The Sinai Blunder the Sinai Blunder'
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THE SINAI BLUNDER THE SINAI BLUNDER' Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 Maj.-Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye (Retd.) In~ian Army FRANK CASS· First published 1980 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Gainsborough House, Gainsborough Road, London, Ell IRS, England and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED c/o Biblio Distribution Centre 81 Adams Drive, P.O. Box 327, Totowa, N.J. 07511 Copyright © 1980 Indar Jit Rikhye British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Rikhye, Indar lit The Sinai blunder, 1. Israel-Arab War, 1967 2. United Nations Emergency Force I. Title 956'.046 DS127 ISBN 0-7 146-3136-1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retn·eval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, pho tocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permis sion ofFrank Cass and Company Limited. Printed in Great Britain by A. \\,'heaton & Co. Ltd. Exeter TO CYNTHIA Foreword by Lt. Gen. E.l.M. Burns, OBE; DSO; MC. (Retd.), Canadian Army THE history of the Middle East since the end of World War I is a recapitulation of blunders: blunders which led to and continued the turmoil and bloodshed of the past fifty years; blunders by the Great Powers, by the Arabs and the Jews. Is it worthwhile now to examine the events of May and June 1967, the Sinai Blunder, as General Rikhye has named it? This foreword is being written some months after the momen tous visit of Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem with his offer of peace (under conditions), and Menachem Begin's acceptance (also under conditions). The euphoria generated by this visit and Begin's return visit to Ismailia has died away, and it is seen that if there is to be peace, both sides \vill have to take decisions which will require giving up long-held and cherished hopes and intentions. It is generally accepted that negotiations which wilI lead to peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours should take place in the context of Security Council Resolution 242 of 26th Novem ber 1967. 'This calls, among other conditions, for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1967 war. This would be to the Armistice Demarcation Line established in the 1948 Truce agreements. From the Mediterranean, south of Rafah, it would run along the old boundary between Egypt and Palestine, dating from the Turkish regime. (In this foreword, I leave the Gaza Strip and its future status aside.) Anwar Sadat insists on withdrawal from all of the Sinai as a condition for peace. Can this be reconciled with Israel's need for "secure and recognised boundaries"? viii FOREWORD There is no such thing as a boundary secure in itself. However, Israel could reasonably demand, as a condition for withdrawal, effective assurances that Egypt would not deploy strong armed forces in the Sinai. In other words, it would mean its demilitarisa tion, which would have to be ensured by impartial observers, backed up by comnlitments by the Great Powers. There was no agreement for demilitarising the Sinai after Israel withdrew in 1956-57. Dag Hammarskjold made some attempts to persuade President N·asser not to strengthen Egyptian forces east ofthe Suez Canal, but Nasser refused to yield the right to locate what forces he felt to be necessary in Egypt's sovereign territory. During the years from 1957 to 1967, Egyptian armed strength was gradually built-up, until in 1967 the threat became imminent, and Israel struck first to remove it. General Rikhye tells briefly how this build-up developed, and then recounts the events of May-June 1967, resulting in the exodus of UNEF I, hostilities, and the defeat of Egypt. The withdrawal of the United Nations Force at the time was regarded as a great defeat for the idea of peacekeeping. Neverthe less to put an end to hostilities in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, it was found necessary to create a Second United Nations Emergency Force to. be a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai, as well as a similar force on the Golan Heights, between Israeli and Syrian forces. Diplomats and academics discussing the conditions for with drawal from occupied territories, with assurances for Israel and other States in the region of the right to live in peace, have generally concluded that there would be a need for some kind of United Nations presence, probably some variation on the forces just mentioned. How such a force or forces could be established and deployed poses difficult problems. Those who may have to grapple with them, or others who have a close interest in the problem of the Middle East, with its frightening possibilities as detonator of a Third World War should find General Rikhye's contribution to history very valuable. He was the Commander on the spot having to act immediately to preserve the security of his command. He tells us the real story ofthe casualties suffered by the Indian contingent during the Israeli attack on the southern part ofthe Gaza Strip, taken very seriously by India, but lost sight of in the crush of events at the time. FOREWORD ix .He had also to contend with the uncertainty as to what deci sions would be taken (or not taken) at the United Nations. He states the problems as they had to be faced by the Secretary-Gene ral, who was responsible for laying down policies for and issuing orders to the UNEF, acting under authority of the General Assembly. The decision of the then Secretary-General, U Thant, that on legal grounds the Force had to be withdrawn when requested by Egypt has been widely criticised, perhaps unfairly. Much of the blame should lie on the Security Council, and particularly on the superpowers, who failed to do anything to head off the threat of war. One of the conclusions drawn after the 1967 experience, and heeded in the setting up of UNEF II, was that it had to be the Security Council which should control such forces. This is more in accordance with the constitution of the United Nations, and with the realities of world power. Another lesson which should have been learned is that the Soviet Union cannot be shut out of the settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. There was no Warsaw Pact representation in UNEF I, although the U.S.S.R. pressed for it. But there is a Polish contingent in UNEF II. If there are to be honest negotiations, sincerely intended to produce a just and secure peace, the experiences of May-June 1967 must be taken into account by Israel and its Arab neighbours, the superpowers, and indeed by all United Nations Members. Preface THE United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) the first peace keeping force of its kind, became a model for subsequent peace keeping forces established by the United Nations in the Congo, Cyprus, West Irian and again in the Middle East after the October 1973 war. While a number of books on peacekeeping forces have been published, including "Between Arab and Israeli" by Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns, the first commander of UNEF, on assuming conlmand of UNEF in February 1966, I planned a more exhaus tive study of the military and administrative aspects of UNEF's experience. However, the sudden withdrawal of the Force in 1967 altered my plans. When I received instructions from the United Nation's Secretary-General to withdraw the Force, I arranged that a detailed record be maintained of all messages received or sent by my Headquarters and of all conversations and meetings between my staff and me and with others. This log proved most useful in drafting reports for the United Nations and later enabled me to refresh my memory on details long since forgotten when I started to prepare this manuscript. During the summer of 1968, thanks to the help of my wife, to whom this book is dedicated, I was able to complete my preli minary notes for this manuscript. Owing to my preoccupations in· a new career, I refrained from publishing the book earlier. Moreover, as a former United Nations staff member and as a participant in the confidential negotiations during the withdrawal of UNEF, 1 was bound not to do so until after a period of two years' separation from the United Naiions. In the meanwhile, I had become only too aware that nearly everyone in the West blamed U Thant and the United Nations for the hasty withdrawal of the Force, resulting in the Six Day War between the Arabs and xii PREFACE Israelis in 1967. I therefore wanted more time to obtain every shred of information relating to the political and diplomatic moves that led to UNEF's withdrawal. Some of the facts have come to light only since the death of President Nasser. Further more, with the passage of time, the United Nation's Secretariat has been agreeable about disclosing information which it had ear lier considered sensitive. In this book I have attempted to describe events that led to the withdrawal of UNEF as seen from my perspective as the Commander of the Force. "Further, I have described at length the process of withdrawal of the Force, a situation that may repeat itself where peacekeeping forces are introduced between opposing armies. The experience of UNEF's withdra,,\'al highlights the need for planning and preparation to meet sinli1ar emergency situa tions.