FROM PEACE (KEEPING) TO WAR: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF By Michael K. Carroll*
UN Secretary-General U Thant's decision to abruptly remove UN forces, in response to Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser's demand, is seen as one of the factors that led to the 1967 War, as well as to a failure in peacekeeping. This article discusses the rights and wrongs of that choice and also the role of the UN and other countries in the crisis.
Should the success of a peacekeeping mission between Israel and Egypt in the form of the be determined by the length of time the peace Six-Day War. is kept or by the lasting initiatives of peace When UNEF was deployed in response to that are created? the Suez Crisis in November 1956, it was Judged by the former, the UN's first major never envisioned that it would still be acting attempt at a peacekeeping force was a as a buffer force between Arabs and Israelis substantial achievement. The United Nations more than a decade later. Originally intended Emergency Force (UNEF) eased tensions and to be a short-term "emergency" force, UNEF kept peace in the Middle East for over a quickly fell into a comfortable routine decade. This initial success in defusing the patrolling along the international frontier and Suez Crisis, and the Nobel Prize it gleaned, Gaza Strip. Despite complaints in New York became the justification for future UN about the expense of peacekeeping, it was peacekeeping initiatives and the basis for the clear that UNEF's presence was a deterrent to myth of peacekeeping that fogs the reality further hostilities, and for most politicians even today. However, when judged by the and diplomats, this uneasy peace was clearly latter criteria--the ability to create a lasting preferable to an open war in the Middle East. peace rather than merely observe a ceasefire-- After ten and a half years, UNEF had become the entirety of the mission must be taken into a well-recognized fixture in the Egyptian account, rather than just the initial cessation desert. of hostilities. Here the UN's report card is Tensions in the Middle East had been high less stellar. UNEF's hasty withdrawal in since the state of Israel was proclaimed in particular, and the UN's inability to even 1948. The rhetoric on both sides was thick, imagine, let alone actively manage, but it was intensified in January 1964 when peacekeeping's retreat, paved the way for the the Arab League officially declared its desire decade- delayed conclusion of hostilities to achieve "the final liquidation of Israel."1 While the Arabs were not entirely unified in
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From Peace (keeping) to War their enthusiasm for Israel's destruction, Arab military was the best way to deal with the prudence dictated that policy makers in Israel Israeli threat, yet there was no cohesive take the threat seriously. As the Arab League approach to achieve this end. Egyptian drafted plans to divert the waters of the officials castigated the Jordanian officer corps Jordan River and other tributaries, Israel was as incompetent, while the Jordanian brought into conflict with the chief proponent representative accused Egypt of "hiding behind of the plan--Syria. Raids and bombardments UNEF" and shirking its military were exchanged until Syria was finally forced responsibilities throughout the Arab world.4 To to abandon the water diversion plan for fear improve the capability of the Arab Legion it of starting a full-blown war. By this time, was subsequently decided that the Jordanian however, a pattern of state-sanctioned high command should be replaced by Egyptian terrorism had been established. officers, and a vote was taken calling for the Skirmishes along the Israeli-Syrian border withdrawal of UNEF. Neither proposal was were commonplace during the mid-1960s, acted upon--at least not immediately. and to a lesser extent along the borders of Realizing the extent of their mistake at Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan had traditionally Samu, the Israelis decided to focus their been opposed to guerrilla acts carried out by attention, and wrath, on Syria. Terrorist acts organizations such as al-Fatah, but the and skirmishes between the two nations Hashimite kingdom failed to effectively curb continued to escalate, culminating in a full- these activities.2 Israel's reprisals against blown aerial battle on April 7, 1967. The Jordan were generally symbolic, but on trouble started when the Syrian army opened November 13, 1966 the Israeli Defense Force fire on an Israeli tractor working in the (IDF) rolled into the Jordanian village of demilitarized zone. Sniping from the Syrian Samu with its tanks, in broad daylight, killing side turned into full-scale shelling, to which "dozens" of Jordanian soldiers and destroying the IDF responded with tanks. When the scores of buildings.3 tanks were unable to stop the shelling, the The attack was undertaken as a response Israeli Air Force was called in to deal with to a mine explosion in Israel, near the the situation. When the artillery had quieted, Jordanian border, that took the lives of three six Syrian MiGs had been downed, two of IDF members. Both the audacity and severity them quite close to Damascus. of the attack shocked the region. Instead of This humiliation at the hands of the Israeli acting as a warning to the Jordanian people Air Force was one of the key events that not to condone terrorism, the raid hardened would culminate in the Six-Day War.5 opinion against Israel, while at the same time Calls for UNEF's withdrawal were highlighting the fundamental weakness of the reintroduced at the Arab League Conference Jordanian army, the Arab Legion. in April 1967. The president of the United By undermining the leadership of Jordan's Arab Republic (UAR), Gamal Abd al-Nasser, monarch, King Hussein, Israel managed to did not immediately move to dislodge the UN alienate its most moderate neighbor.It was force, yet it was obvious that if the UAR was recognized at the Arab Defense Council to retain its self-assumed meeting held in December 1966, that a unified
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Michael K. Carroll position of leadership among the Arab world, The IDF was a formidable force about which more was needed than just words alone. To Nasser had previously warned his Arab this end, the Syrian-UAR Mutual Defense brethren, but with 40,000 troops committed Pact was reaffirmed and an offer was made to to the conflict in Yemen, the UAR Army was provide the Syrian Air Force with Egyptian not at its full capability. MiG 21s.6 Nevertheless, Nasser risked losing Buoyed by the promise of Egyptian credibility throughout the Arab world if he support, terrorist incursions across the Israeli- did not live up to the terms of the Syrian- Syrian border continued to increase. Tempers UAR Mutual Defense Pact. The decision on simmered until May 12, 1967, when Yitzhak May 13, 1967, to remove UNEF and deploy Rabin, chief of staff of the IDF, publicly UAR troops along the Israeli border was mused that Israel should overthrow the subsequently made to strengthen his position Syrian government. While Rabin was throughout the Arab world. It is doubtful that chastised for his comments by the prime Nasser intended his actions to provoke a war minister and members of the Israeli Cabinet, with Israel, yet the alternative--losing Prime Minister Levi Eshkol announced the prestige and influence throughout the Arab following day, that the possibility existed that world–was deemed even less palatable. Israel "may have to teach Syria a sharper The message to withdraw UNEF was first lesson than that of April 7."7 In retrospect, conveyed to the commander of UNEF, Major Abba Eban, the Israeli foreign minister, General Indar Jit Rikhye, on May 16, 1967. believed that some verbal self-restraint would The UAR Liaison Officer, Brigadier General have helped to contain the situation in the Ibrahim Sharkawy, called Rikhye in the Middle East. Yet at the time, the Israelis afternoon to inform him that a special envoy hoped that stern warnings would be sufficient would be arriving with an important message to dissuade Syria from encouraging terrorist for the UNEF commander. The letter-- activities.8 The domestic political situation in delivered by a courier holding the rank of Israel was also a factor, forcing the brigadier general--was from the UAR Chief government to take a harder line regarding of Staff, Lieutenant General Muhammad the fedayeen raids. Fawzy, and simply stated: The tough talk emanating from Israel caught the Syrians' attention, but they were I gave my instructions to all UAR emboldened by Egypt's military backing and armed forces to be ready for action moral support from the Soviet Union. against Israel, the moment it might Nasser found himself in a difficult position in carry out any aggressive action early May 1967, when reports came in from against any Arab country. Due to Moscow and Damascus that Israel had these instructions our troops are mobilized at least 11 brigades along the already concentrated in Sinai on our Syrian border and was poised to strike.9 eastern border. For the sake of
