THE “FIRST HYBRID”: THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Artem Fylypenko Political expert,

The article presents an analysis of the Transnistrian conflict of 1990-1992 through the lens of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and criteria for “hybrid warfare”. According to the author, the Transnistrian conflict may also be considered a “hybrid” one due to its methods and means. Just like the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it has also been a part of the Russian strategy to restore ’s control over the former Soviet republics.

Is the Transnistrian Conflict a Hybrid One? writtenThe Transnistrian enough books conflict about it cannot in the 25 be classified as understudied. There have been and its completion1. At the same time, this localized by March-July 1992, and the armed historicalyears since event the activein itself phase was of theconsidered conflict confrontationTraditionally, thein Dubossary Transnistrian on conflict2 March is beyond the interrelationship with similar 1992 is considered its beginning. At the events that were happening at the beginning of the 1990s in the former Soviet republics. was just the culmination of confrontation. The Russian aggression against Ukraine Thesame referendum time, the armed on the phase establishment of the conflict of TMR (Transnistrian Moldovan Republic) only within the certain historical context was held in December 1989-November makes it possible to regard this conflict not 1990 (due to the impossibility to hold the of 1990-1992 and those of 2014-2017 but referendum simultaneously throughout alsoand toto finddetermine similarities political between interconnection the events between the events separated by the time place in November 1990, with the seizure of gap of 20 years. administrativethe territory); thebuildings first armed by the clashes separatists, took

1 Создание Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (Creation of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic), История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (History of the Transnistri- Волкова,an Moldovan А.З. Republic), Бендеры, 2010., Непокоренное Приднестровье. Уроки военного конфликта (The UnconqueredТом 2-2, . Тирасполь: Lessons Риопгу, of Приднестровски the Armed Conflict),й� Государственны й� УниверситетКонфликт в Приднестровье.им. Т.Г.Шевченко, Причины, 2001., А.В. проблемы Козлов, В.Н.и прогноз Чернобривы развитияй� , (Conflict in Transnistria. Causes, Problems, and Develop- ment Forecast), М., 2015., Г. Перепелица,

К., 2001. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 7 and the establishment of their own • The formation of two of the social authorities and armed units was completed confrontation: the Popular Front of by the end of 1991-beginning of 1992. against the International Movement (Maidan and Anti-Maidan in Ukraine). First of all, it is necessary to answer the • Transnistria was supported by Moscow, which was, at that time, the centre of the question: Can the Transnistrian conflict , seeking to retain Moldova be classified as a “hybrid war”? There are in the USSR with the help of separatist several definitions characterizing this type enclaves, though the position of the of conflicts. One example is a “classical” Communist Party Central Committee definitionHybrid warsby F. Hoffman:can be conducted by both was not consistent in this matter. In states and a variety of non-state actors. 1990-1991, the leaders of Transnistrian Hybrid wars incorporate a range of separatists, I. Smirnov and G. Marakutsa, different modes of warfare, including as well as the leadership of had conventional capabilities, irregular tactics numerous informal meetings in Moscow and formations, terrorist acts including with the Head of the Supreme Council indiscriminate violence and coercion, of the USSR, A. Lukyanov, who fully and criminal disorder. These multi-modal supported and contributed to declaring activities can be conducted by separate and establishing new state entities on units, or even by the same unit, but are the Moldovan territory. Despite the fact generally operationally and tactically that Moldova boycotted the referendum directed and coordinated within the main on the preservation of the USSR (17 battlespace to achieve synergistic effects2. March 1991), it was held in Transnistria and Gagauzia. Among 84% of the Thus, it is worth noting that a number of Transnistrian population, 98% voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union. Permanent close ties of the Ukrainian undersimilarities which unite the the events Transnistrian in Donbas conflict are President V. Yanukovych government and developingand the conflict is very in similar Ukraine. to Thethe events scenario of the Party of Regions with were 1990-1992 in Transnistria: well-known as well.

• The language issue was the formal • After the collapse of the Soviet Union, reason for confrontation (adoption of the Transnistria received not just political but Law of the Republic of Moldova “On the also military support from Russia. Units of functioning of languages on the territory the republican guard have been armed with of the Moldavian SSR” [September the assistance from the 14th Russian army. 1989], according to which the Moldovan Units of Cossacks arrived at Transnistria language received the status of a state from Russia. Igor Strelkov (Girkin), who language and was transliterated into Latin). In the Ukrainian situation, the Donbas seizure, had gone through combat eastern regions actively referred to “practice”later became exactly the main in mediathe Transnistrian figure of the the attempt to repeal the law on the principles of state language policy (2012) Sea Fleet units and supplies of Russian by the representatives of the Maidan. weaponryconflict. In theto Donbas Ukrainian played situation, a decisive the Black role.

