Introduction 1. Karel G. Van Wolfren,“The Japan Problem,”Foreign
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Notes Introduction 1. Karel G. van Wolfren,“The Japan Problem,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.65, No. 2 (Win- ter 1986/87), p. 289. 2. J. A. A. Stockwin et al., Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan (Honolulu: Uni- versity of Hawaii Press, 1988). 3. Kent E. Calder,“Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,”World Politics Vol. 40, No. 4 (July 1988), pp. 517–41. 4. Other explanations of the pervading dysfunction of Japanese foreign policy in- clude: Michael Blaker,“Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance,”in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War:Coping with Change (New York:M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 1–42; and Edward J. Lincoln, Japan’s New Global Role (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992). 5. Susan J. Pharr, “Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing,” in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Cop- ing with Change (New York:M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 235. 6. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels,“Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), p. 182. Samuels also expands on this theme in Rich Nation/ Strong Army: National Se- curity and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1994). 7. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 34. On the concept of Japanese foreign direct investment in Asia as a manifestation of Japanese power and influence, see also, Kozo Yamamura and Walter Hatch, A Looming Entry Barrier: Japan’s Production Networks in Asia, National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1998; and David Arase, Buying Power:The Political Economy of Japanese Foreign Aid (New York:Lynne Rienner, 1995); Walter Hatch and Kozo Yama- mura, Asia in Japan’s Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Dennis J. Encarnation, Rivals Beyond Trade:America versus Japan in Global Competition (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). For the counterargument that Japanese investment in Southeast Asia was forced by macroeconomic factors rather than deliberate foreign or economic policy strategy,see Charles Chang, David Fernandez, and James Rei- del,“U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations and the Southeast Asia Connection:A Boring Analysis,” in Chihiro Hosoya and Tomohito Shinoda, Redefining the 288 • Japan’s Reluctant Realism Partnership:The United States and Japan in East Asia (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), pp. 83–102. 8. Steven Vogel, “The Power behind “Spin On’s”: The Military Implications of Japan’s Commercial Technology,” in Wayne Sandholtz, Michael Borrus, et al., The Highest Stakes:The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.76. Those who argue that Japanese economic power leads to a different definition of national security come from several different theoretical traditions. Some, like Richard Samuels and Eric Higenbotham, argue that the neorealist focus on states’ responses to the distri- bution of power works for Japan, if one also considers technoeconomic secu- rity in conjunction with traditional measures of national power and statecraft; see Heginbotham and Samuels, op. cit. 6, pp. 171–203. Others, like Glenn Hook, Mike Mochizuki, and Michael O’Hanlon, argue in the neoliberal tra- dition that the growth of economic interdependence in Northeast Asia will render Japan’s economic foreign policy tools more effective, allowing Tokyo to move beyond its troubled debate over military roles. See Glenn D. Hook, Mil- itarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996), and Mike Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanlon,“A Liberal Vision for the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer 1998). A third tradi- tion is represented by Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, who reject the neorealist and neoliberal approaches in favor of a constructivist approach. In contrast to the positivist model of social science, which measures material fac- tors (whether military or economic), constructivism focuses on ideational fac- tors (ideas of national purpose, historical experiences, inherited cultural norms, etc.). See, for example, Katzenstein and Shiraishi, op. cit., 7. See also Thomas Berger,“Set for Stability? An American Perspective on the Prospects for Con- flict and Cooperation in East Asia,” paper for the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, September 24–26, 1998. 9. See, for example, Herman Kahn, Japan:The Emerging Superstate (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970). Kenneth Waltz argued in 1981 that even a nuclear armed Japan would be more “normal” and stable than the current ambiguous arrangement. See Kenneth Waltz,“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons May Be Bet- ter,” Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: IISS, Autumn 1981). More recent structural realist arguments that Japanese economic power will lead to the pursuit of mili- tary power include: George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York:St. Martin’s,1991); and Christopher Layne,“The Unipolar Illu- sion,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51. 