Whether Nasser knew these reports to be complete security of all UN troops false is the subject of some debate, though he which install outposts along our later drew on these reports to great effect.10 borders, I request that you issue your
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orders to withdraw all these troops Muhammad al-Kony, the permanent immediately.11 representative of the UAR to the UN. Unaware what was happening back home, al- The courier, expecting immediate Kony was told by U Thant that there had, in compliance on the part of UNEF, was sorely effect, been a breach in protocol and that any disappointed when General Rikhye merely request for the removal of UNEF must be noted the contents of the letter, and informed directed to the secretary-general. U Thant his visitors that he would pass the message on also sought clarification of Nasser's intent. to Secretary-General U Thant. Rikhye would The original note only made mention of have to await orders from New York. withdrawing from the outposts along the Clearly troubled by the lack of immediate UAR border, yet in the course of the action, the envoy explained that UAR troops discussion with Ge neral Rikhye, specific were already on their way to the international mention had been made of withdrawing from frontier and wished to prevent any clashes the UN positions at Sharm al-Shaykh and al- with UNEF. From the UAR military point of Sabha. It was also unclear whether the view, it was imperative that UAR forces withdrawal was of a permanent or temporary occupy Sharm al-Shaykh and al-Sabha before nature. the Israelis had a chance to react. Rikhye was In the view of the secretary-general, adamant in his inability to act before however, a temporary withdrawal "would be receiving instructions from New York, but unacceptable because the purpose of the UN ventured to ask his interlocutors if the Force in Gaza and Sinai is to prevent a consequences of removing UNEF from the recurrence of fighting, and it cannot be asked international frontier had been fully to stand aside in order to enable the two sides contemplated. To this Sharkawy responded, to resume fighting."14 While seeking this "I will see you for lunch at the best restaurant clarification, U Thant sought to reassure 12 in Tel Aviv in a few days." Ambassador al-Kony that were the UAR Rikhye immediately dispatched a priority government to withdraw its consent for cable to the secretary-general reporting the UNEF's presence on their territory, the substance of the meeting, and he was secretary-general would be obliged to respect commended for the difficult, yet correct, their wishes. U Thant did not think that this stand he had taken with the UAR. U Thant position required consultation and made it instructed Rikhye to await further orders, and clear from the start that any request for a in the meantime, to "be firm in maintaining temporary withdrawal or redeployment of UNEF positions, while being as UNEF's forces would be considered as a call understanding and diplomatic as possible in for the entire UN force to leave. 13 your relations with local UAR officials." Most news traveled surprisingly quickly Meanwhile, New York became host to the through the corridors of the UN but the initiation of hurried negotiations. Secretariat was, for the most part, able to Less than two hours after Secretary- keep a lid on the news of Egypt's request General U Thant learned of Egypt's intention until the secretary-general met with the troop- to seek UNEF's withdrawal, he met with contributing nations the following day. 15 As
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Michael K. Carroll he had already decided on a course of action arguments aside, the UN could do little but to follow, the meeting on May 17, 1967, was accede to Egyptian demands. When push purely informative. In the course of the came to shove, as a lightly armed meeting, U Thant reiterated three times his peacekeeping force, UNEF was no match for intention to withdraw UNEF if and when a the UAR military. proper request was made by the UAR On May 17, U Thant met with al-Kony government. He was subsequently backed up and handed the UAR Permanent by Ralph Bunche, U Thant's most trusted aide Representative an aide mémoire to be and the Secretariat's resident expert on transmitted to Cairo. Formalizing what had peacekeeping and the Middle East, and by the been said to al-Kony the previous day, the UN legal advisor, Costas Stavropoulos.16 aide mémoire was intended to clarify a few Opinions in the meeting were varied. The ambiguous points and outline the secretary- representatives from Brazil, Canada, and to a general's understanding of the situation. First lesser extent Denmark, believed that the and foremost, however, U Thant sought to secretary-general should be proactive in assuage any fears Nasser might have that the addressing the situation developing in Egypt, UN was attempting to impinge on the UAR's while the other representatives preferred to sovereignty. wait and see what Nasser's formal response Reports from Gaza on May 17 and 18 would be. It was also suggested that the detailed significant UAR troop movements in matter be referred to the General Assembly, the Sinai desert, and in some cases UAR which was sitting in an emergency session, forces interposed themselves between UNEF though this idea was rebuffed by the UN and the border. The Yugoslav contingent Secretariat. While the General Assembly had deployed in the Sinai bore the brunt of the been responsible for UNEF's creation, Ralph pressure, in some cases being forcibly Bunche argued that UNEF's entry into Egypt removed from their observation posts and was the result of direct negotiations between having artillery shells targeted to land just Nasser and then Secretary-General Dag outside their camp perimeters. As tensions in Hammarskjold.17 Thus, strictly speaking, the desert rose, the UAR forces denied UNEF's deployment was the prerogative of permission for UN flights to resupply the the secretary-general, not the General Yugoslav troops in the Sinai. General Rikhye Assembly. himself was required to fly out to the The "good faith agreement"18 that Yugoslav camp to resolve the situation Hammarskjold negotiated with Nasser to peaceably. On the return trip to Gaza, govern UNEF's deployment did imply a however, two Israeli fighter jets violated "limitation of [Egyptian] sovereignty," UAR airspace and fired warning shots in an though as the UN legal advisor explained, "It attempt to force Rikhye's plane to land in has a certain value --not the value of stopping Israel. It was only due to the "great coolness the secretary-general from withdrawing, and skill" of the UN aircrew "winging their because he cannot do anything else--but the way through sand dunes" that an unfortunate value of being and understanding of how a international incident was avoided. After process will function.[sic]"19 Legal strongly worded protests were lodged with
