Sabotage in the Workplace: the Role of Organizational Injustice

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ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 DECISION PROCESSES www.academicpress.com

Sabotage in the workplace: The role of organizational injustice

Maureen L. Ambrose,a Mark A. Seabright,b and Marshall Schminkec,*

a University of Central Florida, USA b Western Oregon University, USA c College of Business Administration, P.O. Box 161400, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1400, USA

Abstract

This studyexamines the relationship between injustice and workplace sabotage. Drawing on the organizational justice and workplace deviance literatures, we hypothesize that injustice will be the most common cause of sabotage, and that the source of injustice will inﬂuence the goal, target, and severityof sabotage behavior. The results generallysupport our hypotheses. First, injustice was the most common cause of sabotage. Second, when the source of injustice was interactional, individuals were more likelyto engage in retaliation, and when the source of injustice was distributive, individuals were more likelyto engage in equityrestoration. Third, the source of injustice and the target of sabotage were generallythe same, although this relationship was stronger for organizational targets than for individual targets. Finally, there was an additive eﬀect of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on the severityof sabotage. We discuss the implications of these results for future research on sabotage and deviant workplace behavior. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

I worked at the Janacka machine, which cuts the hides and skin oﬀ the pineapple. We usu- allyworked a straight ten-hour shift, so a lot of people would just burn out. To combat that, people would tryto get more breaks —we were onlyallowed two breaks per shift. To do this, theywould send a pineapple down the wrong direction, or send a glove down, and it would break the whole machine. If the Janacka machine shuts down, you can’t cut the pineapple, the line can’t go on. The whole production line shuts down. It takes at least three hours to ﬁx, so you’re getting paid for three hours at least for just sitting around. Lance, pineapple packer. (Sprouse, 1992, p. 18) Workplace sabotage has been of interest to a broad range of researchers and practitioners. The present studybuilds from this previous work and focuses on the relationship between perceived unfairness and sabotage behavior. We draw on the organizational justice and workplace deviance literatures as a basis for our research, in which we propose that the principal cause of sabotage is perceptions of organi-

* Corresponding author. Fax: 407-823-3725. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Schminke).

0749-5978/02/$ - see front matter Ó 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. PII: S0749-5978(02)00037-7 948 M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 zational injustice. Additionally, we propose that different configurations of distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice lead to different types of sabotage behavior. Organizational justice is a promising perspective for understanding workplace deviance (Greenberg & Alge, 1998). A number of scholars have theorized about how different types and combinations of injustice lead to dysfunctional consequences (Folger & Baron, 1996; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg, 1990, 1993a, 1993b; Greenberg & Alge, 1998; Neuman & Baron, 1997; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). However, although there has been substantial theorizing about justice and deviance, few empirical studies exist, and those that do suffer from two limitations. First, the extant empirical justice research has focused on relatively few dysfunctional behaviors, primarily theft (Greenberg, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) and retaliation (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). We believe it is useful to studya wider set of deviant behaviors. Such expansion is instrumental in developing a better understanding of contextual influences and boundaryconditions on the causes of deviant behavior. In the present paper, we extend previous work byexamining a broad categoryof deviance, workplace sabotage. An additional characteristic of most of the relevant empirical work is that it has been relativelycoarse-grained, examining the effect of injustice (distributive, procedural, and/or interactional) on whether or not employees engage in a specific act of deviance, such as theft. Research does not consider how different types of injustice mayaffect the typeof deviance in which an individual engages. Here, we match this multidimensional perspective on justice (distributive, procedural, and interactional) with a more fine-grained image of deviance. Specifically, we describe how types of injustice affect the goal, target, and severityof sabotage behavior. Below, we brieflyreview relevant research and present a series of hypotheses outlining the relationships between justice and sabotage. We then describe a study that examines these relationships between justice and sabotage and discuss the implications of our findings.

2. Sabotage

Workplace sabotage is behavior intended to ‘‘damage, disrupt, or subvert the organization’s operations for the personal purposes of the saboteur bycreating unfavorable publicity, embarrassment, delays in production, damage to property, the destruction of working relationships, or the harming of employees or customers’’ (Crino, 1994, p. 312). Most recent research argues for conceptualizing sabotage as a rational behavior that stems from an individual’s reaction to his or her environment (Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Jermier, 1988). This research has focused on cat- egorizing sabotage behaviors and/or identifying its motivation (e.g., Analoui, 1995; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Jermier, 1988). The sabotage literature suggests ﬁve possible motives: powerlessness, frustration, facilitation of work, boredom/fun, and injustice. These labels reﬂect the terminologyused in the sabotage literature to de- note antecedent conditions to sabotage. We consider each below.

2.1. Powerlessness

Powerlessness stems from a lack of freedom or autonomy(Allen & Greenberger, 1980; Bennett, 1998). Sabotage that results from powerlessness is an effort to attain control for its own sake. It involves trying to change the nature of work or the in- ducements/contributions equation to achieve a nonsanctioned end (i.e., something that benefits the person or workgroup, not the organization). Examples include wildcat strikes to enhance a bargaining position or breaking machineryto gain M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 949 unscheduled breaks. Empirical research suggests that individuals who feel powerless mayengage in sabotage (Bennett, 1998; DiBattista, 1991) and that such destructive behavior can increase individuals’ sense of control (Allen & Greenberger, 1980). Some researchers identifypowerlessness as a source of injustice (Bennett, 1998, p. 228), creating a potential source of confusion between powerlessness and injustice as sabotage motives. However, to maintain the conceptual distinction between these two, we confine our conceptualization of the power motive to acts aimed at ob- taining control, rather than regaining justice.

