno-Karabakh Fuller, Elizabeth Croissant, Bill Keller, “Soviet RegionHit by New Ethnic Unrest and Strike”, 64 since ratio population the in wasincreasingly years. favorof changingAzeris in last Particularly in two occasions the policies of government supplied the radicals from both from radicals the supplied government of policies the occasions in two Particularly When the mobilized masses, now under the leadership of the Azerbaijani Popular Front Azerbaijani underPopular now leadership the of the masses, When the mobilized The Azerbaijani Turks The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The 68 The Azeri government chose to side with radical APF for popular goals and goals for popular APF radical with side to chose government TheAzeri 66 , the Azerbaijani government found itself trapped between Moscow between itselffound trapped Azerbaijani , the government , 206. , 28. Report on the USSR 67 and passage of “law on the sovereignty the on “law of passage and New York Times 65 , no. 41 (13 October1989): 23. , (16September 1988). 24 CEU eTD Collection Nagorno-Karabakh started to slide out from Azerbaijani control. Facing anger in the capital from in fromslide capital the Facinganger Azerbaijani to control. out started Nagorno-Karabakh backfired and handling in issueheavy-handedly the However, rejecting the resolution each case. by unification Armenian Azerithe hardened the SSR and its NKAO,measuresafter government deal regions whiletrying to Amidwith Nagorno-Karabakh the question. the official on requests Wayne State University Press, 1996) 30. enforcement of party discipline together with theand embarkedon creationthe military independentforcesof with full force. dispatch of dissident party officials 72 (March 1992): 84-86. 71 Maclean’s 70 12. Impasse”, Nagorno-Karabakh to Solution 69 backfired policies the Nonetheless, home. at popularity government’s boost time same the at while Army, intimidate Operation called to ‘Ring’, and dissuade Armenians from unification claims a jointSovietmilitary with to conduct for operation the government aprospect forces provided paramilitary Armenian andAzeri Sporadic unprofessional between clashes paramilitary groups. of creation facilitated and citizenry of eyes in the government communist the legitimized in authority capital of troops the assertSoviet presence to with newly installed government failureof inforestallintervention bloody Soviet Bakuandattempt Its escalation process. to period, toanimplacableSoviet level. angerthe dominated the administration Armenians,Nagorno-Karabakh who of the throughout background.ethnic Azerbaijan SSR after the abolishment of NKAO “special administration”, with those of Azeri Mark Malkasian, Mark David E. Murphy, “Operation ‘Ring’: The Black Beret of Azerbaijan,” Saroyan, “The ‘Karabakh Syndrome’ and Azerbaijani Politics”, 26; Anthony Wilson-Smith, “Explosive Protests,” Saroyan, “The ‘Karabakh Syndrome’ and Azerbaijani Politics”, 27; Elizabeth Fuller, “Moscow Attempts New To sum up, the Azerbaijan SSR initially limited its actions complainingto Moscowto and The relation of government with its own constituency was of significance to the to significance of was constituency own its with government of relation The 103, no. 3 (15 January 1990): 22. 71 , when Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh came seeto military war as the only solution Gha-ra-bagh: The Emergence ofthe National Democratic Movement in Armenia 69 The installment of new administration mainly comprised of Azeris raised Azeris of comprised mainly administration new of installment The Journal of Soviet Military Studies (Detroit: 72 to outer , 5, no. 1, 70 de- 25 CEU eTD Collection Importance of Objective Antecedents,” of Objective Importance 73 issues. of in settlement Moscow the with sided NKAO over possession maintaining From 1988 till the official dissolution of the USSR the Azeri central government with the aim engaging inpogroms ended in of Russianthe military invasion the end of Baku, therefore it. of stop from apathy to Failureof theobjectives. populationthe from achieving government or moreforcedfar radical totake which steps were demanded government whomasses resignation, acceptance of nationalist program and issuing of resolutions that called the central called in that authorities central the andissuingprogram of nationalistacceptance of resolutions side with strivingfor population the of unification Armenia NKAO SSR.Government’s and the government atwas pressed outset, on the to Moscow Remainingconflict. gradually loyal to inter-republican. republican to of intra-from Republic claim changedthecharacter of conflictSoviet as apatronage secessionist backing was always an elevating factor. As for the CPSU and the Azerbaijani SSR fact of another demanding from Azerbaijan, secession havewith aneighboring to kin-state material and moral encompassed dual evolution on effect of conflict.the theNagorno-Karabakh For Armenians, member nextto Azerbaijan presenceof the SSR asaconstituent of USSR Armenian the the Azerbaijan with SSR. In the second part of the 1980s,relations when debates over close Nagorno-Karabakh and question overheated, communism to commitment its despite authorities central the before question Nagorno-Karabakh the brought cases few a than more in SSR Armenian Armenian SSR resolution. a peaceful possibility of the inWith itsinvolvement Sumgaitthe ‘Ring’and Operation pogrom government almost ruled out militiaindependentrelationshipbe radical APFand with ineffective. theto proved government Shale Horowitz, “Explaining Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts: Using Regime Type to Discern the Impact and Relative The communist party Armeniaof adiverging followed path during the escalation the of : Starting from the early days of establishment of the USSR until its demise the demise its until USSR the of establishment of days early the from Starting : Nationalities Paper 29, no. 4,(2001): 640. 73 In its 26 CEU eTD Collection 85 84 January 1990): 82. January January 1990): 97; On the annulment of decisionby Moscow, 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 finally led to the replacement of the communist government with the nationalist government. The population Azeri Armenia’s Moscow. by also time this but followedDecision Armenian fate of SSRdecisions the notonlybyBaku,previous and refused includedKarabakh further step one took Committee, and NKAO initsnew budget. unified of continuation Movement, National Armenian nationalist control of the under complete antagonism republican atthe Armenianthe Appendix level. almost D)Yet, (See government, 75 74 SSR Azerbaijan by condemned immediately almost proclamation approve unification to Moscow which would be comprised of Armeniabewhich would andNKAO. comprisedof SSR Armenian SovietSupreme andthe Council declaredNational the United Armenian Republic, SSR. Azerbaijan NKAOunder reinstated and administration initially endorsed Although relations its with Baku and Moscow. exacerbated mobilized leadershippopulation, of Baku andMoscow. with relations expense of the on administration, appointed Moscow toreplace Council, created excludefrom NKAOBaku’s the rule Altstadt, Croissant, For response of Azerbaijani SSR, see SSR, of Azerbaijani Forresponse SeeAltstadt, Saroyan,“The ‘KarabakhSyndrome’ and Azerbaijani Politics,” 20-21. Fraser et al,“A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute,” 668. Ronald G. Suny, G. Ronald 28. Republics”, “Enraged Wilson-Smith, Geeand Baku Domestic Service Moscow Domestic Service Baku Domestic Service Armenpress International Service The Azerbaijani Turks The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The The Azerbaijani Turks The Azerbaijani Looking Toward Ararat 76 the appointment of “special administration” with rationale that it would 78 , 6December1989, in FBIS-SOV,#89-234 (7 December1989): 86-87. , 29November1989, in FBIS-SOV, #89-228 (29 November1989): 89. In a retaliatory move the CPSU Central Committee abolished the special the abolished Committee Central move CPSU the Ina retaliatory , 2December1989, in FBIS-SOV, #89-231 (4 December1989): 112-113. , 197. 85 , 26September 1989, in FBIS-SOV, #89-189(2 October1989): 63-64. amid Armenia the accentuating duel between and Azerbaijan , 212. 83 Baku Domestic Service 74 The rapidly increasing militancy increasing rapidly The after pressures of the Karabakh Karabakh Committee of the after pressures , 202;ChristopherWalker, J. , 39. 77 , the government officially recognized the National the officially recognized , the government TASS , 10 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV,#90-008 (11 , 10 January 1990, in FBIS-SOV, #90-009 (12 Armenia and Karabakh 80 (SeeAppendixAlthough C) the 79 Outraged by Outraged decision,the the 81 , the declaration accelerated declaration , the 84 that accelerated flee of accelerated that , 129. 75 , unofficial , 27 82 CEU eTD Collection 92 91 90 89 88 Foe,” December1990,FBIS-SOV, in #90-233 (4 December1990): 43-44; Jonas Bernstein, “A Big Brother Turns into a 110; 87 86 fewpopular arranged government popularity,boost communist intended the to several acts, unification population.closer In to becomedemanding thewasforced to Moscow, government Armenia. on dependent economically and militarily was which Nagorno-Karabakh, the secessionist to gave confidence inter-republican one and into punishment. ‘Ring’ asa enforce Operation the leaders to Soviet of Azeri and thehands the played to referendum all-Union Gorbachevboycott organized to voted Supreme Soviet militias disobedient the of disbandment was government elected newly the by be done to out set objective ultimate declared that Armenia starts secession procedures from from USSR. secession procedures starts Armenia that declared independent forces. armed of establishment of Armenia and integral United the part Nagorno-Karabakh asan inclusion of Armenia. as SSR Armenian renamed and ofsecession process started openly Armenia”,which of Independence the on “Declaration called Soviet passed adocument, Armenian Supreme amonth than elections, after Azeri settlements Horowitz,“Explaining Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts,” 641. On accounts of a number of events, see of events, number of a accounts On Yerevan Domestic Service Yerevan Domestic Service Moscow Domestic Service Yerevan Domestic Service Ibid. TASS Insight on the News , 239. All in all, Armenia’s existence as a neighboring kin-state changed the intrastate conflict changed the intrastate kin-state asaneighboring Armenia’sAll in existence all, However, the relations with Moscow and Baku further strained when on 23 August, less strainedwhenon 23 August, andfurther Baku relationsMoscow the with However, , 23October1990, in FBIS-SOV,#90-206 (24 October1990): 116-117; 87 and forestall Soviet intervention. Soviet forestall and 86 , Vol.6,, 34,no. (20 August 1990): 29. , in , itwhich tobe proved inquite ineffective, tostop raidsorder on the , 4March1991, in FBIS-SOV,#91-044 (6 March1991): 69-70. , 31January FBIS-SOV,1991, in #91-022 (1 February 1991): 57-58. , 24August 1990, in FBIS-SOV, #90-166 (27 August 1990): 106-107. , 23 , August 1990,FBIS-SOV, in #90-165 (24 August 1990): 100. 89 The turning point in the course of events came when the Armenian the when came events of course in the point turning The 88 There were few clauses in the same document to agitate Baku: TASS , 3September 1990,in FBIS-SOV, #90-171 (4 September 1990): 92 Initially loyal to the central authorities in authorities central the to loyal Initially 91 For many these radical measures Moscow Domestic Service 90 and clearly and , 3 28 CEU eTD Collection authors accused him for being unwilling to find a permanent solution but rather embarking on measure that aimed at aimed that measure on embarking rather but calming populace,Croissant, solution permanent a find to unwilling being for him accused authors Richard Pipes, “The Sovietsee UnionAdrift,” tendencies”, separates for whatsoever sympathy “ no had he Furthermore groups. ethnic USSR’s between 96 Tragedy 95 94 petitions left Gorbachev with no option above) (See conflict. of the but to take evolution on escalation and effect precipitating had hostilities the of beginning actual before the a clear positionof war, was one of such cases. From that point of view, the decisions made in Moscow even well- Moscow’s the brisk SovietAzerbaijanArmenia broughttwo – to Karabakh and – conflict, which Republics response to Armenian 93 in irredentism. some cases and nationalism of rise the indirectly, or directly CPSU chaosreigning andescalation. conflict. At escalationAzerinegatively of the tothe contributed continuously population, against the raided some point theandNKAO its with Bakuand supportto its failuremilitary together disband which to groups, governmenttherefore outflow of Azeri population.turned Hence, uneasy relations of the government with Moscow outsituation whendeteriorated failed governmentthe tocontrol mushroomed armed bands and to be completelywere detrimental its relationsto However, with Baku andMoscow. more importantly, the ineffective passedwhich Armenia on nationalist severalresolutions NKAO, SSRand unification of groups, to stop the meetings banner. Some analysts linked it Gorbachev’s personal lack of knowledge onintensity and complexity of animosity On the issue of rising nationalities problem as unintended outcome of Gorbachev’s reforms, see Malia, reforms, Gorbachev’s of outcome unintended as problem nationalities ofrising issue Onthe Malkasian, Ibid ., 194. : Reforms the late Soviet leader Gorbachev intended to implement eventually promoted, , 409-424; Lapidus, “Gorbachev’s Nationalities Problem,” 100-102. 94 Until the NKAO Supreme Soviet’s official request for its transferal to Armenia SSR that 96 93 In continuation measuresof popular the government, by now underinfluence of the and Azerbaijani calls to take an active role was complete disregard. Moscow’s disregard. wascomplete role anactive take to calls Azerbaijani and and replaced the flag of the communist republic Armenian andreplacedflagthe communist of the with tri-color 1918 the Gha-ra-bagh , 72. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1,America and World,the (1990/91): 77; other , 29. 95 The Nagorno- The Soviet 29 CEU eTD Collection (11 July 1988): 1. 103 102 101 (30 June 1988): 1. 100 November1988): 6. 99 Nagorno-Karabakh”, 98 Libardian, of the Communist Party Committee Central of ofthe the USSR “Response to the relations”. demand inter-ethnic by damage the and governmentArmenian and ofAzerbaijan Soviet Mountainous in people working Karabakh”, ofthe interests the in Gerard contradict J. structure territorial and national existing the revising at directed demands and developments in Nagorno-Karabakh the Autonomous Region, CPSU the Central Committee holds that actions the 97 investmentin housing social and services. appease Armenians indulgencesto suchas region.the Moscow opted of NKAO with Instead, negative answer Affairs Troops (MVD) cracked down protestors cracked down on (MVD) Troops Affairs leaderSoviet andhis reforms.” the for support their of end the “marked fashion harsh very in a claims Armenian the of rebuff labeled it as “attempts to abuse requested with the resolution of Supreme Soviet the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh Gorbachev “anti- and “extremism” as activities the called Gorbachev discontent, and anger their display to streets Yerevan airport through through a massYerevan invasion. airport whotheirfaith in put the Azeri capital, Azeris in general were not content with all implications of handling of contentwith implications Moscow’s all in not Azeris general Azeri were the capital, peaceful attempt of forNKAO unification on 18 July Appendix1988. (See B) last the and rejected leadersMovement Karabakh of of the the arrest the Gorbachev ordered after Philip Taubman, “Gorbachev Says Ethnic Unrest Could Destroy Restructuring Effort,” Yuri Rost, Yuri The decision of the CPSU Central Committee was read as follow: “Having examined the information about the Elizabeth Fuller, “Recent Developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute,” Nagorno-Karabakh in the Developments “Recent Fuller, Elizabeth Croissant, Croissant, Quoted in Elizabeth Fuller, “Nagorno-Karabakh: No Closer toCompromise,” perestroika Although Kremlin’s rejection of the Armenian demands was greeted with enthusiasm in enthusiasm with greeted was demands Armenian the of rejection Kremlin’s Although The Karabagh File Armenian Tragedy The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The 97 BBC BBC Summary of World Broadcast to the official tothe Armeniansto wasatotal the NKAO of request disappointment forces” perestroika , 98. 99 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990): 2; “Party and Government Resolution on were set that toundermine his reforms. When Armenian the SSR 101 glasnost The last remaining ties between Gorbachev and the Armenians the and Gorbachev between ties remaining last The and unification were broken when Soviet Ministry of Internal of Ministry Soviet when broken were unification and 30. , 29; also, see Walker, with the aim of re-carving state borders”. state of re-carving aim the with 98 103 When in Armenians the Armenia it and NKAO took Armenian alienation from Moscow was completed , (4 April 1988). 102 who achieved to interruptachieved who the working to of Armenia and Karabakh Radio Liberty Research Radio Liberty Research New York Times , 125-126. 100 Gorbachev’s RL 312/88 RL 295/88 (28 30 CEU eTD Collection blockades by APF the the short-term remainedsolution. with unhappy of Armenian measureby the the parties. satisfy both to solution aninterim as administration” “special 106 105 104 of the APF The leadership. of heads the arrest in and ofAzeris Soviet affairs improvement necessarily cause of USSR. the in until andcollapse adeadlock the Yerevan remained Moscow between relations independence.for Subsequently drivethe its from resolute Armenia dissuade ‘Ring’ Operation to in the authorities theAzeri collude to with camedecided whenGorbachev and moderate, demands. SSR Azerbaijan under NKAO reinstate and administration” the about concerned overwhelmingly were Azeris all, beyond and Above parties. concerned the of consent without requirementsthe inviolability ofthe republican presumed the that of USSR constitution borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh question. The population accused Moscow for its failure to carry out 108 107 111 1998 36. Mountainous KarabakhQuestion,” 29-30; on the second approach,“The see Croissant, Mouradian, see version, first the On rule, settlement. imposed Azerbaijani centrally to under reason legitimate violence of have would Moscow resurgence the Assuming dispute. ofthe settlement forceful for groundwork the that argued was it accounts of these first In Gorbachev restored statusthe quo control. hoping to wash his hands of the matter.In secondAzerbaijani version, Moscow under was preparing Nagorno-Karabakh reinstate and government 110 109 Mouradian, “The Mountainous Karabakh Question,” 24. Fraser et al., “A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute,” 668. Bill Keller, “Moscow Arrests Azerbaijani Rebels,” interim abolish to decision Gorbachev’s behind rationale the explain to forward put were approaches Several Altstadt, Baku Domestic Service Pravda Baku Domestic Service Paradoxically, the aggravation of relations between center and Armenia did not did Armenia and center between relations of aggravation the Paradoxically, , 19January 1989, in FBIS-SOV, #89-013 (23 January 1989): 66. 110 The Azerbaijani Turks 111 However, the milestone event in relations of Moscow with Armenians, both radical both Armenians, with Moscow of in relations event milestone the However, and military invasion of Baku by Sovietthe Army leftmore that than hundred , 15January 1989,FBIS-SOV, in #89-010 (17January 1989):52. , 29November1989, in FBIS-SOV, #89-228 (29 November1989): 89. de facto 109 , which was perceived byArmenians asMoscow’s Azeri submission to , 206. loss of control over NKAO after Moscow’s installment of the 105 and Azeri New York Times 106 107 governments, the peoples inboth republics Moscow acceded to abolish the “special the abolish to acceded Moscow (25 January 1990): 8. 