76 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) From Peace (keeping) to War the Israeli authorities, Rikhye concluded that period of ten days, providing time for the it was not a premeditated act but most likely General Assembly or Security Council to was the work of "over- exuberant young air deal with the issue. 23 Stavropoulos's advice, force pilots."20 Regardless, tensions were however, was not readily accepted. riding high everywhere. Having already met with the troop- On the morning of May 18, General contributing nations the previous day in an Rikhye also reported that in Cairo, UAR unofficial capacity, the secretary-general Minister for Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Riad, called a meeting of the UNEF Advisory had contacted representatives of all the Committee on May 18, 1967 to apprise them UNEF troop-contributing nations to inform formally of the situation in the Middle East.24 them of UNEF's termination, and asked them The fact that the committee had not met since to facilitate the immediate removal of December 1959 was a testament, according to peacekeeping troops. At this time, however, U Thant, of UNEF's efficacy in maintaining no formal mention of UNEF's withdrawal had peace in the Middle East.25 The events of the been conveyed to the secretary-general. preceding forty-eight hours hinted more at It was not until 12 noon, on May 18, 1967, naïve complacency. that the permanent representative of the UAR The secretary-general left no room for formally conveyed a note to U Thant debate at the Advisory Committee meeting indicating the desire of his government to stating unequivocally in his opening remarks have UNEF removed from UAR territory.21 that UNEF would be withdrawn from the U Thant expressed his misgivings regarding Middle East. Without the consent of the UAR the UAR request, yet gave no indication that government, U Thant believed UNEF lacked the decision would be opposed. Somewhat legitimacy, and it was undesirable for the surprisingly, however, Stavropoulos changed force to maintain its presence in a situation his tune from the previous day and warned that could become hostile. Not all of the the secretary-general against the unilateral representatives, however, agreed with the withdrawal of UNEF: secretary-general's assessment. Canadian Ambassador George Ignatieff was the most I therefore have serious doubts vocal in his opposition to the unilateral whether the secretary-general should withdrawal of UNEF. While not directly take the radical action of withdrawing contesting the UAR's sovereign right to UNEF without first affording the request UNEF's withdrawal, Ignatieff General Assembly (or possibly the contended that the secretary-general should Security Council, in view of the be negotiating the question with the UAR prevailing situation in the Middle while also consulting the General Assembly. East) the opportunity of considering Canada's view was supported by Brazil and 22 the matter. Denmark; India, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia were opposed to further consultations on the Instead of withdrawing, Stavropoulos issue by the General Assembly or Security suggested that it might be more prudent to Council. Had the Advisory Committee been order UNEF forces into base camps for a unanimous against the withdrawal of UNEF,
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Michael K. Carroll it could have compelled the secretary-general the British foreign secretary, "It really makes to bring the issue before the General a mockery of the peace-keeping work of the Assembly. However, with opinion in the UN if, as soon as tension rises, the UN is told Advisory Committee divided, there was no to leave."31 impetus for U Thant to act, nor second-guess U.S. President Lyndon Johnson also his own decision to withdraw UNEF. expressed his concern over the turn of events Immediately after meeting with the in the Middle East, while Israel condemned Advisory Committee, U Thant informed al- the withdrawal of UNEF, stating that Egypt Kony of his intention to "issue instructions did not have the right to unilaterally decide for the necessary arrangements to be put in the UN force's fate. Israel viewed UNEF as a train without delay for the orderly withdrawal permanent feature--until such a time that of the Force." U Thant did, however, ask al- peace was achieved in the Middle East--and Kony to convey to his government the publicly linked the force to the "package secretary-general's concern that UNEF's settlement" that had made possible the Israeli departure "may have grave implications for withdrawal from the Sinai in 1957. peace."26 Yet despite having "serious Realistically though, there was very little they misgivings" about UNEF's removal, the could immediately do. Despite growing secretary-general cabled General Rikhye that tensions, Israeli Foreign Ministry officials UNEF should cease its activities and resigned themselves for the time being to "sit commence its withdrawal on May 19, 1967.27 back and wait for events to unfold." 32 As of 5 p.m. local time, all UN troops were Israel was caught off guard by the "speed withdrawn from their observation posts and and relative efficiency" with which Nasser's according to General Rikhye, "That night the troops were deployed across the Sinai. In peace of the previous ten and a half years was response, 35,000 Israeli reservists were called shattered by exchanges of fire between up as a precautionary measure, though Abba Egyptian and Israeli troops."28 Eban assured the United States that Israel had Once the decision to remove UNEF had "no intention of taking initiatives."33 The been made, the secretary-general submitted a buildup of troops along the Israeli-UAR report to the General Assembly, informing border, while troubling, did not preclude a them of the chain of events in the Middle peaceful outcome. In a series of moves East.29 International response to the decision designed to de-escalate tensions, the Israelis was mixed. While it was heralded throughout sought to work through the UN and the the Arab world, some Western nations were Americans to persuade Nasser of the futility less enamored with the idea. Britain and of waging war against Israel. The recourse to Canada, while privately disagreeing with U arms was still retained as an option by the Thant's decision to remove UNEF, realized Israelis, but with the secretary-general's that it would be counterproductive to criticize impending visit to Cairo, Israeli officials publicly the secretary-general.30 preferred, for the moment, to accord
Nonetheless, statements on the situation in diplomacy its due. the Middle East were not entirely On May 19, 1967, Canada and Denmark encouraging. According to George Brown, requested that the Security Council meet to
78 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) From Peace (keeping) to War discuss the alarming situation concerning to the Middle East, U Thant was met with the UNEF's departure from the Middle East, news that Nasser had closed the Straits of though the appeal was denied by the Soviet Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli Union and Bulgaria. The United States, while shipping. In a speech to the UAR Air Force not vehemently opposed to a meeting of the the previous evening, Nasser pronounced the Security Council, had not been overly move as "an affirmation of our rights and our anxious for one, as it would let Syria air the sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba. This is in claim that the situation in the Middle East our territorial waters and we shall never was the work of an Anglo-American plot.34 permit a ship flying Israeli colours to pass Canada had pushed ahead regardless, yet through this Gulf."37 came up against a similar sentiment when From the Israeli perspective, however, the Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul closure of the waterways was cause for war. Martin met with al-Kony on May 20, 1967. While Israel was capable of weathering the Al-Kony, while stressing that the UAR's, economic impact and oil shortage that the "respect for Canada remains high and closure would have on the port of Eilat and favorable," expressed the feeling that there the Israeli economy in the short-term, the was concern in Cairo, and "elsewhere in [the] psychological strangulation was another Arab World," that there was "a sort of matter. The possibility of war with Israel did conspiracy" to challenge the UAR's sovereign not seem to faze Nasser. He merely taunted, right to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF. 35 "Our answer to them is that we welcome war. Canada, hitherto, had been extremely We are ready."38 critical of the decision to disband the UN By denying Israel access to the Straits of peacekeeping force. Martin's meeting with al- Tiran, Nasser had embarked on a dangerous Kony, however, when combined with reports game of brinkmanship–one that he ultimately from Egypt, led officials in the Canadian lost. It was decided to announce the closure Department of External Affairs to question of the straits before U Thant's visit, in order whether it was wise to oppose UNEF's to forestall criticism by the international withdrawal while Canadian troops were still media of the secretary-general on an issue on the ground. 