2.2. Organizational frustration

Organizational frustration is deﬁned as an interference with goal attainment or goal maintenance (Spector, 1978). In this case, it is the emotional state of frustration that drives the sabotage. For example, anger over inadequate resources to do the job maylead to a cathartic destruction of property(Taylor& Walton, 1971). As with powerlessness, research demonstrates that sabotage is related to organizational frustration (Chen & Spector, 1992; Spector, 1975; Storms & Spector, 1987; Taylor & Walton, 1971). However, some clariﬁcation maybe needed to distinguish between frustration and other possible motives. For example, researchers also have recognized that powerlessness can be frustrating (Bennett, 1998, p. 228) and that injustice can elicit frustration (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975). However, we conceptualize frustration as the motive for sabotage onlyif it is the blocking of goals per se that drives the act. Frustration is not the underlying motive if the employee is frustrated as the result of something else (e.g., powerlessness or injustice). In such cases, the source of the frustration (powerlessness or injustice) would be the motive for sabotage.

2.3. Facilitation of work

Facilitation of work occurs when the goal of the sabotage is to make the work activityeasier to accomplish. Research demonstrates that attempting to make the work process easier can be a cause of sabotage (Bensman & Gerver, 1963; Taylor & Walton, 1971). However, it is important to distinguish between facilitation of work and related concepts like power. Power generallyinvolves breaking the rules, whereas facilitation of work involves bending the rules. Power is anyeffort to change or re- structure the work to achieve a personal or nonsanctioned end. It restructures social relationships, but does not necessarilymake the work easier (Taylor& Walton, 1971). Facilitation of work involves nonsanctioned means to achieve sanctioned ends. The classic example of work facilitation is the use of a ‘‘tap’’ in airplane manufacturing (Taylor & Walton, 1971). A tap is a steel screw that rethreads a nut so that a mis- aligned bolt will fit. In the short run, this makes work easier, but in the long run employees know that it weakens the strength of the connection and may therefore be detrimental to the organization. Although manyefforts to facilitate work are innoc- uous or perhaps even beneficial, these efforts lead to sabotage in cases such as this when individuals ease the work process at a cost (or potential cost) to the organization.

2.4. Boredom/fun

Boredom/fun is identified as the motive for sabotage when the primarygoal of the activityis to cut boredom, generate excitement, or have fun. ‘‘Changing the time on the punch clock, or pulling the fire alarm mayadd just the right level of excitement to an otherwise boring day’’ (Crino, 1994, p. 317). Research indicates that employees mayengage in sabotage in an effort to alleviate boredom and/or entertain themselves or their coworkers (Crino, 1994; DiBattista, 1991; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Taylor & Walton, 1971). 950 M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965

2.5. Injustice

Injustice refers to an employee’s belief that he or she (or someone else) has been treated unfairly. An employee who feels unjustly treated may try to ‘‘even the score’’ bycommitting sabotage. As Crino (1994, p. 315) has observed, an employeewho has been ‘‘shown disrespect, passed over for promotion, given additional responsibilities with no payincrease, denied adequate resources to do the job, or didn’t receive what he or she considered adequate credit for work performed from co-workers or management’’ fits the profile of the classic disgruntled saboteur. Injustice is a frequentlycited cause of sabotage (Crino, 1994; Crino & Leap, 1989; DiBattista, 1989, 1996; Neuman & Baron, 1998; Robinson & Bennett, 1997; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Sieh, 1987; Tucker, 1993). Although this claim has not been directlytested in the sabotage literature, empirical research on justice demonstrates that perceived injustice is associated with forms of deviance such as theft (Greenberg, 1993a,b) and vandalism (DeMore, Fisher, & Baron, 1988). Earlyorganizational justice literature distinguished between two typesof fairness: distributive (the perceived fairness of outcomes such as pay) and procedural (the perceived fairness of procedures). (See Cropanzano & Greenberg (1997) for a review.) However, as the field evolved, justice researchers recognized the importance of how procedures were enacted. Justice research began to focus on interactional justice—the fairness of the interpersonal treatment the individual receives from a decision-maker. Two dimensions of treatment have been shown to be important to judgments of interactional justice: explanations and interpersonal sensitivity. There has been debate in the justice literature about how to incorporate interactional justice into a general justice framework. Bies and Moag (1986) originally described interactional justice as a third type of justice. However, subsequent researchers suggested interactional justice was best conceptualized as the ‘‘social’’ side of procedural justice, rather than a distinct type of justice (e.g., Brockner & Wie- senfeld, 1996; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Folger & Bies, 1989; Tyler & Bies, 1990). Yet more recent research has argued for considering interactional justice as a distinct form of justice (Malatesta & Byrne, 1997; Masterson, Lewis-McClear, Goldman, & Taylor, 1997; Moye, Masterson, & Bartol, 1997). What is clear in this debate is that individuals respond not onlyto outcomes and procedures, but also to interpersonal interactions. It is also clear that there are both structural and social elements that affect justice perceptions (Brockner, Ackerman, & Fairchild, 2001; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Green- berg, 1993a). Greenberg (1993a) presents a model that explicitlyconsiders this distinction. He identifies two dimensions for classifying classes of justice: category of justice (procedural and distributive) and focal determinant (structural and social). In this typology, traditional procedural and distributive justice are classified as structural forms of justice. Interactional justice (separated into the two dimensions of informational justice and interpersonal justice) is classified as a social form of justice. (See also Folger & Skarlicki, 1998.) This distinction between structural and social aspects of justice is relevant to our examination of sabotage. We expand on it below.