108 after series of costly long-term rail long-term costly of series after The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict 104 Despite the endorsement the Despite 31 , CEU eTD Collection 116 114 113 importantly he believed within that conservative elements Kremlin,would who attemptstage a put down to popular nationalistic demandshis would put reform risk.program at More employing force awarelarge-scale behind Kremlin. that was wallsof Gorbachev Obviously, the Moscow’s refrain from using large-scale force, one should deeply the analyze ongoing politics understandviolence.nationalistic Therefore the contain behind and reasons to demands Withoutdoubtsolution. Soviet the instate stillhad 1988 suppress the sufficientstrength to naturally Armenianleaders to opposed demands For Soviet that reason, precedent. set undesirable had to not tobecautious andterritory, Moscow territory disputed in inwas lack. Nagorno-Karabakh Thesituation uniquewas not inUnion a over clash states constituent when conflict the handle to how on provision constitutional givenUnion dispute and the republicsauthorities inMoscow, two wereparty that to became. SovietCentral authorities late the how ineffective anddef demonstrated ears, clearly 115 112 arms. revenge acquire and forcesSoviet to against attacks several employed formations military Azeri defend themselves as furtherwell as their cause.Besidesraids each Armenian against other, and Armeniansgroups, with engagedconsiderablemilitias success, inindependent building raceto Azerbaijan.” in subjects their and dead Azeris Reserves Halted”, Reserves Times Malkasian, Saroyan, “The ‘Karabakh Syndrome’ and Azerbaijani Politics,” 29. Bill Keller, “Soviet Troops Bogged Downby Azerbaijanis’ Blockades of Railroads andAirfields,” Ibid Ibid (19 January 1990): 1; Francis X. Clines, “Soviet Forces Said to Battle with Azerbaijani Militants: Call-up of 114 ., 116. ., 120. Unquestionably,an Nagorno-Karabakh not dispute over central the easy posed problem to Having lostHaving in theirfaith handling Moscow’s Nagorno-Karabakhboth the of question, In fact Gorbachev’s decree calling for immediate disbanding of military groups fell military for to disbanding Infact immediate groups Gorbachev’s decreecalling of 112 Gha-ra-bagh “broke whatever bonds of limited trust remained between inremained Moscow rulers between the oflimited whatever trust bonds “broke New York Times , 201. (20 January 1990). p.1. 113 115 and with sided Baku 116 in its search for New York 32 CEU eTD Collection control. the first time in Soviet history the institutionof that sort dared to place a nationalist demand bypassing executive 121 SOV, #88-135 (14 July 1988): 41. ideas. unification advocating the by Armenians and Nagorno-Karabakh Soviet with an exception process. escalation inputs to the negative of handful thehad and and capitals respective Moscow between theties broke independence, on proclamations great majority Armenian of annulment in Yerevan, Bakuand military downs crack unauthorized meetings, of deputies were tosuppressfire became Decisions suchas undersegments. troops of empoweringradical Soviet strongly consolidate settlement andtheir in “success” aggravatingsides angerinboth hands directly played of to to radicals ranks.for apeaceful parties the persuade failure to Moscow’s in interests. their not were centre the The moderate escalation to sides policiesthe believed that pursued Both by than rather role. playing acalming voices assuming more active role for the center soon 120 episodes. many in 119 secession body proclaimed legislative and loudly, more demands their expressed representative of Baku’s interests in the region. It is not coincidence after his resignationArmenian community his term cultural and academic exchanges betweenArmenia and region were in its worst. Ultimately,deputies insistentlyhe was he refused tobring the questiona soleof Nagorno-Karabakhbefore Baku andMoscow. was It during 118 117 by Soviet NKAO adopted the ArmeniaSSR were with budget region to Armenia solution.” a suitable for search the through off them heading than rather developments to reacting of policy eventually sack him out. againstcoup himlater, wouldmisuse eruption of civil discreditunrest to his and reforms In fact, with these decisions the powerless institution of a local Soviet had broken a taboo on the official level. For level. official the on a taboo broken had Soviet local of a institution powerless the decisions these with fact, In Croissant, Boris Yevrokov, first secretary of NKAO from 1973 to 1988, was a striking figure. Croissant, Despite all cries of Armenian TASS , 13July 1988, in FBIS-SOV,#88-134 (13 July 1988): 55; In the evolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the central authorities “committed to a to “committed authorities central the conflict Nagorno-Karabakh the of evolution In the 117 The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The Hence, measures thatGorbachev the took duringhadmainly process the contributed 119 , unilateral secession from SSR Azerbaijan from secession , unilateral : The NKAO of People’s Soviet Deputies washeavily dominated 118 Various resolutions such as official request for transfer of the , 27. , 29. Baku Domestic Service 121 that manifestly convoluted the 120 , and adoption of unified adoption of , and , 14, July 1988, FBIS-in 33 CEU eTD Collection FBIS-SOV, #89-010(17 January 1989). 124 123 SOV, #89-013 (23 January 1989); On Azerbaijan’s official reply, see 125 122 Committee administration” “special appointed Gorbachev the to government region. The establishment autonomous the of Azeris and Armenians between heightened animosity Bakuand its relations the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh as an alternative parallel impact in subsequent course of of indevelopments. course impact subsequent Armenians of the region saw it as a move to expunge the Armenian administration, the Nagorno- the expungeArmenian administration, the region saw itasamoveto the of Armenians home measure endorsedconsolidate the it their seeingas a one-timegovernments to at opportunity rule power and the administration of NKAO. state local the of of organs theleadership whichassumed committee six-person region under the placed 12 January 1989 decree on Soviet USSRSupreme Arkady The Volskiy. convoy personal headed by specialadministration was Gorbachev’s Nagorno-Karabakh’s the means insignificant, Volskiy Committee neither norby by Moscow Baku andArmenia. as an Along NKAO,increasing grewtobe the with violence body actor, uncontrollable the implicationshad for conflict. of inescalation provocative andantagonistic substantial the Baku as hand thatperceived of andpassing resolutions soon, whichslid out forces, paramilitary manner.As asArmenia the decisive SSR Azerbaijan and itsSoviet through NKAO creation of organized inan units military of creation the initiate to thefirst was NKAO of Council National Mouradian, “The Nagorno-KarabakhQuestion,” 26-27. Saroyan,“The ‘KarabakhSyndrome’,” 20-21; For theArmenian response,see For more informationon Ibid., 125 As already mentioned, even though the Armenian and Azerbaijani Communist 24. , the Armenian and Azeri people in the region greeted it with resentment. While the 122 , coordinated the formation of the formation forces, had, coordinated by paramilitary of significant deputies the : Perhaps the leastcrucial of all level governmental though actors, by no Krunk Committee, see Malkasian, 124 123 Among the governmental level actors the actors level governmental the Among Gha-ra-bagh Baku Domestic Service , 73-75. Pravda and creation of the Krunk , 19January 1989, in FBIS- , 15 January 1989, in 34 CEU eTD Collection and official position of and Armeniaposition official ontheNagorno-Karabakh underwentdispute a notableof perspectives the Azerbaijan of sanctions economic catastrophic and earthquake the of devastation movement. nationalistic communist anti an by government communist the of National Armenian Government moderate. vis-à-vis the positions instrengthen with sides their both radicals to a chance deficit. theleaders of Administration’s theapproach oppressive popularto region the endowed meettheir weapon to werefinesource MVDtroops the in theregion, violence inter-communal violence. behind for Particularly paramilitary the increasing primegroupings, actors the ever eliminating than rather contributed that factor another was region the in troops MVD new of Positioning governments. their from the populations respective further alienated andAzerbaijan enforced The solutions. by endorsement of measure the in governments communist the Armenia seekself- them to necessitated ultimately that interests in with their dispute accordance the of conflict. Firstly,both communities realized once more that Moscow was not capable of settling its hold on to the power. troops, which engaged inabuses population,intoharassmentagainst strengthenand the region to Nagorno-Karabakh,” in 127 decisive steps when itabolished Krunk the Committee most the took administration The intheregion. violence provoking were allegedly who leaders autonomous region. Policy 128 2003). University Press, Manchester 126 itas interpreted Azeris Karabakh Jan Koehler and Christoph Zurcher, “The Art of Loosing State: Weak Empire to Weak Nation-State around Nation-State Weak to Empire Weak State: of Loosing Art “The Zurcher, Christoph and Koehler Jan David D. Laitin and Ronald G. Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way Out of Karabakh,” Suny, VII, 1 no. (October,1999): 154. Despite its short life the Volskiy Committee had some significant inputs to the escalation tothe inputs had significant some Committee life its theVolskiy short Despite During its short reign the six-person supervisory reignits During arrestcommittee short supervisory popular six-personthe tried to Looking Toward Ararat 126 Potentials of Disorder , 207. de facto : Armenia’s path : Armenia’s replacement path toindependence wasthrough edited by Jan Koehler and Zurcher Christoph 21,(Manchester: and de jure 127 loss of Azerbaijani sovereignty over the over sovereignty Azerbaijani of loss , and achieved the installment of MVD of installment the achieved and , 128 Middle East After the 35 CEU eTD Collection “Armenia, Azerbaijan Agree to Cease-Fire”, to Agree Azerbaijan “Armenia, “El’tsin Brokers Agreement onNagorno-Karabakh”, 132 131 1991. 22September on Nagorno-Karabakh andliterature Armenia be will infollowingturned sections, its officially claims on renounced in the overlooked is generally which event, milestone a In autonomy. greater to demands give Armenians limit Nagorno-Karabakh uptheindependencepressured the to claimsand their 133 135 State”. the of Loosing Art “The Zurcher, 134 130 129 Azerbaijan. relations with ameliorated somewhat damaged the army national a build to efforts its again, Then more. even solution military on believe to came government’s radicalization policies promoted Nagorno-Karabakh Armeniansamongst the who hand, one the On government. Azerbaijani the of circles political and military in the war army a national of creation the decree on Presidential Nagorno-Karabakh,Armenians. Nevertheless,thesupport governmenthadby no butto left Armeniansthe options in when theyin among faced hardships Nagorno-Karabakh government radical the the controlling groups opted for Azerbaijan Ter-Petrossian the to his concessions Dueto unpopular factor. self-defeating all-out war against became a in and Armenia Nagorno-Karabakh cop withforces theparamilitary to incompetence Azerbaijan to Nagorno-Karabakh. attain seeking independence the and Azerbaijan between one their goals.independence recognize it Armenia refused to officially blockade the economic evade change. Bill Keller, “Armenia Yielding Claim on Enclave”, Laitin andSuny,“Armenia and Azerbaijan,” 156. Croissant, Malkasian, Fordetailed discussionof the policy, see Horowitz, “Explaining Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts”; Koehler and Horowitz,“Explaining Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts,”, 641. Ibid ., 640. Though theindependentArmenian itself devoted avertgovernment war,itsto the 129 Armenian president, Ter-Petrossian, broadly championed concessions to Azerbaijan to Azerbaijan to concessions championed broadly Ter-Petrossian, president, Armenian The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The Gha-ra-bagh , 201. 130 and tried to improve and relations to tried with Turkey Washington Post , 69. Report on the USSR New York Times 132 And when And itsNagorno-Karabakh when declared (25 September1991): 20. 135 133 was conceived as a sign of of asasign undeclared wasconceived and portrayed the ongoing conflict as conflict ongoing the portrayed and (23 September 1991): 12; Elizabeth Fuller, 3, no. 40 (4 October 1991): 17; Fred Hiatt, 134 131 Moreover, he 36 CEU eTD Collection 140 November1991, in FBIS-SOV, #91-225 (21 November1991): 82. 139 138 64. Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict activeservice. military Within few Azerbaijani presidential days decree called able-bodied all citizens aboveeighteen to Armenia andNagorno-Karabakh. facilities toward running water and power demolished the 143 142 Zurcher, “The Art of Loosing the State,” 2. 141 Minorities”, ‘Vanished’ Its Rediscovers “Azerbaijan Fuller, Elizabeth a precedent. set it before end an to separatism Armenian gerrymandering, first the independent government was particularly inclined to take all necessary means tobring the 137 Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report 136 government of autonomous status terminated Nagorno-Karabakh irregulars, Armenian by downed was Affairs Interior of Minister Azerbaijani the carrying When helicopter the economies. Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh to detrimental were deathly statusandregions place autonomous itunder rule direct of Baku. various for reasons washardened Karabakh and government dispute sensitive issue. Forthis reason, unlikeArmenia, Azerbaijan’s official position on Nagorno-the most was farthe question Nagorno-Karabakh the separatism,that provided to crackthe Armenian several measures government took the perception reverse itspopular illegitimate the previous communist government,its independence with of same government, Azerbaijan the declared apparatus non-communist which was eagerNational Azerbaijani Government to prevent dissolution of the USSR. To Koehler and Zurcher, “The Art of Loosing the State,” 2. Given that Azerbaijanwas a multinational state and minorities were living in compact thanks to Soviet territorial Elusive”, Remains Independence Real Transcaucasus: “The Fuller, Elizabeth see information, more For Radio Moscow World Service Interfax Radio Baku Network Baku Radio TASS International Service Network Baku Radio In the air of rising violence the government embarked on oil , 18 November1991, in FBIS-SOV,#91-223 (19 November1991): 82; Report on the USSR , 5December1991, in FBIS-SOV, #91-235(6 December1991): 81. 27 , November1991,FBIS-SOV, in #91-229 (27 November1991): 63-64; Koehler and 143 , 24November1991, in FBIS-SOV, #91-227 (25 November1991): 93-94. 2, 52 no.(28 December1990): 20; Shireen T.Hunter, , 25November1991, in FBIS-SOV, #91-227 (25 November1991): 93. (Washington,DC: Center forStrategic and InternationalStudies, 1994): 1, no. 1 (3 January 1992): 48-49. : While Armenia was entrenching its independence by the 138 137 Radio Yerevan Network 139 141 moved swiftly to alter the and rail blockades andrail andforces government The Transcaucasus in TheTranscaucasus 136 and promised , 20 Radio 140 that 142 37 CEU eTD Collection under huge influence of the ANM as a result of which several official proclamations on proclamations official several which of a result as ANM the of influence huge under Due tothemounting before popularity long group the of the Armenian Supremebecame Soviet movement. unification of the spearhead the became itsfrom soon path and diverged committee process. Originally found by young nationalist intellectuals to promote 144 National Movement (ANM) The Karabakh Committee the governments in evolution of the conflict. than role negative mostly and important more playing were intelligentsia, of leadership the under organizations,these forces,goals. viewpoint their toenforce certain From government nationalist than the in some cases stronger militias, addition, In they established wereneglected. demands accede totheir and demands, playing against their their when cards governments own their werepopular masses, continuously radicalizing groups pushing governments to the central the reformist organizations more possessedthan popularity communistthe These governments. and nationalist two were in Azerbaijan APF andthe inArmenia Committee The Karabakh Organization Political resolution. peaceful the of unfeasibility the on population the persuade to achieved eventually that ones radical more the favor inthe groups moderate the of eradication the facilitated government Ter-Petrossian mild sanctions against Armenia andNagorno-Karabakh. Government’s unyielding stance against the andeconomic military offensives sporadic via its blockades, totheescalation contributed Mouradian, “The Mountainous Karabakh Question,” 26. Accordingly, uncompromisingAzerbaijani significantly independent the government 144 : Birth of the Karabakh Committee, later renamed later renamed asArmenian : Birth Committee, of Karabakh the , wasdecisive inforgingcourse thesubsequentof escalatory the perestroika , gradually , gradually the 38 CEU eTD Collection USSR 147 146 145 Karabakh establish adirectandrule. The sponsorship group’s anddeploymentof paramilitary rescindmore pressuredto leadershipAPF the autonomy government adothe without Nagorno- Volskiy in Committee NKAO. Having accomplishedfirst theirobjective in way a thriving the out throw Communist firstsettled onto in APF the ofgroups to spectrum regime, opposition for the After becomingorganization an umbrella Nagorno-Karabakh. autonomous the over sovereignty Azerbaijani unquestioned championed and intellectuals nationalist of handful a from The Azerbaijani Popular Front rolein playedANM escalation. utmost an the issue governmentto unilateral the proclamations inexpenseof with relations Moscow Baku and resolution. its Through role inradicalizingmasses, creating and paramilitary groups, urging the itmilitias lacksweep topower, excludedthe apeaceful theindependent of over control Although position the of Nagorno-Karabakhthe on group the question significantly changed after its stance. inAzerbaijanthrough antagonistic theopposition radicalize same servedto time prominent bloc in role the the consolidating inArmeniabutradical Nagorno-Karabakh, and at Azerithe inhabitants of Armenia andSoviettroops. Moreover, the ANM notonly a played failedcontrol,ANMduel. but forces created, to The paramilitary thatcontinuously against raided deterioration of Yerevan and Bakurelations and subsequent intensification inter-republican the of Committee. Volskiy the of downfall the bring committed to creationwere adopted. andNagorno-Karabakh Armenia unification of of paramilitary forces and organization of strikes and demonstrations to Altstadt, Croissant, Ibid 1, 41no. (13October1989): 23. ., 33. The intricate dealings between the ANM and the Armenian government resulted in the resulted government Armenian the and ANM the between dealings intricate The The Azerbaijani Turks The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The , 206; Elizabeth Fuller, “Nagorno-Karabakh and the Rail Blockade”, Rail the and “Nagorno-Karabakh Fuller, Elizabeth 206; , : Like the Karabakh Committee, the APF drew its leadership APF the drew Committee, : Like Karabakh the , 33-35. 146 145 (See Above) The ANM also Report onReport the 147 , the 39 CEU eTD Collection Armenian Diaspora with diverging and sometimes conflicting interests could beidentified. diverse attitudes with communities different between differentiating than rather a unity of more as community towardArmenian Community the dispute.using all necessary means would hardly be by approved Azeristhe who live in Armenia. by violently claims Armenian the suppress to Azerbaijan in and Inin Nagorno-Karabakh Azeris fact threeBaku, whohad living fairly good conditions, could hardly converge. Similarly, demands from the differentface andtheArmenians to of anyretaliation, andwereready demandedindependence radically Armenian interestswith actors goals.diverging Armenians Simply of put, inNagorno-Karabakh, who the communities be as elsewherecan verified Diaspora Armenian and Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and the the Besides governmentsand in and Azerbaijani Armenian political communities organizations Actors Level Community for the peace. prospect the which eventually weakened an Nagorno-Karabakh inflexiblequestion, position on beginningradical the very adopted and from APF the government, by the unrestrained actor independent As an process. escalation in the factor exasperating a major was thegovernment to unaccountable forces military the APFon the hard task for the APF to radicalize the people and the AzeriGiven that ordinary citizenrygovernment lost the faith in the communist government, it wasas notparticularly well. a The reliance of Armeniadetriment of amplified that andNagorno-Karabakh the animosity between parties.the in against blockades of series APF organized of the support people complete With fashion. escalation. imminentthe for catalyst another yetwas population theArmenian drive out to Nagorno-Karabakh forces to To a certain extent the APF played a similar role to the ANM, but in morebut radical a ANM, the to role APF asimilar played the extent To acertain : Most of the works done on Nagorno-Karabakh case portray Armenian 40 CEU eTD Collection 152 independent government of independentArmeniaof government to establish chose contain with relations Turkey to question. Nagorno-Karabakh the to approach radical unyielding and collective memory 1915eventsthe of was majorthe factors definingbehind Diaspora’s paramilitary. joining and Azeri againstviolence of civilians creation initiation through the of the demands theirunification for Armenians be asradical as the Nagorno-Karabakh happened to they weredeported once However, became refugees. they until role escalatory than calming rather approach tothe unification andlargely life question a standards, hadcompletely played different other ArmenianUnlike Armenians thetwo enjoyed communities inBaku,who resided high the issue as the unification. of as important itat least depict and democratization on concentrate to end that for unificationstrikes tothe andorganized demands compassionate were though TheArmenian citizens forto consentArmenia. with peaceful unification information, see Malkasian, information, more For issue. Nagorno-Karabakh seconded and important asmore democratization perceived group second The primacy of Nagorno-Karabakh criticizedand others who saw demonstrationsthe as a vehicle fordemocratization. 