THE SINAI BLUNDER THE SINAI BLUNDER'

Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967

Maj.-Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye (Retd.) In~ian Army

FRANK CASS· First published 1980 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Gainsborough House, Gainsborough Road, London, Ell IRS, England

and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED c/o Biblio Distribution Centre 81 Adams Drive, P.O. Box 327, Totowa, N.J. 07511

Copyright © 1980 Indar Jit Rikhye

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Rikhye, Indar lit The Sinai blunder, 1. Israel-Arab War, 1967 2. United Nations Emergency Force I. Title 956'.046 DS127 ISBN 0-7 146-3136-1

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Printed in Great Britain by A. \\,'heaton & Co. Ltd. Exeter TO CYNTHIA Foreword by Lt. Gen. E.l.M. Burns, OBE; DSO; MC. (Retd.), Canadian Army

THE history of the Middle East since the end of World War I is a recapitulation of blunders: blunders which led to and continued the turmoil and bloodshed of the past fifty years; blunders by the Great Powers, by the Arabs and the Jews. Is it worthwhile now to examine the events of May and June 1967, the Sinai Blunder, as General Rikhye has named it? This foreword is being written some months after the momen­ tous visit of Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem with his offer of peace (under conditions), and Menachem Begin's acceptance (also under conditions). The euphoria generated by this visit and Begin's return visit to Ismailia has died away, and it is seen that if there is to be peace, both sides \vill have to take decisions which will require giving up long-held and cherished hopes and intentions. It is generally accepted that negotiations which wilI lead to peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours should take place in the context of Security Council Resolution 242 of 26th Novem­ ber 1967. 'This calls, among other conditions, for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1967 war. This would be to the Armistice Demarcation Line established in the 1948 Truce agreements. From the Mediterranean, south of Rafah, it would run along the old boundary between Egypt and Palestine, dating from the Turkish regime. (In this foreword, I leave the Gaza Strip and its future status aside.) Anwar Sadat insists on withdrawal from all of the Sinai as a condition for peace. Can this be reconciled with Israel's need for "secure and recognised boundaries"? viii FOREWORD

There is no such thing as a boundary secure in itself. However, Israel could reasonably demand, as a condition for withdrawal, effective assurances that Egypt would not deploy strong armed forces in the Sinai. In other words, it would mean its demilitarisa­ tion, which would have to be ensured by impartial observers, backed up by comnlitments by the Great Powers. There was no agreement for demilitarising the Sinai after Israel withdrew in 1956-57. Dag Hammarskjold made some attempts to persuade President N·asser not to strengthen Egyptian forces east ofthe Suez Canal, but Nasser refused to yield the right to locate what forces he felt to be necessary in Egypt's sovereign territory. During the years from 1957 to 1967, Egyptian armed strength was gradually built-up, until in 1967 the threat became imminent, and Israel struck first to remove it. General Rikhye tells briefly how this build-up developed, and then recounts the events of May-June 1967, resulting in the exodus of UNEF I, hostilities, and the defeat of Egypt. The withdrawal of the United Nations Force at the time was regarded as a great defeat for the idea of peacekeeping. Neverthe­ less to put an end to hostilities in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, it was found necessary to create a Second United Nations Emergency Force to. be a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai, as well as a similar force on the Golan Heights, between Israeli and Syrian forces. Diplomats and academics discussing the conditions for with­ drawal from occupied territories, with assurances for Israel and other States in the region of the right to live in peace, have generally concluded that there would be a need for some kind of United Nations presence, probably some variation on the forces just mentioned. How such a force or forces could be established and deployed poses difficult problems. Those who may have to grapple with them, or others who have a close interest in the problem of the Middle East, with its frightening possibilities as detonator of a Third World War should find General Rikhye's contribution to history very valuable. He was the Commander on the spot having to act immediately to preserve the security of his command. He tells us the real story ofthe casualties suffered by the Indian contingent during the Israeli attack on the southern part ofthe Gaza Strip, taken very seriously by India, but lost sight of in the crush of events at the time. FOREWORD ix