2 F. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies: Arlington, p. 14.

8 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 • The so-called “state security institutions” attack on Moldovan positions turned the of Transnistria were established with the tide in favour of separatists. Similarly, assistance from Moscow. In late 1991, direct participation of the Russian armed Vladimir Artyufeev, under the name forces units reversed the course of events of Vadim Shvetsov, and other wanted near Ukrainian Illovaisk in August 20144. (because of the armed dispersal of Latvian Methods and Tools Used Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs came toprotests the unrecognized for independence) republic officials to participate of the Thus, it should be noted that during the in the establishing of the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security. It is noteworthy war in Donbas a similar set of methods and that V. Artyufeev, forced to leave the post toolsTransnistrian was used, conflict namely: as well as during the of the head of the Transnistrian special services in 2011, and his former employees • active use of irregular forces supported have become active in the Russian “hybrid and armed by Russia; war” against Ukraine. Initially they participated in the operation to occupy • information warfare: discrediting the and then they were sent to DPR for leadership of the states (Ukraine and strengthening the cadres there. In a short Moldova), their armed forces and security while, the Transnistrian leaders gained forces within and outside of the state; leading positions: Artyufeev himself took shaping a negative attitude toward attempts the post of the vice prime minister for of the government to regain control over security issues3, the former TMR vice the separatist territories, etc.; prime minister A. Karaman became the vice prime minister for social affairs and • direct participation of the Russian armed then minister of foreign affairs in DPR; forces in military actions. other leading positions were also taken by In the Ukrainian case, a range of methods special services. applied was enlarged through economic other former officials of the Transnistrian sanctions and terrorist acts (Odessa and • 14th Russian army, located on the territoryIn the courseof the separatist of the conflict,enclave, was the Kharkiv, late 2014-first half of 2015). increasingly getting involved in the to each other not only by means of similar armed confrontation, pretending to be methodsAt the same and time,tools. bothThe analysis conflicts of areideological related “volunteers who want to defend their methods, myths, templates, memes that families” at the early stage. Participation were used in the Russian information wars of the Russian military in the war became against Moldova (1991-1992) and Ukraine undisguised in June 1992 at the height of (2014-2017) is indicative of certain schemes the Battle for Bender: The tank attack on and templates for waging these wars. the Bender Bridge, retained by Moldovan The following directions of information military and police, and the artillery campaigns can be distinguished:

3 Экс-министр КГБ Приднестровья стал «вице-премьером» ДНР (Ex-minister of Transnistrian KGB Became “Vice Prime Minister”), “NB News”, 11 July 2014, http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/126804. 4 Прокуратура выяснила все обстоятельства Иловайской трагедии (The Prosecutor’s Office Discovered All Circumstances of the Ilovaisk Tragedy), “Pravda.com.ua”, 14 August 2017, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/ news/2017/08/14/7152171.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 9 • dehumanization of the enemy, a constant emphasis on the difference dissemination of information about between Romanians and ; also, their cruelty and inhumanity (rumours Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist about a mass rape of school graduates Republic, which existed within Ukrainian committed by Moldovan soldiers; Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924-1940 dissemination of information about and covered territory of TMR and several Moldovan military throwing booby traps districts of Odessa region in Ukraine, made in the form of toys for children; was considered a historical basis for in the Ukrainian case – a sensational Transnistrian statehood; fake about the national guards crucifying a boy in Sloviansk; a story that “nationalists • restoration of the constitutional order played football with severed heads of police terrorism are presented as an aggression ofand one the state fight against against another. separatism Therefore, and officers”, etc.); there are attempts to bring negotiations into an “equal” bilateral format, with the The analysis of ideological presentation of Russia as a mediator; methods, myths, templates, «memes that were used in • the Russian information wars a continuation of the “Great Patriotic War”: against Moldova (1991-1992) an effort to present separatists’ actions as and Ukraine (2014-2017) is against “Romanian fascists”, separatists in indicative of certain schemes and DonbasTransnistrian – against separatists “banderites claimed and toNazis”; fight templates for waging these wars the use of symbols related to the war times;

• the use of vocabulary that revives • manipulation of historical facts. The most stereotypes of the Soviet era: “junta” (the widespread manipulations against Ukraine analogy is with “Pinochet junta” in 1970- are the following: “ and the 1980s), “punishers”, “fascists”; Ukrainian language were invented by the General Staff of Austria- at the • dissemination of information about the time of the First World War in order to participation of foreign mercenaries in weaken Russia”5; “Ukrainian language is military actions on the side of governmental the Polish dialect of ”; “the forces: Lithuanian snipers and Romanian war in Ukraine is waged by Uniates (Greek Catholics), Protestants, and schismatic 1992; Georgian snipers, German, Polish, (supporters of Patriarchate)”6; “all the andsoldiers American in the soldiers Transnistrian in Donbas conflict7; in patriotic actions in south-eastern regions are held by citizens”. • emphasis on the “popular” nature of the There were also active attempts to use separatist movements, and lack of weapons

independence in Transnistria: for example, historical facts for justification of claims for in their hands at the first stage of the conflict.