151 Report 148 solution. citizens becamemore realistic andinclinedquestion to worth the of unification a military through Armenian the by earthquake, the Armenia, devastated already providinggas to andstopped and Infact, when willing faceto Azerbaijan staged rail blockade a full-blown war by Azerbaijan. leadership their of 150 (11 July 1988): 1. 149 Philip Gamaghelyan, “Intractability of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” The issue democratization brought a split between the leaders of popular movement. One group insisted on insisted group One movement. ofpopular leaders the between asplit brought democratization issue The Malkasian, Steve Levine, “When Victim Becomes the Bully”, the Becomes Victim “When Levine, Steve Dispute”, Nagorno-Karabakh inthe Developments “Recent Fuller, Elizabeth , (July 2005):10. Beyond Armenia there are three million members of the Armenian Diaspora. The Diaspora. Armenian the of members million three are there Armenia Beyond The most radical of The most radical of inall, Armenian the community Nagorno-Karabakh with support the 150 In tandem with the growing pessimism among the people, the leaders ANMof started Gha-ra-bagh 148 was ready to fight for the secession, if the Azerbaijani government refused government if Azerbaijani the secession, for the fight was to ready , 87. Gha-ra-bagh , 72-74. Newsweek (29 November1993): 1. Peace andConflict Monitor Special Radio Liberty Research 152 Hence, when the first the when Hence, 149 , were not ready not , were RL 312/88 151 41 CEU eTD Collection for itsfor meansby noinwellbeing, interested recalling autonomous of the status Nagorno- irregularintervals.at Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh blockades, rail both of stagedhaphazard violence communities the Armenians against the in government tonullify the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition well-organizedto on Azeri insisted the dependedonArmenia,they economically easily economically or roleanalogous Armenians in tothat of Baku. an wasplaying however, in Armenia, community The Azeri in accord. were measures, radical Azerbaijan, mobilized in reaction to Armenian demands andAzeris goals of citizens the of the differences, Nagorno-Karabakh trifling Despite Azeri Community in events part, to comprehend the complexity and causes of the conflict. turn which paper will camp, to radical the towards convergence this of dynamics the understand clearly established that initially they had diverging objectives. beactor conflict. examined in to developmentimportant the Nagorno-Karabakh of the For that matter it is an Diaspora makes important media material other resources and andaccessto character supranational to arms 155 154 153 making adeal.from torefrain Petrossian Ter- castigatedfighting andin Diaspora indeedculminating the deterred Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow Domestic Service 156 Keller, “Troops Seek to Calm Azerbaijan: Soviet Debate Cause Violence,” Cause Debate Soviet Azerbaijan: Calm to Seek “Troops Keller, Croissant, “Nagorno-Karabakh‘N’Bash”, Laitin andSuny,“Armenia and Azerbaijan,” 155. Bill Keller, “Soviet Azerbaijan in Ethnic Turmoil: At least 25 Dead,” 154 and in some cases voluntary fighters to the independent military formations. Its formations. military independent the to fighters voluntary cases some in and On the other hand, the Azeri Armenia hand, Armenia,On other dependedon community weakerand Azeri of the the were Azerbaijan of citizens nor Azeris Nagorno-Karabakh neither the Given that is it someEven all at communities andwereradicalized converged point, though those The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflct : The same categorization does not apply in the case of Azeri notapplyin communities. : Thesamecaseof the does categorization , 14January 1990, in FBIS-SOV, #90-010 (16 January 1990): 64. The Economist , 131. (14March 1992): 1. 153 Moreover, played Diaspora akey insupplyingrole 156 155 and coerced the government to take the government andcoerced New York Times New York Times (15 January 1990): 8; Bill , (18January 1990): 8; 42 CEU eTD Collection Croissant, see talk, peace after and during forces Armenian of activities and incident ofhelicopter details the On re-occurred. fighting heavy As aresult fighters. by Armenian down shot was talks, peace on representatives Kazakh and Russian 158 157 had thatthey given becostly, would authorities Soviet to surrendering aware that werewell sides madefor apeaceful governments seriousadvancement resolution. destroy to inwhen onlyandthe real for peacefulsettlement andAzeri chance 1991theArmenian it Infact militias intractable wasthe by governments. becameuncontrollable military the groups popular opposition by leaders or rich “defense” to warlords people the againstenemy raids, by created Generally ceasefire. fighting 1994 the until and politics the dominated forces that military role wasplayedby prominent unprofessional most Perhaps inthe process escalation the Actors Military complexity conflictand the of provide into it. novel insights single and study actor of interestsreasons convergence of the wouldtheir demonstrate than rather different as way systematic a in them analyze To escalation. the to input important another was cause defend their to Nagorno-Karabakh to be sent to units army on Establishment process. escalation contributed to the actors werecritical inengage violence to and eagerness violence unsystematic scale but awide- staged from Armenia of refugees thegroup events thewatershed of one intimidation. In and frustration with Armenia from expelled were they once Azeris, Nagorno-Karabakh the than violent less no became They lives. daily their on effects serious had Azerbaijanis Karabakh by Azerbaijani Ironically, the government. and theblockades economic sanctions by During the pinnacle of the peace talks the Azerbaijani Mi-8 helicopter, carrying Azeri Deputy Prime Minister, Prime Deputy Azeri carrying helicopter, Mi-8 Azerbaijani the talks peace ofthe pinnacle the During Laitin andSuny.“Armenia and Azerbaijan,” 152. Azeri communities, out of control of the government, with their decision startto blockade The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict 157 against Armenian inhabitants in Sumgait. , 45. 158 The armed groups from both 43 CEU eTD Collection 160 159 place. military took enforcement officials and patrols, Sovieton troops, 115 attacks in episodes. several theSoviet troops attacked troops. each against other fought Armenia, groups these where spread to NKAO,Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Eventually establishment of independentmilitary groups in military army Nagorno-Karabakh emerged groupings Groups Military Armed Armenian was inevitable. war the clearthat it became region be inthe when seen to started Diaspora andArmenian CIS, Armenian, Azeri, and Soviet forces, the mercenaries and volunteers from Chechnya, Afghanistan, 162 no. 2(Spring 2001): 60. 161 (September1992): 7. 166 165 164 163 material support from Diaspora. from the material support was undergroups control butthey of government, the of were receiving considerable amount acquire arms to troops Soviet and harassing Azeri main forces, population defense their activities were basis of the Armenian National Army (ANA), the biggest of the unofficial independent military independent unofficial the of biggest the (ANA), Army National Armenian the of basis National Army ofIndependent Armenia into conflict the war. escalated groupings With their self-enforceddisbanding unauthorized military units fell to deaf ears on the part of military units. (See above) decisions and eagerness to commit violence the Armenian military “Bloodshed inthe Caucasus: Escalation of Armedthe Conflict inNagorno-Karabakh”, 70-71. State,” the of Loosing Art “The Zurhcer, and Koehler Malkasian, Inevitable,” War the Was Revisited: Conflict Nagorno-Karabakh “The Melander, “Nagorno-Karabakh‘N’Bash”, Koehler and Zurcher, “The Art of Loosing the State,” 14. Melander,“The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited,” 62. Croissant, 163 Even though in named military the groups themselves asself-Nagorno-Karabakh The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The Gha-ra-bagh , 201. The Economist 165 , and fight against Azerbaijani military groups. Neither of the , 51; See also Jonas Bernstein “A Big Brother Turns into a Foe,” 29. 166 (14March 1992), p.1. : independentThe early Armenianparamilitary and The decrees of Gorbachev and Ter-Petrosyan on 159 : The Armenian Military Forces was found on the on found was Forces Military Armenian : The Indeed between Indeed January May and 1991, around 161 as a result of deadlock between deadlock of asaresult 162 164 and also against the Soviet and the also against Journal of Cold War Studies , raids againstlocal police Helsinki Watch 160 , Besides 3, 44 CEU eTD Collection control control of governmentthe they acquired autonomy action of towards endtheSovietthe Union. Militia(OMON).Officiallyheavilytrained equipped Function the and Troops Special under Azerbaijan National Army means inhandling of conflict.the brutal via of their increasingchaos andescalation employment to the contributed immensely military acquire groups on weaponry.to troops Sovietthe Those employedlingering attacks type warlords “Businessman-patriot” Azerbaijani Independent Militias 1994ceasefire. until their armies over control respective neitherthat Nagorno-Karabakhnor theArmenian governmentestablished full government it as forshouldbe noted people. leaders Yet, warbyAzerbaijani receivedwell as asapreparation Regardlessground. rationalethe of behindits establishment, the creation Armenianof Army was in battle the developments of subsequent and course in theescalation role critical played armies semi-official two between partnership close the non-interference, of position Armenian official form Armenian Artsakh KarabakhLiberation united Army to (PLAA). Popular Despite the of combined their forces. combined their more villages or and two operations during force”, “self-defense hadKarabakh usually a in Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. againstthe villages of Azeri paramilitary Nagorno- operations process. Ideologically ultra-nationalist uncompromising and GreyWolvesin were lines frontthe ANA. 167 groups. 168 170 169 (September1992): 10. Koehler and Zurcher, “The Art of Loosing the State,” 14; Croisstan, Malkasian, “Bloodshed inthe Caucasus: Escalation of Armedthe Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Koehler and Zurcher, “The Art of Loosing the State,” 13. 168 167 While thesewere happening inArmenia,many military the of ingroups Nagorno- Ironically after taking the office the government spent huge effort to disarm the Gha-ra-bagh , 201. 170 Independent militias Independentunder not control were andof government, : Before independence the Azerbaijan the unitspossessed of well- 169 : In wake the of rising Armeniandemands andmilitancy started to dominate independent armed forcesarmed creation independent dominate to started The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The Helsinki Watch , 38. , 45 CEU eTD Collection 174 173 175 Federal Studies 172 Caucasus: Escalation of Armed the Conflict inNagorno-Karabakh”, 171 process. Karabakh Armenian and other inhabited in Azerbaijan regions of was point turning escalation the The joint operation OMONof the the and Soviet called Troops, in ‘Ring’, Operation Nagorno- established control over Azeri militant groups, but that is far from the truth. the from far is that but groups, militant Azeri over control established had it Army. Azerbaijani Supposedly embryo National comprised the the Soviet conscript of abigforces entered scalefighting. Nagorno-Karabakh were fleeing to escape the violence, MVD troops did not committed itself did to not MVD troops escapethe violence, fleeing to were Nagorno-Karabakh Army’s23 Sovietdefense Soviet Particularly, system. part respectively, as army fourth and seventh Azerbaijan, and Armenia both in present were Defense of Ministry Soviet and Other Military Forces process. escalation the alleviating than rather increased region Armythe to of deployment and establishment the As aresult attacks. sporadic venality and limited sources at their disposal soldiers appropriated properties ofArmenians in pogrom MVD troops refused to intervene and stop intervene violencethe refused stop to and pogrom MVD troops circumstances. the on depending parties the of one with sided they hand other their missionstop violence refrained clearly ordered from thetroops to intervention,buton the Despite violence. inter-communal an into turning from demonstrations control to Azerbaijan and buffer role. play a Division Nagorno-Karabakh to was deployed stopfighting militiasto independent among and Razmik Panossian, “The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics,” Informal versus Institutions Formal Nagorno-Karabakh: of Irony “The Panossian, Razmik Murphy, “Operation ‘Ring’,” 68. Croissant, Murphy, “Operation ‘Ring’,” 82-83; Croissant, See James Rupert, “Azerbaijani Town Left to Fighters,” Following the declaration of independence OMON together with the Azeri callbacks from with together Azeri callbacks the OMON independence of declaration Following the 171 Indeed it the forduring was operation the first time Armenian andAzeri military The Armenia-Azerbaijan 11, no. 3 (2001): 145. 173 In addition to the SovietArmy the MVD troops were dispatchedArmenia to Conflict, 38. : All through the conflict Soviet Military Forces of The Armenia-Azrebaijan Conflict The Washington Post Helsinki Watch 175 (15April 1992). . Similarly, when Azeris of Azeris when Similarly, . , 8-10. , 41; “Bloodshed in the 172 rd 174 Motorized Rifle Due to the low In the Sumgait Regional and 46 CEU eTD Collection 183 Croissant, See, mercenary. 182 181 180 179 178 butthey pull March1992. stayed required until out, to combating parties. tothe lefttheiror weapons asajustification. of USSR the collapse withdraw the Armyto showing Soviet towithdrawan started therewasnot order Although the andMoscow stirred Azeri MVDin anger against particular. 1. 177 176 deterioration of the situation. If they had completed the mission assigned to them rather than fighting anddisarm despite militias the the orderfrom abovethe hadsignificantly added tothe serious contribution to theescalation buttoconduct process, of 1992. war after part afterfighters, took thestartin of actual the 1992. war Chechen and Mujaheeden Afghan others, mercenaries, CIS and Russian the except process, include in escalation mercenaries the Although some experts conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh in forces massacre conflict. inKhojali Armenian bloodiest in the Nagorno-Karabakh the fighters. Armenian of side filled with ill-disciplined morethe Russianforces under the bannermainly of CIS, who the took villagers. Military Forces and joined MVD OMONtroops Azeri inmassive attacks against Armenian violence. the stop Suny and Laitin, “Armenia and Azerbaijan,” 156; Levine, “When Victim Becomes the Bully,” 1; Although Moscow rejected the allegations, it has accepted that some Russian soldiercould have taken part as a Croissant, Koehler and Zurcher, “The Art of Loosing the State,” 15. Croissant, Melander,“The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited,” 64. Helsinki Watch Ibid ., 68. Consequently, reluctance of the well-equipped MVDandArmy Sovietstop to troops partin take arguedto the Afghanistan,were andChechnya CIS, from Mercenaries Russia, 177 The Armenia-Azerbaijan The Armenia-Azerbaijan The in January MVD 1990 intervention Baku inmoreof resulted 130dead,which , 11. 176 The apex of military contribution to the escalation reached when the Soviet the when reached escalation tothe contribution military of Theapex The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict 180 After the pressure of nationalists in Azerbaijan CIS armies were armies CIS Azerbaijan in nationalists of pressure the After Conflict, 80. Conflict, 46. Conflict, 178 Amid their withdrawal from the region they either sold 179 The position of the Soviet Forces was eventually , 80. 181 183 The336 From From this viewpoint they had no th Regiment of joined of CIS Regiment Helsinki Watch 182 47 , CEU eTD Collection helicopters, and 90 fighter-bomber aircraft to Azerbaijan. Croissant, Azerbaijan. to aircraft fighter-bomber 90 and helicopters, pieces, 7 and attack helicopters to Armenia; 400 tanks, 720 armored personnel carriers,470 artillery pieces, 14attack 184 Elchibey swept into the powerwith newtotally program portraying Turkey as model the and ally leader Azeri nationalist when be changed to was impartiality Russia’s Nevertheless, violence. cessation for the of leaders andAzeri betweenArmenian talks arranged several peace Russia was negligible. inprocess particularly U.S escalation Russia and leavingYugoslavian theprime therole to role itsto conflicts because commitment of as butwell, influential actor include U.Sas to Few scholars tended of conflict. the escalation and complexity the to contributions and attitudes their analyze to important is still it warfare, open of eruption the after obvious was intervention theirthat fact the Despite superpowers. including Armeniaconflict into wide could between Azerbaijan and turn region conflict regional feared the itsomethat was at point Indeed state. of Soviet the collapse the after particularly in vested region the hadof All interested Transcaucasus, national actors afterwards. these irrelevant was dispute inNagorno-Karabakh actors international of involvement The evolved. conflict the until in which context and regional global the andexamine actors, immediate of the andpositioning the collapse beyondlook relations oneshouldbilateral the understandandescalation conflict the process To of USSR, Actors Regional and was limitedmilitias independent only different. Finally after theto collapse of USSR, which left immense amount of weaponry Iran,for theend depending couldtaking prices proposed, resultthe be parts on parties the completely Russia, and Turkey According to figures collapse the of Soviet Union left 250tanks,350 armored personnel carriers,350 artillery : In the eve of collapse of USSR Yeltsin, assumed the Russian presidency by that time, by that presidency Russian the assumed USSRYeltsin, of collapse eve of : Inthe 184 , many of them became warriors and mercenary killers rather than rather soldiers. killers andmercenary , many warriors became them of The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The , 5. 48 CEU eTD Collection 188 Conflict in theCaucasus 189 Middle Eastern Studies Policy Foreign 187 and and Cold War inMoscow’sAbroad’”, ‘Near of Political Competition and Bargaining in Russian Foreign Policy”, 186 Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report Policy”, Research Report ?”, Future the to Back Policy: Foreign “Russian Jeff Checkel, 1996); (June 29 Liberty Research Report 73, 131-141; Elizabeth Fuller, “The Ongoing Political PowerStruggle in Azerbaijan,” 185 interests. Russian of expense in the Iran conflict. of the escalation in the blockade actor inAzerbaijani outside Russia wascrucial Armenia gasthe wakeof with formula. it Through military inArmeniapresence and andits Nagorno-Karabakh supply of Russian formulated newly of ingredients fundamental the of one was in CIS membership Azeri and Azeri oil over Thecontrol as alooser. out come would Azerbaijan war after conflict. in the even wasactivecreating in upand insistMoscow speeding of other start actual war, several statements about unification of all Azeris all of unification about statements several policies with skepticism.was awakened particularly Iran reign the after madeElchibey,of who research into the conflict. into the research (CIS). States Independent of Commonwealth within Azerbaijan policy Russian leaders decided tosupportArmenia tocurbTurkish influence and keep Svante E. Cornel, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered,” Conflict Nagorno-Karabakh The War: “Undeclared E.Cornel, Svante See Dilip Hiro, “The Azerbaijani Question”, Azerbaijani “The Hiro, SeeDilip Hand”, Russian Hidden The Eurasia: from “Letter Goltz, see Thomas involvement, of Russian overview On For details of discussions during formulating and outcomes of Russian Foreign policy, see Kate Litvak, “The Role “The Litvak, Kate see policy, Foreign Russian of outcomes and formulating during of discussions details For On detailed account of the period, see Thomas Goltz, : Initially interested in peace and stability in the region, Iran soon started to perceive Azeri to soon started region,the in Iran inpeaceand stability interested : Initially Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report The role Russiaof in the escalation process remains ambiguous manyto who have done a 188 According to this group of scholars Russia was particularly interested in interested of eruption was Accordingof tothis group scholars Russia particularly , no. 92,(Fall 1993); Svante E. Cornell, , Vol. 1, no. 41 (16 October 1992); John Lough, “The Place of ‘Near Abroad’ in Russian Foreign Russian in Abroad’ of ‘Near Place “The Lough, John 1992); October (16 41 no. 1, Vol. , XX, 4 (Summerno. 