En Erals Office. No. XXVI. an Utumn Maneuvers

WAR E PAR T M E T D N ,

' A non-ru n ui " n n s Om cz .

Doc umen t N 0 ma

P R E F A C E .

In com ilin the re or ts on the a utumn ma n euvers of 1898 in E uro e p g p p , da a fromboth o mcia l a n d un ofﬁcia l so ur ces ha ve been used T here ha s t . been ta ken from ofﬁcia l r epor ts a n d milita ry per iodica ls such ma tte r a s would seem o furnish in na rra iv form to A merica n om rs th most t , t e , ce e in r s d i r i i T h d on te e tin g a n n st uct ve a ccoun t obta na ble . e escr ipti of the

E n lish ma n euvers is ta k n fr om the ofﬁcia l re ort ‘A r m a n d N a g e p , y vy

r T h i l r rt is r le i h d ils e d B A r ro . m o Ga zett , a n oa d w e o c a ep ep te w t eta , . a n d con i much va lua ble in forma ion which it is n ot ra ctica ble o ta n s t , p t

r in in this d um n T h d i tion of the Fren ch ma n euvers is p t oc e t . e escr p ta ken fromomcia l r e or s omi in such ortions a s do n ot bea r di l p t , tt g p rect y

on i r b in lv T he d r i ion o f he A us up the so lut on of the p o lems vo ed . esc pt t tria n r ma n a n d R i o era tion s is ta ken fromthe R evue M ilita ire , Ge , uss a n p

’ ” d r i fr f il r n e l E n h x r m B ihe z mM ita W he bla t . t a ger , w t a n e t a ct o e t u oc t

‘ T he description of the Swiss ma n euvers is ta ken fr om the A llgemein e

hw i h ili ar i n a n d fr omthe R evue ili re S is Sc e zer isc e M t Ze tu g M ta i u se .

ST O — H Y M V AU R U NGARIAN ARM ANEU ERS.

E V GE N R A L SCO P E O F M A N E U E R S .

Maneuvers organ ized in imitation of real warfare were ﬁrst s v s introduced in Au tria , and other armies ha e ince then d t n s a op ed the pla , ome carrying the scheme much further and employing greater numbers tha n was ever contemplated in Austria . The imperial maneuvers of 1898 took pla ce during the month u s s th of September in Upper H ngary , where the ixth corp , wi u er u v n s headq art s at Kascha , maneu ered agai t a corps formed o e s from tro ps taken from the n ighboring tations, while the seventh corps (Temesvar) maneuvered against the twelfth corps (Sieben burg) . The Honved cavalry brigades and divi i sions sta tioned in these d stricts took part in the ex ercises . u s t s The mane ver between the seventh and welfth corp , or uz so s i those of B ias, named from the locality, are de cr bed in the following account

M A N E U V E R A R E A .

In former years maneuv ers were held in both parts of the — is u u e . 1898 Empir that , both in A stria and in H ngary In te wa s to the thea r limited Upper Hungary . The maneuvers of Buzia s took pla ce in the ea stern part of the Banat of

sv . Teme ar, near the border of Transylvania The operation

u i ms proper were conducted on an ndulat ng terrain , which for c un the approa h of the extensive plain of the H garian Alfold . This plain wa s bounded on the east and southeast by the chain u u s . of the Tran ylvania Alps, which rise q ite abr ptly With u t the exception of the pper par , the valley of the Temes River s presents the character of an extended teppe . When the s plain assume a more rugged character , the water courses coming from the Transylvania Alps form deep ravines . The n s v hi souther part of thi alley forms an extended crest , w ch Semen ica hi culminates in the peak of Petro , meters gh, at the so urce of the Temes River . 8 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S.

The plain is covered from northwest to so uthwest by the s d Dumbr a wa n two exten ive woo s of Dragsina and , leavi g only 8 10 e one open plain , about to kilometers wide, in the cent r of which is located Buz ias . z a s s v i Bu i , a mall illage of nhabitants, is a bathing s im resort, and is connected by railway with Lugo , the most n s v 34 m te porta t city in Teme ar , at a distance of kilo e rs, and s z z a s n ra ns l with Wer chet . Bu i is thus con ected with the T y s l vanian and Roumanian sy tem of rai ways . s l The di trict has few roads , on y the high roads, as that of

s u uz s - Teme var, L gos, and B ia , being rock ballasted and kept in i o . n ra ct g od order The others are ordinary cou try roads , p v u s 1898 c o u cable , howe er , during the mane ver of on a c nt of

’ l r s the o n g d y spell . The village are for the most part laid u r o ut in reg lar squares . They were built du ing the begin u ning of the last cent ry , after the recapture of this country s t from the Turks . The principal indu try of his section is the u c raisin g of corn . At the time of the mane vers the orn wa s still covering the country in all directions and standing some e but c 7 feet high , rendering the t rrain all impra ticable for artillery and cavalry .

GE N E R A L SU PPO SIT IO N .

The general theme for the maneuvers of Buzias wa s the followin g

- i Austria Hungary s at war with Russia . The principal army is sent i n to the ﬁeld from the northea st

s a ha s c ss u ha s (Galicia) . The ho tile rmy ro ed Ro mania and v r penetrated into Transyl ania . It has met with no serious e s s sista n ce thus far . Thi army detache a corps (the twelfth) s s to v n is to Teme var , with order ad ance on the e emy , who

ss s u n a embling on the o th of the Ba at . The latter force (the sev enth corps) is to advance on Temes

to s s c . var , and resi t the ho tile advan e toward the Banat In order to gi ve the maneuvers the greatest possible sem c u m s ha s d blance of a t al warfare , the ini ter of war or ered that the service of subsistence should exercise n o inﬂuence what ever o u the course of the operatio ns o r on the selection of ff camps and canton ments of the troops . The general sta o fﬁ cers of the larger organizations had orders to supply their s c s u c su s troop as would be the a e nder war onditions , b istence s i and reserve supplie to be procured n this manner . — A U ST R IA HU N GA R Y. 9

R GA N A T O N O F T H E O N F E O IZ I PPOSI G OR C S .

ec The dir tion of the maneuvers was intrusted , under orders ’ sta ﬂz of the Emperor , to the chief of the general , Baron de d Beck . His headquarters comprise one section of operations s and one ection of details . The troops participatin g were formed into two parties — that of the West (seventh army corps) under command of Lieu e Schutzer s t nant Field Marshal , and that of the Ea t (twelfth army corps) under command of Lieutenan t Field Marshal t r P r obzt von Ohs o ﬁ . The tr00ps and numbers composing the corps were as follows

Gun s. ta io ns. to . l ns terice.

SE V E N T H A RM Y CO R PS .

Seven teen th in fa ntry division T hirty - thir d infa n tr y briga d e T hirt - fo ur th in fa n t briga de T hir ty o ur th in fa n try ivision : Six ty - se ven th in fa n tr y br iga de Six ty -eighth in fa n try briga de T wen ty -third Hon ved in fa n try division For ty - ﬁfth infa n tr y briga de Fort -six th in fa n tr y br i ga de Sa ven t ca va lry division : Seven th ca va lr y br iga de T wen ty - secon d Hon ved ca va lry briga de f Co rps a rtiller y

T ota l seven th a r my co r ps

' A P r w r m R M Y co n s.

Six teen th in fa n tr y divisio n T hirty - ﬁr st in fa n tr y briga d e T hirt s econ d in fa n tr y briga d T hir ty h in fa n try division : Six ty -n in th in fa n try briga de Seven tieth in fa n try bri ga de T hirty - eighth Hon ved in fa n try division Seven ty -ﬁfth in fa n tr y brigad e Seven six t h in fa n tr y briga de T welfth riga de o f ca va lr y Co rps a r tiller y

L i ht bridge tr a i n oon section

T ota l twelfth a r my co rps

T ota l of the two corps 10 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S.

For the ser vice of observatio n there wa s attached to each c orps one section of balloon with the necessary train . Cyclist sections were attached to the maneuvers headquarte rs and to u i s . c each per or commander . Each army corps had a deta h ment of the ﬁeld telephone train and a detachment of the t pos al service, which has charge of delivery and collection of mail a n d sending of money . Eac h independent briga de and division wa s giv en the pro o rtio n a te n s o s c p war allowa ce of anitary tr op , cal ulated on the maneuver strength .

D E T A I L S O F T H E D A I L Y O P E R A T IO N S .

T he gen eral idea in accordance with which the maneuvers were carried out wa s a s follows

E V T H W E T S E N CO R PS ( S A R M Y) .

The main West army is in the theater of operations to the h th . e northea st (Galicia) The sevent corps has been, up to m s u present ti e , in ob ervation on the Little Save and Dan be . A hostile army ha s suddenly crossed the southern frontier a n d us penetrated Transylvania, and has p hed to the north the few troops in this dist rict and occupied the central part of this territo ry . Upon the reported advance of impo rtant hostile forces s m ss to ward the we t, the seventh corps , in the meanti e a em s z s u d bled near Wer chet , received in tr ctions to a vance toward “ Temesvar in order to dispute the inv asion of the Banat distric t . W E T M T E LFT H CO R PS ( A S A R Y) .

The main army of the enemy is in the theater of o perations

o s to the n rthea t (Galicia) . Several hostile division s have been for some time o cc upying the central frontier of Hungary . The army (East) ha s penetrated into Tran sylvania by the passes Tour Rouge and Vulkan and ha s driven ba ck the ho s c in s tile forces whi h were ob ervation of the frontier . The twelfth corps has been sent to the west to o ccupy Temesv ar r and A a d . f

T emesva r is to be o ccupied sho rtly by la n dsturm o rg a n iza tio n s from

s rn n r W e te Hu ga y .

T emesva r a n d A r a d ther e a re sma ll a rr iso n s whic h a r e ein { A t g , b g i fo rt ﬁed . — A U ST R IA HU N GA R Y . 11

e u When it is report d that the enemy , stationed ntil then on O f the Save and Danube, is concentrated in the south the t i u a d Banat district, the thir eenth corps w ll be instr cted to v ance for the present against this force .

1 O fﬁ O u s the On September , the cial pening of the mane ver , two armies were canton ed a s follows

V T W E T A SE E N H CO R PS ( S R M Y) .

[N OT E — N a mes in ita lic design a te sta tion s o f the hea dqua r ters ]

N a Z sa m Headquarters , gy

e v s D e'n ta Sevent enth infantry di i ion ,

- h s N a Z 3 a m - Z Twenty t ird infantry divi ion , gy , Kis sam ; - - llIo ra vir z a z Thirty fourth infantry division, , Werschet ; s Feren d a Kis Seml ac h m s Seventh cavalry divi ion , y , , Te e Buttyn ; ll cz s a . Corp rti ery, Moravi a

W F E T T E L T H CO R PS ( A S A R M Y) .

t s Fc cset Headquar er , Klicso va L eukusest zusz Sixteenth infantry division , , , S any ;

- s n Bo szu I a s a lva Thirty eighth infantry divi io , , g f ;

- n s Ka oln a s s Thirty fourth i fantry divi ion , p , Sobor in ; L u o s z s Twelfth cavalry division , g , He ere ; f lv I a s a a . Corps artillery , g U nder these conditions the two cavalry columns were 50 0 . s s u 8 kilometers apart The two corp , eparated by abo t kilo in firs in meters, had two divisions the t line and one the sec 2 s . 0 ond line That of the twelfth corps , kilometer in rear , the s s s im edi valley of the Maro , and that of the eventh corp m e o f fi s at ly in rear the r t line . T he 2d and 3d of September were taken up by the service of Observation and information by means of reconnoissance ls and patro . The seventh corps (West army) sent out fiv e detachments ’ a n d o flicer s s c four patrol , who rea hed , by the afternoon of

m 1 n Zs b — — — — er s Septe ber , the li e e ely Liebling Bereny Kadar J — ’ ze - u s g Roman Bogsan , the bo ndary set for that day opera s t s u u tion . The pa rols and detachment p shed on d ring Sep e 2 a n d t mber 3 and reached their destination . ’ The twelfth corps (East army) sent o ut o fIicers patrols and

ta c s w to ea c but n o t ss the l two de hment , who ere r h , pa , ine 12 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

— - za k s— z e 1 Keped Magyar S o Vis ag on Septemb r , and the line — — v r s Roma Gattaja Nagy Ko e e on September 2 .

O P E R A T IO N S O F S E P T E M B E R 2 .

In the evening of September 1 the two corps commanders gav e their orders a s follows

n W s vnN T E COR PS ( E ST AR M Y) .

s a s Wer schetz will se The eventh corps , s embled near , oppo the n o n i t ur advance of the e emy int the Ba at distr ct . For his p pose the seventh cavalry division will advance toward Roman tv d zta mura Oe o s . S , , Cserna, Bereny T he h seventeenth infantry division , wit the balloon section, b l za ko va marches on Zse e C . The thirty - fo urt in fa n tr division and the corps artillery k za will go into canto nment at ere er tc and Denta . The twenty - third Honved infantry division will proceed to ward Gattaja . w s The corps headquarters ill be establi hed at Gattaja . SE R V ICE O F IN FO R M A T IO N — The seventh cav alry div ision t z s will reconnoi er the one compri ed between the Bega, from u - s —Fr obul— Remeta and p, and the line Roman Bog an Obres d n s to cha . On the 3 the mai body hould reach the region the Dum r a w east of the b a Wald .

T W E L PT R CO R PS E A T A R M ( S Y) .

The twelfth corps will ﬁrst enter the region o f Buzias

z s s . S ila , then oppo e the enemy For this purpose the various organizations will take the following positi ons on September 2 f u o s el s K t . Sixteenth in antry divi ion , Bold r and North y The division will con struct a pontoon bridge across the Temes at N orth Ko stely. Thirty - eighth Honv ed i n fantry division and the corps artil

s . lery , Lugo and Herendjest - ﬁfth v Bo szur I a sfa lv a Ba s Thirty infant di ision , , g , and z s 2 s u u e t, battalions ; a alf battery and half q adron nder A r z o z u r i za t n k . d a u u . Lieutenant Colonel v , fr m S s to S The telephone section and balloon park follow the thirty - eighth v di ision . The two head divisions will regulate their movements so a s to cross the Temes a t 12 noon ; the thirty- ﬁfth division will ’

m. leav e Ka po ln a s at 6 o clock a . ’ The corps hea dquarters will be at Lugos after 12 O clock no on . The main body of the twelfth cav alry brigade will reach

c z s z s o n 2d b . the distri t Keped , Bu ia , S ila , the of Septem er On the 3d of September the cav alry will regulate its move ments in such a manner a s to reconn oiter the lines of ma rch — A U ST R IA HU N GA R Y . 13

n h u of the enemy a d t e distrib tion of his forces . If the cav a lr is y driven in , it will fall back on the left wing of the army o z w - a s u cor s t ward I gar . The t enty third battalion of ch s e rs p s O 1 oﬁi cer 30 ss u wil establi h a post of bservation ( , cha e rs , 5 s ka mien and trooper ) on the S , this post to be connected by tel r fﬁ u tele hone with the eg a h o ce at B zias . T he cavalry brigade wil guard the bridges of Lugos until i - s the arr val of the twenty third infantry divi ion . T he execution of these orders brought about a movement of bo th corps toward Buzias,the twelfth corps still having one to division in the second line far the rear . The canton ments occupied on the evening of September 2 were as follows

E V H R P WE AR M S E N T CO S ( ST Y) .

a tta a Headquarters , G j ee v Z sebel sa ko va Sevent nth infantry di ision , y , C ;

h - Ki z t a r s ss . Or Om T irty fourth infantry divi ion , Gy gy , ,

Denta . ;

- v s Ga tta a Kis et Twenty third Hon ed infantry divi ion , j ,

Nagy , Semlak ;

vi Oetvo sd - Szta mura Seventh cavalry di sion, , Roman , Bereny ;

s . Corp artillery , Denta

W E ' O T L F I H C R PS (E AST A R M Y) .

I/u os Headquarters , g

s N a - Ko ste l Sixteenth infantry divi ion , gy y

- v L u o s Thirty eighth Honved infantry di ision , g , Herend jest ;

- ﬁfth I a s a lva Ba szest Thirty infantry division , g f , ; a z B uz ia s Seventh c valry division , S ilas, , Keped ;

Corps artillery , Lugos .

O P E R A T I O N S O F S E P T E M B E R 8 .

s c ma The corps commanders gave order for the day , whi h y be condensed into the following

V C R W E A SE E N T H O PS ( ST R M Y) .

i The seventh corps will continue ts advance . w m c The seventeenth division , with balloon park , ill ar h on

- k o Szta mur a . I l da, Roman , and Liebling

- The twenty third division on V egv a r and Kadar . The thirt - fourth infantry division and the corps artillery on Sipet an Bereny . A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S '

u u ’ m. Ho r of depart re , O c lo c k a .

The hea dquarters will mo v e to Beren y . Infantry company patrols will be sent o ut toward the l ka mien c r ietu en . S , the Blan a , and the Co r s n s uo The seventh infantry divi io , in accordance with in tr Du r v z s mb a wa . tions , will mo e to the one ea t of the Wald It ’ a th t v d will assemble at o clock t e northea s of Oet o s .

WR LF I’ H CO R PS E A ST A T ( R M Y) .

On September 3 the units of the twelfth corps will move a s follows The sixteenth infantry division via Szinerszeg on Buzias and Keped . The thirty - eighth infa ntry di vision and the corps artillery z s via Daruvar on S ila . ’ - n A r z za ko s . Lieute ant Colonel v . s detachment on Magyar S - ﬁfth s The thirty infantry di vi ion on Lugos . corps commander will ma rch o n the road Lugos— E u . The z1a s . The twelfth cavalry brigade will march in advance and a t v u s c in accordance with pre io s instructions . It will a s em s s ble in the ba in to the south of Buzias faced to the we t . v s u Ad ance guard , one q adron . The twenty - third battalion of cha sseurs will occupy the Ska mien with two companies ; the other t wo companies will v m - u v ad ance on Te es V ko ar . The marches thus executed brought the three divisions of s v s s n the e enth corps on the ame line, while the econd li e of wa the twelfth corps s still 2 5 kilometers in rear . s h s 3d u The operation of t i day ( of September) , bro ght u s c v c s n abo t a meeting of the oppo ing a alry for e , both bei g e ordered to continue their reconnoissances . While the sev nth

v s s a s - u di i ion (We t army) m rched to the ea t , on Temes V ko the c wa s u es s s var, twelfth avalry brigade abo t to tabli h it elf s u s 13 3 to the o thea t of point , where it awaited information

s th c f . . a to e mar h O the enemy At a . m the twelfth n s v s n wa s u brigade , heari g that the eventh di i io occ pying the

s s- u v n height of Teme V ko ar, rapidly adva ced to the other s a s ide of the railway and deployed , f ced to the ea t, in line of c u s s e ﬁr e ol mn . The artillery took po ition and open d on the ’ em u u e en y s col mn . Unfort nat ly , the standing corn impeded the movement and the artillery had to be formed in mass . At this moment the regiment at the head of the sev enth division (the seventh hussars) covered by woods which bor

Sur a n - u ee in s dered the g y Arok , s cc ded reaching a light c fl depression , and from there harged the ank of the twelfth — l 5 A U ST R IA H U N GA R Y .

- w ss r its s . s brigade, hich was in the proce of e forming line Thi c i the flank atta k , co ncident with attack of the main body of v s i the se enth divi ion , led to the defeat of the twelfth br gade, which retired in the direction O f Buzia s without active pur s s v uit outhe part of the ho tile ca alry . The situation of the twelfth brigade wa s a disadvantageous n i u s ha d one . I fer or in n mber , it to march in open terrain su m in a hostile country , where the perior nu bers of the the s s a enemy had greate t advantage . The t nding corn added to the difficulties of the brigade in allowing the seventh hussars to approach unseen a t the very moment of the de ployment of the twelfth brigade . The seventh division on the other hand knew how to profit by the occasion in a charge n s u and co eq ent defeat of the enemy . ’ At the close of this day s maneuvers the following were the cantonmen ts of the forces

SEV E N T H COR PS W T A R M ( ES Y) .

u s B er en Headq arter , y;

i s R o ma n - Szfa mura Seventeenth infantry d vi ion , Ikloda, , Liebling ;

- S i et Thirty fourth infantry division , Bereny , Cserna, p ;

- v s V e va r Twenty third Honved infantry di i ion , Kadar , g ;

v D r a s in a T Or Ok - Sza ko s Seventh ca alry division , g , , Ujlak ;

s r e . Corp artille y , Sip t

T W E L FT H C R E AST A R M O PS ( Y) .

a s B uz ia s ' He dquarter ,

- i s B uz ia s Sixteenth infantry div ion , , Keped ;

- v s zila s Thirty eighth Honved infantry di i ion , S ;

- ﬁfth v s L a os H a r ma dia z s Thirty infantry di i ion, g , , He ere ;

l A r z - z ko . S a s Detachment of Lieutenant Co onel v , Magyar ; s il z Corp art lery , S ilas ; r H itt a s z D r a o est Twelfth cavalry b igade , y , Rakovit a, g j .

u 4th s S nday , the of September, was a day of re t and the t w c v o corps remained in the antonments indicated abo e .

O P E R A T IO N S O F S E P T E M B E R 5 .

The following were the orders issued for this day

E V T O R P w A R S EN H C S ( mr M Y) .

s m O ﬂfen siv e s The seventh corps will a su e the , and for thi pur ose the various organizations will march a s follows he s v is s T eventeenth infantry di ion , the corp artillery , and the balloon park via Temes- Vukovar in such direction a s to l 6 A U T U M N M A N E U V E RS .

s z leave the vine ard of S ilas to its right . Direction of the u t right wing, t e inclos re nor h of Daruvar . The sixty seventh infantry brigade and the artillery of the thirty - fourth division via N iczkifa lva and the inclosu re south of Szilas - - h toward the line Obianda Daruvar . The twenty t ird Honved i i s nfantry div sion in two column , the right with the divisional ‘ - i u artillery from Temes Doboz on D . So m l ; left column V ia point 201 (south of Szila s ) toward point 302 . The sixty - seventh infantry division will march in rear of - W the twenty third division toward the olfsberg . The sev en th t w V ia cavalry division , covering the lef ing, will march uz zwi z s B ias on S er ey . The seventeenth divi ion will furnish u a s pport of one battalion . The advance guards will pass the line O f the outposts at

7 a . m . o sition 6 The corps artiller will take at a . m . at the south zta mur a e a r tiller - u entrance of Roman , t y of the thirty fo rth r division at the same time at the south ent ance of Bereny . Bla z va m n s o . d 7 . a The corps headquarters will leave at a , kif l th will proceed via Nicz a va to e Wolfsberg .

T W E ET H CO R PS E AST A R M L ( Y) .

The two advanced divisions of the twelfth corps will assume

- m. . 3d a defensive position at a to morrow, the of Sep s tember, strengthened by intrenchments on the cre t of the z r slo e west of the S in a se Berg . phe S i n ex ce - fir st d ixteenth div sio , t the thirty briga e, will n 6 occupy the norther part of t position , to the ravine near point 296 ; the right flank will be co vered by one battalion to uz the north of B ias . The thirty - eighth Hon ved division (except the twenty - fir st Hon ved regiment) and the corps artillery to the south of the

- thirty second briga de . t e A r z The detachmen of L ieut nant Colonel v . will cover

- . s fir st the left flank The corps re erves , thirty Honved bri - fir st m a n d a s gade , the twenty Honved regi ent, a h lf quadron s Ska mien u r be to the ea t of , where the corps headq a ters will ad l found . The twelfth brig e of cavalry wil march in advance to the north of Buzias . - fifth in fa n tr s z The thirty divi ion will leave Bu ias at 8 a . uv r r h fi t a r a . s t m . and marc at rs on The divi ional ar ille y u will march with the advance g ard . The balloon park will remain at the disposition of the six t h v een t infantry di ision .

c su the v ts The battle, whi h en ed according to mo emen st e u s ordered , la ed thr e ho r , at the end of which time the

s u - inferiority of the twelfth corp was f lly Shown . The thirty ﬁfth infantry div ision O f the twelfth corps did not arrive until the day had been lost and the retreat commenced . The signal

18 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

s u bra wa 8 m the wo od at D m at a . . and advance to the front and the right ﬂank . The headquarters o f the corps will march with the thirty

v z s 6 . . fourth division . It will lea e S ila at a m and march u over Obianda and Dar var .

T WE L F'I‘H CO R PS EA A ( ST R M Y) .

- 6th a The twelfth corps will , to morrow , the , att ck the seventh corps and attempt to force it back toward the southwest . For this purpose the Sixteenth infantry div ision will d c s u s Szin erze a van e from Hodo in two col mn to La Lac and g, l r es ectiv e y . he thirty - ﬁfth infantry division will advan ce toward point 105 (Dumbr a wa Wald) and will cover its left ﬂank by s h two battalions and a half quadron , w ich will advance on

Obianda .

s ss s . The advance guard will the line of outpost at 8 a m . - H o n v e(p s The thirty eighth ainfantry divi ion, with the corps

7 . . artillery , will reach Hodos at a m The twelfth cavalry briga de will cover the right flank and will reconnoiter the terrain between the line Szinerszeg—Szilas z T s e l N ic kifa lva and the Temes . he corp h adquarters wil at v first march with the sixteenth infantry di ision . h h t m. T e signal for e battle of this day was given at a . a o f s v by the horse b ttery the eventh ca alry division , which opened fir e o n the heads of the columns of the hostile thirty A t eighth infantry division . the same time the horse battery of the twelfth cavalry br iga de opened fir e o n the advance u n s z g ard of the seve teenth infantry divi ion n ear Sziners eg . ’ Shortly after 9 o clock the two north wings of the opposing corps (the seventeenth and the eighth infantry di visions) n ope ed the combat near this locality .

At 8 a . m . the Emperor took position on the heights where c wa s n 11 . . . m the seventh orps to deploy Whe , toward a , s its a c the the twelfth corp made main att k , Emperor caused “ ” ﬁre h the cease to be sounded . The seventh corps t en c v s to re ei ed order retire . The troops were cantoned for the night of the 6th o f September as fol lows

SE V E N T H CO R PS WES T A R ( M Y) .

s Szila s Headquarter , ; s B uz ia s Buk v a r Seventeenth infantry divi ion , , o ;

- s zil Thirty fourth infantry divi ion , S a s ; - A U ST R I A HU N GA R Y . 19

T - s I z a r s wenty third Honved infantry divi ion , g , Teme Doboz ; z Corps artillery , S ilas ; wi l s R a ko cz a a s Szir bo v a . Seventh cava ry divi ion, , Hittyi ,

T W E L P rH CO RPS (E A ST AR M Y) .

e Da r uva r Headquart rs, div iswn H o dos Sixteenth infantry , ;

- ﬁfth v s D a r uva r s m e Thirty infantry di i ion , , I tvanfalva , I r fa lva ; One regiment at Magyar- Sza ko s ;

- n t Sz i n e r sz e Thirty eighth i fan ry division , g; s Corp artillery , Daruvar ;

t d h ba - F o r a cs u O a . Twelf h cavalry briga e , g , Bold r

O P E R A T I O N S O F S E P T E M B E R 7 .

The seventh corps took the defensiv e ' and occ upied the i n posit on on the heights of Szilas and Ska mie . The twelfth corps renewed the attack and attempted to d r v i e the enemy to the northwest . The orders for the day were a s follows

E V N W S E T H CO R PS ( E ST A R M Y ) .

The seventh corps will abandon the offensive and take posi s O f uz u s s v e n tion outh B ias . For this p rpo e the e ent e th s e infantry divi ion , re nforced by the corps artillery and the se n v s c ve th cavalry di i ion , will o cupy the terrain between the Temes and the height which connects the Szila zer Berg with m n the Ska ie . - i The thirty fourth infantry division , w th the exception of - t r l u s the sixty seventh infan ry b igade , wi l occ py thi height at point 302 .

- The sixty seventh infantry brigade , forming the corps r s s s in e erve, will be formed in mas faced to the ea t , the de s s s n pression of the Valea Neagra . The e po ition will be oco

0 . . pied not later than 7 . 3 a m The twen t - third Honved infantry division will assemble

ca st 197 S O f z . in two lines aced to the , at point , outh S ilas The corps headquarters will be found on the Ska mien after

7 . a m . W A T E L PT H COR PS (E AST R M Y) .

The twelfth corps will renew the attack of yesterday . For this purpose the main column of the thirty - eighth Honved infantry division will ad vance along the road from zi z to uz v S ners eg B ias . It will be co ered by a detachment 20 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

the su n Dumbra wa v alon inclo re orth of the Wald , ha ing i the c ock tower of Buzia s as point of d rection . A battalion will march by wa Of La Lac in order to establish connection with the thirty - fi th infantry division The thirty - fifth infantry division will direct its prin cipal column from Daruvar V ia Obianda on the Ska mien . It will be covered on the right by a column in the direction of point 16 n d l er 5 a the Szi a s Berg . - za ko s n The regiment cantoned at Magyar S , advanci g via i h s z a s D . So mul on the heig t to the south of S il , will cover the n left fla k of the corps . The advance guards will pass the line of the outposts at 8 a . m . The Sixteenth infantry division and the corps artillery will m s s 8 . form the general re erve and will be formed in mas at a . z at the east entrance of S in erszeg . n a n d z s The twelfth cavalry brigade , marchi g on Keped Bu ia , will cover the ri ht flank of the co 8 . T he corps he quarters will marc with the main column

- of the thirty eighth infantry division .

m c s 9 . . Toward a , when the ommander of the twelfth corp had received information of the dispo sitions of the seventh c - t orps , he gave orders for the thirty eighth infan ry division r a w s to halt near the inclosure near the Dumb a Wald . Thi division was then assembled in the outskirts of the woods and wa s s there deployed . At the ame time the twelfth corps com mander ordered the sixteenth infantry division to pass to the north of the forest and to follow the valley of the Surga n y

- Arok . A t a . m . the entire thirty eighth division advanced to a zila ser deployed the att ck of the S Berg, while the thirty ﬁfth infantry div ision attempted to gain the terrain toward m the Ska ien . Informed a s to the march of the sixteenth infantry division c s s (East army) , the ommander of the eventh corp , in order to c wa s e v his meet this atta k , compell d to mo e reserve from the t uz t a . h right to the left ﬂank, direc ing it oward B i s W en , ’ 11 O s v wa s toward clock , the ixteenth di ision preparing for the

z s - v attack on Bu ia , the twenty third infantry di ision (West c wa s n t army) whi h arriving there , was preparing for a cou er m e se ﬁr attack . At this moment the E peror order d the cea e u u fﬁ s to be so nded and , calling together the s perior o cer on the zila ser s s s a t S Berg, he expres ed his ati f c ion at the outcome of the maneuvers .

u - u v 9 This concluded the A stro H ngarian maneu ers for 18 8. T H E F E CH Y E U V S R N ARM MAN ER .

GE N E R A L SCHE M E .

s s A northern army, compo ed of the eighth army corp and s v v s o f e enth cavalry di i ion, is encamped on the right bank

u - n a . n s the Loire betwee Bo rbon L ncy and St Ag an , facing outh A portion of its cavalry is on the left bank of the river to s r r m u s ward Beaulon . Its supplie are eceived f o Mo lin , where a mple supply depots are established and it is kept in touch s m z with the re t of the ar y by way of Deci e . u s t m s A so thern army , compo ed of the thir eenth ar y corp a n d d v s n of the sixth cavalry i i ion , which came from Roan e , is the its n u the encamped on Roudon , mission bei g to capt re u s ss Mo lin railroad cro ing .

O M M A N D ST R E N GT A N D O R GA N A T O N . C , H, IZ I

General Negrier wa s commander in chief of the armies and c u hief mpire at the maneuvers . The eighth corps a n d seventh cavalry di vision aggregated 96 s n u 7 fﬁ a d 2 6 s . o cers, enli ted men , abo t batterie The t hirteenth corps and sixth cavalry division were approximately th s s t of e ame treng h .

N O R T H E R N A R M Y .

Eighth corps— General Caillard Fifteenth division of infantry— General Barra s Twenty - eighth brigade of infantry Fifty- sixth regiment of infantry One hundred and thi rty - fourth regimen t

infantry . Thirtieth brigade of infantry n Te th regiment of infantry .

- s v in Twenty e enth regiment of fantry . n Compa y of engineers . 6 ﬁ e s Divisional artillery , eld batteri . 22 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

Sixteenth division of infantry— Ge n eral Godard Thirty- ﬁrst brigade of infantry

- ﬁfth a Eighty regiment of inf ntry .

- fth Ninety ﬁ regiment of infantry . Thirty- second brigade of infan try

Thirteenth regiment of infantry .

- Twenty ninth regiment of infantry . O f e Company engin ers . 6 ﬁ t s D . ivisional artillery , eld bat erie t s Telegraph and pon oon train .

Company of engineers .

6 ﬁ 2 s s . Corps artillery , eld and hor e batterie Sev enth division O f cavalry— General Briols Eighth brigade of ca valry

- Twen ty sixth regiment of dragoons . O f ss s Sixteenth regiment cha eur . Third brigade of chasseurs s Eighth regiment o f chas eurs .