36 Canadian officials in Ottawa over which he had no influence.39 The issue and New York began to temper their remarks of territorial sovereignty was also one upon accordingly, yet the damage had already been which Nasser was unwilling, and because of done.Despite Nasser's seemingly impetuous the opinions of his Arab compatriots decision to order troops into the Sinai and to seemingly unable, to compromise. call for the withdrawal of UNEF, with UN Despite the escalating conflict, U Thant troops still in Egypt–though inactive–hope did not consider his visit to Cairo to be a remained in the Western camp that reason complete waste of time. Nasser did not would prevail and a settlement could be dismiss out of hand the idea of submitting the negotiated. With U Thant's visit to Cairo territorial waters' dispute to the International scheduled for May 23, 1967, even Israel was Court, and he agreed to a two-week optimistic of the outcome. Yet when his moratorium on inspecting ships through the plane landed in Paris for refueling on his way Straits of Tiran. He also supported the idea of
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Michael K. Carroll a UN-appointed representative to supervise the crisis. The United States considers efforts, though he stipulated that the UN the gulf to be an international presence was to be in Cairo, not in the Gaza waterway and feels that a blockade of Strip or along the international frontier. Israeli shipping is illegal and However, this was entirely dependent on potentially disastrous to the cause of Israeli cooperation. Despite U Thant's appeals peace. The right of free, innocent that such a moratorium would provide a passage of the international waterway breathing spell, it did little to assuage Israeli is a vital interest of the entire fears and did not change the situation facing international community.41 Israel in the Middle East. Unwilling to await the results of U Thant's Considering himself honor-bound to discussions in Cairo, the Israeli Cabinet follow through on the promises of previous dispatched Abba Eban on a whirlwind tour of presidents, Johnson intended to fulfill Paris, London, and Washington to gauge obligations promised by the Eisenhower international support for Israel. Thoroughly administration in the wake of the Suez Crisis. disappointed with the reception from The American preference was for the UN to President Charles DeGaulle, Eban fared arrive at a solution to the problems growing better in London where he at least felt he had, in the Middle East. Failing that, there was the "crossed…into the twentieth century."40 Eban option for an international maritime force to inferred a much higher degree of sympathy ensure the freedom of international shipping for Israel in Britain and was impressed by through the Straits of Tiran. President Prime Minister Harold Wilson's resolve to Johnson sought to ensure that either way the work collectively on the international stage to situation was resolved peaceably. oppose Nasser's closure of the Straits of In the meeting between Johnson and Eban Tiran. In terms of a diplomatic solution, on May 26, the president aimed to extract a Israel was pinning its hopes on Britain and promise that Israel would not attack its Arab the United States to bring about a peaceful neighbors. Eban hedged, but never outright resolution. stated, that Israel would eschew the right to President Johnson took a strong stand strike first. Seeking assurances of American against Nasser's closure of the Straits of support, Eban was handed an aide-mémoire Tiran. The limiting factor, however, was that and told, among other things, that "Israel will any action to be undertaken in the Middle not be alone unless it decided to do it 42 East needed the full support of Congress alone." Sadly, Johnson knew that Israel which, after having written a blank check for would go it alone. Reflecting on the meeting, Vietnam, was understandably reticent. Upon the President told Undersecretary of State for learning of Nasser's pronouncement of May Political Affairs Eugene Rostow, "Yes, 22, the president declared: they're going to hit. There's nothing we can 43 do about it."
The purported closing of the Gulf of While Johnson sought to avoid war in the Aqaba to Israeli shipping has brought Middle East, there was a certain sentiment in a new and very grave dimension to the State Department that advocated that "we
80 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) From Peace (keeping) to War ought to think long and hard before we reject urgency of the situation, Arthur Goldberg, the this [an Israeli attack] out of hand. "44 American permanent representative to the According to a senior State Department UN, informed the president of his fears that official: Israel would likely decide to strike on the weekend of May 27-28. 48 Abba Eban, The cost of holding them [Israel] back however, credited his meeting with President may be a tremendous and lasting Johnson on May 26 as the only reason Israel commitment to meet their long-term did not launch a preemptive strike the security needs which they feel could following day. 49 Reports of a planned Arab be met by a strike now--before the attack to be launched against Israel on May Egyptians fully consolidate their 27 were taken seriously enough by the position. That cost could be far Kremlin to have their ambassador in Cairo greater to us than an air-clearing wake Nasser at 3 a.m. to convey the Soviet 45 now. Union's, "stern objection to any initiation of war by Egypt."50 Many observers understood, However, from the President's point of view, however, that a confrontation was only a the possibility of a war in the Middle East matter of time. 51 escalating to involve the superpowers was not As the war of words between Egypt and worth the risk. Israel threatened to escalate into military As Eban flew back to Tel Aviv, Nasser operations, UNEF quietly made preparations was speaking to a group of Arab trade to withdraw its troops from UAR soil. unionists, predicting that "the battle against Despite the initial urgency for UNEF to Israel will be a general one…and our basic vacate outposts along the international objective will be to destroy Israel."46 frontier and Sharm al-Shaykh, the UN was Confident of the Arabs numerical and put under no pressure to evacuate qualitative superiority over the IDF, Nasser immediately its troops from UAR territory. U felt he had little to fear from a war with Thant often repeated that the withdrawal was Israel; but he stopped short of declaring war to be, "orderly, dignified, deliberate and not himself.47 Instead, he worded his statements precipitate."52 It was reasoned that the longer very carefully, referring only to the UNEF remained on location, the better the possibility of hostilities initiated by Israel. chances were for a new mandate to redeploy These provocative statements were the UN force and relieve tensions in the nonetheless received with great concern in Middle East. Moreover, as Nasser was in no Israel, though Nasser counted on the United rush to kick UNEF out of the UAR, U Thant States to restrain Israel's actions in the saw no need to effect a hasty retreat. Middle East. Reaping the benefits of his Planning for UNEF's withdrawal had rhetoric, Nasser was heralded as the hero of never been given a particularly high priority the Arab world. in New York. In fact, according to one later It was true that only great power analysis, "It is not too unkind to draw a intervention temporarily saved Israel and comparison with the ostrich who buries his Egypt from the scourge of war. Sensing the head in the sand until danger is imminent,