1997): 11. , 1, no. 18 (1992); Elizabeth Fuller, “Azerbaijan after the Presidential Elections”, (London: Cruzon, 2000), especially chapter 9. 187 Although few argued Russia became a party the conflictafter the few becameaparty to Although arguedRussia , 1, 26no. (1992). 185 Strategic Review Strategic In the midst of heavy debates on formulating new foreign new formulating on debates heavy of midst Inthe The Nation Small Nations and Great Powers: AStudy of Ethnopolitical Azerbaijani Diary , 14December1992. 189 2, no. 11 (12 March 1993); William C. Bodie, “Anarchy 21, no. 1 21,no. (Winter 1993). that was numbered more that fifteen million fifteen morethat wasnumbered that Communist and Post-communist Studies (Armonk,NY: M. ESharpe, 1998): 46- 186 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe/Radio Journal of South Asian and Radio Free Radio , Vol. 49 CEU eTD Collection 191 190 hardly year forget the of 1915. who Armenians, of part in the animosities in increasing crucial was Azeris toward partiality WithTurkey’s military support. its in borderpresence ofArmeniathe Turkey’s andAzerbaijan, the on calculated always side Azeri might, military its Given fighting. scale small of eve in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. A number voluntary of units weremobilized beto sent toAzerbaijan waspan-Turkic continuously groups urgingfirmerto government the take stance inrelation to part of was perceivedasanotheractof Turkey hostility by Armenians. its and complicated historical bloody Armenia with relations approach anymove to Azerbaijan in increase its influence in Azerbaijanoil rich Centraland beyond to Asia Turkic Republics. Due to Armenia support to later than sooner its raiseirredentism Azeri among population. on that time. O. Lesser, 67-84 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). Orientation”, in Johnsen, 54-55 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993); Graham E. Fuller, “Tukey’s New Eastern StrategicPosition in Crossroads of World Affairs 194 193 1992): 7. 192 293. circles. political and military Turkey’s Turkey forfactor theArmenians. wereacheeringindependence 1991. conflictthe after Dilip Hiro, Croissant, See Stephen J. Blank, “Turkey’s Strategic Engagement in the 24. FormerWar,” USSR “Undeclared and U.S. Cornell, Interests”, in Iran”, and Armenia between Entente Growing “The Dorsey, M. James Despite Turkey’s efforts tokeep Despite balance Turkey’s delicate the efforts nationalist with several NATO, and its material with process, escalation the to contributed howIran is itdebatable While : The collapse of Soviet Union was met with an enthusiasm and apprehension by The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing ofFace Central Asia 190 Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China Soon Iran came to the understanding that stronger Azeri state in North would 192 and allegedmilitary support tomilitary forces inwas crucial Iran element 193 The anti-Azeri messages starting from startingfrom The Azerbaijani early messages of anti-Azeri days 194 , 61. Interested in stability in the region Turkey in inwas eagerto stability Interested Turkey region the edited by StephenJ. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere, and William T. Middle East International 191 edited by Graham E. Fuller and Ian and Fuller E. by Graham edited (London: Harper-Collins, 1994): (4 December (4 Turkey’s 50 CEU eTD Collection 196 195 were giving ear of Millions amonghatred adherents populations. nationalism and respective their extremely were arousing figures later and Elchibey, Azerbaijani crucial Elbulfez president, personalities such asZori ArmenianBalayan, intellectual and supporter of hard-line unification, fact In conflict. explain Nagorno-Karabakh the to whileexclude trying personalities crucial not should One conflict. and crisis of emergence in the personalities influential and charismatic the Karabakh. Azerithe newsRadio announcing murder of Azeri youthstwo by Armenians the of Nagorno- people. In another event demonstrators in Sumgait turned into violentmasses immediately after Armenians,hatred to act of andunavoidable increased Armenian theradicalism among the another as in tradition, death rejoicing perceived Azeri tothe Caucasian the reverence attributed Armenian dead. of leftthousands that earthquake the rejoicingAzeris on framed as programs TV of events, first these the In established. media clearly was of negative role the events was radicala crucialrole Intwo intheconsolidation the wingamong people. playing of mediafrom mutilatedbattle corpses media. points, brutal and over By coverageof the killings marginally. only actors willthese look paper due limitation the to time But and space complexity Nagorno-Karabakh. the the appreciate of the conflict. Roles played by religious leaders, media, and key personalities are important tofully of partin development the took actors several other actors analyzed theabove besides Obviously &Personalities Leaders, Religious Media, Melander,“The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited,” 59. Fraser et al., “A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute,” 668. In international relations a voluminous literature exists on the prominent roles playedby existson prominent the avoluminous literature In international relations The role of media increased toward the end of Soviet Union due to loss of firm control 196 195 Given the Given 51 CEU eTD Collection Journal 200 Nationalities Paper on the “enemies of Islam”,governmentto show agoodfaith as early Yet andas 1988-89hecalled constraint. arevenge for and urged the faithful to mobilize. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 199 societies was facilitated. the in groups radical the of consolidation the therefore and parties conflicting by differently interpreted were events specific these because conflict, to the insight havebetter to is important theevents analyze To process. escalation inthe were decisive that events milestone the examine natural occurred.Assumingevents impossibility includingof allthese in events paperIwill the and non-political, political, numerous conflict Nagorno-Karabakh escalation of the Throughout Events: Interpretations and Impacts the conflict. discuss to meeting a arranged even and settlement a peaceful for called leaders religious both episodes Yerevan. in rallies mass several hadorganized they Azeris, Muslim the against masses radicalizing Armenianthe Church supportersGrigorian among were the most vigorous of unification. Besides 198 197 conflict. of bethe in analyzed to escalation the personality interesting another yet is nationalism of dislike personal his for Gorbachev claims. their to Lawrence E. Adams, “The Reemergence of Islam in Transcaucasus”, ofIslam Reemergence “The Adams, E. Lawrence Arie Vaserman and Rami Ginat, “National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,” Cornell, OnGorbachev attitude on nationalism issues, see Richard Pipes, “The Soviet Union Adrift,” 77. no.2/3 (1996): 223. Religious leaders played a crucial role particularly in leaders leadersReligious playedacrucial Armenian the particularly of side, where role 198 Conflict Theory At Azeri beginning the leader, the religious no. 1(1992): 41. 200 , 35. 17,(1994): 357; Vigen Guroian, “Faith, Church, and Nationalism in Armenia,” 197 Sheikh-ul-Islam Religion,State, & Society – the Keston 199 Interestingly enough in some in enough Interestingly , urged the people and , 52 CEU eTD Collection radicalizing force as soon as they arrived in their newplaces. in their arrived as they soon force as radicalizing Nagorno-Karabakh and Baku was widespread. andBakuwas Nagorno-Karabakh pogrom. Several explanations other wereproposed for the1988Sumgaitevents. the of instigators as Armenians blamed Azeris Ordinary issue. the on position Azeri official (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993): 135-136. 209 by Smith,Graham 257 (London: Longman Group, 1996). by Gorbachev. adopted also was which Croissant, reforms, his and Gorbachev discredit to forces by anti-perestroika organized Reforms 1985-1990 Sakwa, Richard ineffectiveness. of because prevent not could authorities central and republican Armenian Conflict,” 561; Another competing view argues that events the in Sumgait was spontaneous, which prison in Kafanfrom and brought released to criminals the were city ofSumgait forstreets aclearthrough purpose. ransacked that mobs IgorAzeri Nolyain, events. Sumgait “Moscow’s the behind Initiation of the Azeri- Armenia from Azeris elements” “hooligan to events bloody the attributed Moscow 208 207 206 Caucasian Knot: TheHistory and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh provocateurs to justify their nationalist policies. LevonChorbaijan, Patrick Donabedian, and Claude Mutafian, 205 Nagorno-Karabakh on demands their up give population Armenian the intimidate to massacre anti-Armenian implemented with officialthe death toll 26 Armenians and 6Azeris intomasses. violentdemonstrators twodays, The violence 29 lasted from February27 to 1988, 204 203 202 Acoounts Shahmuratian, ed., 201 Sumgait Pogrom Ronald G. Suny, G. Ronald Edmund M. Herzig, “Armenia and the Armenians,” in Altstadt, Suny, “The Revenge of the Past,” 29. Igor Nolyan argues that Kremlin, the particularly Gorbachev with hisunfulfilled Malasian, Fraser et al., “A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute,” 659. Ibid TASS ., 54. , 4March1988, in FBIS-SOV, #88-044 (7 March 1988): 44. For unofficialclaims, see See, Samvel Earliest impact Earliest of mass pogrom the departure was of Armenians from Azerbaijan For Armenians the Sumgait pogrom ArmeniansFor the Sumgaitwas awell-organizedpogrom andsuccessfully as (Cambridge: The Zoryan Institute, 1990). The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict The Azerbaijani Turks Gha-ra-bagh The Sumgait Tragedy: Pogroms Against Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan,Volume I: Eyewitness (Hempel Hempstead: Philip Alan, 1990): 244. Another variant argues that everything was The Revenge of thePast: Nationalism, Revolution,and the Collapse of theSoviet Union : 207 , 56. With the arrival of the news of murder of two Azeri youths turned the to escape victimization. Particularly fear among Armenians living in living Armenians fearamong Particularly escape victimization. to , 197. 202 and caused mental reemergence of and mental caused of 1915 trauma. reemergence , 29; Another group claims that riots were instigated by Armenian The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States 208 Refugees from both both became sides a fierce from Refugees 201 . (London: Zed Books, 1994):189. 209 204 As a result formation of military of formation As a result , which is also adopted as the as adopted is also which , perestroika promises, was Gorbachev and His 205 203 Official 206 edited The , and , 53 CEU eTD Collection 216 1. 213 215 214 212 211 210 appraised. somewhat amid the increasing militancy Armenian hopes the Gorbachevthat unification will grant were Armenians Nagorno-Karabakh. of among security guarantee rose their forces to Moscow and Gorbachev in and Gorbachev particular. Moscow pain. Armenian over rejoicing Azeris furtherArmenian polarized attitudes Despite humanitarian aid, were theearthquakeArmenian againstAzeris. galvanizedantagonism after sideeven Azerbaijani from imports Azerbaijan, continuation the sporadicof rail blockades andoil from embargos conflict. the hundreds of thousands homeless, wasone such natural of events had impact onthe evolution of in Armenia earthquake people of Northwest on December 1988,whichleft25,000 deadand Earthquake in Spitak ground lost againstthem.moderates moderate Armenians into the ranks of into ranks Armenians the of moderate radicals. thehomeless, numbers thataddedmoreflow new to of pushed leaders refugee groups and of beloved of Arrest their werejailed. Committee Karabakh leaders of membersof all eleven Soon suffering. human from gain apolitical seeking for members Committee Karabakh accused Malkasian, Croissant, Bill Keller, “Amid the Rubble, Armenians Express Rage atGorbachev”, Rage Express Armenians Rubble, the “Amid Keller, Bill Fraser et al., “A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian Azerbaijani Dispute,” 668. Suny, Melander,“The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited,” 59. Ibid ., 61. Low quality buildings, inadequacy of Armenian anger to teams buildings,Low quality inadequacy aggravated rescue Soviet of Given Armenia that needswas meeting entireenergy almost gas the through and oil Looking Toward Ararat The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Armenia-Azerbaijan The 212 Gha-ra-bagh 211 , 184. Consequently, inboth groups radical sides increased theirranksand : Natural events can be a turning point in the evolution of conflicts. The conflicts. of evolution in the point turning be a can events Natural , 210. 214 215 , Faced with anger and resentment in Yerevan, Gorbachev 32. New York Times 213 whenmediabroadcasted , (12 December1988): 210 Ironically 216 54 CEU eTD Collection ‘Ring’”. discussion of the operation, see Croissant, of operation, the discussion operation justifiable under the July 1990 presidential decree on the disbandment of militaryalthough the bands.details For are morenot disclosed till today. Hepersuaded leadership Moscowin joint Soviet-Azerbaijani 222 221 Times York 220 that the operation was for cracking down theAPF. for cracking down was the operation that confirmed Yazov, operation, the of commander and Defense of Minister Soviet the Infact APF. andover athousandkilled wounded. Azeri military intervention to capital. on stationedstop, Gorbachevdiednothing MVD and12,000Soviet inBakudid to troops decided helicopters surrounded the villages, and Azeri militias and MVD troops entered into the villages entered surroundedmilitias MVDtroops and the villages, andAzeri helicopters inhabited villageson 30 April 1991 the operation started. officially Operation ‘Ring’ formilitary creation of theirforces. campaigns immensely increased Armenia and inNagorno-Karabakh case,Armenians from lessons the their Derived since decades. and decreasedthelegitimacy Army,Soviet of whichin the eyesArmenians of was a protector SSR. and leaders in inAzerbaijan oflimited citizens between of breaking bonds Moscow the trust SovietanotherArmy 11,000 Baku. to troops Kushen, 219 217 Black January 218 1991): 7. It is widely argued that the idea of operation was proposed by Mutallibov, then Koehler first & secreatyZurcher, of“The AzerbaijanArt of SSR,Loosing the State,” 67. Bill Keller, “Soviets Claim Control inBaku: Scores of Azerbaijani Killed: Coup Averted Gorbachev Says”, Bill Keller, “Soviet Troops Bogged Down,” 1; Francis X. Clines, “Soviet Forces Said to Battle,” 1; Robert Robert Kushen, Bill Keller, “Moscow Dispatches 11,000 Troops to Azerbaijan”, to Troops 11,000 Dispatches “Moscow Keller, Bill Conflict intheSoviet Union Azeri people perceivedtheinvasion Sovietleadershipas an of act tobehead the rising The inaction duringof MVD troops the violence reminded Armenians their vulnerability (21 January 1990): 12. Conflict in theSoviet Union: Black January inAzerbaijan : Followinginter-ethnicviolence the in Baku,where both 74people from sides : When Azeri militia units, joined by Armenian forces, Army Soviet attacked , 3. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict 220 217 Within mobilized Moscow anddispatched fewdays 218 At end the invasion of 221 The immediate result of the invasion was invasion the of result immediate The New York Times , 41; also see Murphy, “Operation (New York: Helsinki Watch, May 222 (17 January 1990): 1. 219 Firstly Soviet tanks and more than hundred was New 55 CEU eTD Collection August Coup andDissolution ofUSSR operation impossibilitydisplayed coexistenceof groups between two under Azerbaijan’s rule. the Armenian an ordinary To anger. and victimization fear of of increased out was for unification Azerbaijani Armenian and fractionsarmy tookplace. Contrary to theobjective Armenian desire between fighting large-scale escalation during time first the for a result As themselves. todefend Armenians byNagorno-Karabakh forces ofmilitary in formation increase the give Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan claims upits expected for unification Armenia.with while state, independent becoming an from Armenia to stop calculated however, Moscow military formations, Baku and Moscowin Nagorno-Karabakh. had a legal forces self-defense Armenian destroy the strategy to itwas awell-calculated that argued regions basis to enforce the operation. In reality, conservative elements of Soviet Union to overthrow Gorbachev and reverse his reforms was Gorbachevhis andreverse reforms overthrow of Union to Soviet elements conservative was designedby personally.referendum that Gorbachev punishinto forArmenia all nottaking it “undeclaredpart operation the union as an war”against their resolute drivetheirindependence. resolute for no. 21, (24 May 1991): 14. scope andbrutality. 227 226 225 1991): 32. 224 223 with vehement brutality. Elizabeth Fuller, “What Lies Behind the Current Armenian-Azerbaijani Tensions?” Armenian-Azerbaijani Current the Behind Lies “What Fuller, Elizabeth 32. Control,” Tighten Troops “Soviet Remnick, David in Quoted David E.Murphy,“Operation ‘Ring’,” 84. Border”, Armenian along Villages on Control Tighten Troops “Soviet Remnick, David Dead”, 25 Least at Leaves Clash “Armenia-Azerbaijan Dobbs, Michael None of the objectives were accomplished. The immediate impact of the operation was impactof operation the The immediate wereaccomplished. of objectives None the unauthorized all of disbanding the on decreed Gorbachev ago months few that Given Armenians livingin Armenia received the operation as a move todissuade them from 224 227 223 Operations were continued until Operations until while werehas expandedin continued summer itthe 225 President Ter-Petrosyan immediately announced the announced immediately Ter-Petrosyan President : The ofAugust 1991initiatedcoup by the 226 Several credulous Armenians in the Armenians credulous Several Washington Post Report on the USSR Washington Post (2 May 1991): 26. Vol. 3, (9May 56 CEU eTD Collection warfare, although itwarfare, although hadimmensely decisive impact. theopen of for theeruption catalyst last the nor foremost the neither was system of collapse weaponry from withdrawing units of Soviet contrary Army.many However, to arguments the loads both sides wasfelt after impactinbattlefield of immediate of the dissolution captured the behalf and in mobilizationthe sphere they inferiorwere in position against Armenians. willMoscow settle on dispute the that theirhad they welcomed since expectations outcome, given that USSR continuously repressed their demands. ForAzerbaijanis it wasnotparticularly a Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. of leaders meeting function of 8December1991after to on stopped Union,officially which would be brought underspecial rule of Moscow. 228 from outset. the havefull-scalebeen successfully, warcould the wasconducted avoided coup failed. Hadthe 230 New York Times 229 1991), 85. In his phone meetings with putsch leaders Armenian president Ter-Petrosian was told that Nagorno-Karabakh Cornell, NewCommonwealth,” From 2Republics and Russia Union, of Soviet Death “Declearing Schmemann, Serge From point of view of Nagorno-Karabakh it was one-time opportunity to realize their aim, Conflict Theory (9 December1991): 81. 228 In fact, contrary to its main goal coup had facilitated the collapse of Soviet , 9. 229 Interfax , 20 August 1991, in FBIS-SOV, #91-163 (21 August 230 Infact 57 CEU eTD Collection of Armenia and the conflict is therefore a problem betweentwo sovereignstates. To official Armenia and also to 233 Gamaghelyan, “Intractability Nagorno-Karabakhof the Conflict,” 1; Cornell, “Undeclared War,” 1-2. 232 edited by Michael E. Brown 13, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). 