Military activity. 1961
[s.l.]: [s.n.], 1961 https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/BKWLMXZVENTE48Q
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AND SHORT-RUN. _ a | oe ¢ THE SITUATION OUTLOOK IN LAOS
aE emg 4 De ie a ae ni Gey saan oe he BRE aR eran | ay oh sac te pag: Con creme gpa etna Magee nat ecg 9 ee DR Hl 8 TEE ERS Te aires one ay thd SE ES ee ee INTELLIGENCE 3 oe 1 BA ed ce a tte 3 oe following tee ee sntetigence ec ‘ordanteations siolvatal witha Fo 8 AT BS pete The Central patigenar dgedy Bags eg, Meh Boat ee nee Ge oS preparation of this estimate:. of State, ~*~ i °.and the intelligence organizations of the Departments | one hc Ae Mem the Mame, The Ae Zeros ond Ble Jane ee ote sb | cet yee Cate NEE ve - sates nee) aes “Le Conieurred in by the “Ae: OR Ua a os INTELLIGENGE BOARD’ 2° 2 e os Be en ae ES 2g ee - Pa RP saat 274 3 onhad September 1961. Conturring were The Director'of Intéle ee : Da Saar cos genes ae Sebeareh, Danarknent pt Rte; the Giaee 22 BE pa Army; the ew awe of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the , Depart~..* 7s. * “os oe at a a a MRe ye lS Pept SEER PN, Es ae “2 1 WChtef Assistant Chief. of Naval Operations: (Intelligence) Geen eg OR Be yd » ment. of the: Navy; the Assistant Chief of Stag), Intelligence, 0 oH the Director for Inteltigence, Joint Sta; the Assistant «98. Pg Sak oe “USAP; Special Operations; und the = | eee 2 to the Secretary of Defense, Atomio Energy 62000. 0 winnie a eotcinttersies oat theUSIB, atime tay and, the Assistant Sones sybils ah LR Be SESS, “<2, 5 Commission Representative to ge a sp Pe ental Federal Barto of snoeitioasion, ateatnad, #94 Me en Pak fk eee RT OSI hac cl cr rt eid baler egg Ae aor Peewee RS SRS yl aA RAIS aS abana ereage Ghee ee AE aes Tn balk Te ees eee Pa te Ce eGR psa ee OD EP Ee 0 Fh Re aS ‘| aa Pepto ried ah AT aed aig! ite eh yo ME ii BB IS ge Ea L es dt Bes ae
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O pete ered “This estimate was. disseminated by the Céntral Intelligence “Agency.. ° ‘This ;copy:s 2 g2/ 205 2 38> sAs tor the information and.-use of the recipient, arid of petsons under his jubisdictionon? 2° -°.65) 5) "7 “pa following. need to officials know: basis., within “ Additiotal their respective esseritial.dissemitiation departments, ° ‘may 0.0 ‘be: authorized ee "by, the. Poo a Director of Intelligence and: Research, “forthe Department eco 2g sb. Asslatamt: Chief of, Stall for Intelligente, Department of the of Amy" State: 0% THE SITUATION AND SHORT-RUN OUTLOOK IN LAOS ; THE PROBLEM To analyze recent developments in Laos and to estimate the political and military prospects in Laos over the next two or three months. ‘ CONCLUSIONS 1. Within the next few weeks the Laotian 3. In the absence of a political arrange- crisis will probably enter a new phase con- ment in the next few weeks, hostilities sisting either of a political arrangement are likely to be resumed by either the . . of some sort, renewed efforts in Laos and Phoumi forces or the Pathet Lao side. elsewhere to find a political solution while Phoumi’s relative political and military the tenuous cease-fire remains, or a gen- _ situation remains weak, and he probably eral breakdown of the cease-fire. (Para. believes that his only remaining hope is 11) a renewal of hostilities with outside as- 2. Prospects for a political arrangement, Senne. it any event, the Communist either at Geneva or in Laos, are only fair r aul el tea will Peobebiy HREERGRE because of the wide differences remain- zoclte operanions designed va: increase ing between Western and Bloc positions ators aon lige and to and the suspicions and conflicting objec- oi 1 7 consolidate their control. (Paras. tives among the Laotians. Such an ar- ~ rangement would almost certainly have 4. We do not believe that the Lao Army to be based upon a coalition government can achieve a military solution in Laos under Souvanna Phouma. As Prime _ or even force a north-south partition of Minister, Souvanna would acquire some the country without sizable and long- sources of independent strength and term outside military support. If the probably would try to pursue a neutralist | Lao Army were to take the initiative and ‘course, at least at the