.He had also to contend with the uncertainty as to what deci­ sions would be taken (or not taken) at the United Nations. He states the problems as they had to be faced by the Secretary-Gene­ ral, who was responsible for laying down policies for and issuing orders to the UNEF, acting under authority of the General Assembly. The decision of the then Secretary-General, U Thant, that on legal grounds the Force had to be withdrawn when requested by Egypt has been widely criticised, perhaps unfairly. Much of the blame should lie on the Security Council, and particularly on the superpowers, who failed to do anything to head off the threat of war. One of the conclusions drawn after the 1967 experience, and heeded in the setting up of UNEF II, was that it had to be the Security Council which should control such forces. This is more in accordance with the constitution of the United Nations, and with the realities of world power. Another lesson which should have been learned is that the Soviet Union cannot be shut out of the settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. There was no Warsaw Pact representation in UNEF I, although the U.S.S.R. pressed for it. But there is a Polish contingent in UNEF II. If there are to be honest negotiations, sincerely intended to produce a just and secure peace, the experiences of May-June 1967 must be taken into account by Israel and its Arab neighbours, the superpowers, and indeed by all United Nations Members. Preface

THE United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) the first peace­ keeping force of its kind, became a model for subsequent peace­ keeping forces established by the United Nations in the Congo, Cyprus, West Irian and again in the Middle East after the October 1973 war. While a number of books on peacekeeping forces have been published, including "Between Arab and Israeli" by Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns, the first commander of UNEF, on assuming conlmand of UNEF in February 1966, I planned a more exhaus­ tive study of the military and administrative aspects of UNEF's experience. However, the sudden withdrawal of the Force in 1967 altered my plans. When I received instructions from the United Nation's Secretary-General to withdraw the Force, I arranged that a detailed record be maintained of all messages received or sent by my Headquarters and of all conversations and meetings between my staff and me and with others. This log proved most useful in drafting reports for the United Nations and later enabled me to refresh my memory on details long since forgotten when I started to prepare this manuscript. During the summer of 1968, thanks to the help of my wife, to whom this book is dedicated, I was able to complete my preli­ minary notes for this manuscript. Owing to my preoccupations in· a new career, I refrained from publishing the book earlier. Moreover, as a former United Nations staff member and as a participant in the confidential negotiations during the withdrawal of UNEF, 1 was bound not to do so until after a period of two years' separation from the United Naiions. In the meanwhile, I had become only too aware that nearly everyone in the West blamed U Thant and the United Nations for the hasty withdrawal of the Force, resulting in the Six Day War between the Arabs and xii PREFACE

Israelis in 1967. I therefore wanted more time to obtain every shred of information relating to the political and diplomatic moves that led to UNEF's withdrawal. Some of the facts have come to light only since the death of President Nasser. Further­ more, with the passage of time, the United Nation's Secretariat has been agreeable about disclosing information which it had ear­ lier considered sensitive. In this book I have attempted to describe events that led to the withdrawal of UNEF as seen from my perspective as the Commander of the Force. "Further, I have described at length the process of withdrawal of the Force, a situation that may repeat itself where peacekeeping forces are introduced between opposing armies. The experience of UNEF's withdra,,\'al highlights the need for planning and preparation to meet sinli1ar emergency situa­ tions. I have added an epilogue which includes an analysis of lessons learnt and relates the withdrawal of the first UNEF \vith ~ubsequent developments in the Middle East. I am grateful to my many associates in the International Peace Academy who have all been most helpful to me in completing this manuscript. Mrs. Lauranne Pazhoor and Miss Anne Denvir laboured patiently and cheerfully, typing and retyping portions of the draft manuscript; Mrs. Dana Owen Suszkiw kindly took over to complete the final version. Along the \vay, t\1 rs. Ellen Leventhal assisted in editing the first draft and later Brigadier Michael Harbottle, a successful author in his own right, reorganis­ ed the final draft with a knowledgeability born of experience. I am thankful to my niece, Mrs. Kavita Sharma, for bringing this book and its publisher together, through the intermediary of Mrs. Indu Ramchandani, its final editor. Mrs. Ramchandani has proved to be an understanding and painstaking craftswoman who has retained her enthusiasm and sense of humour throughout the tedious process of transforming manuscript to book. "Finally, my special thanks are due to the Board of Directors of the International Peace Academy, its chairman, Ambassador Arnold C. Smith, and John E. Mroz, the Academy's Executive Vice President, who encouraged me to undertake this book as an Academy publication.