231 Armenia andAzerbaijan. between war. ethnic and separation, peaceful reconciliation, peaceful outcome: of types” “broad in three result could conflict Brown ethnic to According PART II Azerbaijan. and Armenia between conflict aninterstate as Nagorno-Karabakh the portrayed have scholars A of number conflict. the of primary causes the hardly comprehend could one conflict of the a clear classification Without conflict. of ethnic the narrative the into fits case Nagorno-Karabakh itisthat establish necessary ethnic conflict, on of theories analyses intothe the proceeding Before conflict ofthe Categorization literature. present contribute tothe to inorder theories previously appraised tothe approaches politics symbolic and hatreds” “ancient the of elements some add will I Lastly, case. in this war all-out of eruption for the in accounting are they successful how and assess conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh the them to of the rationalist theories offered to explain ethnicclassification war. In following of the Nagorno-Karabakh sections conflict, I will I will brieflymove on to identify apply the the main with Starting violence. ethnic extreme the of assumptions outbreak the with concerned are particularly section inthis I will scrutinize that theories The war. interethnic full-scale into turn consequently and become violent disputes apeacefulseparation, or arrangement constitutional agree on According to the position of the Azerbaijani government, part of its territory is occupied by the neighboring state Laitin and Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan,” 149; Koehler and Zurcher, “The Art of Loosing the State,” 1; Michael E. Brown, “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict,” in 232 Dispute over the parameters of the conflict is also primary source of the unrest 233 Scholars arguing for international character of dispute of the character international for Scholars arguing 231 When antagonistic groups can not ethnic Ethnic Conflict and International Security 58 CEU eTD Collection post-Soviet regions,includingpost-Soviet Nagorno-Karabakh. Accordingtheory increasing to the other it ethnic ofviolentalso that thesurge by JamesFearon,couldexplain conflicts argued who the use of force in the alteration of internationally recognized borders. See Cornell, “Undeclared War,” 1. War,” “Undeclared 236 Cornell, See borders. recognized ofinternationally alteration the in of force use the and cleansing ethnic of the recognition implicit the to again, once leading, issue, onthe stand a taking from keep to 235 Armenia officially declared that the decision of Soviet Armenia does not bind Independent ArmenianRepublic. acknowledgment of the changing regional and international dynamics. And eventually to avoid the accusations 234 Armenian populationof Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan. unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakhgovernment, it is a struggle forindependence and self-determination by the The Commitment Problem Explanations Rationalist justified. meansbelow which application byall be ethnic to theories should of the conflict classified asan conflict the conflict, the of character international strong the despite Therefore, citizenship. than their rather of background, on their basis identifiedthe ethnic other each parties have criteria.” these all of some or of combination identify themselves and each other in terms of nationality, religion, race culture, language, or by a of Cornell: “[ethnic conflict of majority. the For from paperpurpose this of definition the ethnic conflictwill be adopted work is] a political, and minority a between or sovereigns two socialwhether between conflict, ethnic asan conflict or military confrontation in which the partiesposition. Armenian International organizations and major powers, however, definedin the conflict line with Azerbaijani territory and toinvolvementpoints twofoldof deployment Armenian Republic: direct troop direct to Armenian official claim on the territory of Azerbaijan. Cornell, Svante Cornell argues that misconstruction of the conflict as internal ethnic conflict has allowed the majorpwers Ter-Petrosuan after change a huge underwent level republican in Azerbaijan against of Armenia Claims Despite the ongoing debate large number of large theDespite number ongoing of debate scholars haveregardedNagorno-Karabakh Conflict Theory 235 , 17. : This theory was proposed and applied to the Yugoslavian case Yugoslavian the andto applied proposed was This theory 236 In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the 234 (See above) (See 59 CEU eTD Collection in second stage. Consequently, as the majority fails to guarantee to commit itself to minority to itself commit to guarantee fails to majority as the Consequently, stage. in second reforms implemented tothe due economically, militarily and will be stronger, newthe stage state inis the third that however, stages, third and thefirst between biggestdifference war.The start minority previouslyfurther acquiescefaces rebel third or to stage options: two available the – legal meansany posses not to does minority affect the put, Simply rights. their infringe or thecurb not will government policies and rulings of that noguarantees has itself minority and consolidated the hasalready government new majority central government.is the that stage this of model. peculiarity The tri-pillar of Whenthe stage in thesecond wearrive state it comes to the a war against it. Assuming that the minority agrees to live together with the majority in the new is– ethnicthat war. conflict aviolent lead to majority and minority the between calculations and how interactions the illustrate a model to game creates war. avoid andtherefore problem commitment the overcome to parties the precludes amechanismhowanarchy and reason, anarchyasaprecondition, provides theory that assumes For conflict. ethnic violent the for account cannot itself by anarchy theory the to according that prevailing anarchy they fail reachto an agreementto contain the probable war. Itshould be noted the majority has substantially consolidated itself in the newly emerged state. when future not torenegein the or new republics inof creation exploit to them wakeof not the 238 237 them.” between agreements guarantee Problem “when political arises two communities find themselves a without thirdcan party that problem in majority commitment is sole partof the the causeof ethnic eruption the of conflict. Fearon, “Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem,” 2. Problem,” aCommitment Waras “Ethnic Fearon, Ibid ., 3. According to that model the minority initially has two choices: acquiesce to state or stage the due to but war, the of thecostliness anticipate parties that acknowledges The theory 237 In other words, majorities can not guarantee minorities guarantee cannot majorities words, Inother 238 Fearon 60 CEU eTD Collection explained by the security by dilemma. explained security the SovietFormer andYugoslavia, Union where the sovereign suddenly,canbe disappeared sovereign. the of absence is“emergingof as dilemma defined sees anarchy”, conflictas a result which approach ethnic the In some aspectsdrawn from the realist tradition of international relationssimilar theory, topost-Soviet ethnic conflicts. to the aforementioned theory of commitment problem, the security does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure. Cooperation among Cooperation secure. less one can make end, the in that, reactions causes security own one’s enhance to does 242 See, 241 shootings. the behind rationale aclear calculations see strategic but emotionality, calculated and rational action intended to make the cohabitationbetween the two impossible. He leaves no room for 240 Dilemma Security The autonomy. political substantial has minority the from very bytheMoreover, problembeginning costs. raising beprovided could lessacute, that conflict violent might the undermine majority and minority between interdependence economic strong and large, and when there is an external military support from a kin-state. However, strong 239 fighters and communities the including actors, the that presumes also it assumption that with congruent terms, such as Croats situation. in forcesa given military and communities the over control or Croat side, were employedminority, while although minority forecasts the cost of war. naming thefor the superbchoice isstage, in rationally warnow, first the to start at beginning, the rights contending parties. In The classical realism school of international relations theory assumes that security dilemma arises when: what one what when: arises dilemma security that assumes theory relations of international school realism classical The 104. Dilemma,” Security “The Posen, While talking about the shooting of the dead Bosnian bodies by Serbian soldiers, Fearon argues that it is a well- Ibid ., 7. This theory explains the violent ethnic conflict better when the minority is relatively minority the when better conflict ethnic violent the explains theory This In this theory the conflicting parties are assumed as unitary actors, where leaders have 240 , are acting rationally either to stop or escalate the conflict depending on the context. 241 : According to Posen the violent conflicts erupted in the territories of Barry Posen applies the basic concept of of “thedilemma”, security basic the concept Barry applies Posen 242 239 Ibid For thatreason general ., 4 61 CEU eTD Collection cheat. not will party other the that guarantee no is there since behard, to prove could competition the overcome to states a hierarchical control, government atthe top of hierarchy, prevails.Like any other rational choice solution. Equally important assumption of the theory is that both involved parties are rational and trust between them, both of the parties eventually comesee to the destructive war as only feasible lack interactions and because of win. of chance of the nature to the But if even great has side one unclear. is group rival the of intentions the when fight start to choose will it technology, military quality better- and geo-strategicposition better possessesto ifgroups oneof the Therefore, conflict. key two the definefactors in todefensiveto offensiveissuperior strategy agiven whetherthe tosignal concerned are intentions. groups Technology and geography completely their defensive the for impossible becomes it forces military defensive and offensive the between differentiate is defensive advantageover whereit In strategy. hardsituations establishes to extremely itis hard todistinguish between offensive and defensive military forces and if isoffensive open. militarysecede “windowminority of appeal ethnic while is solution to opportunity” the group to the minority groups, ethnic the vis-à-vis might military increase its to state the of advantage relative the Given might. military its increase to but option no has who group, other the insecurity enhance in measurescreates to Whenone concerns. its security groups takes that the of all of imperative most the becomes survival The security. own their from responsible themselves institutions, thestate through all a suddenfind wouldbeof their protected rights guaranteed that According to the theory the parties are well aware that the war is the worst of the options if intense is particularly groups majority and minority the between dilemma security The and were state in entrenched lived a well groups, the state acentral of collapse With the 62 CEU eTD Collection violent ethnic conflict erupts because of the collective fear of future.fear because of of erupts the ethnic collective the conflict violent 243 top of these, groups are now responsible for their own security, and prefer to increase its strength, On agreement. betray reached will the not group stronger the that since guarantees one no worse, problem,collapse emerged institutionsdue to which state makesof induced trust, the situation failures The information suspiciousprevailingcommitment andfinally occur. each other the of information, possesses becomeinformation group tomisrepresent that groups and private tends problem, of information commitmentatmosphere failures, Since and security each dilemma. violent conflict. groups interactions, authors argue, successfully account how the resource competition turns into a between of a result as phenomenon these of emergence The dilemma. security and problem, failures,information commitment are Lake theAccording preconditions andRothshilcd to conflict. ethnic a violent into competition escalate resource to existent several preconditions be should There violentconflict. ethnic lead to not does competition alone However, resources. Property rights, jobs, educational admissions,language and cultural rights are among those scarce indecides toinvest violence andeventually force preemptively.use thegroups of where createacontext one groups between and interactions within Intricate groups. between arbitrate ability to loose and erode structures state the when fear arises collective and Fear of Pure Uncertainty while defining them. and asunitary general rational are employed areregarded terms theories thewarring sides actors Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 41. Accordingly the possibility of a peaceful agreement between groups is undermined in isundermined agreement the between Accordingly apeaceful groups possibility the of conflict. of ethnic isreasons fundamental of one the for thescarceresources Competition : The explanation proposed The by that proposed explanation argues Lake andRothchild 243 Concerns on survival 63 CEU eTD Collection about the true intentions of propagators of violence.the of intentions propagators true the about uncertainty citizenry, and leaders, the fear among predatory ethnicviolence: produce to interact factors model three their In war. explain theethnic to claims that approach on rationalist based which usually war, seems into turns result end of the at irrationality.that rationality individual the itis them For conflict. over peace prefer who citizens average engage leaders of how explanation inthe Manipulation Elite in link missing the provides approach their argue They Manipulation. Elite than rather camp, ofRationalist borders the within as regarded generally theory the war, of 245 244 hawkishthe groups. mobilized around easily people account why peaceful not alone can because they hold not true, does explanation uncertainty, pure matter that for dilemma, security the view their In behavior”. individual of of “using thetools rationality best andcanbe understood victimization” fear of respectively. cooperation from elite manipulation theory and rational choice theory, predatory elites and social dilemma of Politicization ofRational Fear conflict. ethnic violent of eruption the contain cansuccessfully newstates tothe assistance international However, somewhat differentactors. that theThe previousgeneral two and rational asunitary are regarded termsin conflict participating the parties dilemma, andsecurity the models, such in asthis Serbs theory or itCroats, is argued once that again,the were eruption violent the thepolarize societies further,becomes of ethnic unavoidable. conflict used tointeractions group name within the when Consequently, fear. thecollective to leads in turn that groups.uncertainty is pure interactions groups between of the result security end dilemma. The leads to which Because of their emphasis on the rationality of masses and individuals, initially against See, but Figueiredoat the end supportersand Wingast, “The Rationality of Fear.” As the pure uncertainties explanation borrows some features of the commitment problem 245 They “ethnic violenceargue that is by triggereda social the dilemma : Figueiredopropose an theory,alternative andWeingast 244 In their approach they adopt elements adopt they approach their In 64 CEU eTD Collection was to ensure that it is fair to the rationalist theorists, who claim applicability of their models to models their of applicability claim who theorists, rationalist the to fair is it that ensure to was four of theories, all scope the with iscompatible which case, specific this of rationale selecting The outcome. for the account theoriesthe accurately do case, in and this occurs intheory each posited processes the whether asking on focus analyses The in ethnic war Nagorno-Karabakh. to In this section I will test four rationalistmodels of ethnic conflict by tracing the processes that led Case Nagorno-Karabakh on Theories lays conflict. ethnic heartof the atthe an individual of theory this rationality to factaccording rational. In areextremely individuals, and particularly population. As a hallmark of all defined approach, rationalist actors in masses, model,leaders,the the about caring mindedand arereform leaders the that approaches, provided two the first than individuals, eventually into masses,turn support start to predatory the elites. choice is notbetween war and peace but also violent victimization that is worse than war,the rational that Given victimization. prevent to violence in invest to masses drive control their beyond violence victim extreme fearof of becoming the istheadversary.Soon violence of notices the massessource thatthe persuadethepredatory leaders uncertain Atthis pointviolence. increasing masses thenotice failed.parallel to ongoing negotiations negotiations the succeededor However, whether observe only can and negotiation, the of nature the about uncertain are people ordinary faiththeir in between ongoingleaders. negotiations group the Themostis striking point that put erupt to violence the want not do initially hand, other the on Masses, violence. prevailing the of sidebelieve source asthe masses toother the the violenceandmisleading of provocation the facing ahigh ofloosingrisk pursuea power strategy “gamblingof for resurrection” thatprovisos The model, however, argues that the ethnic violent is not inevitable, somewhat different somewhat inevitable, not is violent ethnic the that argues however, model, The leaders The political war. of ethnic cause key asthe predatory elites they propose Instead 65 CEU eTD Collection failed to reach an agreement short of of short war. reach an agreement to failed parties disappearance guarantor, the of wasdueto anarchy,prevailing which becausebut the of itself state. astrong itas consolidated once of terms agreement them. between agreement guarantee successfully could case, that in a that CPSU thirdwithout party, have shouldproblem when the found aforementionedtrust of aroused political parties themselves Armenianshave would equal and equal rights inprotection thenewAzerbaijani Inability state. or leaders’ Azeri that pronouncement totrust Armeniansinability inNagorno-Karabakh was the of conflict as a result of rising commitment problem in the part of majority, then the central issue 247 246 Nagorno-Karabakh asaCommitment Problem Armenian side and Azeri would be employed. described as rational and unitary and Armenians the general andAzeris,the or such terms language that is used the in linewith be will keep I conflict the to theories the While applying nature. caseof that the by the same theorists in other cases. For that matter all actors would be options that were given to them in the first stage: to acquiesce or fight. Nonetheless, Armenians fight.Nonetheless, acquiesce or to stage: first in were given them the to that options harsh onArmenians.in Oncemore Armeniansconditions third faced stage the with same the imposed itself and consolidated Azerbaijan now, where stage second inthe majority we arrive Azeri the to acquiesced in Nagorno-Karabakh the minority Armenian Presuming war. that start acquiescemodel, minority Accordingfaced with Armenian to options, tothe two or first whether in of firstplace. the stage war minority’s Armenian behind werethe main events reasons the Fearon, “Ethnic War As A Commitment Problem,” 2. Ibid 246 ., p. 3. Both of sides,the Armenian Azeri, theand costliness acknowledged probablethe of war, More specifically, Azeri side could not guarantee to Armenian minority not Armenianto renegethe to minority guarantee not Azeri couldside specifically, More 247 Particularly, andsequencing cold calculations the of : To start with, as the theory conceives with, theory To start asthe 66 CEU eTD Collection 249 government newAzeri thatthe It wastheir main concern conflict. laidthe heartof at the entity, case. for Nagorno-Karabakh true The sameholds from the underlying causes anddisplaying only offers partial comprehension ethnicwar. the of 248 asone of developed mostthe regarded explanations Shortcomings of the Commitment problem military,hierarchy, and wasmaintained. people, same applies to the Armenian side, where command chain between political leaders, on the top of Azeri population and unifiedAzerbaijani army givenobediently applies theorders them.to The calculations. cold on actions their base causes and Armenians and Azeris, asaminority and majority, unifiedwere single actors around the same costs. undermine haveNagorno-Karabakh warby to the should playedakeyrole raising guaranteed to autonomy substantial and Azerbaijan and minority Armenian between interdependence strongeconomic token, same the with Armenia. However, actor, from external the are relatively andstrong largeminority living inacompact and amilitary possessing support ends. achieve their to stage first in the war the started Armenians rationale this Following stronger. economically and militarily became Azerbaijan that given stage, in this war at win to chance less had Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics”, 46 Ibid ., 4, 7. To start with, according to the model the calculations of Armenian minority, a rational Systematic application of the model to the Nagorno-Karabakh case reveals that, reveals case Nagorno-Karabakh tothe model the of application Systematic Theory should work better in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, since it assumes Armenians 248 : 249 Despite the fact the Commitment Problem is Problem Commitment the fact the Despite Leaders of Azerbaijan were listened by listened the were Azerbaijan Leaders of of violent ethnic conflict, the model model is far the conflict, of ethnic violent 67 CEU eTD Collection other reason for Azerbaijan not to renege was the presence of Republic, renege neighboringArmenian forof to was thepresence not Azerbaijan reason other status autonomous of region. keepthe the The to cases confirmed leadersinseveral Azerbaijani why Armenian minority believed thatAzerbaijani would state infringe theirrights, provided that government? interim the reject Armenians Nagorno-Karabakh the should resentment by Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian minority. Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh’s by resentment infringeto their Indeed rights. the measure by wasendorsed Azeri the butmetwith government, would thatArmenian Azerbaijan stillnotthere tolerate guarantor to minority that existed apotent of expense in NKAOatthe perestroika be after Union stronger expectingto Soviet becurbed, theirabout because they rights were reformsin Armenia.Therefore,Armenians should innot had Nagorno-Karabakh any concern movement,unification the Karabakh was Committee, originallypromote found to Karabakh,faith puttheir in reforms solve unificationto the the question. and Armenians Karabakh of of supporters hard-line the unification, Committee Nagorno- the most of thecollapse fewyears.USSR within Instead Azerbaijan Armenia anticipated and 251 250 the commencement of the with asearly 1987-88, started SSR Azerbaijan of expense the at for unification claimsArmenian that reveals context historical in the events the back Putting argument. the with compatible CSPU,wasdisappeared. the agreements, would curb andlifetheir rights bewould hardundernew since Azerbaijanistate, theof guarantor Saroyan,“The ‘KarabakhSyndrome’,” 20-21. Mouradian, “The Mountainous Karabakh Question,” 26. Another weak point in model’s logical chain, which ultimately results in war, is to explain Study of the case, however, shows that the sequencing of events is not particularly rather than being demised. Moreover, Moscow’s installment of interim government interim of installment Moscow’s Moreover, demised. being than rather de facto perestroika sovereignty of Azerbaijan should have been strong message strong been have should Azerbaijan of sovereignty reforms. Neither intellectuals nor ordinary people in people ordinary nor intellectuals Neither reforms. 251 The theory does not account why 250 The spearhead of perestroika 68 CEU eTD Collection 252 win to chance limited had Nagorno-Karabakh the in community Armenian The actors. rational small region? against the Azerbaijan amassiveattack not convene forcewhy didappeal during anarchy, to states to stopped andnothing anarchy prevailing the forever.was Assumingthat conflictstop the Yet, the complexity of ofguarantor agreements. thestill existent proves and themyth of This clearly discredits anarchy matter, overlooked by military sabotaged agree groups. uncontrollable later a peacedeal,the on achieved to which by the model, did not Nevertheless isabove it shown letin that collapse 1991, before USSR,contendingthe of parties the central government to off autonomy of the NKAO. call and start fight to were keen leaders who and militias, Azeri several were there of paper the part first in the displayed asalready However, victim. as a portrayed was Azerbaijan particularly and process, in the escalation ignored were Azerbaijan Republic and Armenian The calculations. and only instigator of the war that seemed to them as the best option after several rounds of cold military forces. by Armenian wereinitiated military the operations wide-scale AlthoughArmenian Azeriattack. OMON in committed units brutality in Armenianvillages, first couldsince offensive that war, itwas regardedasrational advantageous actor easily predict another question left was unansweredby Azerbaijani model the why startgovernment did not Yet for that. hasnoanyexplanation Theory minority. repressed biggest and were Georgia’s they that awar,given staged andeventually calculations same the have made should Georgia which possessed significantAzeri minority. Followingline the of Azerisintheory the the Altstadt, Anarchy played a key role in precluding parties to reach an agreement to contain war. As the hallmark of rationalist approach, all parties took partin hallmark took the conflictas visualized As all parties of rationalist the approach, Lookingfrom lensesthe of theory the Armeniansthe posits Nagorno-Karabakh asa chief The Azerbaijani Turks 252 , 206. 69 CEU eTD Collection 253 question. Nagorno-Karabakh initself aunifiedto talk in insplit about position. The Karabakh committee tothe was regards for Even it theleadership washard government. and another one several fought against episodes in of some which several in armies, breaksdown part first of the conflictthe drawn picture leaders. Butthe control the of be under to wereassumed sides both of andarmies attention, no werepaid fractions army Once again,the groups. least aforementioned three at becould divided in who reality asaunitary actor regarded also were Azeris Nagorno-Karabakh. of Armenians Armenians wholived inBaku commitmentproblem was not asignificantissue asitwas for the for example, For parties. contending the to belonged groups different between distinguish deterrent. factor, whichcouldbe to that acrucial Themodel,overlooks however, worse. everything community should have calculated the possibility of losing the war that would necessarily make Armenian case Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteed. In that not intervention was Armenia’s and men andweapon, more possessed Azerbaijan reasons: two for Azerbaijan waragainst the with with NKAO. For government. one itthing,was Armenian SSR whodeclared theunification Armeniaof SSR Azeri Armenianssupportingand evenNagorno-Karabakh, threatening of the the was sometimes continuously was Armenia process. escalation in the neglected significantly was Armenia of single actor. a as leadership the even portray to hard is it Hence, opposition. their against legitimacy political Malkasian, Moreover, whileparties, talking about in Armenians case that model andAzeris, notdid Since the theory described the developments between the minority and majority the role Gha-ra-bagh , 73-74. 253 In Azerbaijan and Moscow the leaders were in struggle of leadersthe were Moscow and InAzerbaijan 70 CEU eTD Collection The Security Dilemma in Karabakh on be arguments prevailingthe discredited. should anarchy the Thus, Moscow. of mediation though agreeresolution a peaceful on to Yerevan achieved heavy fighting Bakuand Secondly,despite in the region. and military existent presence had still was Union Soviet when 1991 as early as started fighting military the Firstly, reasons. two for prevail not case in Nagorno-Karabakh does the beyond, anarchy assumed theory. the Aboveand the of assumptions the with comply not does case Nagorno-Karabakh in the events of evolution The actors. roleexternal the of andunder-appreciate level actors various the deconstruct notdoes It acomplete explanation. propose fails it to warinNagorno-Karabakh, ethnic small Armenian minority opted for war? only 3% of the whole Azerbaijani population, then this assumption fails toexplain why weak and constituted Armenians Nagorno-Karabakh into consideration the Ifthat was strong. takes one minority if the war of eruption the assumed strongly model hand other the On war. the prevent Azerbaijan for its economymight and it had autonomousplay status. a roleYet none of theseto factors stop helped to war. Nagorno-Karabakh was almost exclusively depended on insecurity for party. theother insecurity created necessarily security enhance its own by to side taken one Measures their survival. without aconcern security of and leftsuddenly groups both disappeared on secure theirto own and allowed that Azeris central state Armenians guarantor of the toliverole. and Institutions the its with Union Soviet as be regarded should doubt without sovereign the Nagorno-Karabakh of case Inthe violence. ethnic –thatcausesextreme –absenceof sovereign the anarchy” “emerging All in all, even though the theory in of insightAll in furnishes some though theory the all,even the understanding aspects Lastly, theory assumes that strong economic interdependence and political autonomy : The foremost underlying in factor is model the the 71 CEU eTD Collection as itis shownin part,parties first independent the through were enhancing theirmilitary power However, in group. another causesinsecurity it andincreaseeventually military power groups to makes of the one that isconcern itsecurity the theory the According to conflict. inthe parties emerged. the1991agreementwhich the of out table both around parties afteractor bringing be apotent to proved In factMoscow actor. as a potent Moscow on counting were groups all Consequently, behalf. their on dispute the resolve to CPSU urge the violencein to committing were radical solution,and the find apermanent peaceful were moderateUnion to expecting groups Soviet Onthecontrary Moscow while will collapse. which both parties looked for asolution. As mentioned none of the parties were confident that the as a to sovereign present Union still Sovietwas by when 1990-91 already started military groups Dilemma ofSecurity Failure orders leaders. of their political first place. Like theininitiated ethnic the strife the that support and calculation itfactwas theirrational situation. In people, armies of both sides were professionaldefensive, in which technology and geography were two most importantfactors. and ready to carryArmenians out the to start signal intentions,fight Armenians optedto their defensive a preemptiveAnother reasonfor war. the war in the first itthat wasextremely hard distinguish to offensive between and militaryforces defensive and to hand was the war.Given the both into parties finally and dragged sovereign lack of and trust between parties established interactions the be. However, advantage would resultthe what matter no options of the worst war wasthe of offensive over Secondly, theory significantly underestimates the malign intentions of the participating the of intentions malign the underestimates significantly theory Secondly, a given their in leaders supported who actors wererational andAzeris Armenians the that aware well were Azerbaijan and inNagorno-Karabakh minority Armenian The : In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the fighting between armed between fighting the Nagorno-Karabakh of case the In 72 CEU eTD Collection wisdom wisdom thatoffensive ismoreassumes costly requiresand a itpainstaking planning. Therefore, The conventional war. apreemptive start should strategicbetter position and technology military should Atthis discredited. another point question rises; should possessingwhy a group better behind factors thatthe prove as Armenian reasons the model explanatory the proposes offense Karabakh Armenians a notshouldpreemptive have started war first atthe hand. Thosefactors populations of andArmenia Nagorno-Karabakh andit possessed OMONunits, Nagorno- combined the more than was twice population Azerbaijani that Given their calculations. mobilizenumber high parties more commitment with keyfactor haveincluded were should in ability to the reasons, that For soldiers. of unprofessional wereconsisted units of Azeri OMON with exception the armies sides wasrudimentary and byboth possessed military technology the case Nagorno-Karabakh inRealistically, the military groupings. unprofessional possessed only its highOMON Armenians battle readinessatNagorno-Karabakh while disposal, with units hadwell-equipped Azerbaijan Azeris. Besides, of under control were Shusha, particularly plan in the case of invasion.possible NATO Secondly, mostimportant strategically the heights, possessed more military Azerbaijan complex toSoviet weaponry Technologically due defense inArmeniansof superiority Azerbaijan. compared were offense, to particular disadvantage key determining factors technology geography were two Given and over defense. advantage that case. for theNagorno-Karabakh valid hold not does forces military defensive and offensive between differentiate to hard is it when the intentions of their counterparts. Therefore, the argument that security dilemma is intense to civilians formations. andmilitary adversary parties Moreover, had nodilemma infinding out were that notundercontrol inflictdamage military andgovernments of groups wereeagerto the In parallel to that it is not true to argue that in the Nagorno-Karabakh case offense had 73 CEU eTD Collection because they had no guarantee because theyhadsecure victory,noguarantee victory to costs. hadwould even serious fear among Armenians however, decliningis central state alone aprecondition. according Yet, samemodelthe to prevailing could not accountarise, fear to thecollective For scarce resources. mostly about is concern collective model the for the eruption of ethnic survivalUnlike war. thesecurity of themain thatputs dilemma inas concern, source this the violent of ineruption factor ethnic important most single the was inNagorno-Karabakh minority conflict,Armenian Pure Uncertainty in Nagorno-Karabakh groups. of moderate the eradication radical and of consolidation Theory noattentions dynamics pays tothe of within thatfinally andbetween groups in results overlooked. were impacts their with events non-political and political memories, historical powers, regional republic, kin neighboring of Role theory. by the over necessarily passed is conflict the of on complexity armyfractions people. The the control the over leaders lost because doomed was agreement peace the Nonetheless, them. implement to mechanisms and goals fact. ignores that completely the However, sides. both of calculations the in detail significant a been have should army ready war, but thepresenceofinall-out with military Iran and Turkey better border and the technology itinArmenia particularly into a turned ofthe conflict, playedprominentrole the evolution once region, both of the parties should have taken itinto account before gettinginto action. Obviously, in balance the alter the delicate bearto apotentiality victory would of party one Given that account. in not than takethisintoa defensive The theory warrather does engaging facto offense. wouldbe betterfor Armenians, assumed had better technology and blessed by fightgeography, to Like any other rationalist approach model assumes all actors as rational with clearly set clearly with asrational actors all model assumes approach rationalist any Like other in thetheory. were missed context regional andthe actors of external role Lastly, the : According to this model the collective fear of fear model of the According tothis collective the 74 CEU eTD Collection Karabakh was completely dependent on in more loose Azeri on would terms and oil completely gasArmenians dependent Karabakh was Nagorno- and riches oil huge had Azerbaijan that fact the other, the On violence. communal inter- time of atthe share the resources of fear about a collective NKAO had Armenians of that Armenians were predicting strengthening USSRdueto Armenian and head the Supreme wasethnic dominated of of Soviet NKAO and province Armenian MPs that Azeris. Given of numbers increasing the about they were concerned although cultural rights, or representation, political such education, as resources fear about the Limitations of the Model between two. ofinteractions the impossible series after became which war, avoiding with aim of the rational actors two regarded sideswere Azeri and Armenian Both precondition. anecessary as anarchy theemerging conceived catalyst and war. the into parties pulled both forincentive security theoffensive, between emergedinevitably dilemma parties the and high the Finally, given in future. the of agreement implementation the the guarantee to itself prevailing commitmentproblem amid the decliningcentral authorities neither side could commit concessions. EventhoughArmenian and Azeri sides bargained faith, with good duetothe likely avoid earlier loser theknow through couldof possible conflict, to the catastrophe neither sideknewtheoutcome might, military other’s noclearinformation partiesthe about had overrated enemy’s hostility. As a response both party triggered the escalation. Additionally, since intentionsthey andsubsequently each present other’s about wereuncertain sides andAzeri commitmentproblem, security and Becauseof dilemma. informationthe failures the Armenian Parallel to previous model, this model also assumed the decline of USSR as acrucial USSR as decline of the model assumed also previousthis model, Parallel to failures, informational war: to escalation inthe crucial extremely were factors Three : Armenians have of Nagorno-Karabakh not hadshould collective perestroika , it is implausible to assume to implausible is it , 75 CEU eTD Collection neglected. necessarily was armies the leadersover the of ineffectiveness and communities, Azerbaijani and Armenian among differences actors, regional and external overlooked, necessarily was situation the complexity of the Union. more, Once Soviet the of actual dissolution before the in well- was place the violence thebecause hold wide-scale notfor does thecaseeither, also tofailure. pureuncertaintiesdoomed the approach Nagorno-Karabakh, Karabakh Nagorno- of case case.in the true held dilemma security the nor problem Since commitment the neither both of these view.Therefore, explanations of points andgeographical technological from advantageous particularly not fail was Armenians region the of of to from part offensive in of Nagorno-Karabakh case the that note account for eruption to is crucial it again once Lastly, leadership. level political of highest by the reached agreement of ethnic war in was between overcomein1991bythe problem the commitment indicated parties already as importantly, More assumes. theory asthe as acute not failureswas information and intention end – their unificationreach to violence ethnic start to ready were NKAO of Armenians that understand to much withdo to had not had SSR Azerbaijan token same the By Armenia means. all by unification stop to was that SSR. From that standpoint war. Nagorno-Karabakh the both sidesexplain not alone can resources war.Obviously, scarce Armeniansstaging ethnic from Karabakh were aware Nagorno- the have deterred ties should loosingfear economic of the economy, Azerbaijan’s of others of part integral was since Nagorno-Karabakh Additionally, awar. started if they of resources, The assumption that the violence should had occurred only after the demise of USSR of the demise the only after had occurred should violence the that The assumption – SSR Azerbaijan of intentions the about sure was Nagorno-Karabakh of Armenians The 76 CEU eTD Collection treacherous. Starting from the individual up to military forces, leaders, communities all non- minded and werereform Azeri sides and Armenian if leadersof be avoided could seats. keep their to loosing elites by power the misused individual fearof rational itwas the peace. Therefore, war ifnot or byadversary victimization violent of all worst but peace, between war and were not choices the that conceived individuals Azeri and Armenian rational The individual. Armenian rationalthe to Same applied victimization. avoid leaders to support the predatory to level started Azerisindividual sabotage, at perceivedArmenian in violence and increasing thefaceof ever fearto versa.Started andvice people by Azeri of peace the sabotage Armenian was perceivedas case,which itthat failed inNagorno-Karabakh succeeded. Theory assumes negotiations failedor the whether observe only could they and negotiations of nature the about uncertain were Azeri between violence leaders wasgoingbut thenegotiations constituencies and Armenian on, erupt. Amiddesire rising the to war didnot the violence of initially noticed the source the about unsure and uncertain hand, other the on Azeris, and Armenians Ordinary violence. of source the believeprovocation sideviolence andmisleadingother was to ArmeniansandAzeris thatthe of the provisioned which for strategy, resurrection” “gamblingpursue the anddecided to leaders. not but totheirof totheadversary eruption violence treacherous group, attributed ofviolencesource they exact the know not did people ordinary violence. Since, increasing was offear source Azeris. The and Armenians fear among widespread not was there if bewould succeeded war not tostart intention of