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FROM PEACE (KEEPING) to WAR: the UNITED NATIONS and the WITHDRAWAL of UNEF by Michael K

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FROM PEACE (KEEPING) to WAR: the UNITED NATIONS and the WITHDRAWAL of UNEF by Michael K FROM PEACE (KEEPING) TO WAR: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF By Michael K. Carroll* UN Secretary-General U Thant's decision to abruptly remove UN forces, in response to Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser's demand, is seen as one of the factors that led to the 1967 War, as well as to a failure in peacekeeping. This article discusses the rights and wrongs of that choice and also the role of the UN and other countries in the crisis. Should the success of a peacekeeping mission between Israel and Egypt in the form of the be determined by the length of time the peace Six-Day War. is kept or by the lasting initiatives of peace When UNEF was deployed in response to that are created? the Suez Crisis in November 1956, it was Judged by the former, the UN's first major never envisioned that it would still be acting attempt at a peacekeeping force was a as a buffer force between Arabs and Israelis substantial achievement. The United Nations more than a decade later. Originally intended Emergency Force (UNEF) eased tensions and to be a short-term "emergency" force, UNEF kept peace in the Middle East for over a quickly fell into a comfortable routine decade. This initial success in defusing the patrolling along the international frontier and Suez Crisis, and the Nobel Prize it gleaned, Gaza Strip. Despite complaints in New York became the justification for future UN about the expense of peacekeeping, it was peacekeeping initiatives and the basis for the clear that UNEF's presence was a deterrent to myth of peacekeeping that fogs the reality further hostilities, and for most politicians even today. However, when judged by the and diplomats, this uneasy peace was clearly latter criteria--the ability to create a lasting preferable to an open war in the Middle East. peace rather than merely observe a ceasefire-- After ten and a half years, UNEF had become the entirety of the mission must be taken into a well-recognized fixture in the Egyptian account, rather than just the initial cessation desert. of hostilities. Here the UN's report card is Tensions in the Middle East had been high less stellar. UNEF's hasty withdrawal in since the state of Israel was proclaimed in particular, and the UN's inability to even 1948. The rhetoric on both sides was thick, imagine, let alone actively manage, but it was intensified in January 1964 when peacekeeping's retreat, paved the way for the the Arab League officially declared its desire decade- delayed conclusion of hostilities to achieve "the final liquidation of Israel."1 While the Arabs were not entirely unified in 72 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) From Peace (keeping) to War their enthusiasm for Israel's destruction, Arab military was the best way to deal with the prudence dictated that policy makers in Israel Israeli threat, yet there was no cohesive take the threat seriously. As the Arab League approach to achieve this end. Egyptian drafted plans to divert the waters of the officials castigated the Jordanian officer corps Jordan River and other tributaries, Israel was as incompetent, while the Jordanian brought into conflict with the chief proponent representative accused Egypt of "hiding behind of the plan--Syria. Raids and bombardments UNEF" and shirking its military were exchanged until Syria was finally forced responsibilities throughout the Arab world.4 To to abandon the water diversion plan for fear improve the capability of the Arab Legion it of starting a full-blown war. By this time, was subsequently decided that the Jordanian however, a pattern of state-sanctioned high command should be replaced by Egyptian terrorism had been established. officers, and a vote was taken calling for the Skirmishes along the Israeli-Syrian border withdrawal of UNEF. Neither proposal was were commonplace during the mid-1960s, acted upon--at least not immediately. and to a lesser extent along the borders of Realizing the extent of their mistake at Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan had traditionally Samu, the Israelis decided to focus their been opposed to guerrilla acts carried out by attention, and wrath, on Syria. Terrorist acts organizations such as al-Fatah, but the and skirmishes between the two nations Hashimite kingdom failed to effectively curb continued to escalate, culminating in a full- these activities.2 Israel's reprisals against blown aerial battle on April 7, 1967. The Jordan were generally symbolic, but on trouble started when the Syrian army opened November 13, 1966 the Israeli Defense Force fire on an Israeli tractor working in the (IDF) rolled into the Jordanian