INDAR J IT RIKHYE "OAKLAND", DHALLI, SIMLA Contents

Foreword by Lt. Gen. E.L.M. Burns (Canadian Army). ... vii Preface...... xi

CH 1. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND UNEF RE-ORGANISATION 1966-67 ...... 1

CH 2. UNEF ASKED TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM SINAI. . 14

CH 3. U.A.R. TROOPS MOVE INTO SINAI... 23

CH 4. EGYPT REQUESTS UNEF WITHDRAWAL...... 36

CH 5. UNITED NATIONS DELIBERATES UNEF WITH- DRAWAL...... •...... 5]

CH 6. U THANT'S VISIT TO CAIRO...... 63

CH 7. EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF CANADIAN CONTINGENT.. 87

CH 8. THE FIRST DAY OF THE WAR.. .. 100 CH 9. ~rHE SECOND DAY OF THE WAR...... 112

CH 10. THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR...... •...... 129

CH 11. MEETING WITH RABIN AND DAYAN...... 142

CH 12. FURORE OVER INDIAN CASUALTIES...... •.. 150

EPILOGUE...... •...... 156

POSTSCRIPT...... •...... ] 84

1\r1aps...... 186 Appendices...... 190

Index '" ...... 233 List of Illustrations

PLATES..•.....•...... •...•....•...... •....• 144-45

MAP 1. THE SINAI . 186

MAP 2. UNEF DEPLOYMENT IN .GAZA...... •...... 187

MAP 3. UNEF DEPLOYMENT IN THE SINAI . 188

MAP 4. UNEF DEPLOYMENT ON 5th JUNE, 1967 . 189 1 Developments in the Middle East and UNEF Re..organisation 1966..67

IN 1965 while I was looking after the United Nations Observer Mission in the Dominican Republic, I returned to New York for the Christmas holidays. U Thant informed me at that time that he wanted me to take over the command of UNEF, replacing Major General Syseto Sarmento of Brazil who was completing his tour of duty during February, 1966. I was delighted to be given an independent mission, especially Gaza, where I had already served as the Commander of the Indian contingent and Chief of Staff from October, 1957 to February, 1960. UNEF, the first experiment by the United Nations in the use of military forces for peacekeeping was established during the first week of November, 1956, following the ~uez War, by a resolution of the first Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The introduction of this Force had become essential as a condition to establish a cease-fire and arrange \vithdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Suez Canal area (Map 1) and the Israeli forces from the Sinai. In the initial phase UNEF was interposed between the Anglo-French and Egyptian troops in the Canal area and between the Israeli and" Egyptian troops in the Sinai east of the Canal. Once the Anglo-French troops withdrew, UNEF secured the Suez Canal to ensure smooth clearance operations.

T.S.H. ·-8 2 THE SINAI BLUNDER

When the Israelis agreed to withdraw from the Sinai, UNEF cleared the mines and repaired the roads to the International Frontier. The Israelis agreed to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and on 7th March, 1957, UNEF entered the territory and was deployed around the perimeter to patrol the Armistice Demarcation Line. Later the Israelis agreed to withdraw from Sharm el Sheikh on 8th March, 1957, when UNEF established a post there to ensure freedom of shipping through the Straits of Tiran. The Force under command of Major General (later Lieutenant General) E. L. M. Burns ofCanada comprising some 8,000 troops from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia manned posts and patrolled the Armistice Demarcation Line along the Gaza Strip, the International Frontier between Egypt and Israel and main­ tained a post at Sharm el Sheikh, keeping peace and quiet in the area for the coming years. UNEF proved highly useful in providing a buffer between the Arabs and Israelis which led the United Nations General Assembly to renew its mandate \vithout debate each subsequent year. When I assumed command of the Force with its task having become routine, its size had been reduced to some 4,500 officers and men, and the Colombian, Danish, Finnish and Indonesian contingents had departed. I took over command of UNEF on 24th February, 1966, and found that though the political impasse continued and the countries involved displayed an aggressive military posture, the situation had stabilised a good deal in the UNEF area. This stemmed from the need of Egypt and Israel to achieve normalcy of life and economy. It had therefore become possible to reduce the size of UNEF operations without jeopardising its ability to carry out its mandate, but the political and other developments still had to go a long way before UNEF's replacement by an observer operation could be considered. Recent reorganisation had but slightly altered the pattern of UFEF operations. Along the Armistice Demarcation Line units occupied only half of the eighty..two observation posts initially established (Maps 2 and 3). The actual selection of observation posts to be occupied on anyone day \~/as varied at the discretion of the commanding officers of the units depending on the prevail- ,ing situation at the time. On the International f'rontier all five observation to\vers were occupied during the hours of daylight, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 3 but the scale of patrolling was less frequent than before. The pattern of air reconnaissance had been reduced to coordinate with supply schedules on the International Frontier. The most noticeable change since my previous service with UNEF was the establishment ofan increased and effective control of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip by its U .A.R.t administration and along the International Frontier by the U.A.R. authorities. In the Gaza Strip a police force of 5,000 had esta­ blished complete control over the activities ofthe local population and maintained a satisfactory law and order situation. Along the International Frontier the U.A.R. authorities appeared to have gained greater control over tribal movement. The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) of about 8,000 men was organised in about eight battalions in the Gaza Strip. They were deployed on the basis of one battalion to each of the five adminis­ trative districts with reserve units in the Gaza and Khan Yunis areas. The interesting fact was that the detachments of the PLA were now located all along and just outside the five hundred metre restricted zone on the Gaza Strip, thus in a way assuming of their own accord a major part of UNEF's responsibilities in the Gaza Strip. UNEF stood between the PLA and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and in the main looked after Arab farmers and goats herds in the five hundred metre zone. More PLA soldiers were re­ ported to be under training in Egypt and were likely to be sent up to the UNEF area of operations when they were ready. Basically the PLA was still only a political force; however, their improved standards of training and military capability had become appa­ rent. The force was armed with light weapons, machine guns, mortars, and anti-tank guns; it seemed potentially stronger than UNEF. In the Sinai the U.A.R. forces had made progressive improve­ ments. This included concentrations of their forces opposite Ras el Naqb and EI Auja where the pattern of Israeli activity was that of continuous active patrolling along the armistice lines. Consequent upon the improvement in control of the local population on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line and