leaders the Nonetheless, loosing power. of because facing athreat were erupted elites the model,of warinNagorno-Karabakh predation the War in Karabakh as aResult of Politicization ofFear The model argues, however, somewhat different than the first two models, that the war the that models, two first the than different somewhat however, argues, model The The Azerbaijani Armenian and ruling communist elite faced a high ofloosingrisk power : From the lenses of the elite 77 CEU eTD Collection both parties agreed on the parameters of the peace. First of all, it proves that both parties were parties both that itproves of all, First of peace. the parameters the on agreed parties both in nature. inbut were measures particularly measures, actuality symbolic Black January, popularafter those several is thatto autonomy, AzerbaijaniIt leadershipappealed quite unpopular. true was which Armenian presidentthe pointAtone fanaticsplacate of unification. measures to long-term employed goals due to called indeed, increaseAsgovernment, violence to theirtheevidence popularity. showedTer-Petrosyan the Nagorno-Karabakhcame to power as earlyArmenians as 1989. Given totheir limit immensedisband themselves. Even the Armenian president issued an official theirdecree for this end. popularity, claims thanthey did tostirring notgreater need to appeal placate rather populations triedmainly they to their violence torule, asathreat perceived leaders them to violence.Armenian Indeed and leadersAzerbaijaniMoscow of both toSSR. intervene.sides As they loosing invest hadhad noanoption inviolence, given power to in they that superiors already called described theIn leaders factincreasingly communistalthough of First and were all, outcomes. revealsdifferent independent details in atthe some first armies point theirconsolidate positions. Nonetheless, look closer historical atthe sequencingpart developments of of totheMoscow paper, eyes “Gamblingof citizens. for resurrection” would be foroptimum solution leaders the re- to intervened sincein the the de-legitimized highly were leaders communist when times was it since case, the explaining and removed the heads of Shortcomings ofthe Model extremely influential and had control over the army. leaders were Armenian Azeri and bodies. Accordingly, asrational perceived participants Yet another point noteworthy isanothernegotiations,noteworthy where thesuccess of pointYet discussion 1991 of the nationalists, young popular Committee, of Karabakh the members importantly, the More : From the first glance it seems the model is quite successful in successful isquite model the seems it glance first the From 78 CEU eTD Collection against minority against –Whites against Serbs andoppositions Croats, Russiansagainst Blacks, against struggledismajority itself where governments ethnic asold Few politics conflict arguedthat Theories Choice Rational the of Fallacies Common severely the conflict complexity undermined. of therefore being withoutregarded as with down tosmallerbroken single actors goals, groups different were andAzeris Armenians for emotionality. left andnoroom was actors asrational regarded were communities and Individuals process. escalation in the intervene did indeed and could reformist oppositions.to trust and more respect had both parties of Populations leaders. the than rather their commands Model also underestimatedinto the picture. the The opposition leadersrole were more popular and hadof more militarycentre, men to listen Moscowfit well not did however Nagorno-Karabakh of case The andcitizenry. forces, military media, in that case, who violence, even though leaders called them donot so. to individual fear, can therefore not explain individualswhy force continuously toincreaseused of various reasons. ideaof rationality The for in violence engaged leaders,their communities theof despite contrary isitpeople a that that isitruling established werefeared,well fact true not leaders. the themselves, but populations somemilitary were theviolentforces extent and to agreement of collapse peace at therootHowever, of willing war. shortof leaders something arenot because treacherous the collapse peacetalks assumedthe should that rule. The theory moretheirvalued than peace willing to reach to some kind of agreement. Secondly, it revealed that the leaders of both parties Lastly, according to the model leaders were strong personalities with firm control over control firm with personalities werestrong model leaders tothe according Lastly, Although be feared to entity victimized. asinnocent people portrayed ordinary The model 79 CEU eTD Collection 255 Republic.the Adding these to nationalist military radical groups, non-nationalist and of Azerbaijanis or in minority Nagorno-Karabakh of Armenian from the apart interests poles the livinggroup in inhabited Bakuandin the Azeri group Armenia converged were andtogether of Armenian the interests the Atsome point andhard-liners. moderates between differentiate worseningthe within one Even relations. theidentifiedsixgroups can as deepgo asto towards attitudes and different objectives haddifferent each groups of these that caserevealed the and Armenians livingin Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The deep examination of Azeris groups: three into be divided should aspeoples andAzeris Armenians is that indicated It between Serbs and Croats is too general and at the same too specific. and both of these groups are unitary actors. It is far from the reality. Hence, to display the conflict and Serbs, Croats is between conflict the that assumed is itreadily words In other in theconflict. terms such as Croats and Serbs or Croat side and Serb side, while naming the parties participating insistently theemployed Yugoslavian general examined appliedcase, to all which of theories, The four groups. two between conflict the discussed perceives paper above that warfare cause. particularly focus onethnic and groups assume them unifiedas unitary actors around samethe period violence inPost-Soviet explain ethnic extreme to attempting Rationalisttheorists point that of viewby ethnicwar caused rational the individualpursuit of self-interest. and group suchand interests “individuals’of wealth,security” rational pursuituniversal as power, Ethnic Politics,” 254 Chechens. Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics,” 49. Mark Lichbach and Chalinda Weerasinghe, “Mobilizing For Peace: Majority Credibility, Minority Power, and Power, Minority Credibility, Majority ForPeace: “Mobilizing Weerasinghe, Chalinda and Lichbach Mark Application of the theories to the Nagorno-Karabakh case strongly supports the argument. the supports strongly case Nagorno-Karabakh the to theories the of Application in theories of rationalistthe ethnic central ethnic arethe actors conflict As ethnic groups 254 The pure rational choice theory perceives ethnic conflict as the result of result asthe conflict ethnic theory perceives rational choice Thepure Unpublished Manuscrpipt : 2. : 255 From 80 CEU eTD Collection fact, the command chain between leaders and army was not as healthy as rationalist theorists as healthy asrationalist not was leaders and army between chain thecommand fact, Even professional conflicted. interests their when other each fight to refrain not did They leaders. the Sovietoverthrow to Army in several todominate casesthem. politics fractions andfrom Many time started army madethese to timeof plans did not apply the tobe in weapon underleaders, however, proved powerless their disposal.Political with dealing orders of their superiors.self-defensemilitary forces to withgroupings ofmenthousands with considerable amount of In level militias village from ranged few fractions part. Independent countries, more than army take in in particularly post-Soviet factduring conflict, the that illustrated Karabakh clearly case sides. TheNagorno- conflicting leaders control the of of asinglearmy under sides possess interactions. deeply fail mostlyto dynamics,examine thewithin inter-group group but on concentrate on describing the actors as single unified ethnic groups. Exactly for that reason the same theorists insist theorists rationalist Nonetheless, 1991. early as as mercenaries and volunteers and Afghan overlooked while naming the groups as Armenians or Azeris was the involvement of the Chechen factor that Azeri Another with the of andevents region out together groups. werepushed Kurds,several ethnic of other importantparts Meskethians andRussians, were groups, that leaves out of conflict the groups asactors only the two these Portraying andAzeris. Armenians isitidentify specific as of to Asian too conflict, integral actors the the Central part origin, were that several other actors such as CSPU, mercenaries from various origins, soldiers of Russian and between Armenians Azeris is general.and too conflict describe the to matter For that groups. of the composition the further complicates side other the friendly more and with to very approaches andintellectuals antagonistic organization, Since all theories regard the conflicting parties as unitary actors, it is assumed that both itis that assumed actors, unitary as parties conflicting the regard theories Since all However, namingis theparticipating partiesas same atthe such specific. timetoo Given 81 CEU eTD Collection place in Baku. Likewise, any given rational individual should fear more about being in drafted taking events the about fear of kind any had not should who action, to in Yerevan Armenians of mobilization catalyst the as fear the on concentrate mostly theories rationalist of The group. given thein a moderates masses. However, of eradication sametime the at while the radical of consolidation the comprehend hardly could event one took events the of impacts the analyzing place without words other In camp. radical the ininto slid slowly Baku could easily arouse were of segments groups howinitially moderate the of dynamics the abovethe caseexplain the decisive in between most interactions and In withinin the groups. of general described events the wereextremely events watershed the how show to anevidence case was Nagorno-Karabakh pay inadequate attentionfail when it comes to explain the cut of ears and noses by Armenians and Azeris into the battlefield. the eventsrationality for a moment, where the fateful events of Sumgait ran their course. thatRationality would youngsters could run are and tensions the emotions highandmake could replace irrationality to crucial mob murder Thenews canbecomemasses aviolent of spark.announcing two with a single in development demonstrating peacefully how demonstrated conflict case of Nagorno-Karabakh the scrutinized of the Butthe cultural choices. or irrationality for is noroom left There approaches. by rationalist the conflict. The for explanation theeruption violence.of providingextreme adequate ethnic from them occludes interests different with fractions army identify to theories rationalist and switching amountmoney depending were of the on sides the The failure of offered. in region the werepresent mercenary groups Several theircauses. further successfully forces to build own their preferredparamilitary models, become to Opposition groups underquestion. rationalist therefore leaders, of calculations army, whole lack of the unified presumed. Given Since the rationalist models portray groups as unitary and rational actors, therefore, they therefore, actors, and rational asunitary models portray groups Since rationalist the rational wereconsidered dead corpses, includingshooting soldiers of The actors conflict, 82 CEU eTD Collection 1997) p.26. 256 asunitary interactions where partiesareregarded between and rational. the group on concentrate andpredominantly conflicts, the of complexity the underappreciate significantly theories rationalist in all, All conflict. in the part take to came groups military foreign radical alsoseveral but from fighters Azerbaijan, more part of of mobilization the important becomes religion of role the martyrs, values highly Islam and population Muslim predominantly are Azeris given that However, ignored. completely was conflict intheNagorno-Karabakh leaders is provincialism”. “scholarly central state the deterministic treatment and assumption that parties tothe conflict were certain on breakthe up of this Therefore, succeeded. Augustthe putsch be that everything given could changed, how casethe manner. study proved Yet inadeterminist authorities thecollapse ofcentral treat moderates ones is missing in the rationalist theories. All of the rationalist theories analyzed above relatively the overthrow to achieve leaders hawkish more the how explaining mechanisms The closely. be examined should circle ruling the within dynamics and legitimization political games of the Besides, ofprocess. in escalation be critical to demonstrated and discussed shortly were personalities key and leaders, religious media, of role significant the Nagorno-Karabakh of case Inthe dynamics. changingregional external actors, context, international account into should take Ratherenough. itis theories not conflict for explanation ethnic the adequate provide an to Nonetheless, Azeris. or asArmenians bodies arecollective usually that conflict the to immediateparties on concentrate mainly theories indicated As already theories. rationalist of radical the groups. lines, fearadequately is consolidation front the Hence,the for of individual rather. not accounting Valery Tishkov, Valery Lastly, the complexity of the ethnic conflicts was significantly overlooked by the Ethnicity Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union 256 The role played by the religion and religious (London: SAGE Publications, 83 CEU eTD Collection Aspects of Rationalist Models conflict. violent understanding ethnic of better between and interaction schools three provides how model are, rationalist each of elements successful the briefly what demonstrate to will turn paper Hence,now literature. the to contribution asa serve andwould all benefit schools would those of elements successful of eclecticism conflict, ethnic the explain to is able alone schools those of choice and ancienthatreds,wouldfurnish betterinsights tounderstand ethnic war.Although none symbolic namely conflict, ethnic of schools other with integration and interaction but conflict, of ethnic parts explain aspects successfully have rationalisttheories that violence. Iargue ethnic extreme of understanding approximate gives theory explore whether to turn will paper the rationalist theories alone are farfrom explaining the ethnic warfare andmy hypothesis is valid, be that valid. Havingestablished holds to of matter, hypothesis paper the that violence. For ethnic extreme of theexplanation for account inability to their proves theories rationalist of the caseoverview aswell general Nagorno-Karabakh theory of to the each application The separate Help? Theory Does which was important factor by willingperceived people of Armenians togivethe as Azeri arenot region them guarantee, in further deterioration was Nagorno-Karabakh of community Azeri andthe government Azeri the moves of some of the situation. could through stateinstitutions toethnic arise violence.coexistence of ethnic give Infact groups Therefore, theintentionality majority the of notgovernment to guarantee atleastminimum forstandards the problem of straining of links hard-liners between The group. of inability,each ormalign reluctance in akeyrole couldplay state majority of part the on commitment of problem the conflict, : Although alone by itself is not the only cause of Although not theethnic onlycause byitself is alone of 84 CEU eTD Collection they each time point their finger at the adversary group members as instigators. Theory Theory memberstherefore instigators. group as adversary finger atthe theirthey each timepoint violence, ofthe sources the being about Without sure victimized. being afraidArmenia of were to understand the case. Infact, both Armenian individuals living Azerbaijan and Azeris living in of individuals violenceand attribution of adversary to could beserious contribution of model the fears case,the for Nagorno-Karabakh the account fails toaccurately of theory part elite predation individual fear, which seriesafter violence of gradually rose with sources.Although uncertain theories. other of elements ininteraction with of conflict aspects some could explain onscarce resource future fear of collective conflict, of eruption for the account to theonly being farreason from Once again, directors. village of thenomination over proportion in favor changingwas particularly of population due to It wasaugmenting. in resources sharefuture scarce Azeris their ofabout fear region. collective Armenian fact in assumed, model as government central TheAzerbaijani earliest skirmishes and small scale violenceprovisioned. were in not model but a way as escalation, to the contributed negatively military formations those military Infact guarantee to shifted theirsecurity,eventually raids. forces own military which to independent of establishment facilitated Nagorno-Karabakh of Armenians the operations military violenceandparticularly of After rounds ‘Ring’. Operation the after particularly security, their about concerned were Nagorno-Karabakh in living Armenians the strong how displayed itclearly results, yielded poor Nagorno-Karabakh model application of to the factthat the Despite lying causesof ethnic conflict. deep- many of the one itunearths since element, asuccessful as be regarded should commitment Elite predation model attributed ethnic violence to predatory elites who misused topredatory elites who ethnic violence model Eliteattributed predation and Nagorno-Karabakh of Armenians between failure information not was there Although model. in dilemma important security the factor most single asthe Security regarded 85 CEU eTD Collection Adding Ancient Hatreds Theory understanding. should offer better approaches politics andsymbolic rationalist, as a negative thing, but the paper argues the contrary. Therefore, combination of “ancient hatred”, understanding.inwould Scholars eclecticism conflictbetter and perceive avoid general provide of literatures ethnic and literature the other between rationalist the andintegration eclecticism my belief, to However, the ethnic of conflict. understanding violent the approximate develop the conflict. Through the of situation. aggravation tothe contribute assumptionswork in the favor of radical elements. Increasingofnumbers of radical wouldthe unavoidably aforementionedfinally tounderstand interactions dynamics the that contributes and within group successfully rationalist theories readers can where rational choice theorists could adopt several elements. several could adopt choice theorists where rational point is the it Exactly adversary. the against myths and narratives memories, collective as such theory, the in emphasized were that nuances several are there hand other the on But Karabakh. understandtheprovided causes inthis explanation clear to of conflict argument the Nagorno- inmeans ethnic By violentno has resurfaced USSRandresulted aftercollapse the conflict. of case is warfare.Particularly Nagorno-Karabakh understanding of relevant. ethnic the the better for camp rationalist to interjected be could/should theory of elements several Yet and poor analytical methods.explain conflict its of ethnic inability the to because approach, the discredited works scholarly This paper joins tosoon However, Cold-War. of aftermath the in surged that conflict theethnic these of explanation scholars in their criticism of the theory. At the end, each of these theories has aspects that propose explanation for some parts of parts for explanation some propose that aspects has theories these end,each of the At According to the theory it was the “age-old hatreds” between Armenians and Azeris that Azeris and Armenians between hatreds” “age-old the itwas theory the to According : Perhaps it is the earliest and initially adopted initially andwide itis Perhaps earliest the 86 CEU eTD Collection 258 257 fact” historical living reality wasmorethan been “genocide and generations three crucial Azeris in theirattitudes towards with whom Given they Turks. itequated that has only search for the answer in theranks. their consolidated rationality and narratives historical tothese appealed elements examine radical how to crucial extremely of the group.is itmatter, that For Armenians. by Turks called Azeris were continuously yearsconflict early of As already displayedwere crucial factors in the attitudes of both parties against each other. It is not coincidence that in in the Nagorno- andArmenia. Nagorno-Karabakh between 1915 and 1988byhard-liners was in decisive perception the of Armeniansthe of both them which they believed started by the betrayal of Armenians to Turks. Making analogs mutually Armenian.of narrativeexclusive thatAlso, hadevents of for to 1915 aspect acrucial communal clashes in 1905 and1918,which leftthousands dead, create a them allowed to enemies. “age-old” Azeris as and portray 1915 events memory of collective on embark the could easily problem. In the aftermath of violence againstArmenians, the radical elements of community began in1915” genocide the backfamily that to tree their of branch one least at “traced who Armenians, Soviet among was created that narrative the imagine andtraumabe againsthatred Azeris.existence Theperceptions of hardto 1915and of Malkasian, Ibid ., 56. In the case Nagorno-Karabakh the memory of 1915 events for Armenians was extremely was Armenians for events memory 1915 of the Nagorno-Karabakh case In the Unfortunately, rationalist theories discredit the ancient hatreds theory from the outset, and of sameevents the perceptions mutually exclusive memories, collective the Consequently, inter- The events. these of out narratives own their created hand, other the on Azeris, Gha-ra- bagh, 55. bagh, 258 , played crucial , playedcrucial duringescalation the role 257 , it, would not 87 CEU eTD Collection 259 narrative. be historical the would answer partial the again Once state. majority the trust not does minority why explanation inits problem commitmentthe theory to providecould approach assistance hatreds ancient the Also, adversary. the as minority the portraying narrative historical the would that and answer guarantee not minority the not toinfringegroups Ancienthatred could their rights. provide partial otherthe group.The explain fails commitment problem should to why government majority the adversary can groups fromprevent groups the one anothertrusting and committing themselves to in mutually powers historical ofwar.The explainingexclusive thenarratives of the eruption theories the would augment events past of the memory collective of the addition the conflict, ethnic the for explanation partial offers majority of part the on problem commitment assumed we as words, other In their ranks. consolidate to elements led the radical which place, the on already violence was that problem, provided commitment the of playedcrucial inthe emergence role Azeris asenemy, portraying bloody with narrative, of historical factthis very events 1915. In faced they where live rule the Empire, Ottoman of to under wasequated Azerbaijan rulethe of majority metwith state suspicion.many For Nagorno-Karabakhthe of Armenians tolive under trauma ofArmenians, whichwould explain better why policiesthe and moves Azeri of the theory. hatreds from ancient measures benefit explanationsmore andprovidebetter the ethnic violence,several ifto adopt they modern demands or claims.” consolidating and ethnic isfrequently group, an mainarguments the one of usedin formulating for resource asanecessary serves past version the of shared commonly and“the sides” opposing history,Karabakh including “referencescase the to distant reappearin to past, of arguments the Tishkov, The commitment modelproblem light would shedbetter by adding the of role 1915 Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict 259 From that standpoint, I argue that rationalist theories would , 188. 