2.6. Dominant motives

There is little research that addresses which of the sabotage motives is most dominant. However, a review of the literature provides some basis for prediction. Injustice as a cause of sabotage is a theme that arises in both the sabotage (Crino, 1994; Crino & Leap, 1989; DiBattista, 1989, 1996; Dubois, 1979; Sieh, 1987; Tucker, 1993) and justice literatures (Bies & Tripp, 1998; Folger & Skarl- icki, 1998). Indeed, Greenberg and Alge (1998, p. 84), in their discussion of workplace aggression (sabotage is a form of aggression, Neuman & Baron, 1998, M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 951 p. 400) suggest that an approach based on organizational justice ‘‘is arguablyone of the most promising orientations.’’ Theynote that recent surveysshow that both British (Hoad, 1993) and American workers (Neuman, Baron, & Geddes, 1996) believe that unfair treatment is the dominant cause of aggression in the workplace. Thus, we expect injustice will also be the most common motive for sabotage. We predict:

H1:. Injustice will be a more frequent cause of sabotage than powerlessness, frustration, facilitation of work, or boredom/fun.

3. Sabotage as a form of deviance

Recentlythere has been increased interest in deviant behavior in the workplace. (See Robinson & Bennett, 1997, and Robinson & Greenberg, 1998, for reviews.) Topics in this stream of research include workplace aggression (Baron & Neuman, 1996; Folger & Baron, 1996), incivility(Andersson & Pearson, 1999), revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1998), theft (Greenberg, 1990, 1993b, 1996; Hollinger & Clark, 1983), organization-motivated aggression (O’Leary-Kelly, Griffin, & Glew, 1996), organizational retaliatorybehavior (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), and antisocial behavior (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Workplace sabotage, however, has been largelyoverlooked as a typeof deviant behavior. (For an exception see Giacalone, Riordan, & Rosenfeld, 1997.) This surge of interest in deviant behavior has spawned a varietyof terms and definitions that are both overlapping and unique. An extensive discussion of these variations on a theme, and sabotage’s place among these, is beyond the scope of this paper. (See Robinson & Greenberg, 1998, for such a review.) However, several aspects of our definition warrant discussion. First, the main difference between sabotage and the general concept of deviance is that sabotage explicitlyfocuses on doing harm whereas deviance focuses on violating norms. Although there is considerable overlap between these two constructs because deviance is potentiallyharmful or likelyto be perceived as harmful, deviance can be functional or even beneficial (Robinson & Bennett, 1997) whereas bydefinition sabotage cannot be. Second, sabotage is both narrower than some conceptualizations of deviance and broader than others. For example, although Robinson and Bennett (1995) include gossiping and showing favoritism as forms of deviance, these behaviors are unlikely to constitute sabotage. On the other hand, we would conceptualize organizational retaliatorybehavior as a subset of sabotage. These behaviors reflect sabotage motivated byretaliation and focus on more ‘‘subtle and covert’’ forms of retaliation. Sabotage includes these less subtle and more overt forms of behavior as well. Third, it is important to note that the organizational damage caused bysabotage can be either direct or indirect. Sabotage can target an individual, a unit, or the whole organization (Giacalone et al., 1997, p. 121). Moreover, sabotage can have multiple targets and the organization need not be the primaryvictim. Although we use the term sabotage in this paper, we recognize that we risk adding to the proliferation of terms used to describe various types of deviant behavior. The preceding discussion, however, suggests that sabotage is not just another term for the general concept of deviance nor is it the same as other types of deviant behavior. It is different enough from these other forms to warrant separate consideration. More- over, we believe that the label sabotage is useful in this study, as it is the term used in much of the literature on which we rely(particularlyfor our discussion of causes). Additionally, our study relies on secondary data. Sabotage was the term used during that data collection. 952 M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965

Positioning sabotage as a form of deviance provides a framework for differentiating among types of sabotage. As noted above, sabotage research has focused primarily on identifying causes of sabotage and different types of sabotage behaviors. However, this research has not systematically considered similarities and differences between different acts of sabotage. The literature on workplace deviance provides a framework for such an analysis. The deviance literature suggests that deviant behavior varies in terms of goal, target, and severity. The first dimension, goal, concerns Greenberg’s (1996) distinction between restoration of equityand retaliation. The other two dimensions, target and severity, follow from Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) typology of workplace deviance. The following sections describe each dimension and provide predictions about how injustice affects these sabotage dimensions.