Fourteenth regiment of cha sseurs . — First brigade of drago ons f

Seventh regiment of dragoons .

Eighteenth regiment of dragoon s .

Divisional artillery . n t n Sectio elegraph and po toon trains .

H E R A SO UT N RM Y.

Thirteenth corps— General Ja cquemin — Twen ty - ﬁfth division of infantry General Mouto n Forty- ninth brigade of infantry

Sixteenth regiment of infantry .

- Thirty eighth regiment of infantry . Fiftieth brigade of infantry

- o Eighty Sixth regimen t f infan try . O n e hundred and thirty- ni n th regiment of

infantry . m n Co pa y of engineers . s Divi ional artillery . — Twenty - sixth div ision of infantry General T er rillo n Fifty - ﬁr st brigade O f infantry

- Nin ety eighth regiment of infantry . One hundred and twen ty - ﬁr st regiment O f

infantry . FR A N CE . 23

Fifty - second brigade of infantr y

- m f Ninety second regi ent O in fantry . ﬁ i o f One hundred and fth reg men t infantry .

Company of engineers . v s Di i ional artillery .

Telegraph section .

Balloon section . s Company of engineer .

Corps artillery . S v v — ixth di ision of ca alry General Boysson . Thirteenth brigade of cavalry m u Tenth regi ent of chasse rs . s Thirtieth regiment of dragoon . Fifth brigade of cuirassiers

Seventh regiment of cuirassiers . n Te th regimen t of cuirassiers . Sixth brigade of dragoons f Second regiment O dragoons . f Nineteenth regiment o dragoons . First brigade of hussars s s Eleventh regiment of hus ar . s Twelfth regiment of hu sars . n r s Section telegraph and po toon t ain . v Di isional horse artillery . s s Company of cycli t .

V I N ST R U CT IO N S R E LA T IV E T O T H E E " E CU T ION O F M A N E U E R S .

T H E A T E R O F O PE R A T ION S .

A ll the operations took place within the Villeneuve quad ’ r ila tera l : T er te - H a utr iv e s - l E vé ue (on the Allier) , I sy q , and

- - Marcigny sur Loire .

V E DIV ISIO N OF T H E M A N E U E RS IN T O T HR E E P R IO DS .

— D 1 us v . T E R . 8 0 FIR S P IO From September to , incl i e

s s s . First day , maneuver of one divi ion again t another n s s o s Seco d and third day , maneuver of two army c rp and two cavalry division s operating against each other . — E N D E R D t 12 14 . S CO P IO . From Sep ember to , inclusive Maneuvers of corps and divisions against each other during O f a n s u a perio d three days . Continuation of the oper tio beg n u ﬁ d ring the rst period . — THIR D Fiss i o n September 15 and 16 . Preparation for and grand review of troops by the Presi

O f u m e m s s o . dent the Rep blic . (O itt d fro thi de cripti n ) 24 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The schemes for the divisional maneuv ers were given o ut

September 7 by the division commanders . The instructions for the maneuvers of army corps and cav a lry divisions against ea ch other were promulgated from day d to a y . There wa s no interruption during the progress Of the latter maneuvers except on the day set apart for rest . They were projected and executed under conditio ns of actual u c a n d warfare as far as practicable, with o tposts duly pla ed a s u bivouacs est bli hed when req ired . In order to avoid fatiguing the troops more than necessary i ul s w s for the O perations , the follow ng r e ere adopted , ubject to mo diﬁcation by the commander in chief 1 s s . . Patrol were not to leave their cantonment before dawn

2 v . In . No mo ement of troo ps was to be ordered before a .

3 . s m. All troop were to halt and remain in place at a . s wa s m n for breakfa t, and the maneuver to be resu ed at oon wi u t s to e thout f r her orders . Watche were be regulat d by the railway time . m u s h wa s to a d m 4 . In night ane ver t ere be a halt m e fro th ﬁ 6 . ff e to a . m for co ee and the distribution of eld ration of spirits . s s wa s s a n u In ca e of rain thi halt to la t for half ho r .

O P E R A T IO N S O F S E P T E M B E R 8 .

N O R T H E R N A R M Y.

7th s th v s n On the evening of the , the even cavalry di i io , which wa s camped o n the left bank of the Loi re at Beaulon

n u s - n - leS- s a n d (ge eral headq arter ) , Garnat, Saint Marti Lai ,

- le - es v r s the Paray Fr il , recei ed o der to clear the left bank of c e its u ss h Loire , to fa ilitat thereby lterior pa age by the eight corps at Diou. s a wa s s t s The oppo ing c valry igh ed in the Be bre Valley , s u um o th of Va as . i l . In s vi i t 8 . s s On the th at a the eventh di on , with arti wa s J a illo ts 6 m s s o f lery , concentrated at the ( kilo eter we t e a n d r s a n d u n B aulon) , pat olled the Be bre the co ntry betwee the o s s n ed L ire and the canal . While in thi po itio it was learn ’ a the m s c v n - n th t ene y a alry , debouchi g from Saint Pourcai s ur - T e e e n a n d m w a s v n hi l b tw e Thiel Do pierre , ad a cing to e s u hm wa s si h its me t it . A di mo nted detac ent g ted on left

26 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S . of numerical inferiority to obtain the advantage by utiliz ing ma ss s their men en e , according to circum tances, against the echelons crossing the railroad .

8th s n s s On the evening of the , the po itio of the armie were a s follows

N OR T HE R N AR M Y . T h e army faced south . Seventh cavalry division wa s on the line of Beaulon —Paray ls - e -s ur - w in Fr sil ; eighth brigade , Dompierre Besbre ( ith an fa n tr y ﬂank guard) ; one division of infantry at Diou ; another division at Bourbon - Lancy ; the artillery corps at Chalmoux (6 kilometers southeast of Bourbon - Lancy) ; pontoo n trains at

Gilly . o s s u u s The outp t occ pied the line Perrigny , Thiel , P tay Ca tle, ' deS R o udillon s E in o ts o n Ga uﬂ r o ux Arbre , p (interval p i t , o r s Sav ya d .

SOU T HER N A R M Y .

Sixth cavalry division wa s on the line of Neuilly - le- Réal v r d u a s Mercy ; thirteenth ca alry b iga e , Va m ; one infantry

s n - e o n e s w divi io , Saint L on ; infantry divi ion , Saligny , ith a ﬂank guard a t Coulanges on the lateral canal of the Loire ;

s . the artillery corps, Liernolle e ss u o The outposts occupi d the line Boi ea x (on the L ire) ,

n - u P ier reﬁte along the Dio Digoin ro te , on the canal northwest i l o 232 Ba lin et of Larmiers (interval point nterva p int ,

r u . C eek , Va mas

O P E R A T IO N S O F S E P T E M B E R 9 .

T R N N O R H E A R M Y .

s v v n e c e The e enth cavalry division , ha i g b en oncentrat d at

u a t P er r ia ux l o t its a n early ho r a . m . ) (interva p in patrols c ame in contact with the sixth cavalry division near

Thiel . The Object being to facilitate the Crossing O f the eighth c s the u orp from the right to the left bank of Loire at Dio , a detachment O f three squa drons of hussars and two pieces of

artillery wa s sen t o ut to meet the sixth div ision near Thiel . its m a d wa s Directing march along the Do pierre ro , which u O f o s held by an infantry ﬂank g ard the eighth c rp , the divi sio n adva nced toward Saligny to meet the head s of the column s

o f the thirte en th corps with a V iew to delaying its progress . The artillery went into action a t a ga inst the ad v anced FR A N CE . 27

e s ds 1 guard of the thirt enth corp at the edge of the woo , kilo e o f t 26 1 met r west interval poin . e s s n Assembl d behind the e woods , the eve th cavalry division e nded the day by debouchin g by the E mo n do n s (4 kilometers south of Dompierre) to operate against the infantry of the ee s thirt nth corps, after freeing it elf from the cavalry brigade

o s of that c rps , which a sembled for the purpose of preventing

the movement . fi s The eighth corps nally sent a divi ion to Diou , thereby its u r reenforcing flank g ard at Dompie re . During the fore noon a bridge of boats wa s placed at Diou meters below t the s one bridge , and , its companies of engineers being assem a fieldwo rks bled , bridgehead composed of and batteries wa s

established on a line starting east of Putay , thence by the ss n u n Bro es to the termi al at Ro do , on the farm land of the R o dill n s 2 o ( kilometers southwest of Diou) . ’ 4 c the n At o lock in the afternoon line of outposts , extendi g s u along the edge of the woods o th of Diou , was in contact ’ n a with the e emy s outposts, which were dvanced from Saligny t w ff u o n o ard the north by di erent ro tes converging Diou . The troops of the Northern army bivouacked as follows s s The eventh cavalry divi ion , along the Acolin north of the Thiel ; the eighth corps brigade , on Besbre at Dompierre ; the s u e infantry divi ion , at Dio and V vre (right bank of the o s L ire) . The outposts of the two oppo ing armies were in

con tac t all along the line .

N SOUT HE R A R M Y .

its The sixth cavalry division , in carrying out mission and o u wishing to clear the right bank of the L ire, was in p rsuit s V of the eventh cavalry division , with a iew to emphasiz ing th n s e . the operatio of night before At 7 a . m . it debouched from Thiel toward interval point 2 70 (3 kilometers north t ea st o f Thiel) . I s advanced guard met a detachment of the s s oppo ing cavalry near Loye , which was holding a hamlet

u . occupied by a dismounted sq adron The cyclist company , wa s wi its d s which moving along th advance guard , upported by a section of artillery , attacked the hamlet . During this attack the opposing squadron exposed itself to V iew ; but s O f O c wa s s n losing ight the main bje t, which to form a cree , it committed the blunder of trying to capture a section O f c e u su e s artillery whi h app ared to be n pport d , and found it elf 28 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

u attacked by an entire regiment . It wo ld have been de u u t e its s stroyed , and conseq ently could not f r her execut plan . s s a s d Neverthele s, the ixth c valry divi ion , which advance a s wa s u ss far as Chappes, fo nd to be too far away to succe t fully take par with its army in the operations of that day , and in the evening the chief umpir e o f the maneuvers ordered u e u it to bivo ac between Chap a and Mercy . The heads of columns of the thirteenth co rps became eu gaged with the seventh cavalry , and bivouacked on the Ba lin et E mo n do n s Bea uva n n e w Roudon and from to , ith general headquarters at Paray . The opposing outposts were in contact . - O P E R A T I O N S O F S E P T E M B E R e I o .

N N O R T HE R A R M Y.

T h h u ed e eig th cavalry brigade , which was bivo ack at

- sur - ﬁ s a n t c Dompierre Besbre , nding it elf hampered by at a k

‘ h u s its m u n the of t e o tpo ts of ar y , brought abo t since meeti g u m s . ene y toward du k , advanced on Dio wa s u the c n The seventh cavalry division bivo acked on A oli , n north and south of the Varen es Ra ilway . At night the sixth division had a regiment in proximity to s u the works of the bridgehead , and three other bivo acked or u cantoned at Dio . ﬁ t s i u the B u e The f eenth divi ion , which b vo acked at r y res , wa s a on the right bank of the Loire , c lled to arms by alarm and crossed the river on the bridge of boats and the stone c e s v bridge , in order to rea h the en my , a reconnois ance ha ing t s shown that he wa s preparing for an a tack . This divi ion

111. completed the passage of the Loire at a . u d About 2 a . m . the o tposts of the eighth corps were attacke s u e ss s s almost simultaneou ly at P tay , Bois , Bro e in the Boi ’ l A r r e R o dillon s h de b des , and on the hig way from Saligny to Dompierre . s o n e s These attacks nece sitated reenf rci g the outpost res rve , and the eighth corps undertook at once to force a debouche by a movement executed during the night . With this object in V iew one of its division s endeavored to

u s - the debo ch between the Bros es and Bel Air , while other v a n 275 di ision , holding a brigade in reserve , dva ced on ridge ’ o f l A rbr e des R o dillo n s . By the a ttack became genera l alone the entire line o f the Southern army . FR A N CE . 29

The eighth corps held its own a t Brosses a n d at daybreak made a counter attack which deﬁnitely cleared this point of u s a s pport . But the enemy progre sively dvanced more and n more toward the north , causing the eighth corps to cha ge front in refusing its right . The enemy in fact captured the r e o u s wa s idge betwe n R don and the Be bre , a ridge that not

n . c i trenched This atta k extended his right more and more, causing the eighth corps to engage a portion of its general reserves in order to protect the passage of the canal and

railway . Under these conditions the comman der in chief dec ided that the ridge between Brosses and Bel - Air should remain in s s but w u s the pos ession of the eighth corp , ith the nder tand ing that this corps should be given the necessary time to retrea t across the Loire . Upon receipt of this order the Northern army advanced all r o O f its artille y corps, t gether with a regiment infantry, on u the heights of the right bank , north of Dio , toward Brosses, a position which properly commanded the passage of the its Loire , and then commanded retreat in echelon with the

ﬁfteenth division . v The seventh cavalry di ision, in getting into action , crossed r c s the Besbre at Dompier e , took with it the orp brigade , and separated the Sixth cavalry division from the bulk of the Souther n army by operating in the deﬁles which this division was to cross in order to join in the battle . At the end of the maneuver the situation wa s a s follows

The eighth corps descended the right bank of the Loire , estab lishin - e u u its g itself at Bourbon Lan y and Fo rnea , took bridge t u uwi uc s of boats , lef a rear g ard at Dio th instr tions to de troy the permanent bridge . This Northern corps wa s reenforced during the operations of the tenth by a cavalr y division of two brigades (ﬁfth bri u s n r e gade of c ira siers , sixth dragoo s , and two ho se batt ries) , forming with the seventh cavalry di vision a cavalry corps c s under the command of General Boysson . This avalry corp

— - wa s established o n the line Lusigny Chevannes Beaulon .

The eighth cavalry b rigade wa s at Garnat .

E SOU T H R N A RM Y.

u its The thirteenth corps bivo acked in the Roudon Valley, ’ object being to dri v e ba ck the enemy s outposts during the night in order to prevent the eighth corps from debouching . 3 0 A U T U M N M A N EU V E R S .

m wa s c u o f o n e The ovement executed by three ol mns, each u v e n des . brigad , against Ter at, Brosses, and P tay, respecti ely

The battle took place at daybreak . The thirteenth corps received instructions from the chief umpire that its attacks were to be conﬁned along the front of

- but u Brosses, Bel Air, that the advance by Ternat on Dio

succeeded in forcing the enemy to retreat . During this time the thirteenth cavalry brigade adva nced on the right of the Southern corps and forded the Loire below

Diou for the purpose of atta cking the eighth corps in retreat . The Southern army then cantoned around Dompierre - sur u Besbre . D ring the day it was informed that the sixth ca v a lry division was called away under special orders in v iew of s n ﬁ s s e di tant operatio s , and that the rst brigade of hus ar alon w ould remain .

G E N E R A L S IT U A T IO N S E P T E M B E R 1 1 .

N O R T H E R N A R M Y.

The commandin g general of the Nor thern army rece iv ed from the commander in chief of the armies instruction s to advance on the right ban k of the Loire and secure his co m ’ mun ica tio n s z s by Deci e , the object being to menace the enemy ﬂank in case he should advance on the Moulins railway

crossings. O M S T ON — s C PO I I Eighth army corp complete, the cavalry corps comprising the seventh ca valry di vision augmented by s s s s the ﬁfth brigade of cuiras ier and two hor e batterie .

O T — h c u - c CA N T N M E N . Eight orps around Bo rbon Lan y and Fourneau with a rear guard at Diou ; cav a lry corps at Beau v lon , Che agnes, Lusigny .

SOU T H E R N A R M Y.

The Southern army was ordered to carry out its mission of

capturing the Moulins railroad crossings . M S T O N — a s ﬁ CO PO I I Thirteenth rmy corp complete , rst bri gade of hussars . The other elements of the sixth division were relieved from the army by the commander in chief and assigned to take ff part in distant and di erent operations . — CA N T O N M E N T . Thirteenth corps in the region of Dom ﬁ s s s pierre , Saligny , and Thiel ; r t brigade of hu sar , Mont

u. beugny , Chapea FR A N CE . 3 1

O P E R A T IO N S O F S E P T E M B E R 1 2 .

N A O R T H E R N R M Y .

During the night the commander of the Northern army ca used a bridge to be thrown across the Loire at La Fourneau in order to add to the facilities afforded by the suspension

' - n bridge on the high road from Bourbon L a cy to Moulins . n The army comme ced crossing at a . m . The object O f the Northern army wa s to group itself on the us — line of L igny Chevagnes . The division , which left a rear u wa s g ard at Diou , credited with having blown up the bridge a n d with having advanced in order to unite with the leading division ; but on account of the great distance which sepa O n ev e ss rated the two divisions the of the night of cro ing, the leading division debouched from Garnat on Chevagnes us n s s and L ig y , ri king an i olated attack by the thirteenth c uv orps mane ering en masse . ss a ss c v dis It was nece ary , owing to the m of a alry at the s s po al of the Northern army, that the thirteenth corp advance Slowly . The division arrived and placed itself on the main line of u s - — eu ro te of the thirteenth corp , Dompierre Thiel Montb gny u s u s c wa s Mo lin , so th of the railroad , while the eventh , whi h c n r o centrated no th of Thiel , operated on the right . ﬂank of u the col mns . The sixth cavalry division at an early hour came in con tact with the advanced guard o f the thirteenth corps on the

- u n ﬁre but Thiel Montbeugny ro te, and ope ed on it, the delay s s in the ma rch of the column wa s short . The dispo ition taken by the infantry did not insure a complete success of the s s wa s attack on the cavalry . However, the ixth divi ion obliged to fall back and take up a position behind a wave of P s e u s to ground we t of telo p , from which place it propo ed act upon the arrival O f the infantry in this uncovered region ; but s s the thirteenth corp , having learned the po ition of the ’ e s u its nemy infantry near Chevagnes , stopped the b lk of Of u n c e leading columns on the heights Montbe g y , oncentrat d u s its tro ops and established its o tpost . s its s The seventh cavalry divi ion , contrary to expectation , ’ found itself in the presence of a division of the enemy s cav a lr d i c y supplie w th horse artillery , which atta ked it in the u n n . mor i g, north of the railway line This mane ver of the 32 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S . enemy prevented the seventh cavalry division coming in co n c t co u co n se ta t wi h the right l mn of the thirteenth corps, quently the movement of the Southern army did n o t delay that of the seventh division . On the night Of the 12th the cantonments of the Northern army were as follows

- lo- e - u Eighth corps, Chevagnes, Paray Fr sil , Garnat Bea lon ; ez S i s seventh division , Lusigny , Ch y , Gennetines ; ixth div ion , z Y eures . u s z n s The line of o tpo ts embraced Y eures , on the Mouli u u o u e e u s ro te to L signy , Grand Hanoy , C q es, P t lo p , Grande s t e o n Chappe (interval poin Mai (int rval p int Mo tas, th u u to o Lo ire so th of Bea lon .

E SOUT H R N A R M Y .

The commander of the Southern army formed a provisional s u s divi ion of cavalry , composed of the brigade of h s ars and s u sa the thirteenth corp brigade, which joined the h s rs north of Thiel ; the horse batteries O f the artillery corps were also ss f s s to added . The mi ion o this provi ional divi ion was pro ’ tect the right ﬂank O f the attacking par ty from the enemy s s cavalry . Thi new adversary , which the seventh division e u s ds did not calculat pon meeting, brought it to a tan till for the da y : The thirteen th corps adv anced in four columns against the s n a t u s n divi io Mo lin , followi g the axis Thiel , Montbeugny , u u s u w Petelo p . The col mn which followed thi ro te a s attacked S but w by the ixth cavalry division , o ing to a special order of s s s h v s march thi attack failed . The pre ence of the ixt di i ion u v u having been comm nicated by the ser ice of sec rity, the column instead O f advancing by the road entered the woods u so th of the road , holding the balance of its forces in echelon ’ A S m s in rear . a result of the ovement the enemy artillery c sa w s and avalry nothing on the road , and not having earched s su u s the wood thoroughly , ddenly fo nd themselve in the presence of an infantry force debouching upon them at 600 v wa e meters . The sixth di ision s driven back beyond P te u its lo p , and the thirteenth corps reached the objective of m due arch in time . The Southern army cantonments were a s follows O f u — i Facing to the north on the line Montbe gny Thiel , w th

s - - ﬂank guard of cavalry at Dompierre and Neuilly lo Réal .

34 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S . force which appeared to come from Thiel on its wa y toward s e u Chev agnes . Thi r giment wa s the ﬂank g ard the en emy n l ordered in echelo by batta ion , to form the pivot of the h t V maneuver ; in fact , the t irteen h corps had in iew the cap

- P ur a in M a l cher s u u o e e s s . ture of Saint c , , and ub eq ently L igny

su e fi t. u T he These movements re lt d in a gh and s rprise . infantry of the thirteenth corps foun d itself suddenly engaged n S wa s i with infa try at hort range , which due to not hav ng n c iv scouts in adva e of it . An engagement of considerable a ct u e ity occurred before the artillery co ld int rfere . But this engagement ha d the unloc ked - for result O f causing the Southern army to deploy all the artillery of the fifteenth division and a group O f the artillery corps on the ridge (eas t f e u and west) O the signal level P telo p . T he regiment of the So uthern army which thus c onfronted e v wa s s a s the sixte nth di ision ent far south by the umpires , having been ann ihilated . At the sa me time an engagement occurred near Lusigny between the cav alry corps and a regiment of in fantry of the his t u u ut . e s c ss e So hern army T r giment, a tacked by fo r c e iv echelons of the cavalry corps supported by one piece of artil wa s u s n us its s lery , declared by the mpire u able to s tain po i wa s tion , and ordered to the rear . From that time the cavalry corps did not cease to ma n eu e c n c o s ver in immediat on e ti n with the Northern corp , in order its c wa s cess o utfl a n ked bv to disengage right, whi h in antly ’ m t the enemy s move en s . s a s e u u Of The movement , a whol , bro ght abo t a change

- l - M a r n s front on the line Lusigny es do . sum u u us t c s a n d c u s To p, after n mero at a k o nter attack , s v s c e s ﬁ the Northern corp recei ed order to a e ghting, retreat, and occupy the bivouac s on the lin e of communication toward en d the s r the north . At the of the day po ition of the Northe n army wa s a s follows :

v u ur s s s e ue o . The eventh di ision at Villen ve , O q , and D rne

c u c e a t L ucen a ~le ~ A ix The orps brigade bivo a k d y s . The cav alry wa s thus canto ned tha t it might be in advance l u m c v n on the ine of ret rn ar h . Otherwise it would ha e bee f placed on the la nks .

- The entire eighth co rps wa s bivoua cked a t Saint Ennemond . ’ u o st sse o o ux - sur - I zo n The line of o tp s pa d thr ugh Arn O , ev Pa n n esa n e F a n d wa s c ss ds V re, g , lomont, ro ed by the roa FR A N CE . 35

M u n - c z Jen n etin es- Do r n eS- Our din es us o li s De i e , , Breuil , Ro u s . ets (The cavalry corps was broken p, and the cavalry d v u i isions were ret rned to their respective corps . )

SO A U T HE RN R M Y .

in cu ff th The Southern army, order to completely t o e North m u s v e r n ar y from Mo lin , decided to attack it by maneu ering

on the left . ss c s m At a . m . it a embled in lo e for ation n orth of Mont u a s u u be gny , with a regiment flank g ard , and mane vered on n the route from Thiel to Chevag es . The first objective wa s Saint - Pourcain- M a lecher e a n d the v l But t O r a et . s Cha eau the action of the cavalry corp , sup o a us v p rted by detachment from L igny , ha ing been felt, the thirteenth corps advanced its echelons by the left while send ’ ing its provi sional cavalry division against the enemy s ca v z a lr y in the direction of Che y . O u h ma n eu The divergent peration of the flank g ard , whic s s the i fi vered again t Chevagne , by drawing ent re fteenth d s in s O f e ivi ion the direction of the ignal point P teloup , ena bled the thirteenth corps to attack Lusigny with a superior

force . From that time the thirteenth corps continually reenforced its s it s left and recalled all the troop that were on right . It s u c c s h al o exec ted a hange of front, fa ing northea t , whic ended u n v s in a co nter attack in the directio of Che agne . s but its u su The Northern corp retreated , p r it by the South

ern army was prohibited by the chief umpire . He placed the u s s u s s O f v s o tpo t on the line Saint Jacq e (we t Che agne ) , Bla v s Pelletieres ez JO n cs uvi et , , Ch y , (interval point Cha ns (interval poin t and the northern edge of the woods of

Pommais . s wa s m ur The Sixth cavalry divi ion ca ped a t Yse e . The thirteenth brigade of the cav alry co r pS wa s at Che n v a g es . t c s us The entire thirteen h orp bivouacked at L igny .

O P E R A T I ON S O F S E P T E M B E R 1 4 .

N R T A O H E R N RM Y .

The Nor thern army biv ouacked during the ev ening of the 13th a s follows :

n - m e c v Eighth corps, Sai t Enne ond ; ighth a alry brigade,

u - - A ix s v v s u L cenay les ; e enth cavalry di i ion , Villene ve

u - s Auro er Dorn e . 3 6 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

On the morning of the 14th the commanding general of the Northern army decided to ad vance and meet the South ern army , in order to try once more to relieve Moulins and force the enemy back on the Loire . With this object in V iew the eighth corps wa s concentrated

u - m. 7 . c e at a , fa ing so th , along the Saint Ennemond rout , at Aurouer toward the Thebauts and the Ban guis ; the ﬁfteenth i s and sixteenth div sion to the left and right, respectively, each div ision covering its exterior wing by a ﬂan k guard m s n a n d co po ed of a regiment of i fantry , a battery, a half s u q adron of cavalry . When the formation was completed the army corps moved s to ward the south in two column .

. m te At a . the fif enth division moved from the Thebauts Bo ur ea ude s o s u on Breuil , g , Laurent , Mar on ; its flank g ard M a l r ets T o n n in s s e . marching through the valley on the Rabi , , s n At a . m . the ixtee th division advanced from Saint e u s u its s Enn mond by the great Mo lin ro te , flank guard rea n co din g the right bank of the Abron . P a n n esa n e co v The eighth cavalry brigade , grouped near g , ered the left flank of the eighth corps . c v is m s a wa s The seventh a alry div ion , as ed near R uche , instructed to assume the offensi v e to the southeast in order to secure the debouch of the army corps .

This wa s the ﬁrst div ision which met the enemy . T he u T n n in s v n action occ rred near o s with the ixth ca alry divisio , and owing to its superiority the seventh wa s unable to cross

s s Of . the Vignol ravine , the northern lope which it held Consequently the adv ance O f the columns of the ﬁfte enth division wa s slightly delayed . It wa s only when the infantry columns commenced de houching from the woods that the seventh cavalry division ’ v s c l could ad ance . It became engaged with the enemy ava ry Péchin on the heights of the left bank of the Abron , near ; after several engagements the cavalry of the Southern army

' M o r cer a n d u was obliged to fall back on , being nable to with ’ stand the enemy s advance . To the right of the eighth corps the head of the sixteenth u u u but d division occ pied the agric lt ral college , being attacke on its right and left by a superior force and not being sup o u h ﬁ v to the ported the rig t by the fteenth di ision , owing FR A N CE . 37

e sta wa s to int rvening di nce, it obliged fall back on Genne ﬁ ee s dr ux . tines and the A n ea However, the ft nth divi ion li soon came into ne . ﬁ s s te wa s The rst fraction , uppor d by the artillery, which u s placed along the so thern edge of the Munet fore t, captured Bo isfo u M o rcer a n d hi s and , w ch they lost and regained everal times . These troops compelled the left of the thirteenth corps to

t o . change front, facing the left and extending along the Abron i l ﬁ s F nal y , two reserve regiments of the fteenth divi ion u u skillf lly mane vered , emerged from the depths of a ravine ’ and sudden ly made a V igorous attack upon the enemy s n t u i m 225 i fantry and ar illery , which occ pied the r dge arked , north of the agricultural college ; they were at the same time a tta cked in the rear by foragers from the cavalry brigade of th e eighth corps . About this time the commander in chief signaled the end uv of the mane er .

E A SO UT H R N R M Y .

On the evening of the 13th the Southern army bivouacked a s follows : e c s O f The thirte nth orps , with its cavalry brigade , we t u i i se r L signy ; the s xth cavalry div sion at Y u e . On the morning of the 14th the troops atta cked the enemy

for the purpose of forcing hi mback to the north . n The thirteenth corps advanced in four colum s . The twenty - ﬁfth division wa s for med in two marchi ng s n us the column . One adva ced from J tice on Lucenay and e i h vra Brosse Valley ; the other start d from Pav llon for C e y , u Chauvins, and the agricult ral college . The twenty - sixth division also formed two similar col umn s O f o ts J e , that the left advancing from the G on to on s i O II ez and Dav ds , and the right marching from Lusigny Ch y

and D reva ux . t ss Bla v ets co v The thir eenth cavalry brigade a embled at , r i e ing the right ﬂank of the thirteenth corps . The s xth ca v alr y division formed at interval point 262 to prevent the m s oppo sing force fro debouching from the Munet fore t . The action began by an engagement between the six th a n d s s v e e eventh cavalry division , the latter being pre nt d from r gaining a n y ground south of tha t fo est . 38 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The thirteenth corps debouched from the Pommai woo d s l ts h ic without diflicu ty . I left column advanced on t e a gr ul r e tural college, which it captu ed asily , driving back toward the north the infantry of the eighth corps (sixteenth division) . s v e Thi mo ement, unfortunately for the thirte nth corps, ex po sed its flank to the tro ops of the fifteenth division of the In tur Northern army , which n debouched from the Munet forest . The twenty - fifth division was obliged to face to the left ts r r d and extend along the Abron Creek . I a tille y forme u u e north of the agricult ral college and s pport d the infantry , hi v u B f r n w ch was endea oring to capt re o i o u and M o r ce a d . The twenty - Sixth div ision continued to advance on Genne e A n dr ea ux s ffi u tin s and , but before gaining u cient gro nd on

c o e its a to . whi h to p rate , it, too, changed front , f cing the left The sali ent formed at interval po int 255 (800meters northeast O f the agricultural college) by the line of battle of the thir teen th corps wa s vigorously attacked by two regiments of the w hm eighth corps , hich drove the advanced detac ents of the

- twenty ﬁfth division back on the right bank o f the Abron .

They were closely followed and the heights taken by assa ult . At the same time the fractions of the eighth cavalry brigade atta cked the defenders in rea r . A ll the frac tions of the thirteenth corps were driven back u o n the agric ltural college . h s The maneuvers ended with t i movement . T H E P L G Y IM ERIA ERMA N ARM MANEU V ERS.

The year 1898 marked a cessation in the progressive increase in the number of troops which had assembled an nually since 1 9 m m n u 8 5 for the i perial German a e vers . The army seems to have returned to its former method of o t n s s . ma euvering two army c rp , one again t the o her

DE SCR IPT ION O F T H E R E GIO N

T he region of the maneuvers was the country around the s u s middle Weser . The o thern part belong to the Middle Ger u man mo ntain range , and the northern part to the North m Ger an plains . s e s s The Dei t r Mountains , ri ing outhwest of Hannover and separated by the lowland of Rodenberg, form a boundary be a u tween the high and low land ne r the B cke Berg . They are co n ifer o ris i covered with deciduous and woods, w th a grea ter In part of them fenced as a game park of the Duchy of Lippe, and ca n be penetrated by troops of all arms only by the high uc z h way between Obernkirchen and B hhol . The valley of t e s Bii cke- its s u Aue eparates the Berg from western p r, the s i u s w Bii k Harrl . Flat elevation cont n e we t of the to n of c e burg in Weinberg and of the heights of R dcke up to the t Sandfur h forest . Northeast of Bucks - Berg a wavy plateau is bounded by the s th lowland of the Aue . On e other Side of that lowland are u the impassable lands of Scha mburg forest . South of Bii cke- Berg the hills bran ch out to the west in s fi u parallel range , nally uniting and forming the Weser Mo n s s s s tains . The mountain ridge are traver ed by the pas e of z d s Buchhol a n Kleinenbremen . The We er River flows at the southern foot of the Weser Mountains f rom Hessian- Olden dorf to Rinteln ; then it makes a turn and fin ds its way into c W stfa lika the plains through the deep anyon of Porta e . c s the n Schliis Solid bridges ro s river at Rinteln , Minde , and selburg . 40 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

A prolongation of the Weser Mountains west of the River

Weser constitutes the Wieben Mountains . They begin with

- h c n t0 the Wittekinds Berg, w i h has o its p the monument of the Emperor and King William the Great . The narrow range of Wieben Mountains extends immedi ately to the northwest and bends at L iibbecke towa rd the s u o thwest . The roof- like ridge wa s some years ago stripped of its tim

u w o c s s s s a s ber . Br sh o d over the steep lope and make the p

' d u W a lhi ck s ffi . e sage i c lt At Bergkirchen, , Schnathor t, and L iibb ck u a s e e are fo nd large highways through the ridges , p sa s c i u o n ble for all arm . The chur h of Bergk rchen is b ilt the top of the pass and is visible from a great distance . Narrow u i s footpaths are foun d on the crest . From the mo nta n there is n s s u u a exten ive view to the o th over the wavy hilly co ntry, tra versed by the Werre and Else and bounded by the Ten to u s to a s a s ca n b rg fore t the north of the plain , far the eye reach . Directly north of the Bucke - Berg and of Weser and W iehen mountains lies a thickly settled a n d fert ile zone of farm lands ; u s farther to the north are conifero s woods, with farm land s fi s s s cattered here and there, and nally wamp and tretches of heath . The river bed of the W ese r winds its course with numerous cur s a cco m ves through the plain . Only moderate elevation n c s pa y the river in its our e n orthward . t s The lands on the left, and a small strip on the righ ide of st the river, belong to the province of We phalia . Next to that strip lie the Duchy o f Schaumburg- Lippe and the jurisdiction o f r c Rinteln , belonging to the G and Du hy of Hesse . The maneuvers first touched upon the duchy mentioned h u s above , and then c iefly the circ it of Minden and a mall part u of the circuit of Herford and L bbecke . s r s m s A s These t ip are mostly far land . the latter are owned s s n s is by pea ants and mall la d holder , farming carried o n on a small scale . The terrain is consequen tly thickly covered with villages ’ w n z f and d elli gs . In the ones o woods and heaths peasants dwellings are widely scattered ; in the zone of goo d farm u s i e s u lands are fo nd inclosed town , wh l o th of the Wieben mountain s there are numerous outlyin g farms around the villages .