outset. The Com- were able to concentrate sufficient forces munists, however, would be able to bring for a major attack on any key Commu- very strong pressures against him, and nist position, it probably could make some we believe that his control over the gov- initial advance. It would not, however, ernment would become increasingly in- be able to sustain a major effort, with- , effective. Over a period of time it would stand a serious counterattack, or prevent be increasingly unlikely that he could Communist seizure of the principal Lao- prevent the Communists from acquiring tian towns along the Mekong River in a direct or indirect control. (Paras. 11-14) very short time. (Para. 18) “SECRET 1 ne UPECRET 2 DISCUSSION |. THE SITUATION Laos and have increased their military 2 5. At the time . of the tenuous “ “cease-fire” Ms in | strength troops. They in the have south made alone an to extensive at least propa- 7,500 Taos and the opening of the Geneva Confer- _ ganda and political effort which has expanded ence in May, the combined Souphanouvong/." the area of Communist grassroots control. . . Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma/Kong Le | armed forces dominated the military situation 8. The position of the Souvanna/Kong Le in Laos. At that time, the Laotian Army - group has been seriously undermined. Sou- under General Phoumi was disorganized and vanna has no independent political apparatus demoralized; if the Pathet Lao/Kong Le forces of any significance at his disposal, and Kong , had continued their attacks, they probably _Le’s armed forces are weak in comparison with could have seized the important towns along either the Phoumi or Pathet Lao forces. the Mekong River—Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Moreover, the Souvanna/Kong Le forces are Thakhet, Savannakhet, and Pakse—which almost completely dependent upon the Pathet still remained in the hands of Prince Boun Lao and the Bloc for communications, trans- Oum’s Royal Laotian Government. port, logistical, and financial support. Some . of the group have become increasingly resent- 6. Nevertheless, the Cannintist powers fe. ful of their Communist allies and aE at- . cided to accept a cease-fire and international tempted to prevent the Communists from negotiations. That decision probably re- achieving a dominant military position and flected considerable concern for US prepara- = exnanding their political influence in the Hons tor nalllieety Jnlervenkion in Laos, a con- countryside. However, they have not had the tingency which Hanoi, Peiping, and MoscoW — yecources to match the Communist effort. probably all wish to avoid. Moreover, the Communists had achieved a strong position 9. During the cease-fire, Prince Boun Oum from which to make further gains: the Pathet | and General Phoumi have concentrated on re- Lao already held most of north and central building the Lao Army and redeploying it in Laos, and they held enough of southern Laos the Mekong Valley. As a result of US train- to facilitate Hanoi’s Communist Viet Cong ing efforts and the continued influx of equip- effort against President Diem and his govern- ment and supplies, the offensive and defensive ment in South Vietnam. As for the rest of capabilities of the Lao Army have been im- Laos, the Communists probably estimated proved. The present number of troops in com- that, in view of the military situation in Laos, bat units of the regular Lao Army is 29,200, they could negotiate an agreement which and there are 13,800 full-time Auto Defense would interpose no serious obstacle to eventual (ADC) troops. These figures, however, indi- Communist domination of the Laotian Gov- cate a greater military capability than is actu- ernment through political means. ally available. Although army units have $ demonstrated some effectiveness in limited ts Although there has been 20 dramatic clearing operations and the morale of the change in the situation in Laos since the cease- troops has apparently improved, the Laotian fire, there has been a steady improvement in Go #’s logistical + of its t i ‘ the overall position of the Communist element. vernment's logistical support of its troops 1n The Pathet Lao armed forces have undergone “he field continues