3.1. Goal of sabotage

Earlyresearch on justice and deviance focused on distributive justice and used an equitytheoryapproach for understanding sabotage (DeMore et al., 1988; Fisher & Baron, 1982; Sieh, 1987). This research suggested that the goal of sabotage (theft or vandalism in these studies) was an attempt to restore equity; that is, to compensate for an outcome that was deserved but was not received. Indeed, Adams (1965, p. 276) in his description of equitytheorysuggests, ‘‘[Individuals] do not simplybecome dissatisfied with conditions theyperceive to be unjust. Theyusuallydo something about them.’’ Thus, sabotage was seen as a means to redistribute outcomes to restore a state of equitythat was motivated bydistributive injustice. Yet the literature suggests there are other goals individuals hope to achieve when theyengage in sabotage as a response to injustice. For example, recent research on revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1998; Bies et al., 1997) suggests individuals maytake revenge against someone who has mistreated them. Folger and Skarlicki (1998) suggest that injustice maycreate moral outrage, which spurs the individual to action. The work is consistent with work on sabotage that suggests that sabotage (and deviance in general) can serve two different goals: instrumental and expressive (Dubois, 1979; Robinson & Bennett, 1997). Robinson and Bennett (1997, p. 16) describe an instrumental motivation aimed at ‘‘repairing the situation, restoring equity, or im- proving the current situation’’ and an expressive motivation to ‘‘vent, release, or express one’s feelings of outrage, anger or frustration.’’ Greenberg (1996) identifies two types of responses to injustice that appear to be related to instrumental and expressive goals: restoration of equityor retaliation. Restoration refers to an attempt to increase the levels of reward received in order to ‘‘make up’’ for a good the individual believes he or she deserved but that was denied. Retaliation describes an actor’s behavior designed to harm a target who has caused harm to the actor, regardless of whether or not the behavior redistributes resources. (See Neuman & Baron (1997, p. 45) for a similar distinction.) Greenberg’ s formulation essentiallyrecasts the distinction between instrumental and expressive goals from a justice perspective. We adopt this formulation because it provides a more focused characterization of the goal of sabotage. With respect to retaliation, Greenberg draws on Kemper’s (1966) concept of ‘‘reciprocal deviance.’’ Reciprocal deviance is deviance designed to punish the target. It is founded on motives of revenge. Greenberg (1996) suggests that individuals may engage in deviant behavior (in Greenberg’s case, theft) in an attempt to harm a target that has harmed them, regardless of whether or not the behavior redistributes resources. (See also, Cropanzano & Baron, 1991.) But what might motivate individuals to retaliate against a target? What might cause an employee to want to ‘‘get back at’’ an organization or individual when there is no material gain for doing so? Research suggests that interactional justice may playan important role in retaliatorysabotage. For example, Bies and Tripp (1998) M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 953 identifydemeaning treatment and destructive criticism (i.e., interpersonal insensi- tivity) as a motive for revenge. Folger and Skarlicki (1998, p. 43) indicate that ‘‘interactional justice (especiallylack of interpersonal sensitivity)takes on para- mount importance in predicting retaliation and aggression in the workplace.’’ However, there is a dilemma in examining restoration of equityand retaliation in organizations. The two different motives can be manifested in the same behavior. This dilemma was overcome byGreenberg (1996) in an ingenious laboratoryexperiment that distinguished between these motives. Greenberg found that when individuals were treated in a distributivelyunfair way,theystole onlyif the theft could restore their perceived inequity(i.e., if the stolen item had value). When individuals were treated in an interpersonallyunfair way,theystole even if the item was of no value to them. We expect individuals to engage in sabotage both as an attempt to restore equity and as a method of retaliation. However, as in the Greenberg (1996) study, we expect individuals will attempt to restore equitywhen theybelieve theyhave been treated in a distributivelyunfair wayand retaliate when theybelieve theyhave been treated in an interpersonallyunfair manner. Thus, we hypothesize:

H2:. Individuals who feel they’ve been treated distributively unfairly will engage in sabotage behavior in an attempt to restore equity. Individuals who feel they have been treated interpersonallyunfairlywill engage in sabotage behavior in retaliation.

3.2. Target of sabotage

Robinson and Bennett (1995) presented a typology of workplace deviance that identifies two dimensions of deviant behavior: target (who is harmed bythe behavior—individual/organization) and severity(the magnitude of the harm —minor/ serious). This typology allows researchers to organize a broad range of behaviors as deviant (e.g., taking frequent coffee breaks (organizational-minor), theft (organizational-serious)), while maintaining important distinctions between those behaviors. The framework also provides a foundation for systematically examining the relationship between proposed causes of deviant behavior and a constellation of behaviors that fall along these dimensions. Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) distinction between deviance directed at individuals and deviance directed at the organization is similar to a distinction made in the justice literature between structural and social aspects of justice (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Greenberg, 1993a). The former is injustice created bythe organizational system (procedural and distributive justice); the latter is injustice created through interaction with a specific individual (interactional justice). Research suggests that individuals’ responses to injustice are likelyto correspond to its source. Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton (1992) suggest that when individuals are treated unjustly,theymayexperi- ence a need to punish those blamed for the problem. Bennett (1998) suggests that when management’s decisions seem capricious or enforcement seems biased, employees are likely to behave in a hostile fashion toward the individual they perceive to be responsible. However, if theyperceive the organization to be responsible theymay retaliate against the organization. O’Leary-Kelly et al. (1996) submit that aggressive behavior will be directed against the specific target believed to be responsible for the negative outcome. Robinson and Bennett (1995, p. 567) suggest that organizational variables are ‘‘more likelyto influence deviance directed at harming organizations and individual variables are more likelyto explain interpersonal forms of deviance.’’ Thus, we expect that saboteurs will target their sabotage at the source of the perceived injustice. That is, when the source of the injustice is structural (created bythe organizational system), the target of the sabotage should be the organization. When the source of injustice is social (created byinteraction with a specific individual), the target of the sabotage should be the individual. Thus, we hypothesize: 954 M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965

H3:. The target of sabotage behaviors (organizational/individual) will be the same as the source of the perceived unfairness (organizational/individual).

We should note one area of ambiguityconcerning the target dimension. Robinson and Bennett (1997, p. 7) state that, ‘‘The second dimension, individuallydirected versus organizationallydirected deviance, reﬂects the target of the action, whether it is directed at the organization or whether it is directed at other individuals in the organization.’’ However, Robinson and Bennett (1995, 1997) note that the dimension captures who is harmed bythe action. Although one would expect the target of the sabotage to be related to who is harmed, these are not necessarilythe same. Indeed, research on organizational aggression suggests that targets of harm and entities harmed maydiverge, for at least two reasons. First, individuals maydisplace their aggression. An employee may feel unfairly treated by his or her supervisor, but unable to retaliate against the boss and therefore vent his or her anger on a co- worker. Second, individuals mayengage in behavior that, in harming the source of the problem, harms others as well. Construction workers mayfeel an organization does not paythem enough, so theydo not work carefully.However, in the end, the harm to the customer maybe even greater than the harm to the company. The question then becomes whether individuals are more likelyto harm ‘‘innocent bystanders’’ when they target other individuals or when they target the organization. There is little empirical research to guide our prediction here. However, O’Leary- Kellyet al.’s (1996) work on organizationallymotivated aggression provides some guidance. O’Leary-Kelly et al. suggest that when individuals attribute the impetus for their aggressive behavior to factors in the physical environment, their aggression is more likelyto be directed against nonspeciﬁc targets. The physicalenvironment is most likelyto be associated with organizational targets. Thus, we expect that when the target of harm and the entityharmed diverge, individuals will be more likelyto be harmed when organizations are the targets, than organizations are likelyto be harmed when individuals are the targets. We propose:

H4:. When the target of the sabotage and the entityharmed bythe sabotage are not the same, saboteurs are more likelyto harm individuals when targeting organizations than to harm organizations when targeting individuals.