42 A T U U M N M A N E U V E R S .

a n e e t s Nineteenth brig de ( in te n h dragoon , thirteenth u l 10 ua h ans) , sq drons . 2 e Horse batteries of the tenth artillery , batteri s . t n ee s 2 De achment of pio r cycli ts of the tenth battalion , o ﬁ cer s 60 , men . Seventeenth infantry division Thirty - third brigade (seventy - ﬁfth and seventy - sixth r s 6 s egiment ) , battalion . Thi rty - fourth brigade (eighty- ninth and ninetieth regi

6 . ments) , battalions i ﬁf s u s n Th rd , fourth , and th q adron of the seve teenth u 3 s . dragoons , sq adron First and four th groups of the twenty - fo urth r egiment 6 s of artillery , batterie . a n n o f e s Second comp y of the ninth battalio pion er .

Divisional telegraph section . Nineteenth infantry division Thirty - seventh briga de ( seventy - eighth and n inety - ﬁrst

r s 6 . egiment ) , battalions Thirty - eighth brigade (seventy - third a n d seventy- fourth

s 6 . regiment ) , battalions s hi r ﬁ h s s s Fir t , second , t d , and ft quadron of the ixteenth

dragoons . First and second groups of the twen ty - sixth regiment of ll 6 e . arti ery , batt ries

Fourth company of the eighteenth ba ttalion of pion eers .

- Divisional pontoon train section .

Divisional telegraph section . Twentieth infantry division Thirty - ninth brigade ( seventy - ninth and eighty - second

s 6 s . regiment ) , battalion Eighty- second brigade (one hundred and sixty - fourth

u r - ﬁfth s s 4 a s . and one h nd ed and ixty regiment ) , batt lion ir s ec ﬁ s s F t, s ond , third, and fth quadron of the seven t h u een t h ssars . Thi rd and fourth groups of the twenty - sixth regiment of 6 s artillery , batterie . First and second companies of the tenth battalion of s pioneer . - in s Divisional po ntoon tra ection . Thirty - eighth infantry division Fortieth brigade ( seventy - seventh and ni nety-second n s 6 regime t ) , battalions . E G R M A N Y . 43

Eighty - fourth brigade (one h undred and sixty - second

u r - 4 and one h nd ed and sixty third regiments) ,

battalions . Combined regiment of cavalry (four th squadron of the si e o ﬁ s xte nth drag ons, rst and second quadrons of the s e a s s evente nth dr goon , fourth squadron of the even t n t u ee h h ssa rs) . Second a n d third groups of the twenty - fourth regiment t 6 s . of ar illery , batterie Third compa nies of the ninth and tenth battalions of

pioneers .

o o n to o n - Divisional p train section . s t r 4 ﬁ b e s 3 Corp ar illery, artillery egiment No . 10 ( eld att rie ,

of 2 batteries and 1 of 3 batteries) .

Telegraph corps section . n Balloo n sectio . s 44 n s 45 s u s Total tenth army corp , battalio ; q adron ; 3 r s 5 batte ie .

W AR M Y o r T H E EST (SE V E N T H A R M Y coa rs ) .

n r hi f n n l vo n i h- uch er Comma de in C e : L ieutena t Ge era M kusc B b g .

Se venth infantry division Thirteenth infan tr y brigade (twenty - six th and si x ty - sixth

6 s . regiments) , battalion Fourteenth infantry brigade (twenty - seventh a n d ninety

s 6 a s . third regiment ) , b ttalion

hi s s u s . First, second, and t rd quadron of the tenth h ssar s s ur Fir t and third group of the fo th regiment of artillery ,

6 batteries . t n e s Third company of the four h battalion of pio e r .

- n s ct Divisional pontoon trai e ion .

Divisional telegraph section . T hirteenth infantry division : Twenty - sixth infantry brigade (fifteenth and fifty - fifth

s 6 . regiment ) , battalions Seventy - ninth infantry brigade (one hundred and ﬁfty

e ﬁft - i m s 5 eighth and one hundr d and y n nth regi ent ,

battalions of chasseurs No . i u s u n s o f t F rst , second, third , and fo rth q adro the eigh

een th dragoons . Second and fourth groups of the twenty - se c o n d regiment

6 e s . of artillery , batt rie 44 A U T U M N M a N E U V E R s

First and second companies o f the se v enth battalion of

pioneers .

- Divisional po ntoon train sec tio n . Fourtee nth infa ntry division Twenty - seventh infantry brigad e (sixteen th a n d twenty

6 . third regiments) , battalions Twenty - eighth infantry brigade (thirty- ninth a n d ﬁfty

s 6 s . eventh regiments) , battalion o s ua d o s the u First, second , third , and f urth q r n of fo r t n h ee t hussars . First and third groups of the twenty - sec ond regiment o f

6 s . artillery , batterie

s tt o o f o s Third company of the eventh ba ali n pi neer .

- Divisional pontoon train section .

Divisional telegraph section . Thirty - seventh infantry division (provisional) Twenty- ﬁfth infantry brigade (thirte enth and ﬁfty - sixth

6 s . regiments) , battalion Seventy - sixth infantry briga de (one hundred and ﬁfty

s c u fift - 4 e ond and one h ndred and y third regiments) , s battalion . Thirty - seventh combined cavalry regiment (fifth squadron fi s u u of the eighteenth dragoons , fth q adron of the fo r teen th uss s u fi s u s h h ar , fo rth and fth q adron of the tent

hussars) . T wo groups and horse batteries of the fourth regiment o f

5 e s . artillery, batt rie r n u Fou th compa y of the fo rth battalion of pioneers . s v ﬁel 3 ﬁ l ba t Corp artillery , se enth regiment of d artillery , e d 1 s 1 s 1 e s . torie , and hor e battery , batt rie

Section of the telegraph corps . s Balloon ection .

s t c o r s 4 5 a ta l s 15 s ua o n s 34 Total even h p , b t ion ; q dr ; s batterie .

The above list suggests the fo llowin g o bse rv ations :

T H W A R M Y o r E EST .

s c s d The seventh divi ion , under normal ondition , belonge u m s s s m s to the fo rth ar y corp ; thi divi ion , co po ed of three s e o n e its r brigade in time of peac , gave up of b igades (the s - s the - ﬁfth de eventy ixth) in order to form , with twenty briga t v is n a s a s n (of the thir eenth di io ) , provi ion l divi io under the me ca desi n 37 nu ri l gnatio . GE R M A N Y . 4 5

The c avalry of this provisional di vision was composed of squadrons taken from three different regiments ; its artillery wa s s ﬁ s t compo ed of a group of eld and one of hor e ar illery , ﬁv e making in all batteries .

A R M Y OF T HE E AST .

The seventeenth division (of the ninth corps) was attached to the tenth corps under the same conditions a s the seventh v di ision of the seventh corps .

- l The thirty eighth division (provisiona ) , made up of the fortieth brigade (of the twentieth division under normal co n ditio n s) and the eighty- ﬁr st brigade (of the seventeenth divi s sion) , had also a combined regiment of cavalry , compo ed of a r hussars and dragoons , together with no mal divisional artil l i ery of six batter es . The purpose seems to have been to divide up the corps artil lery into a s many groups a s there were division s in an army o s u s s s c rp , for two gro p of three batterie formed three group r ﬁ v of two batte ies, which, with an ordinary eld battery, ga e u nine batteries divi ded into fo r groups . The cavalry div ision was made up fromtwo brigades of the wa s seventh corps and one brigade of the tenth corps . It n comma ded by Major General Von Lange, chief inspector of

the third cavalry district, which included the cavalry regi

ments of the seventh and tenth regional army corps . d s The thir corps , having furni hed its two brigades of cav a lr s wa s d y to cavalry divi ion B , oblige to draw a regiment o c s from each of the f urth , ninth , and eleventh orp in order to

make up its divisional cavalry . The presence of division B gav e considera ble cavalry pr e s c s but a po nderance to the tenth corp . The seventh orp had — slight superiority in infantry and artillery one battalion and ‘ four guns . V — l s u EFFE CT I E ST R E N GT H . The fol owing con tit ted the total estimated force present :

- 60 l Eighty nine battalions of infantry , squadrons of cava ry , s u men and 69 batterie of artillery, composed of abo t s a s c s and horse ; or, ombatant , riﬂes,

316 s . sabers , and gun

* By rea so n of the compositio n of ba tteries o f four a n d six gun s the sev en h r s with 34 ba tteries ha d 160 ieces wherea s the ten th co r s t co p , , p , p , um ered b t 156 iec es b r i s n b . with 35 a tte e , u p 46 A U T U M N M A N E U V E RS .

The tr oops set out for the maneuvers (pea c e str ength) wi th bo 575 er n n 130 s er s u a ut men p battalio of i fantry , hor es p q ad

120 men 6 se e 4 e e . ron , and and 0 hor s per batt ry of to 6 pi c s So ldiers un ﬁtte d physically for active service were left in

r s n ﬁ the es . the gar i o s, and their places lled from r erve force It does not appear that the effective strength was subject ma u e s a s to ny reductions d ring the p riod of the maneuver , ff s u f wa s the ca se last year . The e ort req ired o the men were perhaps less ; besides the atmospheric conditions were entirely ff ed di erent, and the German troops seemed to stand the heat 1 98 189 term of 8 better than the continual rains of 7 .

CO M M A N D A N D E " E CU T IO N O F T H E M A N E U V E R S .

There was no occasion this year to organiz e an ar my staff ; the commander s of the seventh and tenth corps held their r espective commands during all the maneuvers ; the Emperor

too k command in person of each of the opposing armies . T he u r m co m exec tion of the maneuve s, under the supre e wa s c n fi e mand of the Emperor , o d d to the chief of the gen u c li fi n u sta fi h e e . wa s eral , Co nt S The chief of mpires Prince

Al r u s o fi s . brecht of P ssia, in pect r of the r t army district The fi n s s o r f eld marshal ge eral , in pect s o the third and fourth i t v r . n d a my d s ricts (Count v Waldersee , Pri ce Leopol of Ba a ria s wa r s iff ) , the mini ter of , the in pectors general of the d erent s s o fiicer s arm , mo t of the general detailed in the war depart ffi ff ment, and a large number of o cers of the great general sta w s a s a t ere present at the maneuver , either umpires, or t ached u o fii cer s . 0 so er to the mpires , or as intelligence N foreign v ei n o r wa s s hi g person of note present at the maneuver , w ch “ suggested to a German journalist the followin g remarks : It may be sa id that the maneuver s r epresented all the r wa r bette the picture of , and no one dared pronounce the oe M a n v er a s term of man uvre de parade (Prunk o ) , wa s done ” s r la t year by a eporter of a Bavarian paper . The distribution of the umpires was a s follows

A ssista n t umpires In telligen ce oﬁ cers Aids (servin g a s co n n ectin g lin ks In the dir ec tion of the ma n euvers)

“ i i i r l n N o . o f T he M tar Z e tu 38 Se tem e 17 189 . g, , p b , 8 GE R M A N Y

84 fﬁ s e In all , there were o cer engaged in dir cting the s maneuver , including the umpires . One of the innovations of the maneuvers of 1898 wa s the use s a n d u s of a balloon , intended to keep the troop mpire informed ’ as to the Emperor s whereabouts and the time when oper a n tions ceased and commenced agai . This balloon , the same u s s e to a r m s ie in constr ction a tho e attach d the y corp , carr d a s w s r wa s s u . a long st eamer, by which it di ting i hed There su its s spended to car the following signal , according to requirement A sphere for the signal Halt ; “ A cylinder for the signal March ; “ a T wo spheres for the signal Close of m n e uvers .

F D N D T A T A T OO SU PPLY A R N SPO R IO N .

The troops were supplied with foo d by mean s of preser ved s s meat and vegetables , obtained from the tate factorie at

Mayence and Spandau . s In order to prepare the meals on arrival in camp, the troop ’ c arried with them one day s rations a n d the necessary wood s fo r for cooking the ame . The rations the following day , c ha u in luding forage ( y and oats) , were distrib ted in the even su ing . With this object in view , the military pply depart ment esta blished in the district where the maneuvers took e su s plac , warehouses containing large pplie of wood, straw , s s s v hay , oat , and canned good , from which the troop recei ed what they needed without distinction a s to the army to which they belonged . Each division had for the transportation of its rations two

u - 52 - s s pply trains of 6 one horse wagons and two hor e wagons . s s su s c m s wa s Be ide these pply wagon , ea h ar y corp followed by a train divided into two sections . The ﬁrst section followed the troops at a distance of 2 kilo m It s f ff eters . was composed of wagon rom the di erent head ’ s r s a n d r o ﬁicer s quarter , led ho es , one wagon for car ying food u s l and kitchen ten ils to each battalion , regiment of cava ry , and group of artillery . s s u wa s r The econd section , who e ro te determined by the a my s c e corp commander, was composed of baggage and ant en s wagon . The section s for an army corps were composed of 15 one

- horse wagons and 175 two horse wagons . a mo u o ﬁi er Each of the trains wa s in command of nted c . 8 N N V 4 A U T U M M A E U E R S .

‘

G E N E R A L P L A N O F T H E M A N E I TV E R S .

IN IT IA L PO SIT IO N .

s k se The maneuver took place on both ban s of the We r , a u s s s ff ro nd Minden , and in di trict pre enting perceptible di er m e ees . During the ﬁrst operations the contending forces dispute d

Bii cke- the line of the Aue , which , to the northeast of Berg , s s l n u u i e form a va t ha f circle in a ge tly nd lating reg on , dott d s ud e u e- with numerous village , incl ed betwe n the B ck Berg and r the Schaumburge Wald . The other operations occurred on the right bank of the n i th s Weser, northwest of Minde , then n e wampy valley of s ﬁ s s ifﬁ u s Ba tau , and nally along the wooded lope of d c lt acces , which extended to the north and south of the Wieben Gebirge .

GE N E R A L HYPO T HE SIS .

The general plan of the ma neuvers wa s based on the follow ing hypothesis s ﬁ its o wn An Ea tern army , ghting on ground, advanced u o n s s from Stendal , Magdeb rg ( the Elbe) , again t a We tern r uc wea ker which u a my (m h ) , fell back toward the middle co rse W of the eser .

SPE CIA L HYPO T H E SE S .

A T E W R M Y O F H EST .

On the 4th and 5th of September the Western army estab lished the ese wa s c d itself on the left bank of W r ; it reenfor e , and decided to make a stand on the line Holzmin den- Gross

en wieden .

the 5th s n s m m On of September the eve th corp , co ing fro v s s n Lingen , placed three di ision on the We er, at Porta, Minde , r c its u s n d and Wiete sheim , and advan ed fo rth divi ion beyo ebu Its u wa s the river at Bii ck rg. d ty to cover the left ﬂank of the a rmy . ’ Patrols ca me in co ntact with the enemy s cavalry detach k u h m n s s e c . e t at Wieden ahl , M erbe , and S lbeck In the nig t the sixth army corps at Friedrichshagen informed the seventh c s r s c orp at Minden that , according to repo t from the avalry ’ u s 00 s a ll s u d of the rear g ard , the enemy tr p of arm occ pie in considerable force the region of Rodenberg a n d Gross en n o r f N d .

50 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The tenth corps proﬁted by the opera tions of the 4th a n d 5th O f September in order to advance beyond two haltin g

c e . pla es, in a west rly direction On the even ing of the 5th the different troops of the two armies occupied the following encampments

F W A R M Y O T HE E T .

Headquarters , Minden . s Pet r sha n ri d Fourteenth divi ion (to the north) , e ga , F e e sm fa r e Of wald, with a all force advanced as out as the dge

the Schaumburger Wald .

t w O f . Thir eenth division , Minden and the country est Minden

- i b Thirty seventh div sion , in the Wie en Gebirge , from Berg

kir chen to Porta . m Seventh division , on the right bank of the Weser, fro n Letel to Holtrup , via Minden and Hausberge , and a small Bii k bur force advanced to the east of Meinsen and c e g.

AR M Y OF T HE EAST .

- u . Headq arters, Gross Nenndorf Between the Steinhuder - Meer and the Deister Gebirge were stationed the following troops

- i u . Thirty eighth div sion , W nstorf

Seventeenth division , Haste .

- e s s . Ninete nth divi ion and the corps artillery , Gros Nenndorf

Twentieth division, Lauenau . d The ivision of cavalry was advanced toward the west, on — the line of Wiedensahl Stadthagen . The principal forces of the contending parties were still at

a fair distance from each other . The cavalry division alone, out 15 m t s thrown about kilo e er in advance of the tenth corps, was in contact with the fourteenth and se venth divisions of

the seven th corps .

E " E CU T I O N O F T H E M A N E U V E R S .

O P E R A T I O N S O F SE P T E M B E R 0 .

The orders given by the commanders O f the two armies for the operations Of the 6th were executed a s follows

O E W AR M Y F T H E ST .

T O e O f s prot ct the left ﬂank the Western army, which wa th at Grossenwieden , the commander of e seventh corps ff Biickebur intended to take the o ensive on g, namely GE R M A N Y . 5 1

- m t t a t 9 . . Wi h the thir y seventh division, a , he moved from z Lerbeck by way of Kleinen bremen on Buchol . a u i s d At the s me ho r, w th the thirteenth divi ion , an a vance Biick r wa s made from Minden via ebu g on Musingen . At the fourteenth division moved fr om Papinghausen on Meinsen . During these movements the seventh division concentrated Biickebur d f to the southeast of g behind its outpo sts , hel itsel

in readi ness for action . u Each infa ntry division wa s s pplied with artillery .

AR M Y O F T H E E AST .

During the afternoo n of September 5 the great general staff commun icated to the te nth corps the following information :

’ T he enemy s army halted behi nd the Weser and is prepar ing t o resist an attack ; its left win g seems to be a t Hessisch

Oldendorf . On the 6th of September the tenth corps will carr y out its s Bii k mi sion by advancing on Rinteln , passing north of c eburg in order to support the offensive movement of the Eastern

army by covering the left wing of the Western army . Consequently the commander O f the tenth corps ordered 6th Of that, on the September, the corps would advance upon Biickebur g in the followin g manner The twentieth division via Siilbeck ; The nineteenth division via Kirchhorsten The seventeenth division via Schierneichen ;

t - - The thir y eight division, one half via Hespe , the other s a via Wieden ahl , R derhorst . — The line Wiedensahl - Stadthage n H eidbrin ck to be crossed

at 8 a . m . the corps artillery to be divided between the n ine n s teen th a d twentieth division . l r 6 m The cava ry division to b eak camp at a . . ; the four teen th and nineteenth brigades with the artillery to advance o n Biickebur — iil g, starting from the line Schierneichen S beck . The thir te enth briga de at Wiedensahl to break camp and to a c . dvan e Bierde, to Wietersheim , and Minden

E " E CU T IO N O F T H E M A N E U V E R S .

A s a result of the orders given by the commanders of the r s s Bii ckebur two a mie , the seventh and tenth corp made g their Objective point ; hence a clash should take place in the neighbo rhood Of that city ; but on account of the distance 52 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

n two o t es e a c n c separati g the opp sing par i , a d cisive tio ould s not occur the ame day . According to the mea ns employed for some time in the u s is s te e c German maneuvers , one ro te at lea t elec d for a h of the infan try divisions ; these adva nce equally to the fr ont to ready deploy simultaneously . be s h Finally , it may aid that the commander of the sevent corps did not hold at his disposal any fractional part O f the co rps artillery ; he assigned a portion O f artillery to ea ch division ; in the tenth corps this artillery was divided between the two divisions of the left wing . The Ofﬁcers charged with directing the man euvers were not content this year to communica te to the press the r esult of u c but the co n the mane vers ea h day , exacted from each of tending parties an Ofﬁcial repo rt of the operations Of the day . The repo rt of September 6 is worded thus :

T AR M Y OF HE WE T .

’ About 6 O clock in the morning the outposts Of the seventh division at Achumwere attacked by a considerable cav alry force coming from the direction of Deinsen ; com lled to

a c u the iv isio n . fall b k, they were fo nd at Bergdorf by seventh ’ During the day the enem s cavalry held its own at Achum. s irt - v r e During thi time the t y se enth , thi t enth , and four t n th vi s ee di sions of infantry crossed the We er, at the pre s a t cribed hours , Porta, Minden , Wietersheim , and about — — n attacked the line Selliendorf Bii ckebur g Mei sen . At this time r econnoitering parties reported that north Of the ’ Biicke- Berg three or four divisions O f the enemy s forces were o n advancing the Aue ; Vehlen appeared to be occupied . The commanding general O f the seventh corps ordered the attack ; the thirt - sev enth division advanced via Buchholtz er n kirchen te on Neuehutte , O ; the thirteenth and four enth c n V eblen e divisions atta ked Ah sen and , while the fourt enth r division met the enemy coming f om Rusbend . to ro tect the This last division , in order its left ﬂank , left - t the da thirty ninth regiment a Paping a usen . During y the u ’ regiment rep lsed the enemy s cavalry . s u r t e The seventh divi ion , s ppo ted by parts of the thir e nth v division, succeeded in dri ing the enemy back after he had crossed the A ue at Vehlen ; but wa s obliged to giv e up the a e to a pursuit beyond that river, s the enemy appear d h ve een reenforced . A s - s i wa s s i on the right wing, the thirty eventh div sion t ll in the rear and the troo S hav ing accomplished heavy ma r ch n wa s u a c s ing, the ma euver ro ght to a close, and the rmy orp ni took their places for the ght . GE M R A N Y . 53

AR M Y O F T HE E AST . m Se e ber 6 6 . . r vi On t m , at a , the caval y di sion (less the thi rteen tp d en briga e) advanced via Deins on Achum , and, c s e e ’ afte r a lively onte t, succe d d in driving back the enemy s outposts ; beyond the M eisin gen it met a con sider able force Of ’ u th . e enemy s troops , and fell back on Ach m u - D ring this time half of the thirty eighth division, the s e w r s event enth , nineteenth, and t entieth infant y division advanced on Biickebur g by r outes to the south of the Schaum

l s u . bur er Wa d , conformably to order d ly promulgated A m e i i out a . . the ninet enth and twentieth divis ons e Of a t bl r ached the cut in the bank the Aue Achum and Ve en , e to and prepar d attack the heights west of the villages, when they were met by an o ﬁ en siv e enemy r ushing from these i u u d he ghts down pon Veblen . The enemy rep lse the small c s the n d S bodies of troops whi h cros ed stream , a then imply s co ntented him elf with this result . In the meantime the fortieth infantry brigade (ha lf of the thi rty - eighth division ) advanced on Meinsen witho ut being a Of able to c pture the village . The other half the thirty t - ﬁrst eighth division (eigh y brigade) , on the heels of the ee d hi thirt nth cavalry briga e , w ch had been sent toward

s u . Wieden ahl , was recalled and fell back on R sbend The thirteenth infantry brigade met the enemy ’ s infantry at Papin gha usen . About noo n the battle wa s suspended all along the line and the army corps camped for the night .

In this repo rt no mention is made Of the seventeenth divi s i - ion of the tenth corps . The twent eth and thirty eighth d i n i A ue ﬁ s iv sio s hav ng reached the r t, it was probably obliged to remain in the second lin e . T O e s da ﬁ sum up , the op ration of the y were con ned to an attack O f the outposts Of the se venth division by the cavalry division and an action wi th the advance guards around b Ve len . r s The ope ation , which ceased at noon , were but the prelude to the a ction of the following day . On the night O f the 6th of September the bivouac canton men ts oc cupied by the two Opposin g forces were a s follows

AR M W Y OF T HE EST .

T he l e 25 i te s in of outposts, k lome r long, extended from the

‘ t O f m s Weser to the nor h Wietershei via Frille, Mein en , us a s M ingen , Ahnsen , facing northeast, far as the slopes of

- s eden . the Weser Gebirge , north of Gro senwi A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

In the rear of this line were the following troo ps On the left wing the fourteenth division in the region south of the Scha umburger Wald and neighbo ring places ; In the center a round Biickeburg the thirteenth a n d seven teen th division s ;

- vi n The thirty seventh di sion south of Widen se .

A T H R M Y O F E EAST .

The outposts extended over a distance of 30 kilometers from s l Petershagen (on the We er) via Lahde, Schierneichen , Ge l

- a s s s . dorf, Obernkirchen , far as Bor tel, south of the Buck Berg re O f s d si In ar thi line , on the right wing, the cavalry ivi on s established its bivouac to the we t of the Weser, between Petershagen a n d Windheim ;

- The thirty eighth division in the Schaumburger Wald, north Of Schi erneichen ; s The seventeenth divi ion at Helpsen , Meerbeck ; n n Kircho rste n The ninetee th divisio at Gelldorf, ; s The twentieth divi ion on the left wing at Oberkirchen, lb k Sii ec .

T O two O n s e o n sum up, the pposi g army corp were canton d both sides of the A ue (the v alley of which was held by the u s e v d o tposts of the eventh corps) , and each one of th se co ere r i it by its ight ﬂank the left w ng of s opponent .

O P E R A T I O N S O F S E P T E M B E R 7 .

The orders gi v en for the operations Of September 7 were executed a s follows W A R M Y o r T E E E ST .

u ff s n e The seventh corps contin ed on the o en ive , co s quently

- m hi v n 7 . . a the t rty seventh infantry di isio , at a , dvanced from Buchholz and Bad - Eilsen on Neuehutte the seventh division pressed forward by V eblen a n d south of this villa ge . The thirteenth division north of Musingen and the fourteenth division south of Meinsen were held in readiness for action at

7 a . m . A portion of the corps artillery was assigned to the four s s s teen th division ; at 7 a . m . the other three po ted them elve — west of the line W iden sen Juten bur g .

E AR M Y OF T H E AS T .

The tenth corps too k the O ffensiv e between Schaumburger ’ - e e Wald and the Biicke Berg, vigorously attacking the n my s left wing at Meinsen . E A N G R M Y . 5 5

Two groups O f co rps artillery were placed at Bergkrug ; two s d other remained attache to the twentieth division .

ess f c The cavalry division pr ed forward , west O the S haum

burger Wald .

E " E N CU T IO O F T H E M A N E U V E R S .

The two opposing forces having taken the offensive with u vi c ff their fo r front di sions, the prin ipal e ort of each wa s ’ r e o n m di ect d the ene y s left .

But l - m r whi e the thirty seventh division , for ing the ight Of g the Western army (seventh corps) , operating slowly a n d with difﬁculty through the woo ds Of the Biicke- Berg on the O f e h left the t nth corps, holding Obernkirchen , t e right o f the la st- named corps (compo se d of the thirty - eighth divi t the sion, a par of seventeenth division, and the cavalry division) vigoro usly attacked the fourteenth division O f the n seventh corps orth of Meinsen . T he retrea t of this division carried with it that of the sev s ut o s i su ss h c rp entirely, notw thstanding the cce es Obtained

on the right wing . c i to fﬁ ccu Ac ord ng the o cial report, the operations o rred in the followin g manner :

W A RM Y O F T HE E T .

- s While the thirt seventh and eventh divisions, forming

7 . the right win of t e seventh cor s, was advancing at a m . rn kir c h r s o n Obe en and Gelldorf, t e t i teenth divi ion took e O f a n d en n poss ssion Achum, the fourte th divisio , in order to t f e e O . attack Rusb nd, deploy d to the wes Meinsen But the sa o hi u , at me time , the enemy deb uc ng from R sbend s n e and Heve e in considerable numbers, advanc d on Warber, o and captured that village, which was feebly ccupied , as well a s Mein sen . The fourteenth infantry division was compelled to fall back on Evesen . n Co sequently, about noon, the seventh corps fell back to s - i t the Minden and We er Gebir e, notwithstand ng tha in the mor ning its right took the vi ages of Obernkirchen a n d Gell i dorf . In fact , the loss of Me nsen rendered the retreat toward a s Minden dangerous, because menaced by heavy m sse of cav Of t Of the a lr y advancing b way Frille and Dankersen , wes

Schaumburger ald .

r ms T A RM Y o E AS .

e e 7 . m. ssu S pt mber , at a , the tenth corps a med the Offen sive betwee n Schaumburger Wald and the Biicke - Berg s i Of A ue with a v iew to gaining posse s on the valley of the . '

56 A U T U M N M A N E I V E R s .

’ O f n s rces .It was met in fro nt by heavy columns the e emy fo ff which were also on the o ensive . r - v s u sb The thi ty eighth di i ion , debo ching from Ru end , suc ceeded s c n ot in taking Warber and Mein en , whi h were strongly u or dho lz s e held, and h rled back toward N and Evesen a up rior force which was trying to r each its right ﬂank west of the

Meinsen . The progress of the seventeenth and nineteenth divisions at V eblen wa s s Achum and s low ; the twentieth divi ion , attacked u a t c n wa s e ck by s perior forces Obernkir he , oblig d to fall ba in a northerly direction . The cavalry division a dvanced west of the Schaumburger o n s a n d c e Of Wald, via Frille , Danker en , harg d portions the ’ s s c ss l t enemy forces with u ce , ob iging the latter to re reat z v s toward Nordhol , E er en . o u sc u c u ss Ab t noon the enemy di ontin ed the atta k , do btle o n account Of the progress made by the thirty - eighth divi s r s - ion , and reti ed toward Minden and the We er Gebirge ; the u u u te th corps took p the p rsuit . The seventh co r 3 reached the line Of heights which ex tended o n bo th Si es Of Bii ckeburg parallel to the Weser

Gebirge . Ope rations were stopped at 1 p . m .

s s O f Frankly peaking, the operation the day ended in favor

c s s to the n of the tenth orp , thank adva tage gained by the

- it s o ﬁ cia l o thirty eighth division on right wing . The rep rt seems to indicate that the feeble occupation of the villages of s s f s Warber and Mein en by the troop O the seventh corp , form s O f su s A ue a l ing the point pport on the tream of the , gre t y

uc ss t - v fac ilitated the s ce of he thirty eighth di ision . The bivouac cantonments o ccupied durin g the ev ening of Septembe r 7 were a s follows

F T H E W ES T A R M Y O .

- s v s n so ut o f the ese - e a t Thirty eventh di i io , h W r G birge, s l Ei bergen , Rinte n ;

v s us e e H o lz a use n e a s O f Seventh di i ion , Ha b rg , h ( t the Weser) ; u s n a un e Fo rteenth divi io , ro d Mind n ; t s n s e tum Thir eenth divi io , we t of Mind n , toward Har ; the co s l r e c s A portion of rp artil e y with a h divi ion .

E A R M Y O F T H E AST .

s s s e s e n Cavalry divi ion , we t of the We er , at P ter hag ; e t s n e s O f the es e Ninet en h divi io , a t W er, at Bierd ;

h t - e h is ril T ir y ig th div ion , F le ;

58 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

e c r s n oni ssio conﬁde The t nth o p , aba d ng the mi n d ‘ to t i m s ese e n de h s ti e , cro sed the W r b low Mi n and ’ e ﬂ nergetically against the enemy s left ank, the bu co rps during the night effecting the passage n ear Petersha gen .

E " E CU T IO N OF T H E M A N E U V E R .