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Michael K. Carroll and only then takes to his heels."53 the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent Discussing the dismemberment of the UN within forty-eight hours. Citing unfriendly force was politically sensitive, but more and provocative statements and actions of the importantly, it was a tacit acknowledgement Canadian government as the cause, the UAR that UNEF might fail. The UN's generals had was, "desirous to prevent any probable at least done something. General E.L.M. reaction from the people of the UAR against Burns, UNEF's first commander, had the Canadian forces in UNEF, which may overseen the development of plans for have undesirable reflection on the UN."58 UNEF's withdrawal in the late 1950s. These While it is doubtful that Nasser truly had the plans were updated in the space of a few interest of the Canadian forces at heart, it was hours by Rikhye when he was the military made perfectly clear that they were soon to advisor to the secretary-general in 1964.54 be considered persona non grata. Only two copies of the withdrawal plans had The reasons behind Nasser's unexpected ever been circulated: one was kept by the decision to expel the Canadians were varied force commander in Gaza, while the other and complex. The Canadian government did had been sent to UN Headquarters for little to endear itself to Nasser with its efforts safekeeping. When the time came for the to forestall the withdrawal of UNEF. John plans to be dusted off in 1967, nobody in Starnes, the Canadian ambassador in Cairo, New York was able to locate the copy. had taken great pains to explain to the UAR The plans for evacuation--once they were government that Canada's actions were found and revised--estimated that it would purely motivated by concern for peace in the take about six weeks for UNEF troops to be Middle East, but the comments of Prime withdrawn, and four months for the Minister Lester Pearson and other equipment, though it was hoped that government officials were widely interpreted arrangements could be expedited. 55 Nasser, as being pro-Israeli.59 The dispatch of two for his part, seemed quite content to have the Royal Canadian Navy destroyers and a UN troops take their time winding up their supply ship to the Mediterranean was also operations and "promised his fullest cited by UAR Foreign Minister Riad in his cooperation."56 Various contingencies were letter to the secretary-general, as having taken into consideration, and arrangements "inflamed public opinion in my country. " were made for the Swedish and Brazilian This, according to Starnes, was a "blatant contingents to depart on June 5, 1967, with lie," since news of the Canadian naval the Indians, Yugoslavs, and Norwegians to movements had not been made public.60 follow on June 19 and 20. 57 The bulk of the Starnes had been instructed to inform force's logistical support and air transport Egyptian officials on a confidential basis of services were provided by the Canadian the Canadian naval preparations, which were contingent, and as such, it was understood only to be used to withdraw UN troops that they would be the last to leave. should hostilities break out in the Middle
On May 27, 1967, al-Kony delivered yet East. According to Starnes, UAR officials another fateful letter to U Thant, this time expressed, "little surprise and asked only if calling upon the secretary-general to order
82 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) From Peace (keeping) to War other countries with UNEF contingents were required UNEF to maintain an emasculated doing likewise."61 presence in the Middle East.64 It is more likely, however, that the arrival Resigning himself to make the best of a of Canadian destroyers, along with the bad situation, General Rikhye assigned the presence of the British Navy and the Indian battalion, which at least had some American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, logistics experience, to take over from the gave rise to concerns of a maritime force departing Canadians. The Brazilian infantry designed to open the Straits of Tiran--perhaps companies were then given the important forcibly if necessary--to all international responsibility of guarding UNEF's stores. shipping. The idea of a "Red Sea Regatta" UNEF did its best to centralize its depots, had been floated around as a possible which contained over $15 million of supplies, international solution to the tensions in the and attempted to oversee the distribution of Middle East, and with the state visits of goods to the remaining contingents. Lyndon Johnson and British Prime Minister However, as the Canadians finally withdrew Harold Wilson to Canada at the height of the on May 31, 1967, some tasks fell by the crisis, it would have taken little to convince wayside. Supply distribution ground to a halt Nasser of collusion. The warm reception the as the Canadian operation, formerly Israeli President received when he arrived in employing over one hundred personnel, was Canada to visit Expo 67 on May 21, 1967 turned over to one lonely UN official.65 The was merely icing on the cake.62 lack of regular air transport shipments caused The immediate withdrawal of the mail service to become irregular at best, and Canadian contingent raised a whole host of without an experienced staff to coordinate problems for the force commander. Day-to- ground movements, transportation became a day necessities, such as communications, free-for-all. vehicle repair, supply distribution, and Communal UNEF responsibilities were ground transportation, not to mention the also neglected by some individuals as they airlifting of supplies and personnel out of the became preoccupied with the pressing details Middle East, hitherto provided by the facing their national contingents.66 This lack Canadians, all had to suddenly be of focus led to increased looting of UNEF reorganized. Realizing the logistical supplies, but was nothing compared to that difficulties that lay ahead, and sensing that perpetrated once war broke out–first by local the end was near, General Rikhye residents, and then by the Israeli forces.67 recommended to UN Headquarters the At the same time as Nasser dictated the "speedy withdrawal of entire UNEF….If one terms of UNEF's withdrawal, domestic of my contingents is asked to go quickly it is pressure on the Israeli government continued time for the rest of us to leave as well."63 to grow. The psychological and economic While the withdrawal of all 3,378 UNEF impact of sustained mobilization, as well as personnel could have been accomplished in the effects of the closure of the Straits of less than five days, officials in New York Tiran, necessitated a resolution, diplomatic or deemed that "political considerations" otherwise. The Eshkol government hesitated. To help ease the domestic tensions,
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Eshkol bowed to political pressure and As much as Nasser's order to remove opened his cabinet for the formation of a Canadian troops from UAR soil was abhorred national unity government. Most significant-- in Ottawa, it undoubtedly saved the lives of and perhaps telling--was the fact that Eshkol Canadian service personnel. By the time war abdicated the coveted position of minister of broke out, part of the Yugoslav contingent defense in favor of General Moshe Dayan, had been repatriated, but some 2,519 UNEF hero of the 1956 Suez War. While Dayan's personnel were still deployed in various appointment ensured the confidence of the locations throughout the UAR. The bulk of military, war was by no means inevitable. It the troops had been recalled to camps around was, however, likely. Gaza, and when the fighting intensified they In a last-ditch effort to ascertain the level were relocated to temporary encampments on of support for Israel in the United States, the beach, which was considered to be Meir Amit, the director of the Mossad, was relatively safe compared to the town of Gaza sent to Washington to meet with senior itself. With the UN compounds clearly political and intelligence officers. Returning marked, General Rikhye questioned the to Israel on June 3, Amit reported that among tactics of the Israeli and UAR forces, U.S. officials, including Secretary of Defense commenting that, "surely, black and brown Robert McNamara, there was an "absence of Brazilians, bearded Sikhs, and blonde any strong American objection to unilateral Scandinavians do not look much like Israeli military