tIn February, 1958, Egypt and Syria had formed a union and renamed the two countries the United Arab Republic. This union was dissolved in Septen1ber, 1961. I-Iowever, Egypt continued the usage of U.A.R. as its name even though Syria returned to its original name. 4 THE SINAI BLUNDER

International Frontier, the number of crossings had been reduced, and those that occurred were not very significant from either the political or military point of view. The air and sea violations continued, with Israel overflying U .A.R. territory unhampered, apparently for purposes of reconnaissance. There were few air violations by the V.A.R. Violations at sea were mainly connected with fishing and were therefore unimportant. The increased cultivation in the Gaza Strip had necessitated a change in the operation of patrols in the five hundred metre zone along the Armistice Demarcation Line. UNEF, with the approval ofHeadquarters, had permitted cultivation up to within one metre of the Armistice Demarcation Line although a limit offifty metres had originally been established. With the exception of the sand dunes in the northern part of the Gaza Strip and a few kilometres of desert in the area close to Rafah, the entire length of the Armistice Line was under intense cultivation, including the development of several new orchards. By 1965, Palestinian Arabs were beginning to take part in activities against Israel on a wide scale and in several different organisations. The new Palestinian leadership, recognising the failure and probable inability of- the Arab States to achieve a realistic sense of unity that was a prerequisite for solving the Palestinian problem, encouraged clandestine Palestinian guerrilla organisations to plan commando type operations into Israel. The most active of these guerrilla groups was AI-Fatah and it began its military action against Israel on 1st January, 1965. These guerrilla groups had one primary goal, that of bringing about a war between Israel and the Arab world. There were two reasons why these groups wanted war. In 1965, the Arab States, aside from perhaps Syria, did not want an immediate war with Israel. Nasser felt he was not yet ready for war and would rather fight at a time and place of his own choosing so that he could be ensured of a total victory. However, the Syrian coup of February, 1966 which· brought the extremist group of the Ba'ath party into power adopted the doctrine of Popular War of Liberation advocated by the Palestinian fedayeen. Hereafter the AI-Fatah group in Syria known as Es Saqa was given the backing of the Syrian army, including supply of arms, sabotage equipment and ,training facilities. While the PLA followed Arab summit policies, Es Saqa came increasingly under Syrian control. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5