Anticipating the pa ssage of the Weser by one of the two the co l m se to be ar my corps , chiefs ntrol ing the aneuvers cau d gathered at Schlussebur g (32 kilometer s below Minden) a cer

m r s di to s on tain nu ber of boats , co re pon ng an army corp p hi m e i toon train . T s at rial was put under cover on pr vate r a t st s c ma n s prope ty the in ance , it appear , of the two om der fi wa s so r e of the armies in the eld , and ca efully conceal d that even the cavalry patrols would have found its discover y difficult . 1 u a k m e When the Emperor, pon t ing co mand of the t nth r ss ni hi t co ps, decided to cro the Weser during the ght, t s rain wa s telegraphed for and brought to the points where cross ings were to be made by two tugboats of the Weser Na viga t m m ea n s ion Co pany , the aterial arriving at By m of ri o n a this mate al and of the three divisional pont o tr ins, the six companies of pioneers of the tenth cor ps con str ucted two s c the r is n t e 100 bridge a ross Weser, the iver at th poi b ing meters wide . The work of putting up the bridges was protected by a r i s n o caval y div sion , which cros ed the Weser in the after o n by means of its folding boats or such other mean s as were at hand a n d advanced its outposts to the southern edge of the s z n s woods of Hei terhol ; detachments of i fantry , tran ported r o to the left bank of the iver, reenforced their outp sts and u occ pied the woods . The constr uction of the bridges was completed September 8 ’ m. u v . b t fi e u s 3 o at a , requiring ho r , and at o cl ck the s division of the tenth corps began crossing the Weser . s su s Either by rea on of mea re taken by the tenth corps, or o n a c s s c ount of ome other cau e , the commander of the seventh r s s co ps , who e outpost north of Minden were only 7 to 8 kilo meters from the points chosen where the boats were to be

e 5 . e construct d , was not informed till a . m that the nemy passed the right banks of the Weser . The troops of the tenth corps took the precaution to leave their bivouac ﬁres lighted .

i h h T o a dva n ce on R in teln in touch w t t e ma in a rmy o f the E a st . T he P o s o mber 189 { t , N ve 1, 8. GER M A N Y . 59

s s The position of the seventh corps was critical ; its divi ion , separated by the Weser and distributed so as to execute a concentric advance toward the east in the direction of Bucke see o e c burg ( the order above qu t d) , were not properly pla ed to resist an atta ck coming from the north . The two divisions s u which were cantoned farther to the o th, on the right bank the nl s of Weser, must have marched through the o y treet in Hausberge and crossed the river on a po ntoon bridge before e a d is being abl to support the thirteenth n fourteenth div ions . T he forward movement of these two last divisions would o have given the p ssession of Minden to the tenth corps , which complica ted a ll the mo re the position of the army of the ﬂi i l West . T he o c a report only gives a faint idea of the dan er ous s r s to g po ition of the seventh co ps, and thu refers the events of the operations :

F W A R M Y O T HE E ST .

m n September 8 at 5 a . m . the com andi g general of the seventh corps at Minden received the following information : Durin g the night the army a f the West wa s obliged to abandon the line of the Weser and beat a retreat ; in the mean e wa s a t tim its left ﬂank covered Rinteln and Eisbergen . “ The mission of the seventh co 8 is to prevent the enemy 11 crossing the Weser below Porta . case of a forced retreat the corps will retire a s late as po ssible north of the Wieben ” Gebirge . 00 The tr ps of the seventh corps were at once put in motion , ’ s r and , as it was learned at the time that the enem fo ces had crossed the Weser in the region of Petershagen, t e fourteenth is n u div ion was ordered from Minde toward K tenhausen, the hi t t rteenth from Hahlen toward S emmer . The seventh and thirty - seventh divisions were ordered from Hausberge and E i sber on to Bolho r st and Porta . At uten ha usen and Stemmer the fourte enth and thirteenth divisions met the enemy in force without gainin g an a dv a n u z s tage . In the face of an attack debo ching from Hol hau en o n s the left ﬂank of the thirteenth divi ion, a retreat toward

Minden was ordered . The Hartum route was barred by a stro ng column of the enemy which came from Nord - Hemmern ’ and strong masses of the en emy s cavalry advanced by way ff W i - of Ro thenu eln along the ehen Gebirge . T he city of Minden itself was in the possession of the enemy until it wa s reta ken by the seventh and thir ty - seventh divi s s t ion , debouching from Por a .

T he suspension br idge a t Por ta is priva te pr operty a n d ca n n ot be i o f r oo s used by la rge bod es t p . 60 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

A R M Y OF T HE E A ST .

e r h . se t e September 8 at 3 a m . the t nth corps c os d Weser u n b s n e d ri g the night , over two ridge throw across at Pet rs hagen a nd southwest o f Lahde ; the column of the north wa s o d e et si n t co m se of the ninete nth and the twenti h divi o s, hat

- of t 9 south of the thirty eighth and seventeenth divisions . The column f rom the north a dvanced fr om Petershagen te toward Messlingen and continued on ; the nine enth division , by Wegholm to Nord - Hemmern ; the twentieth division by

Friedewalde toward Holzhausen . The column from the south crossed the Heisterholz and advanced with the thi rty - eighth infantry division via Fohrthof its a w en . on Stemmer, with the seventeenth on to Kutenhaus

0 . 0 e c About 7 . 3 a m . the fourth division the t nth orps — - n u en s a n d d e crossed the line Nord Hemmer K t hau en , a vanc d ce on Minden . In the meantime the cavalry division advan d by ’ way of the R ochen Damm in order to face upon the adversary s a s left ﬂank south of the Ba stau stream . A demonstration w made on Minden via Dankersen by a detachmen t of six l batta ion s . The enem brought one division again st eac h of the vil a usen m f lages Kuten and Ste mer, but had to all back on

n n . Mi den , which was carried by the seventeenth divisio Re enforcements permitted the enemy to take possession of o a n d Minden ab ut noon , but all the region north of that city st e north of the Ba au was occupi d by the tenth corps .

s m t n Thi state ent presents some sligh discrepa cies . In the ﬁrst place the city of Minden was not captured during the

t s n . day by the seven eenth divi io , but was taken at a . m by a detachment composed of troops from the tenth corps, intended for a demonstration before Minden . This detach ﬁ di v ment, nding the city abandoned by the fourteenth ision , s s entered it, and engaged the eventh divi ion from Porta on u the so thern edge of the place . r e s wa s In fact , du ing the entir day , the eventh corps cut in 4 two, and on one side the battle raged kilometers north of w s s the Minden , bet een two divi ion of seventh , and from three to four divisions of the tenth corps ; on the other hand an action took place 1 kilometer south of Min den between a mixed brigade of the tenth corps and a division of the ’ seventh corps ; the la st named wa s reenforced about 11 o clock

- se by a second division (the thirty venth) . ﬁ s n The two ghting line were parallel ; Minde , unoccupied, wa s within the strip of land which separated these two dis a c s ﬁ n in tinct tion , and where , in reality the ghti g tra of the thirteenth a n d fourteen th divisions of the seven th corps E M A G R N Y . 6 1 s hould have changed pla ce . The position of these two divi sion s wa s in fact more critical than wa s indicated in the

r o . ep rt At Osterhahlen , the artillery of the thirteenth divi sion wa s taken by reverse - fir e and obliged to aban don its o n ffi c t p sitio under di cult ondi ions . sum n a To up, notwithsta ding the ret king of Minden by the st e s a army of the We , the t nth corp gained an adv ntage ; it succeeded completely in its mission ; c rossed the Weser and ’ o perated on the enemy s left flank . The troo ps during the in s v day performed heavy march g in pite of the heat, gi ing v u e idence of end rance . The cantonments occupied duri n g the even ing o f Septem ~ her 8 were a s follows

O H W ARM Y F T E EST .

Line of outposts : Lutte rn (o n the slopes

W iehen - s o n c Gebirge) , Haddenhau en , R de be k ,

ese d u . W r) , e ge of the Scha mburger Wald ee z Thirt nth division , Dut en ; tee Bolho rst Four nth division , , Porta ; e n S venth divisio , Minden ;

- b i s e c . Th rty seventh division , Nee en , Ler k

A R M Y O F T HE EAST .

e of : ul s W iehen - Lin outposts H lhorst ( outh of the Gebirge) , i n s Bergk rchen, Minderheide, Todtenhause (on the We er) . Division of cavalry o n the edge north of the W iehen Gebirge ; l s n a t e Nineteenth division , north of the cava ry divi io , Hill ; a c s r Twentieth division and h lf of the orp a tillery , at Hemmern ;

- o uff m Thirty eighth division , R then eln , Hartu ; t s o f Seven eenth divi ion and two halves the corps artillery ,

l . Hah en , Stemmer sum the u di c s To up , fo rth infantry vision of the tenth orp r e Ba sta u ea ch wa s camped north of the marshes fo m d by the , division fa cing one of the roa ds crossing these marshes from t s north o outh . s The seventh corp , closely concentrated at Minden and to c wa s the south of that ity , entirely on the left ﬂank of the

tenth corps . (52 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R B.

O P E R A T I O N 8 O F S E P T E M B E R 9 .

s s e e 9 ch The order given for the operation of Sept mb r , su a s occurred according to the reports contained in the Ger man r s su a s p e s, may be mmed up follows

W A R M Y OF T HE ES T .

During the evening of September 8 the seventh corps received the following news from the general hea dqua rte rs s 8 wa s o e The main army of the We t, which on the th blig d s hi to abandon the line of the Weser, took po ition be nd the i u tr ibuta rv Exter (small r ver, ﬂowing from the so th , a of the in s s to . s co s Weser, at R teln) The mi ion of the eventh rp was

W iehen - t t cross the Gebirge , in order to come in ouch wi h the in . e left wing of the main army With this obj ct view, it atta cked the enemy and forced him a s far back a s wa s n eces s sary to hold the Bergkirchen Pa s . s c s s Con equently , the ommander of the eventh corp decided s n to march west , advancing from the front of Todtenhau e ,

te s - Minden , with the four enth , eventh , and thirty seventh divisions (eac h one reenforced by a gr oup from the corps e r o f artillery) ; the thirt enth division, with the emainder the

s o n . corp artillery , advanced Rothenuffeln

A R M F Y O T HE E AST .

e wa s su The nemy , beaten the day before , pur ed by the com his s s manding general of the tenth corps , who ordered divi ion on roads which would admit of crossing the marshes of the

- s s W iehen Ge . Bastau , then the wooded pas e of the birge

’ F R E R D M N E V E O FICIA L PO T o r T H E A Y S A U R .

The ofﬁcial report thus desc ribes the different even ts of that ’ day s maneuver : A F W R M Y O T HE EST .

s c s c in co At 6 a . m . the eventh orp advan ed a westerly dir

tion , namely The thirty - seventh division crossed the Weser at W ieter im n s m she , on Kute hausen ; the seventh divi ion advanced fro Minden to Minderheide ; the fourteenth di vision proceeded by way of Osterhahlen while the thirteenth division advanced in two columns from Bolhor st on to R o then uﬁ eln and Berg ki rchen .

‘ o mmen ced its movemen t a t midn i ht a n d cr d the T his division c g , osse h Weser dur ing the ni g t. GE R M A N Y. 63

e The fourt enth division met the enemy at Hartum , who s - o o n retired on Sud Hemmern and there took position . A ttacked by the fourteenth division and on the right by the s e e v n v s v nth di isio , the enemy , about one di ision trong, was h - u ed c 8 . . rl ba k at a m on Hille, beyond the Lander Bach, n d a d retire to the northwest . During thi s time the thirteenth division reached R o then uf feln a dva n c and Bergkirchen . It learned that the enemy was i n with a view to crossing the Wieben- Gebirge in three c o u d m um s of ivisions by the three dykes of Ro chen Dam , E ickho rster u Da m o s Damm , Ne er , and that a body of tro p ha d already marched toward Schnathorst (south of the

mountains) . ’ a c 8 c t s Att ked about o clo k , the hirteenth divi ion with a br e e V o lmer di sen but wa s ed igad retreat d toward g , enabl by the support of a or tion of the fourteenth division to hold

possession of Berg irchen . The co mman ding general of the sev enth corps ordered the sui e pur t of the enemy , and direct d The seventh division to Eickhorst by Hille ; The fourteenth division to Waschhorst b Sud - Hemmern ; hi - th uﬂ e T he t rty seventh division to R o en n by Hartum . But the seven th and fourteenth div isions could not debouch ’

o 10 . . fr m the marshes in the enemy s presence, and at a m the fo rward movement wa s interrupted and the maneuver came

to an end . m A T AR M Y o r E S .

ss s In order to cross the depre ion of the Ba tau , the tenth

. s corps moved September 9about 6 a m . in four column ; during s c hi this movement a con iderable for e of the enemy , debouc ng s n from Minden, advanced again t the left ﬂa k of the left

column (seventee nth infantry division) . e v s e t c The sevente nth di i ion deploy d at Har um, fa ing the a c - t c u att k, but soon retired on Sud Hemmern ; at a ked by s pe i a s c i a r or forces, it w driven ba k to H lle with gre t losses ; the di isi n o ﬁ v on, longer in a condition to ght , retired in the 1 direction o f Ra hden ( 2 kilometers northwest of Hille) . u e D rin g this time, the ninete nth, twentieth, and thirty i s s s e s e ghth divi ion cro s d the lower plain of the Bastau , and vis u s the nineteenth di ion contin ed its advance on Schnathor t, ’ until the presence of the enemy s forces a t R o then uifeln and t s Bergkirchen were ma de known by reconnoite ring par ie . Cons uen tly it wa s ordered that the twentieth division s a in s t R o then uifeln t - n t hould a vance , the hirty eighth agai s e i e c s Bergkirch n, an the n nete nth from S hnathorst again t c n u Bergkirchen , Volmerdingsen . Bergkir he was occ pied for ’ a tim but ﬁ fell s ss u 9, nally it into the enemy po ession , incl d

ing Ro thenuffeln . ’ Upon the receipt of the news that columns of the enemy s

a d o 9 . . t u forces of all ar ms were vancing, ab ut a m from Har m , 64 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

- m n c t Sud Hem er , and Hille with a view to rossing the Bas au , all the available forces were employed in warding o ff the ’ s atta ck . As the deployment of the en emy columns wa s c d in n s c ss che ke fro t of the Wa chhorst and Ei khorst pa es , he ceased offensive O perations and the te nth corps return ed to its

canto nments .

e 9 Thus , at the end of the op rations of September the s s u n the ﬁ ma n eu eventh corp , which , d ri g rst two days of the v ce s n t ed ers, fa d ea t, the ce nor h on the third day , now fac south and its to uch with the army wa s dimcult . t c s a w s c r the The ten h orp , pl ced bet een the eventh o ps and u m wa s te a s s b lk of the ar y of the West, in qui ingular a o n e ﬁ o wa s position ; of its divisions , not in a ghting c ndition,

b n - us far enough away , north of the Wie e Gebirge, th other divisions from pursuers became pursued and were obliged to

make a half turn in order to face the seventh corps . The bivouac cantonments occupied during the evenin g of September 9 were as follows

A E W R M Y OF T H E T .

Line of outposts : Volmerdingsen (south of the Wichen U n ter liibbe s s Gebirge) , Bergkirchen, , Eickhor t, Eilhau en, southea st of L iibbecke ; h a n d u s T irteenth division one gro p of the artillery corp ,

to W i hen - b the south of e Ge irge, and east of Volmerdingsen ;

- s n r Thirty eventh divisio and a group of the co ps a rtillery, Rothenuffeln ;

t - m Four eenth division , Sud Hem ern, Hartum ; s two Seventh divi ion and groups of the corps artillery, E ikho r st Hille, ; ‘ n s u Seve teenth divi ion , L bbecke , Gehlenbeck .

A R M Y O F T HE E AST .

s s : s d u bber Line of outpo t Ea t of Wulfer ingsen , Wall cke , O L iibbe ettelstedt s u W i hen , N , Ahlsen , the o th edge of the e Gebirge ; ' in s u M en n i huﬂ n N eteenth divi ion , W lferdingsen , g e ; r two c Thi tieth division and groups of the orps artillery, Broderhausen r Twentieth division and two g oups of the corps artillery, H ulho r st Schnathorst, ; u e m e . Cavalry division , Stift " rnh i

vi f h ma n euvers o f Se tember 10 the se ven te n h divisi n was In ew o t e p , e t o o h ta ken fromthe ten th co rps a n d a tta ched t t e se ven th cor ps .

6 6 A U T U M N M AN E U V E R S .

- s a ssi Farther to the north the thirty eventh division , p ng by

- t vi Bergkirchen, deployed in front of the thirty eigh h di sion,

occupying Broderhausen . During this time the fourteenth and seventh divisions captured the deﬁles of W a llii cke and

Schnathorst . s v e s but l While the e ent enth divi ion , having before it sma l n s i n detachme t , made its action felt on the left w ng of the te th s o utﬂ a n ked e o to corp , the latter, , mov d from one p sition

another . The charges of the cavalry division near Horst did not succeed in retarding the thirteenth division of the seventh

corps .

. o . At 8 a . m the bugle s unded halt This ended the impe rial 1 9 th maneuvers of 8 8. On e following morning the tr00ps i s sta rted for their embarking stat on . s n e hi s By rea on of the i equality of the forc s, t maneuver could w s s not result other i e than in the defeat of the tenth corp , wa s t he o m which forced to retreat toward west , and was c letel o ﬂf its o r us p y cut from the bulk of army , while the vict io s s a ll u eventh corp could , in sec rity , join itself with the main

army of the West .

DIST R IBU T IO N .

T he infantry tr00ps were taken aboard the trains on the l oth

1l th e a t s : n and of Sept mber the following tations Oeynhause ,

Lohne , Porta , Minden , Eisberge , Bunde, Herford , Vlotho , and

Kirchlengern . 56 n The troops required trai s and cars, which trans s 114 580 a nd ported men , hor es, wagons, bicycles,

kilograms of baggage . The artillery and cavalry returned to their garrisons by

marchin g . V T H Y MANEU ERS OF HE BRIT IS ARM .

P R R T T E E R S EPA A ION S FOR HE M A N U V .

A rm a n d N a v Ga zette A u ust 20 1898 [ y y , g , ]

On August 16 the staffs of the Northern and Southern army c orps as sembled at their respective headquarters in prepara tion for the largest man euvers that have ever been held in t England . Some estima e of the scale of the operations may be c formed from the fa t that, apart from the pay and feeding s x n s of the troop , the additional e pe es, though cut down every where by vigilant censors , will approach , if they do not ulti m e the ately exc ed , The area , taking in nearly s 48 s whole county of Dorset and great part of Wilt , is mile s u its s long from north to o th , and at greate t breadth nearly a s u n m c a n d wide as it is long, tho gh betwee Te ple ombe Cran u 1 s s n 7 . bourne it arrows in to abo t mile in width The troop , a ll ss e u when have a embl d , will n mber men , 4 4 s s 2 2 u s n n s 86 s . hor e , g n and machi e gu , and wagon The ' s m s u n Northern army corp ulti ately gathers on Sali b ry Plai , s v me on the ground lately purcha ed by the Go ern nt, and will u be commanded by the Duke of Conna ght . The Southern army corps concentrates at Wareham under Sir Redvers Bul 1 ler . The time up to September will be taken up with what s s a re spoken of as preliminary drills . The troop compo ing the s 18 Northern army did not begin to gather until Augu t , but inasmuch a s practically the whole of the Aldershot com ’ is o n n a u ht s mand included in the Duke of C g force , mobili i n i u in s u za t o s not so difﬁc lt a s the ca e of the So thern army . By the 23d of August the infantry and artillery brigades will s have been completed in both armie , and the preliminary

( t o c m ss hi lls ca n then commen ce a nce . The o mi ariat depart ment had a great deal of its work taken away by the adop tion of the con tract systemto so large an extent in providi n g

ed s . s s o n for the fe ing of the troop Of cour e, thi dependence the ci vilian element is an experiment in tended to furnish the heads of the army with some idea of what the country could in s the do for itself ca e of need , and it will be watched with closest possible interest . 68 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

t s s c m s The roop of the Southern army will be in tanding a p , l t n a l in s n 3 l s n . the vicinity of Dorche ter, u til the i st , whe they will assume the r OIe of an army of invaders who have ff s e e ected a landing on our hores , and from that dat , in com s r mon with the troop of the Northern army co ps, they will s u te occupy fre h q ar rs each day . To provide for the transport by rail of so large a bo dy of soldiery wa s certainly not the least of the many difficult prob lems which the military authorities have been called on to s s a solve within the last few month . Thi task in the ordin ry ’ n way of things fell to the quartermaster general s departme t, a n d how excellently it wa s carried out was shown on Mo nday u s n the ro o s and again on T e day , whe large number of t p train deposited their pa ssengers at Wareham Station well to time u u the l and witho t confusion . The b lk of work has fa len on u s c nl s r ves the So thwe tern Railway Company, whi h not o y e but s e u s Wareham , in ome d gree L dger hall , the chief point c c n of on entratio of the Northern army corps, as well . The method followed by the war office in choosing the ” s s : routes for the troop train has, briefly , been thi From the point of departure to the point of arrival an imaginary li n e ha s been drawn on a map which shows the whole of the s s s t railway y tem of Great Britain . The mo t direct rou e wa s i s c from point to point n every in tance hosen . In the s s m c s ca e of troop co ing from Ireland , having ros ed the chan the s nel , they entrain in rolling tock of the London and m Northwestern Co pany at Holyhead . As far as Chester the is m s journey ade on the London and Northwe tern line . At s is o n Che ter the train turned to the Great Western line, who r un o n s is it to Dorche ter, where it taken in charge by the ’ s O fli cia ls s Southwe tern Company s , who end it on the remain 15 s s ing mile to Wareham . A glance at the map will how is s u is s m but how direct thi ro te . It a novel yste , it had u s ha s worked well p to Wednesday . Mo t of the traveling u r been done at night , and the b lk of the trains have ar ived

s e n at their de tination betwe n 3 and 6 i the morning . Ware is a c us s ha s os ham new and ommodio tation , and it been p s r a ible to deal with the wo k there with comparative e se . The ss r u railway company , however, found it nece ary to const ct n e w s s s docks for the unloading of guns , hor e , and tran port

s . u s wagon L dger hall Station , at which the second and third ’ s o n n a u ht s i division of the Duke of C g army corps will detra n, GR E A T BR IT A IN . 69

is o n s the Midland and Southwe tern Junction Railway , for n i merly the Swi don, Marlborough and Andover Ra lway . T he transfer j unction to and from the Southwestern Ra ilway i s at An dover . A very large number of troops passed through London on Wednesday night and in the early hours of Thurs day morn ing . Several o f the local lines were busily engaged in transfer ring by various routes trains conveying troops a s s u r from the north and e t coast to the So thweste n line .

T H E E E M A N U V E R A R A .

[Oﬁ cia l R epo r t ]

The area selected comprised the whole of Dorsetshire and a portion of Wiltshire south of a li n e drawn roughly through r v t L ud er s Trowb idge, Seend, Market, La ing on , Upavon , and g h s u all, including the government land on Sali b ry Plain . The characteristic feature of the country is open chalk down ' a ﬂ o r ds u u a x s s land , which un s al f cilities for e erci ing troop . The northern or Wiltshire portion O f the area con sists en tir el b - s u y of the rolling chalk ta le land called Sali b ry Plain , s c s v s s t he inter e ted by e eral tream , the Bourne , the Avon, a n d ss r s Wylye, the Nadder, which pa through nar ow valley u and meet in the neighborhood of Salisb ry . s u s t s s u Thi chalk formation contin e in o Dor et hire, r nning southwest from Cran bourne Chase a n d Shaftesbury to Dor c s s is cut u he ter and Beamin ter, but by the Sto r at Blandford . The Dorset chalk hills have not the broad ﬂ a t summits of s u but c s s m w s Sali b ry Plain , on i t of co paratively narro ridge , i s es cc ss e l s w th teep slop hardly a e ibl at p ace , even to infantry

s in formed bodie . Westward of the central mass of chalk lies the close wooded c c c s the ountry of the Bla kmoor and Mar hwood vale , and to s a re s s n s outheastward large tretche of barren heath la d , t he u m s O f s c drained by P ddle and Fro e river , which di tri t is c Wareham approximately the enter .

R SE L E CT ION A N D PR E PA A T ION OF CA M PS .

[Oﬁ cia l R epor t ]

Early in April a reconnoissance wa s made by ofﬁcers from the staff college with a v iew to locating all possible campin g

s s v s s s s . ground for ingle di i ion , or larger bodie of troop A s wa s s ss c s anticipated, the re ult of their reconnoi an e howed 70 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

s r r t l s v r in a ca city of goo d water, pa icu arly in the be t maneu e g — a a i . e . . portion of the re , Salisbury Plain T he possible camping grounds were con ﬁned almost entirely a t to the neighbo rhood of the streams . Samples of e ch wa er s m es supply were ent to Netley for analysis . In a ny instanc s t n the upply was condemned al ogether (sometimes , I thi k , u ﬁ c n n nnecessarily) ; in others ltration , with o seque tly elab

s a . orate preparation , was considered necess ry s fi c s s r ca The neces ity for xed amp , ari ing f om s rcity of e u e O s u wat r, undo btedly depriv d the peration of m ch of their a n d s O ir is o reality , commander were ften influenced in the d p sitio n s by the distance to be covered before the nex t ca mp could be reached . The location of these camps was dictated by the require m in s e s ta ents regard to water , and the re trict d choice of ui ble sites did not permit O f regard being ba d to tac tica l or strategic al considerations . Suflicien t attention wa s not in all a s c ss th s es s c es paid to the ac e ibility of e it elected . The Maneuver Act did n o t come into force till 15th of u s u Aug st, and con eq ently the land required for the prepara tion of camps had to be hi red in many cases at exorbitant u u s s s ul l e rents . In f t re, at lea t two month ho d be a low d for l pre imin ary work . P L Y W A T E R SU P .

[Ofﬁcia l R epo rt ]

m s w s s c ﬂ t d The arrange ent ere highly ati fa tory , and re ec e r s great c redit on the oyal engineer . The light steel 4 - inch main proved most valuable for stand but s s wa s r efera ing camps, for moving camp , canvas ho e p vi c o ur S v s ble . With mo ng amps , ystem of pro iding trough s s is s u s m but s for watering hor e perhap c mber o e , as regard the proposal that canvas buckets Should be carried by mo unted s to t s . troop , I am aver e increasing the weigh on the horse s s s a n d s s s c The canva tank , trough , ho e were ati fa tory , and i s s w ll , in future, be used for temporary tanding camp . A small rotary pump and hose should be carried on each water cart a s part of its equipment ; the present tripod pump should ’ M er r wea ther s ﬁr e s be condemned . y engine for pumping u s gave satisfactory res lt . T GR E A BR IT A IN . 7 1

OR GAN IZA T ION OF T HE OPP SIN F R E O G O C S.

[Oﬁ cia l R epor t ]

The organ ization followed generally upon the lines of two a c rmy orps with a cavalry brigade attached to eac h . To a fford the militia the advantage of being brigaded with the c r wa s s u n d line , ea h infantry b igade compo ed of four reg lar a l s m s two militia batta ion , the for er consi ting of four war s six s trength companies, and the latter of companies of lightly r t m l s s . s malle treng h Several ilitia, and ome few regu ar bat s u fi s t but talion co ld have taken the eld at a higher treng h , the establishments fixed were not greater than could be fur n ished by the majority after eliminating all men under six ’ s s t s m month ervice . The ar illery batterie of the two ar y c s u s s O f s t orp were at f ll trength , except tho e the corp ar illery , which had two instead of three brigade divisions of field Of s wa s s r artillery . The number gun con iderably unde

s u - n stren gth owing to the pre en ce of many fo r gu batteries . The royal engineers were represented by un its at reduced u u n s a s u a n d strength . S pply col m , s ch , were not employed, the medical and vete rinary services were reduced to the mini mum o f efficiency . The chief point O f our army - cor ps organiz ation which de mands attention for future maneuvers is that of the corps i r s o her o n s . tr ops, and e pecially of the co p artillery Both the R ed and Blue commanders appear to have con sti tuted the O fﬁcer commanding corps artillery the commandant

s o f s is O f the c orps troops . The wi dom thi arrangement u u but u s c v c u co n sid do btf l , the whole q e tion will re ei e aref l i er a t o n . D IR E T A FF AR M Y A N U M P S .

n d er in hief : Field -ma rsha l W o lsele Co mma c y .

s n s ff 3 c s ff 10. Per o al ta , ; dire ting ta , st ff 2 s u s c wi 2 ss s um Umpire a , enior mpire , ea h th a i tant ff pires and 3 orderly o icers . um s Ten umpires and 38 assistant pire .

One umpire camp commandant .

One veterinary O ffice r . ‘

" 2 A U T U M N m m .

: f Comma n der D uke o Co nn a ught .

rso a sta ﬁ 5 ° irec t e ra sta ff 8 a tta c ed a dm Pe n l , d ing gen l , ; h in is t ra tio n s a ff 1 t ,

A rmy co rp a tta c hed d e ta c hmen t ﬁrst dra go o n gn a n h

ta bed d e t a c me nt seco n d a t ta o n it. I. At h b li , A tta c hed det a chmen t a rmy se rvice co rps Deta chmen ts a rmy service so n s Deta chmen ts a rmy o rdna nce co rps ' Fi rst ca va l ry lm e ( M ajor Ge nera l T a lbo t :

m ‘ Bria n "0 " O C

T hi rteen th hut-a rr

E B . H . A Ba tte ry , o un t ed deta c me B Ha irm h nt, B. T wo co mpa n ies mo un ted infa n try a n d ma c hi n e-gun sect io n n a rm ser ce co s T hi rd com y, y vi rp e n W ke r El ct . Ge F a : Fi rst di visio n ( . . l )

First briga de (Co lo ne l o lipha nt) B riga de sta ll T hi rd ba tta lio n m ullet gua rds ‘ Sec o n d ba tta lion ( o ldst rea in gua rds First ba tta li on Sco ts gua rds Ba tta lio n a l ma rin es Yitth ba tta i o n m Wa rwickshi re regime n t Fourt h t a tta lio n y:tifordsbire re gimen t T w e nty-third c o mpa n a rmy se rvice co rps Seco n d bri e kilo nc l a men” Bri e eta S Fi rst ba tta l io n ro va l Sco ts seco n d ba tta lio n Li nco lnshire Sec o n d ba tta lion ro ya l Hi ghla nders

t a tta o . a n d Fi rs b li n A d 8. H ighl a n ers T hi rd ba tta lio n ro ya l Highla n de rs urt ba tta l o A a n e Fo h i n . d 8. Highla nd rs rt -se e n t co m n s T hi y v h pa y , a rmy service co rp Attach ed to di visio n Ca va l ry sq uad ro n seco n d dra go o n gua rds A rt illery st a ff - n e tte R T hirty inth fi ld ba ry , . A - a tte R Si x ty eighth field b ry , . A e e -e t e a tte r S v n ty igh h fi ld b y, It . A a mmun t o co N o . 7 i i n lumn e n t e co m N i nete h fi ld pa ny R . E Sixth co mpa n y a rmy se rvice co rps a f seve n te en t e os ta med ca co r s H l h fi ld h pi l i l p . Seco nd divisio n (M ajo r Ge nera l ( fi e ry) Divisio n sta ll T hird briga d e (Co l o n e l Kno x) liriga do sta ff Seco nd ba tta lion Sco ttish ri fles ec n a tta io a e e S o d b l n ro l N . Ia nca shir r gime nt ' Fourth ba tta lio n K ng s roya l rifle co rps Fi rst ba tta lio n ro ya l Dubli n fusilicrs ba tta o n r T hi rd li oya l N . La nca shire re gimen t ‘ T h ird ba tta lio n l a morou Highla nde rs n t co m a Sixtee h p ny, a rmy service conn a de Co l ro n Fo urth brig . E . 8. B w ) Brignd e sta Se co nd ba tta li on ro ya l W est Sur rey re gimen t seco nd ba tta lio n ro ya l Dev o nshi re regimen t Seco n d ba tta l io n West Yorkshi re regimen t ' T hird ba tta lio n Kin s to a i riile co rps Six th ba tta lion roya fuel ism Sev enth ba tta lion roya l fusilio rs T en t -first co m ser c c w y pa ny , a rmy vi e o rps.

74 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

E N SOU T H R AR M Y .

mma n der : en R ed ers ull t B Co G . v B e , G . C. .

