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The “First Hybrid”: the Transnistrian Conflict in the Context of the Russian- Ukrainian Conflict

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The “First Hybrid”: the Transnistrian Conflict in the Context of the Russian- Ukrainian Conflict THE “FIRST HYBRID”: THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN CONFLICT Artem Fylypenko Political expert, Ukraine The article presents an analysis of the Transnistrian conflict of 1990-1992 through the lens of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and criteria for “hybrid warfare”. According to the author, the Transnistrian conflict may also be considered a “hybrid” one due to its methods and means. Just like the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it has also been a part of the Russian strategy to restore Moscow’s control over the former Soviet republics. Is the Transnistrian Conflict a Hybrid One? writtenThe Transnistrian enough books conflict about itcannot in the 25be classified as understudied. There have been and its completion1. At the same time, this localized by March-July 1992, and the armed historicalyears since event the active in itself phase was of theconsidered conflict confrontationTraditionally, thein DubossaryTransnistrian on conflict2 March is beyond the interrelationship with similar 1992 is considered its beginning. At the events that were happening at the beginning of the 1990s in the former Soviet republics. was just the culmination of confrontation. The Russian aggression against Ukraine Thesame referendum time, the armed on the phase establishment of the conflict of TMR (Transnistrian Moldovan Republic) only within the certain historical context was held in December 1989-November makes it possible to regard this conflict not 1990 (due to the impossibility to hold the of 1990-1992 and those of 2014-2017 but referendum simultaneously throughout alsoand toto finddetermine similarities political between interconnection the events between the events separated by the time place in November 1990, with the seizure of gap of 20 years. administrativethe territory); thebuildings first armed by the clashes separatists, took 1 Создание Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (Creation of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic), История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (History of the Transnistri- anВолкова, Moldovan А.З. Republic), Бендеры, 2010., Непокоренное Приднестровье. Уроки военного конфликта (The UnconqueredТом 2-2, Transnistria. Тирасполь: Lessons Риопгу, of Приднестровски the Armed Conflict),и� Государственны и� УниверситетКонфликт в Приднестровье.им. Т.Г.Шевченко, Причины, 2001., А.В. проблемы Козлов, В.Н.и прогноз Чернобривы развитияи� , (Conflict in Transnistria. Causes, Problems, and Develop- ment Forecast), М., 2015., Г. Перепелица, К., 2001. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 7 and the establishment of their own • The formation of two poles of the social authorities and armed units was completed confrontation: the Popular Front of Moldova by the end of 1991-beginning of 1992. against the International Movement (Maidan and Anti-Maidan in Ukraine). First of all, it is necessary to answer the • Transnistria was supported by Moscow, which was, at that time, the centre of the question: Can the Transnistrian conflict Soviet Union, seeking to retain Moldova be classified as a “hybrid war”? There are in the USSR with the help of separatist several definitions characterizing this type enclaves, though the position of the of conflicts. One example is a “classical” Communist Party Central Committee definitionHybrid warsby F. Hoffman:can be conducted by both was not consistent in this matter. In states and a variety of non-state actors. 1990-1991, the leaders of Transnistrian Hybrid wars incorporate a range of separatists, I. Smirnov and G. Marakutsa, different modes of warfare, including as well as the leadership of Gagauzia had conventional capabilities, irregular tactics numerous informal meetings in Moscow and formations, terrorist acts including with the Head of the Supreme Council indiscriminate violence and coercion, of the USSR, A. Lukyanov, who fully and criminal disorder. These multi-modal supported and contributed to declaring activities can be conducted by separate and establishing new state entities on units, or even by the same unit, but are the Moldovan territory. Despite the fact generally operationally and tactically that Moldova boycotted the referendum directed and coordinated within the main on the preservation of the USSR (17 battlespace to achieve synergistic effects2. March 1991), it was held in Transnistria and Gagauzia. Among 84% of the Thus, it is worth noting that a number of Transnistrian population, 98% voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union. Permanent close ties of the Ukrainian undersimilarities which unite the the events Transnistrian in Donbas conflict are President V. Yanukovych government and developingand