The radical Palestinian groups such as Al-Fatah believed that there was a military gap with Israel but that time would increase that gap in favour of Israel. It was therefore necessary to have a military confrontation with Israel as early as possible. Seccndly, the plight of the Palestinian refugee was being publicised less and less both in the outside world and in the Arab media. Arabs were becoming more and more accustomed to looking at the Palestinian problem as one that was insoluble. A military confrontation between Israel and the Arab States would reawaken the Palestinians, the Arabs and the entire world. According to radical Palestinians it was essential to conduct guerrilla raids against Israel. Although it would be impossible for these raids by themselves to destroy Israel it was hoped that they would \veaken Israel militarily, economically and socially. They were intended to create problems in maintaining border security, to discourage foreign investments and possibly encourage emigra­ tion from Israel. It was felt th&t continuous guerrilla activity would force Israel into conducting reprisal or punitive actions of some kind. It was hoped that these reprisal actions against the Arab States and their responses to them would eventually escalate into a full-scale war between Israel and the Arab world. To this end, the Palestinians stepped up their raids into Israel in early 1966. On the night of 25th April, 1966, a man and a woman were injured by explosions in a border village in the Galilee section of Israel. Several buildings were also damaged. Three days later a mine was set off by a truck travelling on the road to Masada. There were no injuries. In the past, whenever Israeli lives were jeopardised by guerrilla activity, Israel usually responded with SOine kind of military action. On this occasion on 29th April, Syria complaine~ to the Security Council that Israel's Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol had issued warlike statements threatening Syria and the neighbouring Arab States and that their threats had been followed by an attack on Jordan on 29th and 30th April. In a reply on 16th May at the Security Council meeting, Israel charged that Syria was the. main support of AI-Fatah. As the Council met, Eshkol warned Syria that the present state of affairs could not continue and condemned Syrian support and encouragement of AI- Fatah activity against Israel. In res­ ponse, i\hmed Shukairy 'the head of the PLO' placed the PLA's six thousand strong force in Syria at the disposal of the Syrian 6 THE SINAI BLUNDER government. Thereafter, Palestinian guerrilla attacks continued without cessation. On 13th July, an Israeli soldier and civilian were killed by a land mine explosion near the Syrian border. The next day the Israeli air force carried out operations against construction at the Syrian Banyas River diversion canal project eight miles inside Syria. On the following day Syria called for a War of Popular Liberation against Israel. Both sides took the problem to the UN Security Council, but this did not result in any effective measures being taken. During the remaining summer of 1966 the situation on the Israeli-Jordan and Israeli-Lebanon borders remained tense. Guerrilla attacks front bases in Syria into the Upper Galilee intensified during the third quarter of 1966. This resulted from the controversy over cultivation rights in the Demilitarised Zone between Israel and Syria. Night after night Palestinian infiltrators would cross into Israeli-held territory and inflict casualties or damage before with­ drawing back across the Line of Demarcation into Syria. Though Syria disclaimed any responsibility for incursions into Israel by Palestinian guerrillas, the Israeli Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin, responded to the renewed guerrilla activity by declaring that "Israel's reaction against Syrian activities must be directed against those who carry out sabotage, and against the rulers who support those acts. Hence the problem with Syria is basically one of clash with the rulers." Guerrilla activity, however, continued at a high level. A pipeline between Arad and Masada was blown up twice in six weeks; at the end of September. Arab guerrillas, infiltrating through Jordan, blew up an Israeli electric transformer that fed power to a pumping station. AI-Fatah was believed to be responsi­ ble for the incident. An increasing number of Israeli soldiers were being injured while on border patrols. On the night of 7th October, four Israelis were injured by three explosions in the Jerusalem area. Apartments \vere damaged in the Romema quarter of the city. On the following night four soldiers were killed and two injured when their jeep ran over a mine near the Syrian border. Eshkol declared that Syria was responsible for all terrorist activity and lsrael laid a formal corrlplaint with the UN Security Council con­ cerning the Syrian border. Syria repeated that it \vould not accept responsibility for the activities of Palestinian guerrilla groups, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 7 insisting that it would not act as a force to protect Israeli security by limiting operations of AI-Fatah. A day later AI-Fatah's reply was an announcement that it had been increasing and would continue to increase the number of border incidents. So the raiding went on with increasing and more punitive reprisals being staged by the Israelis. On 13th October, three Israeli soldiers were wounded when the vehicl~ they were travel­ ling in came under fire near the border village .of Nehusa. Five days later an Israeli patrol vehicle was blown up by a land mine. The incident occurred in northeast Galilee near the Syrian border. Israel complained that ISMAC2 was unable to act and requested Security Council action, but to no avail; instead on 19th October three Arab infiltrators and an Israeli border policeman died in a clash south of Ramat Naftali. One Arab was wounded and captured. His interrogation strengthened Israel's belief that the group had been operative under orders of Syrian intelligence. Guerrilla activity was not only confined to Israel's borders with Syria. Just as serious incidents were occurring along its border with Jordan. On 23rd October an Israeli army command car was blown up by a mine in the Dan area. Four days later an Israeli freight train was derailed by an explosion southwest of Jerusalem near the Jordanian village of Battir. On 12th Novem­ ber, three Israelis were killed and six wounded six miles north of Arad. This extension and mounting increase in the intensity of the ··guerrilla warfare decided the Israeli government to take decisive retaliatory measures to put a stop to it. On 13th November, Israel carried out its largest military action since the Sinai Campaign of 1956. Israeli armoured columns attacked the Jordanian town of Es Samu. It was Israel's first daylight reprisal action and the first to use a large number of tanks. Initial reports stated that six Jordanian Legionaires were killed in the action and eleven were wounded. A UN Committee under General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff, UNTS03 inspected Es Samu after the reprisal assault and reported 125 structures in the to\vn destroyed including a clinic and a school, and a further