S r a d Co l eco nd ca va l ry b ig e ( . J . D . P. Fre nch) ﬁ A rmy co rps sta . “ Briga d e sta ll Regimen t of h o use ho ld ca va lry __ First en r T th b um e .. Ba r ro a o rs e a rti er tte y 0, y l h ll y ted deta c men ro a Ha lf moun h t, y l e ngineers a n moun te f tr t m c - un T wo comp i es d in a n y, wi h a hine g sectio n T rt -seco n co m a n a rm service cor s hi y d y' y p

o d s o n M . sen W B t F urt h ivi i ( al . . u ler) Divisio n a l sta ff e n t bri e M a Gen Bo he Sev h gad ( j. . J . ug y)

' Secon d ba tta lio n N orthumberla n d iusllie rs _ Seco n d ba tta lio n Glo ucestershi re re gime n t ’ Seco nd ba tta li o n Duke of Co rnwa ll s light i n fa n try Fi rst ba tta lio n W o rc esters hi re re gimen t T hird ba tta li o n Glo uceste rshire regime n t T hird ba tta lio n Oxfo rdshire light in fa ntry o m a rm ervi e or s T en th c pa ny, y s c c p d e l R a h n ha ii h Eighth br iga Co . . 8. B. F t ersto g ) Briga de sta First ba tta lio n Ea st L a nca shire re gime n t Seco n d ba tta lio n Shropshire light in fa n try Seco n d ba tta lio n Wiltshire regimen t First ba tta lio n r iﬁe brigade T hi rd ba tta lio n L i verpoo l regimen t Fourt h ba tta lio n Liverpoo l regimen t Fo rt co m a a rm serv ce co r s u h p ny , i p H T Ya tes Div sio n roo s L e t Co . . R . A i t p ( i u . . S , . ) Ca va l ry squa d ro n seventh dra goo n gua rds , Br iga d e d i i isio n sta t?

Se en t e d a tte r R . A v h fi l b y , rtee n t e a ter Fou h fi ld b t y, R . A __ E t - fl rst e a tte r R A i igh y fi ld b y, . 6 sio mm o n N o . a t co m , divi n uni i n lu m R Seven t e co a . E h fi ld p ny , en teen t co m n a rm r ce r s Sev h pa y, y se vi co p lf r s oo s el Ha first co p tr p , fi d hospita l W F ft d isio . Ge n . M . . E Gosset C B. i h iv n (M aj . , . ) Divisio na l st a ff

N n t br a d e M . Gen . G Pa to n C. M . G. i h ig ( aj . , ) B riga de sta ff First ba tta lio n Essex regimen t Secon d ba tta li o n M iddlesex re gimen t First ba tta li o n York a nd La nca ste r regimen t Secon d ba tta lio n roya l Irish fusiliers Fo urth ba tt a li o n Esse x F urt ba tta o id l o h li n M d uex . T wen t -seco n d co m a a rm ser v ce co y p ny, y i T en th br a de M n B Pa rr ig ( al. Ge . . B . ) ” Briga de sta ll Seco n d ba tta lio n Ea st Surrey regiment Fi rst ba tta lio n roya l Sussex regimen t First ba tta li o n So uth La nca ster regiment Secon d ba tta li o n Se a fort h Highl a nders T hi rd ba tta li o n E a st Surrey regime nt Fo urt h ba tta li o n Ea st Surrey regimen t T hirty -fo urth co mpa ny a rmy service co rps s t B ivis n troo L e o l B n . A . D io p ( i n t . C . . M . Fli , ) Ca va l ry squa dro n seventh dra goo n gua rds Briga de d ivisio n sta ff

Seco nd e d ba tter R . A fi l y , urt e d Fo ba tter R . A h fi l y , - Fo rt th rd e a tte r R . A y i fi ld b y. N o 9 d sio o . ivi n a mmun itio n c l umn E even t e co m a n R 16 l h fi ld p y , . F ft co m a n rm se r ce t'o r s i h p y, a y vi p B a f N o 9 e l . fi ld hospita l GR E A T BR IT A IN . 75

T S x t d is o n M en . B T n n e C B . i h iv i ( aj. G . . hy , . ) Divi sio n sta ff

E e en t r a d e Col I S. M Ha mlto n l v h b ig ( . . . i ) Brigude sta ff Seco n d ba tta lio n E a st Kent regimen t eco ba t o n N o rfo k re S nd ta li l giment . Sec o nd ba tta lio n Ea st Yo rkshire re ime n t Seco n d ba tta lio n L e icestershi re ment T hird ba tta lio n Co n n a ught ra n gers Fourt h ba tta lio n Co n na ught ra n gers E t co m a a rra serv ce co r igh h p ny , y i ps W T e ft ri a e Co l. A . M o rr s w l h b g d ( . i )

Secon d ba tta lion Ch eshire re giment Seco nd ba tta li on N ort h Sta ffordshire regimen t First ba tta li on Co n na ugh t ra n rs First ba tta lio n ro ya l M un ster usiliers F ft a tta o Co n n a u t r a n e i h b li n gh g rs . Fifth ba tta li o n L e i nster regimen t T e ft co m a n a rm ser ce co r s w l h p y , y vi p v s ut o l o ro L e W . Pa rso ns Di i i n t ops ( i . C . L . Ca va lry squa dro n seventh d ra go o n gua rds Brigad e divisi o n sta ff T en t -si th e d ba tter R A w y gh fi l y , . - Seven t si t e d a tte r It. A y x h fi l b y , Se en t -n n t e a tter B A v y i h fi ld b y , . 8 d s n mmun N o . ivi io a itio n co lumn T rt -e t e d co m n R E hi y igh h fi l pa y , Fifteenth co mpa ny a rmy service co r s , p Ha l N o 9 e f . fi ld hospita l Co r s tro o 0 u J . F Br p ps (0 1. . o gh) Co r ps tro ops sta ff Co r s a rt er L eut Co l W L Da dso n p ill y ( i . . . . vi Head qua rters a nd 3 squad ro ns thi rd ra go o n gua rds Heed i n arten se venth dra goon gua rds Deta cLmen t fi rst d ra goo n gua rds Br a de d is o n a nd co r s a rt e r sta ffs ig , iv i , p ill y Ba e r hi it B tt . A y , . Ba tter R H R . y , . A Briga de divisi on sta ff -fo ur t e d t Fo rt a ter R . A y h fi l b y , Si t -fourt e ba tter R A x y h fi ld y , . Seve t -fifth fi e d ba tt er R n y l y , . A Bri a de divisio n sta ff E l t -t rd e ba tter R A g y hi fi ld y , . E t -s t e d ba tter R A igh y ix h fi l y , . - E t se en t e ba tter R . A igh v h fi ld y , Cor en n eers L eut Co l C A Ro c o rt -Bo d ps g ( i . . . . hf y i Re imenta l sta ff ’ Ha f bridging ba tta li o n Sect o ns te le ra ba tta o i , g h li n Sec o n d fie ld pa r Seco nd ba ll oo n sec tio n First ba tta l i o n Durha mlight i n fa n try T rt -six t com n a rm serv ce co r s hi y h pa y , y i p Ha f rs t cor s troo s e os ta l fi p p , fi ld h pi l Seco nd ca va lry brigade bea re r compa ny

DA T E S F M A N E E R O U V S .

Offi c ia l R e o rt a n d A rm a n d N a v Ga z ette Se tem er [ p y y , p b

T he maneuvers included three distinct periods

1 T he c c s u 1 u us 2 7 . . avalry exer ise , J ly to A g t T h “ ” A u u 1 e s s 15 3 . drill , g t to

:i u e s m 1 8. . The mane v r , Septe ber to 76 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S.

The real work Of the autumn maneuvers began on T hurs c m day , when the two army orps , com anded respectively by O f e be the Duke Connaught and Sir R dvers Buller, may sa id ﬁ d O to have entered the el as pposing forces . The work pre v io usl s y done had been that of preparation , the various unit having been brought together from a ll parts O f the Kingdom under conditions which placed the greatest strain on the n s s a s is w o the administratio , a train uch quite unkno n n

Continent . M A N E U ' V E R S R E R O D S.

’ ST AN DIN G O R DE RS FO R N OR T HE R N A R M Y .

Br oa d A rr o w A u st 20 [ , gu ,

a ri n as — s m c l . M a Armed troop on the ar h will pay the pre scribed compliment s to a general officer on the first occa sion him is only each day that they pass . Care to be taken that ffi s is ss O s the ordinary tra c on road not unnece arily b tructed . O ffi s s n Mounted cer or troop are not to ride o the footpaths . Bands will not play when marching to the points of rendez ss s s vous . Gla bottle are not to be carried by troop during n u s m s is ma e vers . Paper in which refre h ent are wrapped to be ’ burned on the spot or put in the men s hav ersacks and burned s on return to camp . All hor es must be shod immediately th m n u s u be before proceeding to e a e ver area . They ho ld saved a s much as possible by ordering troops to dismount O O ff n whenever the pportunity ers . Whe not prevente d by c s t te s tacti al con idera ions, there will be a halt of ten minu the m m half an hour after co mence ent of a march , and after m u th wards once a n hour for ten in tes . At e appointed time heads O f brigades will halt irr espectiv e O f any distance they v 1 s c sec . 34 i may ha e lo t . With referen e to , Infantry Dr ll , any man who does not march into camp with his batta lion is s in a s o ut to be hown the return having fallen . Medical O ffic s l ss a t er wil , when po ible, attend the daily parades for ’ f v s u the inspection O the men s feet . Veterinary a eline sho ld e c u l c m s be appli d to the feet in preferen e to soap . S pp y olu n

u s e will proceed to the camping gro nd independently , und r

Where the ter m division a l comma n ders a ppea r s in these or ders it im lies he en er a l o fﬁcer co mma n din the ca va lr ri a d e the en era l p t g g y b g , g o fﬁcers co mma n din division s a n d in ca m the comma n da n o f he cor s g , p t t p r o Wher a rm hea d u r rs is men tion ed he hea d ua rters o f t ops. e y q a te t q h t e N o rther n a rmy is referred to . T GR E A BR IT A IN . 77

orders to be issued daily . They will be accompanied by a staff or specially selected regimental O fiicer from each divi d sion, briga e, and the corps troops (to mark out camping etc n ua rterm grounds, ) ; the regime tal quartermaster, or q a s ter sergeant of each unit (to draw rations) ; a proportion of s Ofi cer the cooks , one noncommis ioned , and ten men per v s s e brigade, di i ional troops, and corp troops (to r ceive rations in a n d and load them the wagons) , a proportion of the water c s s n art (to draw water for the cook ) . Private cantee carts c fi Of s may a company the rst line tran port on the march . Orders will be issued daily a s to the order O f march O f the e O f s cond line transport (baggage column) . The remainder of s s m s s the cook , pioneer (with ca p color ) , and a mall party (to in s s s s co m dig latr e ) will accompany thi tran port . Divi ional manders will detail an army service corps O fiicer to take charge O f m O f the baggage column their com ands . The baggage ’ O fiicer s t guards will be restricted to the servan s, who will o s u e s o fii march in formed b dies . Di mo nt d noncommis ioned cers and men Of the army service corps are allowed to ride on s s but i the wagon of their corp , they w ll invariably dismount s n going up hill . Nothing is to be placed in the wagon beyo d s s the articles enumerated in the load table . 2 A T A L — l s m s O f . T C IC Un e s the military situation ad it it , the distance allowed between units when route marchin g 3 1 6 . (Infantry Drill , sec . ) must not be taken During opera s l m tion His Roya Highness , the general co manding, will be accompanied by a n orderly carryin g a red flag with the letter “ th s s N in e center . Bearer of reports from divi ional com s e s u in mander , or of int lligence from the front, ho ld be structed to deliver their messages to the staff Officer nearest ssu d His o ss this flag . A memorandum i e by R yal Highne in regard to field operation s will be passed for information of i s m div sional commander . All topographical references in ar y

1- - - - hea dquarters orders will be to the inch to the mile map . T — A n O fﬁ be th S . e 3 . CYCLIS cer will placed in charge of c u n s cyclists of ea h division , and he will keep a jo r al howing o n u s the ex act distance traveled daily d ty by each man . Thi n u c ﬁ s informatio , with the req ired erti cate , will be ent to the 15 deputy adjutant general by the th of September , in support of claims under par . Allowance Regulations . Each division will furnish two cyclists to be attached to the army

s c . headquarter , to report to the amp commandant Cyclists 78 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S . can most usefully be employed in a close coun try in mainta in ing communication between columns and detached bodies of in s a z i s troops , di tant reconnoiss nces , sei ing important po nt

in s s r s . in advance, and ecuring ﬂanks from u pri e — I n e a s . A M n 4 C P s . camp the army will be co sider d under h o n s i e . s peace c nditio , unless otherw se ord red W en the corp s s e Oﬁicer i r es o n troop are a s mbled in camp, the senior w ll be p sible that the regulation s a r e strictly complied with and that orders from army headquarters are promulgated to all con

l m s o s . cerned . He will be sty ed co mandant corp tr op Divi sioual c alls will be preceded by corr esponding to the n m f s i u ber O the division . Brigade call w ll be preceded by one ” ’ ” C for brigades with an odd number a n d by two C s for rs a nd to those with an even number . The hou for retreat tat o ill . a s s . . e will be at p . m and (l t po t) at p m R veille w be sounded at such hour as divisional commanders may appo int daily after receiving orders from army headquarters a s to the ’ s s u following day s operations . The e call are to be so nded by ﬁ one unit of each brigade only . There should be a xed half

u a s u a s . ss ho r for breakf t, during which all fatig es will ce e Me i ing books will be compiled da ly , and no large balances allowed c ru m r n to a c e while men are doinghard work . Regi ental ar a ge ments will be made for some foo d being carried in the haver s c s s ﬁ a k daily , and all water bottle will be lled over night and e c s ﬁl inspect d on parade in the morning . Water art will be led e l s c b fore eaving camp . Wet canteen are to be losed from

5 . fi . . s to p m . and nally at p m Entertainment n m s v but are forbidden . Divisio al com ander will pre ent any u a thorized persons dealing at the canteens . m s i c s t Divisional co mander w ll, when spa e permit , loca e the s ss m n a place of a e bly for their cavalry , artillery , and i f ntry i “ ” s . O n m (by br gade ) the alar sounding, smaller units will c f m s proceed dire t to such places O asse bly . Water guard will be mounted imme diately on arriv al in camp (before the o s s i s u s s t s v s tr op are di m s ed) , f rni hing en rie o er all place from i s O d a s . which drinking water btaine , to prevent w te The necessary fatigue parties for pumpin g water will be found by s s s s du the troop . Latrine and rubbi h pit are to be g at the s plac e shown in the plans of the camps (which will be issued) . n sc s The latri es are to be properly reened . Refu e pits are to be dug near the kitchens . The kettle trench should be used s a r e for kitchens . Trenche not to be dug round the tents 9 GR E A T BR IT A IN . 7 w ithout permission O f the general commanding the army . u s 3 . Broken bottles, ref se, etc . are to be buried at lea t feet deep a n d Manure is to be swept up in heaps, is not to be buried or u . n r s s removed Latri es , refuse , and bbi h pit are not to be fi s O ff u lled in until the troop have marched the gro nd . When fi l . s n s lled in, they are to be we l rammed Divi io al commander will detail a sta ff O fficer to insure that campin g grounds are ss u left in good order . It is e ential that horse troughs sho ld O f n w be kept full water to preve t their arping by the sun , and consequen tly leaking . They will be filled by the royal engi n eers O f s s prior to the arrival the troop in camp , but men mu t be detailed from each party of mounted troops to pump while s n so the u s the hor es are bei g watered , that tro gh may never be flicer un un h emptied . O s commanding mo ted its s ould detail fi t s s e v s one man to every f een hor e , or to ery party of maller o s number t pump while the hor es are being watered . N O civilians are to be permitted to enter a camp unless passed in by an Officer or provided with a pass signed by an officer on the staff O f the division al commander O f such camp ; O f m s in the case the ar y headquarter camp , by the camp com n Of ss s a li mandant . Pri ted forms pa e will be provided on pp u u t n n . ss s ca io to the dep ty adj ta t general A few special pa e , s e u to be us d O ign d by the q artermaster general , e nly by Mem O f s s s n um bers Parliament, pre s repre entative , and a limited ber Of other gentlemen whose interests are affected by the s i ss u N . O operation , w ll be i ued from army headq arters dogs are to be allowed in camps . All person n el and animal s provided by the army servic e c s s co orp will encamp with the army ervice rps . Vehicles, s the se v c s whether hor ed by army r i e corp or not , will be m un parked in the ca p of the it to which they are allotted . Smoking in the vicinity of ordnance and supply depots and ks i hay r is s prohibited . E D A L — u s n 5 . M IC Sick req iring ho pital treatme t will be transferred to the field hospitals attached to the infantry di v i s n s s r c s io s and to the corp troop , and f om then e di patched by train (from the nearest railway sta tion ) to the Farnborough s i O ffi s fi railway tation , by the med cal cers in charge of tho e eld s a s n n s m s ho pit l , under arra geme t to be ade by divi ional prin cipa l medical officers and the senior medical O fficer of the s u corps troop , their n mber and the hour of their expected arrival at Farnborough railway station being telegraphed to u I OS l ta l s t Con n a ght p , Alder ho ’ a r e, t he me d i c a l n fl i c e r in ch g I a m 86 1 106 s n ding r y corp , Aldershot’ a n d t o t h e o ffi c e r co mma 7

vi . i - s ma be pro ded S ck from the in 0 1 4 0 , t ha t a mbula n ce y n s ﬁ a ssed to the eare t eld hospital , ca v a lry br ig a d e will be p

ila l . u s whe re they w ill be sim r y dealt with Regimental ro te u n o t fo r sic k d ispatc hed by train to Farnboro gh station ( u ex ceeding fifty i n n umber on any one ro te) will be issued by the medic al O ffi c ers in charge of the field hospitals from which f O 1 s O . 1 n the sick a re sent . Section N bearer compa y are a ttached to each field hospital for transport Of sick to railway t n s to s O f to sta io , and the cavalry brigade for tran port sick fi s a s s us u the nearest eld ho pital . C e of infectio disease occ r

n in us e o e the O fﬁ ri g camp m t , by law, be r p rt d to medical cer of health of the district in question . Such cases should be at s u s on ce isolated , and all anitary preca tion taken to prevent us s se s . n s u s the pread of the di a e If a te t is ed for thi p rpo e, it must be thoroughly disinfected before bein g used for other s v c s purpose . In no case may public con eyan e or railway car ia us fo r c but n r ges be ed their conveyan e , they may be se t in c s a s t s e ambulan e by road to the milit ry ho pi al at Trowbridg , z s c s s c u h u Devi e , Dor he ter, or Chri t h rc , if they occ r near s u s be s e f enough to those in tit tion to tran f rred by road . I spec ial arrangemen ts ca n be ma de with the railway company s e su s s s n u h s uo to tran f r ch ca e to Alder hot by trai , f rt er in tr u ca a n tion s will be issued . If the infectio s ses c not be removed

u a O f the ﬁ s us from the mane ver are , a tent eld ho pital m t be

t fi e a n d su s e se apart and remain x d , itable arrangement mad O ffi s is s d by the principal medical cer of div ion , or senior me i l i cer O f s s to i m ca O fi the corp troop , prov de the with medical aid and nursing .

SPE CIA L IN ST R U CT IO N S T O U M PIR E S .

Broa d A r r ow Se tember 3 [ , p ,

— m 1 E N E R A P R I N CI P L E s . s us c c . G L U pire m t re olle t that at these maneuvers on a large scale decision s must be given upon a broad view of the situation and that the discussion of details which tend to divert a ttention from larger tactical questions is c s s h n to be deprecated except in a e w ere , for any reaso , it is desirable to show combatants the effect of their actions s 207 (Infantry Drill , , It will , therefore , be generally inad visable to place small units out O f action and consider all the s O f minutenes detail laid down in infantry drill . Umpires are

N 2 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

o r s l i To each c p , divisional cava ry br gade, and corps artil lery staff will be attached an as sistant umpire a s repo r ting s ffi Officer . The dutie of this O cer are to keep the senior umpire of his side informed a s to all important movements and a c tions O f is t of the body troops to which he a tached, and to give all information required of him by the umpires on the request of e o fiicer Ofiicer the latt r . The general commanding or com manding the body of troops to which he is atta ched will cause him to be informed of all important orders given or reports u s i his received , and f rni h him w th three orderlies to carry m s s e sages to the enior umpire . These orderlies will wear c umpire badges and are not to arry lances . The reporting officers are to communicate in writing a s Often as seems to m i the necessary with the senior umpire, and only w th him , and are to number their messages to him in succession o n ea ch day . — ’ R E P R T s . A t u i s u 3 . O the senior mp re conference mpires will hand to the staff Officers to the sen ior umpire their notes ’ s s in pencil on the day operation , together with any remarks s u they may de ire to make, and no f rther reports will be m required from the . Their attention is drawn to the last two “ s O f . 206 1 e Offi s entences Infantry Drill , sec , R porting cer will ascertain from the staff Officer to the senior umpire that e e te all their r ports have be n received , and will comple the ” O f sa me up to the conclusion operations .

DE T AIL S OF E A CH DA Y ’S OPE R A T I N O S.

O fﬁ cia l R e o rt a n d Bro a d A r ro w Se te m er 3 a n d 10 [ p , p b ,

A DE A F O H M A N V GE N E R L I R T E E U E R S .

An invading force (Blue) has landed between We ymouth v c a t St . Albans Head , to cooperate in an ad an e on London c m c with another for e (i aginary) , whi h is disembarking on st n the southern shore of the Bri ol Chan el .

GE N E R A L I N ST R U CT ION S .

s O f w s n n 1 . The rolling tock the rail ay havi g been withdraw , is u use s the Blue force nable to the railway , and they are u s O f su available for the Red force only for the p rpo e pply . 2 u u s s O f . Thro gho t the maneuver the boundarie the opera uv tion s are the limits O f the mane er area . GR E A T BR IT A IN . 83

3 c s e to . References in General and Spe ial Idea r fer the l - - - - inch to l mile map .

4 . n Baggage trai s are to be considered as neutral . u to th t o s s 5 . e To obviate nnecessary fatigue r op , order will n m to ﬁ be give fro day to day , limiting the hostilities de nite hours .

O P E R A T IO N S O F T H E F I R ST D A Y .

D S PE CIA L w EA (R E ) .

1 E A A E D . R E M . U R T R S R No H DQ A Y , u 3 1 1898 m. A us t T R . WHI CHU CH , p , g , . m s n is The enemy , estimated as an ar y corp , havi g landed , hi t a n d e c marc ng nor hward , is reported to have r a hed the v - neigh bo rhood of Blandford . Mo e to morrow toward t s c w u Shaf e bury , re onnoitering toward Blandford ith yo r ’ mounted troops ; order them to report o n the en emy s strength m s a n d v him n and move ent , to endea or to prevent marchi g northward . i 1 . o f c s s u N . B . No one the Red for e to be o th of an east - s n u u a s and we t line draw thro gh Martin , Melb ry , and Abb m m 1 . 1 0 . before a , Septe ber . u s v i u 2 . s n b t O tpo ts are to be po ted on arri al camp, may be i 111 w thdrawn at p . .

A L mEA BL S P ECI ( U E ) .

N 0 . D A T E S R 1. E A U R R U E M H Q BL A Y , m u u t 81 1898 O R E ST E R . A s . D CH , p . , g , n u is n Y u I lear Salisb ry being stro gly intrenched . o will s o ur o s c therefore await near Blandford new of tr op , whi h are m ri co mmittin o ur dise barking in the B stol Channel , before g y ut self to a further advance northward . Send o your cavalry to -morrow toward Salisbury to clear up the situation in that direction . i to . u c s s 1 . s N B . No one of the Bl e for e be north of an ea t a n d - west line drawn through Cranbourn e and Chettle before 1 0 m m . . . 1 1898 a , Septe ber ,

N A R R A T IV E O F O P E R A T IO N S .

m v s u in c u s The Red army o ed toward Shafte b ry three ol mn , and halted about Fovant without interr uption from the th m d e . wa s enemy . The cavalry briga e covered move ent It ec te ﬁ o n M in chin to n wn dir d at rst up g Do , with two contact s s s wa s e l qua dron detached . One of the e direct d on the eft o m ﬂank to reconnoiter between Tollard R yal and Pe bridge , t wa s s out o n and to the southwest . The o her ent the right H4 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

ﬂan k to reconnoiter the country between Melbury Abbas and ’

c s u . o ﬂicers Tollard Royal , and then e to the o thwest Three patrols were also sent out . m in en At a . . , a report hav g be received that a hostile cavalry brigade wa s moving from the direction of Blan dford h e R ed toward T orn y Down , the commander of the cavalry

e o n d brigade led it to Handley . It remain d Han ley Hill , in ss s im ece n readine to act, for a con iderable t e without r ivi g further information of the Blue cavalry . d d a n d u . R e At p . m the briga e moved to Oakley fo nd T he Blue cavalry and a battery behind Launcesto n Down . mounted infantry opened ﬁre against them from Thick Thorn

e . Down , followed at by the horse artillery batt ry The

Blue battery replied , and Red cavalry failing to draw the s its m e s oppo ing cavalry on , com and r hortly afterwards with it s s drew . The two batterie , hor e artillery , belonging to the corps troops were directed by the commander of the R ed force su on East Chase Farm as a pport to the cavalry . The orders issued to the commander of the Blue cavalry it ﬁ s wa s brigade induced s rst di positions . He ordered to 10 m 1 u . . 3 6 n occ py , at a , point , Tarra t Hinton Down , and to ’ s o ﬂi cers s s u a n d the end patrol toward Sali b ry , through all s m t avenues and passages of Cranborne Cha e . Full infor a ion s u c was al o req ired of all the approa hes to , and exits from ubha m to n a n St p Bottom , and of y force between the brigade a n d Salisbury . Con tact was established by the Blue cavalry near Cash s R ed ca v 12 e moor with portion of the alry before noon, aft r which hour desultory a n d minor actions took place between advanced parties only for some hours .

R EM A R KS .

The task of the R ed cavalry wa s to cover the march of the a rmy c orps which wa s mov ing fromFov ant towards Sha ftes bury to ascertain the strength a n d movemen ts of the Blue

v n n . force, and to endea or to prevent him marchi g orthward The commander of the Red cavalry kept his command con tr a ted a ct uﬁ s cen and prepared to , and he f l lled the ta k s so a s c m as igned to him , far overing the arch of the Red n A m s wa s c . s s force oncer ed regard infor ation , the report received by him from his advanced parties early in the day d were inconclusive and wantin g in accuracy . It woul there fore have been better ha d he secured more c ertain i n forma i us n e v t on by p hi g forward with great r igor . GR E A T BR IT A IN . 85

The Blue cavalry wa s directed by the special idea to u u u m clear p the sit ation toward Salisb ry . The com ander of the advan ced Blue army ordered it to obtain full informa u s tion of a n y force between it and Salisb ry . Thi information wa s a n d m wa s not obtained , the commander of the Blue ar y left in ignorance of the fact that the Red army wa s that day m m s s u on the arch fro Sali bury toward Shafte b ry .

O P E R A T IO N S O F T H E S E CO N D D A Y .

E L E R SP CIA ID A ( E D ) .

IT 2 m temb r 1 1898 . 2 . U R . . Se e . No WH CH CH , p , p ,

z - m u n Sei e the high ground to orrow abo t Charlto Down , n n c n u t a d prevent the e emy advan ing o Salisb ry . Informa ion has been receiv ed that o n e division of the enemy ha s disem s n s barked in the Bri tol Chan el, and that the di embarkation

of a further force is proceeding .

" . Y . , ' Chie s ta o c 'r f j ﬁ e .

u s is s u a n N . B . No one of the mo nted troop to be o th of ' - - u u a east and west line thro gh Melb ry Abbas and M rtin , and no one of the infan try is to be south of a n east - and - west line

- — u i St 9 111 . thro gh Shaftesbury Berw ck . John before a .

E A B E S P E CIA L ID ( L U ) .

2 t er 1 1898 m. Se em 2 . O R E ST E R . b . No . D CH , p , p ,

un u - Seiz e the high gro d abo t Charlton Down to morrow . so ew r e If unable to do , hold the enemy there with a vi to p venting his interfering with the advance o f the main army m (imaginary) on Shaftesbury . The main ar y will move to

- Blandford to morrow . Information has been received that the disembarkation of t a m c s a t st is c he force (imagin ry) , one ar y orp , Bri ol , pro eed

ing without opposition . B A . . , ' hi e s in ( e e r C f j fﬁc .

m s is a n N . B . No one of the ounted troop to be north of east - a n d - west line through Compton Abbas and Tollard is be s Royal , and no one of the infantry to north of an ea t and - west line through Iwerne Min ster and Chettle before 9 a . m .

N A R R A T IV E O F O PE R A T IO N S .

the uss s i the s At a . m . thirteenth h ar , w th two of hor e

s s z u but o n batterie , went forward to ei e Melb ry Hill, reach

n its u s un s e r e un a to sce n d i g lower feat re , the g w ble a it, and , 96 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

u d s a t u c v t e d c e after ﬁring a few ro n Bl e a alry , hey retir , over d by the hussars . 9 s to 5 . . At . 4 a m the twelfth lancer were ordered Tollard Royal to support the mounted infantry pre " io usly ordered ﬁn d n a n d e there . They did not the mou ted infantry , b ing m t u c e by the Bl e in for e, they returned at The in fantry division s were unable to advance a s far a s the c o positions on which they had been dire ted , for Compt n Down had been occupied previously by the Blue cavalry and a n d u c ec horse artillery , Melbury Hill and the gro nd onn ting

w m u n . it ith Co pton Down , by Bl e infa try s fi six es c At a . m . the corp eld artillery ( batteri ) ame uc s s s s into action by s ce sive brigade divi ion , the left re ting i u s s c n on Win Green Plantation , and the l ne of g n tret hi g z u r toward Bree e Hill . They engaged the Bl e a tillery on the groun d east of Compton Down . Six batteries of division al artillery (first and secon d divi sions) eventually ca me into action in succession on the right fi v c s . s of the orp eld artillery The three batterie , third di i u c c . sion , ame into a tion immediately so th of Win Green In the first instance the fir e of all the batteries was direc ted upon u r the u s the Bl e artille y on gro nd ea t of Compton Down . fi s s At the r t divi ion , which had originally bee n r u directed, one b igade on Melb ry Hill and one brigad e on m wa s cu z i Cann Co mon , ordered to oc py the line Bree e H ll

Charlton Down .

t s c ri a One ba talion of the e ond b gade , having lready passed u u s a s a s u thro gh Melb ry Abba , advanced far Melb ry Hill

s wa s o ut c . un upported , and put of a tion The second and third divisions were ordered up to a con cea led s n a e s po ition orth of Win Green Plant tion , and dir ction gi v e n to the sec ond division to a dvance to the high ground ’ H a tt c about s barn . At its advan ed brigade moved n c s s forward , part bei g dire ted again t We t Wood and part s m It wa s m t down the road to A h ore . e almost at the outset

su r s u n s by greatly perio force of Bl e infa try in both direc tion . At half the brigade wa s facing in a westerly and half in a s c wa s u e outherly dire tion , and at it adj dged by the umpir ff v uff u s s s s s s s c . ta to ha e ered erio lo e , and it was ordered ba k “ m u es er a s ﬁr At a few in t aft noon , when the ce e e wa s s u e n s its r s o nded , Red h ld Charlton Dow , ight re ted on Cann

o mmo the e s ce b ee z e s t v l W in . C n , lin pa ing hen Br Hil to Green 8 GR E A T BR IT A I N . 7

At a signal po st wa s established on Melbury Hill which n t reported there was no enemy on Charlton Dow . About his time the triangle of roads east of Compton Abbas wa s seiz ed c v s ll s i by the a alry and hor e arti ery, upported by a br gade of v wa s the fourth division . The fourth di ision now directed ﬁ upon Ashmore, with orders to hold it strongly ; the fth v u v s u di ision pon Win Green, and the sixth di i ion by S tton n L n co mbe s Waldro and o g Bottom in the ame direction . At c s s 10a . m . the orps hor e batterie came into action on Compton s ce Down again st cavalry yard ) . At this time Red for ha d a strong force of artillery on Charlton Down yards)

firing on Blue artillery . fi s c s s At the six eld batterie , orp artillery , had order s but m n to prolong the line of gun , before co ing into actio r r a s s they we e orde ed e tward , and the whole eight batterie , u u t e fi s bseq en ly re nforced by the three of the fth division , came into a ction ac ross the road (about lev el 810) and down wa s s n . the lope to the orth This position cramped , and the batteries had to be so placed that some of them were en fila ded u v suff by the Red artillery . They wo ld ha e ered heavily , both in coming into action and durin g the maintenance of the u artillery d el . The attempted adv ance of a brigade of the Red (second 1 c d f ue 1 . 10wa s s a e o division) , at met dire tly by thi brig the Bl fi v is ue ( fth di ion) , and taken in flank by the head of the Bl v s c u s (fourth di i ion) , which had advan ed thro gh A hmore .

KS R E M A R .