3.3. Severity of sabotage

The severitydimension of Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) typologycaptures the seriousness of the harm that results from the behavior. The relationship between justice type and deviance severity has received little attention in the literature. We know of no empirical research that explicitlyexamines this relationship. Moreover, the research that is most directlyrelevant focuses on deviance frequency(Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), rather than severity. Other researchers’ work is suggestive of a relationship between interactional injustice and the severityof response, but this relationship is not the primaryfocus of the work (e.g., Baron, Neuman, & Geddes, 1999). For this reason, we have tried to cast a wide net in theorizing on the effect of injustice on sabotage severity. Our review of the justice and deviance literature revealed four possibilities. The first two suggest that justice type has a direct or an additive effect on sabotage severity; the last two advance interaction effects. First, interactional justice mayhave a main or direct effect on deviance severity. The extreme examples most authors provide of workplace violence stem from an individual’s perspective that theyhave been wronged interpersonally(Folger & Baron, 1996; Greenberg & Alge, 1998). The research that most directlyaddresses this issue is the work of Skarlicki and Folger (1997), who suggest that interactional justice is a critical factor in workplace aggression. Theysuggest that interactional M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 955 justice generates stronger main effects on aggression than the structural forms of justice (i.e., distributive and procedural justice). Moreover, theynote that interactional justice has been associated with an extreme form of workplace aggression— physical assault (Folger, Baron, & McLean Parks, 1996, cited in Folger & Skarlicki, 1998), a result demonstrated byBaron et al. (1999). The work implies that interactional justice mayplaya direct role in deviance severity. Second, types of injustice may have an additive effect on deviance (McLean Parks & Kidder, 1994; McLean Parks, 1997). This effect reflects the sum of justice types, rather than their individual or interactive effects. McLean Parks and Kidder (1994) propose a catastrophe function or ‘‘Popeye’’ effect for distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice. According to this formulation, when accumulated injustices reach a certain threshold, the employee ‘‘markedly switches to another form of behavior which is quite different in nature from the previous form of behavior (i.e., malevolent as opposed to benevolent).... Once this threshold has been reached, the change can be quite drastic—in the words of the immortal Popeye, ‘That’s all I can stands, cuz I can’t stands no more’’’ (McLean Parks & Kidder, 1994, p. 133). A similar formulation can be found in the literature on frustration and workplace aggression (Martinko & Zellars, 1998). Baron and Neuman (1996), for example, found a relationship between workplace aggression and the number of frustrating workplace changes. A threshold or additive model maybe especiallyhelpful in understanding deviance severitybecause it focuses on behavioral discontinuities in response to justice. Third, there maybe a two-wayinteraction between justice typeand deviance. Greenberg (1993b) has shown that distributive justice interacts with information validityand interpersonal sensitivityin determining amount of theft. In their analysis of workplace aggression, Greenberg and Alge (1998) propose that distributive injustice is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to elicit aggressive behavior. Rather, it is the interaction of distributive justice and either procedural or interactional justice that leads individuals to engage in aggressive behavior. However, Greenberg and Alge’s analysis suggests an important distinction between the effect of procedural and interactional justice. Theynote that there is no research demon- strating a link between structural injustice and active aggression (although theydo not rule out this possibility). They note the evidence is suggestive that active aggression mayresult from the interaction of distributive injustice and sociallyinsen- sitive treatment. Fourth, there maybe a three-wayinteraction between justice typeand deviance (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Skarlicki and Folger examined the effect of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on the frequencyof organizational retaliatorybehavior (ORB). Theyhypothesized that there would be a three-way interaction for the three types of justice. The results supported their predictions. The relationship between distributive justice and ORB was significant onlywhen all three types of justice were low. However, if employees perceived either procedure or interactions as fair, distributive injustice was not significantlyrelated to ORBs. These possibilities inform four competing hypotheses:

H5a:. Individuals will engage in more serious forms of sabotage when theyexperience interactional injustice than when theyexperience either distributive injustice or procedural injustice.

H5b:. Individuals will engage in more serious forms of sabotage when theyexperience multiple types of injustice. More speciﬁcally, sabotage severity will increase in direct proportion to the sum of types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional). 956 M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965

H5c:. Individuals will engage in more serious forms of sabotage when theyexperience both distributive injustice and interactional injustice than when theyexperience onlyone source of injustice or when distributive injustice is paired with procedural injustice.

H5d:. Individuals will engage in more serious forms of sabotage when theyexperience all three sources of injustice simultaneously(distributive, procedural, and interactional). More speciﬁcally, distributive injustice will increase sabotage severity onlywhen procedural injustice is paired with interactional injustice.