action."68 Buoyed by Palestinians."70 Yet in the heat of battle, it America's tacit consent, the Israeli cabinet seems that little differentiation was made. did not hesitate to act. Preparations for UNEF's withdrawal had For all intents and purposes, the outcome gone on until the last possible moment on the of the Six-Day War was decided on the assumption that there was still time. Part of fateful morning of June 5, 1967. In the space the Swedish contingent found itself on a train of a few short hours, Israel managed to half-way between Gaza and Port Said when obliterate the UAR Air Force before most of the war broke out. The train was seized for the planes had a chance to leave the ground. military purposes when it reached the Suez The Jordanian and Syrian air forces were Canal, and the Swedes were left to find their similarly disposed of that afternoon, leaving own way. One of the first targets of the war Israeli cities free from attack and allowing the had been the airport at Port Said, leaving the IDF to concentrate on advancing against the planned evacuation of UNEF troops by air in enemy. When the dust from the war settled, limbo. The absence of leadership from New Israel had accomplished the unthinkable. The York to resolve the situation forced officials combined military forces of Jordan, Syria, in Stockholm to step in and make and the UAR had been routed, and Israel was arrangements for the immediate evacuation of left in possession of the West Bank, the their troops.71 The Swedes were subsequently Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. The evacuated by ship on June 8, 1967, along costs for UNEF, however, had been dear: with some additional UNEF personnel and fifteen peacekeepers were dead and another twenty-three US citizens. The Swedish seventeen lay injured. 69 government also made arrangements for the
84 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) From Peace (keeping) to War remainder of its troops to be evacuated from General Assembly authorized the creation of the Israeli port of Ashdod. With continued UNEF, entry into Egypt was only granted as silence from New York, General Rikhye took a result of the independent "good faith the initiative and received permission for all agreements" negotiated by the secretary- remaining UNEF troops to be extracted general. After attempting to clarify Egypt's through Israel.72 The majority of troops were request for the withdrawal of UNEF without withdrawn within a week, and the force success, U Thant informed the UNEF commander and his remaining staff officers Advisory Committee of the situation, and the departed the Middle East on June 17, 1967. decision to withdraw UNEF was finalized. At Only a handful of UN civilian staff remained no time was the secretary-general's position to pick up the pieces and arrange for the officially challenged by any member state, evacuation or disposal of any remaining UN and no attempt to convene the General equipment and supplies. Assembly was made. Criticism of U Thant's handling of the Had UNEF been deployed on both sides 1967 crisis and the decision to withdraw of the Egyptian-Israeli border, consent by UNEF came quickly, and from all directions. both nations would have been required for Paul Martin was among the first to publicly withdrawal. However, such was not the case. disagree with the secretary-general's decision Furthermore, as they were a lightly armed to withdraw UNEF. President Johnson was force, UNEF's authority was more moral than "dismayed" by the move, and the British even physical. It was entirely unfeasible for UNEF went so far as to suggest that the situation in troops to defend themselves against the the Middle East was exacerbated by U advance of a determined military. U Thant's Thant's precipitous action.73 The credibility hand was also forced by the fact that of the UN was called into question and the Yugoslavia and India were prepared to New York Times said that the secretary- accede to the UAR demand to withdraw their general had "used his international prestige contingents from UNEF regardless of the with the objectivity of a spurned lover and secretary-general's decision. 76 Taking a very the dynamism of a noodle."74 It is difficult, formal and rigid approach, U Thant could not however, to escape the conclusion that on get beyond the issue of host-nation consent. both legal and practical grounds there were Legalistic arguments aside, however, there few alternatives. was a feeling that the UN had somehow From its inception, UNEF was designed as failed in its duty to maintain the peace. a consensual activity, involving both the host Adding to the controversy was the release nation and troop contributors. Hence, in mid-June 1967 of an aide memoire written Nasser's request for the withdrawal of UN by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in troops was "certainly a natural corollary 1957, giving his interpretation of the good stemming directly from its sovereignty as a faith agreements. Released by Ernest Gross, state, acknowledged by the General former American deputy permanent Assembly in its resolutions regarding the representative at the UN, the document establishment of UNEF."75 Another asserted Hammarskjöld's belief that the UAR important detail to note is that while the could not unilaterally evict UNEF, but rather
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Michael K. Carroll the issue would first have to be put before the But as a devout Buddhist and having grown General Assembly.77 Opinions over the up in Burma under colonial rule, neither was document were divided. Some people U Thant predisposed to confront Nasser over believed the report to be of great importance the question of national sovereignty. Instead in understanding the international situation.78 U Thant sought to deal with the situation by U Thant, on the other hand, discounted its means of quiet diplomacy, which with a value stating that the aide memoire was not dynamic leader such as Nasser had no effect. an official document and thus had no binding Only after all other backdoor channels had authority over Nasser or the UAR been exhausted did the secretary-general government. In a somewhat uncharacteristic undertake personal negotiations in the Middle show of irritation, U Thant went on to say East, but by then it was too late. U Thant's all that "the release of such a paper at this time or nothing approach to the deployment of would seem to raise some question of ethics UNEF also came under the microscope and and good faith."79 has been cited a major factor that propelled Sir Brian Urquhart, at the time a junior the Middle East to war. While it is true that a official in the UN Secretariat, recalled that redeployment of UNEF might have helped to when Hammarskjöld negotiated the "good preserve peace in the Middle East in the short faith agreements," Egyptian sovereignty was term, it would have done nothing to solve the not compromised in any way. Thus Nasser's underlying problems in the Arab-Israeli decision to remove UNEF was within his dispute. rights. According to Urquhart, "he had a Ultimately, the Six-Day War was a failure perfect sovereign right to do what he did. It of peacemaking, not peacekeeping. The was an extremely stupid thing to do, as we absence of war is not necessarily peace, it told him at the time, but in fact he had a merely creates the conditions in which peace perfect right to do it, under the agreement that can be fostered. UNEF's presence in the got UNEF in."80 With varied opinions on Middle East provided such an environment both sides of the argument, the aide memoire for peace to be established, yet the absence of only served to highlight the differences hostilities removed the impetus for the parties between the secretaries-general. Many people involved to reach a meaningful settlement. If believed that had he been alive, the UN and its members were not willing to Hammarskjold would have immediately stand on guard for peace indefinitely, they traveled to Cairo to resolve the issue of should have been actively planning for the UNEF's withdrawal. eventual peaceful withdrawal of UNEF from The fact that U Thant waited eight days the Middle East. Peacemaking activities before meeting with President Nasser on such should have been part and parcel of UNEF's an obviously important issue was a great original mandate. As it was, this first source of concern for some observers.81 peacekeeping effort taught a lesson that Citing his concern for the peacekeepers on continues today to be a challenge: The parties the ground, the secretary-general did not in conflict need to ceaselessly strive for want to endanger the troops by challenging peace, and the UN needs to have structures in the UAR on the issue of host nation consent. place to aid with these efforts. Otherwise, the