By the seiz ure and retention of the position taken up on t W in c ﬁ th Charl on Down and Green , the Red for e ful lled e ” s ta sk assigned to it by the pecial idea . The artillery wa s s a n d u v brought into action with kill promptit de . The ad ance ’ (at of a portion of the second div ision toward H a tt s d barn would have le to serious losses . It appears that it wa s not intended to persevere with it in the ev en t of serious

n n But s o oppositio being e countered . this doe not seem t e u v c wa s un have be n nderstood , for the ad an e continued til stopped by umpires after the situation of the troops had un s m v c become natural . The results of thi o ement, whi h in

o - c n ec es effect to k the form of a counter attack , indi ate the sity for the intention a n d objectiv e be ing clearly indicate d v n ces before a brigade ad a . 88 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The attack by the Blue force directed upon W mGreen was

- s well timed , and two and one half division and the whole of But t the artillery were concentrated against this point . bo h u s a n d n s to the g n the i fantry were expo ed to and , a consider en fila ded fir e u s able extent, by the of a powerful line of g n u v s a d ring their ad an ce . Thi led to the dvanced line of s o ut infantry being ent back , and a battery being placed of a action by umpires . In these circumstances the att ck would n o t u v ha d a , in the opinion of the mpire in chief, ha e a re son f s s the a e able chance o ucces . The work carried out by dvanc d r v u wa s fo ce of ca alry and mo nted infantry of value , and the concentration of the infan try wa s skillfully effected . lr a s 1 . ca va v It w s ob erved at 0 a m . that a regiment of u wa s W s d s (Bl e ) kept halted in a road near e t Woo , expo ed to artillery fir e at yards ; similarly infantry (Red) in a n m wa s u s fire lane ear Cann Co mon m ch expo ed to artillery , is e which was directed on it . Attention drawn to the n cessity for care in av oiding the unnecessary expo sure of troops to r u t m u c s fi e . Abo t the same i e a gro p of ma hine gun was noticed in action across a roa d upon which one of the guns

wa s s s v x s on e . placed . The ituation elected was a ery e po ed

O P E R A T I O N S O F T H E T H I R D D A Y .

P E I A L A R S C IDE ( E D) .

. E A D A T E 3 . U R R S T U R No H Q , WHI CH CH , m e tembe r 2 1898 S . 4 p. . , p , Remain to - morrow in observation of the force with which

- w t . a e a v t you ere in con act to day If ttack d , fall b ck on Fo an , so a s s t m to be in a po i ion to cooperate with the main ar y , of which the advanced division (imaginary) should reach Salis bu - m r v ry to o row e ening .

' hie s t o e r C f aj fﬁc . i u . c s s the N . B No one of the for e to be o th of Gillingham — — s c St . 10 . Shafte bury Berwi k John road before a m .

The following after order wa s issued to the commander of the Red on the receipt of his proposed dispositions for the ’ third day s operation s :

A M F M M N DE IN C P O CO A R CHIE F , 11 m 2 . m e te be r . S p , p , CO M M A N DIN G GE N E R A L o r R E D AR M Y I ha v e receiv ed a copy of the orders yo uhav e issued of your m v s - c o ut the o ement to morrow . They do not arry the plan of

9 0 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

a s s r guard , Blue force , and thi latter advanced the co ps artil lery on White Sheet Hill opened ﬁre upon it . The orders to the cav alry brigade were to scout to war d the co m Semley , Win Green , and Motcombe , reporting to u u i c to mander, Bl e army , with the fo rth div sion, whi h was v n n ﬁ l mo e by Foots Hill on Ca e d Farm . m t At 10 a . m . the brigade left Melbury Hill and at e t s u s ua wa s to at Shaf e b ry one q dron (Red) , which ordered retire .

a . At the brig de moved to Donhead St Mary , where it wa s checked by three half compan ies of infantry (third divi s s v c t u e i f ion Red) . The e were dri en ba k o the mo nt d n antry u su on Charlton Ho se, where the three half companies were p ported by a company ; but they were again dislodged and forced back into Ludwell U po n several battalions of infantry

(Red) . A t the cavalry horse battery wa s brought in action on u s a s ﬁ s the high gro nd at Charlton cro sro d , and red on the troop in the village .

1 n R ed u - At two compa ies ( ) were rep lsed with case shot,

- - m un u n r fir e . achine g , and mo nted infa t y At 12 noon the infantry (Red) vacated Ludwell village ; their columns were fired on by the horse battery during the s retirement . The three divisions and the corp troops all moved in the first instance by the main Iwerne Minster—Shaftesbury u i e a s road . The fo rth div sion led and diverg d to the e t at the a s du s bu a n d n forked ro d e we t of Mel ry Hill , marched on Ca n fi l its s e d Fa rm . Three of battalions, with three batterie of

m. the corps artillery , arrived there at a . , the remainder of the div ision at p . m . he fi v s ss due T fth di i ion was ma ed at the foot of, and north u w n u m of Melb ry Hill , here it remai ed until abo t p . . , wa s a n when it ordered to M yo Farm . The sixth divisio moved o n Ludwell . c s Ca n n field m The orp artillery eventually assembled at Far . Great difficulty wa s experienced in getting the force up to u s Melb ry Abba on account of only one road being available . wa s s Dun cliffe s The balloon ent up at Hill , to ob erve on the

n . left ﬂank, and deceive the Red comma der At the c lose of the operations both the fourth and sixth s s w s a n d u o f divi ion ere moving ea tward , the advanced g ard the latter division ha d reached Ludwell . GR E A T BR IT A IN . 91

“ The term observation used in the special ide a for the s a n d n Red was misinterpreted , as was al o the second expla a w o s a s . t ry instruction , and the force fell back before it attacked Had it been covered by an adequate outpost force properly o e its w u n p st d , retirement , hen really attacked , wo ld have bee se ur u u d c ed and the advance of the Bl e force serio sly delaye . W ith the dispositions actually ma de it wa s possible for two c u s ompanies of mo nted infantry , with a hor e battery (Blue) , to s r c force the outpo ts back on the rear of the reti ing olumns . s d n fo c c o . The avalry ent ba k go i rmation Its commander, by not occupying Breeze Hill on lea rnin g the exposed position o f u fi m s the Bl e fth division below Melbury Hill , is ed a favor a ble opportun ity o f inflicting serious losses on it by artillery fi r e .

wa s d but The movement of the Blue force well conceive , c onsiderable delay and some confusion occurred in carryi n g ut r l o the march . This was att ibutab e in part to the force h v a n d a ing to move on one road , partly to the transport c olumns interfering with the march . The mounte d infantry and the horse battery of the cavalry b r d d igade were promptly and energetically handle , and woul ff u have e ected val able results . The cavalry regiments of the brigades were unable to act in the close country in which they were placed , and while halted they were much exposed to n artillery fire . The brigade would have bee better employed c on the right ﬂank of the a dvan e .

O P E R A T I O N S O F T H E FO U R T H D A Y .

SPE DE A BE D CIAL I ( ) .

E A T E R E D A N N o . 4 . A U R R S R M H DQ M I A Y , N D V m em e r 1898 O E R . . t b Se . A , p , p 4, Information regarding enemy is to the following effect H is main a d vance (imaginary) appears to be by Farnham a n d o u s v Cranbourne n Salisb ry . I propo e to hold him on the Ri er E bb with the force (imaginary) under my immediate com manlp The force (imaginary) which landed at Bristol occupied

- Bath to day . If the enemy with whom yo u were in observation yester c o n is but it im day advan e Sal bury , I can deal with him , is rta n t to prevent a junction between him and the hostile u v orce (ima g ma r y) at Bath . To prevent such a j nction mo e a s to be s o to a position so in readines to act ab ut Codford , and 92 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

W deny to the enemy the line of the River ylye . If you sight him o v c a n d while on the line of march t ward the ri er, atta k drive him back in a westerly direction .

" . Y . , ' Chief sta j ojﬁc

. to N B . No one of the force is be north of the Chilmark ' — T eﬂ o n t v s r - - s ut Magna Ba er tock road , or west of a no th and o h — m. line through Chilmark Ansty before a . , at which hour operations may commence .

SPE CIA L IDE A (BL U E ) .

2 m e tem r 1898 N 4 A N F R . be o . . O . S . BL D D , p , p 4,

The main army will mov e from here to - morrow direct on u Salisb ry . The army corps (imaginary) which lan de d at Bristol is in u n s - v z o n s . occ patio of Bath , and move to morrow De i e Information ha s been received that the force with which you were in observation yesterday will move to -morrow on Wylye and Codford in order to interpose between yo u and z Devi es . Attack him while on the line of march before he v W a n d r t can get to the Ri er ylye, p event him reaching tha i r ver .

B . A . , ’ hie sta o ce r C f j fﬁ .

is ma r N . B . No one of the force to be north of the Chil k — Fonthill Bishop Hindon road or east of a north- and- south line — m s . through Chilmark An ty before a . , at which hour operations may commence

m. c 10 . c a fi Operations commen ed at a , and the e se ring 1 u . so nded at p m . ffi c u d co m The di culty that o c rre , owing to the orders of the manders taking formed bodies of troops of both Red and Blue wa s due u s s i e n to Chilmark , in part to o tpo t not hav ng b e s c t a n d m ordered to be po ted by the dire or , in part to the for ed i s u n s bod e , nprotected by adva ced troop , having been ordered n o s u right up to the limiti g line . Lo king to the it atio n of the s v the s d re pecti e forces, arrangement ma e on the spot by um s c u in su R e d wa s ced pire were pra tical , tho gh the re lt pla v at some disad antage . T he n its fi s d s ffi Red infa try , in r t a vance, was not u ciently ec s suff ss prot ted on its expo ed flank , and ered both lo and delay from the en terprises against it of the Blue cavalry and m n s u s u achine gu . A flank g ard ho ld have been detailed to march to the westward of it . I GR E A T BR IT A N . 93

In the delaying action of the Blue cavalry against the a dvance of the Red infantry it acted with discretion and ff u s promptitude and e ected its p rpose in a sati factory manner . s The charge again t the Red infantry , north of Stockton Wood , must s ss s u have induced con iderable lo e , for the Bl e cavalry wa s charged by Red cavalry after it had bee n exposed to infantry fir e . The conditions of the opera tions carried o ut by the two c ommanders made it difficult for either of them completely to fu lfill his allotted task . s t u Both armie were well direc ed, and the wooded gro nd e a m n bled the Blue ar y , though in inferior force on the spot, t o advance without serious loss nearly up to the ea stern limit f u o s . R ed ce the wood Beyond this , however, a s perior for w a s st in position , which , had it stood on the defensive , mu h the ssu s ave crushed Blue infantry i ing from the wood . u Moreover, if it had contin ed the attack it would have had a fair chance of success . u s The Bl e commander, by detaching one of his divi ions to s c mhis s c a great di tan e fro outhern flank, in urred the danger of its not being in a position to Cooperate wi th the rest of his s t w force . At the termination of operation his division a s but wa s m about 1 mile distant , it clai ed by the Blue com mander that it could later have a cted decisiv ely against the t is s un southern flank of the Red force . I po sible that der dif u s c s so but fer en t circ m tan e it might have done , at the moment it was not in a situation to act effectively . There will always be great danger in makin g an o utfia n kin g attack of u u s un s the nature undertaken by the Bl e fo rth divi ion , les it is sufficiently close to the main a ttack to have the ad vantage r of its fi e .

O P E R A T IO N S O F T H E F IFT H D A Y .

E CIA E A R E D SP L ID ( ) .

E A U A R T E R S R E D R M No . 5 . H DQ A Y , 5 1898 T m. e r R A E E . S tem e G L Y , 4 p , p b , . It is intended to occupy with the main army (imaginary ) a st v s u ﬁghting po sition immediately ea of the Ri er Avon , it ated approximately between Beacon Hill and La v erstock . To in sure its being prepared and occupied without int erruption - r o o f c a - u take up to mor ow , with a p rtion your for e , a re r g ard st Ya r n bur position for observation toward the we , between y

Castle and the River Wylye . 94 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The main body of your force should be disposed so as t o be able to secure the retirement of the rear guard and delay the enemy moving on the high ground east of the stream that u s n u s e s . r n outh by Wi t rbo rne Stoke and Berwick St . Jame u in r Watch yo r right ﬂank carefully , as the enemy (imag a y) is u v z who landed near Br to l has occ pied De i es .

" . Y . , ' hie st i r C f aﬁ oﬁ ce . m l . . s s s c m N B The di po ition are to be o p eted by a . . , be fore which hour no one of the force is to be west of a north ’ and - south line between O rams Grav e and Fisher to n de la

Mere . SPE CIA L I E A B E D ( L U ) .

. 5 . E A U A R T E R S U E R M No H DQ BL A Y , 2 5 1898 m. e em R A N O R N E . t er U S b . C B , p , p , . The ma m ar my (imaginary) will march to - morrow to the l l ine of the River E bb e . s s The army corps (imaginary) , which landed at Bri tol , hould z - - reach Devi es to day . It has been directed to march to morrow ’ a n d ﬂ ect c c e a jun tion with your for e at Maddington . Adv ance eastward to - morrow and seize the line of the stream runnin g south through Winterbourn e Stoke a n d Ber t S . a . wick James , with a view to bivou c near it B A . . , ' Chief s taj aj ie

N . B . No one of the force is to be east of a line drawn — s t c . through Chitterne All Saint S o kton before a m .

fir s u . The cease e o nded at a . m ’ This day s operations form a striking example of the value u c us s s of even a weak rear g ard , judi io ly po ted , in cau ing the s u s s deployment , and con eq ent delay , of a very uperior ho tile c for e . The po sition of the Red main force wa s so strong that a frontal attack against it offered small chances of success ; and the retiremen t of the rear guard upon it wa s well timed and skillfully carried o ut . It was of importance for the rear- guard commander to be informed early of the direction and strength of any hostile s s s v a force advancing against him , and tep hould ha e been t ken v T to insure his recei ing this information . he inciden t of the a rtillery firin g on the horse battery of its o wn cavalry brigade noticeable a s demonstrating the danger of firin g at distant ranges . E A T GR T BR I A IN . 95

The mi sconception that arose as to the Ya r n bur y Castle po sition being occupied in force by Red could hav e been recti ﬁed s a m by an early reconnoi s nce being ade of it by cavalry , which could not have failed to a scertain that it wa s not held in force .

ff s The change of direction e ected by the Blue division , when ﬁ s v w e a s ut . the r t objecti e was alter d , well carried o The infantry of the div ision that attacked wa s deployed to o early ; t s s u cu n l n hi ho ld be avoided where cir msta ces a low, for a lo g a v s u th m d ance in extended order entail extra fatig e on e en .

O P E R A T I O N S O F T H E S I" T H D A Y .

S P IA L E A EC ID (R E D ) .

1 9 c m. 6 8 4 . 8 the ed At p , September , , the ommander of R covering forces receives the followin g dispatch fromthe com mander in chief of the British army

6 . A A T E R . E U R S A S R No H DQ , S LI BU Y , m e te r 1898 . S mbe . p . , p

ur se c o is its v c O nd army approaching Swindon , and ad an e will be felt in the next twenty - four hours on the left of your the s the v - ad ve rsa ry . Force pas age of Ri er Avon to morrow betwee n Amesbury Workhouse and Old Sarum ; attack the m v us us s ene y igoro ly , and p h him back to the we tward of the - u t u Sali sbury Winterbo rne S oke Gro p road .

" . Y . , ' hie sta o i e r C f ﬂ ﬁ c .

0 is s o f sb N . B . N one of the force to be we t the Sali ury — l u s . 5 s High Po t No mi e tone , Amesb ry Road , thence by Stock ” ’ w 409 c s 9 . r n . po t , poi t Dit h, Tanner Do n , before a m

E A L I E A BL E SP CI D ( U ) .

m tem e r 6 1898 D A KE . e b R O A . S No . 6 . B CH L , p , p , . Information ha s been receiv ed that another Red army ut s (imaginary) is a dvancing so hward toward Swindon . Hold the pa ssage of the River Avon to - morrow between Amesbury us u t Workho e and Old Sar m , and prevent the enemy wi h whom c v u l yo u were enga ed yesterday rossing the ri er . Yo r eft

flank will be sa e till nightfall . B A . . , ' hi ta o i er C ef s fl fi c .

i a a - - s u . 0 s s N . B N one of the force to be e t of north and o th line through Stonehen ge and the 2oth milesto ne on the Dev izes — 9 . Longbarrow cross roads Salisbury road before a m . 96 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

R EM AR KS .

r s u u The cease fi e o nded a few min tes before noo n . v The defense of a long stretch of ri er, passable at many u s s s fficu . t point , mu t alway be a di lt ndertaking In the presen instance the difficulty was enhanced by the dense fog that prev ailed in the valley of the Av on a t the commencement of d ffi . the operations, and which rendere observations di cult wa s wa s e o u The plan of attack well conceived , and it carri d t u t s with vigor and nity , except hat the brigade of the third ss n v i e division , after cro i g the Ri er Avon , were w dely separat d s n s for a time . At the clo e of the operatio the attackers were firmly established on the right bank of the river wi th two s i a i n s divi ions, and a br g de of another div sio was in proce s of crossing ; but they were held by two divisions a n d the corps artillery of the defenders posted between themand the Salis — u t u u . b ry Winterbo rne S oke Gro p road Neither force , there wa s in u n ff s v u fore , a sit atio to take the o en i e ntil reenforce ments had come up. The instances of the unnecessary exposure of infantry to v fir e e u s c s s effecti e artillery were fr q ent on both ides . The a e referred to in the narrative of Blue infantry fired at by a brigade division of field artillery when on a road yards s en fila ded fir e di tant, and of Red infantry by artillery when u u s v s u in col mn of fo r , were aggra ated in tances which wo ld v su s ss s a s ha e re lted in erious lo ; but they were not i olated c se , for lines of Blue infantry were observed at about on the s file salient west of Woodford , and also moving to a flank in u c v fir e 1 nder effe ti e artillery , and again at about extended s u u s line of the Bl e fo rth divi ion , moving to gain the right flank

t ff s t fire . of the Red infan ry , o ered their flank to direct ar illery The reconnoissance by the R ed cavalry of the river cross s e s s s a d ing , on the r sults of which the di po ition m e by the commanders of the secon d and third division s for the passage r wa s ffi i u ts of the iver depended , e c ently made , and the res l promptly reported . t m s o h Af er the i t had cleared away from the valley , the ser v a tio n s made from the balloon with the Blue force fur n ished its commander with full and accurate information regarding the movements of the Red force . The question of the time required to destroy solid perma nent bridges requires attention ; in one instance the Blue cav a lr y claimed to have destroyed a stone bridge in about a

u r ide c 2 10 a r . 2 u a n se . . q arter of ho r ( , p , Infantry Drill)

98 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The commander in chief noticed with great plea sure the e wa s way in which the yeomanry rode and work d , and he aware that it wa s difficult at so busy a season of the year fo r r u u ms people engaged in ag ic lt re to get away from their far , and that this fa ct accounted for a smaller number than he v to m but n s se would ha e been glad welco e, everthele s tho who h came a d done well . u u e s Altho gh no formed bodies of vol nt er were employed, c s a ffs c officers of that force were atta hed to the t of ommanders, and they without doubt have der ived much benefit fromtheir It wa s experience . also noted that Colonel the Honorable

c m d a m s u Cri hton , co man er of the H p hire vol nteer brigade, n his o fi cers formed a camp with a umber of , and then followed O s ‘ a n d s u the peration every day , reporting on them di c ssing s ca n b n u them , an exerci e which not fail to have ee of val e and which the commander in chief hopes to see followed on future occasions . There ha s been much learned wi th regard to supply duties s a s s s su and administration , e pecially regard tran port and p h n u . a s ply It been plainly show that no amo nt of hard work, o s m s go d will , and disregard of expen e can co pen ate for want z of previous organi ation . So far a s regards the services carried o ut by the army se s rvice corp , the generals commanding the army corps have reported to the commander in chief that n othing could have h been better than t e work done . Lord Wolseley ha s been well satisfied with the care taken s s by all ranks and ervice , who have done everything that was possible to contribute to the comfort and eflicien cy of their ‘ is s due to o fli r men . H thank are to the umpires and the ce s u ff su of the mpire sta , who have contributed to the ccess of the maneuvers .

R E M A R KS ON T HE M AN E U V E R S BY T HE CO M M AN DE R IN

CHIE F .

[OE cia l R eport ]

T A CT ICA L CR IT ICISM S .

GE N E R A L — It would be optimistic to say that the fullest ’ wa a tactical value s obt ined from each day s Operations . Long days and nights o ut of bed seriously affected the u t ff r recr i ing of a voluntary army , and we can not a o d to u is ignore this fact . To work our men during mane vers, as GR E A T BR IT A IN . 99

d d s often one abroa , would neces itate a far greater pressure upon o ur young soldier s than those respo nsible for the recruit u u m s u ing of our vol nteer army can vent re to i po e, d ring e u l fi e . p ace, pon the rank and In most foreign armies a pro portion of infantry reserve men rejoin their regimen ts for an nual maneu vers ; none do so with us ; and above all things it should be remembered that whilst abroad the men do not e m 20 s u ent r the ar y under year of age, the great b lk of the file o ur s m 1 rank and in foot regiment at ho e are only 8, and m u ta s any are nder that age . The dis nce to be covered to and s s wa s from the point of colli ion were often great, and time spe nt in marching which would have bee n better used in tac s But to sc . s tical operation owing the arcity of water, tho e dista nces were not greater than they would have been in real m war in that sa e locality . T he two armies might have been plac ed nearer to ea ch other the n but n at beginning of the ma euvers, had this bee done the cava lry would have lost all the opportunities afforded them of d s v recon noitering large bo ies of troop on the mo e . k the b c Spea ing generally , extent of front covered y ea h c s force was on occasions remarkable and at times ex es ive . s n A tendency to deploy troop too soo was observable . Full advantage wa s seldom taken of the conformation of the ground to conceal the ad vance of attacking columns ; n o r were the sta fi officers always successful in ascertaining by previous reconnoissance the best and easiest routes for the march of troops . D — s l CA V A LR Y BR IGA E s . The cavalry brigade were not a e i suflicien t s ways handl d w th enterpri e and independence, a n d perhaps a sufi cien tly free hand was not always given by the co rps commanders to . their cav alry brigadiers a s regards f us the method O execution of the tasks intr ted to them .

“ I a m glad to observe that the cavalry have learned the m s s wa s c value of concentration , but at ti e thi principle arried sc ss muc to excess, the outing and reconnoi ance being too h ﬁ s s u subo rdinated to ghting formation , while at other the val e of the concentration wa s discounted by want of vigor in the c use ma de of the brigade when con entrated . The failure to repo rt to army commanders the movements and position of wa s s v s v c s s the hostile main body ob er able on e eral oc a ion . I ca n not too strongly impress upon cavalry comman ders the n ecessity of keeping the general commandin g the army at all E U V E R S . 100 , , M A N A 0 1 q

’ s ful he e nem s a n d o . time ly i n fo rmed o f t y movements p sition i t fi t a nd If they c a n n o t obta in this nformation withou gh ing ( t i t fighting W i th s upe rior force concentra ed at the dec sive poin s t n u fi i of e the o n ly wa y of getting it) , they sho ld ght, but u c s d with the fina l object always in view , and any s c e s shoul w e be promptly utilized . Fighting ithout a fair prosp ct of

success is rarely excusable . A further point in this connection is the necessity for the rapid transmission of information gained to the point where s is s if it is primarily wanted . The be t information valueles c n oes it omes too late, and the more chan els it g through the fﬁ longer it takes to reach the hand that needs it . O cers and orderlies should be instructed to commun icate the news they carry to all general ofﬁcers near to whom they may pass on

. c ss es s their way To fa ilitate delivery of me ag , all orderlie n s a to should be i tructed, on appro ching what they believe be s s to o ut u the de tination of their mes age , call in a lo d voice r m is s the name of the o ﬂice to who it addres ed . Of faults in tactics the inspector- general of cavalry ha s brought to notice : (a ) That opposing forces frequently delayed to o t c c u a ct long the formation for at a k, and were a ght in the to fr o n t o r b wa s fre of forming the , to a ﬂank ; ( ) That line to quently formed after the order gallop, and the rear con

s u n c u s k eq e tly ame p in disorder ; but, pea ing generally , I noticed the v ery great improv ement which ha s taken place in c s the cavalry arm of re ent year . R T E R — I to t s A ILL Y . am inclined think hat of the three arm the artillery derived most beneﬁt from the opportunities of

the maneuve rs . The chief point in its handling which calls for criticism is the practice of frequently taking away the divisional artillery from the divisions and concentrating it with the corps artil

lery under one command . While fully appreciating the value of the concentrated s c s wa s action of artillery, it may be , and I think in ome ase it ,

us ss the s m s s p hed to exce , divi ional co mander being thu v e u s depri ed of the imm diate s pport of their batterie , and their

power to carry out their allotted task being thereby wea kened . s wa s r 5th (Thi pa ticularly noticeable on the of September . ) l s n o t O a c Moreover , the divisiona commander do btain the pr u m n h tice of mane vering the co bi ed arms , w ich , being essen to su c is o n e ts tial c ess in war, of the objec aimed at in these

maneuvers .

A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

- necessary plant and with shelter trench screens . There wa s rt c i m therefore little oppo unity for their ta t cal employ ent . The satisfacto ry manner in which the ar my telegraph serv ice was conducted shows the value of the arr angement between fﬁ u the war department and the general post o ce, nder which the latter employ in their service a portion of the royal

engin eers and a number of army reservists . Under this syste m the Sta te holds available for army requirements a body of soldiers and reservists in full practice under the o c a s O e s n h general p st offi e p rator and li emen . I ave to thank the officials of the gen eral post office for their cordial coo per ation on this a s on all other occas ions when demands have

been made on them . Admirable work wa s done both by the semipermanent lines fi te and by the eld legraph employed in the field . u c m The bridging battalion fo nd little s ope for employ ent . o s c The balloon detachments did go d ervi e . They gained valuable experience in observing a n d in reporting upo n the o o f movements of large b dies troops, and general officers com manding did so also in the selection of advantageous positions s for their balloon , a point of great importance . T he balloon is a most v aluable assistance to a commander fi its u u r a e ta in the eld , but val e wo ld be enhanced by g e t r s

ilit v . b y , which I belie e it can be given The engineer reports contain so much information of tech l u n ica val e that I have attached them in full (Appendix VII) . s c u The points rai ed will receive aref l con sideration . IN FA N T R Y — The endurance and marchin g power of o ur s s t young oldier of the regular infantry were satisfac ory , and Show what strides have been ma de in this direction of late s wa r year . The weather s exceptionally hot, and the ca rying of their valises continually durin g long days of fatiguing operations wa s undoubtedly a strain on those un de r twenty

years of age . The spirit shown by our young soldiers wa s u e xcellent througho t . The principal points which call for c riticism in the handlin g of the in fantry are (a ) The manner in which battalions were frequen tly exposed to artillery ﬁr e in unsuitable formation s ; but this is pa r tly due to diﬁicult z s the y of recogni ing, in the absence of bullet , when

t s . roops come under this ﬁr e . (See Umpire ) (b) In attack formation the lines were often so close that two successive lines would have been struck by bullets from s s the ame hrapnel . GR E A T BR IT A IN . 103

e to u es It is a matt r for regret that, owing ca s already ll to wa s e to n a uded , it impossibl give the infa try a more r omi a r a n d to out p nent p t, carry the attack to its legitimate o si n ﬁ a ss c nclu o . The nal ault, and the supply of ammunition the i s th to lead ng line , as well as e withdrawal of beaten s a re a ll ul force , exercises which it wo d have been of value to

practice . (0) The handling of machine guns was not always skillful s i a c c or at sf ctory . To ollect ma hine guns together and em s a sta ploy them as batterie is mi ken use of the wea pon . Ma chine gun s are attached to battalion s for use un der special u s to in va r i circ mstances, mo tly in defense , and bring them a o c u t s e bly int a tion , whether s itable oppor unitie aris or not , is a grav e error . d e s suf ( ) The ext nsions were in many ca es premature , and ﬁcien t advantage wa s not taken of the gr oun d to bring the r o t o ps into action under cover . (e) There wa s on many occa sions far too much doubling of

' s i r us the battalions . Thi s a very se io error for any com

mandin g ofﬁcer to commit . (f ) Briga diers were not always kept sufﬁciently in formed c of the situation , and consequently their ommands were at es u c s a n s io tim kept in nne es ary re di es for immediate act n .

U M PIR E S .

ha e s . An able report been r ndered by Lieut . Gen Sir H . n c s s s Bracke bury , whi h deal with many important que tion of

tactics a n d organiz ation . They have either been embodied hi s b s e u in t report, or will e con ider d and decided pon after u full a n d caref l investigation . s a s fﬁ s m The number of umpire w su cient . The sy te they c s followed had been arefully con idered , and although the u u d s o u e x res lts were in a meas re i app inting, much val able u perien ce wa s gained for f ture guidance . Frequent and drastic decisions are required to give reality

to pea ce maneuvers . Independence and promptitude should chara cterize the action of the entire umpire staff in order to s u induce satisfa ctory re ults . In s ch decisions it is better to be wrong than undecided . The just appreciation of the results of artillery fir e and the rapid con veyance to troops of the information that they are being fired upon are serious difficulties which confron t um s s s se uv s pire . Screen are not alway en , and at large mane er 104 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S . the system of sound Signa ls breaks down where man y bat n a u f teries use them at the same mome t . An incre sed se o l s the er e e ea st 3 order ies, screens rai ed so that low dg is at l o the o a s n s m feet ab ve gr und , and , in foreign ma euver , a uch m u o e i s greater expenditure of a m niti n by batt r e , are appar ently the easiest methods of dimin ishing the difficulty . ffic wa s The employment of reporting o ers a novel feature, u fi i o . a s which fully j sti ed its intr duct on E rly, preci e , and sufficient information of the course of events ena bles the senior umpire to give corr ect and timely decisions a n d to pre ’ u n u u o f s vent n at ral sit ations, while the summary the day n is s to the operatio s , which he thereby enabled to pre ent en director at the confer ce, is of great value . I can not a gree with a suggestion that the r eporting o th cers should be attached to a n d live with the staffs whose pro ceedin e ud gs they are to report . It is cont nded that they wo l thus get their infor mation more readily ; but the a dvantage m n t sus would, in y opinion, be outweighed by the i evi able picio n of partiality in their repo rts . ’ u wa s n c The mpire s camp placed , for the conve ien e of the um s ff st s 4 a n d 7 pire ta , at di ance of A } miles from the di ’ o e fi rect r s camp, in order to bring them n arer to the eld of s the o a n d the operation . In future the camps of direct r u s s l a s a s ss r to mpire hou d be near together po ible, in o der fac ilita te close personal communication between the director m and senior u pire . Other matters in conn ection with umpirin g are (a ) The n ecessity for a strong detachment of orderlies at the disposa l of the senior umpire . b s s n ( ) The de irability for a plainer di tinguishi g mark . The “ ” s o u s u arm band of the pectat r sho ld be red, to di ting ish it a r m u from the white band of the mpire . (0) Employment on the umpire staff at large maneuvers s v u s u s m a n d hould gi e val able in tr ction to tho e e ployed , the ’ c onferences which were held nightly in the umpire s camp ca n v s not fail to ha e had good re ults . (d) The senior umpire Should have on his personal staff two selected assistan t umpires of ran k and experience to assist him ’ n in compili g his report of each day s proceedings . (e) To facilitate the assembly of commanders and umpires the s u at conference, it will be de irable at f ture maneuvers on s s to fire s a large scale to end up a mall balloon, or three gun u fi in rapid s ccession at the spot xed .

106 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

s ﬁ s . r o a s did not alway ful ll the e conditions Tende s sh uld, far a s c ﬁ for the a t possible , be a cepted from rms only tr nspor ca n su se s the i o c which they pply them lve , and ntr du tion of s c u s s ma n o t s ub ontractors sho ld be repre sed . Thi y alway

s b s . be fea i le , but it is mo t desirable Apart from a few weak points of detail which have been u u n s s noted for f ture g idance, the civilian tra port may be aid s u to have answered it p rpose well . N Iv IL N D N — In FE E DI G C IA N HO R SE S A M E . deference to the t o s l o wishes of the larges contract r , they were a l wed to under u o in s ite s . s wa s take their own pply Thi a notable err r, as p c e of the contra tor having provid d plenty of food, they had mi u i u scalc lated their power of distr bution, and were nable to r ro i issue it , and food and forage had f equently to be p v ded by the army service corps without previous notice . EN T R A IN IN G CIV ILIA N HO R SE S A N D M E N — Nea rly the whole of the wagons and horses were sent by train to the man euver n r e e s area . The experie ce gained b ought to light c rtain def ct it is s to of detail , which propo ed bring to the notice of the s t railway companie , in view of the probable entrainmen of large numbe rs of civilian horses and wagons on mobilization . W N — In n O N O F A s . s L A DI G GO order to avoid the expe e, ’ s us s s amounting to ome tho and of pound , of each extra day s m m s a n d re hire, the ti e allowed for the allot ent of tran port p n a c n wa s u wi limi ary p ki g trials red ced to a minimum , th the result that notwithstanding the liberal margin allowed for s s possible increa e of weight by rain , the loading of the wagon u to s s e s a a left m ch be de ired , and the pre crib d weight of b gg ge u were no do bt exceeded . u u s s S u In f t re , at lea t three day ho ld be allowed for allot m ent . A GGA E O M N N T E — s B G C LU S O H MA R CH . The di cipline of c umus v baggage ol on the march is a problem of ast importance, and demands the careful atten tion of general officers com m s s anding divi ion and brigades . When on the march civilian tran sport requires different c i a treatment, and mu h more careful superv sion than milit ry r s s sufi cien tl t an port, and thi was not y provided for . One vi ffi c n o t army ser ce corps o er, however hard he works, can u u u u ins re reg larity througho t a long col mn . A mounted regimental transport o fli cer should accompany s t c r n the tran por of ea h unit, and a p oportio of police , both I GR E A T BR IT A N . 107

mi ta l s l o off a cco m li ry and civi , to each divi ion shou d be t ld to a p ny the baggage . Civilia n wagons require more road space tha n milita ry tra ns

a c c in n - u um port, for the slow p e ne essary a lo g closed p col n c auses many horses to jib at the ascent of hills which they ” v u ha e been acc sto med to spring . The len gth of the column ofte n moving on one road caused ’ in t s delay star ing, and , for economy s ake , pairs with a pro po rtion of spare leaders to stage the wagons up steep hills s s is l were used in tead of team . It to a l such difﬁculties we must attribute the fact of the baggage being often lon g upon the a n d r road , not to any infe iority in the actual quality of r the transpo t itself . Although the work wa s done without any serious break o o f wa s u d wn, I think the margin safety ndoubtedly too sm a d ess o f r u all , and that it was only the h r n the roads th o gh n s us the abse ce of rain, which aved from having to hire more n s t tra port at great addi ional expense . — TR A CT IO N EN GIN E S The value of stea m trac tion a s an emcien t u e m s ppl ment to ani al transport , especially in carry

s ea . ing upplies in rear of an army , was cl rly proved The o l n ew l e u c p werfu engine employed easi y dr w fo r tru ks , carry O f 25 u s s ing a total load tons p steep gradient , and moved ea ily u wa s wherever the gro nd fairly hard .