4. Method

Procedure

The 132 first-person accounts of sabotage activities in the book Sabotage in the American workplace: Anecdotes of dissatisfaction, mischief, and revenge. (Sprouse, 1992) served as data for the study. These accounts are self-reports, typically 200–800 words in length, from individuals interviewed bySprouse. Sprouse’s sample is not a scientific one. To identifysubjects he distributed fliers, placed ads in newspapers, received referrals from friends, and friends of friends. The book onlyincludes accounts from individuals who did something ‘‘theyweren’t supposed to do’’ at work. Sprouse reports interviewing individuals who did not engage in sabotage, however these accounts are not included in the book. Three trained raters (see below) read the accounts, evaluating and coding each on four dimensions: (1) the antecedent condition (cause) of the sabotage (powerlessness, frustration, facilitation of work, boredom/fun, or injustice), (2) who was the target of the sabotage (individual, organization), (3) who was harmed bythe sabotage (individual, organization), and (4) the severityof the sabotage. If the cause was injustice, raters then coded (5) the existence of distributive injustice (1 ¼ yes, 2 ¼ no), (6) the existence of procedural injustice, (7) the existence of interactional injustice, (8) whether the source of injustice was structural (organizational) or social (individual), and (9) whether the goal of the sabotage was restoration (of equity) or retaliation. Raters were provided with definitions of the antecedent conditions for sabotage that are consistent with the definitions of each provided in the introduction to this paper. For each account, raters identified the primarycause of the sabotage. Thus, onlyone cause of sabotage was identified for each account. If the cause was injustice, coders then evaluated which types of injustice occurred (distributive, procedural, or interactional) and of these, which was the primarysource of injustice. Coders also determined whether the cause of injustice was the result of structure (characteristics of the organization systems like work rules or compensation systems) or was social (interpersonal treatment). Severityof sabotage and who was harmed bythe sabotage were coded according to Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) typology of deviance behavior. Raters used the specific examples provided byRobinson and Bennett (Figs. 1 and 2, pp. 562–563 and 565, respectively) as a guide for determining the appropriate category of the act. The severityof the act was rated on an 8-point scale based on the x-axis from Robinson and Bennett’s Fig. 1, which theytermed seriousness or harmfulness. For ratings of who was harmed bythe sabotage, raters used the y-axis from the Robinson and Bennett figures to categorize the act as harmful to an individual or to the organization. For assessing the target of sabotage, raters focused on who (an individual) or what (the organization) was the intended target of the sabotage episode. Raters were instructed that the intended target might differ from who was actuallyaffected. For example, if an employee sent customers damaged goods to get back at the organi- M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 957

Table 1 PRL reliability PRL reliability Severityof sabotage .77 a Harmed bysabotage .98 Target of sabotage .95 Cause of sabotage .93 Distributive injustice .72 Procedural injustice .79 Interactional injustice .94 Source of injustice (structural/social) .90 Goal of sabotage (restore/retaliate) .94 a This variable is an interval scale. The reliabilitystatistic is Cronbach’s a. zation, the organization would be identified as the target, even though the customer mayhave been harmed. Additionally,coders assessed whether the goal of the sabotage was retaliation or the restoration of equity(as with cause, the primarygoal was identified; a single goal was determined for each scenario). With the exception of severityof harm, all ratings were categorical. Rater training began with each rater reading the Robinson and Bennett (1995) article and discussing the deviance typology with the authors until a clear understanding of each dimension and the examples provided in the figures was reached. Raters were also provided with definitions and descriptions of the antecedent conditions for sabotage, the three types of justice, the distinction between structural and social sources of injustice, and the distinction between restoration of equityand retaliation. Raters then independentlycoded five scenarios. The scenario ratings were compared both across raters and to a ‘‘master’’ coding prepared bythe authors. Raters were then debriefed, and discrepancies were discussed among raters and the authors. The raters then coded five additional scenarios. This round of coding demonstrated substantial agreement both between raters and with the ‘‘master’’ coding, so no additional training was conducted. The 10 training scenarios were excluded from the analyses. The ratings for the 122 remaining scenarios were ana- lyzed. After all ratings were completed, we assessed interrater agreement using Rust and Cooil’s (1994) Proportional Reduction in Loss (PRL) coefficient. PRL allowed us to assess agreement across multiple raters on categorical ratings. This measure gener- alizes manyexisting measures, including Cronbach’s a. For this reason, the measures can be interpreted using the same standards as Cronbach’s a. As can be seen in Table 1, the reliabilities range from .72 to .98 (mean ¼ .88), indicating acceptable interrater agreement for each of the variables.

5. Results

Our ﬁrst hypothesis examined the prevalence of injustice as a cause of sabotage behavior. The results support the hypothesis. Perceived injustice was the most frequent cause of sabotage behavior; it was more frequent than all of the other causes combined (v2 ¼ 4:72, df ¼ 1, p <:05). The frequencies for the causes are shown in Table 2. Of the 122 scenarios, injustice was identiﬁed as the cause for 73. The second most common cause was powerlessness, followed byboredom/fun, frustration, and facilitation of work. (Two scenarios were coded as ‘‘other.’’) Our second hypothesis predicted that when individuals perceived distributive injustice as the cause, theywould engage in sabotage to restore equity,whereas when individuals perceived interactional injustice, theywould engage in sabotage to retaliate. (Here, we included onlythe 61 cases for which the primarycause of 958 M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965

Table 2 Motives for sabotage behavior Cause Frequency Injustice 73 (59.8%) Powerlessness 24 (19.7%) Boredom/Fun 13 (10.7%) Frustration 8 (6.6%) Facilitation of work 2 (1.6%) Other 2 (1.6%) Total 122 sabotage was either distributive or interactional injustice.) As shown in Table 3, the v2 for this hypothesis was significant (v2 ¼ 12:28, df ¼ 1, p <:001). Of the scenarios that reflected interactional injustice, retaliation was the most commonly identified goal. For the cases of distributive injustice, restoration was the most common goal. Our third hypothesis suggested that the target of the sabotage would be the same as the source of the perceived unfairness. This hypothesis is partially supported (v2 ¼ 6:26, df ¼ 1, p <:01). As shown in Table 4, when the source of the injustice was structural (organizational), saboteurs were more likelyto target the organization than individuals. However, when the source of injustice was social (individual), the saboteur was as likelyto target an individual as the organization. Our fourth hypothesis examined the relationship between the target of sabotage and the entityharmed (Table 5). We predicted that sabotage targeted at the organization was more likelyto ‘‘miss its mark’’ and harm individuals than sabotage targeted at individuals. The results revealed a significant v2 (v2 ¼ 10:47, p <:01). However, the results were not as predicted. Sabotage targeted at individuals was more likelyto harm organizations than sabotage targeted at organizations was to harm individuals. Our final hypotheses examined the relationship between the severity of sabotage and the source of injustice. We used linear regression to assess the four competing hypotheses. The dependent variable for each model was sabotage severity, rated on an 8-point scale. The models for testing Hypotheses 5a, 5c, and 5d included the main