5 Корифей украинской мифологии (The Coryphaeus of Ukrainian Mythology), “Stoletie”, 24 August 2014, http://www.stoletie.ru/territoriya_istorii/korifej_ukrainskoj_mifologii_337.htm. For example: В. Панов, 6 Получите, «суки православные». На Украине готовится чудовищная провокация против Православия (Take That, “Orthodox Bitches”…), - ite-suki-pravoslavnie.-Na-Ukraine-gotovitsya-chudovishchnaya-provokatsiya-protiv-Pravoslaviya-17096.html.For example: А. Никишин, “Русская Правда”, http://ruspravda.info/Poluch

10 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 What Makes It Different? Russian Goals

However, despite formal resemblance However, the creation of controlled enclaves (TMR in Moldova, DPR and LPR should not be ignored. The Transnistrian between the conflicts, serious differences objective to get these states back under context, when centrifugal tendencies covered in Ukraine) has not reached the final theconflict entire developed Soviet Union. within Attempts another to historicalestablish an independent Republic of Gagauzia in favourablethe Russian for political Russia conditions, influence. namely The final the Moldova and Republic of Bessarabia in conditionsobjective is deprivingthe settlement Moldova of the and conflict Ukraine on Ukraine (in the south of Odessa region) were of international subjectivity and of the the integral parts of this process. possibility to implement their foreign policy

The economy of Moldova was not integrated into the global one and was a part of the Inirrespective 2003, Moldova of Moscow’s was closepolitical to will.signing a single all-union Soviet economy. From the document, which, under the pretext of solving like a movement for preserving the USSR. state of a Russian vassal. It is about the well- Thebeginning, economy the Transnistrianof Donbas, on conflict the contrary, looked knownthe Transnistrian , conflict, would which have envisaged fixed its has already been integrated into the global the transformation of the Moldovan Republic into an “asymmetric federation”. oriented to the Russian market. economy, although its significant part was An analysis of demands to Ukraine, Furthermore, in the Ukrainian case, an articulated by Russia and terrorists from the so-called DPR and LPR (controlled by Russia), points to similarities between them borderimportant with factor Russia. influencing As for theTransnistria, nature of and leads to the conclusion that they are itthe is conflictan enclave is the separated existence from of aRussia common by parts of a single scenario. The principles are Ukraine, which complicates economic and as follows: military relations with Moscow. • at the constitutional level, establishing Thus, the similarity of scenarios, means, quotas in the parliament for representatives tools, ideological methods used in both of the separatist enclaves and actual transformation of Ukraine into a federation; well as their interim results (establishment ofconflicts the enclaves (Ukrainian that andare not Transnistrian) controlled by as • granting for the separatist enclaves the the legitimate governments) suggest that right to recruit staff for police, security belong to the category of “hybrid” ones. border guards, etc. independently, without Wethe can Transnistrian say Transnistria and Ukrainian was a “test conflicts case”, coordinationservices, judiciary, with the central prosecutor’s authorities; office, experiment that allowed Russia to • granting broad economic (freedom of accumulatethe first and, the unfortunately,necessary experience successful to foreign economic activity), political conduct such operations. (right to choose its own parliament,

7 Американский блогер: В Донбассе воюют и гибнут кадровые офицеры стран Запада (American Blogger: Western Officers Fight and Die in Donbas), - ions/1439583413. “Русская весна”, 14 August 2015, http://rusvesna.su/recent_opin

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 11 government, and president), and cultural military formations temporarily located on (protection of the Russian language) the territory of the Republic of Moldova. autonomy of the region; As for now, the existence of the unrecognized • granting the right to coordinate all TMR constitutes direct and indirect threats passing laws and the right to veto all to Ukraine. decisions of the states (Ukraine and Moldova) in foreign policy; The direct threats include:

• neutral or non-aligned status for the state. • intelligence activities against Ukraine;