SU PPLY .

su s The pplie of bread , meat, wood , and forage were well c u c o ut wa and pun t ally arried by the army service corps . It s origin ally inten ded to form central supply depots (within a given radius of possible camps) from which the troops could s s but u s draw by upply column , when for water p rpose it was c ﬁ c s us b de ided to prepare xed amp beforehand , it obvio ly e c ame the most econ omical plan to place supplies also before hand in the different camping areas by contracts including

v . s a n d r deli ery Fre h meat bread was inva iably provided , and the reserves of tinned meat and biscuit were never drawn u pon . These reserves were (a ) partly carried on railway trucks and moved daily to the stations nearest the rayons of ca mps b t c s occupied by each army , or ( ) par ly arried on truck drawn by c n s m s a s a n c s tra tion e gine in rear of the ar ie , in c e y onge tion s on the railway line in terfered with the arran gement in (a ) . 108 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The chance of any failure in the mea t supply wa s mini mized by the contract requirin g the live sto ck to be in the s ui red a n d a camps three day before the rations were req , bre d and meat could also have been dispatched from the Lo n don market at short notice . The esta blishment of the army service corps wa s too shor t u u r wa s handed to ndertake the b tche y or the baking, and this s u o ur ed left to the contractor . Altho gh no hitch actually cc r , assistan ce had to be giv en by the army service corps to both c t s a m ul contra or , and I of opinion that to insure reg arity of su u fi pply , both the b tchery and baking for an army in the eld in maneuv ers should be done as in war by soldiers under mil ita r sc n s the y di ipli e, and that the peace e tablishment of army — service corps should be made sufficien t a s it wa s formerly s u m u u for thi p rpose . I recom end at f ture mane vers that the m c u n m employ ent of ontractors be red ced to a mi i um , and su s u a n d st be that the pplie of flo r, forage, live ock bought by v c ffic army ser i e corps o ers as far as possible on the spot . The v u s s to n t ad antage of s ch a y tem , both to the corps and the co u y c u s u in whi h the mane ver take place are obvio s .

- A R O E R U . s et s G C Y S PPLY regards groceries and veg able , u u m s s had their s pply been ndertaken by the ar y ervice corp , a fi u c ss xed scale for both wo ld have been ne e ary, and the recently ri z us s is autho ed messing allowance m t have been topped . Th s s wa s to e c was con idered inadvi able , and it preferred let a h corps expend the messing money in the usual way through a s ca n the dry canteen . But the employment of a numbe r of c s u v c us ss u was teen ontractor wo ld ha e a ed endle conf sion , it determined to make one general contrac t for all the canteens t n n s s . co of both armie . The tender of Messr Lip o for this tract wa s accepted a s an experiment for home mobilization to enable us to j udge how far a large ci vilian fir mcould deliver supplies during large maneuvers without the aid of military u u transport and staff . The res lt was val able as an object ss h u c a c s le on , and proved that owever hopef l ivilian contr tor v su es a c s mus may be in pro iding ppli , the tual di tribution t remain in military control under trained o flicer s . t h m s ss m c l In e ca p of a e bly the ontract worked fairly wel , b t s s u . when the troop began to move daily , Me srs Lipton , in t a s u s s a spi e of the v t s pplie they had tored in each camp are , u f wa s were unable to distrib te to the di ferent brigades . This due x c ff to the ine perien e of their sta in military matters, and

110 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

m t em n e e n cto r a n d hu e ducin aking h i d pend nt of co tra s , t s r g r f ca v lr the expen ses of the mess . T he inspector gen e al o a y in r ta s a e e £70 ea c his eport s te th t regiments wer thus sav d h, a nd I reco mmen d that such an issue be in future san ctio ne d n a t n e ts u i re be by regulatio , suitable p t er s of t n and f rn tu ing made the subject of further consideration . e t r su a s e in ea a c i e m C r ain a ticles ch pick t g g r, m h n ade s s a u es a e a l e c s hoe , horse mb lanc , w t r tanks, regiment str t her ,

t sa s i . e t so etc . ec , were repor ed not to give ti fact on The d f s to brought light will receive careful consideration . The expenditure o f blank ammunition wa s much less than n t a s s ll r had been a ticipated , excep in the c e of some hor e arti e y

. a rm u r batteries The allowance for this sho ld be mo e liberal, as it is early engaged . a n ex en si e u Blank ammunition is p y item in mane vers, but I am of opinion that great eco nomy of ammunitio n at large s a s r maneuver is a mistake, detra c ting g ea tly from the reality of the proceedin gs . 157 u ns The provisions of paragraph , Equipment Re g latio , k I . ed es n Part , appear to have been neglect , and box of bla ammunition to have been opened unnecessa rily ; such neglect

a e s be . le ds to wast , and mu t checked

P A Y O F T H E T R O O PS .

Arr a ngements were made wi th the Wilts and Do rset Bank ing Company for cashin g checks fo r the payment of the o s is a r a l tr op , and th r angement worked s tisfactori y . Al a hi a lowances were m de locally by the c ef p ymaster, s i to r n m Alder hot distr ct, the No ther ar y , and by the chief t s r . payma ter , southe n district, to the Sou hern army Extra duty pay returns were rendered to the wa r o ﬂice by the general o ﬁ cers n m n t e comma ding army corps, and the ar y age s wer to instructed issue accordingly . r n n The above a ra geme ts were satisfa ctory .

E I M E QU P N T A N D CLO T HIN G .

T he ﬁ I eld cap was worn by all except cavalry . n the ex ceptio n a lly hot weather this ca p gave insufﬁcient pro tection s ff t again t the sun , and the troops su ered to some exten . x a a ff a n a n d The e periment l st forage cap gave sa tisf ctio , I c mm re o end its adoption throughout the service . G T R E A BR IT A IN . 111

T he swo r d fro g wo rn by some of the hea dquarters staff gave s t s a c n o ro l o m b a i f tio ; the sw rd de we l and c forta ly , and if Her M est een t t aj y the "u approves of it , I intend i o be used by a ll m te o fi ers fi oun d c for eld work . s a s u In hot weather, uch we experienced d rin g these ma n eu v s u a er , men nat rally unhook the coll rs of their serges, and u o u e in o nd bt dly their march g p wer is increased thereby . The a doption of a rolled collar a s wor n by troops in India would r e a a n d nder this pr ctice unnecessary , add much to the comfo rt a n d efi i n c f s c e y o the wear er . I hall have these rolled collars tr ied . s ed s s Bli ter heel are till attributed to the gaiter . The on ly r e s to medy appear be to hollow out the gaiter over the heel . The experimenta l equipment in use at the maneuvers will ec r form the subj t of a sepa ate repo rt .

M E DICA L A R R A N GE M E N T S .

s w T he health of the troop a s goo d . The marches were n u often trying, owi g to the heat and thick d st in the narrow sunken lanes we moved over ; but the casualties from heat n d n s s s w a fatigue were few, and sick es from other cau e a s m n s s mall . Of the Northern ar y per cent were tra ferred a s to ho S ita ls o f u sick the base p , and the So thern army “ e r but s p cent, in the latter ca e the time occupied by the ” u drills is incl ded . In the Nor thern army there were 35 ca ses of sunstroke and In 41 s 2 0 o . of exhausti n the Southern army , of sun troke and

3 8 of exhaustion . Owing to the absence of a large portion of the royal army s c medical corps in Egypt, the medical per onnel was redu ed w a n to the lo est pr cticable limit, and I thi k that had the Sick s s h n ess been greater, the train upon their re ources would ave n been greater than they could have bo r e . e s ff u r s T h medical ta of the army req i e augmentation . Amon g the points to which the experien ce of the maneuvers dir ect attention are n z (a ) T he orga i ation of the medical bases . (b) The transfer of the sick by rail from the ﬁeld hospita ls s u r un s to the base . A special train ho ld be daily and uitable s ra ilway a ccommodation provided . The de ign and provision of railway ambulance trains for home defense requires atten n tio . 112 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

(0) More than o n e medica l oﬁ cer is required fo r the efﬁcient c ri a n d be s ed are of an infantry b gade , a tent should furni h i s for the n pection of the sick . (d) A special pattern of light ambulan ce is desirable to a c

company mounted troops . The arrangement by which a n infectious ambulance wa s kept at the railway station at Salisbury ready for use any in n u where the ma e ver area was a wise precaution .

V E T E R IN AR Y A R R A N GE M E N T S .

The condition O f the horses on joining and their hea lth t u u uv s s s a c v s hro gho t the mane er was ati f tory . The ery mall u s s is n mber of ore back gratifying, and shows the care taken c ha s s by all ranks , and the advance whi h been made in thi m i portant matter . The number of severe injuries to horses in the Southern c in i army greatly ex eeded that the Northern army . This s attributable to the barbed wire and treacherous ground abo ut s u Wareham . Farrier sergeants ho ld carry a few rounds of ball ammun ition at maneuvers to destroy injured horses with

o ut delay in case of necessity . Many important points have been brought to notice by the v director general , army eterinary department, and I concur in his recommendations a u ( ) That all private horses bro ght to camp, employed by u ss s . s me e , contractor, etc , m t be examined on arrival . (b) That a sliding scale of forage rations for animals work i ing or idle is necessary , the proportions of corn and hay be n g c increased and decreased ac ordingly . (c) That mounted o fi cer s must bring spare shoes and nails with them to camp . (d) That each v eterinary officer must have a tent to him s c s use a s m ffi elf, whi h he can al o a phar acy and o ce ; that he u v r his m st ha e a selected fa rier at disposal , who can assist i s s . r him in di pen ing, etc , and that the pr ncipal veterina y ffi ffi . o cer must be provided with o ce, stationery , and a clerk Proper provision does not appear to have been made fo r the transport of the veterinary chests . e is s s r ( ) That the present pattern of float not ati facto y, a n d that an improved pattern of horse ambulance should be introduced .

114 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

I R A LW A YS .

The assembly a n d dispersal by rail of the large number o f a s as m troops engaged , well of the hired transports, were ad i ra bly carried o ut and reflect great credit on the o fli cers of the ’ ffi is quartermaster general s department . The war o ce much in debted to the railway companies for their cordial coopera

u s s u s . tion , witho t which ucce s wo ld have been impos ible is l to The experience gained valuab e , and has brought notice many important po ints in connection with mobilization fo r s c the u home defen e, to whi h the attention of railway co ncil wi ll be directed . The repo rt of the quartermaster general is atta ched (Appen dix I" ) . The appendices thereto are available for reference in the c war o fli e . Among the poin ts to which attention is directed are the followi ng (a ) The early arrival of trains is a s apt to dislocate arrange ments as their late arrival . (b) Special arrangements are n ecessary for effectively light in g stations a n d their vicinity for use at night . c a s s n ss e ( ) Places of sembly (adjoining the tatio , if po ibl ) must always be provided . (d) Careful previous arrangement by commandin g officer s i h r e s s n ecessary where men are to be fed en route , or o s watered . e ff o ic r a a s ( ) The power of the railway sta fl e at a st tion , the n u a represe tative of the highest authority, m st be par u u n s s u u a mo nt, and s ch i cident a that all ded to nder railw y st ff fi r m s o ce s I" s . a , in Appendix , should be i po ible (f) Wagons should n ev er be loaded with bale hoops stand ing, on account of the varying height of both trucks and rail s way arche .

I A M SCE LL N E O U S .

CA N T E E N S A N D OT HE R IN ST IT U T ION S — The circumstance s under which a general contract for canteen supplies was given to Messrs . Lipton have been already set forth in my remark s upon supply . That the grocery bar and canteen do greatly swell the ba g u s is a c but is r gage col mn deplorable fa t, the evil a necessa y R E T G A BR IT A IN . 1I5

n ot v one, and I can ad ocate their abolition even durin g the a ctual maneuver period . I have recommended (under Supply) that the distribution o f n the grocery and haversack rations, which are ecessaries, s s hould be in the hand of the army service corps, but I would l u u u n mn s eave the provision of l x ries , incl di g i eral water , to the c ontractors , though limiting the list to articles of a simple c haracter . T he u is s pply of malt liquor a more serious matter . The issue of a fixed quan tity under regimental supervision ha s e a but a m s b en advoc ted , I of opinion that the evil to be fore seen in the limitation of the supply obtainable in camp o ut the v u a s o f u weigh ob io s advant ge s ch a course . The army temperance association and other kin dred so cie t u a n d ies did good work d ring the drill period , added much s to the comfort of the troop . su s u s v fi The work of ch in tit tions hould , howe er, be con ned to s s t the tanding camp , and heir transports should not be a llowed to swell the baggage when movement begins . ’ OFFICE R S E" PE N SE S — The allowance of transport for o ffi ss s wa s uffi a n d s cers and their me e s cient, that extra tran port o f any kind wa s strictly forbidden undoubtedly produced the desirable r esult of reducing the expenses incur red by fi o cer s .

’ I do not concur in the adv isability of increasing o ﬁ cer s

field allowance . s n wa s 3s The average reported extra co t of messi g . per d but us ffi iem , it m t be remembered that if regimental o cers r i a e will ng to live on simple fare , they can retain their health fli i n c wi u e a n d e c e y tho t incurring any extra exp nse . This v w a s proved in the 1893 maneu ers . Wear and tear of clothing and equipmen t and the provision f u ss u but o camp furniture are do btle so rces of expense, the fi is n s eld allowance which give in aid of uch expenses is , I t hi n uffi n k , s cie t to meet all reasonable claims under these h ea din gs . PO ST OFFICE — Field post offices were established by the

- s . V t u h . wenty fo rt Middle ex R , which did excellent work . The n umbers laid down in the war establishment ta bles sufﬁ w n proved in cient for the ork and had to be ree forced . The ex pe rience gain ed can not fail to be of great value in making similar arrangements in future . 116 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

PR IN T IN G — The printing wagon is equipped with a hand s a n d n t ffi pres , the work can o be done with su cient rapidity to turn o ut the requisite number of Copies of special ideas e ns and orders for a large force . The equipment of th se wago e u r q ires improvement . — O E V I A N D T A R . P LIC , CI L MILI Y The proportion of both i civil and m litary police attached to army corps, divisions, f and briga des was su ficient . The conduct of the troops wa s excellent ; but the presence of a large number of undisciplined civilian followers caused l and must always prove a difii cu ty . I — u IN HA B T A N T S . The good will and co rtesy of the inhabit ants o f the maneuver area of all classes and co ndition s wa s most marked . — MA R CH PA ST . The march past at the conclusion of the u maneuvers was not only a s ccessful military spectacle, which afforded gratification to the thousands of spectators who s s i assembled to witne s it, but it howed the ab lity of the gen er a ls and staffs concerned to handle troops of all arms in

ﬁ a i " I . masses . The eld st te is g ven in Appendix

I CON CLU S O N .

' In conclusion I desire to sa y that in my opinion these maneuvers hav e been of very considerable value to the army . n n uv s a s s Many poi ts in the arrangements for ma e er , al o But a n eu s . m for war, are always open to critici m it is from vers that we look to learn in time of peace the weak points of z s s our organi ation for war , and the les on learned will, I hope, n s in the present insta ce be taken to heart . Amongst the mo t valuable of these lessons I would place : 1 s d u . The need of con iderable ad itions to our s pply and tran sport establishments . v a s s su s l 2 . The inability of e en the l rge t, mo t cces fu , and liberal - minded civil firms to cope with the distribution of sup plies to an army in the field . n s 3 . The ge eral unsuitability of civilian tran port for mili fi fi tary purposes in the rst line with an army in the eld . For use s us man euvers its is generally a neces ity with , but careful previous organiz ation and constant supervision afterwards is essential to its sa tisfactory employment . e m r s While thes aneuve s have brought out mi takes, they have shown indubitably the immense strides which the army

P A L V O Y IM ERI MANEU ERS F RU SSIAN ARM .

T he/ex er cises at the camp of Krasnoe- Selo terminated in 1898 e with grand maneuvers, in which all the conscript d s u s troops of Finland took part . The e mane vers lasted six day , r 35 2oth u us f om the th to the of A g t, including two days of ﬁ rest . They took place on a diversi ed terrain north and south s u of the Neva, extending to the environs of St . Peter b rg, and

’ o n ut grounds of which the troops had b a meager knowledge . The navy combined with the opposing armies in the passage

o f ff s . the Neva , both on the o ensive and defen ive u s As in preceding years, the mane vering corp were com

th - posed of e troo ps camped at Krasnoe Selo and Oust Ijora , in a s s ddition to the Finni h troop , to which was added the bri gade of Finnish chasseurs not belonging to the guard .

CO M PO SIT IO N O F T R O O PS E N GA GE D .

The two maneuvering corps were designated the Northern n : and Souther , and were composed as follows

N OR T H E R N COR PS . headquarters

- - General in chief Aid de Camp General Prince Obolensky , the u commander of g ard corps . s ff : z Chief of ta Major General Gla ov , chief of staff of the

guard corps . ‘ : Ka n i h h ff Chief of artillery Lieutenant General s tc e , com the u mander of the artillery of g ard corps . : u A lex a n dro vitch Chief of cavalry Grand Duke Pa l , commander of the ﬁrst division of cavalry of the guard

corps . : htch rba tch v Chief of transportation Colonel C e e .

s : n k n Chief of engineer Colonel Baro Ko l e .

Chief of military intendance : Colonel Galler . n Fo v elin Surgeon general : Surgeon Cou sellor e . i in e Provost marshal : Captain P a lt n . (119) 120 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S.

‘ Troops

1 . Paul military school , battalion

u 16 n s . First infantry division of the g ards, battalio l School of the infantry younkers of St . Petersburg, ha f

battalion . First and fourth regiment of the Finland brigade of

s u 4 . cha se rs , battalions ﬁ s Third , fourth , fth , sixth , seventh , and eighth battalion

of Finland chasseurs .

- t 6 s . For y ninth infantry brigade of the reserves, battalion Mixed battalion formed of the ﬁrst and eighteenth bat

talions of the sappers . Mix ed battalion formed of the ﬁrst and third battalions

of pontoniers .

l v 25 a s . First cava ry di ision of the guard , squ dron

6 . Regiment of Finland dragoons, squadrons

s 8 . Michael artillery chool , pieces

t u 24 s . First ar illery brigade of the g ard , piece

- u r r 16 e . Twenty fo rth a tille y brigade, pi ces 1 s 6 . Finland artillery regiment, piece s ur S u s d Fir t, fo th , and ixth mo nted batterie of the guar , 1 8 pieces .

35 s 3 1 s 82 . Total, } battalion ; quadrons , and pieces a t of The ﬂeet squ dron of the North , commanded by Cap ain

Frigate Bolshev , composed of l ia n ka The yacht S a r . - s s o s 12 1 n d 1 . 1 31 35 . First clas torpedo boat , N , , a

- N o s . 6 2 29 34 53 . Second class torpedo boats, , , , and

SO UT H E R N COR PS . Headquarters Commander in chief : Lieutenant General Baron Meyen i fi s dorf, command ng r t army corps . s ff : st fi Chief of ta Major General Andreev , chief of a of fi m the rst ar y corps . : com Chief of artillery Lieutenant General Danilov ,

mander of artillery of the ﬁrst army corps .

l : k Chief of cava ry Lieutenant General O str ogra ds y, l commanding second cava ry division of the guard . h s n C ief of tran portatio : Colonel Voronov .

s : Chief of engineer Colonel Prescott . Chief of military intendance : Lieutenant Colonel A lex ievsk e y .

122 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

As the reserve troops in Russia are not called out for these maneuvers the Opposing forces engaged on their peace footing .

GE N E R A L SCHE M E O F T H E M A N E U V E R S .

A corps from the north coming from Finland , occupies the n s v norther district of the go ernment of St . Petersburg , v ha ing for its object the capture of Gatchina . u f A corps from the so th , advancing rom Louga via Gat i s t . r china on Vyborg, halted in the vicinity of S Pete sburg , s e awaiting reenforcement from Gamburg, and for the purpos ’ of reconnoitering the enemy s position . The commanders of Opposing forces were given entire free dom of a c tion in operations to attain the object indicated . a t However , in c se of night operations authori y of the chief u wa s ss mpire nece ary . He had power to determine initial o ut to positions, to map the general plan of the maneuvers, ’ determine the time for beginning and terminating the day s x s ff in e erci es , in so far as they related to the operations a ect g the s the m v si na l ﬁ two force , E peror to gi e the g for the nal r te min ation of the maneuvers .

IN IT IA L PO SIT IO N O N A U GU ST 14 .

’ 4 o n 14 s At o clock in the afternoon , August , the troop ’ n s s 9 ha d occupied their i itial po ition , and at o clock they taken measures for security and had sent out ﬂying patrols to reconnoiter the enemy . The terrain on which the preliminary operations took place u was v ery broken . There were b t few good roads in the direction of the movement of troops and these were separate d from each other by vast marshy and wooded regions . The principal lines of operations for the Northern corps were t wo

u : ﬁ s a n d in n mber r t , the road to Kexholm , then to Vyborg ,

S mud - M ia ki - M ia ki T o x ovo econd , the road to Melike , Tarry , , D via tkin o u e . , Mo rino The Northern corps wa s consequently div ided into two c u s c ha d s t a n v a a ol mn , each of whi h en out ad nce guard to u or 8 e r distance of abo t 7 kilom te s . 17 ta n 16 s u s 44 u Right column ( bat lio s , q adron , g ns) Main forces a t Agala tovo Three regiments o f the ﬁrst infantry division o f 2 t i 1 s . the guard , bat al on 4 s s . The Michael chool of artillery, gun R U SSIA . 123

First brigade of the artillery of the guard (4 bat

teries 16 u . ) , g ns

Second brigade of the cavalry of the guard , 8 s squadron .

t 4 . Four h horse battery of the guard, guns 1 : 2 8 s s 30 . Total battalions, quadron , guns u Advance g ard at V . Stanki P r bra n k eo e s 4 . Regiment g y , battalions

s 1 . Mixed battalion of sapper , battalion d 2 u First artillery briga e ( batteries) , 8 g ns . First brigade of the ﬁrst division of the cavalry u 8 . of the guard , sq adrons

s 6 s . First hor e battery of the guard , gun : 5 a a 8 u 14 Total b tt lions , sq adrons, guns u 18 s 15 u 38 u s Left col mn ( 4 battalion , sq adrons , g n )

- i ki Main forces at Melike M a . First and fourth regiments of the Finnish chas ur se s 4 . , battalions s u Four battalion of Finnish chasse rs .

- 6 Forty ninth brigade of reserve infantry, bat s talion .

- 2 s 8 Twenty fourth artillery brigade ( batterie ) , guns Re 1 u s 6 . giment of Finnish artillery , g n n s 6 a Regime t of Finnish dragoon , squ drons . : 14 s 6 s 2 Total battalion , quadrons, and 4

guns . Advance guard at Tarry - Mis ki 1 The Paul military school, battalion .

. s The St Petersburg school of infantry younker , n half battalio . 1 a Mixed battalion of pontoniers, b ttalion .

- u 2 s Twenty fo rth artillery brigade ( batterie ) , 8 gun s Third brigade of the ﬁrst division of cavalry of * u 9 so tn ia s the g ard , . s 6 u Sixth hor e battery of the guard , g ns .

: af a 9 so tn ia s 14 s Total t b ttalions, , gun . Patrols were not to pass beyond the line Serpolovo— L ouppo — i— — — — lo vo M en tsa r R a n tolo vo V ilko vka Kez e M ia ki .

— 100 men Sotn ia Cossa ck squa dron con sistin g o f . 124 A T M N A N E V U U M U E R S .

h In regard to information concerning the hostile strengt , the Northern corps knew that heads of columns were observed r the in the environs of St . Petersburg o n the ight bank of

Neva . On the other hand the Southern corps wa s informed tha t e of the enemy , coming from Finland , advanc d by the roads Kexholm and T o x o vo ; that his advance guards were seen OII n V a rtemia ki—T o x o vo a e ed the li e , and that its squ dron threat n s o the mouth of the Neva . The Southern corp c nsequently a cantoned part of its troops on the right bank of the Nev , u se which wa s occ pied by two strong advance guards . The were stationed as follows Left advance guard

81 a s 16 u Main forces ( ) batt lion and g ns) , at Pargo lovo

h l . The Nicholas school of engineers , alf batta ion First brigade of the thirty - seventh division of 8 infantry , battalions .

- 16 n s . Thirty seventh artillery brigade, gu a the ssin o v a a 2 a n 12 He d at farm of O y ( b ttalio s , s u s 22 q adron , guns) n s s Two battalions of Fin i h chasseur .

16 s . The Constantine school of artillery , gun First brigade of the second division of the cavalry Of u s 13 . the g ard, squadron

e 6 . Two horse batt ries of the guard , guns Right advance guard 7 t 12 u s D via tkin o Main forces ( ba talions and g n ) , at e Second brigade of the thirty- seventh division of 6 t infantry , ba talions .

Battalion of the sappers of the guard . - a 12 u Thirty seventh artillery brig de , g ns . 2 a 8 10 u Kouzmo Head ( batt lions , squadrons, g ns) , at lovo Second brigade of the thirty - seventh division of 2 infantry , battalions . - s 4 s Thirty eventh brigade of artillery, gun . Second brigade of the second division of the cavalry of the guard (less 2 squadrons of the ’ us s 8 s d Emperor s h sar ) , qua rons . s r 6 Fifth hor e batte y of the guard , guns .

126 A T M N M A N E V E U U U R S .

dis i . e s e o s a s o n re o da . am tr bution of tro p the p vi us y (i , m in two ns c a n a e r . arch g in colum , ea h to have adv nc gua d) in r v a c a The ma forces of the ight column will , howe er, det h c i 8 s ua r s a n d 6 eces olumn to the center, cons sting of q d on pi , — whi ch will ta ke the road L o uppo lo v o - M en tsa r i farm of u r c t i s to n t n m u Bo g y . The obje t of h s column i mai ai co m ni th cation between e right and left c olumns . u w The advance g ards will like ise detach ﬂan k gua rds . The squa dron concentrat ed a t Cro n sta d received order s to u ente r the Neva and to take poss ession of its mo th . The comman der of the Southern cor ps resol ved to hold D vi tkin o the a ua r s e a and second Pargolovo by the dvance g d , u s ss th N e in order to sec re the pos e ion of e right bank of the va, he where he intended to concentrate all his forces . T r ight advance guard wa s to give special attentio n to a possible movement of the enemy against the Bo ugr y Farm and B01

- o cc u u v shiye Lavriki . The ﬂ tilla o pying the mo th of the Ne a wa s to prevent the hostile squadron from entering the r iver . The main forces of the Southern army were suppo sed to t u d o n . s o . a vance St Pe er b rg, via L uga and Yamburg E n gagements be tween the ad v ance guar ds resulted from c r th r the execution of these orders . The aval y of e Southe n a 12 s 6 u s ha d a d rmy ( quadrons, reenforced by g n ) , which v a n ced in order to recon noite r the strength and intention s of h 7 t e enemy, encountered the cavalry of the Northern army ( squadrons and 6 guns) somewhat to the south of the villa ge o o f L uppo lo vo . According to the decision of the umpires bo th detachments n its of ca valry had to retreat . The Northern fell back upo infantry ; the Southern dismounted a n d occupied an a d v a n ta us s n the s O f v Dra n ishn iki geo po itio to outh the illage of , after ha ving ﬁctitio usly destroyed a bridge over a rivulet se crossing the road . The hor battery took up its position to

the right of the road . The advance guard of the right column of the Northern P reo br a en sk its army , with the g y regiment at head , com ma n ded the u st e r i B n by Grand D ke Con antin , ar ved at ra ish u wa s a v e niki . Grand D ke Vladimir marching with this d anc guard from the beginning of the operation ; he wa s aecom a n i n c p ed by Pri e Andrew of Greece . P reobra en sk b a n The g y regiment deployed , reenforced y

8- un the a d u d a n d g battery of brig e of artillery of the g ar , R U SSIA . 127

o ﬁr e m n pened on the ene y . It soo advanced against the cav a lr i wa s ﬁ y br gade , which ghting on foot, and was forced to t fall back to the south upo n its infantry , sta ioned in the v i icinity of the farm of Oss n o v a ya . T he s a co m Emperor and Empress arrived at thi moment , c n ied i pa by their suite . After hav ng greeted the troops Their Majesties return ed to the position occupied by the hea d of the

Southern army . T he cavalry of the Northern army, after having crossed the D r a n ishn iki bridge situated to the south of , turned toward the right and to ok a mud road in order to make a turning

movement by the Vyborg road . The infantry continued to a Ossin o va a dvance by the Kexholm road toward the farm of y . Informed of the approach of superior forces threatening its v s front and of the turning mo ement of the ho tile cavalry, the head of the advance guard of the Southern army began to its eva cuate po sition . The cavalry started at a trot toward the cross roads of Kexholm and Vyborg ; the infantry and a rtillery retreated ﬁrst to a position situated about 1 kilome t s ter o the outh of the former, near an old ruined Swedish

intrenchment , then still farther on the road to Vyborg . There they were joined by two battalions of the one hundred

-ﬁth i m s a s and forty infantry reg ent, ent a reenforcement from the second Pargolovo by the main forces of the left advance

guard of the Southern army . The Vyborg road was thus d barre to the advance march of the Northern cavalry . m n The E peror , who had followed the retreati g movement the u of So thern army , rode farther to the village of Yukki , Ossin o va a v thence to the farm of y , and there ga e orders to s close the maneuvers . The re ults were communicated to the troops , and the schemes for the following day were given to bo th corps and squadrons . The lines of demarkation were established as follows For the Northern corps : Farm O ssin o va ya - Poroshki— Koro o clki—Ka pito lo va

: o - — For the Southern corps Pargolov Maliye Lavriki . On the 15th of August the Northern squadron forced the S u to outhern one , which it enco ntered on the sea , retreat to h t k u its t e mouth of the Neva, and oo p position nea r the Sea

Canal .

The Southern squadron , after having accepted a naval v u its s c ombat, retired into the Ne a and took p po ition at the e ntrance of the Sea Canal . 128 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

On the night of the 15th of August the two armies occupied the following po sitions u its c Right col mn of the Northern army , with advan e u a m ssin o v a a g ard , ne r the far of O y ; center column at Koro l i u T o x o v o v nz oc k ; left col mn at , and its ad ance guard at Ko m l o o o v .

t s The forces of the Southern army , af er the engagement that had taken place between the advance guards at the farm ssin o v a a Kouzmolo v o e of O y and at , had concentrat d at the

s . econd Pargolovo and at Mourino A special advance guard , sis 4 t 4 u 1 con ting of ba talions, g ns, and squadron, was sent from the center to the farm O f B o ugr y to bar to the enemy the intermediary road between the roads of Vyborg a n d

Mourin o .

O P E R A T I O N S O P A U G U ST 1 6 .