Table 3 Type of justice and goal of sabotage Type of injustice Goal of sabotage Retaliation Restoration Distributive 14 21 35 Interactional 22 4 26 36 25 61 v2 ¼ 12:28, p <:001.

Table 4 Source of injustice and target of sabotage Source Target Organization Individual Structural 38 8 46 Social 15 12 27

53 20 69 v2 ¼ 6:26, p <:01. M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 959

Table 5 Target of sabotage and entityharmed bysabotage Harmed bysabotage Target of sabotage Individual Organization Individual 5 2 7 Organization 22 93 115 27 95 122 v2 ¼ 10:47, p <:01. effect terms, two-wayinteractions, and the three-wayinteraction, respectively,of distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice. For Hypothesis 5b, we created dummyvariables indicating whether the raters noted the presence of one, two, or three types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional). This approach allows for nonlinearityin the additive effect of injustice. As shown in Table 6, Hypotheses 5a, 5c, and 5d were not supported. The predicted main effect and interaction effects for these three hypotheses were not significant. Hypothesis 5b, however, was supported. As Table 7 reflects, the sum of the three types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional) was significantly related to the severityof sabotage ( F ¼ 2:89, df ¼ 3, 118, p <:05). Fig. 1 displays the cumulative effect of injustices on sabotage severity. The average severity for sabotage unrelated to injustice (i.e., sabotage caused bypowerlessness, frustration, facilitation of work, and boredom/fun) was 5.74. The experience of one type of injustice increased sabotage severityto 6.02; two typesof injustice increased it to 6.67; and three types of injustice increased it to 7.89.

6. Discussion

This studyexamined the relationship between injustice and sabotage behavior. In general, the results supported our hypotheses. As predicted, injustice was the most

Table 6 Main and interaction eﬀects for type of injustice on sabotage severity Main eﬀects Two-way Three-way model (H5a) interactions interaction model (H5c) model (H5d) Independent variables B B B (Constant) 5.69 (.16) 5.72 (.18) 5.72 (.18) Distributive injustice .43 (.26) .37 (.32) .37 (.32) Procedural injustice .40 (.33) ).18 (.57) ).18 (.61) Interactional injustice .29 (.29) .46 (.48) .45 (.50) Distributive procedural injustice .92 (.74) .93 (.86) Distributive interactional ).29 (.60) ).28 (.65) injustice Procedural interactional ).02 (.72) ).02 (1.52) injustice Distributive procedural ).01 (1.73) interactional injustice F 2.97 1.78 1.52 Multiple R .27 .29 .29 R2 .07 .09 .09 df 3, 118 6, 115 7, 114 * p <:05. ** p <:01. 960 M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965

Table 7 Additive eﬀect of type of injustice on sabotage severity Model B b (Constant) 5.74 (.17) One type of injustice .28 (.28) 0.09 Two types of injustice .65 (.32) 0.19 Three types of injustice 1.22 (.49) 0.23 F 2.89 Multiple R .26 R2 .07 df 3, 118 * p <:05. ** p <:01.