2IsraeIi Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission established by the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. 3United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation established by the General Arnlistice Agreenlent of 1949 \vith its Headquarters at the Govern­ nlent House, Jerusalem. 8 THE SINAI BLUNDER fifteen huts in the nearby villag1e ofJimba. The Committee report­ ed that fifteen Jordanian soldiers and three civilians had been killed and that thirty-seven soldiers and seventeen civilians had been wounded. On the following day, the Security Council considered Jordan's complaint concerning Israel's attack on Es Samu and censured Israel emphasising to her that military repri­ sals would not be tolerated and if repeated, the Council would consider more effective step~.4 The Es Samu raid was a serious turning point in the deteriorat- ing situation between Israel and her Arab neighbours. Repercus­ sions from the raid also had the effect of further fracturing the already weakened ties between Jordan and the other Arab States. Jordan was in the forefront of those Arab countries (i.e. Gulf States and Saudi Arabia) who disavowed Al-f"atah. Jordan like Lebanon was not allo\ving elements of the PLA to train on their territory. Jordan felt that any Palestinian Arab living in its terri­ tory could obtain military training by joining the Jordanian army. Jordan was unwilling to allow a military force that was not under the King's control to operate in its territory. Like Lebanon, Jordan feared Israeli reprisals in response to Palestinian Arab guerrilla activity. In fact, a number of Palestinian Arabs were jailed in Jordan during the first week of 1966 because of conflict between the government and the PLO. Thus Israeli retaliation was felt to be an undeserved punishment on Jordan. During an Arab League meeting before the end of the year, Jordan was accused for its failure to defend its populace from Israeli retalia­ tion. Jordan in turn insisted that Egypt too should participate in the confrontation with Israel by removing UNEF, instead of sheltering behind it. But no one, least of all the United Nations, took seriously these acrim.onious exchanges. Of all the armistice and demarcation lines those supervised by UNEF between Israel and Egypt remained the quietest during these difficult months. After much hard work in adjusting to the inevitable difficulties arising out of recent reductions in the size of the .Force, UNEF had, by the beginning of 1967, settled down and had acquired a high state of efficiency and morale. It was a knife-edge situation in the Middle East at this time, so while an atmosphere of calm prevailed in UNEF area of operations, I

-iUN Sj7598 of 25th Novenlber, 1966. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 9 maintained a close watch on the shifting of political developments. The Arabs remained committed to a Palestine War of Liberation and to "driving" Israel into the sea. The Israelis were adamant that only force through retaliation would provide peace and that given enough time the Arabs might eventually accept a de facto existence of their State. The great powers with theil conflicting interests were further contributing towards the heightening crisis by their inaction to deal with the developing crisis. 1967 started with an intensification of incidents between Israel and Syria. Israel complained to the Security Council that Syrian forces had shelled and fired at Israelis, acts of aggression which resulted from the land disputes in the Lake Tiberias area and the Demilitarised Zone. Syrians complained of illegal occupa­ tion of the Demilitarised Zone by Israel. Israel told the Council that these violations of the General Armistice Agreement endan­ gered peace of the whole area and could not be tolerated. At the same time, Syria cOlnplained that the grave deterioration of 'the situation along the armistice lines resulted from Israel's intention to increase tension so as to justify aggression against Syria and expand its illegal occupation of cultivatable land in the Demili­ tarised Zone. Syria justified their firing at the Israelis on the grounds that it was in return for provocative firing by Israelis against peaceful Arab farmers and Syrian army posts. On 15th January, U Thant appealed to Israel and Syria to refrain from action and to accept without delay the proposal of the Chief of Staff of UN-TSO, General Odd Bull, for holding an emergency meeting of ISMAC, to resolve the problems of cultiva­ tion in the area which had given rise to the recent incidents. Israel and Syria agreed to this proposal and the first meeting was held on 25th January, but after meeting thrice, the talks became dead­ locked and thereafter General Bull re"sorted to separate nego tia­ tions; this met with no succ~ss either and on 23rd March, these too were terminated.5 On 7th April, on the Ba'athist Anniversary, President Atasi of Syria declared, "The battle is between us on the one hand, and reaction, imperialism and Zionism on the other. It is a decisive battle of destiny ....The People's Liberation War will cleanse the entire Arab territory of the Zionists, the Imperialists, and their