the conflict is very in similar Ukraine. to Thethe eventsscenario of the Party of Regions with Russia were 1990-1992 in Transnistria: well-known as well. • The language issue was the formal • After the collapse of the Soviet Union, reason for confrontation (adoption of the Transnistria received not just political but Law of the Republic of Moldova “On the also military support from Russia. Units of functioning of languages on the territory the republican guard have been armed with of the Moldavian SSR” [September the assistance from the 14th Russian army. 1989], according to which the Moldovan Units of Cossacks arrived at Transnistria language received the status of a state from Russia. Igor Strelkov (Girkin), who language and was transliterated into Latin). In the Ukrainian situation, the Donbas seizure, had gone through combat eastern regions actively referred to “practice”later became exactly the main in mediathe Transnistrian figure of the the attempt to repeal the law on the principles of state language policy (2012) Sea Fleet units and supplies of Russian by the representatives of the Maidan. weaponryconflict. In theto Donbas Ukrainian played situation, a decisive the Black role. 2 F. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies: Arlington, p. 14. 8 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 • The so-called “state security institutions” attack on Moldovan positions turned the of Transnistria were established with the tide in favour of separatists. Similarly, assistance from Moscow. In late 1991, direct participation of the Russian armed Vladimir Artyufeev, under the name forces units reversed the course of events of Vadim Shvetsov, and other wanted near Ukrainian Illovaisk in August 20144. (because of the armed dispersal of Latvian Methods and Tools Used Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs came toprotests the unrecognized for independence) republic officials to participate of the Thus, it should be noted that during the in the establishing of the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security. It is noteworthy war in Donbas a similar set of methods and that V. Artyufeev, forced to leave the post toolsTransnistrian was used, conflict namely: as well as during the of the head of the Transnistrian special services in 2011, and his former employees • active use of irregular forces supported have become active in the Russian “hybrid and armed by Russia; war” against Ukraine. Initially they participated in the operation to occupy • information warfare: discrediting the Crimea and then they were sent to DPR for leadership of the states (Ukraine and strengthening the cadres there. In a short Moldova), their armed forces and security while, the Transnistrian leaders gained forces within and outside of the state; leading positions: Artyufeev himself took shaping a negative attitude toward attempts the post of the vice prime minister for of the government to regain control over security issues3, the former TMR vice the separatist territories, etc.; prime minister A. Karaman became the vice prime minister for social affairs and • direct participation of the Russian armed then minister of foreign affairs in DPR; forces in military actions. other leading positions were also taken by In the Ukrainian case, a range of methods special services. applied was enlarged through economic other former officials of the Transnistrian sanctions and terrorist acts (Odessa and • 14th Russian army, located on the territoryIn the courseof the separatistof the conflict,enclave, wasthe Kharkiv, late 2014-first half of 2015). increasingly getting involved in the to each other not only by means of similar armed confrontation, pretending to be methodsAt the same and time,tools. bothThe analysis conflicts of areideological related “volunteers who want to defend their methods, myths, templates, memes that families” at the early stage. Participation were used in the Russian information wars of the Russian military in the war became against Moldova (1991-1992) and Ukraine undisguised in June 1992 at the height of (2014-2017) is indicative of certain schemes the Battle for Bender: The tank attack on and templates for waging these wars. the Bender Bridge, retained by Moldovan The following directions of information military and police, and the artillery campaigns can be distinguished: 3 Экс-министр КГБ Приднестровья стал «вице-премьером» ДНР (Ex-minister of Transnistrian KGB Became “Vice Prime Minister”), “NB News”, 11 July 2014, http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/126804. 4 Прокуратура выяснила все обстоятельства Иловайской трагедии (The Prosecutor’s Office Discovered All Circumstances of the Ilovaisk Tragedy), “Pravda.com.ua”, 14 August 2017, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/ news/2017/08/14/7152171. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 3 (9), 2017 9 • dehumanization of the enemy, a constant emphasis on the difference dissemination of information about
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