88 CEU eTD Collection 64. 260 emotional isneededforthe background socio-economic and historical a certain “First memory. wouldhistorical appeal events arouse to to fearsthe of moderate the citizens. inArmenian society groups The radical understanding. narratives aplausible provide would and memories historical by past the boosted was Armenians theNagorno-Karabakh fearsof that “white genocide” Nakhchevan, called of and“de-Armenianization” from Anatolia their between exodus similarities Karabakh drew which had by they been driven force. totheout Parallel rising violence Armenians of Nagorno- from homelands historical their as Nakhchevan and Anatolia Eastern the claimed continuously would beresources main of lost wasthe TheArmenian ethnic narrative conflict. reason themselves against historical enemy. defend uparms would to take each of asinvaderandbrutal killer,groups adversary the group portrays memory historical the Since above. from constraint not was there when behaved group see how adversary the tohistory to look will Consequently, not? they a or threat constituted ingroup adversary the defining whether become themainelement narrative would the words conflictthe would the of historical use adversary the record asprediction group Inother tools. which eventually became defend forcesmilitary of to themselves, tobedecisivein proved narrative establishment the the one of the the level township main and in village least at Ultimately, reasons time. that on widespread were invaders as of the escalation. Partiesportrayed sides narratives that popular themutually doubt, exclusive Without explanation. better participating in Nora Dudwick, “The Karabagh Movement: An Old Scenario Gets Rewritten,” Lastly, the elite predation model would work better if it attains some role to past historical scarce future that fear of collective the argued that model The third approach rationalist of In provide histories role security the of model dilemma couldto beincorporated past the 260 and the ongoing dispute over the region. The argument The region. the over dispute ongoing the and Armenian Review 43,no. 3 (1989): 89 CEU eTD Collection 263 chauvinist mobilization”. chauvinist of politics symbolic a and extinction, group of fears hostility, justify myths “ethnic is model, the ofextreme according ethnicviolence, category to individuals.formed byrational Thecause is more than a social ethnic identity that recognizes approach, than rationalist different somewhat 262 261 Ararat….” national Mountreferring as symbols to such drew orators a million Armenians rallies Karabakhto on issue in1988by tapping pride, national nationalist “Armenian words: his in explains Kaufman As ranks. their into moderates recruit to hostile Infact, massattitudes. those attitudes toolsforprovided in radicalsocieties segments both power. afore increase theirbe models explanatory it added to to hasto aspects conflict, ethnic Synthesis of theSymbolist Model individualpowerful narratives to fear. bloody events. Therefore, theory would benefitmore and offer better explanation if it adds of narratives spreadthe popular through of be augmented fear individual could the Moreover, of model.the power enhance the explanatory would by be That elite. the adversary exploited can as group usually other narrative that the portrayed inclusion historical the of elite. Thus, forthe treacherous material aready serve could Azeris Armenians and of memories collective fighters” of rank-and-file mobilization better explanation of ethnic conflict and latter two fills some of the gaps left by leftrationalist thegaps fills of some two latter and conflict explanationethnic of better assumed. asrationalists Armenians of concern biggest notthe were interests Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics,” 47 Also see Kaufman, Tishkov, Ibid .,52. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the myths justified hostility were strong andled to were strong hostility justified myths the Nagorno-Karabakh In thecaseof The combined model of The combinedhatred-symbolist model rationalist-ancientof theories perhapsprovides Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict 262 Although theory alone proposes incomplete explanation for violent for explanation incomplete proposes alone theory Although 244. : 261 Less themodel beginning, from known readers, very to to make elite predation model work better. The better. work model predation elite make to Modern Hatreds 263 According to him individual group According or to . 90 CEU eTD Collection 264 empty of real information”. popular into andmaking than why politiciansothers, putso many symbolic appeals resources – why weredefined theywere,whysomeweremore theory parties as ideas cannot contending theorists. Symbolist and ancient hatred theories explain a “range of phenomena that rationalist explanation for the understanding of ethnic conflicts. Literature onethnic Literature would benefit understanding conflict for explanation the of conflicts. ethnic bearbetter would during process the myths created history and past of memory collective the approaches. remaining Thesameoffer,respectively. “why”“what” parts applies rationalist to and would approaches and rationalist hatreds” “ancient while explanation, partof “how” the offer the would model politics symbolic the Therefore, symbols. popular and myth exclusive mutually radicalizationthrough mobilization and of population,the whichis achieved through the be howthecommitmentproblem ethniclead to war. Theanswerfor this question would be: logically iswould question The remaining of explanation. narratives:that the “why” as historical by answer the accounted be partially could infirst place problem emerged why commitment the would be the problem of commitment problemcauses forethnic thequestion violent commitment answerthe the what of conflict theory – that is “what” of the explanation. And of otherthe group as hostile evil as mythsquestion define was not taken into account in rationalist theories. of framing after mobilization facilitated of was The notion people case. Nagorno-Karabakh that the in be true to out turns which act, to people motivating in rationality than role more play emotions that argues approach symbolist the However, motivate people. that calculations only rational isit that assume fear.Same theories role to biggest the pointassigns and that overpass however, approaches, leaders. for radicals Rationalist forerespectively, andtreacherous asaready Ibid ., 48. As a result assuming partial rationality in the part of andadding as leadersof inpeople aswell part the rationality partial As a assuming result the In explanation. the of part “how” the provides model politics symbolic the sense a In 264 Ancienthatreds andmodels symbolist history propose and myths, 91 CEU eTD Collection a negative thing. asparticularly be regarded not should Eclecticism with each other. modelsif interact more those 92 CEU eTD Collection the interpretations of the immediate parties and the impacts of those events on on events them studied. impacts of those and the parties immediate of the interpretations the and visited were non-political includingones events Accordingly, the watershed demonstrated. was case the of complexity the actions groups between and within their of scrutiny and paper. Throughidentification governmental,andmilitary, examination levelof actors community of part the in first the was displayed case study Nagorno-Karabakh of the the thorough argument, outcome. for the account accurately theories the in do case,and this occurs in theory each posited processes whether the islanguage used that in by cases. sametheorists the other analyses The focused onasking inline inthe with keeping special effort I spent conflict the to theories the While applying fair to the rationalist theorists,is it that ensure to was theories, whofour all of claim scope the with applicabilityis compatible which case, specific this of their models to selecting the of case rationale The of hypothesis. that my of nature. validity the matter that for and theories rationalist literature. conflict oftheethnic currents with other interaction and eclecticism integrative from benefit would theories rationalist that states literature, tothe contribute intended to claim, main theoretical The explanation. a complete from offering precludethem shortcomingsout the pointrationalist that deconstruct and paper wasto theories is of themainTherefore post-Soviet present the violence-that task ethnic war. extremeto ethnic explanations plausible providing from far are theories rationalist the isthat study the of argument Thecentral forward. and claim atheoretical In this onecentral were put argument thesis Conclusions To contain malleablebiasfita possible andavoid case shaping the it to to central the of explanatory the assess to study case asa selected was case Nagorno-Karabakh The 93 CEU eTD Collection necessarily left out other important participantsnecessarily important other left thatway ofthenaming conflict. Besides,out groups these groups to conflict. Limitingnaming theactors of the Serbian side, while the participants theories chose to employ general terms such as Croats explanation. from arefar complete offering theories Secondly, theories. chain the logical of and Armenians or Azerbaijanidevelopment and in sequencing comply of events Nagorno-Karabakh the case didnot with the side and Firstly, the violence. extreme ethnic success out-break not inexplaining record theories can conflict. of limited toprovidepicture the many only scholars choose whole picture than providing first part of thesis showed how the complexity of the conflictis neglected by the literature. Rather in Thedeepstudy of conflict apply appraise the power. their to explanatory theorists theories its scopeand Duetoitseveral views. provides parameters a forcontending ground solid the in detail, afew well-established conclusions can be drawn. theories of shortcomings and merits of scope whole the out point to enough extensive not is case case. in explanation Nagorno-Karabakh the better provide see if to they approaches rationalistto the wereincorporated explanations politics andsymbolic hatred” “ancient the Consequently, literature. present the to contribution a as claim theoretical produce a main thepapermovedthe to Having task out. accomplished were briefly pointed choiceexplanations rational all the of shortcomings thecommon Later case. Nagorno-Karabakh the to application individual their after evaluated subsequently and discussed wereapproaches Common fallacies of rational choice theories were rather numerous. Firstly, all four of the the that caserevealed Nagorno-Karabakh the to theories rationalist the of Application there although conflict, ethnic of example is aclear conflict The Nagorno-Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh the to application their and theories the of analyses brief Although rationalist four different of basic assumptions the of thesis the part In the second 94 CEU eTD Collection necessarily anegative thing. necessarily incorporatingmatter that For war. theethnic of understanding the into insights better offers approaches aspectsrationalist to explanations politics symbolic and hatreds” “ancient of Addition conflict. ofviolent other theories while milestone events wereoverlooked. leaders, religious offering an and religion actors, external role of The rational theorists. the peculiar to not something conflict, explanation the of complexity the to overlooked approaches these Lastly, masses. of mobility the explain to should notsilentitkept that well,given account not did Rationality rationality. attributed be were conflict the seen as followprofessional didnot armies the orders of placetheir Secondly, superiors. all took actors in most the even that shown is it because true, hold not did point same the hit and unitary are actors the that The assumption eradicated. were groups moderate same the time atthe while their ranks, consolidated wheregroups radical theprocess over-passed theories these Hence, interactions. and assumingthem unitary leavesas actors noroom for discussion of withinthe group Nonetheless, rational choice approaches posses some aspects that explain parts of extreme 95 CEU eTD Collection Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR. from the region the of transfer the regarding resolution a positive toreach of USSR Supreme Soviet the with intercede to time same the at SSR, Armenian the to SSR Azerbaijani the from population of Nagorno-Karabakh and to transfer the Autonomous Region Azerbaijaniof Armenian SSRsthe and appreciate deep aspirationsof they that Armenian the of Nagorno-Karabakh request theSupreme Soviets to Region Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous of of of the workers the of Welcoming wishes the resolves, of Nagorno-Karabakh of regional soviet 20th the regional soviet session special the SSR,” Armenian the to SSR Azerbaijani the from Nagorno-Karabakh of Region Autonomous the transferof for the SSR Armenian and SSR Azerbaijani the between Soviet mediation SSRSupreme the the of “regarding Soviet Region of Nagorno-Karabakh listeningAfter toand reviewing of the statements people’s the of deputies Autonomous the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR: the from Region Nagorno-Karabakh of Autonomous for thetransferof the mediation Regarding RESOLUTION: Appendix A Text of Resolution theSovietof by the Autonomous Regionof Nagorno-Karabakh requesting incorporation into the Armenian SSR Stepanakert,20 February 1988 Appendixes 96 CEU eTD Collection Azerbaijan and Armenia in a spirit of fraternal friendship and cooperation. and friendship fraternal of in aspirit Armenia and Azerbaijan strengthenlegality socialistandintensify public and order, education the of population the of its theimprove well-being people, working Region, of Autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh outliningfar-reachingfurthermeasures theeconomic to cultural of development and the of the shortcomings,USSR the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium Supreme With rectifying inand overcominga view serious to situation the Nagorno-Karabakh the of andinter-ethnic peoplesof relations the andArmenia Azerbaijan. SovietThe insituation has the republics growntenseand heavy hasbeen damage economies done tothe and posture. passive, wait-and-see the inunfounded calls for reviewingtheexistingarrangement areaand ethnic-territorial the a adopted USSR have Councilrealize of political failed danger the assessingto situation, to the attitude taken a superficial Region Autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh the and Armenia Azerbaijan, of authorities The of Ministers breached. been have of fields the in culture and education inandespecially personnel policy.The autonomous region’s constitutional rights population, Armenian the of interests national the have affecting issues many passedAt the same resolutionsLenin’s nationalities policy guidance local the and under of and organizations. timeparty government implementing of basis the on life social no of spheres in other actionand science and economy has been haveworkingsuccess people of achievedsignificant indevelopingNagorno-Karabakh the taken in Thethe Presidium autonomous of the USSR Supreme in area. the relations inter-ethnic harm to serious and cause Soviet notesregion that over A thedifferent years decisionfor would of contradict Sovieta the fundamentallong Government interests consent. latter’s without the of altered the peoples thetime of both republics to solveConstitution of USSR(Articlethe 78),under which territory the a unionof republic may notbe Making this ruling, Presidium is the USSRSupremethe of Soviet guidedby ina provision the impossible. basis aconstitutional on Armenia unacceptable, deems a change of borders and Azerbaijan anethnic-territorial division of and Azerbaijan thatmaking the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region Nagorno-Karabakhpart of Armenia is united Armenia with inconjunction with by an application Sovietof the People’s Deputies of Supreme Sovietof Republicthe ofArmenia the for Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region be to and thefrom having the The Soviet, 1988requestUSSR Supreme 15June the Presidium of examinedthe 17 June 1988 decision of the Supreme Soviet of the RepublicAppendix B of Resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet regarding thedecisions of the Supreme Soviets of Azerbaijan andArmenia onNagorno-Karabakh Moscow, 18July 1988 97 CEU eTD Collection population in northern Artsakh (NKAO), Shaumian rayon, and Getashen districts. Getashen and rayon, Shaumian (NKAO), Artsakh northern in population of Armenian the interests represent national the to theobligation assume reunification. They realize to steps formulate practical jointcommission to up a set hereby National Council the republic citizenshipCouncil the declare reunification Republic Armenian the of and NKAO.Thethe Armenian rights NKAONational and Soviet TheArmenian Supreme in sole legalauthority force oblast. extends theover plenipotentiary the population of congress andthe self-determination, fact of NKAO’s the recognizes Soviet Supreme Armenian ofrepresentatives theaspiration NKAO. forThe reunification Supreme Proceedingfrom universal the ofnational principles self-determination legal and to acceding of the ofSoviet NKAOthe two segmentsand and the of Nationalthe Armenian peopleCouncil torn apart it by hasforce, elected the as the Appendix C Joint resolution ofArmenia SSRandNagorno-Karabakh Oblast onreunification 1 December 1989 98 CEU eTD Collection Appendix D and restore normal conditions. normal restore and in region stabilize the situation made the to theeffort contribute toward not does integrity, which SSR’sterritorial Azerbaijan atencroaching andameasure the aimed on SSR’s Azerbaijan affairs Sovereign in the interference impermissible an as is regarded NKAO and SSR Armenian by The adopted decision unite Armenian the SSR Supremeon 1 December Soviet the 1989to Decision of the Supreme Soviet of the AzerbaijanSSR in connection with the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR on uniting the Armenian SSR and the NKAO Baku, 6December 1989 99 CEU eTD Collection Brass, Paul. 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