5War and Peace in the Middle East, General Odd Bul1, Ch. 6, p. 108. 10 THE SINAI BLUNDER reactionaries. The People's Liberation War is our means to stamp out the enemies of toiling masses." As if to put effect to his words, Syrian forces later in the day opened fire on Israeli tractors in the Demilitarised Zone. Israel retaliated with an air attack against Syria in which 70 to 80 aircraft took part. Syria complained to the Security Council that "Israel had carried out a premeditated attack to provoke Syria into a full-scale war." Israel accused Syria of a "people's war" against its territory. The Syrians replied that they \vere not responsible for and nor would they obstruct activities of Palestinian Arabs. This was followed by more incidents on the Israel-Jordan front. As the situation be­ came more critical, particularly that between Israel and Syria, the Arab League at its meeting later in the month reiterated that the Egyptian forces should be moved up into the Sinai and thereby reduce Israeli military pressure against Syria. But this call and its significance in regard to UNEF attracted little attention from the United Nations. On 8th May, the Secretary-General circulated to the Security Council a communication that he had received from General Bull reporting that the serious incidents of 7th April had widened the gap of disagreement between Israel and Syria on the resumption of the ISMAC meetings, and consequently it was not possible for the time being to expect any fruitful meeting in the interests of peace. Bull had continued with separate talks with the two sides in an attempt to achieve an understanding on the practical arrange­ ments for cultivation along the armistice lines. U Thant had strongly endorsed Bull's appeal to both parties to exercise utmost restraint and to observe the unconditional cease-fire and to make use of the armistice machinery in order to resolve any differences which arose between them. On 11 th May, the Ba'ath Party, the fuling political party of Syria, had sent a note to all friendly Arab parties giving their version of the 7th April incident, adding that there were many signs which· pointed to the probability of renewed Israeli aggres­ sion. The same day U 'Thant, following his endorsement of Bull's appeal to Israel and Syria, told the press in reply to a question regarding AI-Fatah activity against Israel, "That type of activity is insidious, is contrary to the letter of Armistic~ i\greements and menaces peace in the area." As the feda.,veens kept up their tempo of attacks with a haunt- DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 11 ing sense of crisis, Israel responded to the growing threat across her borders by taking several diplomatic steps. Israeli representa­ tives, in their meetings with UNTSO, Member States of the Secu­ rity Council, the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, made no pretence of Israel's serious attitude towards the worsening situation on the Israeli-Syrian border. All who were the target of this diplomatic onslaught were left in no doubt that the problem of cultivation disputes on the border was no longer the main issue; the paramount threat to peace was the jedayeen activity inside Israel. On 13th May the Syrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, George Tuma met U Thant to inform him of the statement issued by his Foreign Ministry that day alleging that "a plot was being concocted by Imperialists and Zionists quarters against Syria" ...and revealing "the prearranged aggressive role which Israel is preparing to carry out within the framework of this plot." Tuma added that Israel's open threats to go to war against Syria were creating a very dangerous situation. The Israelis sought to leave its Arab neighbours in no doubt as to how it reacted to the fedayeen attacks, especially Syria. General Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Chiefof Defence Staff, said on 14th May that while Jordan and Lebanon were against sabotage raids, Syria actively supported saboteurs. "Therefore the air action against Syria" he concluded, "is different from what it may be against Jordan and Lebanon." This only added fuel to the fire. On 15th May Syria called the attention of the Security Council to threats of war against Syria made by Israeli leaders and said that these threats revealed the provocative role assigned to Israel by the CIA6 as part of a wider plan. The Israeli-Syrian border situation was approaching the critical moment of explosion and yet the Security Council found itself unable to" act in any positive way to ease tensions. Israel's warnings were taken by the Arabs as a threat of an imminent attack against Syria, designed to overthrow the regime. The Soviet Union, Syria, and Egypt had already complained to the Security Council that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border. Israel agreed to a UN inspection by UNTSO, on the