The following orders were given for the 16th of August The Northern cor s will continue its offensive movement to the right bank of t e Neva and to the suburb of the powder s factory , the compo ition of its columns remaining the sa me as on the revious day . The right column and its advance guard will march by the it h n Vyborg road . As soon as shall ave taken possessio of the right bank of the river it will make use of all the material s on hand to repair or construct a cros ing . Bo u r The central column will follow the road , farm of g — r a da n ka h Mourino G j , and will join the right column for t e s c n night . Its mi sion will onsist , as heretofore , in the mai te u lu s nance of comm nication between the two other co mn . The left column and its advance gua rd (reenforced by ﬁv e squadrons taken from the main forces of the column) wi ll march via Devia tkin o on R jevska a and the suburb of the

- powder factory . At Novo Deviat ino the third brigade of ﬁ s s w the rst cavalry divi ion , reenforced by a hor e battery , ill be deta ched by the road Mourino—R o utchyi—Gra jda n ka to the halting lace of the cavalry of the right column . d t c u uc ff Shoul the righ ol mn s ceed in e ecting a crossing , the tr co ps of the left column may join the former by a special zi or er . The squadron has been ordered to take possession of the mouth of the Neva and to endeavor to drive the enemy as fa r s as the monastery of Alexander Nev ky . The commander of the Southern army has resolved to stay on the right bank of the Neva and to concentrate there all his u v to forces . He has conseq ently ordered the ad ance guards a t o sitio n s v obstinately maint in heir at the second Pargolo o ,

Bo u r s . at the farm of g y, an at Mourino again t the enemy

130 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

s H wis cavalry of the guard and one hor e battery) . e like e recalled the whole of the cavalry o f the central reserve a n d l to o utch i in c u ordered the atter march to R y order to pi k p, m n . in case of need , the troops retreati g fro Mourino ns r n 8 There were consequently on the defe ive in Mou i o , n s 12 s 20 s a s ffe s v battalio , gun , and qu dron ; on the o n i e there 8 u i Dev ia tkin o a n d were 5 battalions and g ns advanc ng from , 1 s 12 s ua 6 u a m 3 battalion , q drons , and g ns dvancing fro Bol s - r m hiye Lavriki . The left advance guard of the Northe n ar y advanced slo wly in order to await the results of the turning n u us to moveme t of the main forces of its col mn, and to r h s the attack simultaneou ly with the same . The advance guard of the Southern army retrea te d to wa rd

su ta . Mourino , destroying (as med) the bridge over the Okh For the defense of the crossin g it had posted on the road a n d in v the en iron s four guns supported by a regiment of infantry . s e u n The Co sacks , marching at the h ad of the left col m of h m u u n e w t the Nort ern ar y , enco ntered near Mo rino a ravi i h i c ss s ifﬁ u marshy bottom . After hav ng ro ed it with ome d c lty , u to the c ce v ed they deployed and r shed atta k , but they were re i by a counter - attack of the entire cavalry of the Southern c orps c u which for ed them to fall back pon their infantry , while the Southern cavalry disa ppeared behind the houses and bar n s of

Mourino . Shortly after n oo n the left column of the Northern corps its a u drew up in battle formation , while dvanced g ard , having

a n . found a ford in the Okht , was crossi g the river The South ern troops began to retreat progressively to the position o ccu th a u i pied by e reserve t R o tchy . At this moment the Emperor sent orders to close the opera tions for the day and to give instructions for the following

one . n s d s On that day the Norther qua ron , after engagement with the hostile ﬂeet near the mouth O f the Neva and in the vicin

ss . s c u a n ity of the fortre of St Peter burg, ontin ed its dva ce n a s a d drove the enemy far a s the Alexander bridge .

O P E R A T I O N S O F A U GU ST 1 7 .

' On the morning of August 17 the positions o f the hostile armies were a s follows : Almost all the units composing the Southern corps which were formerly o n the right bank o f the Ne v a had retreate d R U SSIA . 131

to ee s a P r eo br a en ska the left, betw n the t tion j ya of the Nico la s railway and the mouth of the Ijora . On the right bank t o - to vs here remained near Nov Sara kaya, only one regiment o f infantry (the one hundred and forty- eighth) and one battery . a v c r m u en vi The main forces, d an ing f o Lo ga, were in the

n s - ro s of Kra n oe Selo . The ﬂotilla maintained the hostile squadron below the vil lage of Rybatskoye . Part of the Alexander bridge wa s de stroyed . The Northern corps ha d pa ssed the night divided into two s t group , one at the village of S araya on the road from the o w c Ka lto ushi s p der fa tory to , the other at St . Peter burg on m r n . the Vybo g side , in the barracks of the Moscow regi e t s 17 u u The following order were given for the th of A g st .

co 8 w v n The Southern ill defend the Ne a , coveri g the road c m s - to . co s Gatchina The ine of ombat , ri ing the thirty ev n th v s ﬁ s a n s a e di i ion of infantry , the r t econd batt lions of i s s u 2 s sa F nni h chas e rs, companie of the battalion of ppers s s hi of the guard , the Con tantine chool of artillery , the t rty ’ s l i 4 s u n s eventh artil ery br gade , and q adro of the Emperor s

ss s a 181 a s 4 s u s 48 hu ar , total of } b ttalion , q adron , and pieces, u nder command of Lieutenant General Tillo, will defend the z river from the mouth of the Ijora to Mur inka . The troops remaining on the other bank of the river will be brought o v er

as soon a s ssible . r u s u s The cava y and horse artillery (mo nted grenadier , hlan s o s 2 o f 18 s u of the Empre s , drag on , and batteries, a total q ad 12 n n s rons and gu s) , commanded by Lieutena t General O tro gra dsk will be drawn up near the station of Pr eo bra jen ska ya ti u z s u s and wi g ard the Neva from Mur inka to the ub rb of St . s u Peter b rg . r s s u s The rese ve, compo ed of the brigade of chas e r of the r n s n u guard , of the egime t of re erve i fantry of the g ard , of c s u the second regiment of the has eurs of Finland , of a gro p s u ﬁ t of artillery of the cha se rs of the guard , of the f h reserve u r c a n d battery of the g ard , of the fou th mortar re im nt, of s 8 2 u the Nichola cavalry school , a total of batta ions, sq ad ‘ 36 s u d Yevrein o ff rons , piece , n er command of Major General ,

- v 9 . will lea e Krasnoe Selo at a . m and advance via Bolshoye u Sho usha ri u t e P lkovo to , where it will await f r her ord rs . The chief of engineers of the Southern corps will immedi l u h r e a red c the ate y constr ct , wit the material p in advan e at o un d s mouth of the Ijora and with that on the pot , a bridge la via n ka c a c over the S , at the bri k f tory , and prepare the nec essa ry means of transportation for the infan try regiment and battery from the r ight bank of the Neva to the left . A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The Northern co rps had received orders to cross the Neva o n 17 u a n d u the th of Aug st , to take p a position on the left ss wa s d bank of the same . The cro ing to be ma e in two u gro ps . c u ﬁ s v s u The right ol mn ( r t di i ion of the infantry of the g ard, sc l e 1 s s u the Michael hool of arti l ry , quadron of the hor e g ard , 16 n s 1 u n 32 s o ss a total of battalio , sq adro , and gun ) will cr the riv er by the Alex ander bridge a s soon as the latter is o r o s h a v c repaired , at no n at the earlie t , t en d an ing up the Nev a will help the other column to cross in the V icinity of the v illage of Rybatskoye . umn v s 2 s The left col (mixed di i ion of infantry , batterie of s 1 s ua n sh the regiment of Finni h artillery , q dro of Finni s 2 s s s 1 n rs dragoon , companie of apper , battalio of pontonie , 19 t s 1 s u 8 s c a total of bat alion , q adron , and gun ) will mar h t o va a e s from S araya to N y , then toward the a tern extremity the v - v s c so a s the of No o Sarato kaya olony , to reach banks of m s h . . t e the Neva at a at the earlie t, in order to make crossing . Four batteries of the twenty - fourth artillery brigade and 2 s m c v e 5 s u s batteries of the Finni h regi ent, o er d by q adron of

s a c 9 m. Finnish dragoon , will leave their halting pl e at a . , and passing through the s uburb of the powder factory will place themselves under orders of the commander of the right column . The cav alry and horse artille ry (15 squadrons and 18 guns) i s v c u w ll cros the Ne a in rear of the right ol mn , and advancing up the stream o n the left bank will assist the c rossing of the l left co umn .

The Northern squadron wa s to sa il up the Nev a to the point ﬁ ss co lumn which wa s xed for the cro ing of the left , it to aid by he lending it transportation and prote ctin g t pontoon bridge . ’ About 10 o clock in the morning the two squadrons came to a n engagement in V iew of the No vo - Sarato vska ya colony and

v i c n a . o s u a olent anno de took place The S uthern q adron, c wa s s s ﬁ whi h the weake t, retreated lowly , ring at the enemy

- ﬁr e un s c c s tu its with rapid g , whi h on ti ted the armament of to rpedo boats . In the meanwhile the Southern troops which had remained O II the right bank of the Nev a were c rossing the river on barges . The imperial ya cht A lex a n dr ia. arrived at this m c c oment and dropped anchor near the rossing . A spe ial wa s s s s i but barge tran porting the la t of the Ca pian reg ment, n v the head of the Norther army had arri ed on the bank , and the ss wa s cu its ﬁre c s cro ing exe ted under , to whi h the troop ut r s d of the So hern army e ponde from the barges .

134 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

The artillery and in fantry fire of the Northern corps wa s directed on the Southern flotilla pursuing the Northern u n wa s to a h sq adron . At the mome t when the flotilla appro c (assumed) the bridge in order to destroy it (in reality it re u a ss s c r e mained some distance from the latter) , three fo g e , o r spo n din g to torpedoes which would have been used at the s h se s s fi . moment of pas age of the hostile ves el , were red T e fougasses were plac ed at such a distance as not to in jur e the m ss s c ter e st e bridge . A a of stone and earth was s at d almo ov r ' u e s o f the the whole width of the river . The nc asing volley batteries lead us to believe that the Southern flotilla co uld ffi have forced the bridge on ly with great di culty . t s c d m n The two pon oon raft were repla e , and the re ai der of s the troo ps cro sed over to the left bank . The duration of these various operations had bee n ca lcu suc s u e In u ma n lated with h preci ion , and were exec t d s ch a u r five u s ner , a s to ca se a variance of not mo e than or ten min te u m from the sched led ti e . After breakfast the Emperor V isited the position fortified by the sappers to defend the crossing . This position co m

s 6 - un c s pri ed a g battery and tren hes on the side for infantry . t so Ba tery and trenches were completely hidden , that they ’ a m s - did not attr ct the ene y attention . A narrow gauge rail wa s s uc e in c O f r way con tr t d a dit h in rear the batte y , by means of which it communicated with the neighboring s u s l trenche . S pplementary po itions had ikewise been pre e un s s ﬁr e the par d for g , in ca e the enemy opened upon m s l c m s c u x cu b for er . The di p a e ent of the gun o ld be e e ted y

s - u fe w c s e e mean of the narrow ga ge railway . A tren he w r , v v s u c s moreo er , ery killf lly hidden by bran he .

O P E R A T IO N S O F A U G U ST 1 8 A N D 1 9 .

u us 18 wa s s i P r bra A g t a day of re t, and a hol day of the eo n sk u ge y regiment of the g ard . u us 19 s n s On A g t the troop agai re ted . During the day the Northern army occupied the environs of the imperial china fac tory of A lex a n dro v sko ye and the l vi lages of Murzinka and Rybatskoye . The Southern army wa s concentrated at Podgornoye- Poul

- ul v a n d s - uz s P o ko o . kovo, Bol hoye , Bol hoye K mino Orders were issued for the Northern army to continue its advance march o n the following day on the line Krasnaya

— - z Slobodka Malye Kabo i . R U SSIA . 135

The cavalry and horse artillery (29 squadrons and 18 guns) to a d u - m a o n - Po ulko v o vance by the Fo r Ar s ro d Podgornoye ,

R iedko - z x e . y Ku mino, and Ale androvka u n 22 a s 1 s 24 u The right col m ( batt lion , otnia, and g ns) to f ﬁ s the a s ollow at r t same road the cavalry , but beyond the o - bservatory to take the Malye Kabozi road . u 12 1 s t 40 un The left col mn ( battalions, o nia, and g s) to go

u Sho usha r - uz thro gh Garry , y , Bolshoye K mino , and Tsar

k e- n - s o . y Sela, in order to reach Kras aya Slobodka The bat talion of pontoniers to remain at the crossing of the 17th of u s A gu t on the left bank of the Neva . The commander of the Southern army had resolved to pre v ent the en emy from marching upon Gatchina by taking up o s o n s P o ulko v a 23 a s 60 p itions the height of ; batt lion , guns, 24 t s 2 s s e mor ar , and squadron had been de ignat d to take the lea d in the action . The fro nt of the position exte nded from the church of B01 Shoy e- Kuzmino to the heights of P o ulko vo (near the obser va

tory) . s s 20 s 24 s The general re erve , compri ing battalion and gun ,

- was placed at R iedko ye Kuz mino . The whole of the cavalry (2 1 squadrons) a n d 12 guns had been pushed in advance to ascertain the direc tions of march f of the main forces O the enemy . The commander of the engineers of the corps wa s intrusted

with fortifying the position .

O P E R A T IO N S O F A U GU ST 2 0 .

m s r lk . In . Po u o v The Emperor and E pre s a rived at a at o , whence the march of the Northern corps and the position of

the Southern could be observed . r n c Po ulko vo s The No ther avalry , following the road of , ee o s s s wa s ing that this p ition , trong already in it elf, occupied s r by considerable force of infantry and a tillery , turned to the Ko kko l v o s e o . right t ward Pe ki and There , under cover of its the forest, it resolved to await the arrival of infantry, in order to rush at the moment of attack upon the rear of the

enemy . h u n s u T e left col mn of the Norther corp , pon marching from ho usha r u m its S y , began to draw p in battle for ation ; artillery opened ﬁr e and its infan try e x ecuted an offensive movement h n n us so a s attrac t t e atte tio of the enemy, and th make him 136 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

l n n c r t a c wa s uncover his eft fla k, upo whi h the p incipal a t k to be made . w c d ffic The right column, hi h had to make a long and i ult a d ha in er tsk co n march, m e a short lt the Sredn o ga aya lo y, and co in d a e on a then nt ued to a v nc Kamenk . The Southern cavalry en deavored by repeated atta cks to n impede the o fi e sive movement of the left column . n i r io The right colum , which had drawn up n battle fo mat n, understanding the difficulty of a frontal attack aga in st the l e ec e u m n s i eft wing of the en my, ex ut d a t rning oveme t on Pe k l Its and Ga lero v o in order to fall upo n his flank . artillery a s a llero o a n d the a n o advanced to the southe t of G v , inf try t ok o fien sive up the . m a n n a d The co m der of the So uther corps, informed of the in rce m a d his vance of the hostile ma fo , i medi tely gathere to s R iedko e- z i left the general re erve, which was at y Ku m no, and

- u s co part of the artillery from Bolshoye Po lko vo . The e nd di vision of the infa n try of the guard deployed rapidly to the south of the observatory a n d marched against the enemy . The cavalry had likewise been a ssembled upo n the left ﬂank and respo nded by a counter- attack to the attack of the North i o ff s ve ern cavalry, wh ch had s mewhat delayed the o en i move ment of the second division of the guar d . The sign al for the general attack had been given and the troops were prepa ring for combat when the Emperor ordered “ ” the a s h lt and cau ed the generals to assemble . This concluded the gran d impe rial Russian maneuvers of

1898.

138 V A U T U M N M A N E U E RS .

E T E M E — n S P B R 6 . Exercises of regime t again st regiment under direction of the briga de commanders . E T E M E R — is v w r S P B 7 Div ion against di ision, ith auxilia y s a ir ec s n troop ssigned to each , under d tion of the divi io commander . — E T E M E R 8. A r ecess a r a S P B day set apa t for n ary rep i s, cle n ing, and inspection . T — i a E E M E R 9 10 A N D I2 . s vi s S P B , , Exercise of d ion ag inst u division nder direction of the cor ps comman der . E T E M E R 11 N A — e S P B (SU D Y) . Full r st day . — SE PT E M BE R 13 A N D 14 . Exercises of a combin ed army c orps against a maneuver division . 8 en d the n e em From September until the of ma euvers, S pt ber

14 o n s x s . , the c dition of actual warfare were supposed to e i t

R A N O N F T R V O G IZA T I O O O PS FO R M A N E U E R S .

Fourth army corps

Staff and twelfth company guides . Fourth division ff u Sta and fo rth company guides . Sev enth infantry brigade

Staff . e Thirt enth infantry regiment . e Fourte nth infantry regiment . Eighth in fantry brigade ff Sta .

Fifteenth infantry regiment .

Sixteenth infantry regiment . Division ar tillery ﬁ Fourth eld artillery regimen t . Engineers 4 Half battalion No . . s ﬁ Divi ion eld hospital No . 4 . Eighth division ff Sta and eighth company guides . Fifteenth in fantry brigade t ff S a .

- Twenty ninth regiment of infantry . i Thirtieth reg ment of infantry . Sixteenth infantry brigade

Staff .

-ﬁr st t Thirty regiment of infan ry .

t - s Thir y econd regiment of infantry . SW IT ZE R L A N D . 139

Division artillery e ﬁ l Eighth r giment of eld arti lery . Engineers

o 8. Half battalion N .

i a 8. Divis on hospit l No . Corps troo ps

Four th cava lry brigade . rt ﬁ t l Corps a illery , twelfth regiment eld ar i lery

Sta ff .

First division . i Sec on d div sion . n Four th division po toniers . e Four th company t legraphists . ur n Third and fo th compa ies ra ilroad troops . ur r Fo th administ ative company . s Cyclis t .

T H E M A N E U V E R A R E A .

The district between Sursee and Baden had been selected for v m a neuvers of the di ision s and army corps . This an nounce ment a s to the country was so general that it preven ted the te a n d participants from deciding on the rrain , consequently n u s o the course of the mane ver and the battles . The close s i h in pect on of the terrain by the igher commanders , which u a s su lly preceded the maneuver in previous years , was not 1898 su s hi s a had in , and the re lt of t ye r were so much better is s i u that it hoped that thi practice w ll be discontin ed . The man euver area selec ted for 1898 is divided by the river t es a n d us n s . Re s i o two great divisions , a w t an ea t On the r ct l i u r t a to the eft of the r ver the division mane ve s were held, while the corps maneuv ers were executed on the tract on the k right ban . Parallel with the Reuss Valley are those of the Bun z and the

c . r is Aare , all in a northerly dire tion The north pa t again i i Bii n z v s s d v ded by the Ri er into two ubdivi ions, while the part south of Muri is divided by the line of the wooded Lin c c e Sa rmen sdo rf denberg, which, ommen ing n ar on the north , s r n r end at Hohen ain on the south in an irregular hilly cou t y . On the north the Lindenberg connects with the wooded Vil m r er s is 713 e b e . g, whose highe t peak m ters The Lin denberg in s s 800- 900 its southern portion ri e to meters ; that is, on an 5 er bo l n t average, 4 0met s a ve the p a e of he Aare River and 500 140 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S.

t s o es of me ers above the plane of the Reus River . B th slop in t b e s the L denberg are in ersected y numerous wat r cour es, ' a n d is in general the terrain very rough and hidden . The is the o crest well wooded and so are water c urses, and the other parts contain small woods . The en tire terrain is cov a m n s c a so ered with towns, vill ges, far s, garde , and or h rds, s e that it make a good t rrain for maneuvers . — is CO M M U N ICA T IO N S . The district well supplied with good

d s s . s roa s , al o railroad The principal bridge across the Re uss Sin ser e c are the Bridge and those at Obfelden , Ott nba h, and Bremgarten , and there are fords at Muhlau a n d Unter

L in khofen .

D E T A I L S O F T H E M A N E U V E R S .

The general idea for the three days of exercises of division si 9 10 12 a s s against divi on on September , , and w as follow “ A North army is about to cross the Rhine at Bale a nd u Waldsh t . u is n a ts . A So th army at Ber , with det chmen at Luce rne The situation on the afterno on of Septembe r 8wa s a s follows — ha s ss n O R T R M . a N H A Y Main body cro ed the Rhi e at B le, a n d its u v s ha s h s u fo rth di i ion crossed the R ine at Wald h t,

i s n 8 s : n and arr ve on the after oon of September , a s follow Mai m u body at the line of the Aare River fro Soloth rn to Olten, u the head of the fo rth division at Wohlen . — s d c o he SO U T H AR M Y . Begin the a van e from Bern t ward t u s u n . Aare River, and the advance guard reache Fra br n en i s a s The eighth div sion reache Ch in . The ixth division V h reaches the icinity of Wo len . The orders of the North army co mmander to the fourth divi sion were a s follows :

’ The enemy s a dvance g uard ha s reached Fraubrunnen ; a i is m u Zu hostile div sion marching fro L cerne to rich . ur c - 9th O army will advan e to morrow, the , in direction of

Bern . Your di vision will on September 9 advance by Muri against the upper Reuss River and try to cut o ff the hostile division advancing on Chain . The commander of the South army issued the following orders to the eighth division T he enemy ha s arriv ed at the line of the Aare River from l t u n . s c r Solo h r to Olten The hosti e divi ion , whi h ar ived at u ha s s v t ls to Br gg yesterday, ent large ca alry pa ro ward

142 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

i t Beinw l a s e e to i Ma n ain your positions at y , r port d me , unt l e c m n a c the arrival of r enfor e e ts, which will re h you from the n t 10 a n d direction of Lucerne on the mor ing of Sep ember , hen you will attempt to drive ba ck the hostile force opposed t0 you . In accordance with this order the eighth division made its dispositions for the occupation of the close po sition along the s i cre t of the L ndenberg .

O P E R A T IO N S O F SE P T E M B E R 1 2 .

The 12th of September presented an opportunity for co m in ed u o n s t the b mane vers a uitable terrain . It permit ed employment of the entire force of artillery . o n u s n em The direct r of the ma e ver , on the eveni g of Sept 11 s u s ber , outlined the it ation as follow a se iv ér e e 10 The North army p s d the Aare R on Sept mb r , but its left wing wa s thrown back and is now occupying the n Batter kin der— Othen ba ch— li e R Aarwangen . t v n u The four h di ision, as a co seq ence , retired in a north westerly direction . The South a rmy has advanced its right win g a s far a s Her

- z o en buchsee t st u r u n . g Langenthal , the lef being ill at Fra b nne The eighth division followed the retiring enemy a s far a s

Bo w l- ttw l s y Be y . The fourth division received the following order s from the commander of the North army After a hard struggle the left wing of this army wa s forced wa s a v the to retire toward the Aare , and part forced b ck o er

A are at Aarwangen . The right wing of the army is still in position at Batter kin en — R bthen b h d a c .

- to 12th. is To morrow , the of September, it my intention again assume the offensive and attempt to regain possession z of Langenthal and Her ogenbuchsee . u u in o si Yo r division will , ntil further orders, remain p tion at Sarmensto rf for the protection of the left wing of the army . The orders of the South army commander to the eighth div ision were a s follows

’ The enemy s left win ha s recrossed the Aare . His army — —A r w occupies the line Batter inden Rothenbach a a n n . m to - t 12 It is my intention to engage the ene y morrow, 0 th, along the whole line . u s ss s o Yo r divi ion will , if po ible , crowd the ho tile force p posing it so a s to cut it o ff from the main body . W A N D 143 S IT ZE R L .

The division of the forces into two parties on this day wa s c a s r s the s e a exa tly even , two pa t of corp artillery w re ssigned to s the divi ions . 12 c 6 . m. The operation commen ed at a , September , at w u hich time both lines of outposts ha d to be oc c pied . Neither side wa s to cross the line Meisterschwanden—U ez wyl—Walten

s l . chwy before a m .

O P E R A T I O N S O F SE P T E M B E R 1 3 .

t s 12th After the opera ion of the of September, the condition of assumed warfare between the two div isions of the fourth corps cea sed and the exercises of the combined corps against m u v m u a ane ver di ision co menced . The fo rth cavalry brigade

n i a d the twelfth artillery reg men t returned to the corps . During the day of September 12 a third division ha d been c oncentrated between the Reuss a n d the Limmat riv ers in the

st u a s l s : vic inity of Dietikon . It was con it ted fol ow Eleventh e s v n and thirt enth infantry brigades, sixth and e e th battalion a n d i of carbineers, third brigade of cavalry , the eleventh reg s s wa s c ment of artillery . Thi combined divi ion alled the is wa s s maneuver div ion , and commanded by Colonel Mei ter . The division was to operate September 13 and 14 against the u m u m s . fo rth ar y corp Colonel Ble ler, co manding the third t army corps, was charged with the direc ion of the maneuvers .

GE N E R AL IDE A FOR T HE CO R PS M AN E U V E RS .

a d r u A North army has advanced on B en and B gg . The advanced parties have crossed the Aare and the Reuss

v s u - r i ers and have reached the front Hab b rg Mellingen . r s d the A No th divi ion , combine division of third army c a s the ha s orps protection of the left ﬂank of North army , m c rossed the Li mat River at Dietikon .

is c - ha s A South army oncentrated Villmergen Seen , and occupied the front Hagglingen - Holderbank with its advanced s po ts. m u s u A right ﬂank corps of this ar y , the So th corp (fo rth) in u ha s u Bun z advancing from S rsee , reached the pper Valley . The operations between the two parties commenced Septem

12 2 . . ber , p m The director of the man euv ers issued the following orders to the fourth army corps

T R E A D A R T E e tember 12 2 M U R S S m. OU . S H A Y H Q , p , p 1 n s . The South army will e gage the ho tile main body along t - s u to - 13 the fron Mellingen Hab b rg morrow, the th . 144 A U T U M N M A N BU YE R S .

os i d v si ha s ro s mm The h t le i i on, which c s ed the Li at River t n u a a c . at Dietikon , is repor ed dv ing to ward the Re ss River 2 h n oc u the e . The Sout corps will this eveni g c py lin Muri W a lten schw l a d oo s i ta o ssess n y , and the vance tr p w ll ke p io of e s the R u s River passages from Bremgarten up . Your division will esta blish conta ct with this troo p at Fisch

a c u s . b ch, which is o c pied by the advance troop of my left wing

- 3 . . In n ss e s To morrow a . your divisio will cro the R us River and gain po ssession of the hills between the river and the in e s e Limmat , order to operat from there again t the l ft ﬂank ’ and the communications of the enemy s main army .

DE CIS ION FO R T HIS DA Y.

’ a T he r s e oﬁ cers s ( ) caval y of the South corp , exc pt patrol ,

us c s Bun z 2 m. e e 12. m t not ro s the line of before , S pt mber (b) In the case of the occupa tion of t e br idges a t Otten a c e c s n b h and Bremgart n by the advan ed guards, the po itio of the latter must n o t be beyond the ea stern crest of these localities . (c) The outpo st of the South corps must n o t be passed In t 3 m 5 . . e 1 before a Sep mber , except by cavalry and s all i s e uss nfantry patrol , nor will troo ps be crossed over the R before that time .

The instructions for the North division (combined ma neuver division) were contained in the following orders of the North army commander

E A T R O R T R M H DQU A R E S N H A Y , 2 2 1 m. A E N Se tember . B D , p , p

1 T h n . e North army will e gage the hostile main force in e Kesten ber - m r the dir ction of g and Hagglingen to o row, Sep tember 13 . s 2 . The North divi ion is to r o tect the left ﬂan k of the orth army against the report advan ce of the hostile corps m u s th u fro S r ee toward e Re ss . s n h s he 3 . Your divi io will t is even ing take po session of t heights of W elschen lo h- Lieli and advan ce the outposts to the

Reuss . These will establish contact on the right near E g en w l h u s g y wit the o tpo ts of the North army . Your division will oppose any hostile attempt to cro ss the us v Re s Ri er .

E D CISION FOR T HIS DA Y.

a e o 12th i ( ) On the aft rno n of the of September, w th the ex ’ ce tio n O f o ﬁi cer s s t s p patrol , no par of the North divi ion will leave Dietikon before 2 p . m . (b) With the exception of the cavalry and small infantry s n o i n atrol , troops of the North division w ll be beyo d the p E en w l—Zuﬁken — i n — ine gg y L n kho fe Arn i .

146 A U T U M N M A N E U V E R S .

I therefore order e r the 2 . The cavalry brigade will advanc at daylight f om right wing and attempt the destruction of the bridges at n e Dietikon and Schlieren . Cavalry patrols will also reco n oit r a r n be to ward H r e rg and Hasenberg . e o a s l ws A t a . m . the troops will be r ady in p sition fol o s n o Friedlis Eighth division ea t of Lieli , to adva ce t ward

a n d re . burg, from the toward Hasenberg Fourth di vision at R otzebrihl to advance over Ober- Berikon toward Hasenberg . The fourth division will place one infantry brigade at Rute

di itI n . his . s o s o at a . m at the p of the corps commander T brigade will follow the r ight win g of the eighth division .

Both divisions will secure their march .

The outpo st line is to be passed at 8 a . m . Twelfth artillery regiment posted at Rute ; for escort o f ni this regiment the co rps reserve will furnish two compa es . u The attack wa s carried o t as ordered . The eighth brigade over the plateau of Berikon- Wyden against the right ﬂank of the position . s n Fr iedlisbur its it s The eighth divi io over the g and to left , artillery somewhat moved toward the right ﬂank . The seventh brigade as corps reserve in rear of the r igh t

flan k of the eighth division . The cavalry brigade advanced on the left flan k of the posi tion and the artillery in position between the eighth division vi s m and the eighth brigade . The di ion field hospital re aine d at Lieli . At the cessation of hostilities the situation wa s a s follows ’ On the right flank of the defenders position the somewha t u i a wa s lsed premat re attack of the eighth infantry br g de repu . The twenty - second regiment held the southern edge of the h s Michael woods and the rifle trenc e to the west . In rea r o f its right wing wa s the twenty - secon d regiment with two ba t c L a n er n oo s i talion s . In the enter near g was the art llery of s t the North divi ion , par ly ruled out of action , and in its rea r

- fifth i th two battalions of the twenty reg ment of infantry , e s vi other battalion of the eighth brigade ha ng not yet deployed . Opposed to these forces was the entire infantry of the eighth v s s uffi n fi di i ion, however , not clo ed up s cie tly for the n a l ’ attack . On the left flank of the defenders position there were 3 t s 6 a s s bat alion against the batt lion of the corp reserve , which T h i . e 10 were advanc ng artillery of the attacker, with bat teries o t w Fr iedlisbur n still in the p si ion bet een g and Beriko , s e s d with 4 batterie advanc d to the ea t of Frie lisburg . W 1 S IT ZE R LA N D . 47

The director of the maneuvers decided that the North army wa s still able to maintain its position . The comments were that the defender should not have exposed his artillery a s long a s he did to the ﬁr e of the superior artillery force of the u u t the So th army . It wo ld have been bet er to withdraw t s t s bat erie af er the deployment of the enemy to secure place , and later on advanced to a dvantageous positions from which t he ﬁnal atta ck could have been opposed .

M A M AT ILIT RY IN FOR ION DIV ISION PUBLICATION S.

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ex ha ust ed . ) — “ e n i ti t r n . . 2 . T h Orga za on of he Ge ma A rmy 1894 (E dition ex

ha unted. )

. h it f t e t t . 3 T e Organ i zed M il ia o h U ni ed S a tes 1893 . (E ditio n

— “ ” t . 4 . N otec on Orga n iza tion, A rma men t, a n d M ili a ry P rogress 1894 .

” h r t th t 5 . T e O ga n ized M ili ia of e U n i ed Sta tes. 1894 . (E dition ex ha ust ed )

6 . T he A utumn M a n euvers of (E dition ex ha ust ed. ) f 7 . T he Orga nized M ilitia o the U n ited Sta 1895 . (Editio n

” ti n ma men t a n d M ilita r r s . 8. N ot es o r a iz A r P ro e s 1 n O g n a o , , y g 896 .

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” t t ti x usted. 12 . T he M ili a r S m f w en . 1 E di on e ha y ys e o S ed 897 . ( ) ” t t . 18 . T he Orga niz ed M ilitia of th e U n i ed S a tes. 1896 —“ 14 . he t r ste f re ce a n T urke 189 . T M ili a y Sy ms o G e d y . 7 ” 15 . T he A utumn M an euvers of 1896 in E urope . 1897 . — ” e rmi . 1 . 16 . P a rt 1 : Subsisten ce a n d M essin g in E urop a n A es 897 ” h x l v . 1 . P a rt 2 : Ca v a lr y Pion eer T ools, a n d H ig E p osi es 898 P a rt 3 E x t ra ct s fromthe N ew D rill R egula tion s o f the R ussia n l ” Ca va ry . 1898.

ma ti M ilit r ro ession a l Su ects. 189 1 . Sources of Infor on on a P 8 7 y f bj . ” 18 . Selected P rofessiona l P a pers. 1898.

th t in 1 98 19. T he Orga niz ed M ili tia of e U n ited S a tes 8 . ” r in . 189 . 20. M ilita y N otes on th e Philipp es 8 ” t . 2 1. M ili a ry N otes on Cuba . 1898 —“ ” mi . 1 . 2 2 . sta h of V a rious A r es 899 ” 2 3 . Obser va tion s A hma d . 1899.

- 2 4 . A Fren h n lish M ilit r T echni cal Dicti na r . P a rt I . 189 c E g a y o y 9 .

x r s . 899 2 5 . R eports o f E plora t ion s in th e T errit o y of A la ka 1 .