86 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) From Peace (keeping) to War job of peacekeepers is little more than a temporary, albeit worthy, distraction. houses, a medical clinic, and a school were destroyed, and a further 28 houses and a *Michael K. Carroll teaches at Seiwa mosque were damaged. See, Anthony College, Japan. His dissertation at the Nutting, Nasser (New York: E.P. Dutton & University of Toronto examined the political Co., 1972), p. 392; Shlaim, The Iron Wall: and military aspects of Canada's involvement Israel and the Arab World, p. 233; UN doc. in the United Nations Emergency Force, as S/7539, November 13, 1966 and UN doc. well as the underlying myth of Canadian S/7539/Corr. 1, November 21, 1966. 4 peacekeeping. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 24, A previous version of this article was Vol. 21595, file 2-5081.2 [Vol. 10], presented at the U.S. Department of State's December 19, 1966, Cairo to External; conference "The United States, the Middle Department of National Defence Directorate East, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," held of History and Heritage (DHH), 112.3H1.001 on January 12 and 13, 2004, in conjunction (D19), March 21, 1968, Interview with with the release of Volume XIX in the General I.J. Rikhye, late Commander of Foreign Relations of the United States UNEF. (FRUS) series. 5Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, p. 235. 6 NOTES Abba Eban, in his autobiography, contends that the Egyptian overtures to Syria were 1Quoted in Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel made only after some prodding from and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Moscow. See Eban, An Autobiography, pp. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 230. 317-318. The MiGs, however, were never 2According to Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign transferred to Syria because of a dispute with Minister at the time, King Hussein Egypt as to where they would be based. "understood well that the terrorist bands of al DHH, 112.3H1.001 (D19), March 21, 1968, Fatah were a much sharper threat to his Interview with General I.J. Rikhye, late kingdom than was Israel." Abba Eban, An Commander of UNEF. Autobiography (New York: Random House, 7Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab 1977), p. 312. World, pp. 236-237. 3Reports as to the actual toll of death and 8Eban contended, "If there had been a little damage vary widely. Anthony Nutting more silence, the sum of human wisdom reports that 18 soldiers were killed and 125 would probably have remained intact." Eban, buildings were destroyed, while Avi Shlaim An Autobiography, p. 319. asserts that only 41 buildings were 9For an interesting account of the Russian demolished, yet "dozens" of soldiers were involvement in the lead-up to the Six-Day killed. The official UN report lists the War, see, Isabelle Ginor, "The Cold War's Jordanian deaths at 18– Longest Cover-Up: How and Why the USSR 15 soldiers and 3 civilian –with 17 civilians Instigated the 1967 War," Middle East and 37 military personnel wounded; 125 Review of International Affairs Vol. 7, No. 3
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(September 2003). Available online at: Contingents for UNEF; also see United http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue3/jv7n Nations Archives (UNA), S-464-373, file 3a3.html. Accessed November 23, 2003. 3017. 10General Fawzi, the UAR Chief of Staff, was 17It quickly became evident that this was a sent to co-ordinate efforts with the Syrians in contentious and widely misunderstood mid-May 1967 and reportedly found no interpretation, which Bunche sought to set indication of an Israeli troop build-up, and he straight in a press briefing on May 20, 1967. believed that "the Russians must have been See UNA, S-512-0127, May 20, 1967, Press having hallucinations." Quoted in Nadav Briefing by Dr. Ralph Bunche. Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli 18See UN Resolution 1121(IX), November Confrontation, 1948-1967 (New York: 24, 1956. Pegasus, 1969), pp. 274-275, note 8. 19TRIN, George Ignatieff Papers, file 985- 11Quoted in UN doc. A/6730/Add. 3, June 26, 0039/005 (21), May 17, 1967, Verbatim 1967. Also see, Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye, Record of Informal Meeting of The Sinai Blunder: Wtihdrawal of the United Representatives of Governments Providing Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six Contingents for UNEF; UNA, S-464-373, file Day War June, 1967 (New Delhi: Oxford and 3017. IBH Publishing Co., 1978), p. 16; Rosalyn 20Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, pp. 30-35; Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946- Rikhye, Trumpets and Tumults, p. 198. 1967: Documents and Commentary. Volume 21For a copy of the note from the UAR 1, The Middle East (London: Oxford Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad, see UNA, University Press, 1969), p. 340; Nils Sköld, S-464-373, file 3017, May 18, 1967, United Nations Peacekeeping after the Suez Mohamed El Kony to U Thant. War. Trans Stig Nihlen (London: Hurst & 22UNA, UNEF withdrawal – Legal Matters – Company, 1996), pp. 159-160. May-July 1967, May 18, 1967, CA 12Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye, Trumpets and Stavropoulos to U Thant. Tumults: The Memoirs of a Peacekeeper 23UNA, UNEF withdrawal – Legal Matters – (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), p. 196. May-July 1967, May 18, 1967, CA 13U Thant, View From the UN (New York: Stavropoulos to U Thant. Doubleday & Co., 1978), p. 220. 24In attendance at the meeting were 14UN doc. A/6669, May 18, 1967; also see representatives from Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, UN doc. A/6730, June 26, 1967. Colombia, Denmark, India, Norway, 15In May 1967, UNEF was comprised of Pakistan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. troops from Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, 25TRIN, George Ignatieff Papers, file 985- Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. 0039/005 (21), May 18, 1967, Verbatim 16Trinity College Archives (TRIN), Record of Meeting of UNEF Advisory University of Toronto, George Ignatieff Committee; UNA, S-464-373, file 3017. Papers, file 985-0039/005 (21), May 17, 26UNA, S-464-373, file 3017, May 18, 1967, 1967, Verbatim Record of Informal Meeting U Thant to Mohamed El Kony; see also UN of Representatives of Governments Providing doc. A/6730/Add. 3, June 26, 1967.
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27UN doc. A/6730/Add. 3, June 26, 1967, Want the Six Day War?" Azure 7 (Spring Annex, Cable containing instructions for the 1999), available online at: withdrawal of UNEF sent by the Secretary-