6Central Intelligence Agency of the Governlnent of the United States of Anlerica. 12 THE SINAI BLUNDER completion of which, General Bull reported that there had been no recent concentrations in Israel. U Thant, however, was only able to report this to the Council on 17th May. Meanwhile on 14th May, Cairo Radio, referring to recent warnings directed at Syria by Israeli leaders and to reports of Israeli troop concentration at the Syrian front, stated that any attack against Syria would be met by Syrian-V.A.R. forces. These two countries had signed a U.A.R.­ Syria Joint Defence Pact towards the end of 1966 agreeing that an attack against either State would be regarded as an attack against both. However, the success and popularity of the fedayeens and their championship by Syria posed a problem to Nasser. He feared that the fedayeen activity would eventually draw Egypt and the whole Arab world into an untimely war with Israel. No Arab leader expected Israel to withstand guerrilla attacks without retaliating in some way. As stated earlier, Nasser wanted to avoid war at any cost, at least for the time being. His failure to go to war if Israel attacked any other Arab State would deal a serious blow to his goal of Arab unity and hurt his prestige throughout the Arab world. Such an incident would also provide fuel for any propaganda machin~ of rival Arab leaders. Nasser's leadership of the Arab world was now being seriously challenged by Syria. Syria realised that the support of the feda­ yeen was a means of attacking Nasser and of increasing Syrian prestige in the radical Arab capitals. It was also a means of achieving a Syrian hope for a Popular War of Liberation to solve the Palestinian problem. Even though he realised that his action could further lessen his prestige among the Palestinians and apparently among other Arabs, Nasser decided out of fear of Israeli reprisals to forbid guerrilla activity into Israel from the S~nai Peninsula or Gaza Strip. GuerriHas operating from Sinai or Gaza risked arrest by Egyptian police. Nasser's efforts in keeping the border area calm were assisted by the presence of lJNEF. There were disquieting developments along the Israeli-Jordan border as well, during this period. On 6th February Jordan had pro­ tested to the UN against the Israeli decision to hold a military parade in Jerusalem on 15th May in defiance of the General i\rmistice Agreement and Security Council Resolution (162 of 1961) of 11 th April 1961. On 10th May the representative ofAlgeria as the Chairman for the Arab group for that month brought to the DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1J

Secretary-General's attention the views of his associates, that the decision of the Israeli government to hold a parade in Jerusalem on its independence day was "nothing but a step forward strengthen­ ing the Israel trial of strength over the Holy City ofJerusalem to aim at establishing that city as Israel's political capital." Despite these demarches and the intervention of U Thant, Israel held the parade on 15th Mayas planned causing Jordan to again complain to the UN. Jordan had also drawn the attention of the Secretary-General during April to the crossings of the armistice lines by Israeli forces in the area of Hebron in which casualties were inflicted on Arab civilians. :L\gain on 17th May Jordan drew the Secretary-General's attention to the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission of 3rd May which had con­ demned the Israeli authorities for crossing in April. With inexorable certainty events were moving towards a conclusion-war. There were other developments which at first did not appear to have any special significance. On 13th Maya UNEF supply C(..; ( ....!Gy from Port Said was not permitted to cross the ferry at Kantara, because it was in use by U-.A.R. troops. This had happened before but when on 15th May the convoy returned to Rafah it reported large-scale V.A.R. troop movement into the Sinai. This was indeed more serious but did not imme­ diately alarm anyone of us in UNEF. In anticipation of these Israeli independence day celebrations, PLO had organised demon­ strations against Israel. Shukairy had been touring the area and creating excitement among the refugees. The PL.L\ had been alerted. We in UNEF were, however, accustomed to all this. It was the season for an exchange of verbal threats, demonstrations, parades across the border and high tension. We in Gaza could not help but be concerned with the gradual escalation ofincidents along Israel's Syrian and Jordanian borders, but in contrast to UNTSO, we felt that UNEF as a peacekeeping force, had a better capability of preventing war and a greater chance of maintaining peace, despite the increase in incidents. We thanked our good fortune for having a force deployed all along the cease-fire lines between Israel and Egypt to keep that peace. However, we did intensify our alertness, but it was quiet along the armistice lines where UNEF was positioned and none of us foresaw that we were heading towards another "round" in the Middle East conflict.