10. Rajan Menon, “The Once and Future Superpower: At Some Point Japan Is Likely to Build a Military Machine that Matches Its Economic Might,” Bul- letin of the Atomic Scientist, Vol.52, No. 1 (January/February 1997), p. 34. Menon argues from the neorealist perspective, which sees changes in the balance of power in Northeast Asia as the principle driver for change in Japanese security and foreign policy.Aaron Friedberg described those changes in 1993 as creat- ing conditions “ripe for rivalry” in the region; see Aaron Friedberg,“Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steve E. Miller, eds., East Asian Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). Notes • 289 11. Carol Gluck,“Patterns of Change; A ‘Grand Unified Theory’ of Japanese His- tory,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol.48 (March 1995), p. 38. 12. As international relations theory has moved in the direction of monocausal ex- planations for state behavior, regional experts have been caught in a bind. Ma- terial determinants alone simply cannot explain Japanese state behavior adequately. Constructivists like Peter Katzenstein and Thomas U. Berger have done an enormous service by providing a theoretical and methodological framework for examining norms and institutions as determinants of foreign and security policy in Japan and Germany.But there is also a problem with ex- amining these factors in isolation from the material factors that neorealists rec- ognize as paramount—even with Japan. Something of a synthesis has emerged in what Gideon Rose calls “neoclassical realism.” Critics charge that the neo- classical realists’ allowance for variation in state preferences is not true “real- ism.” If studies like this are to remain relevant to policy, however, there must be both an allowance for—and explanations of—such variation. On the cri- tique of monocausal mania, see Stephen M.Walt,“Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Ra- tional Choice and Security Studies,” International Security, Vol.23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5–48. On norms and institutions, see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed.,The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity and World Politics (New York: Co- lumbia University Press, 1996). On neoclassical realism, see Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144–172. For a critique, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik,“Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 5–55. 13. Examples are discussed later but include the unilateral imposition of sanctions on North Korea in the wake of the Taepodong missile launch; the decision to develop indigenous reconnaissance satellites in the same period; and the de- ployment of fighter squadrons and destroyers near the Senkaku Islands in re- sponse to penetrations by Chinese naval survey vessels in 1997 and 1998. Chapter 1 1. John Dower, Empire and Aftermath:Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1979), p. 369. 2. Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in A New Era: 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: AEI, 1996), p. 59. 3. Ibid., p. 26. 4. Ozawa Ichiro, Nihon Kaizou Keikaku (Blueprint for a New Japan) (Tokyo: Ko- dansha, 1993), p. 109. 5. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Waga Gaikou no Kinkyou (Our Recent Diplomacy, Diplomatic Blue Book) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sep- tember 1957), pp. 7–8. 6. Economists at the Nomura Research Institute made this argument to the au- thor in late 1988. 7. Department of Defense (U.S.), Critical Technologies Plan, March 15, 1990. 290 • Japan’s Reluctant Realism 8. For an influential Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)–spon- sored commission report that captured exactly this zeitgeist, see Tsushou Sangyou Shou Daijin Kanbou (Minister’s Office of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry), Nihon no Sentaku (Japan’s Choices), June 1988. 9. The Nikkei index plummeted three times: first, it fell by 10,666 yen between January 4 and April 5, 1990; second fall is as described above; and third, it fell by 12,837 yen between March 18, 1991, and August 18, 1992. See Takao Yoshikazu, Heisei Kinyu Kyoukou (Financial Panic in Heisei Era) (Tokyo: Chûkou Shinsho, 1994), chapter 1. 10. The author covered Ozawa for the local Iwate Nippou newspaper in 1986. 11. Jiyû Minshutou (Liberal Democratic Party), “Kokusaishakai ni okeru Nihon no Yakuwari:Anzenhoshou Mondai ni Kansuru Teigen” (Japan’s Role in the Interna- tional Society: Proposals on Security Issues), April 11, 1997. 12. Ozawa Ichiro, op. cit., n. 4. 13. Takemura Masayoshi, Chiisakutomo Kirari to Hikaru Kuni Nihon (Japan: A Small But Shining Nation) (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1994).