to be poor and the field extensive reorganization and have substan- CoMmanders are for the most part indecisive, 5 tially augmented their equipment. Through Weak, and poorly motivated. The major local recruitment and reinforcement from operational successes since the cease-fire have North Vietnam, Pathet Lao troop strength has _ been scored by Meo guerrilla units which have been greatly increased. They have made effectively harassed Communist lines of com- considerable progress toward consolidating munication in the Plaine des Jarres area and their military positions in north and central forced the Communists to divert a consider- “REGRET “SECRET 3 : able number of troops in an effort to elimi- claim to a neutralist position but he is de- : nate the Meo bases. pendent upon the Communist for support and . ; could not agree to terms which were not ac- 10: On the basis of recent and ‘incomplete ceptable to the Communists. He works with evidence we pee cat omcan on tne Semen Souphanouvong on a basis of equality but is s ein the ane rnment fonnes in Laos. Our unwilling to accept equal status for Phoumi. Opp & governmeny . Phoumi is still hoping for a military solution best estimate at present is that they number in Laos and probably would not accept a . about. 34,000, hae selelttiors io Bout 16,000 political settlement which would be accept- Pathet Lao, this figure includes 1,600 North able to Souvanna Phouma unless the US Vietnamese cadre and specialist personnel who forced Hiitn'to-do's0. ‘Rom these-véasoria "Bout operate the logistics and roselia ccepemcptaesied Oum and General Phoumi almost certainly do systeins, man the field and antiaircraft not intend genuinely to seek a negotiated po- artillery, and provide technical and tactical litical settlement, guidance at all levels of the Pathet Lao/Kong : Le effort; four North, Vietnamese infantry bat- 13. If the present crisis moves into a political talions (about 1,600 men) serving as special phase as the result of arrangements made at assault forces; 4,000 troops in Kong Le’s com- Geneva and among the three Laotian Princes, mand; and 8,000 in Phong Saly under Kham it would almost certainly have to be on the Ouane who, like Kong Le, is responsive to basis of a coalition government under Sou- Souvanna Phouma. vanna Phouma. Souvanna probably has . aspirations for performing a role as a neutral- Il. THE PROSPECTS ist leader in Laos and in Southeast Asia. seis ¥ However, Souvanna is not a free agent and it 11. Ww ithin the: next few weeks''the Laotian is unlikely that he would be able to steer a crisis will probably ener: a mew phase con- truly neutral course. As Prime Minister, he sisting either of a political arrangement of would probably try at least at the outset to Some Sorl, TEE Weo crores * bans and eLse~ maintain a neutralist position and to reduce where to find a political solution while the his near total dependence upon the Com- tenuous cease-fire remains, or a general break- munists. He indicated in his talks with Gown, of'the Ceasefire. At present, the pros- ambassador Harriman an awareness of Com- pects for a political arrangement are only fair. munist strength and intentions in Laos and ahere 2 Ble ide anierences between tne West- a desire to avoid Communist domination. er ae t ‘oc posi lems =. thou - “ee However, the Communists would still be able Sotciaunil te he ec ay dis 1a Bie n to bring very strong pressures against him. ciliator attitude and have shown some will, Although control of the government would ingness. to compromise on minor issues, the give Souvanna some sources of independent Bl ticularly Peipi d Hi : strength he does not now have, the Commu- 0¢ powers, particulary reiping and Manol, nists would retain a large part of their armed appear confident in their strong bargaining d thei litical t : position, and have shown no inclination to forces an ei polltica! ap: para. us, either make major compromises for the sake of overtly or covertly, to insure their continued reaching agreement. dominance of major parts of the country, to influence any future elections, and to main- ; 12. Moreover, general agreement among the tain Communist pressure against South major Western and Bloc powers at Geneva Vietnam ' would