Fig. 1. Relationship between number of types of injustice and sabotage severity. common cause of sabotage behavior. Also, distributive injustice was associated with sabotage behavior aimed at restoring equity, while interactional injustice was associated with retaliatorysabotage behavior. Whereas the source of the injustice (structural or social) affected the target of the sabotage (organization or individual), this effect was clearest for structural sources of injustice. The results also revealed that saboteurs are more likelyto ‘‘miss their mark’’ when theytarget individuals than when they target organizations. Finally, the additive effect of the three types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional) determined the severityof the sabotage. Below we discuss these results in greater detail. The sabotage literature tends to identifycauses of sabotage without exploring their relative importance. While injustice is often noted as a potential cause, it rarely figures prominentlyin mainstream work on sabotage. Put differently,a surveyof the sabotage literature is likelyto leave the reader with the impression that injustice is, at best, one of manypossible causes of sabotage or, at worst, a relativelyminor motive. The results of the present studyare in sharp contrast to this image. Our studyin- dicates that injustice is a dominant cause of sabotage. Injustice clearlywarrants greater attention in the sabotage literature. From a practical perspective, this research is encouraging. It suggests that the primarycauses of sabotage are workplace phenomena that can be managed. Re- search on justice provides useful guidelines for increasing workplace fairness. Sim- ilarly, because powerlessness was the second most frequent cause of sabotage, research on empowerment mayalso provide a useful framework for managing sabotage. This result also has implications for justice research. It is interesting to note that of the potential causes for sabotage, justice, and powerlessness dominated, ac- counting for nearly80% of the sabotage events. As these two constructs share M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 961 common consequences, it could be useful for justice researchers to consider what other characteristics these two domains have in common. These areas maybe more tightlyrelated than we traditionallybelieve. For example, it is clear that both share a common link in terms of the importance of control. We might gain additional insights to organizational justice byconsidering shared and unique attributes of each. Our results also suggest that sabotage behavior can fulfill two motives: restoration of equityand retaliation against a harm-doer. As predicted, distributive injustice was more likelyto be associated with sabotage aimed at restoring equity,while interactional injustice was more likelyto be associated with retaliation. Interestingly, procedural injustice was as likelyto be associated with restoration (8 of 13 incidents) as retaliation (5 of 13 incidents). Apparently, when the structure of procedures is unfair, individuals are as likelyto perceive this as taking from them something they deserve (restoration) as theyare to perceive themselves as being harmed (retaliation). Our results also provide some support for the rational view of sabotage. Sabotage is often conceptualized as being a ‘‘hot’’ response. Thus, we might expect sabotage- inclined individuals to lash out at anything around them. But our results suggest that saboteurs do not randomlyengage in sabotage activities. Rather, theytarget their behavior at the perceived source of the injustice. When the source of injustice is seen as structural, caused bythe organization, the target is the organization. However, the match is not quite as clean when the injustice stems from an interpersonal interaction. Here, saboteurs are as likelyto target the organization as to target individuals. The relationship between injustice and effects of sabotage become muddier when one considers that there is not a perfect correlation between who or what is the target and who or what is harmed. The results for Hypothesis 4 show that in approximately 20% of the cases, the target of the sabotage is different from the entitythat is harmed. However, the collateral damage is nearlyalwaysto the organization. When saboteurs target organizations, theyhit their mark 98% of the time. However, when saboteurs target individuals, 81% of the time theydo greater harm to the organization than to the individual. These results are inconsistent with our generalization of the prediction of O’Le- ary-Kelly et al. (1996). However, in retrospect, there may be several reasons for this. First, O’Leary-Kelly et al.’s predictions were based on the impetus for aggression that stems from the physical environment. When injustice is caused bythe organization, it is likelythat individuals can clearlyidentifythe source —thus making a match between the source and target more likely. Why then might acts of sabotage aimed at individuals be more likelyto harm the organization? An examination of the 22 vignettes in which that occurred reveals three themes. First, the organization appears to be harmed when the individual targeted is the owner or a visible representative of the organization. That is, employees may harm their nemesis by harming the organization that person owns or represents. In this latter case, the target individuals mayultimatelybe made to look bad when the sabotage is discovered. The second theme is characterized byindividuals who withdraw from work (e.g., work slowly, file false work reports, quit) in an effort to respond an unreasonable boss. The third theme is individuals who harm the organization bytaking to an extreme the ‘‘rules’’ that their boss insists upon. This is similar to the idea of ‘‘working to rule’’ that characterizes union slowdowns. But in this case, the individual is reacting to the unreasonable expectations of a single individual (the boss). Theydo not view the organization as the problem. We believe these results are intriguing from a number of perspectives. Theyun- derscore the importance of frontline supervisors and managers to the overall well being of the organization. In an effort to retaliate against such bosses, individuals frequentlyharm the organization. However, it is important to note here that the number of cases of interpersonal deviance was small. Moreover, post-hoc analyses 962 M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947–965 reveal no significant relationship between the source of the injustice (organizational vs. interpersonal) and who is harmed (organization or individual). Our results did not support our prediction that interactional injustice would be associated with more serious sabotage than either distributive injustice or procedural injustice. Nor did theysupport our prediction that the typesof injustice would in- teract to predict the severityof sabotage. However, we did find that distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice exerted an additive effect on sabotage severity: the greater the cumulative injustice, the more serious the sabotage. Moreover, the lack of anytwo- or three-wayinteractions (see Table 6) indicates that this additive effect is blind to particular combinations of types of injustice. The combined results from our four competing hypotheses indicate that sabotage severity is a purely additive function of the number of types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional). This finding differs from that of Skarlicki and Folger (1997). Two aspects of this result warrant attention. First, the Skarlicki and Folger studyexamined the frequencyof ORB. Our study examines the severityof the behavior. It maybe that the additive effect of injustice is most relevant when individuals are considering engaging in more seriouslyharmful behavior. Second, our assessment of justice in this studyis fundamentallydifferent from that represented in previous work. We have dichotomous measures that indicate injustice/no injustice. In other studies, justice can varyfrom high to moderate to low. Additionally, in many cases, we lack information about the other forms of justice. We onlyknow if individuals described the situation as unjust on a particular dimension. We do not know if the lack of discussion of a particular type of justice indicates fairness on that dimension or not. Nonetheless, the additive effect revealed in this studysupports a threshold or ‘‘Popeye’’ model of justice outcomes (McLean Parks & Kidder, 1994). However, as there are manydifferences between our work and previous work (outcome type, severity, and measurement), further research is needed to clarifythe basis for this effect. All studies suffer from limitations and this one is no exception. Our data source is one such limitation; several potential problems exist with this self-report methodology. (We are sampling only individuals who admitted to engaging in sabotage activities and agreed to be interviewed; it is retrospective; it reflects only the saboteur’s perspective of the events; we must sometimes make inferences about motives, etc.) However, we believe it provided a rich, interesting set of data for this initial studyabout fairness and sabotage. In manyways,this approach conforms to that recommended byGiacalone and Rosenfeld (1987). For example, it relies on accounts that were collected outside the work place. However, the results should be considered in the context of the data limitations. Nonetheless, we hope these results provide greater understanding about the relationship between justice and sabotage, and that future research will extend this work in field settings in which the relationships we identifyhere maybe studied more systematically. Interest in the relationship between justice and deviance behavior is growing. In this studywe attempt to increase our understanding of the relationship between sabotage and justice byintegrating frameworks from organizational justice and workplace deviance. We hope our research adds a useful perspective for understanding these relationships, and that our results provide insights to the effect of organizational injustice on the goal, target, and severityof sabotage behavior.

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