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1984; UN doc. A/6730/Add. 3, June 26, personnel with 2,700 tanks and 1,090 aircraft. 1967; NAC, RG 24, Vol. 21596, file 2- Israel, on the other hand, only had 300,000 5081.2 [Vol. 11], May 25, 1967, Cairo to troops–mostly reservists–800 tanks, and External. approximately 400 aircraft. See, The 40Eban, An Autobiography , p. 346. Washington Post, June 6, 1967. Despite the 41LBJ, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Arabs numerical superiority, US Intelligence Crisis, 12 May – 19 June 1967, Vol. 1, Tabs estimates forecast that "[t]he Israeli ground 11-20," May 23, 1967, May 23, 1967, forces can maintain internal security, defend Remarks of the President on the Near East successfully against simultaneous Arab Situation. attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks 42Eban, An Autobiography , p. 359; FRUS, simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any 1964-68, Vol. XIX, doc. 77, Memorandum of three fronts while mounting successfully a Conversation, May 26, 1967; see also PRO, major offensive on the fourth." LBJ, NSF, PREM 13/1906, Record of Conversations Country File, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 1, Between the Prime Minister and President Memos & Misc, 5/67", Box 105, 5/67, Report Johnson at the White House on Friday, June on Arab and Israeli Capabilities; also see 2, 1967. United States National Archives (USNA), 43LBJ, LBJOHP, AC74-72, Eugene V. RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Rostow, interview conducted by Paige Middle East Crisis Files, 1067, Lot File Mulhollan, December 2, 1968; LBJ, 68D135, Entry 5190, Box 7, May 24, 1967, LBJOHP, AC 79-61, John P. Roche, CINCSTRIKE to State. interview conducted by Paige Mulhollan, 48LBJ, NSF, Memos to the President, Walt July 16, 1970. Rostow, Box 16 [2 of 2], "Walt Rostow, Vol. 44LBJ, NSF, National Security Council 29, 25-31 May 1967, [2 of 2]," May 27, 1967, Histories, Box 17, "Middle East Crisis 12 Walt Rostow to the President. May – 19 June 1967, Vol. 2, Tabs 31-42," 49LBJ, Meeting Note File, Box 2, October 24, May 25, 1967, Memorandum for WWR. 1967, Meeting with Abba Eban and Others. 45LBJ, NSF, National Security Council 50Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June Histories, Box 17, "Middle East Crisis 12 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle May – 19 June 1967, Vol. 2, Tabs 31-42," East (New York: Oxford University Press, May 25, 1967, Memorandum for WWR from 2002), p.16. Hal Saunders. 51To add to the complexity of the situation in 46Statement by President Nasser to Arab the Middle East, it is worth noting the Trade Unionists, May 26, 1967. Available relationship between Nasser and his second online at:
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(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 59At a press conference on 28 May, Nasser 1993), pp. 83-89. categorized Pearson's opposition to UNEF's 52See UN doc S/7896, May 19, 1967; UN withdrawal as "a hostile act, and neo- Press ReleaseEMF/449, June 3, 1967; a colonialism," and described the Canadian similar statement was also made by U Thant Prime Minister as a "defender, and an at the meeting of the UNEF Advisory advocate for Israel." UNA, S-464-0086, File Committee on May 18, 1967. 802, May 28, 1967, Press Conference by 53DHH, 95/6, Series 3, WAB Douglas, "The President Gamal Abdul-Nasser with the Last Days of UNEF: A Study of Military and Representatives of the International and Arab Diplomatic Imperatives." Press, Radio & T.V. Stations. 54DHH, 112.3H1.001 (D19), March 21, 1968, 60NAC, RG 24, Vol. 21596, file 2-5081.2 Interview with General I.J. Rikhye, late [Vol. 12], May 28, 1967, 626, Cairo to Commander of UNEF. External. 55NAC, RG 24, Vol. 21596, file 2-5081.2 61NAC, RG 24, Vol. 21596, file 2-5081.2 [Vol. 11], May 19, 1967, Permis NY to [Vol. 11], May 23, 1967, 626, External to External; and Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, p. Cairo; NAC, RG 24, Vol. 21596, file 2- 40. 5081.2 [Vol. 11], May 26, 1967, Cairo to 56"General Rikhye's Minutes of the Meeting External. of May 24, 1967, Between President Nasser 62John Starnes also speculates that the and the Secretary-General," in U Thant, View Russians may have been partially responsible From the UN, p. 486; also see, NAC, RG 24, for the hasty withdrawal of Canadian troops Vol. 21596, file 2-5081.2 [Vol. 11], May 25, from UNEF by passing on doctored military 1967, Cairo to External; also found in DHH, and political communications to UAR 82/988. officials. Interview with John Starnes, August 57NAC, RG 24, Vol. 21596, file 2-5081.2 9, 2002, Ottawa, ON; John Starnes, Closely [Vol. 11], May 20, 1967, Permis NY to Guarded: A Life in Canadian Security and External. Intelligence (Toronto: University of Toronto 58UNA, S-316, Box 9, File 1, Evacuation of Press, 1998), pp. 120-124; DHH, 87/312, Canadian Contingent, May-June 1967, October 23, 1987, Operation Lazarus. Mahomoud Riad to U Thant. In a message to 63UNA, S-330, Box 4, File 2, May 27, 1967, General Rikhye, the unfriendly actions Telex from Gaza to Secretary-General; also perpetrated by the Canadian government see UNA, S-316, Box 9, file 1, "Evacuation included the evacuation of embassy families of Canadian Contingent, May-June 1967," and the burning of documents, as well as May 27, 1967, Rikhye – Gaza to Secretary- "vicious propaganda being conducted by General. them, [which] constituted hostile activity 64Depending on the availability of air against [the] UAR Government." See UNA, transport locations and the level of S-316, Box 9, File 1, May 27, 1967, Rikhye – cooperation offered by the UAR government, Gaza to the Secretary-General. it was determined that the entire force could have been pulled out in as little as 84 hours.
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Other contingencies would have required five 72Rikhye writes: "I realised that New York days. DHH, 112.302.009 (D2), "Copies of D was under a great deal of pressure and was Ops Messages on withdrawal of Cdn overworked. I could not, however, Contingent of UNEF Egypt, May 1967," sympathise with their total ignorance of the CANLIFTCOM to CANFORCEHED. See military situation, and sadly I became more also, Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, pp. 90-91. aware of the inadequacies of their small 65Canadian War Museum (CWM), Canadian though conscientious and hard-working War Museum Oral History Project staff." Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder, p. 136. (CWMOHP), 31D2 Brown RJ, Ronald J. 73LBJ, NSF, NSC History, Box 17, Middle Brown, interview conducted by F. Quiller East Crisis May 12-June 19, 1967, Vol. 1, Graham, February 12, 2002. Tabs 11-20, May 23, 1967, Remarks of the 66CWM, CWMOHP, 31D2 Brown RJ, President on the Near East Situation, The Ronald J. Brown, interview conducted by F. Fish Room; Clyde Sanger, "Ambassadors Quiller Graham, February 12, 2002. urge Thant to call Security Council meeting 67The final tally of UNEF equipment and on Middle East," The Globe and Mail, May supplies taken by the IDF was estimated at 20, 1967, pp. 10-11. During the crisis the close to $5 million. To help resolve the issue Canadians tried not to be too harsh in their quietly, the US government offered to criticism of the manner in which the situation compensate the United Nations for the cost of was handled. At a NATO Conference two the lost materials. For a detailed report, see weeks after the fact, however, Paul Martin UNA, S-316, Box 8, File 7, "UNEF was less guarded and admitted that UNEF's Withdrawal – Sullivan & Seward Reports, withdrawal made a "mockery" of June – Oct 67". peacekeeping. See, "Mr. Martin Should Now 68Oren, Six Days of War, p. 21; also see Set the Record Straight," The Globe and William B. Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson and the Mail, June 21, 1967. June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?" 74Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder The Middle East Journal Vol. 46, No. 2 Keg: A History of the UN Security Council (Spring 1992), pp. 198-228. (London: Methuen & Co., 1971), p. 196. 69UN doc. A/6730/Add. 2, June 26, 1967. 75Nabil Elaraby, "United Nations Casualties were primarily sustained by the Peacekeeping By Consent: A Case Study of Indian contingent, with one Brazilian soldier the Withdrawal of the United Nations killed, and another wounded. For coverage of Emergency Force," Journal of International the Indian reaction, see Rikhye, The Sinai Law and Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1968): p. Blunder, and J. Sundaram, Operation Shanti: 149. Indian Army on Peace Mission in Egypt 76Part of India's rationale for complying with 1956-1967 (New Delhi: Government of Nasser's request stemmed from the perceived India, 1990). lack of support from Western nations on the 70Rikhye, Trumpets and Tumults, p. 203. dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. USNA, 71Sköld, United Nations Peacekeeping after RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretary, the Suez War, p. 172. Middle East Crisis Files – 1967, Lot File
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68DDD135, Entry 5190, Box 6, Arab Israeli Crisis – Chron, USUN to Wellington [6 of 8], May 26, 1967, USUN to State. 77New York Times, June 19, 1967. Also available online at:
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