History does not know conditional clauses, but • presence of the Russian armed forces units if the Kozak Memorandum had been adopted, the territory of TMR; numbering 1,400 soldiers and officers on post-Sovietthe model ofspace conflict (particularly resolution the servingUkrainian as • Transnistrian armed forces (4,000 soldiers, one)an example would havefor other been similarimplemented. conflicts in the artillery, armoured vehicles including heavy armour, aircrafts); Ukraine itself joined negotiations on the political status of Transnistria in • weapons depots at the Colbasna station; 1995. The Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the The indirect threats include: Republic of Moldova and Transnistria was signed on 8 May 1997. According to it, • necessity to improve security of the Ukraine alongside with Russia and the OSCE Transnistrian part of the border, which act as guarantors of the negotiation process. Within these years, the Ukrainian position directions; in the negotiation process was ambivalent. diverts significant forces from other Standing for the territorial integrity of • threat of blockade of the railway Moldova, offering its own settlement plans communication with the Danube ports;

often followed the Russian position. Many of • disconnection of southern districts of the(e.g. problems Yushchenko’s were planoverlooked. of 2005), Kyiv very Odessa region from electricity supply from the Moldovan hydro power plant; The attitude to Transnistria changed after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning • participation of Transnistrian residents of the events in Donbas. The presence of the in the anti-governmental actions in Russian military forces in the unrecognized Odessa region; republic gave grounds for considering this enclave to be a threat to the national security • broadcasting of Russian TV channels in the border areas of Odessa region, information strategic documents. During 2014-2017, warfare; Ukraineof Ukraine. took Itsteps was to fixed reduce in risks the relevantrelated to Transnistria: It increased security of the • smuggling of goods. Ukrainian-Moldovan part of the border, including establishing of the common Furthermore, there is a risk of retaking border and customs posts. The Parliament of the Kozak Memorandum as a model of the Ukraine denounced the agreement on transit through the Ukrainian territory of Russian of Moldova I. Dodon claimed reintegration Transnistrian conflict resolution. President

12 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 of Transnistria by means of transforming Given the fact that Ukraine and Moldova are Moldova into a federation to be one of his subjects to Russian foreign policy ambitions to the same extent, there is a need to join his visit to Moscow in January 2017. At the jointpriorities. press He conference reaffirmed hiswith intention the Russian during region, force the Transnistrian separatists to president, Dodon admitted that the refusal obeyefforts the to rules weaken worked Russian out influencein Chisinau in and the to implement the Kozak Memorandum Kyiv on the terms of legitimate authorities. in 2003 was a mistake8. If the plan is successfully implemented, this model can be The key conditions for the reintegration of imposed on Ukraine, which will contribute Transnistria should be the following: to reaching the aims of the “hybrid war” waged by Russia against Moldova in 1990- a) demilitarization of the region: withdrawal 1992 and Ukraine in 2014-2017. of Russian troops and weapons, replacement of armed peacekeepers with a police mission Conclusions under the auspices of the United Nations;

b) democratization of the region: authorization of activity of Moldovan political inThe the Transnistrian Eastern Ukraine conflict in 2014-2017 in 1990-1992, are the parties, non-governmental organisations, partsthe annexation of the Russian of Crimea, general andstrategy the conflictto keep and mass media in Transnistria;

c) restoration of the single economic space, Moldova and Ukraine in Moscow’s sphere of namely, the use of the Moldovan leu as the influence. In this context, the Transnistrian single national currency; establishing a reintegrationconflict has anof the apparent separatist “hybrid” enclaves nature. on single banking system; favourableThe final objectivefor Russia of thisterms, strategy namely: is the d) development of a single educational of foreign policy priorities (abandoning thepossibility course to on influence European foreign and policy,Euro-Atlantic change of educational programs and systems of integration), and maintaining dependence educationand cultural assessment, space: gradualadoption unification of single on energy supplies from Russia. of teachers, etc. Responses to the “hybrid” aggression can be rules of getting academic titles, certification in the following forms: asymmetric actions Artem Fylypenko – journalist, historian, political on certain regions of states undergoing expert. In 2012-2015, he was the director of Odessa humanitarianaimed at neutralizing aggression, Russian including influence branch of the National Institute for Strategic Transnistria; an active humanitarian Studies. The author of about 30 books and academic policy (publishing books, creation of movie publications on the history of Moldovan republic, the and TV products, support for national Moldovan-Ukrainian relations, the economy of the culture, holding conferences, culture and Ukrainian Black Sea area. social campaigns) aimed at neutralizing the Russian impact; holding information campaigns abroad in order to shape the image of Russia as an aggressor.

8 Совместная пресс-конференция с Президентом Молдовы Игорем Додоном (Joint Press Conference with Presi- dent of Moldova ), “Kremlin”, 17 January 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53744.

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