not necessarily assure a political “solu- , tion” in Laos because of the mutual suspicions 14. Souvanna’s ability to resist Communist Z and conflicting objectives among the Laotian _ pressures on him and to offset Communist in- elements represented by the three princes, fluence in the countryside would depend both Souphanouvong, Souvanna Phouma, and upon the achievement of effective interna- Boun Oum. Souphanouvong represents the tional controls to insure Laotian neutrality Communist position. Souvanna Phouma lays and upon the full support and cooperation of SECREI_ “SECRET 4 the Boun Oum/Phoumi element with Sou- might be renewed by either the Phoumi forces vanna to provide firm resistance to Pathet Lao or by the Pathet Lao/Kong Le side. Both demands and pressure. We do not believe have certain motivations. General Phoumi’s that the Communist powers, particularly political and military situation remains weak Peiping and Hanoi, would agree to effective and he probably believes that his only re- international controls. Although US pressure maining hope is a renewal of hostilities in on Boun Oum and Phoumi might force them which he would have outside assistance. If to accept a coalition government under Sou- _he thought he could resume hostilities in such . vanna Phouma, they would not willingly sup- a manner as to bring the US into the conflict, port Souvanna and probably would seek by he almost certainly would do so. Moreover, every means they could to undermine him. General Phoumi is sometimes disposed to mis- Consequently, although a coalition govern- interpret the extent of US commitment to him. eee talline seentedet cone oe appear 17. We do not believe it likely that within the ; ana next two or three months the Communists will that Souvanna’s control over the Laotian Gov- — wndertake conventional operations to seize ernment would become increasingly ineffec- and hold key cities in the Mekong River Valley. tive. Over a period of time it would be in- Instead, they probably will increase their creasingly unlikely that he could prevent the _ limited operations to maintain pressure for a Communists from acquiring direct or indi- political settlement and to consolidate further . rect control. their control. They probably will increase . . their efforts to eliminate Meo resistance in the ee continuation of the present iennans Plaine des Jarres area and increase the scale cease-fire line, or any attempt to formalize or of their own guerrilla activities in areas under consolidate it, would probably not be tolerated = nominal Lao Army control. The Communists by Peiping and Hanoi unless it were backed up —thus will be able to further consolidate their by substantially increased non-Communist control in northern Laos and, at the same time, military force. A durable partition of the prevent the Lao Army from preparing for at- country would almost certainly requirealong- tacks on key Communist-held areas. term commitment of outside forces, including 18. We do not believe that the Lao Army can US troops, to the defense of the Mekong achieve a military solution in Laos or even Valley. Any effort by US or SEATO forces to force a north-south partition of the country expand the area under non-Communist con- without sizable and long-term outside mili- trol would run serious risk of intervention by tary support. If the Lao Army were to take North Vietnamese troops or volunteers.1 the initiative and were able to concentrate 16, If a political arrangement is not reached Samentitons for a major attack on any key in the next few weeks, we believe it likely that Sea osition, it probably could make the cease-fire will break down. Hostilities pore inal Boye ne a woud nok HOweyer, be able to sustain a major effort, withstand a "See SNIE 10-2-61, “Likelihood of Major Commu- Serious counterattack, or prevent Communist nist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeast_ Seizure of the principal Laotian towns along Asia,” dated 27 June 1961 CORBET | the Mekong River in a very short time. —SECEET e 2 - S : oe : 5 S Es % L 5 i a ne ee a g ‘ ao aS es ee “ - < f s ny * : fe a e a s oy - S. Oy ° an ze . : : ‘ : . : ; “ 2 ‘ es 2 aS L : 1. . “ “ 2 “¥ e 3 ; at 2 Gs iS , i Bs ie . ae ! : is i : wate . ee sas oe