village of demilitarized zone. Sniping from the Syrian Samu with its tanks, in broad daylight, killing side turned into full-scale shelling, to which "dozens" of Jordanian soldiers and destroying the IDF responded with tanks. When the scores of buildings.3 tanks were unable to stop the shelling, the The attack was undertaken as a response Israeli Air Force was called in to deal with to a mine explosion in Israel, near the the situation. When the artillery had quieted, Jordanian border, that took the lives of three six Syrian MiGs had been downed, two of IDF members. Both the audacity and severity them quite close to Damascus. of the attack shocked the region. Instead of This humiliation at the hands of the Israeli acting as a warning to the Jordanian people Air Force was one of the key events that not to condone terrorism, the raid hardened would culminate in the Six-Day War.5 opinion against Israel, while at the same time Calls for UNEF's withdrawal were highlighting the fundamental weakness of the reintroduced at the Arab League Conference Jordanian army, the Arab Legion. in April 1967. The president of the United By undermining the leadership of Jordan's Arab Republic (UAR), Gamal Abd al-Nasser, monarch, King Hussein, Israel managed to did not immediately move to dislodge the UN alienate its most moderate neighbor.It was force, yet it was obvious that if the UAR was recognized at the Arab Defense Council to retain its self-assumed meeting held in December 1966, that a unified Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 73 Michael K. Carroll position of leadership among the Arab world, The IDF was a formidable force about which more was needed than just words alone. To Nasser had previously warned his Arab this end, the Syrian-UAR Mutual Defense brethren, but with 40,000 troops committed Pact was reaffirmed and an offer was made to to the conflict in Yemen, the UAR Army was provide the Syrian Air Force with Egyptian not at its full capability. MiG 21s.6 Nevertheless, Nasser risked losing Buoyed by the promise of Egyptian credibility throughout the Arab world if he support, terrorist incursions across the Israeli- did not live up to the terms of the Syrian- Syrian border continued to increase. Tempers UAR Mutual Defense Pact. The decision on simmered until May 12, 1967, when Yitzhak May 13, 1967, to remove UNEF and deploy Rabin, chief of staff of the IDF, publicly UAR troops along the Israeli border was mused that Israel should overthrow the subsequently made to strengthen his position Syrian government. While Rabin was throughout the Arab world. It is doubtful that chastised for his comments by the prime Nasser intended his actions to provoke a war minister and members of the Israeli Cabinet, with Israel, yet the alternative--losing Prime Minister Levi Eshkol announced the prestige and influence throughout the Arab following day, that the possibility existed that world–was deemed even less palatable. Israel "may have to teach Syria a sharper The message to withdraw UNEF was first lesson than that of April 7."7 In retrospect, conveyed to the commander of UNEF, Major Abba Eban, the Israeli foreign minister, General Indar Jit Rikhye, on May 16, 1967. believed that some verbal self-restraint would The UAR Liaison Officer, Brigadier General have helped to contain the situation in the Ibrahim Sharkawy, called Rikhye in the Middle East. Yet at the time, the Israelis afternoon to inform him that a special envoy hoped that stern warnings would be sufficient would be arriving with an important message to dissuade Syria from encouraging terrorist for the UNEF commander. The letter-- activities.8 The domestic political situation in delivered by a courier holding the rank of Israel was also a factor, forcing the brigadier general--was from the UAR Chief government to take a harder line regarding of Staff, Lieutenant General Muhammad the fedayeen raids. Fawzy, and simply stated: The tough talk emanating from Israel caught the Syrians' attention, but they were I gave my instructions to all UAR emboldened by Egypt's military backing and armed forces to be ready for action moral support from the Soviet Union. against Israel, the moment it might Nasser found himself in a difficult position in carry out any aggressive action early May 1967, when reports came in from against any Arab country. Due to Moscow and Damascus that Israel had these instructions our troops are mobilized at least 11 brigades along the already concentrated in Sinai on our Syrian border and was poised to strike.9 eastern border. For the sake of Whether Nasser knew these reports to be complete security of all UN troops false is the subject of some debate, though he which install outposts along our later drew on these reports to great effect.10 borders, I request that you issue your 74 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.
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